Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Volume XLV 2013 OFFPRINT FROM

Joshua Wilburn

that act as independent sources of motivation Other commenta-tors have argued that Plato shifted towards a bipartite division of thesoul into a rational and a non-rational part According to a recentversion of this line of interpretation defended by Maria Sassi themain innovation in Platorsquos moral psychology in the Laws is that theintermediate psychological element the thumoeides is missing Onher view Plato no longer endorses the idea of an educable spiritedpart of the soul that can be utilized for moral development Spir-ited motivations are present in the soul but they no longer play theelevated role that they did in the Republic they are simply so manyamong our irrational desires and emotions alongside our appetitiveurges

I will argue against these developmentalist views that the tripar-tite theory of the soul remains intact in the Laws and that althoughtripartition is not explicitly endorsed it informs much of the con-tent of the text from beneath the surface In particular I will arguethat the thumoeides continues to act as a distinct psychic source ofemotion desire and motivation and that moral education in theLaws should be understood as aiming primarily at the spirited partof the soul In Section I will clear the way for my account byaddressing some of the main arguments offered by Bobonich andSassi In Sections and I will examine the musical and gym-nastic programmes of the Laws and will highlight parallels to theaccounts of the thumoeides and its role in the psychology of moraleducation that are offered in Republic and Timaeus (where triparti-tion is also advocated) Finally in Sections and I will examinethe educational role given to the laws themselves in Magnesia andwill suggest that the education provided through them is largely dir-ected at the spirited part of the soul as well My conclusion will bethat despite initial appearances the thumoeides continues to play an

Utopia What makes lsquonon-rationalrsquo desires and emotions non-rationalaccording to Bobonich is that although they all involve applications of reasoningthey involve partial or incomplete applications of it Impetuous anger for exampleinvolves a sensitivity to some but not all relevant rational considerations about aperceived injustice (ibid ndash)

See W W Fortenbaugh Aristotle on Emotion (London ) ndash T MRobinsonPlatorsquos Psychology (Toronto ) MM Sassi lsquoThe Self the Souland the Individual in the City of the Lawsrsquo [lsquoSelf rsquo] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philo-sophy () ndash D A Rees lsquoBipartition of the Soul in the Early AcademyrsquoJournal of Hellenic Studies () ndash and perhaps A Laks lsquoLegislation andDemiurgy On the Relationship between Platorsquos Republic and Lawsrsquo Classical An-tiquity () ndash at lsquoSelf rsquo

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

important positive rolemdashindeed an expanded rolemdashin moral deve-lopment in the Laws it is no longer simply the ally of reason butalso the ally of law itself

Tripartition in the Laws

One of the key passages to which commentators such as Bobonichand Sassi appeal in arguing for Platorsquos abandonment of tripartitionis the image of the puppet that is offered at Laws ndash Thepassage occurs in the course of the Athenian Visitorrsquos attempt toexplain the notion of being lsquostrongerrsquo or lsquoweakerrsquo than oneselfmdashanotion that he takes to be central to his discussion of education Weare all like divine puppets he suggests pulled in opposite directionsby the lsquocordsrsquo within us we are pulled towards vice by our lsquoironrsquocordsmdashwhich are associated with pleasure and pain feelings of an-ger (thumoi) sexual desires and other non-rational impulsesmdashandwe are pulled towards virtue by the lsquogoldenrsquo cord associated withreasoning and law ( ndash ) Many commentators have em-phasized the fact that in this passage no qualitative distinction ismade among the various types of non-rational impulses Thereare simply iron cords on the one hand and the golden cord on theother and as Bobonich puts it lsquoPlato makes no room here for sil-

The issue of whether Plato abandons the theory of tripartition in the Laws ishighly contentious Against the developmentalists L Brisson lsquoSoul and State inPlatorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoSoulrsquo] in R Barney T Brennan and C Brittain (eds) Plato and theDivided Self [Divided] (Cambridge ) ndash (and cf L Brisson lsquoEthics andPolitics in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoEthicsrsquo] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ()ndash at )MMMackenziePlato on Punishment [Punishment] (Berkeley ) and T J Saunders lsquoThe Structure of the Soul and the State in Platorsquos LawsrsquoEranos () ndash argue that tripartition is still present in the Laws C KahnlsquoFrom Republic to Lawsrsquo [lsquoLawsrsquo] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy ()ndash at ndash and R Kamtekar lsquoPsychology and the Inculcation of Virtue inPlatorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoPsychologyrsquo] in C Bobonich (ed) Platorsquos Laws A Critical Guide[Guide] (Cambridge ) ndash at ndash argue somewhat more neutrally thattripartition is compatible with the puppet passage and the moral psychology of theLaws even if it is not explicitly advocated in the text

Or at least (so as not to beg the question against Bobonich) impulses that wereattributed to non-rational parts of the soul in earlier dialogues

D Frede lsquoPuppets on Strings Moral Psychology in Laws Books and rsquo inBobonich (ed) Guide ndash at for example remarks lsquoThere is no functionaldistinction between the two unreasoning strings of pleasure and pain as there isbetween the two lower partshorses with the better part acting as an ally of reasonagainst the powerful pull of the appetitesrsquo Cf Sassi lsquoSelf rsquo

Joshua Wilburn

ver cordsrsquo In the puppet passage thumos is included indiscrimi-nately among the recalcitrant and disruptive irrational forces thatpull against reasoning Given the emphatic contrast between spir-ited emotion and appetitive desire in Republic and Timaeus andgiven the important moral role granted to the thumoeides in thosetexts this seems surprising Moreover as Sassi rightly points outcomments on spirited anger throughout the Laws confirm its lowstatus thumos is treated as a lsquotyrannicalrsquo force that can motivatecriminal behaviour ( ) and even parricide ( ) it can leadto ignorance ( ) or madness ( ) and it is a force that needsto be minimized or extinguished ( ) In short spirited angeror thumos is far from making a reliable contribution to individualvirtue in the Laws On the contrary it is treated as a potentiallysignificant threat to virtue lsquoAlthough in the Laws Plato continuesto attribute to thumos an important role in moral psychologyrsquo Sassiconcludes lsquoin this text his attention is focused more on its irrationaland uncontrollable manifestations which make it a decidedly un-likely candidate for that alliance with reason which is hinted at inboth the Republic and Timaeusrsquo

Utopia In Utopia ndash and in C Bobonich lsquoAkrasia and Agency inPlatorsquos Laws and Republicrsquo [lsquoAgencyrsquo] Archiv fuumlr Geschichte der Philosophie () ndash at ndash Bobonich offers a detailed interpretation of the puppet pas-sage in support of his developmentalist thesis about Platorsquos moral psychology Bo-bonich emphasizes the fact that none of the puppetrsquos affections is described as beinglsquoagent-likersquo the iron cords are not described as soul-parts with their own psycho-logical lives but rather they all seem to be occurrent mental states of some kind(lsquoAgencyrsquo ) I confront Bobonichrsquos interpretation of the passage in J WilburnlsquoAkrasia and Self-Rule in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash and offer my own alternative reading of it lsquoSelf rsquo Ibid R F Stalley lsquoJustice in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo in L Brisson and S Scolnicov

(eds) Platorsquos Laws From Theory into Practice (Proceedings of the VI SymposiumPlatonicum Sankt Augustin ) ndash at n agrees that in the Laws spir-ited motivation does not have the same psychological role that it had in the RepubliclsquoIn the Republic it is the positive role of spirit that is emphasized its task is to cometo the aid of reason and help it overcome the temptations of appetite In the Lawson the other hand it appears in a negative role as the source of irrational passionswhich oppose the reasonrsquo Cf Bobonich Utopia Brisson who argues that theLaws accepts tripartition none the less agrees that lsquoin the Laws spirit displays aprimarily negative role Anger is a source of vicious behaviour a negative forcethat needs to be moderated by gentlenessrsquo (lsquoSoulrsquo ndash) He also remarks that lsquowehear so littlersquo of thumos in the Laws (ibid ) While Brisson does acknowledge twolimited positive uses of spirit in theLawsmdashfirst when entering into a competition inthe practice of virtue (cf comments in sect below) and second when channellingonersquos anger towards punishing the incurably unjustmdashhe does not acknowledge theimportant role that (I will argue) the thumoeides plays in early education and moraldevelopment

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

There are several points to make in response to this line of inter-pretation The first is that despite what many commentators sug-gest the puppet passage is not intended to provide an account ofthe human soul Indeed the word lsquosoulrsquo psuchē despite being usedfrequently throughout the rest of Book does not occur anywhereeither in the puppet passage itself or in the passage immediatelyleading up to it That is not to say that the Athenian is not con-cerned with the soul at all in the passage of course but only thathe is not attempting to illustrate a general theory of human psycho-logy Rather his express purpose is to shed some light on a spe-cific notion within moral psychologymdashnamely the notion of beinglsquostrongerrsquo or lsquoweakerrsquo than oneself This has two important impli-cations First given that Platorsquos focus is relatively narrow in thepuppet passage we should be cautious about drawing any conclu-sions about his overall theory of the soul on its basis Second ifwe take the aim of the passage into account we can readily see whyPlato would not have been inclined to distinguish among our vari-ous non-rational impulses because the passage is designed to illus-trate the notion of being stronger or weaker than oneself it makessense that it should focus on non-rational impulses than which weneed to be stronger In that context there is no dialectical need tointroduce an intermediate class of unproblematic non-rational mo-tivations

The next point to make is that although Platorsquos treatment ofthumos in the Laws emphasizes its negative and psychologicallydangerous aspects Plato crucially does not identify thumos with thespirited part of the soul Platorsquos usage in the works that feature tri-partition confirms this When Plato wants to refer to the emotionalstate of spirited anger he typically uses thumos (as a synonym fororgē) When he wants to refer to the part of the soul responsible forspirited desires and emotions on the other hand he typically em-ploys either the substantivized term to thumoeides or a periphrasticexpression such as lsquothemiddle part that loves victory and is spiritedrsquo(τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ Rep ) The distinc-

Psuchē occurs at and but it is conspicuously absent from to

Kahn lsquoLawsrsquo ndash notes this point and he rightly argues that the absenceof tripartition in the Laws reflects more about the aims and context of the dialoguethan it does about Platorsquos moral psychological theory

See A Hobbs Plato and the Hero Courage Manliness and the Impersonal Good[Hero] (Cambridge ) ndash for a discussion of this issue

Joshua Wilburn

tion is clearest in theTimaeus where Plato uses thumos to refer to anaffective state among many others but refers to the spirited part ofthe soul itself as lsquothe part that has a share in courage and thumosrsquo (τὸμετέχον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνδρείας καὶ θυμοῦ ndash) Platorsquos characteriza-tion of spirited anger in the Laws therefore cannot be taken as acharacterization of the part of the soul responsible for that anger

