-
Otto von Bismarck
For other uses, see Bismarck (disambiguation).
Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke ofLauenburg (1
April 1815 30 July 1898), known asOtto von Bismarck, was a
conservative Prussian states-man who dominated German and European
aairs fromthe 1860s until 1890. In the 1860s he engineered a
se-ries of wars that unied the German states (excludingAustria)
into a powerful German Empire under Prussianleadership. With that
accomplished by 1871 he skillfullyused balance of power diplomacy
to preserve Germanhegemony in a Europe which, despite many disputes
andwar scares, remained at peace. For historian Eric Hobs-bawm, it
was Bismarck, who remained undisputed worldchampion at the game of
multilateral diplomatic chess foralmost twenty years after 1871,
[and] devoted himself ex-clusively, and successfully, to
maintaining peace betweenthe powers.[2]
In 1862 King Wilhelm I appointed Bismarck as MinisterPresident
of Prussia, a post he would hold until 1890 (ex-cept for a short
break in 1873). He provoked three short,decisive wars against
Denmark, Austria and France,aligning the smaller German states
behind Prussia in de-feating his arch-enemy France. In 1871 he
formed theGerman Empire with himself as Chancellor, while
re-taining control of Prussia. His diplomacy of realpolitikand
powerful rule at home gained him the nickname theIron Chancellor.
German unication and its rapid eco-nomic growth was the foundation
to his foreign policy.He disliked colonialism but reluctantly built
an overseasempire when it was demanded by both elite and
massopinion. Juggling a very complex interlocking series
ofconferences, negotiations and alliances, he used his un-rivaled
diplomatic skills to maintain Germanys positionand used the balance
of power to keep Europe at peacein the 1870s and 1880s.He was the
master of complex politics at home. He cre-ated the rst welfare
state in the modern world, with thegoal of gaining working class
support that might other-wise go to his Socialist enemies. In the
1870s he alliedhimself with the Liberals (who were low-tari and
anti-Catholic) and fought the Catholic Church in a culture war.He
lost that battle as the Catholics responded by forminga powerful
Center party and using universal male surageto gain a bloc of
seats. Bismarck then reversed himself,ended the culture war, broke
with the Liberals, imposedtaris, and formed a political alliance
with the Centerparty to ght the Socialists. A devout Lutheran, he
wasloyal to his king, who in turn gave Bismarck his full sup-
port, against the advice of his wife and his heir. WhileGermanys
parliament was elected by universal male suf-frage, it did not have
real control of the government. Bis-marck distrusted democracy and
ruled through a strong,well-trained bureaucracy with power in the
hands of a tra-ditional Junker elite that comprised the landed
nobility ofthe east. Under Wilhelm I, Bismarck largely
controlleddomestic and foreign aairs, until he was removed byyoung
Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890.Bismarck, an aristocratic Junker himself,
had an ex-tremely aggressive and domineering personality. He
dis-played a violent temper and kept his power by threat-ening to
resign time and again. He possessed not onlya long-term national
and international vision, but alsothe short-term ability to juggle
many complex develop-ments simultaneously. As the leader of what
historianscall "revolutionary conservatism",[1] Bismarck became
ahero to German nationalists; they built hundreds of mon-uments
glorifying the iconic symbol of powerful conser-vative leadership.
Historians generally praise him as astatesman of moderation and
balance who kept the peacein Europe, and was primarily responsible
for the uni-cation of Germany and building its world-renowned
bu-reaucracy and army.
1 Early yearsBismarck was born in Schnhausen, a wealthy family
es-tate situated west of Berlin in the Prussian province ofSaxony.
His father, Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand von Bis-marck (17711845), was a
Junker estate owner and aformer Prussian military ocer; his mother,
WilhelmineLuise Mencken (17891839), was the well-educateddaughter
of a senior government ocial in Berlin. Theworld saw Bismarck as a
typical Prussian Junkeran im-age which he encouraged by wearing
military uniforms.Bismarck was well educated and cosmopolitan, with
a giftfor conversation. In addition to his native German, he
wasuent in English, French, Italian, Polish and Russian.[3]
Bismarck was educated at Johann Ernst Plamann's ele-mentary
school,[4] and the Friedrich-Wilhelm andGrauesKloster secondary
schools. From 1832 to 1833 he stud-ied law at the University of
Gttingen, where he wasa member of the Corps Hannovera, and then
enrolledat the University of Berlin (183335). In 1838,
whilestationed as an army reservist in Greifswald, he
studiedagriculture at the University of Greifswald.[1] At
Gttin-gen, Bismarck became friends with the American student
1
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2 2 EARLY POLITICAL CAREER
Bismarck at 21, 1836
John Lothrop Motley. Motley, who later became an emi-nent
historian and diplomat while remaining close to Bis-marck, wrote a
novel in 1839,Mortons Hope, or theMem-oirs of a Provincial, about
life in a German university. Init he described Bismarck as a
reckless and dashing eccen-tric, but also as an extremely gifted
and charming youngman.[5]
Although Bismarck hoped to become a diplomat, hestarted his
practical training as a lawyer in Aachen andPotsdam, and soon
resigned, having rst placed his ca-reer in jeopardy by taking
unauthorized leave to pursuetwo English girls, rst Laura Russell,
niece of the Dukeof Cleveland, and then Isabella Loraine-Smith,
daughterof a wealthy clergyman. He also served in the army fora
year and became an ocer in the Landwehr (reserve),before returning
to run the family estates at Schnhausenon his mothers death in his
mid-twenties.Around age 30 Bismarck had an intense friendshipwith
Marie von Thadden, newly married to one ofhis friends. Under her
inuence, Bismarck becamea Pietist Lutheran, and later recorded that
at Mariesdeathbed (from typhoid) he prayed for the rst timesince
his childhood. Bismarck married Maries cousin,the noblewoman
Johanna von Puttkamer (182494) atAlt-Kolziglow (modern Koczygowy)
on 28 July 1847.Their long and happy marriage produced three
children,Herbert (b. 1849), Wilhelm (b. 1852) and Marie (b.1847).
Johanna was a shy, retiring and deeply religiouswomanalthough famed
for her sharp tongue in laterlifeand in his public life Bismarck
was sometimes ac-companied by his sister Malwine Malle von
Arnim.
Bismarck soon adopted his wifes pietism, and he re-mained a
devout Pietist Lutheran for the rest of his life.
2 Early political career
Bismarck at age 32, 1847
In 1847 Bismarck, aged 32, was chosen as a repre-sentative to
the newly created Prussian legislature, theVereinigter Landtag.
There, he gained a reputationas a royalist and reactionary
politician with a gift forstinging rhetoric; he openly advocated
the idea that themonarch had a divine right to rule. His selection
wasarranged by the Gerlach brothers, fellow Pietist Luther-ans
whose ultra-conservative faction was known as theKreuzzeitung after
their newspaper, the Neue Preussis-che Zeitung, which was so
nicknamed because it featuredan Iron Cross on its cover.[6][7]
In March 1848, Prussia faced a revolution (one of therevolutions
of 1848 across Europe), which completelyoverwhelmed King Frederick
William IV. The monarch,though initially inclined to use armed
forces to suppressthe rebellion, ultimately declined to leave
Berlin for thesafety of military headquarters at Potsdam
(Bismarcklater recorded that there had been a rattling of sabres
intheir scabbards from Prussian ocers when they learnedthat the
King would not suppress the revolution by force).He oered numerous
concessions to the liberals: he worethe black-red-and-gold
revolutionary colours (as seen onthe ag of todays Germany),
promised to promulgate aconstitution, agreed that Prussia and other
German statesshould merge into a single nation-state, and appointed
aliberal, Ludolf Camphausen, as Minister President.[8]
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3Bismarck had at rst tried to rouse the peasants of his es-tate
into an army tomarch on Berlin in the Kings name.[9]He travelled to
Berlin in disguise to oer his services,but was instead told to make
himself useful by arrang-ing food supplies for the Army from his
estates in casethey were needed. The Kings brother, Prince
Wilhelmhad ed to England, and Bismarck intrigued with Wil-helms
wife Augusta to place their teenage son FrederickWilliam on the
Prussian throne in FrederickWilliam IVsplace. Augusta would have
none of it, and detested Bis-marck thereafter,[10] despite the fact
that he later helpedrestore a working relationship between the King
and hisbrother. Bismarck was not yet a member of the Land-tagthe
lower house of the new Prussian legislature. Theliberal movement
perished by the end of 1848 amid in-ternal ghting. Meanwhile, the
conservatives regrouped,formed an inner group of advisersincluding
the Ger-lach brothersknown as the "Camarilla"around theKing, and
retook control of Berlin. Although a consti-tution was granted, its
provisions fell far short of the de-mands of the
revolutionaries.[11]
In 1849, Bismarck was elected to the Landtag. At thisstage in
his career, he opposed the unication of Ger-many, arguing that
Prussia would lose its independence inthe process. He accepted his
appointment as one of Prus-sias representatives at the Erfurt
Parliament, an assemblyof German states that met to discuss plans
for union, buthe only did so to oppose that bodys proposals more
ef-fectively. The parliament failed to bring about unica-tion, for
it lacked the support of the two most importantGerman states,
Prussia and Austria. In September 1850,after a dispute over Hesse,
(the Hesse Crisis of 1850[12])Prussia was humiliated and forced to
back down by Aus-tria (supported by Russia) in the so-called
Punctation ofOlmtz;[13] a plan for the unication of Germany
underPrussian leadership, proposed by Prussias Minister Pres-ident
Radowitz, was also abandoned.In 1851, Frederick William IV
appointed Bismarck asPrussias envoy to the Diet of the German
Confedera-tion in Frankfurt. Bismarck gave up his elected seat
inthe Landtag, but was appointed to the Prussian Houseof Lords a
few years later. In Frankfurt he engaged ina battle of wills with
the Austrian representative CountFriedrich von Thun und Hohenstein,
insisting on beingtreated as an equal by petty tactics such as
insisting on do-ing the same when Thun claimed the privileges of
smok-ing and removing his jacket in meetings.[14] This episodewas
the background for an altercation in the Frankfurtchamber with
Georg von Vincke that led to a duel be-tween Bismarck and Vincke
and Carl von Bodelschwinghas impartial party, which ended without
injury.[15]
Bismarcks eight years in Frankfurt were marked bychanges in his
political opinions, detailed in the numer-ous lengthy memoranda
which he sent to his ministerialsuperiors in Berlin. No longer
under the inuence ofhis ultraconservative Prussian friends,
Bismarck becameless reactionary and more pragmatic. He became
con-
vinced that to countervail Austrias newly restored inu-ence,
Prussia would have to ally herself with other Ger-man states. As a
result, he grew to be more accepting ofthe notion of a united
German nation. He gradually cameto believe that he and his fellow
conservatives had to takethe lead in the drive toward creating a
unied nation inorder to keep from being eclipsed. He also believed
thatthe middle-class liberals wanted a unied Germany morethan they
wanted to break the grip of the traditional forcesover
society.Bismarck also worked to maintain the friendship ofRussia
and a working relationship with Napoleon III'sFrancethe latter
being anathema to his conservativefriends the Gerlachs,[16] but
necessary both to threatenAustria and to prevent France allying
herself to Russia. Ina famous letter to Leopold von Gerlach,
Bismarck wrotethat it was foolish to play chess having rst put 16
of the64 squares out of bounds. This observation was ironic asafter
1871, France indeed became Germanys permanentenemy, and eventually
allied with Russia against Ger-many in the 1890s.[17]
Bismarck was alarmed by Prussias isolation during theCrimean War
of the mid-1850s, in which Austria sidedwith Britain and France
against Russia; Prussia was al-most not invited to the peace talks
in Paris. In the East-ern crisis of the 1870s, fear of a repetition
of this turn ofevents would later be a factor in Bismarcks signing
theDual Alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1879.
