Palestinians in Lebanon. The Birth of the Enemy Within, in Khalidi, M.A., Manifestations of identity, The lived Reality of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, IPS/IFPO, Beyrouth, 2010,

1

Palestinians in Lebanon:

The Birth of the "Enemy Within"

Jihane Sfeir

The demographic composition of Lebanon, reflecting the coexistence of a

variety of religious and ethnic groups, raises the question of who, in fact, is the

“outsider” in Lebanese society. The arrival of 120,000 Palestinians in 1948 and their

settlement in Lebanon has been perceived and is still considered as a threat to the

Lebanese confessional state. Yet before the creation of Israel and the Nakba, the Arabs

of Palestine were perceived differently in Lebanon. They were the “rich tourists,” “the

wealthy businessmen,” but also the friendly neighbors with whom the inhabitants of

South Lebanon sustained thriving business contacts while enjoying cordial relationships

and often, family ties. This paper discusses how the events of 1948 transformed the

image of the Palestinians in the Lebanese collective consciousness.

The idea of investigating the image of Palestinians in Lebanon is linked to more

general concepts such as, identities, nationalism and otherness. In this paper I seek to

understand the cultural and political dimensions of Palestinian representation through

public opinion, political and ideological positions, and state institution mechanisms.

In studying the transformation of the Palestinian image in Lebanon we gain an

insight into the construction of territorial, imaginary, or communal frontiers as defined

by the “other.” Considering that each group has its own boundaries characterized by

ascription and self-ascription, for the settlement of 'internal frontiers' excludes or

assimilates the other and contributes to the formation of national identities.1 Identities in

Lebanon are not unified, and after the end of the war, became increasingly fragmented,

fractured, conflicting and tense; never singular but multiple.2

2

In the case of Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee community, the birth of

national identities can be seen as a long process of nation-building in mirror image, in

the absence of a state for the Palestinians and in the presence of a weak state for the

Lebanese. Within this framework, I will examine the impact of the Palestinians on the

formation of identities. The paper explores when, by whom, and why Palestinians in

Lebanon were considered as friends, foreigners, enemies or allies. To reveal these

mechanisms, I will examine the key role of the “other” in the policies of space, place,

and social control relevant to the formation of communal identities.

1. The Arabs of Palestine: Rich Tourists, Friendly Neighbors

What’s Palestine? And what’s Lebanon? The earth is common, the frontiers are

artificial and the relations ancestral. I remember when a wedding took place in ‘Akkā,

the singers came from Beirut and Zahleh and the sword dancers were from Saida… A

lot of men had their wives from Saida.3

For more than 500 years, Lebanon and Palestine /Israel, were part of the Ottoman

Empire. Their territories were divided into sanjaks (districts), parts of the wilāyas

(provinces) of Damascus, Acre, Saida, Beirut, and Mutasarrifīyyat Jabal Lubnān.

Boundaries at this time were constantly changing, and there was no defined

geographical or political space marking the beginning of a state and the ending of

another. The end of World War I reshaped the geography of the Middle East. Palestine

was placed under the British Mandate, and the French ruled Lebanon. The Mandate

authorities fixed the frontiers separating the two countries and reshaped the identities.

In spite of physical boundaries, cross-border migrations lasted throughout the

Mandate years; principally during the 1930’s, Palestine attracted workers from all over

the Arab World. This immigration was economic, and far smaller in number and

different by nature from the Jewish movement animated by a national project.

Simultaneously, Palestine witnessed real industrial growth which attracted Lebanese

and Syrian workers, businessmen, and fiancées. Workers were hired in agriculture and

the war industry. They were given special permits, which allowed them to work and

stay for a temporary period in Palestine, mostly in the northern districts of Galilee.

3

Businessmen established themselves around the ports of Haifa and Jaffa in the prospect

of expanding their trade.4 During the decade before World War II, Palestine was the

main market for Lebanese products, absorbing nearly 50% of total exports.5 This

movement to Palestine was also marked by a female component, representing the

majority of legal immigration (62% of legal migration from 1935 until 1945). Most of

the Lebanese women who went to Palestine and settled were destined to be married.

The majority was Muslim but there were Christians too. Some of them came from

wealthy families, and the marriage of daughters to rich Palestinians meant not only the

bonding of two bourgeois urban households but also the expansion of trade, political

interests, and intellectual relationships. Others who came from the villages of southern

Lebanon, wedded two families and expanded the hamūlah (clan).

During this period, the young Arab elite from Palestine rented apartments in Rās

Beirut, and studied at the American University of Beirut. Prior to 1948, AUB was

considered to be a major centre of political activity, its students came from a variety of

Arab countries, especially Palestine, and debated the independence of Arab countries

and the unity of the Arab people. Moreover, during the summers, many Palestinians

visited Lebanon where they had family and friends. In 1947, they represented more than

50% of all tourists. They rented villas in the mountain resorts, and apartments in Beirut.

Hotels were sold out in Sawfar, cAlayh and Bhamdūn, and the Lebanese economy

gained a lot from their patronage.6

On 29 November 1947 the United Nations voted for the Partition Plan of

Palestine (UN General Assembly Resolution 181). The plan would have partitioned the

territory of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem under international

control. After the vote, tension was growing in Palestine between Arabs and Jews. The

number of Palestinian “tourists” coming to Lebanon reached 30,000; this wave

announced the dawn of the Nakba.

