Organizational Crisis and Bolstering: Underrated …Organizational Crisis and Bolstering: Underrated Strategy or Puffery? An experiment into the effect of the Bolstering strategy in

OrganizationalCrisisandBolstering:Underrated

StrategyorPuffery?AnexperimentintotheeffectoftheBolsteringstrategyinmitigatingnegative

reputationfalloutduringinitialcrisiscommunicationsresponsesonsocial

media.

StudentName: NoudLeeflang

StudentNumber: 359167

Supervisor: Dr.YijingWang

MediaStudies:Media&Business

ErasmusSchoolofHistory,CultureandCommunication

ErasmusUniversityRotterdam

MasterThesisMedia&Business

22June2017

MAMediaStudies:Media&BusinessMasterThesis

2

N.M.Leeflang--359167ErasmusUniversityRotterdam

3

ABSTRACT

Theuseof thebolsteringstrategywas identifiedbyKimetal. (2009)asthe most prevalent crisis response strategy amongst practitioners. This is incontrast with what the Situational Crisis Communication Theory states: thatbolsteringisaminimaleffectstrategyonlytobeusedincertainsituations.Thisstudy used an online experiment (N=146) to determine how effective theincorporationofbolsteringisincombinationwiththedenialorcorrectiveactioninitialcrisisresponsestrategiesforacompanyofgoodpriorreputationfacingapreventable crisis. Four different crisis response strategies (with/ withoutbolstering X denial/ corrective action)were tested following a fictional articleaccusing Sony of negligence, resulting in dangerous product malfunction.Conditionswere presented randomly to our respondents.Our crisis responseswere framed as Facebook posts, as social media has evolved to an importantinitialcrisiscommunicationtool.

Bolstering was found to have little effect on the three factors crisiscommunication attempts to minimize the negative effects on: Post-CrisisReputation (reputation held after the crisis), Secondary Crisis Communication(intentiontospreadthecrisis)&SecondaryCrisisReactions(negativeword-of-mouth andpurchase intentions). Response strategy (denial/ corrective action)wasalso found tohave little effecton these factors.We found that thebiggestasset inminimizing negative reputational fallout is Pre-CrisisReputation, as isconfirmed inexisting theory.Ourresults indicate themost importantaspectofinitialcrisismanagementisthereputationheldbythecompanybeforethecrisisand that a positive pre-crisis reputation helps ‘shield’ the organization fromnegativecrisisfalloutonallthreeofourfactors.KEYWORDS:SCCT,Crisis,Communication,Reputation,Bolstering


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TableofContents

ABSTRACT 31.Introduction 6

2.TheoreticalFramework 132.1Pre-CrisisReputation 152.2.ReputationHistory,RelationshipsandThreats 172.3.CorporateCrisistypes&Responses 182.4.SecondaryCrisisResponses:BolsteringStrategy 222.5.Social-MediatedCrisisCommunication 242.6.SecondaryCrisisReactions 26

3.Methodology 293.1.ResearchDesign 293.2.ExperimentalScenarios 303.3.DataCollection 313.4.Operationalization 323.4.1.Pre-CrisisReputation 323.4.2.AttributionofGuilt,History&Relation 333.4.2.Post-CrisisReputation 333.4.3.SecondaryCrisisCommunication 343.4.4.SecondaryCrisisReactions 34

3.5.ManipulationCheck 343.6.ComputedVariables:Reliability&FactorAnalysis 353.6.1.Pre-CrisisReputation 353.6.2.Relation 353.6.3.Attribution 363.6.4.PostCrisisReputation 363.6.5.SecondaryCrisisCommunication 373.6.6.SecondaryCrisisReactions 38

3.7.Description&Demographics 38

4.Results 414.1.Hypotheses1:TheeffectofBolsteringonPost-CrisisReputation 414.2.Hypotheses2:TheeffectofBolsteringonSecondaryCrisisCommunication 424.3.Hypotheses3:TheeffectofBolsteringonSecondaryCrisisReactions 444.4.AdditionalResultsonPost-CrisisReputation 464.4.1.Pre-CrisisReputation 464.4.2.LevelofAttribution 474.4.3.Age 474.4.4.Gender,Bolstering,ResponseStrategy&Facebook 47