3 Ambassador to Russia andFrance
Bismarck with Roon (centre) and Moltke (right), the three
leadersof Prussia in the 1860s
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4 4 MINISTER PRESIDENT OF PRUSSIA
In October 1857, Frederick William IV suered aparalysing stroke.
His brother Wilhelm took over thePrussian government as Regent.
Wilhelm was initiallyseen as a moderate ruler, whose friendship
with liberalBritain was symbolised by the recent marriage of hisson
Frederick William to Queen Victoria's eldest daugh-ter. As part of
Wilhelms New Course he broughtin new ministers, moderate
conservatives known as theWochenblatt party after their newspaper.
Soon the Re-gent replaced Bismarck as envoy in Frankfurt and
madehim Prussias ambassador to the Russian Empire. In the-ory, this
was a promotion as Russia was one of Prussiastwo most powerful
neighbors. But Bismarck was side-lined from events in Germany,
watching impotently asFrance drove Austria out of Lombardy during
the ItalianWar of 1859. Bismarck proposed that Prussia
shouldexploit Austrias weakness to move her frontiers as farsouth
as Lake Constance on the Swiss border; insteadPrussia mobilised
troops in the Rhineland to deter fur-ther French advances into
Venetia.As a further snub, the Regent, who scorned Bismarck asa
Landwehrleutnant (reserve lieutenant), had declinedto promote him
to the rank of major-general, normal forthe ambassador to St
Petersburg (and important as Prus-sia and Russia were close
military allies, whose headsof state often communicated through
military contactsrather than diplomatic channels). Bismarck stayed
in StPetersburg for four years, during which he almost losthis leg
to botched medical treatment and once again methis future
adversary, the Russian Prince Gorchakov, whohad been the Russian
representative in Frankfurt in theearly 1850s. The Regent also
appointed Helmuth vonMoltke as the new Chief of Sta of the Prussian
Army,and Albrecht von Roon as Minister of War with the jobof
reorganizing the army. Over the next 12 years thesetwo and Bismarck
transformed Prussia. Bismarck laterreferred to this period as the
most signicant of my life.Despite his lengthy stay abroad, Bismarck
was not en-tirely detached from German domestic aairs. He re-mained
well-informed due to his friendship with Roon,and they formed a
lasting political alliance. In May1862, he was sent to Paris, to
serve as ambassador toFrance. He also visited England that summer.
Thesevisits enabled him to meet and take the measure of sev-eral
adversariesNapoleon III in France, and in Britain,Prime Minister
Palmerston, Foreign Secretary Earl Rus-sell, and Conservative
politician Benjamin Disraeli. Dis-raeli, who would become Prime
Minister in the 1870s,later claimed to have said of Bismarck, Be
careful ofthat man he means every word he says.
4 Minister President of PrussiaThe regent became King Wilhelm I
upon his brothersdeath in 1861. The new monarch often came into
conictwith the increasingly liberal Prussian Diet. A crisis
arose
Otto von Bismarck as Minister President of Prussia, shown
wear-ing insignia of a knight of the Johanniterorden
in 1862, when the Diet refused to authorize funding for
aproposed re-organization of the army. The Kings minis-ters could
not convince legislators to pass the budget, andthe King was
unwilling to make concessions. Wilhelmthreatened to abdicate in
favour of his brother FrederickWilliam (who opposed it) and
believed that Bismarck wasthe only politician capable of handling
the crisis. How-ever, Wilhelm was ambivalent about appointing a
personwho demanded unfettered control over foreign aairs.When, in
September 1862, theAbgeordnetenhaus (Houseof Deputies)
overwhelmingly rejected the proposed bud-get, Wilhelm was persuaded
to recall Bismarck to Prussiaon the advice of Roon. On 23 September
1862, Wilhelmappointed BismarckMinister President and Foreign
Min-ister.[18]
Bismarck, Roon and Moltke took charge at a timewhen relations
among the Great PowersGreat Britain,France, Austria and Russiahad
been shattered by theCrimean War and the Italian War. In the midst
of thisdisarray, the European balance of power was restructuredwith
the creation of the German Empire as the dominantpower in Europe.
This was achieved by Bismarcks diplo-macy, Roons reorganization of
the army, and Moltkesmilitary strategy.[19]
Despite the initial distrust of the King and Crown Prince,and
the loathing of Queen Augusta, Bismarck soon ac-quired a powerful
hold over the King by force of person-ality and powers of
persuasion. Bismarck was intent onmaintaining royal supremacy by
ending the budget dead-lock in the Kings favour, even if he had to
use extralegal
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5.2 Defeat of Denmark 5
means to do so. Under the Constitution, the budget couldonly be
passed after the king and legislature agreed onits terms, Bismarck
contended that since the Constitutiondid not provide for cases in
which legislators failed to ap-prove a budget, there was a hole in
the Constitution,and he could merely apply the previous years
budget tokeep the government running. Thus, on the basis of the1861
budget, tax collection continued for four years.[20]
Bismarcks conict with the legislators intensied in thecoming
years. Following the Alvensleben Convention of1863, the House of
Deputies resolved that it could nolonger come to terms with
Bismarck; in response, theKing dissolved the Diet, accusing it of
trying to obtainunconstitutional control over the ministry (which,
underthe Constitution, was responsible solely to the king).
Bis-marck then issued an edict restricting the freedom of thepress;
this policy even gained the public opposition of theCrown Prince.
Despite attempts to silence critics, Bis-marck remained a largely
unpopular politician. His sup-porters fared poorly in the elections
of October 1863, inwhich a liberal coalition (whose primary member
was theProgress Party) won over two-thirds of the seats. TheHouse
made repeated calls for Bismarck to be dismissed,but the King
supported him as he feared that if he did dis-miss theMinister
President, he would likely be succeededby a liberal.[21]
5 Unication of GermanyMain article: Unication of Germany
5.1 Blood and Iron speechMain article: Blood and Iron speech
German unication had been a major objective of therevolutions of
1848, when representatives of the Germanstates met in Frankfurt and
drafted a constitution creatinga federal union with a national
parliament to be electedby universal male surage. In April 1849,
the FrankfurtParliament oered the title of Emperor to King
FrederickWilliam IV. Fearing the opposition of the other
Germanprinces and the military intervention of Austria and Rus-sia,
the King renounced this popular mandate. Thus, theFrankfurt
Parliament ended in failure for the German lib-erals. On 30
September 1862, Bismarck made a speechto the Budget Committee of
the Prussian Chamber ofDeputies, in which he expounded on the use
of "iron andblood" to achieve Prussias goals:
Prussia must concentrate and maintain itspower for the favorable
moment which hasalready slipped by several times.
Prussiasboundaries according to the Vienna treaties are
not favorable to a healthy state life. The greatquestions of the
time will not be resolved byspeeches and majority decisionsthat was
thegreat mistake of 1848 and 1849but by ironand blood.[22]
5.2 Defeat of Denmark
Bismarck at 48, 1863
Germany, prior to the 1860s, consisted of a multitude
ofprincipalities loosely bound together as members of theGerman
Confederation. Bismarck used both diplomacyand the Prussian
military to achieve unication, excludingAustria from a unied
Germany. Not only did this makePrussia the most powerful and
dominant component ofthe new Germany, but also ensured that it
remained au-thoritarian, rather than a liberal parliamentary
regime.[23]
Bismarck faced a diplomatic crisis when Frederick VIIof Denmark
died in November 1863. Succession tothe duchies of Schleswig and
Holstein were disputed;they were claimed by Christian IX (Frederick
VIIs heiras King) and by Frederick von Augustenburg, a Dan-ish
duke. Prussian public opinion strongly favoured Au-gustenburgs
claim, as Holstein and southern Schleswigwere and still are mostly
German-speaking. Bismarcktook an unpopular step by insisting that
the territorieslegally belonged to the Danishmonarch under the
LondonProtocol signed a decade earlier. Nonetheless, Bis-marck
denounced Christians decision to completely an-nex Schleswig to
Denmark. With support from Aus-
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6 5 UNIFICATION OF GERMANY
tria, he issued an ultimatum for Christian IX to returnSchleswig
to its former status. When Denmark refused,Austria and Prussia
invaded, commencing the SecondSchleswig War and Denmark was forced
to cede bothduchies.At rst this seemed like a victory for Frederick
of Au-gustenburg, but Bismarck soon removed him from powerby making
a series of unworkable demands, namely thatPrussia should have
control over the army and navy ofthe Duchies. Originally, it was
proposed that the Dietof the German Confederation (in which all the
states ofGermany were represented) should determine the fate ofthe
duchies; but before this scheme could be eected,Bismarck induced
Austria to agree to the Gastein Con-vention. Under this agreement
signed 20 August 1865,Prussia received Schleswig, while Austria
received Hol-stein. In that year he was given the title of Graf
(Count)von Bismarck-Schnhausen.[24]
5.3 Defeat of Austria
1867 cartoon making fun of Bismarcks dierent roles, fromgeneral
to minister of foreign aairs, federal chancellor, hunter,diplomat
and president of the Zollverein parliament.