Until this date, the Lebanese represented Palestinians as rich and prosperous.

One Palestinian woman recalls the transformation in perceptions as follows:

A lot of Lebanese thought that we were rich and that one could sweep up money in the

streets in Palestine. They could not believe that we had lost our money. After 1948, we

rented an apartment for a year in Furn al-Shubbāk, but then we couldn’t afford it so we

4

had to move to the camp in Jisr al-Bāshā.7

The degradation of the living conditions of Palestinians made many of them move from

rented apartments to tents and dwellings in camps. In 1949 more than 65% of the

Palestinians lived in houses,8 twenty years later, 67% were living in the camps.9 The

advent of the “poor” Palestinian, and the transformation of Arab Palestinians into

Palestinian refugees, created a new image of this group in the Lebanese consciousness.

2. The Palestinian Community in the Lebanese Sectarian Framework

After the 1948 war, and once the return of the 130,000 exiled Palestinians to

their homes was no longer possible, Lebanese opinion towards the Palestinians changed

radically. By signing the armistice agreement in 1949, the state of Lebanon agreed to

block any attempt to approach or return to Palestine on the part of the refugees, and to

prevent any newcomers from crossing the borders to Lebanon. The consciousness of the

frontiers, the settlement of the Palestinians, and the birth of a strong external enemy,

Israel, disrupted the Lebanese state, created an emergency situation, but also

paradoxically, gave a certain credibility to the fragile government. For the new

Lebanese state, it was urgent to restore public order, and political unity. To understand

this situation one should read the historical context of the moment. In 1943, Lebanese

President Bishārah al-Khūrī and his Prime Minister Riyād al-Sulh became national

heroes when the French arrested them, thereby precipitating international intervention.

Fathers of the independence, their popularity remained until 1946. Their prestige

declined first when in 1947, through fraudulent elections, al-Khūrī brought in a puppet

Chamber which, on 22 May 1948, adopted a constitutional amendment enabling him to

succeed himself. Another puppet parliamentary chamber, fraudulently elected in April

1951, proved to be the beginning of his political ruin. For Sulh, the reasons of his

demise were different.10 One of the multiple causes was the execution after a mock trial

by a military court of Antūn Sacādeh, founder of the Syrian Popular Party (later, the

Syrian Social Nationalist Party) in 1949. After independence, Sacādeh who advocated

union with Syria, had watered down his rejection of the Lebanese entity, declaring that

he would accept it on political and religious grounds, not on national grounds. But the

Nakba in Palestine put the party on the path of radical opposition. Sacādeh wrote that

5

the Arab defeat in 1948 was proof of the bankruptcy of Arab nationalism and caused the

Lebanese government to be suspicious of him and his party. On 1 July 1949 groups of

armed SPP members tried to take over government positions but their coup collapsed in

72 hours. Sacādeh was in exile in Damascus under the protection of Syrian President

Husnī al-Zacīm, and was delivered to the Lebanese government on 6 July and executed

two days later. This event would eventually lead to the assassination of Sulh in Amman

in 1951 by an SPP member.11

Unstable, and fragile economically and politically, the government needed to

strengthen its legitimacy. In this climate of tension, a catalyst became essential to

reunite the political factions and reinforce the central authority. The external enemy,

Israel, served to unify Lebanese civil society, and restored a certain political legitimacy

to the state. The latter reinforced its authority by imposing a state of emergency (état

d’urgence), deploying the army all over Lebanese territory. There was another unifying

element: the Palestinian who was no longer perceived as the rich tourist, but rather seen

as the "other," the displaced and destitute person. As a Palestinian refugee from the

town of Saffūrīyyeh in northern Palestine put it, “In 24 hours we were changed from a

state of dignity to humiliation.” Furthermore, in 1951, while Arab League resolutions

advocated that the host governments should offer full civil rights (but not nationality,

since this could weaken their right to repatriation) to the refugees, no clear definition of

the status and rights was given to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. By

contrast, in Jordan and Syria they are considered, respectively, as citizens or residents of

the host country.

Most of the Palestinians in Jordan were granted citizenship in 1949. The arrival

of Palestinians and the expansion of the Hashemite kingdom to the West Bank,

transformed Jordan demographically overnight from a country of 375,000 people to one

of 1,275,000 people, almost a threefold increase (in 1951-1952, Palestinians represented

around 65% of the total population). This sudden demographic growth had a major

impact on all aspects of life in the new Jordan. Palestinian-Jordanians, were generally

more urban, more educated, and more experienced in political participation, and many

had been expelled from cities to less developed small towns in Jordan. They engaged in

a nation-class narrative of superiority towards Transjordanians. The visible markers of

6

difference created tension between Transjordanians and the new citizens. Jordanian

Christians (disproportionately better educated), especially took offense and felt

endangered by Palestinian competition. Moreover, the Palestinian working class and

former peasants, who were living in the refugee camps, did not partake in this discourse

of superiority. Thus nation and class intertwined in the discourse of both Palestinian and

Transjordanian chauvinists at different periods after 1948.12

In Syria the newcomers had a definite status of permanent residence, they had

equal civil rights with Syrian citizens, while keeping their own identity. Most

Palestinian refugees in Syria came from northern Palestine. By the summer of 1948,

there were about 70,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria, the majority concentrated along

the border area with Israel.13 The legal status of Palestinian refugees in Syria was

satisfactory: the state granted refugees full access to government services. The legal

status of Palestinian refugees in Syria was regulated by the Syrian Arab Republic Law

no. 260 of 1957. The law stipulates that Palestinians living in Syria have the same duties

and responsibilities as Syrian citizens other than nationality and political rights. They

have freedom of movement and are entitled to travel documents. They do not require

work permits, and may be government employees. They have the same educational

rights as normal citizens. Many obtained financial security sufficient to enable them to

leave the refugee camps and purchase houses.14 In accordance with the Casablanca

Protocol of the Arab League, which established standards for the treatment of

Palestinian refugees, they were not granted Syrian citizenship despite meeting the

conditions. For the Syrian government, this decision was made to preserve their national

identity.