4.5.AdditionalResultsonSecondaryCrisisCommunications 484.5.1.Pre-CrisisReputation 484.5.2.BolsteringStrategy 484.5.2.Attribution,Age,Gender&ResponseStrategy 494.5.3.Facebook&SecondaryCrisisCommunications 49

4.6.AdditionalResultsonSecondaryCrisisReactions 504.6.1.Pre-CrisisReputation 504.6.1.Attribution 504.6.3.ResponseStrategy 514.6.4.FacebookUse 51


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4.6.5.Age,Gender,Bolstering&FBNews 514.7.RobustnessCheck 524.7.1.H1:PostCrisisReputation 524.7.2H2:SecondaryCrisisCommunications 544.7.3H3:SecondaryCrisisReactions 554.7.3.AdditionalResultsfromtheRobustData 55

5.Discussion 585.1.H1:Bolstering&Post-CrisisReputation 595.2.H2:Bolstering&SecondaryCrisisCommunications 605.3.H3:Bolstering&SecondaryCrisisReactions 615.4.Pre-CrisisReputationShieldsOrganizationsfromNegativeReputationFallout 625.5.OtherFindings 635.6.Conclusion 635.7.Limitations&FutureResearch 64

References 66

AppendixA-experimentconditions 72A1-FictionalNewsPost 72A2-FictionalFacebookPosts 73A2.1-Denial: 73A2.2-Denial+Bolstering 73A2.3-CorrectiveAction 73A2.4-CorrectiveAction+Bolstering 73

AppendixB-ExperimentSurvey 74


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1.IntroductionIthasbecomeincreasinglyimportantforbusinesses,andespeciallythose

ofconsiderablesize,toattend,manageandbuildtheircorporatereputations

amongststakeholdersintheglobalized,interconnectedworld.Socialmediahas

empoweredstakeholdergroupstocreate,findorshareinformationon

organizationsandtheirconductintheformofsecondarycrisiscommunications

onsocialmedia(Mangold&Faulds,2009).Whereinthepast,peoplewere

reliantonthemainstreammediaandinformationfromspokespeople,theynow

havetheabilitytoconnectandengagewithcompaniesonlinebutcanalsolearn

ofmisconductorfaultsquickerandreactmoreeffectively.Individualshave

becomethepolice,juryandjudgewhenitcomestocorrectcorporatebusiness

conduct.Thedreaded‘mediashitstorm’,traditionallyreservedtomajorcrises,

hasbecomeanincreasinglycommonoccurrencewithbusinessesbeing

scrutinizedandinvestigatedbytheirstakeholders.Thiscanresultinnegative

effects,thesecondarycrisisreactions,likestakeholdersspreadingnegative

messagesorevenadaptingtheirpurchaseintentions.

Powerdynamicshaveshiftedascompanieshaveseenthehighlevelof

controltheyhadinthetraditionalintegratedmarketingcommunication

hierarchydiminishedinfavorofconsumerempowerment(O’Brien,2011).

CorporateCommunicationisnolongeraone-waystreet,butamyriadof

overlappingroadsdispersinginalldirections.Thishasopenedan

unprecedentedlevelofdialoguebetweenorganizationsandstakeholdersthatis

uniquetoourtime.Assuch,manyorganizationshavesuccessfullyintegratedthis

onlinepresenceandreputationmanagementintotheirstrategiesandevenuse

socialmediaasafirstcommunicationpointduringcrises(Schultz,Utz&Goritz,

2011).

