Overseas employment contract -
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE
SERVICES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ROGELIO BISULA RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO ATOK, NILO CRUZ,
ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and
JOSE ENCABOrespondents.Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner.The
Solicitor General for respondent NLRC,Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta
&- Valmonte Pena Marcos Law Offices for private respondents.R E
S O L U T I O NGUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:Before the Court en banc is a
motion to reconsider the decision promulgated on July 20, 1982
which set aside the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission and reinstated the decision of the National Seamen
Board.To better understand the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration, we reiterate the background facts of the case,
Taken from the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission:t.hqwIt appears that on different dates in December,
1978 and January, 1979, the Seamen entered into separate contracts
of employment with the Company, engaging them to work on board M/T'
Jannu for a period of twelve (12) months. After verification and
approval of their contracts by the NSB, the Seamen boarded their
vessel in Japan.On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel
complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a cable from the Company
advising him of the possibility that the vessel might be directed
to call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same time informing him
of the procedure to be followed in the computation of the special
or additional compensation of crew members while in said ports. ITF
is the acronym for the International Transport Workers Federation,
a militant international labor organization with affiliates in
different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie down a vessel
in a port by preventing its loading or unloading. This is a
sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the payment of its wages
rates for seafarers the so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the
crew members of a vessel who have affiliated with it are below its
prescribed rates. In the same cable of the Company, they expressed
its regrets for not clarifying earlier the procedure in computing
the special compensation as it thought that the vessel would 'trade
in Caribbean ports only.On 22 March 1979, the Company sent another
cable to complainant Bisula, this time informing him of the
respective amounts each of the officers and crew members would
receive as special compensation when the vessel called at the port
of Kwinana Australia, an ITF-controlled port. This was followed by
another cable on 23 March 1979, informing him that the officers and
crew members had been enrolled as members of the ITF in Sidney,
Australia, and that the membership fee for the 28 personnel
complement of the vessel had already been paid.In answer to the
Company's cable last mentioned, complainant Bisula, in
representation of the other officers and crew members, sent on 24
March 1979 a cable informing the Company that the officers and crew
members were not agreeable to its 'suggestion'; that they were not
contented with their present salaries 'based on the volume of
works, type of ship with hazardous cargo and registered in a world
wide trade': that the 'officers and crew (were) not interested in
ITF membership if not actually paid with ITF rate that their
'demand is only 50% increase based on present basic salary and that
the proposed wage increase is the 'best and only solution to solve
ITF problem' since the Company's salary rates 'especially in
tankers (are) very far in comparison with other shipping agencies
in Manila ...In reply, the Company proposed a 25% increase in the
basic pay of the complainant crew members, although it claimed,
that it would "suffer and absorb considerable amount of losses."
The proposal was accepted by the Seamen with certain conditions
which were accepted by the Company. Conformably with the agreement
of the parties which was effected through the cables
abovementioned, the Seamen were paid their new salary
rates.Subsequently, the Company sought authority from the NSB to
cancel the contracts of employment of the Seamen, claiming that its
principals had terminated their manning agreement because of the
actuations of the Seamen. The request was granted by the NSB
Executive Director in a letter dated 10 April 1979. Soon
thereafter, the Company cabled the Seamen informing them that their
contracts would be terminated upon the vessel's arrival in Japan.
On 19 April 1979 they were asked to disembark from the vessel,
their contracts were terminated, and they were repatriated to
Manila. There is no showing that the Seamen were given the
opportunity to at least comment on the Company's request for the
cancellation of their contracts, although they had served only
three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their
contracts.The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with the National Seamen
Board. The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed
a complaint for breach of contract and recovery of excess salaries
and overtime pay against the private respondents. On July 2, 1980,
the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached
their employment contracts when they demanded and received from
Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The
dismissal of the seamen was declared legal and the seamen were
ordered suspended.The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC
which reversed the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner
to pay the wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the
termination of the contract by the petitioner was without valid
cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.The private
respondents submit the following issues in their motion for
reconsideration:t.hqwA. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID VIOLENCE TO LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS
MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID NOT VIOLATE THEIR
CONTRACT.B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S
HAVING AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE SEAMEN'S BASIC WAGE WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN
IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING THAT THE
ADDENDUM AGREEMENT COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS HONORABLE
COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD VIOLATED THE
SAME.D. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER
VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING TERMINATED BEFORE EXPIRY DATE THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL
AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH TERMINATION.E. THIS HONORABLE COURT
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY PETITIONER OF THE TWO
PAYROLLS AND THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN
BAD FAITH.F. THIS HONORABLE COURT INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.At the outset, we are faced with the
question whether or not the Court en banc should give due course to
the motion for reconsideration inspite of its having been denied
twice by the Court's Second Division. The case was referred to and
accepted by the Court en banc because of the movants' contention
that the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated
fromWallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor(L-50734-37,
February 20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts and
issues. We are constrained to answer the initial question in the
affirmative.A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional
Law is the fact, that there is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings.
(Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v.
Barrera, 34 SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The
majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two Divisions,
but the Court remains one court, single, unitary, complete, and
supreme. Flowing from this nature of the Supreme Court is the fact
that, while ' individual Justices may dissent or partially concur
with one another, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks
with only one voice. And that voice being authoritative should be a
clear as possible.Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Court, whether en banc or in Division, may be modified or reversed
only by the Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.)
In the rare instances when one Division disagrees in its views with
the other Division, or the necessary votes on an issue cannot be
had in a Division, the case is brought to the Court en banc to
reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier
decision, and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has
happened in this case.The decision sought to be reconsidered
appears to be a deviation from the Court's decision, speaking
through the First Division, inWallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon.
Minister of Labor(102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly
conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two
Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the case to
the Court en banc. Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the
third motion for reconsideration states that the resolution of the
motion might be the needed vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem
case clearer and more in time with the underlying principles of the
Labor Code. We agree with the petitioner.After an exhaustive,
painstaking, and perspicacious consideration of the motions for
reconsideration and the comments, replies, and other pleadings
related thereto, the Court en banc is constrained to grant the
motions. To grant the motion is to keep faith with the
constitutional mandate to afford protection to labor and to assure
the rights of workers to self-organization and to just and humane
conditions of work. We sustain the decision of the respondent
National labor Relations Commission.There are various arguments
raised by the petitioners but the common thread running through all
of them is the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the
respondent seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect
"kill the hen that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino
seamen, admittedly among the best in the world, should remain
satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest, international
rates of compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while
their contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as
sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which require
them to falsely pretend to be members of international labor
federations, pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign
ports only to return the increased pay once the ship leaves that
port, should stifle not only their right to ask for improved terms
of employment but their freedom of speech and expression, and
should suffer instant termination of employment at the slightest
sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government
and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos
would no longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose
their jobs, and the still unemployed would be left hopeless.This is
not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the
interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their
terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing the
interests of labor as a whole.In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years
ago. Chief Justice Beasley of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was
ponente of the court's opinion declaring as a conspiracy the threat
of workingmen to strike in connection with their efforts to promote
unionism,t.hqwIt is difficult to believe that a right exists in law
which we can scarcely conceive can produce, in any posture of
affairs, other than injurious results. It is simply the right of
workmen, by concert of action, and by taking advantage of their
position, to control the business of another, I am unwilling to
hold that aright which cannot, in any, event, be advantageous to
the employee, and which must always be hurtful to the employer,
exists in law. In my opinion this indictment sufficiently shows
that the force of the confederates was brought to bear upon their
employer for the purpose of oppression and mischief and that this
amounts to a conspiracy, (State v. Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867.