Lebanon differed from the two other main host countries in several ways. The

National Pact that serves as the foundation of the Lebanese political system established

a sectarian equilibrium, whereby the President of the Republic must be a Maronite

Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the President of the Chamber a

Shicite Muslim. The distribution of public and political functions in the state

administration were given according to religious affiliation. The pluralistic nature of the

country, where identification by religion is inherent to the political system, clustered the

population by groups, and generated a fixed place for each individual. Identity in

7

Lebanon refers first to religious sect, then to village or town of origin, and finally to the

nation. Consequently, when Palestinians came to Lebanon, they were external to the

Lebanese system of categorization and identification. They were in principle subject to

the same legal status as other foreigners (ajānib) in Lebanon.

In time, the refugee became a potential disrupter of public order living on the

margins of the society, but also an essential element in the formation of Lebanese

national identity because he or she reflected the anti-Lebanese identity. The

Palestinians, the foreigners, the "outsiders" forged their national identity in the ghurbah

(exile) because they felt rejected from the Lebanese space. In parallel, the fragile

Lebanese identity redefined itself in the context of the aftermath of 1948, in particular in

the Arab space, as absolutely distinct from the Palestinian one. In this rough sketch of

Lebanese identity, it appears that Palestinians were there to comfort each group in its

unity and legitimacy in the Lebanese confessional mosaic.

3. Economically, a Heavy Burden

Although the exact size of the Lebanese population at that time is not known, a

generally accepted estimate of the ratio of refugees to host population in 1948 is that it

was 1:10, a heavy burden for any country, particularly one with Lebanon’s unbalanced

economy and delicate sectarian “equilibrium”. Given that 80% of the incoming

Palestinians were Muslims, the size of the influx threatened the political ascendancy of

the Maronite sect, who considered the refugees as a factor that might tip the

demographic and political balance towards the Muslims.15 However, not only did the

Maronites feel threatened by the demographic impact of Palestinians, but so did other

sects, including the Sunnis, who had established a traditional political foundation with a

strong network, and the Shicites, who had difficulties in inserting themselves into the

Lebanese political arena. Economically, Palestinian refugees were considered an

“unbearable burden,” as the leader of the right-wing Phalangist party, Pierre Gemayel

explained in his address to the President of the Republic in 1951:

Palestinian refugees are seeking any labor, they accept salaries that are refused by the

Lebanese workers. Due to this, wages have decreased by 60%, and in many places

refugees have supplanted Lebanese in several occupations. Lebanon is now in a social

8

and economic crisis and Lebanese people need to work…16

Declaring that they constituted an economic burden, the country could not cope with,

the Lebanese government made attempts to dump them over the borders in Syria, in cAbdeh in the north and the Masnac in the east.17 One journalist suggested during the

same period “to send them to Syria or to Iraq, maybe some regions in Saudi-Arabia,

where large spaces are at their disposition, better life conditions, and a less precarious

future.”18 The settlement of Palestinians was unanimously refused; consequently, they

were not welcome anymore, and Lebanese officials, while defending the Palestinian

cause in their speeches, set up a system to monitor the refugees.

4. The Institutions

With the creation of the Central Committee for Refugees in 1948, the Lebanese

government set up a policy that would develop according to internal needs. The first

decision taken by this institution was the prohibition of arms held by Palestinians and a

prohibition on border crossing for males aged between 18 and 50 years, only women

and children were admitted.19 This decision was of course not respected in practice, but

it indicated the official attitude towards refugees in its early stages. But the first major

action undertaken was a census of all Palestinians, an action made all the more

important given that the first and the last census ever carried out in Lebanon was in

1932. With this operation, all Palestinians were registered by the Lebanese authorities,

but no definite status was given to them. The census was conducted jointly by the

League of the Societies of the Red Cross (LSCRS) and the Sûreté Générale.