Thisconnectiontothestakeholdercomesatapriceasconsumersare

moreawareoftheirrights,wishesandopinionsandwillhappilypointoutany

mistakethecompanymakesorinformtheirpeersofmisconduct(Mangold&

Faulds,2009;O’Brien,2011).Thedigitalera,withallitssharingcapabilities,has

madecrisesmorenumerous,visibleanddisastrouswithalargergroupof

victimsandawiderimpact(Seeger,Sellnow&Ulmer,1998;2003)Small

mistakesareeasilyhandled,buttherealchallengeistomanagecorporate


7

reputationintimesoforganizationalcrisis.Corporatereputationisanintangible

assetoftheorganizationformedbyevaluationsofthestakeholdersaboutthe

organization(Coombs,2007a).Organizationalcrisesarespecific,unexpected

andnon-routineevents,oftenwithhighlevelsofuncertainty,whichthreatenan

organizationsreputationandgoals.Thesecrisesaffecttheinteractionwith

stakeholdersandoftendiminishtheorganizationsreputation,credibilityand

legitimacy(Schultz,Utz&Goritz,2011).Stakeholdersmightevenadapttheir

purchasinghabitsorthewaytheytalkaboutanorganization,thesecondary

crisisreactions,basedonitsreputationandcrises(Coombs&Holladay,2014;

Stockmyer,1996).

Oneofthemostwell-knowncorporatecriseseveristheJohnson&

JohnsonTylenolcrisisof1982.Itisacaseoftencitedasanexemplaryguideon

howorganizationshouldrespondtoacrisis.Thecrisisitselfwas,withouta

doubt,oneofthemoreseriousoneswithsevenpeopledyingofcyanidelaced

Tylenoltablets.AnextremelytroublingeventthatcouldhavecostJohnson&

Johnsontheirreputation,haditnotbeenfortheirswiftandcorrectresponse.

ThemomentitbecameclearthatTylenoltabletshadbeenlaced,Johnson&

Johnsonimmediatelypulledallstock,haltedproduction,gotinvolvedinthe

investigationandoffereda$100,000rewardforfindingthekiller.Afterthe

crisisJohnson&Johnsonintroducedtemper-resistantpackagingandoffered

discounts.Thecrisishadcosttheminexcessof$100millionbuttheirreaction,

cooperationandtransparencyhadputthecompanyinafavorablelightandthe

brandwasabletorecoverquickly(Kaplan,2005).Johnson&Johnsondisplayed

howeffectivecrisismanagementcannotonlyminimizeacorporation’snegative

reputationfalloutfollowingacrisis,buthoweffectivecrisismanagementcan

alsohelpimprovereputationpost-crisis.

WhenToyotafacedacrisisin2009pertainingtotheirfloor-matsgetting

stuckbehindtheaccelerator,aproductfaultthatresultedinafatalaccident,it

wasthecatalystforaseriesofcustomercomplaints.Asaresult,morethan8

millionvehicleswererecalledworldwideandToyotafacedthebiggestcrisisin

itshistory.However,Toyotadidnotrespondtothecrisisuntil6monthsafterthe

crash(Davey,2010;Verschoor,2014).Toyotahadfailedtotakeappropriate

actionintimeandonlywhenthetraditionalmediapickedthestoryupdidthey


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gointo‘crisismode’,eventhoughtherewerealreadydefinitesignsofacrisis

online.Companiesshouldthusmonitortheirreputationonlineand‘assumethe

worst’whenitcomestocrisesandrespondbeforespeculationandrumortake

over(Davey,2010;Schultz,Utz&Goritz,2011).Badcrisismanagementresults

inworsecrises,andinthecaseofToyotacostthecompanymillionsofdollars

andasignificantblowtotheirreputation.Nonetheless,Toyota’spriorgood

reputationprotectedtheminpartandtheywereabletorebuildtheirreputation

inthefollowingyears.

Evenwhenmonitoring,itisstillpossibleforanorganizationtobe

oblivioustothecorporatecrisisensuing.TakeforexamplePepsi,amultinational

beverageconglomerate,whorecentlylaunchedanewadinwhichanInstagram

celebrityappearstobemockingpoliticalprotestandthegrowingpolitical

divisionanddiscontentfoundamongstmanypeopleinsociety.Bytryingtomake

averyserioustopic‘fun&whimsical’,theyeffectivelyangeredmany

stakeholdersandwereputtoheavyscrutinybycivilrightsgroupsandthe

media.Pepsihadtriedto‘hook-in’onacurrentaffairbutfailedmiserably,andin

theendappearedtobemostlymockingsomeveryserioussocietalissues.Sucha

corporateblunder,resultinginafull-blowncrisis,isnotuncommonandoften

stemsfrominternalissuesormismanagementinsaidcompany.