Cited in Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13. Emphasis
supplied)The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the
rights of the workingman.And they have invariably been proved
unfounded and false.Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum
wages, workmen's compensation, social security and collective
bargaining to name a few were all initially opposed by employers
and even well meaning leaders of government and society as "killing
the hen or goose which lays the golden eggs." The claims of
workingmen were described as outrageously injurious not only to the
employer but more so to the employees themselves before these
claims or demands were established by law and jurisprudence as
"rights" and before these were proved beneficial to management,
labor, and the nation as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.The case
before us does not represent any major advance in the rights of
labor and the workingmen. The private respondents merely sought
rights already established. No matter how much the
petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the
entire industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of
employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.The
contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not
survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the
petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was
decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe
repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen,
and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the
petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all exception?The wages of seamen
engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign
principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary
function is recruitment and who usually gets a lump sum from the
shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen
and the determination of their compensation is subject to the
interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how much
in terms of profits the local manning office and the foreign
shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And
costs include salaries of officers and crew members.Filipino seamen
are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other
country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many of them
in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is
competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen
so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never demanded the same
high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom,
Japan and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled
to government protection when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employer, and when they exercise the right to
petition for improved terms of employment, especially when they
feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement
according to internationally accepted rules. In the domestic scene,
there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for
their employees one in keeping with minimum wages and the other
recording the sub-standard wages that the employees really receive,
The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums
required by fair labor standards legislation but even go way above
the minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The
same is true of international employment. There is no reason why
this Court and the Ministry of Labor and Employment or its agencies
and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the
standards and practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners,
who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and
deceptive schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of honorable, competent,
and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign.If any minor
advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow cut into the
profits of local manning agencies and foreign shipowners, that is
not sufficient reason why the NSB or the ILRC should not stand by
the former instead of listening to unsubstantiated fears that they
would be killing the hen which lays the golden eggs.Prescinding
from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board
nor the National Labor Relations Commission should, as a matter of
official policy, legitimize and enforce cubious arrangements where
shipowners and seamen enter into fictitious contracts similar to
the addendum agreements or side contracts in this case whose
purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its
ministries and agencies should present a more honorable and proper
posture in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our
desire to have as many job openings both here and abroad for our
workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no
less than our dignity as a people and the welfare of our workingmen
must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form of policy
legislation, not from administrative rule making or
adjudicationAnother issue raised by the movants is whether or not
the seamen violated their contracts of employment.The form
contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to
protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of
themselves. The standard forms embody the basic minimums which must
be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15,
Rule V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.) They
are not collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts
which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of
the agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that the affected
seamen cannot petition their employer for higher salaries during
the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to established
principles of labor legislation. The National Labor Relations
Commission, as the appellate tribunal from decisions of the
National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen did not
violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.The respondent
Commission ruled:In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find
that the cable of the seamen proposing an increase in their wage
rates was not and could not have been intended as a threat to
compel the Company to accede to their proposals. But even assuming,
if only for the sake of argument, that the demand or proposal for a
wage increase was accompanied by a threat that they would report to
ITF if the Company did not accede to the contract revision -
although there really was no such threat as pointed out earlier the
Seamen should not be held at fault for asking such a demand. In the
same case cited above, the Supreme Court held:Petitioner claims
that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the
latter threatened the ship authorities in acceding to their
demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by
the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken.But even if there
had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for them to employ some means of
pressing their demands for petitioner, the refusal to abide with
the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same,
they were only acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law and
public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the
case at bar which would justify respondents' dismissal just because
of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner
of its obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially
on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis supplied).The above
citation is fromWallem.The facts show that when the respondents
boarded the M/T Jannu there was no intention to send their ship to
Australia. On January 10, 1979, the petitioner sent a cable to
respondent shipmaster Bisula informing him of the procedure to be
followed in the computation of special compensation of crewmembers
while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not having
earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the vessel would
trade in Carribean ports only.On March 22, 1979, the petitioner
sent another cable informing Bisula of the special compensation
when the ship would call at Kwinana Australia.The following day,
shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that the officers and
crews were not interested in ITF membership if not paid ITF rates
and that their only demand was a 50 percent increase based on their
then salaries. Bisula also pointed out that Vir-jen rates were
"very far in comparison with other shipping agencies in Manila."In
reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only after
Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum amount
given monthly to Vir-jen was the decision to terminate the
respondents' employment formulated.The facts show that Virjen
Initiated the discussions which led to the demand for increase .
The seamen made a proposal and the petitioner organized with a
counter-proposal. The ship had not vet gone to Australia or any ITF
controlled port. There was absolutely no mention of any strike,
much less a threat to strike. The seamen had done in act which
under Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed
illegal, oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it
was mild compared to accepted valid modes of labor activity.We
reiterate our ruling inWallem.Petitioner claims that the dismissal
of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened
the ship authorities in acceding to their demands, and this
constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated by the Labor Code.
This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish
clearly the commission of any threat, But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured because
it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their
demands for petitioner, who refused to abide with the terms of the
Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same, They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of
their form of expression is contrary to law and public policy.
...Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that
the Ministry of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist
primarily for the workinginan's interests and, of course, the
nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in
his comments refer to the issue of allowing what the petitioner
importunes under the argument of "killing the hen which lays the
golden eggs." This is one of policy which should perhaps be
directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other policy
makers for more specific legislation on the matter, subject to the
constitutional provisions protecting labor, promoting social
justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement of the freedom of speech,
press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with the movants
that there is no showing of any cause, which under the Labor Code
or any current applicable law, would warrant the termination of the
respondents' services before the expiration of their contracts. The
Constitution guarantees State assurance of the rights of workers to
security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II, Constitution).
