PALE hw 010715

In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 568 (AC 1928)

FACTS:

Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment of his IBP dues, hence the petitioner on this case. He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a precondition in maintaining his good standing as a lawyer, to pay and settle his dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and refused to admit full competence of the court in this matter. But after some time in realization, his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his subsequent communication with the court. He appealed that his health, advanced age, and concern to his former clients’ welfare be considered in his prayer so that he can again practice law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.

HELD: YES.

Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to abide entails loss of such privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2) years Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban that “the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not on the vindictive principle”. After contrition on the part of the petitioner, the court finds reinstatement in order.

CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN

FACTSAMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for expelling some students due to having

published objectionable features or articles in the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled students and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUEWhether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics

HELDYES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law for having ciolated the Code of

Professional Ethics.In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho

was already the retained counsel for the students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty. Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were being represented by counsel.

Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel."

In re LAURETA

Facts: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC, complaining about the dismissal of the her case (a land dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution. Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.

Illustre also threatened in her letter that, “there is nothing final in this world. This case is far from finished by a long shot.” She threatened that she would call for a press conference.

Illustre’s letter basically attacks the participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. It was established that Justice Yap was previously a law partner of Atty. Ordonez, now the Solgen and counsel for the opponents.

The letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos (who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself from the case.

Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to “expose the kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice.”

True to her threats, Illustre later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan, charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were also charged of using their influence in the First Division in rendering said Minute Resolution.

Atty LAURETA was the counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complain to the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.

The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.

Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.

They claim that the letters were private communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the court.

Issue: WON privacy of communication was violated

Held: The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.

There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

We re not convinced that Atty Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustre’s letters, nor with the complaint filed with the tanodbayan. Atty Laureta repeated disparaging remarks such as “undue influence”, powerful influence” in his pleadings. This was bolstered by the report that Laureta distributed copies of the complaint to the newspaper companies in envelopes bearing his name. He was also heard over the radio. Lastly, as Illustre’s lawyer, he had control of the proceedings.

SC resolutions are beyond investigation from other departments of the government because of separation of powers. The correctness of the SC decisions are conclusive upon other branches of government.

In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987), a lawyer was suspended indefinitely.

A letter individually addressed to some justices of the Supreme Court is not covered by the constitutional right to “privacy of communication” when the same pertain to their exercise of judicial functions.

To subject the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. “For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful”. (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court’s resolution and claim that the members acted ‘with deliberate bad faith” and rendered an “unjust resolution” in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

VILLAFLOR VS. SARITA 308 SCRA 129

FACTS: Complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The Commissioner assigned to investigate the case issued an order directing respondent to file his answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time alloted to answer the complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his comment. An order was issued requiring the parties to attend the hearing of the case but the respondent failed to appear. A notice of hearing was sent to respondent but again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving the respondent enough opportunity to face the charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the case was submitted for resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to obey notices from the IBP investigators constitutes an unethical act.

HELD: Yes. As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to court orders and processes.

MALIGAYA VS DORONILLA

FACTS: Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel for several military officers. During a hearing, he said “…we had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him (Maligaya) he will also withdraw all the cases. Do with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving pension.” Atty. Doronilla was then charge of misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting in obstruction of justice.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Doronilla guilt of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of canon 10 of the code of professional responsibility.

RULING: by stating untruthfully in open court, Att. Doronilla breached peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only violated the lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of an in court,” but also his acts infringed on every lawyer’s duty to “ never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. He was suspended from practice of law for two months.

Occena vs. Marquez

FACTS:

1. OCCENA seek to nullify order of MARQUEZ:a. “In the matter of testate estate of William Ogan”, in relation to OCCENA’s claim for partial payment of

attorney fees P30,000 (November 2, 1966), fixing at P20,000 (covering March 1963-December 1965) and directing its payment minus P4,000 previously received by petitioners.

b. Order denying motion for reconsideration and modifying Nov. 2 1966 order by deleting the phrase:

i. “direct the said court to approve the release to them as attorney’s fees amount P30,000 minus P4,000 already advanced to them by executrix”

ii. “allow petitioners to submit evidence to establish the total attorney’s fees to which they are entitled, in case no agreement thereon is reached between them and the instituted heirs”

2. GROSS VALUE OF OGAN ESTATE IS P2,000,000.a. OCCENA are the lawyers for estate executrix, Mrs. NECITAS OGAN OCCENA.

i. Have been representing since 1963 ii. Defended the estate against claims and protecting the interests of the estate.

3. EXPEDITE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE:a. 7 instituted heirs compromised with claimants, including co-executor BINAMIRA, lawyers and wife.

i. Partial distributor of corpus and income made to heirs in total of P450,000.

b. Estate and inheritance taxes were settled by executrix (Nov. 6)

i. Requisite tax clearance and discharge from liability was issued by Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

4. OCCENA FILED MOTION FOR PARTIAL PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES (1965) to approve payment of P30,000 as counsel since 1963; authorize executrix to withdraw amount from deposits of estate.

a. 3 heirs moved to defer consideration until total amounts of executrix fees and attorney fees are agreed upon.

i. In July 1966, 5 of 7 heirs filed manifestation, no objection to release P30,000 as partial payment and recommending approval of OCCENA petition.

b. First motion (Nov. 18, 1965) still unresolved, filed 2nd motion for release of P30,000.

i. Deferred by QUIJANO and ARROYO for remaining 2 heirs until all heirs have agreed in writing on total attorney fees.