WhatmakesthiscaseinterestingisthatfollowingthePepsiAdCrisis,

internationalbeercompanyHeinekenlaunchedanadinwhichtheydidwhat

Pepsiwastryingtodo,butdiditright.Insteadofmockingpoliticaldifferences

andprotest,theyputtwopeoplewithwidelydifferentviewpointsacrossone

another.OnlywhentheyhadbuiltarapportdidHeinekenrevealthewidely

differentviewseachpersonhad.Wouldtheystayanddiscusstheirdifferences

overabeerorwalkaway?Obviouslytheystayedandshareda‘Heiny’.Whatthis

teachesusisthatcorporatecrisescanappearsuddenly,thatmanycompanies

areinternallyoblivioustothewaystheymightstartacorporatecrisis,thateven

thebestintentionsarevoidwhenexecutedwronglyandthatonecompanies’

crisisisanothercompaniesopportunity.Whatisalsointerestingtonoteisthat

therewasevenoutragetowardstheHeinekenadbythe‘progressive’media.Itis

hardtoappeaseallthestakeholdersasanorganization.


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Appeasingeveryonemightbedifficult,buttherearealsocasesinwhich

companiesblatantlyplacetheirprioritiesinthewrongballpark.The2009

financialcrisiswasharshforthefinancialindustry,butconsiderablyharsherfor

thepeoplewhowereafraidtolosetheirhome,incomeorlivingasaresultofit.

WhenJPMorgandecidedtoinvest138milliondollarsintoafewprivatejetsand

anewhangarafterhavingjustreceiveda25billionbailout,itwasnotsurprising

thatcriticswerequicktohighlightthehypocrisyofthis(Sarstedt,2009).This

wasconsequentlyusedasanexampletocondemnthewholebankingindustry

foritsirresponsibleandlavishspending,effectivelyspreadingthecrisisto

involvepartieswhohadnodirectguiltinthematter.Asimilarfeatoccurred

duringtheVolkswagenemissionscrisis,afterwhichthewholeautomobile

industrywasscrutinizedandinvestigatedafteritwasdiscoveredVWhadplaced

‘tamperingsoftware’intheirdieselcars.Thismeansthatcrisesthatstartinone

company,canspreadtothewholeindustrywhenmismanaged.

Tohelpprofessionalsinovercomingcrises,andtobetterunderstand

them,theSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheorywasdeveloped(Coombs,

2007a).Thistheoreticalguidehelpsinassessingthereputationalthreat,

identifyingthetypeofcrisisandoffersadviceonthecorrecttypeofresponseto

begivenbytheorganizationtominimizenegativereputationalfalloutfromthe

crisis.Duetotheextensivetestingandresearchonwhichitwasbuilt,theSCCTis

consideredacornerstoneofcorporatereputationmanagementandwillactasa

theoreticalguidethroughoutthisthesis.

TheSCCToffersthreeoverarchingresponsestrategiestocorporate

reputationcrises(Coombs,2007a).Thesethreecrisisresponsesaredenialofthe

accusation,rebuildofthereputationanddiminishoftheattribution.These

strategiesareeachapplicabletoadifferenttypeofcrisisandcrisisguilt

attribution.OneoftheleaststudiedaspectsoftheSCCTisthepracticeof

bolstering-tostrengthenorsupportthecorporatereputationbyhighlightingthe

goodpracticesofanorganization,praisingstakeholdersorvictimization(Benoit,

1997;Coombs,2007a).Bolsteringisgenerallyconsideredanadditionalcrisis

responsestrategytobeusedincombinationwithanotherstrategy,butassuch

limitedattentionhasbeengiveninacademicstothisstrategythatdoesnotfocus

onattributingresponsibility(Ma&Zahn,2016).Nonetheless,researchhas


10

shownthatbolsteringisindeedausefultoolinminimizingreputationaldamage

(Brinson&Benoit,1999;Sheldon&Shalot,2009).