Presumptions and provisions of law, the evidence on record, and
fundamental State policy all dictate that the motions for
reconsideration should be granted.WHEREFORE, the motions for
reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.1wph1.tFernando, C.J.,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.EN
BANCG.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989RESURRECCION SUZARA,
CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, AMORSOLO
CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA, RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO
SABADO, MARTIN MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and VITALIANO
PANGUE,petitioners,vs.THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and
MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC.,respondents.G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15,
1989RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL, ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO
TANEDO, RAYMUNDO PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO
BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO PANGUE, RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO
PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN
MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO CRISTOBAL,petitioners,vs.THE
HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SEAMEN
BOARD (now the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and
MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC.,respondents.Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pe;a
and Nolasco for petitioners.Samson S. Alcantara for private
respondent.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:These petitions ask for a
re-examination of this Court's precedent setting decision inVir-Jen
Shipping and Marine Services Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.(125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On constitutional,
statutory, and factual grounds, we find no reason to disturb the
doctrine in Vir-Jen Shippingand to turn back the clock of progress
for sea-based overseas workers. The experience gained in the past
few years shows that, following said doctrine, we should neither
deny nor diminish the enjoyment by Filipino seamen of the same
rights and freedoms taken for granted by other working men here and
abroad.The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were
declared by the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of
breaching their employment contracts with the private respondent
because they demanded, upon the intervention and assistance of a
third party, the International Transport Worker's Federation (ITF),
the payment of wages over and above their contracted rates without
the approval of the NSB. The petitioners were ordered to reimburse
the total amount of US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in Philippine
Currency representing the said over-payments and to be suspended
from the NSB registry for a period of three years. The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the
NSB.In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure
of the petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon
demand by the former, filed estafa charges against some of the
petitioners. The criminal cases were eventually consolidated in the
sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence, these
consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos. 57999 and
58143-53, which respectively pray for the nullification of the
decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of the
criminal cases against the petitioners.The facts are found in the
questioned decision of the NSB in G.R. No. 64781-99.From the
records of this case it appears that the facts established and/or
admitted by the parties are the following: that on different dates
in 1977 and 1978 respondents entered into separate contracts of
employment (Exhs. "B" to "B-17", inclusive) with complainant
(private respondent) to work aboard vessels owned/operated/manned
by the latter for a period of 12 calendar months and with different
rating/position, salary, overtime pay and allowance, hereinbelow
specified: ...; that aforesaid employment contracts were verified
and approved by this Board; that on different dates in April 1978
respondents (petitioners) joined the M/V "GRACE RIVER"; that on or
about October 30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with the respondents on
board, arrived at the port of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port
respondent received additional wages under rates prescribed by the
Intemational Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) in the total
amount of US$98,261.70; that the respondents received the amounts
appearing opposite their names, to wit: ...; that aforesaid amounts
were over and above the rates of pay of respondents as appearing in
their employment contracts approved by this Board; that on November
10, 1978, aforesaid vessel, with respondent on board, left
Vancouver, Canada for Yokohama, Japan; that on December 14, 1978,
while aforesaid vessel, was at Yura, Japan, they were made to
disembark. (pp. 64-66, Rollo)Furthermore, according to the
petitioners, while the vessel was docked at Nagoya, Japan, a
certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the NSB Legal Department boarded the
vessel and called a meeting of the seamen including the
petitioners, telling them that for their own good and safety they
should sign an agreement prepared by him on board the vessel and
that if they do, the cases filed against them with NSB on November
17, 1978 would be dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the
"Agreement" dated December 5, 1978. (Annex C of Petition) However,
when they were later furnished xerox copies of what they had
signed, they noticed that the line "which amount(s) was/were
received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNERS" was
inserted therein, thereby making it appear that the amounts given
to the petitioners representing the increase in their wages based
on ITF rates were only received by them in trust for the private
respondent.When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent
demanded from the petitioners the "overpayments" made to them in
Canada. As the petitioners refused to give back the said amounts,
charges were filed against some of them with the NSB and the
Professional Regulations Commission. Estafa charges were also filed
before different branches of the then Court of First Instance of
Manila which, as earlier stated, were subsequently consolidated in
the sala of the respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo and which
eventually led to G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53.In G.R. Nos.
64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB that contrary to
the private respondent's allegations, they did not commit any
illegal act nor stage a strike while they were on board the vessel;
that the "Special Agreement" entered into in Vancouver to pay their
salary differentials is valid, having been executed after peaceful
negotiations. Petitioners further argued that the amounts they
received were in accordance with the provision of law, citing among
others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book I of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code which provides that "the basic minimum
salary of seamen shall not be less than the prevailing minimum
rates established by the International Labor Organization (ILO) or
those prevailing in the country whose flag the employing vessel
carries, whichever is higher ..."; and that the "Agreement"
executed in Nagoya, Japan had been forced upon them and that
intercalations were made to make it appear that they were merely
trustees of the amounts they received in Vancouver.On the other
hand, the private respondent alleged that the petitioners breached
their employment contracts when they, acting in concert and with
the active participations of the ITF while the vessel was in
Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and by means of threats,
coercion and intimidation compelled the owners of the vessel to pay
to them various sums totalling US$104,244.35; that the respondent
entered into the "Special Agreement" to pay the petitioners' wage
differentials because it was under duress as the vessel would not
be allowed to leave Vancouver unless the said agreement was signed,
and to prevent the shipowner from incurring further delay in the
shipment of goods; and that in view of petitioners' breach of
contract, the latter's names must be removed from the NSB's
Registry and that they should be ordered to return the amounts they
received over and above their contracted rates.The respondent NSB
ruled that the petitioners were guilty of breach of contract
because despite subsisting and valid NSB-approved employment
contracts, the petitioners sought the assistance of a third party
(ITF) to demand from the private respondent wages in accordance
with the ITF rates, which rates are over and above their rates of
pay as appearing in their NSB-approved contracts. As bases for this
conclusion, the NSB stated:1) The fact that respondents sought the
aid of a third party (ITF) and demanded for wages and overtime pay
based on ITF rates is shown in the entries of their respective
Pay-Off Clearance Slips which were marked as their Exhs. "1" to
"18", and we quote "DEMANDED ITF WAGES, OVERTIME, DIFFERENTIALS
APRIL TO OCTOBER 1978". Respondent Suzara admitted that the entries
in his Pay-Off Clearance Slip (Exh. "1") are correct (TSN., p. 16,
Dec. 6, 1979).Moreover, it is the policy (reiterated very often) by
the ITF that it does not interfere in the affairs of the
crewmembers and masters and/or owners of a vessel unless its
assistance is sought by the crewmembers themselves. Under this
pronounced policy of the ITF, it is reasonable to assume that the
representatives of the ITF in Vancouver, Canada assisted and
intervened by reason of the assistance sought by the latter.2) The
fact that the ITF assisted and intervened for and in behalf of the
respondents in the latter's demand for higher wages could be
gleaned from the answer of the respondents when they admitted that
the ITF acted in their behalf in the negotiations for increase of
wages. Moreover, respondent Cesar Dimaandal admitted that the ITF
differential pay was computed by the ITF representative (TSN, p. 7,
Dec. 12, 1979)3) The fact that complainant and the owner/operator
of the vessel were compelled to sign the Special Agreement (Exh.