Though it was a relatively easy task for most Lebanese to identify Palestinians

from their accents, that was not the case for the humanitarian institutions that took care

of the refugees in the early years. According to the agents of the LSCRS more than 80%

of newcomers did not have any proof of identity. This estimated ratio is very high. Of

course many had been struck by the brutality of the events and left their homes without

taking anything. The hijra (exile, migration) was marked by waves and stages

corresponding to different population movements coming from different classes and

places in Palestine. The majority of the urban upper and middle class left with some

personal belongings, legal papers, and travel documents. For the rural population, the

9

brutality of the operations and the rapidity of the expulsion may have led a great number

to flee without taking anything. However, this hypothesis is only partly confirmed in

reality. And it cannot explain the very high proportion of the lack of proof of identity

among refugees. One has to ask the question, who retained an identity card at this time

and why? In France, for instance, the issuing of the first identity cards, dates from the

18th century. The papers were designed to monitor the movements of marginalized

people (beggars, peasants in rupture, and later, labor unionists, and gypsies). It was only

under the Vichy government that the identity card became obligatory for everyone. It

served mainly to distinguish Jews, who had a special document, from other French

citizens.20

Before 1948, in Palestine, it seems that the majority of the rural population did

not possess an identity card. Quoting the mukhtār (headman) of the village of Sacsac ,

who was living in Nahr al-Bārid refugee camp, Palestinian peasants did not carry

identity papers.21 They often registered birth months, and sometime even birth years,

late. The role of the mukhtār was to register and issue birth, divorce, wedding, and death

certificates, but he did not have the authority to issue identity cards. In order to get an

identity card one had to apply to the administrative post in the district capital town;

which often meant a long journey, and moreover, a confrontation with a complex

administration. For the same reasons, many persons in Lebanon did not posses any

identity papers at that time. It was only during the 1960s and under President Fu’ād

Shihāb’s rule that the ID became obligatory. The registration of Palestinians by the

Lebanese government demonstrates the need at that time to distinguish without

ambiguity the Palestinian foreigners from the Lebanese citizens. With the registration of

the refugees, the state monopolized the legal means of monitoring them.

Until 1958, the beginning of President Shihāb’s term, the Central Committee

fulfilled the function of a civil institution. Its role was to issue birth, death, and divorce

certificates, and to issue special travel documents for the refugees. This body reported

directly to the Prime Minister’s office, and controlled all refugee movements on

Lebanese territory. With the birth of the Directorate of Palestinian Affairs under Shihāb,

and the regime of the Deuxième Bureau (Lebanese military intelligence service), the

role of the institution changed. A Palestinian lawyer quoted by Rosemary Sayigh

10

describes the Palestinians’ situation in Lebanon in the following manner:

The policy of Lebanese authorities regarding ID and travel papers has always

fluctuated, depending on the political situation at the time… To take a specific example:

travel documents are issued by the Directorate of Refugee Affairs via the Surete

Generale which issues passports to Lebanese, and which is part of the Ministry of the

Interior. According to the political interests of the moment, the Surete Generale would

be helpful or difficult about issuing travel permits. At one time Palestinians wanting to

go to Damascus would have to wait two or three weeks for a permit; at another time--

which lasted several years--the Deuxième Bureau also had to give its OK. If the D.B.

said “No”, there was nothing a Palestinian could do about it. This lasted through the

regime of President Helou. They did not say to someone we forbid you to travel because

you did such and such, it was simply a “ No” without any reasons…

In regard to work, Palestinians were regarded as non-nationals, and had to apply for a

work permit from the Ministry of Social Affairs. Here, too, there was fluctuation. In

periods of tension, the number of permits would decrease, even though President Shihab

once said in an official speech that Palestinians ought to be treated like Lebanese. But

when we asked when this should be applied, or that there should be a law which would

regulate employment of Palestinians, the authorities always refused to present a text to

the Parliament. They would tell us "It's true that you are treated like foreigners but you

have priority."22

This testimony helps us to understand the official representation of the Palestinians.

They are considered as foreigners, but they have priority of being the foreigners, the

Lebanese government said it would have liked to treat them as nationals but could not,

and the legal attitude fluctuated from a period to another. All these indicators show that

even under Shihāb’s mandate, whose agenda promised to reform institutions,

democratize, and engage in state-building, the state was still fragile. And because of its

vulnerability it needed to strengthen its policy by controlling the space and movement

of the refugees.

5. The Fidā'ī :The Hero, the Enemy Within

11

The presence of Palestinians in Lebanon contributed to the creation of multiple

Lebanese identities, that disabled the formation of a unified national identity. The 1958

war and later the 1975 war, divided the Lebanese people on their position towards the

question of Palestine and the Palestinians. Thirty years later, Lebanon is still healing

from a “déchirure" , in which the Palestinian played a key role.23

Until the mid-1960s, the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon was fragmented,

resigned, and without an adequate leadership. With the birth of the Palestinian

Resistance Movement (PRM), a lot of Lebanese joined the Palestinian cause. Most of

those who came from leftist parties and groups leaded by Kamāl Junblāt, embraced the

Palestinian action to protest against “the reactionary policies of the Lebanese

government towards Fida'eyin action” and to call for “the opening of southern borders

for guerrilla operations against Israel.”24 Junblāt supported the Palestinian national

cause and backed its struggle, considering it as the main national issue in Lebanon.

The impact of the 1967 war was essential to the emergence of the Palestinian

Resistance. In physical terms, Israel now occupied both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

With this, a further 300,000 Palestinians had fled their homes in these areas to join the

Palestinian Diaspora. Thus, by the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war all of historic

Palestine lay under Israeli occupation; over one-half of its population had become

involuntary exiles from their homeland.