Moreovermdashand this is the most important pointmdasheven in theworks that feature tripartition spirited anger is always treated war-ily and is often characterized as irrational and potentially viciousIndeed the very case that Plato uses in Republic to argue for thedistinction between the reasoning and spirited parts of the soul pre-supposes a negative side of thumos Odysseus must restrain his an-ger precisely because it is lsquoirrationalrsquo and pulls him contrary to lsquothepart that has reasoned about better and worsersquo ( ndash ) Simi-larly in Republic thumos is included with pleasure and pain ina generic list of irrational states that lead us (just as they do in thepuppet passage) contrary to reasoning and law ( ) Finallyin the Timaeus Plato twice includes thumos indiscriminately amongthe irrational affections of the mortal soul ( ) and heeven emphasizes the unruliness of thumos by calling it lsquodifficult tosoothersquo (δυσπαραμύθητον ) None the less the unruly nature ofspirited anger does nothing to undermine the positive psychologicalrole of the thumoeides in the Timaeus the spirited part of the soul isconsidered lsquonaturally superiorrsquo to the appetitive part and it is loca-ted in the chest near the head lsquoso that it might listen to reason andtogether with it restrain by force the part consisting of appetitesrsquo( ndash ) These passages make it clear that Platorsquos charac-terization of spirited anger as a dangerous irrational impulse cansit comfortably alongside his characterization of the spirited part ofthe soul as reasonrsquos psychic lsquoallyrsquo The fact that anger is treated withcaution in the Laws therefore cannot be taken as a sign of a changein Platorsquos attitude towards the thumoeides itself and a fortiori can-not be taken as a sign of Platorsquos abandonment of tripartition

It will be apposite here to specify what I mean in speaking ofPlatorsquos lsquotheory of tripartitionrsquo and in arguing that he continues torecognize the thumoeides as a distinct lsquopartrsquo of the soul given thatthere is significant scholarly debate about what Platorsquos view that thesoul consists of three lsquopartsrsquo amounts to What I take to be essentialto the theory of tripartition and what I take theLaws to be commit-ted to (at a minimum) is () the view that there are three distinct

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

sources of motivation in the soul each of which is characterized bythe distinctive objects that attract or repel it and each of which canproduce action all by itself independently of the other parts Tosay that there exists a spirited part of the soul then means thatthere is a distinct source of desires and emotions in the soul thatcan cause a person to act independently of his reasoning and inde-pendently of any appetitive impulses he may have () The threesources of motivation in the soul moreover have distinctive func-tions or roles in our psychology (see esp Rep ndash and Tim ndash ) Roughly put the thumoeides is responsible for providingthe soul with couragemdashwhich means (in a broad sense) supplyingmotivations emotions and attitudes (ones characterized by a cer-tain kind of object see Section below) that effectively supportreasoning and good judgement against vicious internal or externalresistance

Note that this lsquomotivationalrsquo interpretation of tripartite the-ory represents a (relatively) neutral kind of middle way betweenlsquoliteralistsrsquomdashwho drawing on the personifying language that Platooften uses to characterize the tripartite soul take the three partsof the soul to be robustly lsquopersonrsquo-like each being the subject ofits own desires beliefs thoughts and even (for some interpret-ers) reasoningmdashand lsquodeflationistsrsquomdashwho downplay Platorsquos use ofpersonification and offer various weak readings of Platorsquos talk oflsquopartsrsquo It should be further noted however that my arguments

Brissonrsquos defence of the claim that the Laws remains committed to tripartitepsychology evidently presupposes a similarly lsquomotivationalrsquo conception of triparti-tion In the course of arguing that the Laws acknowledges the existence of the threesoul-parts he concludes that lsquoappetite is a part of the soul that is one of the causes ofhuman actionrsquo that lsquothumos or spirit is indeed considered as a distinct part of thehuman soul that is one of the causes of human actionrsquo and that lsquothe spirit of angeris obviously the cause of specific actionsrsquo (lsquoSoulrsquo ndash)

Commentators who incline towards more or less lsquoliteralistrsquo views include JAnnas An Introduction to Platorsquos Republic (Oxford ) ndash and ndash Bo-bonich Utopia ndash T Brickhouse and N Smith Socratic Moral Psychology(Cambridge ) E Brown lsquoThe Unity of the Soul in Platorsquos Republicrsquo inBarney Brennan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndash at M Burnyeat lsquoLectureI Couches Song and Civic Traditionrsquo in Culture and Society in Platorsquos Republic(G Peterson (ed) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values ndash Salt LakeCity ) ndash at ndash G R Carone lsquoAkrasia in the Republic Does PlatoChange his Mindrsquo Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash at ndash ead lsquoPlatorsquos Stoic View of Motivationrsquo in R Salles (ed) Metaphysics Soul andEthics in Ancient Thought Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji (Oxford )ndash at ead lsquoAkrasia and the Structure of the Passions in Platorsquos Timaeusrsquoin C Bobonich and P Destreacutee (eds) Akrasia in Greek Philosophy From Socrates

Joshua Wilburn

are somewhat flexible in that many of them do not depend on anyparticular interpretation of tripartite theory Because I am making

to Plotinus [Akrasia] (Leiden ) ndash at ndash T Ganson lsquoThe RationalNon-Rational Distinction in Platorsquos Republicrsquo Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash at ndash Hobbs Hero C Kahn lsquoPlatorsquos Theory of DesirersquoReview of Metaphysics () ndash at ndash G Lesses lsquoWeakness Reasonand the Divided Soul in Platorsquos Republicrsquo History of Philosophy Quarterly ()ndash at ndash H Lorenz The Brute Within Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aris-totle [Brute] (Oxford ) id lsquoThe Cognition of Appetite in Platorsquos Timaeusrsquo inBarney Brennan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndash at ndash J Moline lsquoPlatoon the Complexity of the Psychersquo Archiv fuumlr Geschichte der Philosophie ()ndash at ndash M Morris lsquoAkrasia in the Protagoras and the Republicrsquo Phronesis () ndash at ndash J Moss lsquoAppearances and Calculations Platorsquos Divi-sion of the SoulrsquoOxford Studies inAncient Philosophy () ndash at ndash eadlsquoPictures and Passions in theTimaeus andPhilebusrsquo in Barney Brennan and Brittain(eds) Divided ndash at ndash C D C Reeve Philosopher-Kings The Argumentof Platorsquos Republic (Princeton ) ndash and M Woods lsquoPlatorsquos Division ofthe Soulrsquo Proceedings of the British Academy () ndash at Barney Bren-nan and Brittain in their introduction to the recent volume Plato and the DividedSelf refer to lsquowhat seems to be a growing consensusrsquo that the three parts of the soulare robustly agent-like lsquoFor each seems to comprise an integrated system of capa-cities for cognition volition affect and agency vis-agrave-vis the other parts All thisevidence suggests that we are to understand the parts as real agents having some-thing of the completeness and autonomy of different kinds of organismrsquo (Dividedndash) There are however dissenters M Anagnostopolous lsquoThe Divided Soul andthe Desire for Good in Platorsquos Republicrsquo in G Santas (ed) The Blackwell Guideto Platorsquos Republic (Malden Mass ) ndash F Cornford lsquoThe Division ofthe Soulrsquo [lsquoDivisionrsquo] Hibbert Journal () ndash at A W Price lsquoArePlatorsquos Soul-Parts Psychological Subjectsrsquo Ancient Philosophy () ndash RRobinson lsquoPlatorsquos Separation of Reason from Desirersquo Phronesis () ndashat ndash C Shields lsquoSimple Soulsrsquo in E Wagner (ed) Essays on Platorsquos Psycho-logy (Lanham Md ) ndash at and id lsquoUnified Agency and Akrasiain Platorsquos Republicrsquo in Bobonich and Destreacutee (eds) Akrasia ndash at ndash andndash and J L Stocks lsquoPlato and the Tripartite Soulrsquo Mind () ndashCornford for example suggests that tripartition is not really about a division intoparts but rather into three types of life and human character () while Price ar-gues that the soul-parts are simply lsquoaspects of ourselvesrsquo () C Gill lsquoPlato and theEducation of Characterrsquo Archiv fuumlr Geschichte der Philosophie () ndash at R Kamtekar lsquoSpeaking with the Same Voice as Reason Personification in PlatorsquosPsychologyrsquo [lsquoSpeakingrsquo] Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndashR F Stalley lsquoPersuasion and the Tripartite Soul in Platorsquos Republicrsquo [lsquoTripartitersquo]Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash and R Woolf lsquoHow to Seean Unencrusted Soulrsquo in Barney Brennan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndash atndash all remain somewhatmore neutral regarding the agent-like status of the partsFinally J Whiting lsquoPsychic Contingency in the Republicrsquo in Barney Brennan andBrittain (eds) Divided ndash is distinct in offering a lsquohybridrsquo interpretation ofPlatorsquos theory it is contingent not only how lsquoagent-likersquo the parts are in a givenpersonrsquos soul on her reading but even how many parts each personrsquos soul actuallyhas Because of this contingency there is variation in Platorsquos account whereas de-flationists provide the correct interpretation of Republic rsquos presentation of the soulliteralists provide the better interpretation of Republic and rsquos presentation of it

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

a case for continuity of Platorsquos views on the soul many of my ar-guments should stand regardless of onersquos preferred understandingof Platonic psychological theory Commentators who read theRepublicrsquos commitment to a tripartite soul in a deflationary lightfor example will have reason for thinking on the basis of whatfollows that Plato remains committed to that same tripartite soulin the Laws In this way my account will admit at least some degreeof either literalist amplification or deflationist contraction Myown position however is that the tripartite theory of Republic andTimaeus is committed at least to () and () above and I will arguethat the Laws is committed to them as well Furthermore the Ti-maeus also suggests that on Platorsquos view () the three parts of thesoul have distinct physiological locations and associations withinthe body (the reasoning part is located in the head the spirited inthe chest and the appetitive in the midriff) As we will see thereare reasons for thinking that the Laws remains committed to thisaspect of tripartite theory as well (at least in the case of spirit)

Finally before turning to my positive account it should be notedthat much of the debate surrounding the status of tripartite theoryin the dialogue concerns the burden of proof does it lie with thosewho claim Plato abandons the theory or with those who claim hecontinues to accept it There are at least three initial reasons forthinking that it lies with the former First although Plato neverexplicitly endorses tripartition in the Laws he also never explicitlyrejects it either in the Laws or in any other dialogue He does how-ever explicitly endorse tripartition in two relatively late dialogues

Those most resistant to the claim that tripartition is present in the Laws willtend to be literalists however Note that the sharp developmentalism that Bobonichposits in Platorsquos moral psychology is partly a result of his interpretation of the Re-publicrsquos tripartite theory Bobonich adopts an extreme version of literalism accordingto which the parts of the soul in the Republic are very robustly agent-like not onlyis each part a distinct source of motivation (a claim I accept) but each also has itsown rich discrete psychological life with its own beliefs thoughts and fairly so-phisticated cognitive capacities One reason why he perceives such a dramatic shiftbetween theRepublicrsquos theory and theLaws then is simply that he takes the formerrsquostheory to be so extreme Although I cannot address his interpretation of tripartitionin the Republic here I do think that there are strong reasons for doubting it many ofwhich have been recorded in Lorenz (Brute ndash) and Stalley (lsquoTripartitersquo) OnceBobonichrsquos interpretation of the Republic is disarmed much of the theoretical basisfor identifying a sharp shift between it and the Laws is disarmed as well Even gran-ted his strongly literalist reading of the Republic however my arguments will pointto significant continuity in Platorsquos thinking about the soul that (particularly in thelight of the burden-of-proof shifting considerations adduced below) tells against Bo-bonichrsquos developmentalist conclusions

Joshua Wilburn

Timaeus and Phaedrus Second in the Republic Plato deduces thetripartite theory on the basis of the Principle of Opposites com-bined with the phenomenon of psychic conflict Plato certainly ack-nowledges psychic conflict in the Laws which means that if he hadcome to reject tripartition he would have had to have rejected eitherthe Principle of Opposites itself or at least its application to the factof psychic conflict Yet neither the principle nor that connection isever called into question in the Laws or anywhere else in the Pla-tonic corpus And finally the context and aims of the Laws arequite distinct from those of the Republic and we should expect tofind differences in its moral psychological focus in the light of thosedifferent aims