"20") and to pay ITF differentials to respondents in order not to
delay the departure of the vessel and to prevent further losses is
shown in the "Agreement" (Exhs. "R-21") ... (pp. 69-70, Rollo)The
NSB further said:While the Board recognizes the rights of the
respondents to demand for higher wages, provided the means are
peaceful and legal, it could not, however, sanction the same if the
means employed are violent and illegal. In the case at bar, the
means employed are violent and illegal for in demanding higher
wages the respondents sought the aid of a third party and in turn
the latter intervened in their behalf and prohibited the vessel
from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded
to respondents' demand for higher wages. To avoid suffering further
incalculable losses, the owner and/or operator of the vessel had no
altemative but to pay respondents' wages in accordance with the ITF
scale. The Board condemns the act of a party who enters into a
contract and with the use of force/or intimidation causes the other
party to modify said contract. If the respondents believe that they
have a valid ground to demand from the complainant a revision of
the terms of their contracts, the same should have been done in
accordance with law and not thru illegal means. (at p. 72,
Rollo).Although the respondent NSB found that the petitioners were
entitled to the payment of earned wages and overtime pay/allowance
from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978, it nevertheless ruled
that the computation should be based on the rates of pay as
appearing in the petitioners' NSB-approved contracts. It ordered
that the amounts to which the petitioners are entitled under the
said computation should be deducted from the amounts that the
petitioners must return to the private respondent.On appeal, the
NLRC affirmed the NSB's findings. Hence, the petition in G.R. Nos.
64781-99.Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53
moved to quash the criminal cases of estafa filed against them on
the ground that the alleged crimes were committed, if at all, in
Vancouver, Canada and, therefore, Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction. The respondent judge denied the motion. Hence, the
second petition.The principal issue in these consolidated petitions
is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the amounts they
received from the private respondent representing additional wages
as determined in the special agreement. If they are, then the
decision of the NLRC and NSB must be reversed. Similarly, the
criminal cases of estafa must be dismissed because it follows as a
consequence that the amounts received by the petitioners belong to
them and not to the private respondent.In arriving at the
questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the petitioners are not
entitled to the wage differentials as determined by the ITF because
the means employed by them in obtaining the same were violent and
illegal and because in demanding higher wages the petitioners
sought the aid of a third party, which, in turn, intervened in
their behalf and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless the
owner and/or operator of the vessel acceded to respondents' demand
for higher wages. And as proof of this conclusion, the NSB cited
the following: (a) the entries in the petitioners Pay-Off Clearance
Slip which contained the phrase "DEMANDED ITF WAGES ..."; (b) the
alleged policy of the ITF in not interfering with crewmembers of a
vessel unless its intervention is sought by the crewmembers
themselves; (c), the petitioners' admission that ITF acted in their
behalf; and (d) the fact that the private respondent was compelled
to sign the special agreement at Vancouver, Canada.There is nothing
in the public and private respondents' pleadings, to support the
allegations that the petitioners used force and violence to secure
the special agreement signed in Vancouver, British Columbia. There
was no need for any form of intimidation coming from the Filipino
seamen because the Canadian Brotherhood of Railways and Transport
Workers (CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an
international labor federation was actually doing all the
influencing not only on the ship-owners and employers but also
against third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower wages
and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the employment and
livelihood of seamen from developed nations.The bases used by the
respondent NSB to support its decision do not prove that the
petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the ITF or deliberately
sought its assistance in order to receive higher wages. They only
prove that when ITF acted in petitioners' behalf for an increase in
wages, the latter manifested their support. This would be a logical
and natural reaction for any worker in whose benefit the ITF or any
other labor group had intervened. The petitioners admit that while
they expressed their conformity to and their sentiments for higher
wages by means of placards, they, nevertheless, continued working
and going about their usual chores. In other words, all they did
was to exercise their freedom of speech in a most peaceful way. The
ITF people, in turn, did not employ any violent means to force the
private respondent to accede to their demands. Instead, they simply
applied effective pressure when they intimated the possibility of
interdiction should the shipowner fail to heed the call for an
upward adjustment of the rates of the Filipino seamen. Interdiction
is nothing more than a refusal of ITF members to render service for
the ship, such as to load or unload its cargo, to provision it or
to perform such other chores ordinarily incident to the docking of
the ship at a certain port. It was the fear of ITF interdiction,
not any action taken by the seamen on board the vessel which led
the shipowners to yield.The NSB's contusion that it is ITF's policy
not to intervene with the plight of crewmembers of a vessel unless
its intervention was sought is without basis. This Court is
cognizant of the fact that during the period covered by the labor
controversies inWallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Minister of
Labor(102 SCRA 835 [1981];Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services,
Inc. v. NLRC(supra) and these consolidated petitions, the ITF was
militant worldwide especially in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia,
and various European countries, interdicting foreign vessels and
demanding wage increases for third world seamen. There was no need
for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF intervention. The ITF was
waiting on its own volition in all Canadian ports, not particularly
for the petitioners' vessel but for all ships similarly situated.
As earlier stated, the ITF was not really acting for the
petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF was merely protecting the
interests of its own members. The petitioners happened to be pawns
in a higher and broader struggle between the ITF on one hand and
shipowners and third world seamen, on the other. To subject our
seamen to criminal prosecution and punishment for having been
caught in such a struggle is out of the question.As stated
inVir-Jen Shipping(supra):The seamen had done no act which under
Philippine law or any other civilized law would be termed illegal,
oppressive, or malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild
compared to accepted and valid modes of labor activity. (at page
591)Given these factual situations, therefore, we cannot affirm the
NSB and NLRC's finding that there was violence, physical or
otherwise employed by the petitioners in demanding for additional
wages. The fact that the petitioners placed placards on the gangway
of their ship to show support for ITF's demands for wage
differentials for their own benefit and the resulting ITF's
threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The petitioners
were exercising their freedom of speech and expressing sentiments
in their hearts when they placed the placard We Want ITF Rates."