In 1866, Austria reneged on the agreement and demandedthat the
Diet determine the SchleswigHolstein issue.Bismarck used this as an
excuse to start a war withAustria by accusing them of violating the
Gastein Con-vention. Bismarck sent Prussian troops to occupy
Hol-stein. Provoked, Austria called for the aid of other Ger-man
states, who quickly became involved in the Austro-Prussian War.[25]
Thanks to Roons reorganising, thePrussian army was nearly equal in
numbers to the Aus-trian army. With the strategic genius ofMoltke,
the Prus-sian army fought battles it was able to win. Bismarckhad
also made a secret alliance with Italy, who
desiredAustrian-controlled Venetia. Italys entry into the warforced
the Austrians to divide their forces.[26]
Meanwhile, as the war began, a German radical namedFerdinand
Cohen-Blind attempted to assassinate Bis-marck in Berlin, shooting
him ve times at close range.Bismarck had only minor injuries;
Cohen-Blind commit-ted suicide while in custody.
The war lasted seven weeksGermans called it aBlitzkrieg
(lightning wara term also used in1939).[27] Austria had a seemingly
powerful army; it wasallied with most of the north German and all
of the southGerman states. Nevertheless Prussia won the
decisiveBattle of Kniggrtz. The King and his generals wantedto push
onward, conquer Bohemia and march to Vienna,but Bismarck, worried
that Prussian military luck mightchange or that France might
intervene on Austrias side,enlisted the help of the Crown Prince
(who had opposedthe war but had commanded one of the Prussian
armies atKniggrtz) to dissuade his father after stormy
meetings.Bismarck insisted on a soft peace with no annexationsand
no victory parades, so as to be able to quickly restorefriendly
relations with Austria.[28]
As a result of the Peace of Prague (1866), the
GermanConfederation was dissolved. Prussia annexed
Schleswig,Holstein, Frankfurt, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel, and
Nassau.Further, Austria promised not to intervene in German
af-fairs. To solidify Prussian hegemony, Prussia forced the21
states north of the River Main to join it in formingthe North
German Confederation in 1867. The confed-eration was governed by a
constitution largely drafted byBismarck. Executive power was vested
in a presidentahereditary oce of the kings of Prussia. He was
assistedby a chancellor responsible only to him. As president ofthe
confederation, Wilhelm appointed Bismarck as chan-cellor of the
confederation. Legislation was the responsi-bility of the
Reichstag, a popularly elected body, and theBundesrat, an advisory
body representing the states. TheBundesrat was, in practice, the
stronger chamber. Bis-marck was the dominant gure in the new
arrangement;as Foreign Minister of Prussia, he instructed the
Prussiandeputies to the Bundesrat. Prussia only had a plurality(17
out of 43 seats) in the Bundesrat despite being largerthan the
other 21 states combined, but Bismarck couldeasily control the
proceedings through alliances with thesmaller states. This began
what historians refer to as TheMisery of Austria, in which Austria
served as a merevassal to the superior Germany, a relationship that
was toshape history until the two World Wars. Bismarck
hadoriginally managed to convince smaller states like Sax-ony,
Hesse-Kassel, and Hanover to join Prussia againstAustria, after
promising them protection from foreign in-vasion, morale unity, and
fair commercial laws.Bismarck, who by now held the rank of major in
theLandwehr, wore this uniform during the campaign, andwas at last
promoted to the rank of major-general in theLandwehr cavalry after
the war. Although he never per-sonally commanded troops in the eld,
he usually worea generals uniform in public for the rest of his
life, asseen in numerous paintings and photographs. He was
alsogiven a cash grant by the Prussian Landtag, which he usedto buy
a new country estate, Varzin, larger than his exist-ing estates
combined.Military success brought Bismarck tremendous
politicalsupport in Prussia. In the House of Deputies elections
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5.4 Franco-Prussian War 187071 7
of 1866, the liberals suered a major defeat, losing theirlarge
majority. The new, largely conservative House wason much better
terms with Bismarck than previous bod-ies; at
theMinister-Presidents request, it retroactively ap-proved the
budgets of the past four years, which had beenimplemented without
parliamentary consent. Bismarcksuspected it would split the liberal
opposition. Whilesome liberals argued that constitutional
government wasa bright line that should not be crossed, most of
them be-lieved it would be a waste of time to oppose the bill,
andsupported it in hopes of winning more freedom in the
fu-ture.
5.4 Franco-Prussian War 187071
Main article: Franco-Prussian WarPrussias victory over Austria
increased tensions with
Anton von Werner's depiction of Wilhelms proclamation as
Em-peror in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles; Bismarck is in
thecentre-right wearing white.
France. Its emperor, Napoleon III, feared that a pow-erful
Germany would change the balance of power in Eu-rope; opposition
politician Adolphe Thiers had observed,it was France, not Austria,
who was really defeated atKniggrtz. Bismarck, at the same time, did
not avoidwar with France, though he feared the French for a num-ber
of reasons. First, he feared that Austria, hungry forrevenge, would
ally with the French. Similarly, he fearedthat the Russian army
would assist France to maintain abalance of power.[29] Still,
however, Bismarck believedthat if the German states perceived
France as the aggres-sor, they would unite behind the King of
Prussia. Toachieve this he kept Napoleon III involved in various
in-trigues whereby France might gain territory from Luxem-bourg or
BelgiumFrance never achieved any such gain,but it was made to look
greedy and untrustworthy.[30]
A suitable premise for war arose in 1870, when the Ger-man
Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen wasoered the Spanish
throne, vacant since a revolution in1868. France pressured Leopold
into withdrawing hiscandidacy. Not content with this, Paris
demanded that
Wilhelm, as head of the House of Hohenzollern, assurethat no
Hohenzollern would ever seek the Spanish crownagain. To provoke
France into declaring war with Prus-sia, Bismarck published the Ems
Dispatch, a carefullyedited version of a conversation between King
Wilhelmand the French ambassador to Prussia, Count Benedetti.This
conversation had been edited so that each nation feltthat its
ambassador had been disrespected and ridiculed,thus inaming popular
sentiment on both sides in favorof war. Langer, however, argues
that this episode playeda minor role in causing the war.[31]
France mobilized and declared war on 19 July. The Ger-man states
saw France as the aggressor; swept up by na-tionalism and patriotic
zeal, they rallied to Prussias sideand provided troops. Both of
Bismarcks sons served asocers in the Prussian cavalry. The war was
a greatsuccess for Prussia as the German army, controlled byChief
of Sta Moltke, won victory after victory. Themajor battles were all
fought in one month (7 August till1 September), and both French
armies were captured atSedan and Metz, the latter after a siege of
some weeks.Napoleon III was taken prisoner at Sedan and kept in
Ger-many for a time in case Bismarck had need of him tohead the
French regime; he later died in exile in Englandin 1873. The
remainder of the war featured a siege ofParis, the city was
ineectually bombarded";[32] the newFrench republican regime then
tried, without success, torelieve Paris with various hastily
assembled armies andincreasingly bitter partisan warfare.Bismarck
acted immediately to secure the unicationof Germany. He negotiated
with representatives of thesouthern German states, oering special
concessions ifthey agreed to unication. The negotiations
succeeded;patriotic sentiment overwhelmed what opposition
re-mained. While the war was in its nal phase WilhelmI of Prussia
was proclaimed German Emperor on 18January 1871 in the Hall of
Mirrors in the Chteau deVersailles.[33] The new German Empire was a
federa-tion: each of its 25 constituent states (kingdoms,
grandduchies, duchies, principalities, and free cities)
retainedsome autonomy. The King of Prussia, as German Em-peror, was
not sovereign over the entirety of Germany;he was only primus inter
pares, or rst among equals. Buthe held the presidency of the
Bundesrat, whichmet to dis-cuss policy presented by the Chancellor
(whom the em-peror appointed).At the end, France had to surrender
Alsace and part ofLorraine, because Moltke and his generals wanted
it asa defensive barrier. Bismarck opposed the annexationbecause he
did not wish to make a permanent enemy ofFrance. France was also
required to pay an indemnity;[34]the indemnity gure was calculated,
on the basis of pop-ulation, as the precise equivalent of the
indemnity whichNapoleon I imposed on Prussia in 1807.
-
8 6 CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE
6 Chancellor of the German Em-pire
Otto von Bismarck in 1873.
In 1871, Otto von Bismarck was raised to the rank ofFrst
(Prince). He was also appointed as the rst ImperialChancellor
(Reichskanzler) of the German Empire, butretained his Prussian oces
(including those of Minister-President and Foreign Minister). He
was also promotedto the rank of lieutenant-general, and given
another coun-try estate, Friedrichsruh, near Hamburg, which was
largerthan Varzin, making him a very wealthy landowner. Healso
continued to serve as his own foreign minister. Be-cause of both
the imperial and the Prussian oces that heheld, Bismarck had near
complete control over domes-tic and foreign policy. The oce of
Minister Presidentof Prussia was temporarily separated from that of
Chan-cellor in 1873, when Albrecht von Roon was appointedto the
former oce. But by the end of the year, Roonresigned due to ill
health, and Bismarck again becameMinister-President.