1. Filed for motion for reconsideration, payment of P30,000 would be chargeable against the fees they and instituted heirs might agree to be their total fee.

a. MARQUEZ order fixing total fees from 1963-1965 to P20,000. i. MARQUEZ denied motion for reconsideration and also

modified lawyer fees to P20,000.

5. OCCENA CONTEND THAT MARQUEZ ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION/ EXCESS OF JURISDICTION:

a. Motion submitted for resolution was only for partied payment of attorney fees

i. Without prejudice to any agreement that might later be reached between them and instituted heirs on question of total attorney fees, yet MARQUEZ resolved the question of total attorney fees.

b. Considering only question raised by OCCENA for court’s determination was of partial attorney fees, they never expected the court to make a ruling on the question of total attorney fees.

i. Consequently, OCCENA did not have the opportunity to prove to total fees to which they were entitled.

ii. Hence, they were denied due process of law.

c. 5 of 7 heirs agreed to OCCENA motion for partial payment while remaining 2 did not oppose the motion.d. MARQUEZ said he based the P20,000 on records of the case but amount of attorney fees cannot be

determined on sole basis of records for there are other circumstances that should be taken into consideration.

e. Contrary to MARQUEZ opinion, the fact that one of OCCENA is the husband of executrix does not deny them the right to fees to which they are entitled.

6. ONLY MARQUEZ IS NAMED RESPONDENT FOR ACCORDING TO PETITIONERS, “NO PROPER PARTY IS INTERESTED IN SUSTAINING THE QUESTIONED PROCEEDINGS IN LOWER COURT”.

7. MARQUEZ COUNTER-ARGUMENT:

a. OCCENA proper remedy is appeal and not special civil action, considering there is already a final order on motion for payment of fees.

b. One of OCCENA is the husband of executrix.

i. Hence, pecuniary interest goes against pecuniary interest of 4 heirs he is representing in special proceeding.

c. There are miscellaneous payments appearing in the compromised agreement and in the executrix’s accounting which cover expenses incurred by OCCENA for the estate- reason why MARQUEZ deleted 1963-1965 from November 2 order.

d. Co-executor BINAMIRA should be included as party respondent to comply with SEC 5, RULE 65 of Revised Rules of Court.

e. Duty of MARQUEZ not to be very liberal to the attorney representing the executrix, who is the wife of said counsel and is herself an heir to a sizable portion of the estate, for it is his duty to see to it that the estate is administered “frugally” as economically as possible.

1. And to avoid a considerable portion of estate is absorbed in the process of such division in order that there may be a worthy residue for the heirs.

f. As special defenses, MARQUEZ alleged that 7 instituted heirs are indispensable parties in this case; mandamus cannot control the actuations of the trial court because they involved matters of discretion; no abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Judge for trying his best to administer the estate frugally.

8. Since SAMUEL OCCENA AND JESUS OCCENA are husband and father-in-law of executrix, NECITAS OGAN OCCENA, JESUS OCCENA cannot oppose claim for attorney fees, thus leaving co-executor (BINAMIRA) as the lone party to

represent and defend the interests of estate. a. BINAMIRA filed for motion for leave to intervene, granted in 1967.

i. OCCENA filed motion for reconsideration of AUG 9 1967 resolution and opposition to BINAMIRA’s motion for leave to intervene:

1. BINAMIRA ceased to be co-executor upon his resignation in 1965.9. Intervenor (BINAMIRA) filed Reply to Executrix’s Opposition and Opposition to Executrix’s Motion for Reconsideration;

filed Intervenor’s Comments on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution (AUG 9 1967).a. OCCENA filed against BINAMIRA, Petition for Contempt asking to hold BINAMIRA in contempt of court.

i. Court required BINAMIRA to comment.b. OCCENA filed Supplemental Petition for Contempt.

i. BINAMIRA responded, asking court to dismiss OCCENA’s motion for indirect contempt and hold them guilty of indirect contempt for gross breach of legal ethics.

1. Action deferred until case is considered on merits. ii. Exchange of petitions for contempt between BINAMIRA and OCCENA.

1. Charge of false averments against BINAMIRA.

ISSUE:WON the Court made a grace abuse of discretion upon modifying attorney fees?Is there a conflict on interest on the testate proceedings considering one of petitioners is husband of executrix?

HELD:PETITION FOR CERTIORARI GRANTED. COURT A QUO IS DIRECTED TO HOLD A HEARNG TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO.BINAMIRA, WHO APPEARED AS INTERVENOR, IS DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND SENTENCED TO PAY COURT P500.

1. On BASIS PETITION OF ATTORNEY FEES:a. GENERAL RULE: When lawyer rendered legal services to executor/administrator to assist in execution of

his trust, attorney fees may be allowed as expenses of administration.

i. Estate not directly liable for his fees. ii. Liability of payment rests on executor. iii. If executor/administrator pays, he may reimburse from the estate. iv. In case of failure to pay:

1. File an action against him in his personal capacity and not as administrator2. File a petition in testate or intestate proceedings asking court to direct payment of fees as expenses of administration

v. *Whichever action chosen, heirs will have to right to inquire into the value, of the services of the lawyer and on necessity of his employment.