Under the facts and circumstances of these petitions, we see no
reason to deprive the seamen of their right to freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the
fundamental law of Canada where they happened to exercise it.As we
have ruled inWallemPhil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor, et al.
supra:Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents
was justified because the latter threatened the ship authorities in
acceding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct
as contemplated by the Labor Code. This contention is now
well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission of
any threat. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents'
behavior should not be censured because it is but natural for them
to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who
refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor
and respect the same. They were only acting in the exercise of
their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. ... (at page 843)We likewise,
find the public respondents' conclusions that the acts of the
petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over and above the
rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts is in effect an
alteration of their valid and subsisting contracts because the same
were not obtained through mutual consent and without the prior
approval of the NSB to be without basis, not only because the
private respondent's consent to pay additional wages was not
vitiated by any violence or intimidation on the part of the
petitioners but because the said NSB-approved form contracts are
not unalterable contracts that can have no room for improvement
during their effectivity or which ban any amendments during their
term.For one thing, the employer can always improve the working
conditions without violating any law or stipulation.We stated in
theVir-Jencase (supra) that:The form contracts approved by the
National Seamen Board are designed to protect Filipino seamen not
foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard
forms embody the basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts
of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code).They are not collective
bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which the parties
cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of
time. To state, therefore, that the affected seamen cannot petition
their employer for higher salaries during the 12 months duration of
the contract runs counter to estabhshed principles of labor
legislation. The National Labor Relations Commission, as the
appellate tribunal from the decisions of the National Seamen Board,
correctly ruled that the seamen did not violate their contracts to
warrant their dismissal. (at page 589)It is impractical for the NSB
to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor
struggle between the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway
around the world in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure the
approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement which the
employer was willing to sign. It is also totally unrealistic to
expect the petitioners while in Canada to exhibit the will and
strength to oppose the ITF's demand for an increase intheirwages,
assuming they were so minded.An examination of Annex C of the
petition, the agreement signed in Japan by the crewmembers of the
M/V Grace River and a certain M. Tabei, representative of the
Japanese shipowner lends credence to the petitioners' claim that
the clause "which amount(s) was received and held by CREWMEMBERS in
trust for SHIPOWNER" was an intercalation added after the execution
of the agreement. The clause appears too closely typed below the
names of the 19 crewmen and their wages with no similar intervening
space as that which appears between all the paragraphs and the
triple space which appears between the list of crewmembers and
their wages on one hand and the paragraph above which introduces
the list, on the other. The verb "were" was also inserted above the
verb "was" to make the clause grammatically correct but the
insertion of "were" is already on the same line as "Antonio Miranda
and 5,221.06" where it clearly does not belong. There is no other
space where the word "were" could be intercalated. (See Rollo, page
80).At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have
pretended to accept the increased wages while in Vancouver but
returned them to the shipowner when they reached its country,
Japan, has already been answered earlier by the Court:Filipino
seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any
other country in the world. Otherwise, there would not be so many
of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this
globe. It is competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes
our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have never
demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States,
the United Kingdom, Japan and other developed nations. But
certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask
for fair and decent treatment by their employer and when they
exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment,
especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are
capable of improvement according to internationally accepted rules.
In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two
sets of payrolls for their employees one in keeping with minimum
wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the
employees really receive. The reliable employers, however, not only
meet the minimums required by fair labor standards legislation but
even go away above the minimums while earning reasonable profits
and prospering. The same is true of international employment. There
is no reason why this court and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment or its agencies and commissions should come out with
pronouncements based on the standards and practices of unscrupulous
or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without
resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of Government
maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices
of honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or
foreign. (Vir-Jen Shipping,supra, pp. 587-588)It is noteworthy to
emphasize that while the Intemational Labor Organization (ILO) set
the minimum basic wage of able seamen at US$187.00 as early as
October 1976, it was only in 1979 that the respondent NSB issued
Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all shipping companies to adopt the
said minimum basic wage. It was correct for the respondent NSB to
state in its decision that when the petitioners entered into
separate contracts between 1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic
wage for able seamen ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00.
However, it is not the fault of the petitioners that the NSB not
only violated the Labor Code which created it and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish
the seamen for a shortcoming of NSB itself.Article 21(c) of the
Labor Code, when it created the NSB, mandated the Board to
"(O)btain the best possible terms and conditions of employment for
seamen."Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code provides:Sec. 15. Model contract of
employment. The NSB shall devise a model contract of employment
which shall embody all the requirements of pertinent labor and
social legislations and the prevailing standards set by applicable
International Labor Organization Conventions. The model contract
shall set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions to
govern the employment of Filipinos on board vessels engaged in
overseas trade. All employers of Filipinos shall adopt the model
contract in connection with the hiring and engagement of the
services of Filipino seafarers, and in no case shall a shipboard
employment contract be allowed where the same provides for benefits
less than those enumerated in the model employment contract, or in
any way conflicts with any other provisions embodied in the model
contract.Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules and Regulations
provides:Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-seamen. The basic
minimum salary of seamen shall be not less than the prevailing
minimxun rates established by the International Labor Organization
or those prevailing in the country whose flag the employing vessel
carries, whichever is higher. However, this provision shall not
apply if any shipping company pays its crew members salaries above
the minimum herein provided.Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the
Omnibus Rules provides:Section 8.Use of standard format of service
agreement. The Board shall adopt a standard format of service
agreement in accordance with pertinent labor and social legislation
and prevailing standards set by applicable International Labor
Organization Conventions. The standard format shall set the minimum
standard of the terms and conditions to govern the employment of
Filipino seafarers but in no case shall a shipboard employment
contract (sic), or in any way conflict with any other provision
embodied in the standard format.It took three years for the NSB to
implement requirements which, under the law, they were obliged to
follow and execute immediately. During those three years, the
incident in Vancouver happened. The terms and conditions agreed
upon in Vancouver were well within ILO rates even if they were
above NSB standards at the time.The sanctions applied by NSB and
affirmed by NLRC are moreover not in keeping with the basic premise
that this Court stressed in theVir-Jen Shippingcase(supra) that the
Ministry now the Department of Labor and Employment and all its
agencies exist primarily for the workingman's interest and the
nation's as a whole.Implicit in these petitions and the only reason
for the NSB to take the side of foreign shipowners against Filipino
seamen is the "killing the goose which lays the golden eggs"
argument. We reiterate the ruling of the Court inVir-Jen
Shipping(supra)There are various arguments raised by the
petitioners but the common thread running through all of them is
the contention, if not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent
seamen are sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the
hen that lays the golden egg." In other words, Filipino seamen,
admittedly among the best in the world, should remain satisfied
with relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their
contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as sacred,
iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which require: them to
falsely pretend to be members of international labor federations,
pretend to receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports only to
return the increased pay once the ship leaves that port, should
stifle not only their right to ask for improved terms of employment
but their freedom of speech and expression, and should suffer
instant termination of employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from their Government and their
courts. Otherwise, the petitioners contend that Filipinos would no
longer be accepted as seamen, those employed would lose their jobs,
and the still unemployed would be left hopeless.This is not the
first time and it will not be the last where the threat of
unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue against the
interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to better their
terms of employment would be characterized as prejudicing the
interests of labor as a whole.xxx xxx xxxUnionism, employers'
liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's compensation, social
security and collective bargaining to name a few were all initially
opposed by employers and even well meaning leaders of government
and society as "killing the hen or goose which lays the golden
eggs." The claims of workingmen were described as outrageously
injurious not only to the employer but more so to the employees
themselves before these claims or demands were established by law
and jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were proved
beneficial to management, labor, and the national as a whole beyond
reasonable doubt.The case before us does not represent any major
advance in the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private
respondents merely sought rights already established. No matter how
much the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking
for the entire industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of
employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.The
contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not
survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the
petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was
decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe
repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen,
and none of the dire consequences repeatedly emphasized by the
petitioner. Why should Vir-Jen be an exception?The wages of seamen
engaged in international shipping are shouldered by the foreign
principal. The local manning office is an agent whose primary
function is recruitment and who usually gets a lump sum from the
shipowner to defray the salaries of the crew. The hiring of seamen
and the determination of their compensation is subject to the
interplay of various market factors and one key factor is how much
in terms of profits the local manning office and the foreign
shipowner may realize after the costs of the voyage are met. And
costs include salaries of officers and crew members. (at pp.