6.1 KulturkampfBismarck launched an anti-Catholic Kulturkampf
(cul-ture struggle) in Prussia in 1871. This was partly mo-tivated
by Bismarcks fear that Pius IX and his succes-sors would use papal
infallibility to achieve the papaldesire for international
political hegemony. ... The re-sult was the Kulturkampf, which,
with its largely Prus-sian measures, complemented by similar
actions in sev-eral other German states, sought to curb the
clerical dan-ger by legislation restricting the Catholic churchs
politi-cal power.[35] In May 1872 Bismarck thus attempted to
Between Berlin and Rome, Bismarck (left) confronts the
Pope,1875
reach an understanding with other European governmentsto
manipulate future papal elections; governments shouldagree
beforehand on unsuitable candidates, and then in-struct their
national cardinals to vote appropriately. Thegoal was to end the
popes control over the bishops in agiven state, but the project
went nowhere.Bismarck accelerated the Kulturkampf. In its course,
allPrussian bishops and many priests were imprisoned orexiled.[36]
Prussias population had greatly expanded inthe 1860s and was now
one-third Catholic. Bismarck be-lieved that the pope and bishops
held too much powerover the German Catholics; he was further
concernedabout the emergence of the Catholic Centre Party
(or-ganised in 1870). With support from the anticlericalNational
Liberal Party, which had become Bismarckschief ally in the
Reichstag, he abolished the Catholic De-partment of the Prussian
Ministry of Culture. That leftthe Catholics without a voice in high
circles. In 1872,the Jesuits were expelled from Germany. More
severeanti-Roman Catholic laws of 1873 allowed the
Prussiangovernment to supervise the education of the RomanCatholic
clergy, and curtailed the disciplinary powers ofthe Church. In
1875, civil ceremonies were requiredfor civil weddings. Hitherto,
weddings in churches werecivilly recognized.[37][38]
Kulturkampf became part of Bismarcks foreign-policy,as he sought
to destabilize and weaken Catholic regimes,especially in Belgium
and France.[39]
The Catholics reacted by organizing themselves; theystrengthened
the Centre Party. Bismarck, a devout pietis-tic Protestant, was
alarmed that secularists and socialistswere using the Kulturkampf
to attack all religion. Heabandoned it in 1878 to preserve his
remaining politi-cal capital. He now needed the Centre Party votes
in hisnew battle against socialism. Pius IX died that year,
re-placed by the more pragmatic Pope Leo XIII who negoti-ated away
most of the anti-Catholic laws. The pope keptcontrol of the
selection of bishops, and the Catholics sup-ported unication and
most of Bismarcks policies; how-
-
6.4 Socialism 9
ever they never forgot his culture war and preached soli-darity
lest it ever happen again.[40]
Bismarck became Chancellor of Germany in 1871.
6.2 EconomyIn 1873, Germany and much of Europe and America
en-tered the Long Depression, the Grnderkrise. A down-turn hit the
German economy for the rst time since in-dustrial development began
to surge in the 1850s. To aidfaltering industries, the Chancellor
abandoned free tradeand established protectionist import-taris,
which alien-ated the National Liberals who demanded free trade.
TheKulturkampf and its eects also stirred up public opinionagainst
the party that supported it, and Bismarck used thisopportunity to
distance himself from the National Liber-als. This marked a rapid
decline in the support of theNational Liberals, and by 1879 their
close ties with Bis-marck had all but ended. Bismarck instead
returned toconservative factionsincluding the Centre
Partyforsupport. He helped foster support from the conservativesby
enacting several taris protecting German agricultureand industry
from foreign competitors in 1879.[41]
6.3 GermanisationThe government tried to Germanise the states
nationalminorities, situated mainly in the borders of the
empire,such as the Danes in the North of Germany and the Polesin
the East of Germany. He pursued a hostile policy con-
cerning the Poles[42] furthering enmity between the Ger-man and
Polish peoples. The policies were motivated byBismarcks view that
Polish existence was a threat to theGerman state. Bismarck compared
Polish population toanimals that need to be shot and privately
confessed thathe would like to exterminate them.[43][44]
6.4 SocialismWorried by the growth of the socialist movementin
particular, that of the Social Democratic PartyBismarck instituted
the Anti-Socialist Laws in 1878. So-cialist organizations and
meetings were forbidden, as wasthe circulation of socialist
literature. Police ocers couldstop, search, and arrest socialist
party members; socialistleaders were arrested and tried by police
courts. But de-spite these eorts, the movement steadily gained
support-ers and seats in the Reichstag. Socialists won seats in
theReichstag by running as independent candidates, unal-iated with
any party, which was allowed by the GermanConstitution.[45]
7 Foreign policiesMain article: International relations of the
Great Powers(18141919)Bismarck had unied his nation, and now he
de-
A main objective of Bismarcks was to prevent other powers
be-coming an ally of France (shown as the lonely girl on the
farleft).
voted himself to promoting peace in Europe with hisskills in
statesmanship. He was forced to contend withFrench revanchismthe
desire to avenge the losses of theFranco-Prussian War. Bismarck
therefore engaged in apolicy of diplomatically isolating France
while maintain-ing cordial relations with other nations in Europe.
He hadlittle interest in naval or colonial entanglements and
thusavoided discord with Great Britain. Historians empha-size that
he wanted no more territorial gains after 1871,and vigorously
worked to form cross-linking alliances thatprevented any war in
Europe from starting. A. J. P. Tay-lor, a leading British
diplomatic historian, concludes that,
-
10 7 FOREIGN POLICIES
Bismarck was an honest broker of peace; and his systemof
alliances compelled every Power, whatever its will, tofollow a
peaceful course.[46]
Well aware that Europe was skeptical of his powerful newReich,
Bismarck turned his attention to preserving peacein Europe based on
a balance of power that would allowGermanys economy to ourish.
Bismarck feared that ahostile combination of Austria, France, and
Russia wouldcrush Germany. If two of them were allied, then the
thirdwould ally with Germany only if Germany conceded ex-cessive
demands. The solution was to ally with two ofthe three. In 1873 he
formed the League of the ThreeEmperors, an alliance of Wilhelm,
Czar Alexander II ofRussia, and Emperor Francis Joseph of
Austria-Hungary.Together they would control Eastern Europe, making
surethat restive ethnic groups such as the Poles were kept
incontrol. The Balkans posed a more serious issue, andBismarcks
solution was to give Austria predominance inthe western Balkan
areas, and Russia in the eastern areas.The system collapsed in
1887.[47]
In 1872, a protracted quarrel began to fester between Bis-marck
and Count Harry von Arnim, the imperial ambas-sador to France.
Arnim saw himself as a rival and com-petitor for the
chancellorship, but the rivalry escalated outof hand, and Arnim
took sensitive records from embassyles at Paris to back up his
case. He was formally ac-cused of misappropriating ocial documents,
indicted,tried, and convicted, and ed into exile, where he died.No
one again openly challenged Bismarck in foreign pol-icy matters
until his resignation.[48]
7.1 France
Main article: International relations of the Great
Powers(18141919) War in Sight crisis of 1875Between 1873 and 1877,
according to Stone (1994),Germany repeatedly acted the bully
against France bymanipulating the internal aairs of Frances
neighbors tohurt it. Bismarck put heavy pressure on Belgium,
Spain,and Italy hoping to obtain the election of liberal,
anticler-ical governments. His plan was to promote republicanismin
France by isolating the clerical-monarchist regime ofPresident
MacMahon. He hoped that ringing France withliberal states would
help the French republicans defeatMacMahon and his reactionary
supporters.[49]
The bullying almost got out of hand with a brief warscare in
mid-1875. It was sparked by an editorial entitledKrieg-in-Sicht
(War in Sight) in a Berlin newspaperclose to the government, the
Post. It indicated that highlyinuential Germans were alarmed by
Frances rapid re-covery from defeat in 1875 and its announcement of
anincrease in the size of its army. They talked of launching
apreventive war against France to hold it down. Bismarckdenied
knowing about the article ahead of time, but hecertainly knew about
the talk of preventive war. The ed-itorial produced a war scare.
Britain and Russia made
Bismarck ca. 1875
it clear they would not tolerate a preventive war againstFrance.
Bismarck did not want any war either, and thecrisis blew over. It
was a rare instance where his oppo-nents outmaneuvered and
embarrassed Bismarck, but helearned an important lesson. It forced
him to take into ac-count the fear and alarm that his bullying and
Germanysfast-growing power was causing among its neighbors.
Thecrisis reinforced Bismarcks determination that Germanyshould
work in proactive fashion to preserve the peacein Europe, rather
than passively let events take their owncourse and react to
them.[50][51]
7.2 Italy
Bismarck maintained good relations with Italy, althoughhe had a
personal dislike for Italians and their country.[52]He can be seen
as a marginal contributor to Italian uni-cation. Politics
surrounding the 1866 war against Austriaallowed Italy to annex
Venetia, which had been a king-dom of the Austrian Empire since the
1815 Congressof Vienna. In addition, French mobilization for
theFranco-Prussian War of 18701871 made it necessaryfor Napoleon
III to withdraw his troops from Rome andThe Papal States. Without
these two events, Italian uni-cation would have been a more
prolonged process.
-
7.6 Avoiding war 11
7.3 RussiaAfter Russias victory over the Ottoman Empire in
theRusso-Turkish War of 187778, Bismarck helped nego-tiate a
settlement at the Congress of Berlin. The Treatyof Berlin revised
the earlier Treaty of San Stefano, re-ducing the size of newly
independent Bulgaria (a pro-Russian state at that time). Bismarck
and other Euro-pean leaders opposed the growth of Russian inuence
andtried to protect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire (seeEastern
Question). As a result, Russo-German relationsfurther suered, with
the Russian chancellor Gorchakovdenouncing Bismarck for
compromising his nations vic-tory. The relationship was
additionally strained due toGermanys protectionist trade policies.
Some in the Ger-man military clamored for a preemptive war with
Russia,but Bismarck said that Preemptive war is like commit-ting
suicide for fear of death.[53]
7.4 Triple AllianceThe League of the Three Emperors having
fallen apart,Bismarck negotiated the Dual Alliance with
Austria-Hungary, in which each guaranteed the other against
Rus-sian attack. He also negotiated the Triple Alliance in1882 with
Austria-Hungary and Italy. Italy and Austria-Hungary soon reached
the Mediterranean Agreementwith Britain. Attempts to reconcile
Germany and Russiadid not have lasting eect: the Three Emperors
Leaguewas re-established in 1881, but quickly fell apart (theend of
the Russian-Austrian-Prussian solidarity whichhad existed in
various forms since 1813). Bismarcktherefore negotiated the
Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 withRussia, in order to prevent
Franco-Russian encirclementof Germany. Both powers promised to
remain neu-tral towards one another unless Russia attacked
Austria-Hungary. However, after Bismarcks departure from of-ce
Wilhelm II failed to renew the Reinsurance Treaty,thus creating a
critical problem for Germany in the eventof a war.