2. NO AUTHORIZATION IN THE COURT to fix amount of lawyer fees entitled without according to lawyer the opportunity to prove the legitimate value of his services.

3. IMPORTANCE OF RECORD IN DETERMINING ATTORNEY FEES:a. Whatever attorney fees may have been approved by the Court were result of compromise and were the

written consent of all heirs and of all signatories. The record can reflect what an attorney has done.b. However, in fixing attorney fees solely on basis of records of the case, without allowing OCCENA to bring

evidence to prove what is the proper amount of attorney fee’s they are entitled to, MARQUEZ has committed a grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari. Other factors in assessing lawyer fees:

i. Amount and character of service rendered ii. Labor, time and trouble involved iii. Nature and importance of litigation or business services were rendered iv. Responsibility imposed v. Amount of money or value of property affected by controversy/involved in employment vi. Skill and experience in performance of services vii. Professional character and social standing viii. Results secured

c. An attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.4. BINAMIRA DELIBERATELY MADE FALSE ALLEGATIONS WHICH TEND TO IMPEDE OR OBSTRUCT

ADMINSITRATION OF JUSTICE:

a. Claimed to have duly executed mortgage which in reality is only a proposed mortgage not signed by parties.

b. Record showed only a certain P50,000 loan and not P100,000 as he claimed against the petitioners.c. Stated that SAMUEL OCCENA became president of Bohol Land Transport after making the P100,000

load. Corporate secretary of Bohol Land said otherwise.d. Stated a certain income distributed to heirs when no income existed.e. Said that executrix failed to state assets which are actually gifts or furniture payments to the executrix

personally.f. Mentioned that petitioners and executrix did not pay him when there was a receipt signed.

RE: SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER STATE PROSECUTOR

Facts In the Crim. Case No. 5144, which is declared by Judge Buyser as a crime of homi cide and not of murder, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Am ount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Bagabuyo objected thereto on the ground that the original charge of murder is not subject to bail. Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan favorably resolved the Motion for bail and denied the respondentâ s motion for recons ideration for lack of merit. Instead of availing himself of judicial remedies, r espondent caused the publication of an article regarding the order, in which pro secutor lambasts and lashes out at judge Tan for allowing the murder suspect out on bail. The article also contains misrepresentation about the strength of the evidence against the accused in the criminal case. Respondent admits to have hel d a press conference but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the newspaper article. For refusing to answer, the trial court declared him in cont empt. After this, respondent still entertained media interview in a radio statio n, and in said interview, again attacked the integrity of Judge Tan, calling him a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord d ue process to the people. He was ordered by the trial cause to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and not be suspended from the practice of law fo r violating Canon 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, on scheduled hearing respondent did not appear or informed the court of his abs ence. Issue Whether or not respondent should be suspended for violating the Code Ruling The Office of the Bar Confidant found that the acts of the respondent constitute grave violation of oath of office, and with said findings the Supreme Court agr eed. Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order allowing the accused to post bail. He also violated the same Canon for his disrespect of the court w hen he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that he was studying mahjo ng instead of studying the law and that he was a liar. The SC held that it is no t against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules provide the proper venue and procedure because respect for the institution must always be maintained. Hence, Atty. Bagabuyo was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Rheem of the Philippines v Ferrer (In re: Proceedings Against Enrile...) Facts:The proceeding for certiorari and contempt is an offshoot of the Court of Industrial Relations’ (CIR) denial of motion to dismiss the respondent’s complaint.

The following was filed by the counsel (Atty. Jose S. Armonio) for the petitioner:One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Court's decision in the instant case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .

The Court ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

Issue:Whether or not Atty. Armonio’s statements violated the duty of respect to courts.

Held:

YES. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.” Worth remembering is the attorney’s duty to the courts “can only be maintained by rendering no service involving disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold”.

In the case, the Court felt that Atty. Armonio’s language makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of the SC blindly adhere to earlier rulings without making “any reference and analysis” of the pertinent statutes of the CIR. The statements made by counsel detract much from the dignity and respect of the SC.

Atty. Armonio was admonished by the SC

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel

FACTS:

The first contempt proceeding arose from third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, that the petitioners, who, according to the Solicitor General and based on their submitted and signed memorandum, alleged that petitioners:

To have made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International (such efforts could be accurately called “scattershot desperation”);To have such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners, and petitioners … opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Atty Santiago further alleged that the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel and

And the Supreme Court in the effect:

“Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the “right to reject any and all bids”) can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud…”. Atty. Santiago also filed a motion to inhibit against Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro.

The second contempt proceeding arose when respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and included citing the New Rules of Court Section 1 Rule 51 and that alleged injustice may cut off all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government by invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment after making it known to the World Court. Meads, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion left out was anyway marked by “XS” which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that “it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.”.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

a) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto; Graciano C. Regala; and Associates; and Atty. Erlito R. Uy; are guilty of contempt on the filed Third Motion for Reconsideration;

b) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Juanito M. Caling, and Mr. Morton F. Meads are guilty of contempt on the filed Fourth Motion for Reconsideration;

HELD:

a) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago – YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

For Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto – YES. Fine of P100.00.