585-586)TheWallemShippingcase, was decided in 1981.Vir-Jen
Shippingwas decided in 1983. It is now 1989. There has'been no
drying up of employment opportunities for Filipino seamen. Not only
have their wages improved thus leading ITF to be placid and quiet
all these years insofar as Filipinos are concerned but the hiring
of Philippine seamen is at its highest level ever.Reporting its
activities for the year 1988, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) stated that there will be an increase in
demand for seamen based overseas in 1989 boosting the number to as
high as 105,000. This will represent a 9.5 percent increase from
the 1988 aggregate. (Business World,News Briefs,January 11, 1989 at
page 2) According to the POEA, seabased workers numbering 95,913 in
1988 exceeded by a wide margin of 28.15 percent the year end total
in 1987. The report shows that sea-based workers posted bigger
monthly increments compared to those of landbased workers. (The
Business Star,Indicators, January 11, 1988 at page 2)Augmenting
this optimistic report of POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso is the
statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon that the
Philippines has a big jump over other crewing nations because of
the Filipinos' abilities compared with any European or westem
crewing country. Drilon added that cruise shipping is also a
growing market for Filipino seafarers because of their flexibility
in handling odd jobs and their expertise in handling almost all
types of ships, including luxury liners. (Manila Bulletin,More
Filipino SeamenExpected Development,December 27, 1988 at page
29).Parenthetically, the minimum monthly salary of able bodied
seamen set by the ILO and adhered to by the Philippines is now
$276.00 (id.) more than double the $130.00 sought to be enforced by
the public respondents in these petitions.The experience from 1981
to the present vindicates the finding inVir-Jen Shippingthat a
decision in favor of the seamen would not necessarily mean severe
repercussions, drying up of employment opportunities for seamen,
and other dire consequences predicted by manning agencies and
recruiters in the Philippines.From the foregoing, we find that the
NSB and NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding the
petitioners guilty of using intimidation and illegal means in
breaching their contracts of employment and punishing them for
these alleged offenses. Consequently, the criminal prosecutions for
estafa in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53 should be
dismissed.WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The
decisions of the National Seamen Board and National Labor Relations
Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one is entered holding the petitioners not guilty of the
offenses for which they were charged. The petitioners' suspension
from the National Seamen Board's Registry for three (3) years is
LIFTED. The private respondent is ordered to pay the petitioners
their earned but unpaid wages and overtime pay/allowance from
November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the
Special Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver,
Canada.The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos.
57999 and 58143-53, are ordered DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.FIRST
DIVISIONG.R. No. 80918 August 16, 1989JOSEFINA M.
PRINCIPE,petitionervs.PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.
and CHUAN HUP AGENCIES, PTE. LTD., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYEES EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION,respondents.R. C. Carrera Law Firm for
petitioner.Eladio B. Samson for private respondent.GANCAYCO,J.:Once
again this Tribunal is faced with the issue of the validity of the
quitclaim executed by the employee's heir in favor of the
employer.Petitioner is the widow of the late Abelardo Principe who
was then the Chief Engineer of M/V OSAM Falcon, a commercial vessel
of Singaporean registry owned by Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd.
(Chuan Hup for brevity), one of the private respondents herein, who
is the principal of Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.
(PSTSI), also a private respondent herein. The contract of
employment of the deceased with private respondent Chua Hup
provides, among others, that Principe would receive Singapore
$2,800.00 a month to commence on September 7, 1982, medical
benefits and insurance coverage through group hospitalization and
surgical insurance and group and personal accident insurance for a
capital sum of US$75,000.00. It also provides that the laws of
Singapore shall apply in cases of disputes arising out of the said
appointment and that said disputes are to be resolved by the courts
of the Republic of Singapore.1On September 15,1982, while Principe
was on duty in Malintoc Field, Palawan, Philippines, he suddenly
contracted a serious illness which eventually resulted to his
death.2On July 5, 1983, petitioner filed a complaint3against PSTSI
with the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), seeking the
payment of death compensation benefits and other benefits accruing
to her deceased husband. While the aforesaid case was pending, the
parties entered into a compromise agreement. On December 22, 1983,
petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor of PSTSI in
consideration of the sum of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00)
together with hospital, burial and other incidental expenses
previously disbursed by PSTSI in favor of petitioner's deceased
husband.4Consequently, Atty. Wellington Lachica, counsel for
petitioner, with the latter's conformity, filed a motion to dismiss
the case with prejudice against PSTSI and without prejudice as
against Chuan Hup5On the basis of the compromise agreement and the
motion to dismiss dated November 23, 1983, the POEA issued an order
dated December 27, 1983, dismissing petitioner's complaint with
prejudice against PSTSI.On April 21, 1986, petitioner filed with
the POEA another claim for death benefits against PSTSI, this time
including Chuan Hup. The new case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L)
86-04-328. In the decision dated January 27, 1987, the POEA
dismissed the complaint on the ground that there exist identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action between the previous
case, POEA Case No. L-635-83 and the new case, and that the present
case is barred by prior judgment based on a compromise agreement in
the previous case.6Petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).lwph1.tIn a resolution dated September
25, 1987, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.7Hence,
the present petition.It is the position of the petitioner that the
release and quitclaim that she signed in favor of private
respondent PSTSI is null and void on the ground that the
consideration given in exchange thereof in the amount of P7,000.00
is extremely low and unconscionable. Petitioner added that she was
merely misled to sign the quitclaim due to the assurance given by
PSTSI that it will help her recover the death compensation and
insurance proceeds due her deceased husband. She argued that even
on the assumption that the quitclaim is valid, the release should
benefit PSTSI alone and should not include Chua Hup as the
quitclaim was executed only in favor of PSTSI. Further she
contended that notwithstanding the quitclaim executed in favor of
PSTSI, the latter may still be held liable since it is an agent of
Chuan Hup here in the Philippines.8The Solicitor General supports
petitioner's view stating that the principle ofres judicatais
inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner and PSTSI agreed
that the dismissal of the suit against the latter is without
prejudice insofar as the principal Chuan Hup is concerned; that the
quitclaim is null and void as the consideration given is
unconscionably low as it is not even equal to one percent (1%) of
petitioner's claim; and that the quitclaim is inequitable and
incongrous to the declared policy of the State to afford protection
to labor, citing Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.9We rule for the petitioner.The release and quitclaim
in question reads as follows: JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPLE, of legal age,
widow, and resident at 1287-E, G. Tuazon St., Sampaloc, Manila in
favor of PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANS-PORT SERVICES, INC., a domestic
corporation domiciled and having its principal place of business at
205 Martinez Bldg., Dasmarinas, Manila.WITNESSETH, that:WHEREAS, on
July 5, 1983, Josefina M. Principe fled a complaint for death
benefits against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. as a
shipping agency of Chuan Hup Agencies Pte. Ltd. of the Republic of
Singapore for the death of her husband, Engr. Abelardo D. Principe,
on September 15, 1982 in Matinloc Field, Offshore Palawan,
Philippines while in the course of as employment as Chief Engineer
of OSAM Falcon' in POEA Case No. (L) 635-83 of thePhilippine
Overseas Employment Administration, entitled Josefina M. Principe
vs. Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.;'WHEREAS, the
parties have agreed to settle the above- entitled case
amicably.NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of
SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00), Philippine currency and of the
hospital, burial and other incidental expenses previously disbursed
by Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., receipt of which
in full is hereby acknowledged to her full and complete
satisfaction, JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPLE have (sic) released and
discharged, as she hereby releases and discharges,
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors,
officers, employees, principals and agents from any and all claims,
actions obligations and liabilities which she have or might have
against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. in connection
with the death of her husband Abelardo D. Principe on September 15,
1982 in Matintoc Field, Offshore Palawan under the circumstances
narrated in the aforementioned case.That she hereby represents and
warrants to Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. that she
is the surviving spouse legally entitled to claim for
damages/support which may arise from the death of said Abelardo D.