In what follows I will attempt to add to this burden of proof Ifwhat I have said so far is right then there is room in the Laws forthe spirited part of the soul to continue to play an important posi-tive role in moral education and development

Musical education

My account will draw on two basic assumptions about the thu-moeides The first is that the spirited part of the soul for Plato isthe part of the soul responsible for what we might call our lsquosocialrsquoor lsquoother-directedrsquo emotions and desires These include the desiresfor honour victory and good reputation the emotions of angershame admiration and disgust and attitudes of praise and blameSecond it is one of the primary tasks of early musical educationin the Republic to shape those desires and emotions of the spiritedpart In particular musical education aims to habituate individualsto feel shame and disgust towards character and behaviour that aregenuinely aischron shameful and to feel admiration towards char-acter and behaviour that are genuinely kalon admirable or beauti-ful I will not argue for either of these assumptions in the present

Kamtekar (lsquoSpeakingrsquo ndash) too points out that if Plato attributes conflictingmental states to a single subject in the Laws (as Bobonich claims) then that wouldseem to violate the Principle of Opposites and hence would demand an explanatorystory that Plato never provides

It should be noted here that the ostensible goal of Republic is to address the twinquestions lsquoWhat is justicevirtuersquo and lsquoWhy should we be justvirtuousrsquo and thetheory of tripartition is central to the answers it provides to them Neither questionis ever taken up in the Laws in any systematic way however

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

paper although I take both of them and especially the first to beat least relatively uncontroversial

Spirited motivation

The Athenian identifies virtue as complete consonance betweencorrect rational belief and law on the one hand and an individualrsquosfeelings of pleasure and pain on the other ( ndash) Educationhe says is concerned with fostering that consonance from the sideof pleasure and pain It is lsquothe drawing and pulling of children to-wards the argument that is said to be correct by lawrsquo ( ndash)and it aims at lsquocorrect training in pleasures and pains so that a per-son hates what he is supposed to hate from the very beginning un-til the end and also loves what he is supposed to loversquo ( ndash) TheAthenian goes on to identify education with the choral artHuman beings alone among animals perceive and take pleasure in

Certainly both of them have been widely endorsed and defended in the secon-dary literature The view that the spirited part of the soul is responsible for thedesires emotions and attitudes cited above is advocated in among many others TBrennan lsquoThe Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Objectrsquo [lsquoSpiritedrsquo] inBarney Brennan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndash at D Cairns Aidōs ThePsychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature [Aidōs] (Ox-ford ) ndash J Cooper lsquoPlatorsquos Theory of Human Motivationrsquo in id Reasonand Emotion (Princeton ) ndash Hobbs Hero and T Irwin Platorsquos Ethics(Oxford ) The view that early education targets the spirited part of the soul isdefended in Cairns Aidōs ndash R C Cross and A D Woozley Platorsquos Repub-lic A Philosophical Commentary (London ) J C B Gosling Plato (Lon-don ) ndash Hobbs Hero ndash J Moss lsquoShame Pleasure and the DividedSoulrsquo Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash G R Lear lsquoPlatoon Learning to Love Beautyrsquo in G Santos (ed) The Blackwell Guide to Platorsquos Re-public (Malden Mass ) ndash Mackenzie Punishment and I VasilioulsquoFrom thePhaedo to theRepublic Platorsquos Tripartite Soul and the Possibility of Non-Philosophical Virtuersquo in Barney Brennan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndash at (It is however partly challenged in two recent articles by Wilberding who arguesthat the spirited part of the soul is the target of a smaller portion of musical and gym-nastic training than is commonly supposed See J Wilberding lsquoPlatorsquos Two Formsof Second-Best Moralityrsquo Philosophical Review () ndash at ndash andid lsquoCurbing Onersquos Appetites in Platorsquos Republicrsquo [lsquoAppetitesrsquo] in Barney Brennanand Brittain (eds) Divided ndash) For textual support for my first assumptionsee esp Rep ndash ndash and Tim ndashand Phdr ndash For the second see esp Rep ndash and ndash (Although the discussion of early education in the Republic precedes the introduc-tion of the tripartite soul Socratesrsquo comment at ndash indicates that weare to identify the thumoeides of books and with the spirited part of the soul as itis characterized in book lsquoAnd isnrsquot it as we were saying a mixture of music andpoetry on the one hand and physical training on the other that makes the two partsharmoniousrsquo)

Translations of the Laws are based on T Pangle The Laws of Plato (Chicago

Joshua Wilburn

order in voice and bodily movement he says (lsquoharmonyrsquo is orderin voice lsquorhythmrsquo order in bodily movement ndash ) Thatis why from the time they are very young human beings are in-capable of keeping still or remaining silent but are always movingtheir bodies around and using their voices The institution of thechorus attempts to instil the proper rhythm and harmony in indivi-duals by directing the pleasure they take in order and by imposingrhythm and harmony on their own movements and speech broadlyspeaking gymnastic education is the bodily part of the choral artconcerned with dancing and orderly movement and musical educa-tion is the vocal part of the choral art concerned with singing andorderly speech

There is a prima facie reason for thinking that musical educationin the Laws aims at the spirited part of the soul it targets the sameclass of emotions and attitudes that were previously attributed tothe thumoeidesmdashin particular admiration disgust and shame Thechoral art as a whole the Athenian indicates and music in particu-lar aims at a proper appreciation of what is admirable and beautifulThe properly educated individual he explains will consider admir-able things to be admirable and shameful things to be shameful Anindividual is adequately educated in this sense lsquowho is not fully ableto express correctly with voice and body what he understands yetfeels pleasure and pain correctlymdashwarmly welcoming what is ad-mirable and being disgusted by what is shamefulrsquo ( ndash )

What is most important is not a personrsquos technical skill in singingand dancing but rather the admiration he feels for what is kalon andthe contempt he feels for what is aischron Song and dance providemeans of cultivating these appropriate attitudes because they are

) with modifications All other translations of Plato are based on J Cooper(ed) Plato Complete Works (Indianapolis )

The properly musically educated individualrsquos lsquowarm welcomingrsquo (ἀσπαζόμενος ) of what is admirable has a parallel to Rep ndash Socrates says thatif the young are properly reared on rhythm and harmony they will love what is ad-mirable and hate what is shameful before they are able to grasp reason and thatwhen reason does come they will lsquowarmly welcome itrsquo (ἀσπάζοιτrsquo ) on ac-count of their strong kinship (δι ᾿ οἰκειότητα ndash) to it Significantly ἀσπάζεταιis the verb used at to describe the reaction that spirited dogs have to thosewith whom they are familiar (οἰκεῖον ) It is a spirited trait to love and pro-tect what is familiar and musical education in the Republic (and in the Laws on myaccount) aims to exploit that trait by making beautiful character οἰκεῖον Cf n below Brennan (lsquoSpiritedrsquo ndash) offers an insightful discussion of the role of theοἰκεῖον in spirited psychology

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

lsquoimitationsrsquo of moral character admirable postures and songs imi-tate virtue and disgraceful postures and songs imitate vice ( )By delighting in the right kinds of songs and dance therefore aperson is cultivating feelings of admiration towards kalon characterand behaviour (and feelings of shame and disgust towards aischroncharacter and behaviour) The reason attitudes of admiration anddisgust are so important is that those who admire a certain kind ofcharacter or behaviour come to acquire that character and to behavein those ways themselves lsquoSurely it is necessaryrsquo the Athenian de-clares lsquothat one who takes delight in things then becomes similarto the things he takes delight in And what greater good or evilcould we say there is for us than such completely necessary assimi-lationrsquo ( ndash) Musical education then is designed to makepeople admire and praise the right kinds of things so that they be-come the right kinds of people

There are further reasons for thinking that musical educationaims at the thumoeides however These become clearest throughthe Athenianrsquos discussion of public drinking parties When theAthenian suggests that drunkenness can be useful and praiseworthyunder the right circumstances he meets significant resistance fromhis more austere Cretan and Spartan interlocutors In response totheir concerns he provides an extended defence of the practice inbooks and He begins by explaining the psychological effectsof wine-drinking wine makes pleasures pains feelings of anger(thumoi) and sexual desires stronger and more intense while itcauses perceptions memories beliefs and prudent thoughts tolsquocompletely abandonrsquo a person The intoxicated individual theAthenian says lsquoarrives at a disposition of the soul that is the sameas the one he had when he was a young childrsquo ( ndash)

Although this represents a depraved state of the soul drunken-

Aristotle agrees that musical rhythms and harmonies contain likenesses to as-pects of character and that taking pleasure in the right kinds of music can make aperson more inclined to take pleasure in the right kinds of people and behaviour Heoffers an analogy lsquoFor if someone enjoys looking at the image of something for noother reason than because of its shape or form he is bound to enjoy looking at thevery thing whose image he is looking atrsquo (Pol andash)

This dual process of delighting in the kalon and becoming more kalos oneselfmoreover is mutually reinforcing for people tend to take pleasure in what is mostlike themselves lsquoThosewhose character is in accordwithwhat is said and sung and inany way performedmdashbecause of nature or habit or bothmdashare necessarily delightedby the admirable things and led to praise them and pronounce them admirablersquo( ndash )

Joshua Wilburn

ness can if practised under the right conditions and supervisionprovide at least two interrelated benefits in a moral educationalprogramme The first is that drunkenness can provide a kind ofendurance training for people through which their sense of shameis tested The Athenian points out that although Crete and Spartahave developed many ways of testing their citizens in their endur-ance of painsmdashfor example through strenuous physical exercisesand exposure to extreme heat and coldmdashthey do not provide com-parable tests for their endurance of pleasures This is troubling theAthenian says given that those who cannot hold firm in the faceof pleasures are even worse than those who cannot endure pains( ) Alcohol however on account of its unique properties andpsychological effects provides an excellent way of testing resolve inthe face of temptation Because our pleasures are stronger and moreintense when we are drunk they are much harder to resist and be-cause reasoning lsquocompletely abandonsrsquo us we cannot rely on ourrational judgements and desires to hold us in check against themThis means that we are completely at the mercy of our non-rationalimpulses Those who have cultivated the proper sense of shamehowever will continue to find morally objectionable behaviour re-pugnant even while they are drunk and will act accordingly thosewho have not on the other hand will indulge their basest pleasuresand impulses having neither shame nor reason to restrain themDrinking parties then provide a way of practising resistance topleasure and testing onersquos sense of shame in the process

What is noteworthy about this discussion is that it clearly draws adistinction between two classes of non-rational impulses there arethe potentially vicious impulses particularly those related to plea-sure that need to be resisted and there are the better impulsesparticularly feelings of shame that can do the resisting Thus al-though the image of the puppet lsquomakes no room for silver cordsrsquothis discussion of drunkenness that immediately follows it does re-cognize an intermediate class of superior non-rational motivationsand they are precisely the kinds of motivations that were previouslyattributed to the spirited part of the soul Those motivations can

In this way intoxication provides an opportunity to see what kinds of motiva-tions people have in the absence of their better judgements as well as how thosenon-rational motivations balance against each other See discussions of the functionof the drinking party in G M A Grube Platorsquos Thought [Thought] (Indianapolis) Kamtekar lsquoPsychologyrsquo ndash and G Morrow Platorsquos Cretan City[Cretan] (Princeton ) ndash