For Atty. Graciano C. Regala and Associates – NO. (Took no part)

For Atty. Erlito R. Uy – NO. (Took no part)

b) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago – YES. Additional fine of P1,000.00

For Atty. Juanito M. Caling – YES. Fine P200.00.

For Mr. Morton F. Meads – YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

RATIO:

a) On the Third Motion for Reconsideration

The Supreme Court finds language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. Atty. Santiago pictures petitioners as “vulturous executives” and speaks of this [Supreme] Court as a “civilized, democratic tribunal”, but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Atty. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. Finally, borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of the contempt citation.

b) On the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration

Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have reminded him that “[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.”

Atty. Caling lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. He has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.

As to Mr. Meads, having admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration, he cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer.

CORLETO v ARRO

Impugned in these special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus is the order of respondent Judge dated September 28, 1979 wherein he refused to give due course to petitioners' appeal from an order of dismissal.

The petitioners, as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5170 of the Court of First Instance at Palo, Leyte, presented three witnesses and finished the presentation of their evidence on August 1, 1977 when they formally offered their documentary evidence.

Thereafter the defendants (now private respondents) commenced the presentation of their evidence. The continuation of the hearing was scheduled on April 2, 1979 when the defendants supposedly would present their fourth and last witness.

On that date, respondent Judge issued a minute order dismissing the case because of the "failure of the counsels of the parties to appear". The plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for the reconsideration of that order of dismissal.

Respondent Judge in his order of June 13, 1979 denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration because it was not set for hearing and because "failure of the plaintiffs or their counsel to appear for the reception of defendants' evidence can only be construed as lack of interest or abandonment in the prosecution of their case".

Respondent Judge bypassed defendants' motion for reconsideration. (The order of dismissal was favorable to them.)

The petitioners perfected their appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order of dismissal but respondent Judge in his order of July 20, 1979 ruled that the appeal should be made to the Supreme Court. cdrep

Acting on the motion for approval of the record on appeal, respondent Judge in his order of September 28, 1979 held that the appeal should not be made by record on appeal "since the case was not decided on its merits and (there is) no question of law or of facts to be reviewed on appeal".

In his order of October 22, 1979, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, respondent Judge held that no record on appeal could be filed because no decision was rendered and a record on appeal is supposed to contain the decision under appeal. Respondent further held that the review of the order of dismissal should be made by means of "some other legal remedy".

In the interest of justice and to avoid delay, we have treated the petition for certiorari and mandamus (mailed on November 5, 1979) as an appeal from the order of dismissal under Republic Act No. 5440, a law which took effect on September 9, 1968 and of which many practising lawyers, especially those in the provinces, are not cognizant up to this time.

We hold that the trial court acted precipitately in dismissing the case for nonappearance of the parties and their lawyers at the continuation of the hearing for the reception of defendants' evidence.

In doing so, the lower court caused the plaintiffs to lose their case due to the mistake or irresponsibility of their lawyer in not informing the court that he was waiving his appearance at the hearing and that he was submitting plaintiffs' case on the basis of their evidence.

The trial court observed that plaintiffs' absence at the hearing constituted "willful and deliberate disobedience" of the court's order setting the case for hearing and that the plaintiffs could be held liable for contempt "for obstructing the speedy administration of justice".

What the trial court could have done was to adjudge the lawyers in contempt of court and to reset the hearing instead of dismissing the case and erasing the proceedings already held.

It is understandable why the lower court should take offense for the unexplained nonappearance of the parties and their lawyers at the hearing and why, to vindicate its dignity, it was provoked to dismiss the case and thus teach the lawyers an unforgettable lesson in courtesy and decorum and to make them realize that they should not trifle with the courts.

It is one of the duties of an attorney "to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers" (Sec. 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court). prLL

A lawyer who does not appear at the scheduled hearing of a case without any explanation or justification shows disrespect to the court and the presiding judge. He is guilty of contumacious behavior for obstructing and degrading the administration of justice.

Such behavior is censurable and is bound to antagonize the presiding judge who would feel belittled and ignored. The lawyers involved in this case were evidently inexperienced and lacking in elementary courtesy to the court. They did not bother to apologize for their nonappearance in court.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is set aside and it is directed to finish the trial of the case. No costs.

JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Pairing Judge, Branch 30, Complainant, vs.ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom ("Judge Lacurom"), Pairing Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("respondents"). Complainant charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,1

11.04,2 and 19.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion ("Veneracion") in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos ("Barrientos").4 The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rendered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing judge.

On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution ("Resolution") reversing the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.5 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the court a quo dated July 22, 1997.

Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the 1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137.

SO ORDERED.6

Veneracion’s counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for Inhibition)7 dated 30 July 2001 ("30 July 2001 motion"), pertinent portions of which read:

II. PREFATORY STATEMENT

This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x

x x x x

III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION

1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:1awph!l.net

x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a very questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon. Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2) decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

x x x x

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/mar2006/ac_5921_2006.html#fnt7







[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been established and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the case, all "loaded" in favor of the alleged "TENANT." Clearly, the RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?

x x x x

4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:

THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion? x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and now!

x x x x

6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:

Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is backed up by a Litany of Cases!

x x x x

7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00 to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiff’s HOUSE:

THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.

x x x x

This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight!8

The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself "in order to give plaintiff a fighting chance" and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set aside.9 Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba ("Velasco-Jacoba") signed the motion on behalf of the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.