Principe, and further, that she hereby manifests that any and all
rights or claims which she, as a surviving forced heir of the late
Abelardo D. Principe might have against Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc., its directors, employees, principals and
agents arising out of or by reason of the death of said Abelardo D.
Principe are hereby deemed waived and discharged and she have (sic)
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its directors,
officers, employees, principals and agents and whoever may be held
liable, completely free and harmless from any claim and/or
liabilities that may arise from the death of said Abelardo D.
Principe (sic).That in the event that any other person/persons, as
surviving spouse of the deceased Abelardo D. Principe should claim
against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc. for such
damages/support arising from the death of Abelardo D. Principe, and
the claim is held valid, then Josefina M. Principe hereby
undertakes and agrees to reimburse to Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc. the amounts hereunder received, plus legal
interest therein.That she further states that the foregoing
consideration is voluntarily accepted by her as a full and final
compromise, adjustment and settlement of any and all claims that
she may have against Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.,
its directors, officers, employees, principals and agents; and she
hereby irrevocably affirm (sic) that Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc. has made this settlement solely to buy peace, avoid
litigation and on human consideration, and she acknowledges that
the payment of said consideration is not and shall never be
construed as an admission of liability or obligation by
Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc., its officers,
directors, employees, principals and agents.10It is true that a
compromise agreement once approved by the court has the effect
ofres judicatabetween the parties and should not be disturbed
except for vices of consent and forgery. However, settled is the
rule that the NLRC may disregard technical rules of procedure in
order to give life to the constitutional mandate affording
protection to labor and to conform to the need of protecting the
working class whose inferiority against the employer has always
been earmarked by disadvantage.11The Court finds that the
compromise agreement entered into by the petitioner in favor of
PSTSI was not intended to totally foreclose her right over the
death benefits of her husband. First, the motion to dismiss, filed
by petitioner through Atty. Lachica before the POEA, which cited
the compromise agreement entered into by the parties, clearly and
unequivocally reflects the undertaking that the release is without
prejudice as regards private respondent Chuan Hup. This fact was
acknowledged in the decision of POEA Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso in POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. It is surprising why both
the POEA and the NLRC failed to consider this aspect in the
resolution of the second complaint filed by the petitioner against
PSTSI and Chuan Hup.The second complaint was filed by petitioner to
enforce the joint and several liability of PSTSI and Chuan Hup per
joint affidavit of responsibility executed by said parties in
entering into a principal agent relationship after PSTSI failed to
live up to its commitment to assist petitioner in the recovery of
death compensation.12This observation is supported by the
provisions of the release signed by the petitioner wherein the
parties referred to therein were only the petitioner and PSTSI. The
release is from any claim against PSTSI. Chuan Hup is not a party
thereto. He cannot be considered covered by the release.Moreover,
the Court sees no reason why petitioner, with the assistance of a
counsel would ever agree to foreclose her right against Chuan Hup
over the death benefits of her husband in exchange for a very
measly sum of Seven Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00). They must have been
aware that should she pursue her case, she was assured of getting
at least One Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Singapore dollars
(US$100,800.00). This Court has laid down the rule in similar cases
that applying the Singapore Maritime Laws in case of a seaman's
death, the heirs of the seaman should receive the equivalent of 36
months wages of the deceased seaman.13The fact that petitioner
received the sum of P7,000.00 only should not be taken to mean as a
waiver of her right. The circumstances she was confronted with
during that time left her with no other alternative but to accept
the same as she was in dire need of money due to the sudden death
of her husband. PSTSI contends that it was precisely because of her
need for cash that petitioner thereby totally waived her right over
the death benefits of her husband. We do not think so. What is
plausible is the protestation of petitioner that PSTSI took
advantage of her financial distress and led her to signing the
release and quitclaim without explaining the consequences to her.
While it may be true that her counsel assisted her in the process,
said counsel must have been persuaded by the assurance of PSTSI
that it shall help obtain for her the corresponding benefits from
Chuan Hup.Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim
had foreclosed petitioner's right over the death benefits of her
husband, the fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof
was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders
the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public
policy.14The State must be firm in affording protection to labor.
The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low and
inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her
legitimate claim.15Equity dictates that the compromise agreement
should be voided in this instance.Lastly, it must be noted that the
first complaint of petitioner was merely an action against PSTSI
whereas in the second complaint Chuan Hup was already included. The
POEA ruled that the second complaint was merely an afterthought,
and that it was a product of a pre-conceived mind considering the
interval of time from the issuance of the order of dismissal in the
previous case and the institution of the second complaint. We do
not think so. On the contrary, the Court holds that the delay was
due to PSTSI's failure to make good its promise to assist the
petitioner in recovering the death benefits of her husband. We see
no other reason thereby. Hence, even if the second action was filed
beyond the three (3) year reglementary period as provided by law
for such claims, We cannot buy PSTSI's argument that the claim is
already barred. The blame for the delay, if any, can only be
attributed to PSTSI.On the other hand, PSTSI argues that it cannot
be held responsible on the ground that the aforesaid affidavit of
undertaking with Chua Hup is applicable only to those members of
the crew recruited by PSTSI in the Philippines for and in behalf of
its principal Chuan Hup and that since Principe was directly hired
by Chuan Hup, PSTSI cannot be held responsible as it has no privity
of contract with those personnel recruited in Singapore.The
argument is untenable. This is the first time PSTSI raised this
defense when it had all the chance to do so below. Moreover, if
PSTSI honestly believed it had no privity of contract with Principe
who was directly recruited by Chuan Hup, then there is no reason
why it entered into a compromise agreement with herein petitioner.