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

cause a person to act moreover independently (a) of his reason-ing which has abandoned him and (b) of his appetites which heis resisting And finally these virtuous motivations serve the samepsychological function that is attributed to the thumoeides in tri-partite theorymdashnamely providing courageous resistance to internalthreats to virtue The discussion of drunkenness thus points to adistinct psychic source of non-rational non-appetitive motivationsIn other words it points to the existence of a spirited part of the in-dividualrsquos soul

There is a second benefit to drinking parties If used properlythey do not merely test a personrsquos sense of shame but also reinforceand shape that sense of shame Although education is supposed tocultivate the proper non-rational feelings and attitudes in individu-als that education the Athenian says lsquotends to slacken in humanbeings and in the course of a lifetime it becomes corrupted to agreat extentrsquo ( ndash) The primary benefit of alcohol on his ac-count is that it provides a way of correcting this natural tendencythrough a kind of re-education of adults

Didnrsquot we assert that the souls of drinkers like some iron [καθάπερτινὰ σίδηρον] become fiery [διαπύρους] softened [μαλθακωτέρας] and youth-ful so that they can be easily ledmdashas they were when they were youngby someone who possesses the ability and the knowledge required to edu-cate and mould [πλάττειν] souls Didnrsquot we say that the one who did themoulding is the same as he who moulded them earlier the good lawgiverwhose laws must be fellow drinkers at the banquet They must be ableto make whoever becomes confident bold and more shameless than he

Brisson (lsquoSoulrsquo ) also finds tripartition in the passage on drunkenness buthe does so solely on the basis of ndash lsquoWhen the Athenian suggests giving wine tothis puppet we find a very clear distinction between () pleasures and pains () an-gers and desires and () sensations memory opinions and thought that is betweenappetite (epithumiai) spirit (thumos) and intellect (nous)rsquo This comment is some-what curious however because it is unclear how ()ndash() are supposed to map ontothe tripartite soul and particularly how () and () are supposed to map onto appe-tite and spirit Brisson provides no details Moreover it is doubtful whether Platoreally intends to mark off any distinction between appetitive and spirited impulses at given that the Athenian is at this point merely distinguishing between statesand impulses that are intensified by drinking and those that are weakened or elimi-nated by itmdashthat is between non-rational states and rational ones (corresponding tothe iron cords and golden cord respectively in the immediately preceding puppetimage) The fact that the Athenian lists the non-rational impulses as τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶλύπας καὶ θυμοὺς καὶ ἔρωτας at without distinguishing among them (evensyntactically) confirms this reading It is not until the subsequent discussion of theeducational benefits of drinking parties that the distinction between appetitive andspirited impulses becomes evident in the way I have suggested

Joshua Wilburn

should be willing to act in just the opposite way When ignoble bold-ness appears these laws will be able to send in as a combatant the noblestsort of fear accompanied by justice the divine fear to which we gave thename lsquoawersquo and lsquoshamersquo ( ndash )

There are several things to note about this passage First winersquosusefulness lies in the fact that it makes the souls of drinkers youngagain Youth is the period of time in our lives when we are mostimpressionable and educable and alcohol temporarily induces a re-turn to that impressionable and educable state Second the primarypsychological means through which the intoxicated individuals areto be educated is shame In a properly run drinking party indivi-duals will be encouraged to avoid indecorous behaviour and whilethose who succeed will be publicly praised those who fail will bepublicly blamed and humiliated These practices will reinforcethe attitudes of admiration and shame that were cultivated duringearly education but which have since lsquoslackenedrsquo And finally theAthenian uses distinct metaphorical language in his discussion thesoul is likened to soft fiery lsquoironrsquo and education is understood as aprocess of lsquomouldingrsquo that iron

This characterization of the effects of musical education on thesoul parallels in striking ways the Republicrsquos characterization of theeffects of musical education on the spirited part of the soul In theRepublic Socrates also characterizes early education as a kind oflsquomouldingrsquo of the soul for during youth a person is lsquomost malleablersquoand lsquotakes on any stamp one wishes to impress on himrsquo ( ndash) After outlining his programme of musical and gymnastic edu-cation Socrates then describes the psychological consequences ofneglecting or overindulging in either of the two disciplines Aboutmusic he says

When someone gives music an opportunity to charm his soul with the fluteand to pour those sweet soft and plaintive tunes we mentioned throughhis ear as through a funnel and when he spends his whole life hummingthem and delighting in them then at first whatever spirit [thumoeides] hehas is softened like iron [ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν] and from being hard anduseless it is made useful But if he keeps at it unrelentingly and is charmedby the music after a time his spirit [thumos] is melted and dissolved untilit vanishes and the very sinews of his soul are cut out and he becomes lsquoafeeble warriorrsquo ( ndash )

See ndash cf ndash

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

In this passage the thumoeides is again likened to iron which musiccan lsquosoftenrsquo and make usefully malleable Gymnastic educationmeanwhile is understood as a process of hardening the thumoeides( ) In conjunction with music gymnastics ensure that the thu-moeides becomes tough enough to hold the lsquoshapersquo that is given to itthrough musical education This metaphorical language preciselyparallels the Athenianrsquos characterization of the psychology of edu-cation Given the parallel and given that in the Republic the iron-like malleable part of the soul is the spirited part we have strongreason for thinking that when Plato employs the same characteriza-tion of the psychological effects of education in the Laws he con-tinues to have the thumoeides in mind

This is by no means an isolated use of the moulding metaphormoreover Indeed passages throughout the text characterize propereducation in terms of hardness and softness of the soul andmany ofthem contain tantalizing occurrences of thumos and its cognates

For example when a person drinks wine lsquothe soul by escapingfrom its dispiritedness [δυσθυμία] has its disposition turned fromharder to softer so that it becomes more malleable like iron when itis plunged into firersquo ( ndash ) Likewise lsquoIf [our citizens] arenrsquotpractised in enduring pleasures and in never being compelled to doanything shameful their softness of spirit [γλυκυθυμία] before plea-sures will lead them to experience the same thing as those overcomeby fearsrsquo ( ndash )

Finally in his condemnation of insulting speech the Atheniansays lsquoThe one who speaks [abusively] is gracious to a graceless

The reason that the thumoeides is lsquousefulrsquo when it has been softened is that liketempered metal it can be moulded and shaped On the other hand if it is too softor soft for too long it becomes lsquouselessrsquo (just as a hammer is useless if the metal outof which it is moulded never cools and hardens)

Cf Hom Il σιδήρειόν νύ τοι ἦτορ The heart is traditionally associatedwith thumos and is often characterized as lsquoironrsquo in Homer It is also the seat of thethumoeides in Plato (see Tim ndash and sect below)

T Saunders Platorsquos Penal Code [Penal] (Oxford ) ndash discusses theLawsrsquo use of the lsquophysiologicalrsquo language of hardnesssoftness and hotnesscoldnessto characterize the soul though he does not note any connections between the useof that language and the use of thumos and its cognates

See also ndash where the Athenian states that the laws exist lsquopartly forthe sake of those who have shunned education who employ a certain tough natureand have been in no way softened so as to avoid proceeding to everything badrsquo ndash where pleasures lsquocan turn to wax the spiritedness [thumos] even of those whothink themselves solemnrsquo and ndash lsquoWhen the child is born [the woman] mustmould it like wax so long as it remains moistrsquo

Joshua Wilburn

thing spiritedness [thumos] and gorges his anger with wickedfeasts making that sort of thing in his soul [τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον]that was at one time tamed [ἡμερώθη] by education savage againrsquo( ndash) Although Plato avoids explicitly acknowledging theexistence of soul-parts in the Laws this remark comes close withits lsquothat sort of thing in the soulrsquo In any event the Athenian makesit clear that whatever it is in the soul that is responsible for angeris also a primary target of education Based on everything we haveseen we have good reason for thinking that that thing is still thespirited part of the soul

Pleasure and pain

There is an objection that one might raise to my account at thispoint the Athenian characterizes education as correct training inpleasure and pain and his programme of musical education is pre-dicated on the delight that children take in songs dance and playThis might suggest that to the extent that music targets part ofthe tripartite soul it targets the appetitive part not the spirited

There are at least two ways to respond to this worry however Firstthe Athenianrsquos talk of pleasure and pain throughout the dialoguemakes it clear that he has in mind not simply appetitive feelings ofpleasure and pain but a diverse range of non-rational states andimpulses that explicitly include spirited impulses such as anger andenvy Similarly in the Timaeus it is the entire non-rational soul

Cf Rep where music lsquotamesrsquo (ἡμεροῦσα) the spirited part of the soul This is the view of Bobonich who argues that in the Laws appetitive pleasure

(which Bobonich does not of course attribute to a distinct appetitive part of thesoul) is actually considered more useful than spirited emotions for the purposes ofmoral education (Utopia ndash) Kamtekar (lsquoPsychologyrsquo ndash and ndash) alsoemphasizes the role of pleasure in Magnesian early education and provides a usefuldiscussion of various interpretations of the psychology underlying pleasurersquos rolein education Pleasure is also prominent in the accounts of Morrow (Cretan ndash) and R F Stalley An Introduction to Platorsquos Laws [Introduction] (Indianapolis) ndash W Jaeger Paideia The Ideals of Greek Culture iii The Conflict ofCultural Ideals in the Age of Plato trans by G Highet (New York ) em-phasizes the Athenianrsquos focus on lsquoirrationalrsquo impulses in general

See the Athenianrsquos discussion of the psychological causes of criminal behaviourat ndash He initially identifies anger (thumos) and pleasure as the two non-rational causes of crime ( ndash) but at ndash he expands this list to includelsquoanger fear pleasure pain feelings of envy and appetitesrsquo Then at ndash henarrows the list back down to two categories lsquoanger and fear which we call ldquopainrdquorsquoand lsquopleasure and appetitesrsquo See similarly broad lists of pleasures and pains at and

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

not merely the appetitive part of it that partakes in pleasure andpain and in the Republic each part of the soul is assigned its owndistinct pleasures Because the language of pleasure and pain isused throughout the Laws as a way of referring generically to non-rational affections the Athenianrsquos description of early education astraining in pleasure and pain does not determine our interpretationof the psychology underlying that process When he characterizesmusic as a process of directing and moulding the childrsquos feelingsof pleasure and pain therefore that leaves open the possibility thatwhat he has in mind includes or even predominantly involves spir-ited impulses

Second (and more importantly) it should be noted that my ac-count does not claim that musical education aims exclusively at thespirited part of the soul Presumably appetitive pleasure is a tar-get of early education and in at least two waysmdashone negative andone positive It is a target negatively in that early education partlyaims to make sure that children do not have strong and intractableappetitive urges that might interfere with their pursuit of decencyWhile ensuring that they would be ashamed of indecent appetitiveindulgence is one way to achieve the proper balance of motivationsthe task will obviously be easier if their appetites have been moder-ated and controlled through childhood rearing Second it seemssafe to assume that much of the pleasure the child takes in songdance and play is appetitive pleasure and that appetitive pleasureand pain play a positive psychological role in the childrsquos coming to

See Tim ndash Rep ndash Moreover in the Laws χαίρειν is the verb the Athenian most frequently uses to

refer to the pleasure the young take in song and dance It occurs at least twenty-onetimes in book (eg ) and he clearly identifies χαίρειν withtaking pleasure (see esp and where χαίρειν is opposed to λυπεῖσθαιin parallel to the ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη that occurs throughout book eg at ndash and ) Even in the Republic however this kind of pleasure evidently playsa positive role in early education Socrates says that those who are educated throughproper rhythm and harmony will lsquotake delightrsquo (χαίρων ) in what is admir-able The Athenianrsquos emphasis on the pleasure and delight the young take in music isnothing novel therefore and cannot be taken as evidence of a shift in Platorsquos views