On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the "very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating" contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.10 In her Explanation, Comments and Answer,11 Velasco-Jacoba claimed that "His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case."12 Velasco-Jacoba disavowed any "conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is rightfully due all courts of justice."13 She rationalized as follows:

x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together, side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x

x x x x

We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks, machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous. They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental errors deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had to call a spade a spade. x x x14








Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize "for whatever mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they] may have ‘stepped on the line and gone out of bounds’." She also agreed to have the allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.15

On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.16

Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis Jacoba ("Jacoba") stopped her and said "O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli." (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in "trusting blind faith" on her husband of 35 years with whom she "entrusted her whole life and future."17 This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law.18

Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring "a personal vendetta," ordering her imprisonment despite her status as "senior lady lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother many times over."19 At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited himself from the case out of delicadeza because "[Veneracion] had already filed against him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and before the Ombudsman."20

The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001 accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance21 and violating

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019").22 The first charge became the subject of a preliminary investigation23 by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City. On the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-Affidavit24 filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt.25 Jacoba complied by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacoba’s statements implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in evidence.26 Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision27 finding Jacoba guilty of contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.

On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro ("IBP Commissioner Navarro") despite sufficient notice.28

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six months.29 IBP Commissioner Navarro found that "respondents were prone to us[ing] offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and disrespect for authority."30 Although the remarks were not directed at Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at "his position as a judge, which is a smack on the judiciary system as a whole."31

The IBP Board of Governors ("IBP Board") adopted IBP Commissioner Navarro’s Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board reduced to three months.32 On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case.

Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision, thus:33

x x x x




















3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and Preliminary Injunction x x x;

4. We filed an Administrative Case against Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same issues we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;

5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the Court of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari case by the Court of Appeals.34 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court’s Ruling

On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacoba’s contention that the present complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction ("petition for certiorari")35 filed before the Court of Appeals.

The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October 2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No. 2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying respondents’ respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that Judge Lacurom acted "with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of the Supreme Court."36

Plainly, the issue before us is respondents’ liability under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.

Neither should the Court’s dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint. Judge Lacurom’s orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an administrative complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a final declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.37

The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.

There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacoba’s responsibility as counsel is governed by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3.Signature and address.—Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him x x x.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.

x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied)

By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.

Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because of her husband’s request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently, this practice of signing each other’s pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, "[s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other."38 By Velasco-Jacoba’s own admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground






for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.39

We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30 July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacoba’s statement pointing to him as the author of the motion.

The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he "trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and monumental."40

Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacoba’s version of the facts more plausible, for two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous, unlike Jacoba’s defense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-Jacoba’s assertion that she had not "actually participate[d]" in the prosecution of the case.

Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the contempt charge against him.41 This petition for certiorari anchors some of its arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacoba’s handiwork.42

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent.43 This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 11.03.—A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

Rule 11.04.—A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his client’s cause. We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created "a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect."44

Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.

Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.45 However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom’s Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.46 The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.47

In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use dignified language but also to pursue the client’s cause through fair and honest means, thus:

Rule 19.01.—A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative cases against Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before Judge Lacurom’s sala. The Court’s attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.










Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases before this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six months because of "his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff’s fees."48 In Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when he failed to file the appellant’s brief, resulting in the dismissal of his client’s appeal. We imposed the penalty of one year suspension.49

As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.50

In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find respondents to have fallen short of the mark.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondentsthat a repetition of the same or similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondents’ personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Balaoing vs. Calderon

FACTS:

1. SEVERAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST BALAOING.a. BALAOING vs. JUDGE DOJILLO

i. Balaoing was required to show why he should not be disciplinarily dealt for suppressing certain material facts of which he was charged with knowledge and for having engaged in forum-shopping.

ii. Balaoing’s motion for reconsideration was denied, his explanation was declared unsatisfactory and he was severely censured for having instituted a patently unfounded and frivolous admin action and warned that the commission of same conduct will be dealt more severely.

b. BALAOING vs. JUDGE MALIWANAG

i. Grave misconduct for failure and regusal to issue corresponding write of action (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion in civil case, ZABALA vs. BUENO.

ii. Balaoing’s use of unsavory, defamatory and offensive language against Judge brought dismissal to the complaint, 1-year suspension and P1000 fine for violation of canons.

c. 2 MORE COMPLAINTS: CALDERON AND MALIWANAG.

i. BALAOING: filed complaint against CALDERON for grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in administration of justice.

1. CALDERON does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory; practice of Judge to automatically grant postponements and deferment of hearing of cases to a later hour whenever his OIC makes a manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer or party called up requesting that his case be postponed.

2. Judge drinks a lot and fraternizes openly.3. Delayed cases:a. Allowed defendants to keep postponing hearings more than 1 year.b. Cahoots with deputy sheriff, unlawfully prevented implementation of writ of Possession.4. Charged both CALDERON AND OIC, MANIAGO with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and malicious delay in admin

of justice.5. OIC MANIAGO alleges BALAOING calling her notorious, swindler, insane.

ii. CALDERON: Balaoing won a foreclosure case and became the highest bidder in the public auction, Certificate of Sale was issued and registered.