In political terms, the failure of the Arab leaders raised more critical questions

about the ability of pan-Arab orthodoxy to liberate Palestine. This political failure was

to serve the expansion of the Palestinian armed resistance. Subsequently, Palestinian

liberation would be conducted accordint to a Palestinian commandment engaging a new

pan-Arab dimension, namely: "Arab unity will lead to the liberation of Palestine and the

liberation of Palestine will lead to Arab unity."25

The Arab defeat of 1967 thus served to expand the action of the fidā’īyyīn, who

were seen as a viable alternative to the failed option of regular military confrontation. In

January 1968 a "Permanent Bureau" of fidā'īyyīn groups was formed upon Fateh's

initiative to coordinate their activities. Further impetus was received on 21 March 1968

when Israeli troops struck at fidā'īyyīn concentrations near the Jordanian town of

12

Karāmeh. The majority of guerrillas did not withdraw but rather (supported by

Jordanian forces) confronted the Israeli troops, inflicting unusually heavy casualties.

The Battle of Karāmeh did much to boost Palestinian and Arab morale which had been

so badly shattered by the debacle of the Six-Day War less than a year before. Thousands

now flocked to join the fidā'īyyīn.

In September 1970, the PLO was evicted from Jordan, and relocated its

leadership and guerillas to Lebanon, where the Cairo Agreement endorsed their

presence. The influx of several hundred thousand additional Palestinians upset

Lebanon's delicate confessional balance, and polarized the country into two camps:

proponents and opponents of the PLO presence. For a number of Lebanese, refugees

became heroes, the figure of the fidāi’ī inspired many revolutionaries whether they were

Lebanese, Arabs, or westerners. The fidā’ī guerrilla fighter and his gun (typically, a

Russian Kalashnikov) were an image and a symbol of freedom, revolution, and power

for Palestinians, but also for all the Lebanese fighters who joined their cause. The fidā’ī

became the pan-Arab hero, hiding in the mountains and fighting for a noble cause26.

With the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement, Lebanon became an

increasingly important focus of Palestinian nationalist activity. Lebanon's position on

the borders of Palestine was a primary reason for this, as fidā'īyyīn adopted cross-border

infiltration as a major military tactic. Although Jordan was the primary theater for such

action, the Lebanese-Israeli border was also useful. The mountainous cArqūb region in

southeast Lebanon, close to guerrilla supply bases in Syria, soon became a major

fidā'īyyīn supply and infiltration route. Within Israel, the number of incidents reported

near the Lebanese border grew from two in 1967, to 29 in 1968, to 150 in 1969.

Ideologically, the Palestinian movement held that the Arab regimes' past failures

obliged them to permit such military activity. In the words of Khalīl al-Wazīr (Abū

Jihād) of Fateh (later deputy commander of PLO forces), Lebanon's importance lay not

simply in the fact that it bordered on Palestine, but that it also reflected Arab political

responsibility for the Palestinian cause:

We believe--and this is a very important point--that every Arab regime around our

occupied territories is responsible for our tragedy, and they have a duty to let us have

our chance to liberate our country because they are responsible. They must pay the price

13

of their crime against our people and their share in creating our tragedy by giving us

permission to be there, to work to organize ourselves and to prepare ourselves for

returning to our homeland. For that we consider that every Palestinian border country

must be a base for our people.27

Lebanon's development as a sanctuary for the Palestinian resistance movement was also

encouraged by widespread popular Lebanese support. One survey of public opinion

conducted in September 1968 by the Lebanese newspaper al-Nahār found that 79% of

the population supported the fidā'īyyīn (notably students, leftists, Arab nationalists, and

Muslims). Further evidence of the mass popularity of the Palestinian resistance came in

April 1968 with the funeral of the first Lebanese Fateh volunteer to die in action, Khalīl

al-Jamal. Between one hundred and fifty thousand and a quarter of a million people

took part in the procession which accompanied the body from the Syrian border to

Beirut, including Prime Minister cAbdullah al-Yāfī, and representatives from all major

Lebanese political parties. For the fidā'īyyīn, such public funerals were a deliberate tool

of public relations, a means of mobilizing mass Palestinian and Arab support after the

1967 Arab defeat: "guerrilla freedom of action" (hurrīyat al-camal al-fidā'ī) became a

major rallying cry in the progressive, Arab nationalist, and Muslim sectors alike.28

For Lebanese decision-makers, however, the presence of an armed and

organized Palestinian resistance movement on Lebanese territory involved a number of

costs. The presence of Palestinian fidā'īyyīn on its territory, their implantation in the

south, and the increasing guerrilla activity at the southern borders, triggered a policy of

mounting Israeli military actions and punishment attacks. These were aimed not just at

the Palestinians but even more so at the Lebanese, in an attempt to pressure the Beirut

authorities to put an end to guerrilla incursions. Israeli cross-border shelling had become

commonplace by 1968, later followed by air raids, ground incursions and helicopter-

borne commando raids. During the most dramatic of these on 28 December 1968, Israeli

raiders retaliated to a Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) attack on an

El Al airliner in Athens the previous day with an attack on Beirut International Airport

that destroyed thirteen Lebanese civilian airliners. During this period, tens of thousands

of largely Shicite peasants fled Israeli destruction in the south to the relative safety of

Beirut.

14

An equally important consideration, however, was the ideological and political

threat posed by the fidā'īyyīn. The obvious domestic popularity of the Palestinian

movement, and Lebanon's particular vulnerability to the currents of Arab politics,

constrained the response of all Lebanese political figures. At the same time, such

popularity, combined with the revolutionary message of many fidā'īyyīn groups,

accentuated the alarm felt by much of the Lebanese elite.