7.5 ColoniesBismarck had opposed colonial acquisitions, arguing
thatthe burden of obtaining, maintaining, and defending
suchpossessions would outweigh any potential benet. He feltthat
colonies did not pay for themselves, that the Ger-man bureaucratic
system would not work well in the easy-going tropics, and that the
diplomatic disputes coloniesbrought would distract Germany from its
central inter-est, Europe itself.[54] However, in 188384 he
suddenlyreversed himself and overnight built a colonial empirein
Africa and the South Pacic. Historians have de-bated exactly why he
made this sudden and short-livedmove.[55] He was aware that public
opinion had startedto demand colonies for reasons of German
prestige. Healso wanted to undercut the anti-colonial liberals
who
were sponsored by the Crown Prince, whomight soon be-come Kaiser
and remove Bismarck.[56][57] The old Kaiserwas 84 years old.
Bismarck was inuenced by Ham-burg merchants and traders, his
neighbors at Friedrich-sruh. The establishment of the German
colonial empireproceeded smoothly, starting with German New
Guineain 1884.[58][59] Other European nations, led by Britainand
France, were acquiring colonies in a rapid fashion(see New
Imperialism). Bismarck therefore joined inthe Scramble for Africa.
Germanys new colonies in-cluded Togoland (now Togo and part of
Ghana), GermanKamerun (now Cameroon and part of Nigeria),
GermanEast Africa (now Rwanda, Burundi, and the mainlandpart of
Tanzania), and German South-West Africa (nowNamibia). The Berlin
Conference (188485) establishedregulations for the acquisition of
African colonies; inparticular, it protected free trade in certain
parts of theCongo basin. Germany also acquired colonies in the
Pa-cic, such as German New Guinea.[60]
7.6 Avoiding warIn February 1888, during a Bulgarian crisis,
Bismarck ad-dressed the Reichstag on the dangers of a European
war.
He warned of the imminent possibility thatGermany will have to
ght on two fronts; hespoke of the desire for peace; then he set
forththe Balkan case for war and demonstrates itsfutility:
Bulgaria, that little country between theDanube and the Balkans,
is far from being anobject of adequate importance ... for which
toplunge Europe from Moscow to the Pyrenees,and from the North Sea
to Palermo, into a warwhose issue no man can foresee. At the end
ofthe conict we should scarcely know why wehad fought.[61]
Bismarck also repeated his emphatic warning against anyGerman
military involvement in Balkan disputes. Bis-marck had rst made
this famous comment to the Reich-stag in December 1876, when the
Balkan revolts againstthe Ottoman Empire threatened to extend to a
war be-tween Austria and Russia.
Only a year later [1876], he is faced bythe alternative of
espousing the cause of Rus-sia or that of Austria. Immediately
after thelast crisis, in the summer of 1875, the mu-tual jealousies
between Russia and Austria hadbeen rendered acute by the fresh
risings inthe Balkans against the Turks. Now the is-sues hung upon
Bismarcks decision. Imme-diately after the peace, he had tried to
paral-yse the Balkan rivals by the formation of theThree Emperors
League. I have no thought
-
12 8 SOCIAL LEGISLATION
of intervening, he said privately. That mightprecipitate a
European war. [...] If I wereto espouse the cause of one of the
parties,France would promptly strike a blow on theother side. [...]
I am holding two powerfulheraldic beasts by their collars, and am
keep-ing them apart for two reasons: rst of all, lestthey should
tear one another to pieces; and sec-ondly, lest they should come to
an understand-ing at our expense. In the Reichstag, he pop-ularises
the same idea in the words: I am op-posed to the notion of any sort
of active partic-ipation of Germany in these matters, so longas I
can see no reason to suppose that Ger-man interests are involved,
no interests on be-half of which it is worth our riskingexcusemy
plain speakingthe healthy bones of oneof our Pomeranian
musketeers.[62]
A leading diplomatic historian of the era, William L.Langer sums
up Bismarks two decades as Chancellor:
Whatever else may be said of the intricatealliance system
evolved by the German Chan-cellor, it must be admitted that it
worked andthat it tided Europe over a period of severalcritical
years without a rupture. ... there was,as Bismarck himself said, a
premium upon themaintenance of peace.[63]
Langer concludes:
His had been a great career, beginning withthree wars in eight
years and ending with a pe-riod of 20 years during which he worked
forthe peace of Europe, despite countless oppor-tunities to embark
on further enterprises withmore than even chance of success. ...
Noother statesman of his standing had ever beforeshown the same
great moderation and soundpolitical sense of the possible and
desirable. ...Bismarck at least deserves full credit for
havingsteered European politics through this danger-ous
transitional period without serious conictbetween the great
powers.[64]
8 Social legislationBismarck implemented the worlds rst welfare
state inthe 1880s. He worked closely with large industry andaimed
to stimulate German economic growth by givingworkers greater
security.[65] A secondary concern wastrumping the Socialists, who
had no welfare proposals oftheir own and opposed Bismarcks.
Bismarck especiallylistened to Hermann Wagener and Theodor
Lohmann,advisers who persuaded him to give workers a corporate
status in the legal and political structures of the new Ger-man
state.[66] In March 1884, Bismarck declared:
Franz von Lenbach's portrait of Bismarck, painted in his
75thyear.
The real grievance of the worker is the in-security of his
existence; he is not sure that hewill always have work, he is not
sure that hewill always be healthy, and he foresees that hewill one
day be old and unt to work. If he fallsinto poverty, even if only
through a prolongedillness, he is then completely helpless, left
tohis own devices, and society does not currentlyrecognize any real
obligation towards him be-yond the usual help for the poor, even if
he hasbeen working all the time ever so faithfully anddiligently.
The usual help for the poor, how-ever, leaves a lot to be desired,
especially inlarge cities, where it is very much worse thanin the
country.[67]
Bismarcks idea was to implement welfare programs thatwere
acceptable to conservatives without any socialisticaspects. He was
dubious about laws protecting work-ers at the workplace, such as
safe working conditions,limitation of work hours, and the
regulation of womensand child labor. He believed that such
regulation wouldforce workers and employers to reduce work and
produc-tion, and thus harm the economy. Bismarck opened de-bate on
the subject in November 1881 in the ImperialMessage to the
Reichstag, using the term practical Chris-tianity to describe his
program.[68] Bismarcks program
-
8.3 Old Age and Disability Insurance Law of 1889 13
centered squarely on insurance programs designed to in-crease
productivity, and focus the political attentions ofGerman workers
on supporting the Junkers government.The program included sickness
insurance, accident insur-ance, disability insurance, and a
retirement pension, noneof which were then in existence to any
great degree.Based on Bismarcks message, the Reichstag led
threebills to deal with the concepts of accident and sick-ness
insurance. The subjects of retirement pensions anddisability
insurance were placed on the back-burner forthe time being.[69] The
social legislation implementedby Bismarck in the 1880s played a key
role in thesharp, rapid decline of German emigration to
America.Young men considering emigration looked at not only thegap
between higher hourly direct wages in the UnitedStates and Germany
but also the dierential in indi-rect wagessocial benets, which
favored staying inGermany. The young men went to German
industrialcities, so that Bismarcks insurance system partly osetlow
wage rates in Germany and furthered the fall of theemigration
rate.[70]
8.1 Sickness Insurance Law of 1883
The rst bill that had success was the Sickness InsuranceBill,
which was passed in 1883. Bismarck consideredthe program the least
important and the least politicallytroublesome. The program was
established to providesickness insurance for German industrial
laborers.[71][72]The health service was established on a local
basis, withthe cost divided between employers and the employed.The
employers contributed 1/3, while the workers con-tributed 2/3s. The
minimum payments for medical treat-ment and sick pay for up to 13
weeks were legally xed.The individual local health bureaus were
administered bya committee elected by the members of each bureau,
andthis move had the unintended eect of establishing a ma-jority
representation for the workers on account of theirlarge nancial
contribution. This worked to the advantageof the Social Democrats
whothrough heavy Workermembershipachieved their rst small foothold
in pub-lic administration.[69]
8.2 Accident Insurance Law of 1884
Bismarcks government had to submit three draft bills be-fore
they could get one passed by the Reichstag in 1884.Bismarck had
originally proposed that the Federal Gov-ernment pay a portion of
the Accident Insurance contri-bution. Bismarcks motive was a
demonstration of thewillingness of the German government to lessen
the hard-ship experienced by the German workers as a means
ofweaning them away from the various left-wing parties,most
importantly the Social Democrats. The NationalLiberals took this
program to be an expression of StateSocialism, which they were dead
set against. The Center
party was afraid of the expansion of Federal Power at theexpense
of States Rights. As a result, the only way theprogram could be
passed at all was for the entire expenseto be underwritten by the
Employers. To facilitate this,Bismarck arranged for the
administration of this programto be placed in the hands of Der
Arbeitgeberverband inden beruichen Korporationen (the Organization
of Em-ployers in Occupational Corporations). This
organizationestablished central and bureaucratic insurance oces
onthe Federal, and in some cases the State level to performthe
actual administration. The program kicked in to re-place the
sickness insurance program as of the 14th week.It paid for medical
treatment and a Pension of up to 2/3sof earned wages if the worker
was fully disabled. Thisprogram was expanded in 1886 to include
Agriculturalworkers.[69]
8.3 Old Age and Disability Insurance Lawof 1889
The Old Age Pension program, an insurance equally -nanced by
employers and workers, was designed to pro-vide a pension annuity
for workers who reached age 70years. Unlike the Accident Insurance
and Sickness In-surance programs, this program covered all
categories ofworkersindustrial, agrarian, artisans and servants
fromthe start. Also, unlike the other two programs, the prin-ciple
that the national government should contribute aportion of the
underwriting cost, with the other two por-tions prorated
accordingly, was accepted without ques-tion. The Disability
Insurance program was intended tobe used by those permanently
disabled. This time, theState or Province supervised the programs
directly.[73]
9 Forced to resignIn 1888, the German Emperor, Wilhelm I, died
leavingthe throne to his son, Friedrich III. The newmonarch
wasalready suering from an incurable throat cancer and diedafter
reigning for only 99 days. He was succeeded by hisson, Wilhelm II,
who opposed Bismarcks careful foreignpolicy, preferring vigorous
and rapid expansion to enlargeGermanys place in the sun.[75]
Bismarck was 16 years older than Friedrich. Before thelatter
became terminally ill, Bismarck did not expect hewould live to see
Wilhelm ascend to the throne, and thushad no strategy to deal with
him. Conicts between Wil-helm II and his chancellor soon poisoned
their relation-ship. Perhaps on account of his prominent role in
Wil-helms upbringing, Bismarck believed that he could dom-inate the
young Kaiser and showed little respect for hispolicies in the late
1880s. However, Wilhelm wantedto be his own master and was
surrounded by sycophantstelling him that Frederick the Great would
not have beenso great with a Bismarck at his side. Their nal
split
-
14 9 FORCED TO RESIGN
occurred after Bismarck tried to implement
far-reachinganti-Socialist laws in early 1890. The Kartell
majorityin the Reichstag, of the amalgamated Conservative Partyand
the National Liberal Party, was willing to make mostof the laws
permanent. But it was split about the lawallowing the police the
power to expel socialist agita-tors from their homes, a power used
excessively at timesagainst political opponents. The National
Liberals re-fused to make this law permanent, while the
Conserva-tives supported only the entirety of the bill and
threatenedto and eventually vetoed the entire bill in session
becauseBismarck would not agree to a modied bill.[76]
A painting of Bismarck, late in his career, by Franz von
Lenbach
As the debate continued, Wilhelm became increasinglyinterested
in social problems, especially the treatmentof mine workers during
their strike in 1889, and keep-ing with his active policy in
government, routinely in-terrupted Bismarck in Council to make
clear his socialpolicy. Bismarck sharply disagreed with Wilhelms
pol-icy and worked to circumvent it. Even though Wilhelmsupported
the altered anti-socialist bill, Bismarck pushedfor his support to
veto the bill in its entirety. But whenhis arguments could not
convinceWilhelm, Bismarck be-came excited and agitated until
uncharacteristically blurt-ing out his motive to see the bill fail:
to have the social-ists agitate until a violent clash occurred that
could beused as a pretext to crush them. Wilhelm replied that hewas
not willing to open his reign with a bloody campaignagainst his own
subjects. The next day, after realizing hisblunder, Bismarck
attempted to reach a compromise withWilhelm by agreeing to his
social policy towards indus-trial workers, and even suggested a
European council todiscuss working conditions, presided over by the
GermanEmperor.