1. He prevented the writ of Possession dude to prejudice.




a. Gavilan’s widow (former owner), Alice and children were residing in the properties; period to redeem the properties had not yet expired.

2. When redemption period elapsed, he issued write of possession but up to present time, Balaoing has not yet taken possession and showed his disinterest.

iii. MALIWANAG denied BALAOING allegation, judgment is based on equity and justice against injustice by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from Baguio.

ISSUE:WON Balaoing’s admin complaints hold merit? NO.Is Balaoing guilty of gross misconduct? YES.

HELD:ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS DISMISSED. BALAOING DISBARRED.

1. CANON 11: Lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

a. Rule 11.03: Lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before Courts.

b. Rule 11.04: Lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by record or have no materiality to the case.

2. Complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material allegations of fact, substantiated by evidence.

3. RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORP. & ATTY. TACORDA v. ATTY. CAMACHO4. (A.C. No. 6403, August 31, 2004)5. FACTS:On September 3, 1998, Sisenando Singson, represented by herein respondent Atty.Manuel N. Camacho,

filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaintagainst herein complainant Rudecon Management Corporation for damages and reconveyance,docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. The case was originally raffled to Branch 79, RTC,Quezon City but was eventually re-raffled to Branch 85 of the same court. On September 21,1998, Singson, again represented by Atty. Camacho, filed with Branch 78, RTC, Quezon City a

6. Motion for Intervention (With Attached Answer in Intervention With Affirmative Defenses andCompulsory Counterclaim) in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, entitled, Rudecon ManagementCorporation,plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon M. Veluz, defendant-appellant, a case for unlawfuldetainer on appeal before said court. On October 1, 1998, Rudecon filed a motion before Branch78 seeking to cite Singson and his counsel, Atty. Camacho, for contempt for having allegedlyviolated the rule against forum shopping. And the court, in its dispositive portion found themguilty. On the basis of the above-cited order, Rudecon and Tacorda filed the instant complaintfor disbarment or suspension against Atty. Camacho.

7. ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is liable for violation of Canon 10 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility.

8. HELD:Although respondent was held to be guilty in forum shopping, the court agreed withrespondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court by concealing thependency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 in Branch 79 when they filed the Motion forIntervention and Answer in Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 in Branch 78. Indeed, thefirst paragraph of the said Answer in Intervention shows that respondent and his client called the

9. trial court’s attention with respect to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q10. -98-35444. Hereincomplainant, which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-11. 35326, does not dispute respondent’s12. allegation that the latter and his client attached to their Answer in Intervention a copy of theircomplaint in Civil

Case No. Q-98-35444. Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for his having allegedly violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, however, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspensionagainst lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burdenof proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer mustshow the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof. In the presentcase, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that respondentwillfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct in violationof the standards of honesty as provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility whichwould have warranted the imposition of administrative sanction against him.Wherefore, Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 dated February 27, 2004 of the Integrated Barof the

Philippines is SET ASIDE and the instant administrative case filed against Atty. ManuelN. Camacho is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Baja vs. Macandog/Munez

FACTS:BAJA INSTITUTED A CIVIL CASE, CONTRACT AND DAMAGES AGAINST MUNEZ

One of the conditions in the contract of lease (Baja-lessor and Munez-lessee), MUNEZ should pay the real estate taxes of the leased land; and this same condition was re-stated in their second contract of lease.

i. MUNEZ failed to pay the taxes P4,000 and still refused to pay despite demand.MUNEZ FILED A “MANIFESTATION” SAID HE ALREADY PAID THE REALTY TAXES (with evidence)

MACANDOG DISMISSED THE CASE.BAJA FILED FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND EX PARTE MOTION TO DECLARE THE DEFENDANT IN

DEFAULT AND TO DISQUALIFY, PRESIDEING JUDGE (MACANDOG).Baja failed to appear in the hearing.MACANDOG ordered in contempt of court and required him to explain in 72 hours why he should not be

punished.Two motions are “highly contemptuous and libelous”.

i. Baja failed to submit explanations. ii. MACANDOG FOUND HIM GUILTY OF CONTEMPT, ORDERED HIS ARREST AND 6 MONTHS IMPRISONMENT.1. Baja filed notice of appeal from the order with court a quo for purpose of elevating the case to SC on question of law, but the case never elevated.4. BAJA WROTE TO JUDGE WHILE IN JAIL’1. ISNT THIS A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF NON SEQUITOR? i. “Interested in Spec. Proc. No. X-315 “in the matter of intestate estate of late Agustin Gutierrez Sr.,” because it is a revelation of ignorance of law, incompetence and perhaps, bribery since you have already received the Order of Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, requiring you.1. Does he have a service eligibility required by SC to return the P50,000 to the intestate estate?” ii. “… as you are living in the ivory tower… and many lawyers here are already wise to your dubious if not nefarious ways…. As for myself and at my age, you and your husband can never intimidate me, anytime anywhere, although you two remind me since long ago of Bonnie and Clyde!”1. MACANDOG FOUND LETTER TO BE SLANDEROUS AND LIBELOUS.a. Issued an order requiring Baja to show cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt.b. BAJA filed a “Manifestation” stating there is nothing to explain.c. MACANDOG declared contempt of court ordering his arrest and incarceration until he obeys the court order requiring him an explanation.5. BAJA ASSERTS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION1. Excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:WON BAJA’S OBJECTION TO ORDER (one that allowed him to be arrested) DISMISSING HIS COMPLAINT WAS WITH MERIT? YES.