Wilberding (lsquoAppetitesrsquo ndash) provides a useful discussion of how on Platorsquosaccount our appetites can be trained through early education by practising self-restrained and moderate behaviour On Wilberdingrsquos view though this training af-fects the appetitive part of the soul exclusively acting moderately he claims lsquodoesnot serve to arouse the spirited part of the soulrsquo () However given Platorsquos viewthat courage involves resistance by the spirited part against both external threats andappetites within it is unclear why moderate behaviour could not for Plato involveboth the subduing of appetite and stimulating training for the thumoeides itself

Joshua Wilburn

have the right attitudes of admiration disgust and shame While Ithink that a range of possible ways of spelling out this role are com-patible with my account my own tentative suggestion is the follow-ing the child takes both appetitive pleasure and spirited pleasure insong and dance but for two different reasons The child takes ap-petitive pleasure because rhythm and harmony are pleasing to thesensesmdashbecause it lsquofeels goodrsquo to perceive and take part in songand dancemdashand the child takes spirited pleasure because the thu-moeides is naturally responsive to what seems kalon or admirableThe appetitive pleasure serves to reinforce the spirited pleasureand the result of all this is that the child comes to develop the properspirited attitudes of admiration shame and disgust The importantpoint is this though whatever role appetitive pleasure might playin musical education it is clear that the primary aim and outcomeof that education is for the individual to have the right feelings ofadmiration shame and disgust That is why the institution of thedrinking party which is supposed to test and restore the effects ofeducation is training in shame And because admiration shameand disgust are spirited attitudes in Plato we have good reason forthinking that the primary goal of music is proper training of thethumoeides

One final question that is worth considering why not think thatattitudes of admiration disgust and shame have become in Platorsquoslater work rational attitudes (or at least as Bobonich claims atti-tudes that necessarily draw on reasoning) and that musical educa-tion thus aims at training the childrsquos developing rational capacitiesThere is an immediate response to this however If musical edu-cation had its primary psychological effect on our rational naturethen it would be inexplicable why drinking parties would have theeffect of mimicking musical education and restoring its psychologi-cal effects If early musical education were rational then why wouldthat education be renewed through drunkenness which is precisely(according to the Athenian) when our rational capacities abandonus and our emotions are at their peak

Grube (Thought ) agrees lsquoThe ldquopartrdquo of the soul most directly concerned[inmusic and gymnastics] is undoubtedly the θυμός the spirit or feelingsrsquo D CohenlsquoLaw Autonomy and Political Community in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo Classical Philology () ndash at and Cairns (Aidōs ) also emphasize the Athenianrsquos focuson shaping the values of shame and honour in early education

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

Gymnastic education

The Athenian returns to the topic of early education in book where his focus shifts to gymnastic education As we have seenhe characterizes gymnastics as the part of the choral artmdashthat isof educationmdashconcerned with order in bodily movement TheAthenianrsquos gymnastic proposals are founded on the ideas that cer-tain kinds of bodily motions characterize virtuous individuals thatthose bodily motions express and imitate corresponding motionsand conditions of the virtuous individualrsquos soul and that habitu-ation in the appropriate bodily motions can facilitate acquisitionof the corresponding psychic condition Hence he reiterates hisearlier view that the rhythmic movements of dance (like the har-monies of song) are lsquoimitationsrsquo of human character ( ndash) Thepurpose of gymnastics is to impose the right kinds of movement onthe body therefore so that the corresponding virtuous motions ofthe soul become inculcated (at least in a preliminary way) in the in-dividual as well

This process should begin the Athenian claims even before thechild is born lsquoAll bodies benefit from the invigorating stir produced

It should be noted that because singing and dancing are two sides of the sameart music and gymnastics are not always very strictly separated from each other In-deed participation in a chorus will count as both musical and gymnastic educationTherefore we should avoid thinking that musical and gymnastic training take placestrictly one at a time in succession Cf remarks in Morrow (Cretan ndash) and LStrauss The Argument and Action of Platorsquos Laws (Chicago )

The Athenian provides a useful physiological analogy to illustrate the effects ofgymnastics in the case of the body a person can become accustomed to all kindsof foods and drinks and exercises even if at first he is upset by them Over timethe person becomes familiar with them and becomes lsquolikersquo them and at that pointit would pain the person to change back to his old regimen lsquoOne must holdrsquo theAthenian says lsquothat this very same thing applies to the thoughts of human beingsand the natures of their soulsrsquo ( ) Saunders (Penal ndash) provides an accountof the psychological effects of punishment in the Laws that draws on this lsquomedi-calrsquo physiological model According to Saunders punishment is painful (and henceeffective) because it represents a sudden violent breaking up of the patterns and af-fections to which the criminal agent has become accustomed

See discussions of gymnastic education in Morrow (Cretan ndash) Grube(Thought ndash) and especially Kamtekar (lsquoPsychologyrsquo) with whose account Itake my own to be largely aligned Whereas the accounts of Grube and Kamtekar(along with my own) focus on the inward psychological effects of gymnastic educa-tion Morrowrsquos interpretation focuses on the outward effects pointing to the variousways in which proper motion and dance are intended to impact on lsquothe gesturespostures and movements of ordinary lifersquo () Kamtekar responds to Morrowrsquosaccount ()

Joshua Wilburn

by all sorts of shaking and motionsrsquo he says lsquowhether the bodies bemoved by themselves or in carriers or on the sea or by being car-ried on horses or on any other bodyrsquo ( ndash) For that reasonpregnant women must go for regular walks and once children areborn the infantsrsquo bodies and souls should be kept in motion as con-tinuously as possible lsquoas if they were always on a ship at searsquo ( ndash) Motion brings order and quiet to the restlessness of the in-fantrsquos soul as evidenced by the fact that mothers use rocking notstillness to lull their babies to sleep The Athenian explains thisphenomenon

The passion being experienced is presumably terror and the terror is dueto some poor habit of the soul When someone brings a rocking motionfrom the outside to such passions the motion brought from without over-powers the fear and the mad motion within and having overpowered itmakes a calm stillness appear in the soul that replaces the harsh poundingof the heart [καρδίας χαλεπῆς πηδήσεως] in each case It thereby replacesour mad dispositions with prudent habits ( ndash )

Feelings of fear are associated with certain kinds of motions inthe soul and if those motions become a settled part of the childrsquospsychic habit they will become an obstacle to its acquisition ofcourage Feeling fear is lsquopractice in cowardicersquo the Athenian saysand for that reason infants should be kept free of terror and suffer-ing as much as possible during the first three years of their lives( ) This is accomplished by imposing the right kinds ofexternal motions which in turn alleviate the internal motions thatconstitute that fear and worry

From the ages of three to five or six children should play games Kamtekar (lsquoPsychologyrsquo) provides an illuminating discussion of this passage

In particular she addresses the question in what sense the disturbing motions ofthe infantrsquos soul could count as fear given that the Athenian elsewhere character-izes fear as the expectation of evil ( ) which (she claims) seems to require theinvolvement of the rational part of the soul Her suggestion is that what the infantexperiences are the physiological and phenomenological correlates of the rationalexpectation of evil that constitutes fear and that in virtue of their usual correlationwith such expectation those experiences can be counted as a primitive form of fear() Her explanation of why rocking the child helps prepare it for courage is asfollows lsquoIf the rational part may but need not occupy itself with non-rational af-fections then perhaps eliminating such affections from the childrsquos early experiencesreduces the opportunities for the rational part to form the associated false opinionswhich would if they took hold make for a coward Presumably the motions of fearare uncomfortable and a child familiar with them would tend to form the opinionthat whatever occasions them is evilrsquo ()

Grube (Thought ) concurs that external motion alleviates the troubling

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

of their own design The main concern of their nurses during thisstage of development is to make sure that the children do not be-come accustomed either to excessive luxurymdashwhich leads to iras-cibility ill-humour and a propensity to be upset by trivialitiesmdashorto excessive punishmentmdashwhich leads to servility and savageness( ) At the age of six the children begin to learn martial skillssuch as horseback riding archery and javelin-throwing and in lateryears they study the two main branches of gymnastics wrestlingand dancing Because the Athenian considers dancing and singingto be two sides of the same activitymdashparticipating in a chorusmdashmany of his comments about the latter apply to the former as wellIn book however the Athenian provides further details concern-ing the guidelines for dance Dancing he says is divided into twomain forms imitation of admirable bodies in solemn movementand imitation of shameful bodies in low movement The youthsshould be trained only in the imitation of the admirable whichin turn has two parts the Pyrrhic or warlike part which involvesthe imitation of noble bodies engaged in violent martial exertionand the peaceful part which involves the imitation of noble bodiesbehaving moderately in peaceful conditions ( ndash ) As forwrestling the youths must not practise techniques that are uselessfor the purposes of war but should focus exclusively on those thatpromote strength health and military prowess ( ) The youthsshould practise wrestling fighting and dancing that involves heavy

psychic motion within E B England The Laws of Plato [Laws] vols (New York) ii however offers an alternative interpretation of the passage Accordingto England φαίνεσθαι at indicates that the lsquocalm stillnessrsquo merely appears tothe child to be present in its soul (but is not really present) Rocking accomplishesthis England claims by distracting the childrsquos attention away from the mad motionwithin It is not that the external motion actually has any effect on internal psychicmotion on this account it simply makes the child temporarily unaware of the troub-ling psychic motion

Kamtekar takes it to be a virtue of her account (as do I) that it provides an ex-planation of why for the purposes of achieving the desired psychological effects ofgymnastic education it is not enough that the young citizens simply observe orderlymovement but must also practise orderly movement themselves Because on heraccount engaging in the right kind of physical motion impacts the psychic motionsand affections within we cannot produce those results simply as spectators (lsquoPsycho-logyrsquo ndash) In his own account of musical education Aristotle offers a somewhatdifferent view on why the young must not be mere spectators lsquoIt is not difficult tosee of course that if someone takes part in performance himself it makes a greatdifference in the development of certain qualities since it is difficult if not impos-sible for people to become excellent judges of performances if they do not take partin itrsquo (Pol bndash)

Joshua Wilburn

armour and weapons and the movements that they learn should bethose that are lsquoby far the most akin to fighting in warrsquo ( )

There are several reasons for thinking that gymnastic education isdirected at the spirited part of the soul First the Athenian makesit clear that one of the most prominent aims of gymnastic train-ing is to prepare the young citizens for war by making them morecourageous Most obviously this aims at defence against externalforeign enemies but his remarks also reveal that the citizensmust befit to combat internal lsquoenemiesrsquo as wellmdashnamely recalcitrant feel-ings of pleasure and fear The spirited part of the soul we haveseen is the part that is specially responsible both for the virtue ofcourage and for battling external and internal enemies alike Againthis provides a prima facie reason for thinking that Plato presentshis gymnastic proposals with the thumoeides in mind