Despite this, a turn of events eventually led to his dis-tancing
from Wilhelm. Bismarck, feeling pressured andunappreciated by the
Emperor and undermined by ambi-tious advisers, refused to sign a
proclamation regardingthe protection of workers along with Wilhelm,
as was re-quired by the German Constitution, to protest
Wilhelmsever increasing interference to Bismarcks previously
un-questioned authority. Bismarck also worked behind thescenes to
break the Continental labour council on whichWilhelm had set his
heart.[77]
The nal break came as Bismarck searched for a new par-liamentary
majority, with his Kartell voted from powerdue to the
anti-socialist bill asco. The remaining forcesin the Reichstag were
the Catholic Centre Party andthe Conservative Party. Bismarck
wished to form anew block with the Centre Party, and invited
LudwigWindthorst, the parliamentary leader, to discuss an
al-liance. This would be Bismarcks last political manoeu-vre.
Wilhelm was furious to hear about Windthorstsvisit. In a
parliamentary state, the head of governmentdepends on the condence
of the parliamentary major-ity, and certainly has the right to form
coalitions to en-sure his policies a majority. However, in Germany,
theChancellor depended on the condence of the Emperoralone, and
Wilhelm believed that the Emperor had theright to be informed
before his ministers meeting. Aftera heated argument in Bismarcks
oce Wilhelm, whomBismarck had allowed to see a letter from Tsar
AlexanderIII describing him as a badly brought-up boy, stormedout,
after rst ordering the rescinding of the Cabinet Or-der of 1851,
which had forbidden Prussian Cabinet Min-isters to report directly
to the King of Prussia, requiringthem instead to report via the
Prime Minister. Bismarck,forced for the rst time into a situation
he could not useto his advantage, wrote a blistering letter of
resignation,decrying Wilhelms interference in foreign and
domesticpolicy, which was published only after Bismarcks
death.Bismarck resigned atWilhelm IIs insistence on 18March1890, at
age 75, to be succeeded as Chancellor ofGermany and
Minister-President of Prussia by Leo vonCaprivi.[78] Bismarck was
discarded (dropping the pi-lot, in the words of the famous Punch
cartoon), pro-moted to the rank of Colonel-General with the
Dignityof Field Marshal (so-called because the German Armydid not
appoint full Field Marshals in peacetime) andgiven a new title,
Duke of Lauenburg, which he jokedwould be useful when travelling
incognito. He was soonelected to the Reichstag as a National
Liberal in Ben-nigsens old and supposedly safe Hamburg seat, but
hewas embarrassed by being taken to a second ballot by aSocial
Democrat opponent, and never actually took up hisseat. He entered
into a restless, resentful retirement on hisestates at Varzin, now
part of Poland. Within one monthof his wifes death on 27 November
1894, he moved toFriedrichsruh near Hamburg, waiting in vain to be
calledupon for advice and counsel.
-
9.2 Death 15
"Dropping the Pilot" Famous caricature by Sir John
Tenniel(1820-1914), published in an English magazine, 29March
1890.
9.1 Last warning and predictionIn December 1897, the Emperor
Wilhelm II visited Bis-marck for the last time. Bismarck again
warned himabout the dangers of improvising government policybased
on the intrigues of courtiers and militarists. Bis-marcks last
warning was:
Your Majesty, so long as you have thispresent ocer corps, you
can do as you please.But when this is no longer the case, it will
bevery dierent for you.[79]
Subsequently, Bismarck made this prediction:
"Jena came twenty years after the deathof Frederick the Great;
the crash will cometwenty years after my departure if things goon
like this"a prophecy fullled with theKaisers abdication almost
twenty years to theday after Bismarcks death.[80]
According to Albert Ballin, the year before he died Bis-marck
told him:
One day the great European War willcome out of some damned
foolish thing in theBalkans.[81]
Bismarck on his 80th birthday (1 April 1895)
9.2 Death
Bismarck spent his nal years composing his memoirs(Gedanken und
Erinnerungen, or Thoughts and Memo-ries), a work of literary genius
but questionable accu-racy, in which he increased the drama around
every eventand always presented himself favorably. He died in
July1898 at the age of 83 in Friedrichsruh, where he is en-tombed
in the Bismarck Mausoleum. He was succeededas Frst von
Bismarck-Schnhausen by his son Herbert.He continued his feud with
Wilhelm II by attacking himin his memoirs and by publishing the
text of the Rein-surance Treaty with Russia, a breach of national
securityfor which any individual of lesser status would have
beenprosecuted.Bismarck managed one nal attack onWilhelm II by
hav-ing his tombstone inscribed with the words Here lies atrue
servant of the Emperor Wilhelm I.
10 Legacy and memoryHistorians have reached a broad consensus on
the content,function and importance of the image of Bismarck
withinGermanys political culture over the past 125
years.[82][83]According to Steinberg, his achievements in
186271were the greatest diplomatic and political achievementby any
leader in the last two centuries.[84]
-
16 10 LEGACY AND MEMORY
Otto von Bismarck statue in Berlin
Bismarcks most important legacy is the unication ofGermany.
Germany had existed as a collection of hun-dreds of separate
principalities and Free Cities since theformation of the Holy Roman
Empire. Over the cen-turies various rulers had tried to unify the
German stateswithout success until Bismarck. Largely as a result
ofBismarcks eorts, the various German kingdoms wereunited into a
single country.Following unication, Germany became one of the
mostpowerful nations in Europe. Bismarcks astute, cau-tious, and
pragmatic foreign policies allowed Germany topeacefully retain the
powerful position into which he hadbrought it; maintaining amiable
diplomacy with almost allEuropean nations. France, the main
exception, was dev-astated by Bismarcks wars and his harsh
subsequent poli-cies towards it; France became one of Germanys
mostbitter enemies in Europe. Austria, too, was weakenedby the
creation of a German Empire, though to a muchlesser extent than
France. Bismarck believed that as longas Britain, Russia and Italy
were assured of the peacefulnature of the German Empire, French
belligerency couldbe contained; his diplomatic feats were undone,
however,by Kaiser Wilhelm II, whose policies unied other Eu-ropean
powers against Germany in time for World WarI.Historians stress
that Bismarcks peace-oriented, satu-rated continental diplomacy was
increasingly unpopular,
because it consciously reined in any expansionist drives.In
dramatic contrast stands the ambition of Wilhelm IIsWeltpolitik to
secure the Reichs future through expan-sion, leading to World War
I. Likewise Bismarcks policyto deny the military a dominant voice
in foreign politi-cal decision making was overturned by 1914 as
Germanybecame an armed state.Bismarcks psychology and personal
traits have not beenso favourably received by scholars. The
American his-torian Jonathan Steinberg portrays a malign genius
whowas deeply vengeful, even toward his closest friendsand family
members. Evans says he was intimidatingand unscrupulous, playing to
others frailties, not theirstrengths.[85] British historians,
including Evans, Taylor,Palmer and Crankshaw, see Bismarck as an
ambivalentgure, undoubtedly a man of great skill but who left
nolasting system in place to guide successors less skilledthan
himself. Being a committed monarchist himself,Bismarck allowed no
eective constitutional check on thepower of the Emperor, thus
placing a time bomb in thefoundation of the Germany that he
created.Observers at the time and ever since have commentedon
Bismarcks skill as a writer. As Henry Kissingerhas noted, The man
of 'blood and iron' wrote proseof extraordinary directness and
lucidity, comparablein distinctiveness to Churchill's use of the
Englishlanguage.[86]
During most of his nearly 30-year-long tenure, Bismarckheld
undisputed control over the governments policies.He was well
supported by his friend Albrecht von Roon,the war minister, as well
as the leader of the Prussianarmy Helmuth vonMoltke. Bismarcks
diplomatic movesrelied on a victorious Prussian military, and these
twomen gave Bismarck the victories he needed to convincethe smaller
German states to join Prussia.Bismarck took steps to silence or
restrain political op-position, as evidenced by laws restricting
the freedom ofthe press, and the anti-socialist laws. He waged a
cul-ture war (Kulturkampf) against the Catholic Church untilhe
realized the conservatism of the Catholics made themnatural allies
against the Socialists. His king Wilhelm Irarely challenged the
Chancellors decisions; on severaloccasions, Bismarck obtained his
monarchs approval bythreatening to resign. However, Wilhelm II
intended togovern the country himself, making the ousting of
Bis-marck one of his rst tasks as Kaiser. Bismarcks succes-sors as
Chancellor were much less inuential, as powerwas concentrated in
the Emperors hands.