HELD:CERTIORARI GRANTED, quashing the warrant of arrest and declaring NULL and VOID order (sentence imposing 6-month imprisonment for direct contempt, and sentence imposing indefinite period of imprisonment for indirect contempt). TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IS MADE PERMANENT. Order is MODIFIED FROM IMPRISONMENT TO REPRIMAND for the offensive and disrespectful statements in Baja’s letter and motions.

1. FUNDAMENTAL RULE OF PROCEDURE: When civil complain is filed in court, defendant is required to answer complaint or in alternative, may file motion to dismiss within the time of pleading. MUNEZ DID NEITHER and yet, MACANDOG DISMISSED THE CASE upon a mere “manifestation” making the dismissal highly irregular and improper.

1. Court cannot dismiss case without tending to petitioner’s right to be heard. i. EXCEPT:1. If plaintiff fails to appear before court at time of trial.2. If he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable amount of time.3. If court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.2. “Manifestation” can be considered as a Motion to Dismiss on ground of payment, Macandog erred in dismissing without

giving Baja a chance to present evidence to disprove the motion.1. There must be hearing, where Motion to Dismiss may be approved or disapproved.

2. EXCEPTIONS:3. Motion to Dismiss is based on failure to state cause of action.4. Courts may dismiss a case sua sponte (on their own accord)3. BAJA HAD VALID CAUSE TO COMPLAIN BY REASON OF UNWARRANTED DISMISS OF HIS COMPLAINT.1. “there is nothing to explain for indirect contempt there must be first a charge in writing to be filed and that the

accused must be given the opportunity to be heard by himself or counsel” i. Baja was in effect complying with the Order requiring him to explain why he should not be punished.2. Power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly, only in cases of clear refusal to obey and not on the

vindictive principle; with the corrective rather than retaliatory idea of punishment.4. Macandog did not elevate the case, thereby depriving Baja opportunity to have the order reviewed by high court.2. Punishment of imprisonment on indirect contempt cannot exceed 10 days. 6 months imprisonment is imposable

only incases of indirect contempt against a superior court and after charge and hearing.5. A judged should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his

duties.2. Lawyers are charged with basic duty to observe and maintain respect due to court of justice and judicial offers.They should be fair, courteous, circumspect not petulant/combative in their dealings with courts.

RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORP. & ATTY. TACORDA v. ATTY. CAMACHO(A.C. No. 6403, August 31, 2004)FACTS:On September 3, 1998, Sisenando Singson, represented by herein respondent Atty.Manuel N. Camacho, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaintagainst herein complainant Rudecon Management Corporation for damages and reconveyance,docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. The case was originally raffled to Branch 79, RTC,Quezon City but was eventually re-raffled to Branch 85 of the same court. On September 21,1998, Singson, again represented by Atty. Camacho, filed with Branch 78, RTC, Quezon City aMotion for Intervention (With Attached Answer in Intervention With Affirmative Defenses andCompulsory Counterclaim) in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, entitled, Rudecon ManagementCorporation,plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon M. Veluz, defendant-appellant, a case for unlawfuldetainer on appeal before said court. On October 1, 1998, Rudecon filed a motion before Branch78 seeking to cite Singson and his counsel, Atty. Camacho, for contempt for having allegedlyviolated the rule against forum shopping. And the court, in its dispositive portion found themguilty. On the basis of the above-cited order, Rudecon and Tacorda filed the instant complaintfor disbarment or suspension against Atty. Camacho.ISSUE:Whether or not Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is liable for violation of Canon 10 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility.HELD:Although respondent was held to be guilty in forum shopping, the court agreed withrespondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court by concealing thependency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 in Branch 79 when they filed the Motion forIntervention and Answer in Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 in Branch 78. Indeed, thefirst paragraph of the said Answer in Intervention shows that respondent and his client called thetrial court’s attention with respect to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. Hereincomplainant, which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, does not dispute respondent’sallegation that the latter and his client attached to their Answer in Intervention a copy of theircomplaint in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for his having allegedly violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, however, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspensionagainst lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burdenof proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer mustshow the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof. In the presentcase, complainant failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show that respondentwillfully and deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct in violationof the standards of honesty as provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility whichwould have warranted the imposition of administrative sanction against him.Wherefore, Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 dated February 27, 2004 of the Integrated Barof the Philippines is SET ASIDE and the instant administrative case filed against Atty. ManuelN. Camacho is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ROXAS VS. CA NO. L-76549 DEC. 10, 1987

Facts:

On October 21, 1985, petitioner filed a notice of appeal. In the Resolution of October 25, 1985, the court a quo directed the ventilation of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals as the notice of appeal

was filed within the reglementary period. On January 29, 1986, petitioners were notified by the respondent Court of Appeals to pay the docket fee and on March 7, 1986, petitioners were required to file appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt thereof, copy of which was received by petitioners on March 18, 1986.