Second we once again find a useful parallel to the Republic(where gymnastic education is explicitly said to target the thu-moeides at ndash) In the Laws the Athenian identifies a clusterof psychic defects that can result from improper gymnastic edu-cation the young can become ill-humoured (δύσκολον) irascible(ἀκράκολον) slavish (ἀνελεύθερον) or savage (ἄγριον) and they cancome to possess cowardice (δειλία) ( ndash) In the Republicthis same cluster of defects are all explicitly identified as defectsof the thumoeides excessive music ruins a personrsquos thumoeides andmakes him ill-humoured (δύσκολον) irascible (ἀκράκολον) andquick-tempered while excessive gymnastics makes a person savage(ἄγριον) ill-humour (δύσκολία) overstrains the thumoeides luxuryand softness introduce cowardice (δειλία) into it and slavishness(ἀνελευθερία) turns the thumoeides from lsquolion-likersquo to lsquoape-likersquo( ndash ndash ndash )

Finally further evidence can be found by looking to the TimaeusAs we have seen the Athenian often characterizes our psychologyin terms of motion (a position which receives a theoretical foun-dation at ff) and he characterizes gymnastic education as aprocess of instilling the appropriate psychic motions in the soulthrough training in corresponding motions of the body Similarlyin the Timaeus psychological states and disturbances as well aspsychic health and affliction themselves are characterized in terms

See ndash ndash ndash cf Rep ndash Tim ndash And cf Laws ndash where cowardice and luxury cause lsquosoftness of spiritrsquo

(ῥᾳθυμία)

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

of psychic motion and education is understood as a process of fos-tering the proper motions in each of the three parts of the soul( ) With this framework in mind Timaeusrsquo comments on thespirited part of the soul are especially significant He says that thespirited part of the soul is located near the heart and he explains

The gods foreknew that the pounding of the heart [πήδησις τῆς καρδίας](which occurs when one expects what one fears or when onersquos anger isaroused) would like all such swelling of the passions [τῶν θυμουμένων] becaused by fire So they devised something to relieve the pounding theyimplanted lungs a structure that is first of all soft and without blood andsecondly contains pores bored through it like a sponge This enables it totake in breath and drink and thereby cool the heart so that when an-ger (thumos) within the heart should reach its peak the heart might poundagainst something that gives way to it and be cooled down ( ndash )

Here the lsquopoundingrsquo of the heart in fear or anger is caused by orrelated to the agitation of the spirited part of the soul which Ti-maeus locates in the chest Likewise in the passage quoted abovefrom the Laws ( ndash ) fear is associated with precisely thesame lsquopoundingrsquo of the heart and agitation of the soul The par-allel suggests that in the Laws Plato continues to be committed toa similar model of the soulrsquos physiological associations and thatalthough the thumoeides is not explicitly mentioned in the Laws ac-count it is still the psychic source of the agitation involved in fearand anger Two further points hint at this interpretation First asnoted above the Athenian states that if infants become accustomedto feeling fear of the sort he has described they will not becomecourageous but cowardly And second he follows up his commentsby asking lsquoIf someone were to apply every device in an attempt tomake the three-year period for our nursling contain the least pos-sible amount of suffering and fears and every sort of pain donrsquot wesuppose that he would give the soul of the one brought up this waya better spirit [εὔθυμον]rsquo ( ndash)

Kamtekarrsquos account of gymnastic education in the Laws is similarly informedby the psychology and physiology of the Timaeus (lsquoPsychologyrsquo ndash) Brisson(lsquoSoulrsquo ndash) also draws attention to parallels between Timaeus and the Lawsthough with a different focus

Joshua Wilburn

The law

Moral education for the citizens ofMagnesia does not end withmu-sical and gymnastic training Plato also assigns to the lawgiver andto the laws themselves an important educational function in theLaws Indeed one of the chief innovations of the dialogue is Platorsquosinsistence that the laws should make use of persuasion rather thanmere force The Athenian draws an analogy whereas the slave doc-tor (who treats slaves) will simply issue medical orders without ex-planation the free doctor (who treats free men) will lsquoas much as hecan teach the one who is sick He doesnrsquot give orders until he hasin some sense persuadedrsquo ( ) Similarly legislation should beaccompanied by preludes that attempt to persuade the citizens tofollow the laws rather than simply threaten them with punishmentif they do not Commentators have presented a wide range of inter-pretations of the precise role the preludes are intended to play andin what sense they are to lsquopersuadersquo the citizens On one side of thedebate commentators such as Bobonich and Terence Irwin haveargued that the preludes teach the citizens in a very robust sensethey provide the citizens with lsquogood epistemic reasonsrsquo for think-ing that the principles underlying the laws are true (reasons whichPlato himself accepts) and the rational instruction they provide isintended to lead to understanding On the other side commenta-

Bobonich (Utopia ) See C Bobonich lsquoPersuasion Compulsion and Free-dom in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoPersuasionrsquo] Classical Quarterly () ndash idlsquoReading theLawsrsquo in CGill andMMMcCabe (eds)Form andArgument in LatePlato (Oxford ) ndash at id Utopia ndash and T Irwin lsquoMoralityas Law and Morality in the Lawsrsquo [lsquoMoralityrsquo] in Bobonich (ed) Guide ndash at The rationalist interpretation is well stated by Bobonich lsquoWhat the lawgiver andthe preludes do is characterized as ldquoteachingrdquo that is giving reasons to the citizensand bringing it about that they ldquolearnrdquo The preludes are thus designed to beinstances of rational persuasion Thus the citizens will learn why the laws arefine and just and should also learn why following the laws and more generally act-ing virtuously is good for them They are to receive a true and reasoned accountof what is good for human beingsrsquo (Utopia ) Bobonich goes so far as to suggestthat the preludes could even produce knowledge in the citizens (lsquoPersuasionrsquo ndash)(though cf Bobonichrsquos later remarks at Utopia ) R Curren lsquoJustice Instruc-tion and the Good The Case for Public Education in Aristotle and Platorsquos LawsrsquoStudies in Philosophy and Education () ndash at ndash also advocates a ratio-nalist interpretation of the preludes J Annas lsquoVirtue and Law in Platorsquo [lsquoVirtuersquo]in Bobonich (ed) Guide ndash inclines towards the rationalist camp but adopts amore moderate interpretation than that of Bobonich She argues that the preludesare neither wholly rational argument nor wholly lsquorhetorical spellrsquo (ndash) Many ofthem she claims are more like an lsquoearnest addressrsquo that lsquoprovides no argumentrsquo ()

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

tors such as AndreacuteLaks andRichard Stalley have suggested that thepreludes appeal primarily to non-rational aspects of our psychologyand that for that reason they are not intended to provide rationaleducation Although I will not undertake a complete examinationof the preludes here I will briefly provide some considerations infavour of thinking that the kind of moral education that the lawstaken as a whole (that is taken to include the preludes as well as therules and prescribed punishments themselves) provide is largelyintended to appeal to non-rational spirited attitudes and desiresAlthough this does not by itself show that they are intended to ap-peal to a distinct spirited part of the soul in the light of the aboveanalysis of early education it is reasonable to conclude that they areIt is especially reasonable I will suggest because there are strongreasons for doubting the robustly rationalist interpretations offeredby Bobonich and Irwin

See A Laks lsquoLrsquoUtopie leacutegislative de Platonrsquo Revue philosophique ()ndash and id lsquoThe Lawsrsquo in C Rowe and M Schofield (eds) The CambridgeHistory of Greek and Roman Political Thought (Cambridge ) ndash at Stalley Introduction and id lsquoPersuasion in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoPersuasionrsquo] His-tory of Political Thought () ndash R Mayhew lsquoPersuasion and Compul-sion in Platorsquos Laws rsquo Polis () ndash E R Dodds The Greeks and theIrrational (Berkeley ) England Laws i G Morrow lsquoPlatorsquos Con-ception of Persuasionrsquo [lsquoPersuasionrsquo] Philosophical Review () ndash andid Cretan A Nightingale lsquoWritingReading a Sacred Text A Literary In-terpretation of Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoSacredrsquo] Classical Philology () ndash andid lsquoPlatorsquos Lawcode in Context Rule by Written Law in Athens and Magnesiarsquo[lsquoLawcodersquo] Classical Quarterly () ndash Brisson lsquoEthicsrsquo ndashC Ritter Platos Gesetze Kommentar zum griechischen Text (Leipzig ) ndashand H Goumlrgemanns Beitraumlge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi (Munich )who all adopt (varyingly strong versions of) anti-rationalist interpretations Doddsfor example writes lsquoIn the Laws at any rate the virtue of the common man is evi-dently not based on knowledge or even on true opinion as such but on a processof conditioning or habituation by which he is induced to accept and act on certainldquosalutaryrdquo beliefs Plato now appears to hold that the majority of human beingscan be kept in tolerable moral health only by a carefully chosen diet of ldquoincanta-tionsrdquo (ἐπῳδαί)mdashthat is to say edifying myths and bracing ethical slogansrsquo ()Morrow shares Doddsrsquos emphasis on the Athenianrsquos characterization of educationalmeasures as ἐπῳδαί (lsquoPersuasionrsquo ff) Bobonich (lsquoPersuasionrsquo ndash) offers areply to Morrow Goumlrgemanns argues that the preludes make use of lsquoeine staatsmaumln-nische Rhetorikrsquo that is directed to a popular non-philosophical audience ( )

In support of his rationalist interpretation of the preludes Bobonich points outthat what the preludes do is sometimes characterized as lsquoteachingrsquo and that the citi-zens are sometimes characterized as lsquolearningrsquo from them (Utopia ) Howeverthe passages that Bobonich citesmdash ndash ndash and mdashare farless conclusive than he suggests for a number of reasons () Two of the occurrencesof lsquolearningrsquo ( and ) are actually occurrences of εὐμαθέστερον the pre-ludes are intended to make the citizens ἡμερώτερον ( ) εὐμενέστερον (

Joshua Wilburn

There are several reasons for thinking that the educational role ofthe laws is conceived largely with spirited emotions in mind Firstthe Athenian repeatedly and emphatically characterizes the task ofthe lawgiver as that ofmaking the citizens univocal in their attitudesof praise blame and shame The lawgiver must care for the citizensby distributing honour and dishonour correctly among them and inall the various experiences and circumstances that arise throughoutlife the lawgiver must issue praise and blame correctly lsquoby meansof the laws themselvesrsquo ( ndash ) The traditional attitudetowards incest provides a model for his approach The reason thatincest is the one sexual act from which almost everyone refrainslsquoas willingly as possiblersquo is that everyone considers it to be the mostshameful of shameful things and no one ever says otherwise ( ndash) The lawgiverrsquos goal then is to instil the proper sense of shamein the citizens by fostering through the laws themselves univer-