The ideological impact of the guerrillas worried Lebanon's urban bourgeoisie. In

Beirut student protests in support of the Palestinian movement were also directed at

prevailing economic, social, and political conditions in Lebanon. Many of the

impoverished, predominately Shicite peasants of south Lebanon felt greater affinity with

the Palestinian movement than with either their exploitative landlords or the politically

(if not geographically) distant central government. This affinity was reinforced by the

fact that the Shicites of the south had historically stronger ties to northern Palestine than

they did to Mount Lebanon. After 1967-68 hundreds of southerners flocked to join the

Palestinian resistance movement.

If the fidā'ī was considered and seen as the pan-Arab hero by a part of the

Lebanese population (mostly the Muslims), he was also seen as the terrorist, the enemy

within, by another faction of Lebanese. For he was seen as the main disrupter of

Lebanese sovereignty and he was blamed for the increasing Israeli retaliatory attacks on

Lebanese. He was the one building a state within a state, and claiming that the road to

Palestine went through (the mostly Christian) seaside town of Jounieh, north of Beirut.

For the anti-Palestinian Lebanese, the image of the fidā’ī and his kaffīyah evoked

‘terrorism’, ‘violence’, ‘kidnapping’, and ‘criminality’ For he was seen as the enemy

who threatens the unity of Lebanon, and the cause of the partition of the Lebanese state

and population.29 This opposition of visions towards the Palestinian question and the

Palestinian presence in Lebanon crystallized the antagonism between the different

Lebanese communities.

Moreover, the refugee camps were no longer controlled by the State. The

resistance movement assumed the daily management of the refugee camps, providing

security as well as employment, educational, medical, and social services. For the

Lebanese Christians, the control of the camps by the PLO was resented as an insult to

15

the Lebanese army and state sovereignty. But for others they were the places to be,

because it was there that the Revolution was born.

The early 1970s gave way to a fifteen-year period of civil war (1975-90), in

which Palestinians were heavily involved. The civil war opposed rightist, largely

Maronite forces against a coalition of leftist militias, largely but not solely Muslim.

Palestinians fought on the side of the leftists and progressive parties. The period of

Palestinian autonomy came to an end with the Israeli invasion and siege of Beirut in

1982. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon,

resulted in Palestinian political and military containment. The war caused massive

destruction in the refugee camps, two camps were completely destroyed; another,

Nabatīyyeh in south Lebanon, had been destroyed in 1973 in the prelude to the civil

war.30 The withdrawal of the PLO left the civilian refugee population vulnerable to a

variety of militias with explicit anti-Palestinian sentiments. In September 1982 a

Lebanese Forces militia group was permitted to enter two Palestinian refugee camps, in

an area under Israeli army control, and the militia massacred an estimated several

hundred to several thousand civilians. After the Israeli invasion and the massacres of

Sabrā and Shātīlā, things changed. Their erstwhile Lebanese comrades, bitter and

disappointed, progressively disengaged from the Palestinians. The brotherly and

solidarity relationships between the inhabitants of west Beirut and the Palestinians

transformed into fear and mistrust. A woman from Shātīlā recalls that after the

massacre:

The doors of our Lebanese neighbours were shut. I recall crossing Mazracah street with

my family, nobody would let us inside their houses. I don’t know if I have to blame

them finally. Maybe they were afraid of being slaughtered too. They had suffered a lot

from the siege and maybe they considered that it was because of us that they suffered. It

was a very bad experience, a bad memory which left us bitter and disappointed; Beirut

had left us.31 By the mid-1980s, the camps were under siege by the Amal Shicite militia, supported by

Syria. Known as the "War of the Camps," this three year period (1985-1988) of intense

conflict caused extensive damage to the camps and thoroughly traumatized their

inhabitants. Many were unable to leave the camps for nearly three years; daily life with

its patterns of work, schooling, and domestic life came to a standstill as people

16

organized to survive under the horrific conditions of a prolonged siege. Food and

medicines were exceedingly scarce and many of the casualties died from lack of

medical care.32 Reduced once again to their refugee identity, the lāji’īn (refugees) were

slowly disappearing from the Lebanese political scene at a time when they were most

vulnerable to human rights abuses.

6. Representing Refugees in the Post-War Reconstruction: No Place for the

Palestinians

With the end of the Civil War in 1991, the Palestinian community was considered as a

convenient scapegoat for the war in Lebanon. In the post-civil war era, restrictions on

employment, travel, education, health, property, and re-building in the camps were

taken to extremes. The Lebanese government insists on the "repatriation of Palestinian

refugees," or anything that will remove the non-citizen Palestinian population from the

country. This is due both to communal politics and the legacies of past conflict.

Consequently, the Palestinians' great contribution to Lebanese national post-Tā’if

reconciliation has been that "they have taken all the blame for the civil war." Beirut

constantly repeats the mantra of former Prime Minister Rafīq al-Harīrī: "Lebanon will

never, ever integrate the Palestinians."33

The settlement (tawtīn) of Palestinians in Lebanon is a major issue that has been

the subject of agreement and disagreement in Lebanon, agreement on rejecting it and

disagreement about the motives for rejecting it. For some Lebanese the rejection of the

settlement of the Palestinians is motivated by fear for the fragile Lebanese sectarian

equilibrium, for others rejecting the settlement of Palestinians is a sign of resistance. For

the latter, accepting tawtīn implies the recognition of the state of Israel and the loss of the

right of return based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which called for the

return of the refugees to their homes. Therefore, on the pretext that it would be

interpreted as a concession before any future peace talks with Israel, the Lebanese state

refuses to grant Palestinians basic rights. They are not granted civic or economic rights,

or even work permits. The claim is that their integration would render the Palestinians

ineligible to receive aid from UNRWA, the UN agency that has supported them since

1949.