ThisbecomesapparentwhenlookingatthecrisismanagementCitibank

employedduringthe2009financialcrisis.Thebailoutofthefinancialindustries,

andresultinglossoftrust,wasaserioustarnishtoCitibank’sreputation.Unlike

JPMorgan,Citibankadaptedtothecrisisandbyusingcrisisresponsestrategies,

thebankwasabletorecoveralargepartoftheirreputationandre-instillfaith

fromtheconsumers.Intheseresponses,Citibankusedbolsteringmostoftenin

responsetothecrisisandgovernmentbailout(Weberetal,2011).Bolsteringis

bestusedincombinationwithanothercrisisresponsestrategyasprevious

researchhasproven,andwasalsothecasewithCitibank(Coombs,2007a;Kim

etal,2009;Weberetal,2011).

Duetothelackofexperimentalresearchdealingwithbolstering

specifically,thisresearchwillfocusonthevalueofbolsteringasasupplementto

crisisresponsesintimesofcorporatecrisisandhowthisaffectspost-crisis

reputation.Itwillalsostudythewayinwhichonlineaudiencesmightengagein

secondarycrisiscommunications(sharing/commenting)onsocialmediaor

performsecondarycrisisreactions(recommendingorcondemningtopeers),

whichalsoincludespurchasingbehavior.Theresearchquestionthatthisthesis

willaimtoanswerwillthusbe:

Towhatextent,ifany,doesthebolsteringstrategyaffectpostcrisis

reputation,secondarycrisiscommunicationsandsecondarycrisisreactionsduring

timesoforganizationalcrisis?

Toanswerthisquestion,anonlineexperimentwasdesignedinwhicha

fictionalcrisiswasintroducedandtherespondentswereconsequently

presentedwithdifferentconditionsatrandom.Theseconditionspresented

differentcrisisresponsesthateitherincorporatedbolsteringordidnot.Another

aimofthestudywastodistinguishtheinfluenceofbolsteringonsecondary

crisiscommunicationsandsecondarycrisisreactions,whichwere

operationalizedusingpreviousresearchmodelsandtheory.


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Bolsteringhaspreviouslybeenstudiedmainlyinacase-studydesign,

fromwhichtheresultsindicatethatitisawidelyusedandeffectivecrisis

responsestrategy(Kim,Avery&Larissa,2009;Sheldon&Sallot,2008;Weberet

al,2011).TheSCCT,however,claimsbolsteringisa‘minimalopportunity’to

increasereputationalassetsintimeofcorporatecrisis(Coombs,2007a).

Limitedresearchhasdealtwiththequestionifthebolsteringstrategymakes

crisisresponsestrategiesmoreeffectiveornotinlimitingnegativepostcrisis

falloutcomparedtostrategiesthatdonotincorporatebolstering(Ma&Zhan,

2016).

Thisstudywillattempttodiscoverthetrueeffectofthebolstering

strategyoncorporatereputationandstakeholderreactionsusingan

experimentalresearchdesign.Sucharesearchmighthelpusbetterunderstand

howbolsteringworksoncorporatereputationintimesofcrisis,andoffer

academicsaswellaspractitionersimportantinsightintotherealvalueof

bolsteringasasecondarycrisisresponsestrategy.Hopefullyitwillfillan

importantgapinthetheoryofcrisiscommunication.

Theimplicationthatmanypractitionersofcorporatecrisis

communicationareindeedusingthebolsteringstrategytoprotecttheir

reputationsindicatesagapbetweenwhatisfoundinthe‘realworld’andsociety,

andwhatresearchershaveincorporatedintomodelsandtheory(Claeys&

Opgenhaffen,2016).Thisresearchwillattempttofillthisgapandprovidethe

corporateworld,societyandacademicswithananswertothequestionif

bolsteringisaneffectivesupplementtotheprimarycrisisresponsestrategies,as

indicatedintherealworld,orthatitisminimalassetasisindicatedinacademic

theory.Theresultsofthisstudycouldhaveanimpactonboththesocietal;the

waybolsteringisusedincorporatecommunication,asontheacademic,inthe

formofanupdatedtheoryoratleasttheinsinuationthatmoreresearchis

required.