10.1 MemorialsImmediately after he left oce, citizens started to
praisehim and established funds to build monuments likethe Bismarck
Memorial or towers dedicated to him.Throughout Germany, the
accolades were unending, sev-eral buildings were named in his
honour, portraits of
-
17
Memorial dedicated to Bismarck as a student at the
Rudelsburg
him were commissioned from artists such as Franz vonLenbach and
C.W. Allers and books about him becamebest-sellers. The rst
monument built in his honour wasthe one at Bad Kissingen erected in
1877.Numerous statues and memorials dot the cities, towns,and
countryside of Germany, including the famousBismarck Memorial in
Berlin and numerous Bismarcktowers on four continents. The only
memorial depictinghim as a student at Gttingen University (together
witha dog, possibly his Reichshund Tyras) and as a memberof his
Corps Hannovera was re-erected in 2006 at theRudelsburg. The
gleaming white 1906 Bismarck Monu-ment in the city of Hamburg,
stands in the centre of the St.Pauli district, and is the largest,
and probably best-known,memorial to Bismarck worldwide. The statues
depictedhim as massive, monolithic, rigid and unambiguous.[87]Two
warships were named in his honour, the SMS Bis-marck of the German
Imperial Navy, and the Bismarckfrom the World War IIera.
10.2 Bismarck myth
Gerwarth (2007) shows that the Bismarck myth, built
uppredominantly during his years of retirement and evenmore
stridently after his death, proved a powerful rhetor-ical and
ideological tool. The myth made him out to be adogmatic ideologue
and ardent nationalist when, in fact,he was ideologically exible.
Gerwarth argues that theconstructed memory of Bismarck played a
central role asan anti-democratic myth in the highly ideological
battle
The Bismarck Monument, Hamburg
over the past which raged between 1918 and 1933. Thismyth proved
to be a weapon against the Weimar Repub-lic, and exercised a
destructive inuence on the politicalculture of the rst German
democracy. Frankel (2005)shows the Bismarck cult fostered and
legitimized a newstyle of right-wing politics, and made possible
the post-Bismarckian crisis of leadership, both real and
perceived,that had Germans seeking the strongest possible leaderand
asking, What Would Bismarck Do?"For example, Hamburgs memorial,
unveiled in 1906, isconsidered one of the greatest expressions of
imperialGermanys Bismarck cult and an important developmentin the
history of German memorial art. It was a prod-uct of the desire of
Hamburgs patrician classes to de-fend their political privileges in
the face of dramatic socialchange and attendant demands for
political reform. Tothose who presided over its construction, the
monumentwas also a means of asserting Hamburgs cultural
aspira-tions and of shrugging o a reputation as a city hostile
tothe arts. The memorial was greeted with widespread dis-approval
among the working classes and did not preventtheir increasing
support for the Social Democrats.[88]
11 Place names
A number of localities around the world have been namedin
Bismarcks honour. They include:
-
18 14 REFERENCES
Bismarck Archipelago, near the former Germancolony of New
Guinea.
Bismarck, Illinois Bismarck, North Dakota, a city and state
capital inthe United States.
Bismarck, Missouri, a city in Missouri. Bismarck Sea Bismarck
Strait, a channel in Antarctica. Bismarckburg (Kasanga,
Tanzania)
12 Titles and styles from birth todeath
1 April 1815 1865: Junker Otto von Bismarck 18651871: High Born
Count Otto of Bismarck-Schnhausen
18711890: His Serene Highness The Prince of Bis-marck
1890 30 July 1898: His Serene Highness ThePrince of Bismarck,
Duke of Lauenburg
Bismarck was created Graf von Bismarck-Schnhausen(Count of
Bismarck-Schnhausen) in 1865; this comi-tal title is borne by all
his descendants in the male line. In1871, he was further created
Frst von Bismarck (Princeof Bismarck) and accorded the style of
Durchlaucht(equivalent to Serene Highness); this princely title
de-scended only to his eldest male heirs.
12.1 Duke of LauenburgIn 1890, Bismarckwas created furtherHerzog
von Lauen-burg (Duke of Lauenburg"; the Duchy was one of
theterritories which Prussia seized from the Danish king in1864).It
was Bismarcks ambition to be assimilated into themediatized houses
of Germany. He attempted to per-suade Kaiser Wilhelm I that he
should be endowed withthe sovereign duchy of Lauenburg, in reward
for his ser-vices to the imperial family and the German empire.
Thiswas on the understanding that Bismarck would immedi-ately
restore the duchy to Prussia; all that he wanted wasthe privilege
of a mediatized family for himself and hisdescendants. This novel
idea was turned down by the con-servative emperor, who thought that
he had already giventhe chancellor enough rewards. There is reason
to believethat he informed Wilhelm II of his wishes. After
beingforced by the sovereign to resign, he received the
purelyhonoric title of Duke of Lauenburg, without the duchy
itself and the sovereignty that would have transformed hisfamily
into a mediatized house. Bismarck regarded it as amockery of his
ambition, and he considered nothing morecruel than this action of
the emperor.[89]
On Bismarcks death in 1898, his dukedom (held only forhis own
lifetime) was extinguished and the princely titlepassed to his
eldest son, Herbert.
13 See also Adelbert Theodor Wangemann, made only knownrecording
of Bismarcks voice
Film footage of Bismarck removing his military hel-met
Gerson von Bleichrder, Bismarcks banker andeconomics advisor
Here is Germany House of Bismarck Wilhelm Stieber, master
spy
14 References[1] Steinberg, Jonathan. Bismarck: A Life. p. 51.
ISBN
9780199782529.
[2] Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 18751914 (1987),p.
312.
[3] Lowe, Charles (2005). Prince Bismarck: An
HistoricalBiography With Two Portraits. Kessinger Publishing.
p.538. ISBN 9781419180033.
[4] Field 1898, pp. 6034.
[5] Steinberg, 2011, pp. 3941.
[6] Steinberg, 2011, p. 93.
[7] Panze 1971, p. 56.
[8] Steinberg, 2011, p. 89.
[9] Steinberg, 2011, p. 86.
[10] Steinberg, 2011, pp. 8788.
[11] Panze 1971, p. 64.
[12] Alan Palmer, Bismarck [Charles Scribner Publishers:New
York, 1976] p. 41
[13] Alan Palmer, Bismarck, p. 42.
[14] Steinberg, 2011, p. 117.
[15] Steinberg, 2011, pp. 14243.
[16] Quotations from letters between Leopold von Gerlach
andBismarck debating the topic of Napoleon III are in Stein-berg,
2011, pp. 13133.
-
19
[17] Steinberg, 2011, ch. 5.
[18] Steinberg, 2011, ch. 6.
[19] Eyck 1964, pp. 5868.
[20] Taylor 1955, pp. 4851.
[21] Eyck 1964, pp. 6970.
[22] Hollyday 1970, pp. 1618.
[23] Gordon A. Craig, Germany, 18661945 (1978), pp 121
[24] Eyck 1964, pp. 58106.
[25] Eyck 1964, pp. 10738.
[26] Pearce 2010.
[27] Friedrich Darmstaedter (2008). Bismarck and the Cre-ation
of the Second Reich. Transaction Publishers. p. 289.ISBN
9781412807838.
[28] Steinberg, 2011, p. 253.
[29] Bismarck, Otto von (1966). The Memoirs vol. II. NewYork,
NY: Howard Fertig. pp. 5860.
[30] Eyck 1964, pp. 13986
[31] William Langer, Bismarck as Dramatist, in Studies
inDiplomatic History & Historiography in Honour of G.P.Gooch
(1962) pp 199216,
[32] Taylor 1969, p. 126.
[33] Crankshaw.
[34] Taylor 1969, p. 133.
[35] Hollyday 1970, p. 6.
[36] Blackbourn 1998, pp. 2613.
[37] Ross 2000.
[38] Gross 2005.
[39] James Stone, Bismarck and the Containment of
France,1873-1877, Canadian Journal of History (1994) 29#2 pp281-304
online
[40] Rebecca Ayako Bennette, Fighting for the Soul of Ger-many:
The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unica-tion (Harvard U.P.
2012)
[41] E. J. Feuchtwanger, Bismarck (2002) p. 208
[42] Koschnirk, Leonore; von Specht, Agnete. Room 10: TheSocial
Dimension - Founders and Enemies of the Em-pire"". Deutsches
Historisches Museum. Archived fromthe original on 2 July 2004.
[43] Norman Davies, Gods Playground, a History of Poland:1795 to
the present (1982) p 124 online
[44] The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and
NewMigrants inWestern Europe Since 1850 (Studies ofWorldMigrations)
Page 60 Leo Lucassen 2005 University ofIllinois The depth of his
hatred for the Poles is illustratedby a letter Bismarck wrote in
1861 to his sister: Hit thePoles, so that they break down. If we
want to exist, wehave to exterminate them;"
[45] Friedrich Darmstaedter, Bismarck and the creation of
theSecond Reich (2008) p. xiv, xvii
[46] A.J.P. Taylor, Europe: Grandeur and Decline (1967) p 89
[47] Raymond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History:18711932
(1933) pp 358
[48] Crankshaw 1981, p. 322.