17

As they were in 1951, Palestinians are now often seen as an economic burden,

and a causal connection is often imputed between their presence and Lebanese

emigration. For some Lebanese, resettling the Palestinians permanently is beyond the

capacity of Lebanon. It may threaten its very existence by endangering its natural unity

and economy. They emphasize that Lebanon is a country of emigration and not

immigration and settlement, losing people as a result of war and the weak economy. The

naturalization of transient residents in addition to the settling of Palestinian refugees

would increase Lebanon's population by 25%. No country can absorb such a

demographic change.34 Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Butrus Sufayr has openly

expressed these fears during one sermon: "The peace that is being promised may have

adverse consequences. If the resettlement of Palestinians in vast under-populated Arab

countries is not acceptable then the effects on a small highly over-populated country

like Lebanon would be even more dire." Elsewhere, he added, "Lebanon has suffered

for 25 years because of the Palestinian presence and today we hear rumors that the past

situation is likely to be recreated." For Sufayr, the issue of the Palestinian refugees in

the country is hampering Lebanon's peace and tranquility. 35

This position seems to find a wide backing among other politicians of various

religious and political backgrounds. As early as 1997, Speaker of Parliament Nabīh

Birrī categorically rejected resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon, "a stand not subject to

any discussion or compromise.” He added: "We are all, as Lebanese, against permanent

resettlement, and no one can accept this disaster, this question is categorically rejected

by all parties in Lebanon." Others, like MP Kamīl Ziyādeh, consider that Lebanon will

defeat "the implantation of Palestinians" because of its economic and demographic

repercussions.36

Unanimously, today, all Lebanese agree on the refusal of Palestinian

resettlement in Lebanon. State discourse is also based on this denial. The unanimous

Lebanese rejection of Palestinian implantation in Lebanon is reflected in the post-Tā’if

preamble to the constitution, which states that there will be "no partition and no

repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon]."37 When it comes to the representation of

Palestinians in Lebanon, their presence in the country, the legacies left by the civil war,

and their uncertain future, the Palestinians are cast in the role of unwanted outsiders.

18

Moreover, in the last ten years, the figure of the Palestinian in Lebanon is frequently

associated with terrorism. For the camps are perceived as symbols of poverty and

misery, and at the same time, as shelters for criminals.

7. No Place for Criminals and Terrorists

In the absence of a legitimate Palestinian authority following the Oslo Accords of 1989,

the refugee community is left without aid and without a unified political leadership.

Islamist parties, such as cUsbat al-Ansār, cUsbat al-Nūr, Islamic Jihad, and most

recently, Fatah al-Islām, have taken root in the camps and recruited from among the

poor and desperate. Based principally in the camps of cAyn al-Hilweh and Nahr al-

Bārid, they advocate an Islamic ummah and rail against everything that is not

“Islamic.”38 The presence of these fundamentalist groups in the refugee camps

threatens Palestinians first. The battle of Nahr al-Bārid between Fatah al-Islām and the

Lebanese army in 2007, concretized the threat and crystallized the figure of the

Palestinian as a terrorist in the collective Lebanese imaginary. Vaguely inspired by al-

Qācidah, Fatah al-Islām may have been financed by Syria and was certainly intent on

orchestrating terrorist attacks. The conflict began with the killing of 22 Lebanese

soldiers by Fatah al-Islām, on 20 May 2007 on the outskirts of Nahr al-Bārid and ended

on 7 September 2007. At least 446 people, including 168 soldiers and 226 militants, had

been killed in the fighting and during the 105-day siege of the camp. In addition, 54

civilians were killed in the fighting at the camp and in Tripoli, 47 of them Palestinians.

Most of the approximately 31,000 Palestinians that lived in the camp fled the fighting to

other refugee camps in the country. This battle elevated the figure of the Lebanese army

as the national symbol of unity in times of political division. For ever since the

assassination of former Prime Minister Harīrī on 14 February 2005, and the division of

the Lebanese political class and society into two camps (opposition and majority), the

only times when the Lebanese have been unified were in July 2006 (after the Israeli

attacks) and during the Nahr al-Bārid crisis. One can quote then army commander

General Michel Sulaymān during a commemoration ceremony for the soldiers killed in

the Nahr al-Bārid battle, in Jūniyeh on 17 September 2007: “In unity we defeated Israel

and terrorism.”39 In the first conflict it was the external enemy who played the role of

19

unifier and in the latter the enemy within was the element of national cohesion. In both

cases, the enemy (external or internal) helped to found a political order. In this

perspective the enemy represents a means in opposition to which the political institution

and the state build their existence and guarantee their continuity40.