From the very start, it should have asked for the dismissal of the
case against it on the ground of lack of cause of action, but it
did not do so. What is obvious is that Principe was actually
recruited by PSTSI and that he signed the employment contract with
the principal Chuan Hup. Thus, private respondents stand jointly
and severally liable for the claim of petitioner.Anent the argument
that the Philippine courts are without jurisdiction over the
subject matter as jurisdiction was, by agreement of the parties,
vested in the courts of the Republic of Singapore, it is
well-settled that an agreement to deprive a court of jurisdiction
conferred on it by law is void and of no legal effect.16In this
jurisdiction labor cases, are within the competence of the National
Labor Relations Commission.With respect to petitioner's monetary
claim, since the parties agreed that the laws of Singapore shall
govern their relationship and that any dispute arising from the
contract shall be resolved by the law of that country, then the
petitioner is entitled to death benefits equivalent to 36 months
salary of her husband.17As the wage of deceased Abelardo Principe
was S$2,800.00 a month, then petitioner is entitled to a total of
S$100,800.00.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
granted. The resolution of the NLRC dated September 25,1987 is
hereby set aside and another decision is hereby rendered ordering
private respondents PSTSI and Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd. to
jointly and severally pay petitioner the sum of S$100,800. 00 in
its equivalent in Philippine pesos. This decision is immediately
executory.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994BIENVENIDO
M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of
1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty.
GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION,respondents.QUIASON,J.:The
petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et.
al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's
Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court:(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases
Nos.L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460; (2) to
render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in
default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii)
ordering Asia International Builders Corporation (AIBC) and Brown
and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the 1,767
claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de
Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No.
L-86-05-460; and(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992
of NLRC, denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution
dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).The petition in G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon.
National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was filed under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court:(1) to reverse the Resolution
dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555,
L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 andL-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied
the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the
Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under the
Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the"three-hour daily
average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay;
and(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).The petition in G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders Corporation,
et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was filed
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:(1) to reverse the
Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 andL-86-05-460, insofar as it
granted the claims of 149 claimants; and(2) to reverse the
Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the
motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59;
61-230).The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which
modified the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded
monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor
Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive
evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of
substantial evidence or proof of employment.Consolidation of
CasesG.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the
Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the Second
Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second
Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, p. 895).In the Resolution dated September 29,
1993, the Third Division granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776
and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos.
104911-14,Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30,Rollo, pp.
369-377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the
First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos.
104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,Rollo, p. 1109;
G.R. Nos. 105029-32,Rollo, p. 1562).IOn June 6, 1984, Bienvenido
M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their
own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers
(OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint"
with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for
money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment
by BRII (POEA Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented
by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.BRII is a foreign corporation with
headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction;
while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.The amended
complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion
of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the
Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area
wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS
and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not
remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices;
as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 13-14).At the
hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to
file its answer.On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of
AIBC and BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars
within ten days from receipt of the order and the movants to file
their answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of
particulars. The POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial
conference on July 25, 1984.On July 13, 1984, the claimants
submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 23, 1984,
AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint"
and the "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the
claimants filed their "Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among
other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers
and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The
claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to
present evidence and had defaulted by failing to file their answers
and to attend the pre-trial conference.On October 2, 1984, the POEA
Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of the Records"
filed by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out in the order.On October
10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the
Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent Manifestation,"
praying that the POEA Administrator direct the parties to submit
simultaneously their position papers, after which the case should
be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty. Florante
de Castro filed another complaint for the same money claims and
benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also
claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).On
October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the Order
dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that
the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position
papers after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file its comment on the
"Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November
6, 1984, it filed a second motion for extension of time to file the
comment.On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC
that its motion for extension of time was granted.On November 14,
1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions for extension of
time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for
failure to file their answers.On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII
filed a "Comment" praying, among other reliefs, that claimants
should be ordered to amend their complaint.On December 27, 1984,
the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to
file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.On
February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the
reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants
opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and praying that
AIBC and BRII be declared in default.On April 2, 1985, the original
claimants filed an "Amended Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated
March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of overtime
pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave
indemnity pay, retirement and savings benefits and their share of
forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985,
the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the
amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776,Rollo, p. 20).On May 28, 1985,
claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On the
same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file
their answers to the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be
deemed to have waived their right to present evidence and the case
would be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.On June 5,
1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class
Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated
March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the motions.On September 4,
1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC and
BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.On
September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC,
together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction.
On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from
hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of
the answers of AIBC and BRII.On September 19, 1985, claimants asked
the POEA Administrator to include additional claimants in the case
and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their
respective lawyers.On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two
co-claimants filed a complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against
AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to
those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month,
Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No.
L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.On October 17, 1985, the law
firm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked for the
substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation
of the special powers of attorney given the original counsel.On
December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of the
claim to enforce attorney's lien.On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro
filed a complaint for money claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in
behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in
POEA Case No. 84-06-555.On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed
the two appeals filed on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985
by AIBC and BRII.In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases
before the POEA Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two
cases were filed in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely G.R.
No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on
March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA
Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and
oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460
and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.AIBC also
filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning
the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said
order required BRII and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in
POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution dated November 9, 1987,
we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that all its technical
objections may properly be resolved in the hearings before the
POEA.Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was
filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18
co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC
Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint to the
Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request for the early
disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed on
April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R.
Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social
legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N.
Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations
of labor laws.On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.On
January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its
motion for suspension of the period for filing an answer or motion
for extension of time to file the same until the resolution of its
motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC dismissing the
two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRCen bancdenied the motion for
reconsideration.At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its
answer to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were
given a period of 15 days from said date within which to submit
their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed
their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the
answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed
their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with
the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and
BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants
filed their "Ex-ParteMotion to Expunge from the Records" the
position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of
time.On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De
Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On
September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental
Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to
Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted
their "Ex-ParteManifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental
Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of employments and
service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a
"Consolidated Reply."On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator
rendered his decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other
consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in
favor of only 324 complainants.On February 10, 1989, claimants
submitted their "Appeal Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the
decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion
for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of
Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for
AIBC.On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to
Appeal," praying for th