On April 28, 1986, petitioners filed their first motion for extension of time for thirty (30) days counted from May 2, 1986 within which to file their brief. Said motion was granted per Resolution of May 7, 1986, counted from notice thereof copy of which was received by petitioners counsel on May 14, 1986. On May 29, 1987, petitioners filed a second motion for extension of time for another period of thirty (30) days on the ground that petitioners' counsel is suffering from asthma and hypertension and that their brief has not yet been completely finished in draft form. Per Resolution of June 6, 1986, respondent court granted the motion counted from notice thereof copy of which was received by petitioners, counsel on June 23, 1986. Then, on July 21, 1986, two (2) days before the expiration of the 30-day period granted, petitioners filed their last motion for extension of time praying for fifteen (15) days counted from notice.

Issues: Whether or not there was delay on the part of the petitioners

Held: Yes. Let this serve as warning among members of the Philippine bar who take their own sweet time with their cases if not purposely delay its progress for no cogent reason. It does no credit to their standing in the profession. More so when they do not file the required brief or pleading until their motion is acted upon. Not only should they not presume that their motion for extension of time will be granted by the court much less should they expect that the extension that may be granted shall be counted from notice. They should file their briefs or pleadings within the extended period requested. Failing in this, they have only themselves to blame if their appeal or case is dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SAMBAJON VS. SUING

Facts:

Herein complainants are the complaints in a NLRC case entitled Microplast Inc Workers Union v. Microplast Inc for ULP (Unfair labor practice) and illegal dismissal. Respondent was the counsel for the respondents in the case. The labor arbiter dismissed the illegal strike case and declared the employer-clients of respondent guilty of ULP.

On the basis of individual release waiver and quitclaims purportedly signed and sworn to by 7 complainants, the labor arbiter dismissed said case insofar as the 7 complainants were concerned.

Herein complainants, 4 of the 7 who allegedly executed the quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the arbiter the documents or having received the considerations therefor. Complainants also filed a criminal complaint for falsification against respondent.

The IBP commissioner recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded with warning.

The IBP board of governors approved and adopted the recommendation of the commissioner. One of the complainants assailed the IBP resolution. The petition was filed 3 days after the 15 day period to assail the resolution.

Issues: Whether or not herein lawyer violated Canon 12 of the code of professional responsibility

Held: Yes. As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jose A. Suing, is found GUILTY of negligence and gross misconduct and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Six (6) Months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Re: AGRIPINO A. BRILLANTES

On July 18, 1972, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case 657, was filed with the Court of First Instance of Abra, by the spouses Melchor and Valentina Bernardez against the spouses Joaquin and Angustia Balmaceda for recovery of a parcel of land which said complainants allegedly acquired from Tranquilina Vda. de Pabalan under a deed of sale, dated September 18, 1969, registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Abra on September 30, 1969.

At the pre-trial conference of the above Civil Case 657 on September 13, 1972, the defendants, thru their counsel, the herein respondent Brillantes, claimed that they were not the real parties in interest. They exhibited a duplicate copy of a deed of sale dated April 13, 1969 of the land in dispute executed by Tranquilina Vda. de Pabalan in favor of Dr. Restitute Balmaceda, an alleged son of the defendants, which was notarized by the respondent Brillantes. Due to that manifestation, Dr. Balmaceda was named as an additional defendant in Civil Case 657.

On January 8, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts, based on that stipulation and the various documentary evidences presented by both parties, the trial court, with Judge Leopoldo B. Gironella presiding, rendered its decision, dated February 7, 1973, declaring the plaintiffs as the true and lawful owners of the land in dispute. Based on his observations that the second copy of deed of sale the acknowledgment of Atty. Agripino Brillantes is mutilated or cut-off, making it appear as an unnotarized document.

Thereafter Atty Bringas, nephew of the defendants, filed two sworn complaints agains Atty. Brillantes alleging that the latter notarized a deed of sale of real property without being commissioned as a notary public. Prior to the filing of the charges by the fiscal, Atty. Bringas filed an unverified motion in the sala of Judge Gironella praying that Atty. Brillantes be suspended from the practice of law in view of the "strong prima facie cases" found against him.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Bringas was in violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of professional responsibility.

Held: Yes. What made the respondent's pretensions unpardonable, however, was his act of presenting to this Court spurious and falsified evidence of his alleged commission. Instead of accepting his misdeeds and asking for leniency, the respondent chose to sow even more falsehood. The alacrity of the respondent in foisting deception on this Court is, in the perspective of his long years in the Bar, a manifest sign that as the respondent has gained in age, he has veered further away from life's virtues. By his persistent disregard of the lawyer's credo "to do no falsehood, nor

consent to the doing of any in court," the respondent has demonstrated beyond cavil that he is not fit and worthy to continue in the distinguished and exalted calling of the Bar.

In view of all the foregoing, this Court does not consider it necessary to resolve the additional issues raised in the supplemental complaints of Atty. Bringas.

ACCORDINGLY, Agripino A. Brillantes of Bangued, Abra is hereby disbarred. This decision shall be immediately executory.

.

PALE hw 010715

Documents