) and εὐμαθέστερον But εὐμαθέστερον does not indicate that the citizens learnfrom the preludes It indicates that if anything the preludes make them lsquobettersuited for learningrsquo or lsquomore disposed to learnrsquo That implies that what the citizensgain from the preludes does not constitute the learning itself but at most a kind ofpsychological preparation for learning if any is to occur The fact that εὐμαθέστερονis paired with ἡμερώτερον and εὐμενέστερον further suggests that the preludes aim ata pre- or non-rational good condition of the soul rather than at rational education() At ndash while characterizing the free doctor to whom the prelude-givinglegislator is likened the Athenian says that the doctor lsquoboth learns [μανθάνει] some-thing himself from the sick and as much as he can teaches [διδάσκει] the afflictedonersquo Two points are noteworthy here First the doctor only lsquoteachesrsquo his patientκαθ ᾿ ὅσον οἷός τέ ἐστιν That suggests a limitation on how much the patient can actu-ally learn (cf εἰ καὶ μὴ μέγα τι σμικρὸν δέ) Second the sense of μανθάνει isevidently broad enough in this context to allow that the doctor is learning from thepatient The doctor certainly cannot be learning medicine from a layperson how-ever but at most some empirical facts about the individual patientrsquos case If that is allthat is necessary for something to count as learning then to say the citizen lsquolearnsrsquofrom the preludes does not say very much at all () At the free doctor isaccused of lsquopractically teachingrsquo his patient Once again however σχεδόν suggeststhat what is going on at best approximates teaching but is not actually teachingMoreover the fact that this accusation is put into the mouth of the slave doctorwho does not possess the art of medicine himself further undercuts its significanceas a genuine assessment of what constitutes teaching the art of medicine () TheLaws is noteworthy for the way it characterizes lsquoeducationrsquo as something that fallsfar short of rational education At and lsquoeducationrsquo (παιδεία) is defined asthe correct training in pleasure and pain and at ndash the Athenian paradoxicallycharacterizes ignorance (ἀμαθία ἄνοια) as the condition in which a person feels plea-sure and pain in a way that is opposed to reasoning All of this suggests that evenif the preludes are taken to teach the citizens (for example with παιδεύει at )that does not necessarily mean that they provide rational education for the citizens

Cf ndash

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

sal agreement about what is praiseworthy and blameworthy To theextent that he succeeds citizens will behave correctly For that rea-son the lawgiver lsquoreveres with the greatest honoursrsquo the emotion ofshame and he considers a lack of shame to be the greatest privateand public evil ( ndash)

Second the punishments themselves that the laws employ con-sist largely and often exclusively of blame dishonour and publichumiliation To give just a few examples the penalty for men whodo not marry by the required age of thirty-five is that they will beexcluded from the honours the young pay to their elders ( ) thepenalty for buying or selling an allotted house is that an account ofthe offenderrsquos wrongdoing will be written on tablets to be stored inthe temples lsquothere to be read and remembered for the rest of timersquo( ndash) and those who abandon their post while serving in theguard are to be held in ill-repute and anyone who encounters themmay strike them with impunity ( )

And finally as the converse of this second point there is signi-ficant positive emphasis throughout the preludes and laws and inthe Athenianrsquos characterization of the lawgiverrsquos aims throughoutthe dialogue on the love of victory and good reputation Indeedthe argument of the very first prelude that the Athenian offersmdashthe prelude to the marriage lawmdashappeals to lsquothe desire to becomefamous and not to lie nameless after one has diedrsquo The Athenianalso frequently refers to the lsquocontest in virtuersquo and he claims thatwe must all be lovers of victory when it comes to virtue ( )Children must be educated for the sake of lsquovictoryrsquo over pleasureshe says and sexual indulgence should be kept in check by love ofhonour ( )

There is an important caveat to add here although the laws and Brisson (lsquoSoulrsquo ndash) also observes that the punishments imposed by the laws

as well as the preludesrsquo heavy use of the rhetoric of praise and blame are lsquoon the sideof spiritrsquo

If the citizens treat the law against sexual indulgence with sufficient reverenceand awe the Athenian claims then they will be entirely obedient to it However theAthenian acknowledges not everyone will be perfectly successful in this regard andfor that reason it is necessary to establish lsquoa second-best standard of the shameful andnoblersquo ( ndash) According to this second-best standard the citizens must alwayshave a sense of shame towards sexual behaviour that makes them practise it infre-quently and only when they can do so without being detected Notice that there is nomention in any of this about the extent to which the citizens are rationally convincedthat they should not be sexually indulgent The difference between the highest stan-dard and the second-best standard is simply a difference in the degree to which thecitizens possess due reverence and shame

Joshua Wilburn

preludes appeal largely and primarily to spirited attitudes they byno means do so exclusively Indeed it is clear that many of thepunishments prescribed by the laws will be especially repulsive tothe appetitive part of the soul and some of the myths presented inthe preludes are plainly intended to make the citizens (appetitively)afraid of doing wrong by citing physically painful consequences

Moreover it is clear that at least some of the preludes are inten-ded to appeal partly to the citizensrsquo rational nature by providingarguments or reason-like considerations in favour of obeying thelaw Given Platorsquos recognition of the diversity of human motivationthroughout his works and in the Laws itself it would be strange ifthe laws and preludes did not reflect an awareness of psychologicalcomplexity

However although it is clear that some of the preludes recognizeand appeal to our rational nature there are strong reasons for res-isting the idea that they genuinely teach the citizens in the strongsense of providing them with knowledge understanding or even afirm grasp on good reasons for holding true beliefs To begin within his late dialogues Plato raises concerns about the value and effect-iveness of writing that bear directly on the written legislation of theLaws In the Phaedrus Socrates levels the criticism that writing en-courages readers to defer to the authority of the writer rather thanto learn for themselves Writing Socrates says lsquowill enable themto hear many things without being properly taught and they willimagine that they have come to know much while for the most partthey will know nothingrsquo ( ndash ) However it is not just that

Bobonich (lsquoPersuasionrsquo ndash and Utopia ndash) addresses the fact that thepreludes sometimes offer myths that appeal to our appetitive impulses Cf Saun-ders Penal ndash

The prelude that comes closest to doing so is the prelude to the law on pietywhich takes up most of book The Athenian offers some very sophisticated argu-ments in support of the claims that the gods exist that they care for human beingsand that they are not subject to bribery However the Athenian makes it clear thatthe prelude to the law on piety is directed at impious individuals many of whomhold the beliefs that they do not because they have vicious non-rational desires butbecause of ignorance ( ndash ) Indeed some of them are lsquonaturally justrsquoand become impious lsquowithout evil anger or dispositionrsquo ( ) Moreover theAthenian makes it clear that impiety is special among crimes in being (at least some-times) a purely rational failure of this sort Given its uniqueness in this regard itmakes sense that the prelude on impiety should appeal to rationality in a way thatthe others do not Annas (lsquoVirtuersquo ) concurs that the prelude to the impiety lawrequires special attention to argument lsquoCitizens who have once got the idea of athe-ism need to be met with argument since a rational challenge to tradition has to bemet on its own groundrsquo

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

readers do not as a matter of fact learn from writing rather theycannot learn from it Learning requires questioning which writingdoes not permit

Writing shares a strange feature with painting The offspring of paintingstand there as if they are alive but if anyone asks them anything they re-main most solemnly silent The same is true of written words Yoursquod thinkthey were speaking as if they had some understanding but if you questionanything that has been said because you want to learn more it continues tosignify just that very same thing for ever ( ndash)

Socratesrsquo conclusion is that writing is not to be taken seriously be-cause words lsquoare as incapable of speaking in their own defence asthey are of teaching the truth adequatelyrsquo ( ndash)

There are several reasons for thinking that this criticism applies tothe written legislation of Magnesia First the point in the Phaedrusis clearly a general one it is not that some writing if done in theright way can avoid the shortcomings Socrates describes ratherall writing shares those shortcomings The generality of this pointis even emphasized ( ndash cf ) Furthermore thePhaedrus actually flags Socratesrsquo discussion as one that specific-ally concerns the political role of rhetoricmdashin particular in whatways it is appropriate for politicians or lawgivers to make use of it(see esp ndash ) In his closing remarks Socrates reiterates thispoint by explicitly applying their conclusions to laws and politicaldocuments lsquoIf Lysias or anybody else ever did or ever does writemdashprivately or for the public in the course of proposing some lawmdashapolitical document which he believes to embody clear knowledgeof lasting importance then this writer deserves reproach whetheranyone says so or notrsquo ( ndash) Moreover the Lawsrsquo character-ization of the role of law in education echoes the Phaedrus in at leasttwo noteworthy ways First the Phaedrus introduces and draws ona medical analogy like the good doctor who must be familiar withthe body in order to improve it so also the good rhetorician mustbe familiar with the soul Rhetoric itself moreover is likened toa medicine or drug (φάρμακον ) Likewise we have seen that the Athenian introduces theneed for preludes by way of a medical analogy and he too charac-terizes law as a kind of medicine (φάρμακον ) Thegood judge he says must internalize the writings of the lawgiverand use them as lsquoantidotesrsquo (ἀλεξιφάρμακα ) both for him-

Joshua Wilburn

self and for the rest of the city against vicious unlawful speech

Second the Phaedrusrsquo characterization of rhetoric as lsquosoul-leadingrsquo(ψυχαγωγία ) anticipates the Lawsrsquo talk of the lsquopullof lawrsquo (ἀγωγῇ τῇ τοῦ νόμου ndash) that draws the soul towardsvirtue as well as its understanding of education as the lsquodrawingrsquo(ἀγωγή cf ) of the soul towards law Fi-nally we should note that Platorsquos critique of writing is not uniqueto the Phaedrus Concerns about written law are also articulated inanother late workStatesman (see esp ff and n below) andeven in the Laws itself the Athenian voices scepticism about the ef-fectiveness of speeches lsquospoken before the massesrsquo ( ndash)

In the light of these considerations the implications of thePhaedrusrsquo critique of writing for the written legislation of Mag-nesia are clear whatever psychological effect the preludes mighthave on the citizens and even if part of that effect is a rationalone involving persuasion they cannot be teaching the citizens inany genuine sense Teaching requires the active engagement of thestudent or lsquolistenerrsquo which means above all questioning and thatis precisely what the written laws do not allow Indeed they posi-tively discourage questioning for the citizens are trained to defer tothe laws as a god-given absolute authority and anyone who doesquestion them is punished The analogy of the free doctor which

And cf the characterization of wine as an educational φάρμακον at and

This point is noted by Nightingale (lsquoSacredrsquo ) We should also note the cri-tique of writing and of written law that is voiced in the Seventh Letter ( ndash)

In general the Laws does not promote an environment that is conducive to ra-tional philosophical enquiry This point is noted in Nightingale (lsquoSacredrsquo ndash)Grube (Thought ) and Morrow (lsquoPersuasionrsquo ndash) Morrow for examplewrites lsquoIt is hard to imagine how any citizen who had been subjected for thirty yearsor more to the strictly supervised regimen we have described could retain the criticalpower and the freedom of mind required for [dialectical and philosophical] studyrsquo() Bobonich on the other hand argues that the Athenian does intend for the citi-zens to cultivate their rational skills in a significant way (Utopia ndash) As evidencehe draws attention to the fact that the citizens learn some mathematics including thedoctrine of incommensurability as well as some astronomy Bobonich takes this toindicate that the citizens are learning about non-sensible value properties and thatin doing so they are being prepared for arguments contained in the preludes aboutwhat is good for them However there is another way of interpreting the purpose ofthese studies The Athenian makes it clear that the purpose of learning astronomy isto dispel the myth that the heavenly bodies are lsquowanderersrsquo that move without orderand that the purpose of learning about incommensurability is that doing so intro-duces the citizens to lsquodivine necessityrsquo ( ndash ) In other words the citizenslearn just what is useful for making them pious believers in the gods (And note thatat ndash the Athenian says that these studies are not lsquodifficultrsquo to learn suggest-