[49] James Stone, Bismarck and the Containment of
France,18731877, Canadian Journal of History (1994) 29#2pp 281304,
online
[50] Lothar Gall, Bismarck: The White Revolutionary, Volume2:
18711898 (1986) pp 4648
[51] William L. Langer, European Alliances and
Alignments,18711890 (2nd ed. 1950) pp 4455
[52] Taylor 1969, p. 212.
[53] Retallack 2008, p. 29.
[54] Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann. Domestic Origins ofGermanys
Colonial Expansion under Bismarck. Past &Present (Feb 1969),
Issue 42, pp 140159 in JSTOR
[55] Kennedy 1988, ch 10.
[56] Eyck 1964, pp. 27376.
[57] Wehler 1970, pp. 11955.
[58] Strandmann 1969, pp. 14059.
[59] Crankshaw 1981, pp. 39597.
[60] S. G. Firth, The New Guinea Company, 18851899: A case of
unprotable imperialism, Histori-cal Studies (1972) 15#59 pp 361377
DOI:10.1080/10314617208595478
[61] Ludwig 1927a, p. 73.
[62] Ludwig 1927b, p. 511.
[63] William L. Langer, European Alliances and
Alignments:18711890 (2nd ed.) 1950 p 459
[64] Langer, European Alliances and Alignments: 18711890pp
50304
[65] E. P. Hennock, The Origin of the Welfare State in Eng-land
and Germany, 18501914: Social Policies Compared(Cambridge
University Press, 2007)
[66] E. P. Hennock. Social Policy under the Empire: Mythsand
Evidence German History 1998 16(1): 5874; Her-man Beck, The Origins
of the Authoritarian Welfare Statein Prussia. Conservatives,
Bureaucracy, and the SocialQuestion, 181570. 1995.
-
20 15 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[67] Frederic B. M. Hollyday, Bismarck (1970) p. 65
[68] Moritz Busch. Bismarck: Some secret pages from his
his-tory. New York: Macmillan, 1898. Vol. II, p. 282
[69] Holborn, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany 18401945.
Princeton UP, 1969. pp. 29193.
[70] David Khoudour-Castras. Welfare State and LaborMo-bility:
The Impact of Bismarcks Social Legislation onGerman Emigration
BeforeWorldWar I. Journal of Eco-nomic History 68.1 (2008):
211243.
[71] Leichter, Howard M. (1979). A comparative approach topolicy
analysis: health care policy in four nations. Cam-bridge: Cambridge
University Press. p. 121. ISBN 0-521-22648-1. The Sickness
Insurance Law (1883). Eli-gibility. The Sickness Insurance Law came
into eect inDecember 1884. It provided for compulsory
participationby all industrial wage earners (i.e., manual laborers)
in fac-tories, ironworks, mines, shipbuilding yards, and
similarworkplaces.
[72] Hennock, Ernest Peter (2007). The origin of the
welfarestate in England and Germany, 18501914: social
policiescompared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.157.
ISBN 978-0-521-59212-3.
[73] E. P. Hennock, Social Policy in the Bismarck Era: AProgress
Report, German History, (June 2003) 21#2 pp229238 online
[74] Cowen 2012.
[75] Craig, (1978) pp 22529
[76] Steinberg, 2011, pp. 42964.
[77] Craig, (1978) pp 17179
[78] Rich, Norman (1965). Friedrich von Holstein: politics
anddiplomacy in the era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II 1. Lon-don:
Cambridge University Press. pp. 27983.shows thatFriedrich von
Holstein was a key player
[79] Palmer, Alan (1976). Bismarck. New York City:
CharlesScribners Sons. p. 267. ISBN 978-0684146836.
[80] Taylor 1969, p. 264.
[81] Churchill, Winston (1923). The World Crisis.
CharlesScribners Sons. p. 195.
[82] Mller (2008)
[83] Urbach (1998)
[84] Steinberg, 2011, p. 184.
[85] Richard J. Evans, The Gambler in Blood and Iron, NewYork
Review (23 February 2012) p 39
[86] Kissinger 2011.
[87] Sieglinde Seele, Lexikon der Bismarck-Denkmler.Trme,
Standbilder, Bsten, Gedenksteine und andereEhrungen, Michael Imhof
Verlag: Petersberg, 2005; 480pp.
[88] Mark A.Russell, The Building of Hamburgs BismarckMemorial,
18981906, Historical Journal 2000 43(1):133156
[89] THE MEDIATIZED OR THE HIGH NOBILITYOF EUROPE; Consisting of
Something Like Fifty fam-ilies Which Enjoyed-Petty Sovereignty
Before the HolyRoman Empires Overthrow, They Still Exercise
Cer-tain Special Privileges Mixed with Unusual Restrictions..New
York Times. 27 September 1908.
15 Bibliography
15.1 Biographical Crankshaw, Edward (1981), Bismarck, The
VikingPress.
Darmstaedter, Friedrich. Bismarck and the Cre-ation of the
Second Reich (2008)
Dawson, WilliamHarbutt. The Evolution ofModernGermany (1908),
503pp covers 18711906 with fo-cus on social and economic
history& colonies onlinefree
Engelberg, Ernst. Bismarck; 2 vols., (198690);major academic
study by an east-German historian(only in German)
Eyck, Erich (1964), Bismarck and the German Em-pire, ISBN
0393002357 (excerpt and text search)
Feuchtwanger, Edgar (2002), Bismarck, Histori-cal Biographies,
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Gall, Lothar (1986), Bismarck: The White Revolu-tionary, 2 vol;
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Headlam, James Wyclie. Bismarck and the Foun-dation of the
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Heuston, Kimberley Burton (2010), Otto von Bis-marck: Iron
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Kent, George O (1978), Bismarck and His Times. Kissinger, Henry
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Lerman, Katharine Anne. Bismarck: Proles inPower. Longman, 2004.
ISBN 0-582-03740-9;312pp
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15.3 Specialized studies 21
Ludwig, Emil (1927a), Wilhelm Hohenzollern:The last of the
Kaisers, New York, ISBN9780766143418, popular.
Ludwig, Emil (1927b), Bismarck: The Story of aFighter, Little,
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Panze, Otto, Bismarck and the Development ofGermany; 3 vols.,
196390. vol 1 online, Bismarckand the Development of Germany: The
Period ofUnication, 18151871
Panze, Otto (Apr 1955), Bismarck and GermanNationalism, American
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1845577
Steinberg, Jonathan. Bismarck: A Life (Oxford Uni-versity Press,
2011), 592 pp
Stern, Fritz (1977), Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Ble-ichrder and
the Building of the German Empire,Penguin.
Taylor, A.J.P. (1969), Bismarck: the Man and theStatesman, New
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15.2 Surveys Berghahn, Volker. Imperial Germany,
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Blackbourn, David (1998), The Long NineteenthCentury: A History
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Clark, Christopher. Iron Kingdom: The Rise andDownfall of
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Sheehan, James J. German History, 17701866(1989), dense,
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Welfare State in Prussia, 18151870.
Clark, Chester Wells. Franz Joseph and Bismarck:The Diplomacy of
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Liberalism, Journal of Modern HistoryVol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 1971),
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22 15 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ross, Ronald J (1998), The Failure of BismarcksKulturkampf:
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Waller, Bruce. Bismarck at the Crossroads. TheReorientation of
German Foreign Policy after theCongress of Berlin 18781880
(1974)
Wawro, Georey. The Franco-Prussian War: TheGerman Conquest of
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Wawro, Georey. The War Scare of 1875: Bis-marck and Europe in
the Mid-1870s. German His-tory (2012) 30#1 pp: 140-141.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich Bismarcks Imperialism18621890 Past and
Present, No. 48, August1970. pp: 119155 online edition
Wetzel, David. A Duel of Nations: Germany,France, and the
Diplomacy of the War of 18701871 (University of Wisconsin Press;
2012) 310pages
Wetzel, David. A Duel of Giants: Bismarck,Napoleon III, and the
Origins of the Franco-PrussianWar (U of Wisconsin Press, 2001). 244
pp. ISBN0-299-17490-5
15.4 Historiography and memory
Cowen, Ron (30 January 2012), Restored EdisonRecords Revive
Giants of 19th-Century Germany,New York Times, retrieved 31 January
2012
Frankel, Richard E. From the Beer Halls to theHalls of Power:
The Cult of Bismarck and the Le-gitimization of a New German Right,
18981945,German Studies Review, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Oct.,2003), pp.
543560 in JSTOR
Frankel, Richard E (2005), Bismarcks Shadow. TheCult of
Leadership and the Transformation of theGerman Right, 18981945,
ISBN 1-84520-033-0,222 pp.
Gerwarth, Robert. Inventing the Iron Chancellor,History Today
2007 57(6): 4349, in EBSCO
(2005), The Bismarck Myth:Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the
Iron Chan-cellor, ISBN 0-19-928184-X, 216 pp.
Hamerow, Theodore S. ed. Otto von Bismarck andImperial Germany:
A Historical Assessment (1993),excerpts from historians and primary
sources
Mller, Frank Lorenz (2008). Man, Myth andMonuments: The Legacy
of Otto von Bismarck(18661998)". European History Quarterly 38
(4):62636. doi:10.1177/0265691408094517.
O'Shea, John J. Bismarcks Decline and Fall, TheAmerican Catholic
Quarterly Review, Vol. XXIII,January/October 1898. online
Pearce, Robert (March 2010), The Austro-Prussian War, History
Review (66).
Russell, Mark A. The Building of Hamburgs Bis-marck Memorial,
18981906, Historical Journal,Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 13356
in JSTOR
Steefel, Lawrence D. Bismarck, Journal of Mod-ern History, Vol.
2, No. 1 (Mar., 1930), pp. 7495in JSTOR
Strmer, Michael. Bismarck in Perspective, Cen-tral European
History, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1870/71(Dec., 1971), pp. 291331 in
JSTOR
Urbach, Karina. Between Saviour and Villain: 100Years of
Bismarck Biographies, Historical Journal1998 41(4): 114160 in
JSTOR
15.5 Primary sources Bismarck, Otto von (1899), Bismarck, the
Man &
the Statesman: Being the Reections and Reminis-cences of Otto,
Prince von Bismarck 1
(1898), Thoughts and Reminis-cences I