Implicationsforcorporatecrisiscommunicationcouldbethattheyare

eithercorrectinusingthebolsteringstrategyandthatitisanunderratedtoolin

minimizingnegativereputationfalloutfollowingacrisis.Or,itismerelya‘fluff’

pieceusedbypractitionersbecausetheyarereluctanttoonlycommunicate

negativeinformationlikeadmittingguiltandapologizing.Thiswouldmeanthat


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thebolsteringstrategymightnotbeanythingmorethanapsychologicalcrutch,

makingitslightlyeasiertoadmitguiltandtakeappropriateaction.Alternatively,

usingbolsteringwhiledenyingguiltmightbeastrategytodivertattentionfrom

thenegativecrisisunfolding.

Beforementionedpotentialimplicationsforcrisiscommunicators,that

bolsteringisindeedaveryeffectivestrategyinminimizingnegativereputation

falloutwouldmeanthatacademicshaveconsistentlyunderestimatedthe

effectivenessofthestrategy.Ifthiswerethecase,theacademicfieldofcrisis

communicationwouldbewisetore-investigatethematterofbolsteringandifit

wereindeedpossiblethatthebolsteringstrategyhasbeenunderestimatedinthe

SCCT,thetheorywouldneedtobeadapted.

Thisresearchwillattempttodissecttheeffectivenessofthebolstering

strategyonthethreemainfactorstheSCCTattemptstominimizethenegative

reputationalcrisisfallouton.Thesefactorsarethereputationafterthecrisis

(post-crisisreputation),willingnesstospreadthecrisis(secondarycrisis

communications)andbehavioralactionstakenafterthecrisis(secondarycrisis

communications)


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2.TheoreticalFrameworkCorporatereputationistheaccumulationofopinions,expectationsand

evaluationsmadebystakeholders,anyonewhohasastakeorinterestinthe

company,aboutanorganization(Coombs&Holladay,2006;VanRiel&

Fombrun,2007,ch2.).Theseevaluationsmakeupthecorporatereputationofan

organizationandcanresultineitherfavorableoutcomes,suchasattractiveness,

credibilityandimprovedfinancialperformance,ornegativeoutcomessuchas

lossofbusiness,distrustandsometimesevenprotestsorboycottsofthe

organization(Coombs,2007a,VanRiel&Fombrun,2007,ch2.).These

reputationsareconstantlybeingrenegotiatedinsociety,arealwayschanging

andneedtobemanagedcontinuously(Fombrun&vanRiel,2004,ch1.).O

Duetothebenefitsofagoodreputationorganizationswillthusaimtomaintaina

positivereputationamongstitsstakeholders,butwilllosesaidgoodreputation

whentheyneglecttoproperlymanageit.

Positivereputationalcapital,ora‘reservoirofgoodwill’,canalsoactasa

defenseagainstnegativepublicity,meaningthatanorganizationwithaprior

goodreputationwillexperiencelessharmduringacrisisthananorganization

withanegativeorevenneutralreputation(Coombs&Holladay,2006;Decker,

2012).Thisissupportedbybothcasestudiesasexperimentalresearch(Decker,

2012;Fombrun&Foss,2004;Mahon&Wartick,2003;Tucker&Melewar,2005;

Turketal,2012).Thepublicwillbemorereceptiveofthecorporation’scrisis

responseandhandlingif,upuntilthen,thecorporationhasbeenheldinhigh

esteem.Furthermore,apositivereputationcanbeusedasadefensive‘weapon’,

forinstancebybolsteringaboutpastgooddeeds,tomaintainandprotectthe

marketpositionandrelationshipwithstakeholdersandrecovermorerapidly

(Coombs,2007a;Decker,2012;Mahon&Wartick,2003).Becauseofthis,

bolsteringisgenerallyonlyrecommendedintheSCCTwhenthereisagoodprior

reputation.Onewayofmeasuringacorporation’spriorreputationisthroughthe

RepTraksystem,whichannuallyrankscorporatereputationsbasedon

worldwidesurveys(Ponzi,Fombrun&Gardberg;2011).

AccordingtoFombrun&VanRiel(2004,ch5)thefoundationofastrong

reputationarefiveprinciplesthatseparatewinningreputationsfromtherest.