8. Conclusion:

More than ever before, the figure of the Palestinian is needed in Lebanon. At

times of conflict, fragile reconstruction, and fear of the future, the enemy within

becomes the most significant element in constituting collective identity. The negation of

the “other” is a constitutive element in shaping a national Lebanese identity. Violence

and fear are therefore important factors in constructing collective memories, in their

reproduction and dissemination of a given historical reality, and in their inclusion in or

exclusion from the balance of power. In the case of Lebanon and Palestinian refugees,

controlling the collective memory of both groups is part of the violent and existential

struggle for national survival. The effort to shape collective memory is therefore a

dialectical process motivated by the fear of the other and the wish to negate it. Part of

this process is a complete takeover of the victim’s status, (Lebanese) and the negation of

the other’s suffering. For who is the victim? The Lebanese who consider themselves

victims of the Palestinian presence which led to a civil war or the Palestinians who are

increasingly marginalized in the country? In a way, both groups need each other in

today’s configuration. Both of them have built their identity on fear. The Lebanese fear

Israeli attacks on their land because of an armed Palestinian presence, they fear the

camps because they host radical Islamist movements, and they fear the refugee because

he symbolizes a suffering memory. This fear leads to designating the foreigner, and

reaffirming the role of nationals in the preservation of state sovereignty. This

nationalism built on suspicion and fear of the “other” can only lead to reinforcing the

character of the enemy within, and helps to unify Lebanese public opinion around it. On

the other hand, Palestinians live constantly in fear of being expelled, fear of losing

everything, and fear of the Lebanese state, institutions and society. With this fear they

consolidate their legitimacy as victims and moreover as Palestinians. Any discussion of

the Palestinian presence in Lebanon today should begin from the principle that the

20

refugees should be granted civil rights. But the refugees may also benefit from

strengthening the Lebanese state, making it more confident and at peace with its

tormented past.

1 Frederic Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries,Boston: Little Brown, 1969.

2 Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage, 1996.

3 Abū Khālid, a native of Saida, Lebanon, interviewed by Bushrā al-Mughrabī, January 1998. Quoted in

Taghribat Ahmad wa Maryam, Beirut: Al-Janā, 2000, p.21.

4 Nadine Picaudou, “La Bourgeoisie Palestinienne et l’Industrie,” in André Bourgey (ed.), Industrialisation

et Changements Sociaux dans l’Orient Arabe, Beirut: CERMOC, 1982, pp.347-400.

5 Sir Alexander Gibb, The Economic Development of Lebanon, London: 1948, p.167.

6 The number of Palestinian visitors to Lebanon was 6,300 out of a total of 13,000 visitors. In December

1947, the number of Palestinian “tourists” who visited Lebanon reached 30,000. See Gibb, Economic

Development, p.176.

7 Interview with Nuhād A., July 2000.

8 Yusif Sayigh, Economic Implications of UNRWA Operations in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Beirut:

American University of Beirut, 1952, p.14.

9 Claudine Ghosn, Etude sur les Réfugiés Palestiniens des Camps au Liban, Pertinence d’une Approche

Socio-Professionnelle, Beirut : Université Saint Jospeh, 1973, p.10.

10 Eyal Zisser, Lebanon:The Challenge of Independence, London: I.B. Tauris, 2000, Chapter 7.

11 Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, London: Pluto Press, 2007, pp.114-115.

12 Joseph Massad, “Producing the Palestinian as Other: Jordan and the Palestinians,” Journal for Palestine

Studies,

13 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, second edition, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.248-252.

14 See http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/syria.html

15 Rosemary Sayigh, Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon, London: Zed Books,

1994, pp.22-28.

21

16 L’Orient (Beirut), 16 December 1951.

17 Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, pp.112-113.

18 Le Jour (Beirut), 19 December 1951.

19 Al-Jarīdah al-Rasmīyyah (Lebanese Official Newspaper), 26 May 1948.

20 Jean Claude Kaufmann, L’Invention de Soi, une Théorie de l’Identité, Paris : Armand Colin, 2002.

21 Interview with M. W., 11 July 2004.

22 Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries, London: Zed Books, 1979, p.112.

23 Abū Ridā, a former pro-Palestinian Lebanese Shicite.

24 Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, ch.2 and

ch.3.

25 Palestine National Charter, Article 13, 1968.

26 Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 2007.

27 Khalīl al-Wazīr, quoted in Rex Brynen, Sanctuary and Survival,

28 Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon, pp.152-153.

29 Libanius, Les Guerres du Liban au Fil des Jours, Beirut: Centre Libanais de Documentation et de

Recherches, 1981, pp.250-251.

30 Julie M. Peteet, “Lebanon: Palestinian Refugees in the Post-War Period,” Le Monde Diplomatique,

December 1997.

31 Interview with Nuhād A., Shātīlā, 1999.

32 Sayigh, Too Many Enemies.

33 Quoted in Simon Haddad, “Sectarian Attitudes as a Function of the Palestinian Presence in Lebanon,”

Arab Studies Quarterly 3 (2000), pp.81-100.

34 Nicmatallah Abī Nasr (Lebanese Member of Parliament), Conference on "Palestinians in Lebanon:

Between Naturalization and Resettlement," University of Kaslik, Lebanon, December 1999.

35 Quoted in Simon Haddad, “The Palestinian Predicament in Lebanon,” Middle East Quarterly 7 (2000),

pp.29-40.

36 Quoted in Haddad, “The Palestinian Predicament in Lebanon.”

22

37 For the full text of the Tā’if Agreement, see http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm (accessed

11 June 2008).

38 Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon,

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

39 Al-Nahār (Beirut), 18 September 2007.

40 Carl Schmitt, La Notion de Politique/Théorie du Partisan, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1988, pp.86-87.