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

Bobonich and other advocates of the rationalist interpretation citeas evidence for their view actually draws attention to precisely thisshortcoming of the laws For whereas the free doctor persuades hispatient through a conversation in which the patient is permittedto ask questions there is no dialogue between the legislator orthe laws on one side and individual citizens on the other Thelegislator issues the laws and the preludes and the citizens mustobey them Even if the preludes did as Bobonich claims providereasons that Plato would endorse for holding true beliefs at bestthey would provide the citizens with some reasons that they couldrecite That would not mean that they truly understand those

ing that what the citizens are learning is actually unexceptional) The point is not toteach them about the Good (or even to prepare them for teaching about the Good)but simply to make them acknowledge the active role of the divine in the universeWhy is this so important Because the revered status granted to the Magnesian lawsdepends on the claim that those laws come from god The citizens will not be suf-ficiently reverent towards those laws therefore unless they believe that god existsand watches over human affairs My reading receives further support from the factthat in his closing remarks of the dialogue the Athenian claims that no one who hasrecognized the orderly motion of the stars can fail to recognize the existence of thegods ( ndash )

This point is well made by Nightingale (lsquoSacredrsquo and lsquoLawcodersquo ndash)and Stalley (lsquoPersuasionrsquo )

See Nightingale lsquoSacredrsquo ndash There are at least two reasons however for doubting that the reasons offered

by the preludes for complying with the laws really are good reasons for holding truebeliefs First many of the arguments that are presented in the preludes are as Stal-ley puts it lsquoembarrassingly badrsquo (lsquoPersuasionrsquo ) This is true even if we leaveaside the many dubious myths and superstitions that some preludes advocate Takefor example the prelude to the law on marriage the Athenianrsquos model prelude Theargument it offers for the good of marriage is that having children provides a wayof satisfying the natural desire to be immortal and lsquoto become famous and not to lienameless after one has diedrsquo ( ) It seems clear however that the desire for famecannot be the right Platonic reason for doing anything and in any event the argu-ment certainly fails to explain whymarriage has to take place between the ages of thirtyand thirty-five But secondly it is not even clear that it is good for everyone to marry(or at least to marry at those ages) In the Statesman the Eleatic Visitor criticizeswritten legislation on the grounds that given the unpredictability and variety of hu-man affairs and individual circumstances lsquoit is impossible to devise for any givensituation a simple rule that will apply for everyone for everrsquo ( ndash) Ratherlsquohis regulations for each community will be rather imprecise and will be concernedI think with the majority of the population with the most common situations andwith being broadly rightrsquo ( ndash) What the Eleatic Visitorrsquos remarks stronglysuggest is that for at least some of the citizens it will not always be better for themto obey at least some of the lawsmdashthe marriage law for example The fact that Platohimself never married suggests that he did not endorse the Magnesian marriage lawas an absolute rule for living a good life (a point made by Stalley lsquoPersuasionrsquo )If this is right then for those citizens in those circumstances in which following a

Joshua Wilburn

reasons however As the Phaedrus indicates rhetoric and writtenspeech at most persuade but they do not teach ( ndash ) TheMagnesian citizens we may conclude may be persuaded by thepreludes (which surely involves application of their rationality)but they do not in any significant way learn from them

Two final considerations on this matter first the Athenian re-peatedly characterizes the kind of persuasion offered by the legis-lator the laws and the preludes as paramuthia This is significantbecause Plato typically identifies paramuthia as a means of influen-cing our non-rational psychology In the Statesman paramuthein iswhat a cattle farmer (being compared to a politician) does in order tocalm down the cattle and charm them into docility ( ) Of spe-cial note for my purposes it is a word Plato uses to characterize thekind of influence that is exercised on the spirited part of the soul

Second there are several indications in the Laws that most citi-zens never really learn what is good for them at all lsquoAs for prudenceand firmly held true opinionsrsquo the Athenian remarks lsquohe is a luckyperson to whom they come even in old agersquo ( ndash) It seemsthat far from ever having understanding or knowledge most citi-zens never even have stable true beliefs The old alone may possessthem and even among the old only the lsquoluckyrsquo ones Moreoverif the citizens did learn what is good for them then it is unclearwhy education would lsquoslackenrsquo throughout their lives and why thesymposiummdashan exercise in abandoning onersquos rationalitymdashwould benecessary for restoring it This point is especially compelling whenwe consider first that the symposium is to take place quite fre-quently (at least monthly and perhaps even daily see ndash) andsecond that in the Republic the Guardians (all of whom are to havestable belief and at least some of whom will go on to have know-ledge) receive an absolute prohibition against drinking ( ) Inshort what all of this suggests is that while moral education surelydoes appeal to the Magensian citizensrsquo rationality in various wayswhat it does not do is teach them in any meaningful sense That is

given law is not actually best for them the preludes will offer them reasons for hold-ing a beliefmdashthat following the law is good for themmdashthat is not in their case trueCf Irwin lsquoMoralityrsquo ndash who notes the problem of generality that written lawsuffers from but thinks that the external written law is ideally supplemented byeach citizenrsquos own lsquointernal lawrsquo

Cf the discussion in Nightingale lsquoSacredrsquo See eg Rep Cf Kamtekar lsquoPsychologyrsquo

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

precisely why deference and obedience to law are so important inMagnesia

Conclusion the ally of reason

Aristotle remarks in thePolitics that the citizens ofMagnesia receivelsquothe samersquo education that the citizens of Kallipolis receive (a

ndash) While this is no doubt an oversimplification I hope to haveat least partially vindicated Aristotlersquos comment according to myinterpretation musical and gymnastic education aim largely at thespirited part of the soulmdashunderstood as an independent psychicsource of motivationmdashjust as they did in the Republic The Lawsadds something to the Republicrsquos account however In Magnesia adetailed written lawcode supplements and reinforces the values in-stilled in the citizens through early education and it does so in partI have argued by continuing to target the spirited part of our psy-chology throughout adulthood What all of this shows is that Bo-bonichrsquos claim that lsquothe parts of the soul do not do any philosophicalwork in the Lawsrsquo is simply mistaken Although tripartition is notexplicit in the Laws the evidence strongly suggests that Plato re-mains committed to it and that his views on the thumoeides continueto inform his policies on moral education An important differencehowever is that whereas the Republic characterized spiritrsquos psychicrole as the role of supporting the commands issued by the reasoningpart on the basis of wisdom the Laws casts doubt on whether mostcitizens will ever achieve wisdom knowledge or even stable beliefIn their place the citizens are to enslave themselves to the lawswhich embodymdashto the extent possible for written legislationmdashthewisdom of the lawgiver That does not mean that the citizens arenot to make any use of their own rational capacities but it doesmean that their main use of those capacities will consist in believingwhat the laws say and figuring out in their own individual circum-stances which actions best conform to them Sassi argues that thelaws in Magnesia are intended to fill the gap that is left by what sheperceives to be the omission of the spirited part of the soul in theLaws On my account however the gap that the laws fill is not leftby a demoted thumoeides It is left rather by a reasoning part that

lsquoAgencyrsquo lsquoSelf rsquo ndash

Joshua Wilburn

in most cases never achieves reliably stable belief This suggests ashift in or at least an expansion of the role that the thumoeides playsin moral development and virtue in the Laws the spirited part ofthe soul is no longer simply the ally of reason but now also andperhaps primarily the ally of law

Wayne State University

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anagnostopolous M lsquoThe Divided Soul and the Desire for Good inPlatorsquos Republicrsquo in G Santas (ed) The Blackwell Guide to PlatorsquosRepublic (Malden Mass ) ndash

Annas J An Introduction to Platorsquos Republic (Oxford )lsquoVirtue and Law in Platorsquo [lsquoVirtuersquo] in Bobonich (ed) Guide ndash

Barney R Brennan T and Brittain C (eds) Plato and the Divided Self[Divided] (Cambridge )

Bobonich C lsquoAkrasia and Agency in Platorsquos Laws and Republicrsquo[lsquoAgencyrsquo] Archiv fuumlr Geschichte der Philosophie () ndash

lsquoPersuasion Compulsion and Freedom in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoPersua-sionrsquo] Classical Quarterly () ndash

(ed) Platorsquos Laws A Critical Guide [Guide] (Cambridge )Platorsquos Utopia Recast His Later Ethics and Politics [Utopia] (Oxford

)lsquoReading the Lawsrsquo in C Gill and M M McCabe (eds) Form and

Argument in Late Plato (Oxford ) ndashand Destreacutee P (eds) Akrasia in Greek Philosophy From Socrates to

Plotinus [Akrasia] (Leiden )Brennan T lsquoThe Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Objectrsquo

[lsquoSpiritedrsquo] in Barney Brennan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndashBrickhouse T and Smith N Socratic Moral Psychology (Cambridge

)Brisson L lsquoEthics and Politics in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoEthicsrsquo] Oxford Studies

in Ancient Philosophy () ndashlsquoSoul and State in Platorsquos Lawsrsquo [lsquoSoulrsquo] in Barney Brennan and

Brittain (eds) Divided ndashBrown E lsquoThe Unity of the Soul in Platorsquos Republicrsquo in Barney Bren-

nan and Brittain (eds) Divided ndash In the Republic those who are unable to rule themselves on the basis of wis-

dom are enjoined to make themselves slaves of those who do have divine rule withinthemselves ( ndash) In the Laws however the Athenian suggests that no humanbeing could ever rule without becoming corrupted (see ndash ) Being enslavedto the laws is thus a lsquosecond-bestrsquo in Magnesia

Moral Education in Platorsquos Laws

Burnyeat M lsquoLecture I Couches Song and Civic Traditionrsquo in Cultureand Society in Platorsquos Republic (G Peterson (ed) The Tanner Lectureson Human Values ndash Salt Lake City ) ndash

Cairns D Aidōs The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in An-cient Greek Literature [Aidōs] (Oxford )

Carone G R lsquoAkrasia and the Structure of the Passions in Platorsquos Ti-maeusrsquo in Bobonich and Destreacutee (eds) Akrasia ndash

lsquoAkrasia in the Republic Does Plato Change his Mindrsquo Oxford Stu-dies in Ancient Philosophy () ndash

lsquoPlatorsquos Stoic View of Motivationrsquo in R Salles (ed) MetaphysicsSoul and Ethics in Ancient Thought Themes from the Work of RichardSorabji (Oxford ) ndash

Cohen D lsquoLaw Autonomy and Political Community in Platorsquos LawsrsquoClassical Philology () ndash

Cooper J (ed) Plato Complete Works (Indianapolis )lsquoPlatorsquos Theory of Human Motivationrsquo in id Reason and Emotion

(Princeton ) ndashCornford F lsquoThe Division of the Soulrsquo [lsquoDivisionrsquo] Hibbert Journal

() ndashCross R C and Woozley A D Platorsquos Republic A Philosophical Com-

mentary (London )Curren R lsquoJustice Instruction and the Good The Case for Public Edu-

cation inAristotle andPlatorsquosLawsrsquoStudies in Philosophy andEducation () ndash

Dodds E R The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley )England E B The Laws of Plato [Laws] vols (New York )Fortenbaugh W W Aristotle on Emotion (London )Frede D lsquoPuppets on Strings Moral Psychology in Laws Books and rsquo

in Bobonich (ed) Guide ndashGanson T lsquoThe RationalNon-Rational Distinction in Platorsquos Republicrsquo

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy () ndashGill C lsquoPlato and the Education of Characterrsquo Archiv fuumlr Geschichte der

Philosophie () ndashGoumlrgemanns H Beitraumlge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi (Munich

)Gosling J C B Plato (London )Grube G M A Platorsquos Thought [Thought] (Indianapolis )Hobbs A Plato and the Hero Courage Manliness and the Impersonal

Good [Hero] (Cambridge )Irwin T lsquoMorality as Law and Morality in the Lawsrsquo [lsquoMoralityrsquo] in Bo-

bonich (ed) Guide ndashPlatorsquos Ethics (Oxford )