Theseprinciplesarevisibility,distinctiveness,authenticity,transparency,and


14

consistency.Visibilityreferstothewillingnessandcapabilityofanorganization

tocommunicatewithitsstakeholders,themediaandreleaseinformationabout

itself.Distinctivenessreferstobeingunique,oratleastbeingperceivedas

unique,andusingthisfeatincommunicationandmarketing.Authenticityishow

believableacompanyis.Fakingauthenticityishard,andsomethingstakeholders

canfindoutquicklyintodaysconnectedandinformedworld.Authenticityis

relatedtotrustandcredibility:youneedtobegood,notjustappeargood.

Transparencymeansbeingopenabouthowyouworkandwhatyourgoalsare.

Companiesthatdonotshyawayfromcommunicatingwiththepublicand

openingtheirdoorstothemhavehigherreputationsbecausetheycanshowthe

worldtheyaremorethanafacelesscorporation.Consistencyinactionsand

messagebuildswinningreputations.Choosewhatyourorganizationstandsfor

andstickwithit.Finally,VanRiel&Fombrun(2007)addasixthfactorinalater

publication:responsiveness.Companiesthatareabletoquicklyandadequately

respondtosituations,negativeorpositive,buildmoretrustandcanoften

preventacrisisinitsinfancy.

Maintainingapositivereputationbecomesconsiderablymoredifficult

whentheorganizationfacesacrisis.Corporatecrisesareeventsthatare

unexpected,disruptiveandhavethepotentialtonegativelyinfluencethe

stakeholderrelationship(Coombs,2007a;Bundy,Pfarrer,Short&Coombs,

2016;Kahn,Barton&Fellows,2013).Thismeansmostorganizationswillaimto

avoidcrises,andifthatisnotpossibleattempttominimizethenegativefallout

fromthecrisis.Tominimizethiscrisisfallout,theorganizationmusttakeprior

reputation,crisisresponsibility,crisishistoryandpriorrelationsintoaccount

whendetermininghowtorespondtoacrisis(Chiciudean&David,2013;

Coombs,2007a).Someofthemainnegativereputationalfalloutscrisis

communicationattemptstominimizearepost-crisisreputation,secondarycrisis

communicationsandsecondarycrisisreactions.Post-crisisreputationhereby

referstotheevaluationsgivenbystakeholdersabouttheorganizationafterthe

crisis.Secondarycrisiscommunicationsaretheactionstakenbythestakeholder

followingacrisis;doesheorsheshare,commentorinformpeersaboutthe

crisis?Finally,secondarycrisisreactionsrefertotheopinionsandactiona

stakeholdermighttakeafterthecrisis,likespreadingnegativeword-of-mouthor


15

evenadaptingpurchaseintentions.

OneofthecornerstonesofcrisismanagementtheoryistheSituational

CrisisCommunicationTheorydevelopedbyTimothyCoombs(2007a).This

theoryoffersaframeworkthatcanbeusedtoprotectreputationalassetsduring

acrisis.TheSCCTattemptstopredicthowstakeholderswillreactinacertain

crisissituationbyassessingthelevelofreputationalthreat(basedonattribution,

crisishistoryandpriorrelationship)andwhatresponsestrategyisbestsuitedto

reducelossofreputation.TheSCCTdrawsontwoprevioustheoriesofcorporate

reputationcrises,andincorporatesthesetocreateatheorythataimstoidentify

andrestorecorporatereputationaftercrises.

ThefirsttheoryistheAttributiontheory,whichexplainsthatpeoplewill

searchforthecauseofeventsandattributeresponsibility(positiveornegative)

ofsaideventtoapersonororganization(Weiner,1985).Themostcommon

attributionsintheSCCTareangerandsympathy(Coombs,2007a).Attribution

canalsoinfluencebehavioralresponses,negativeonesforangerattributionand

positiveonesforsympathyattribution(Weiner,1985;Coombs2007a,2007b).

ThesecondtheoryistheImageRestorationtheory,whichaimstooffer

guidelinestorestorecorporatereputationwhenfacedwitha(negative)crisis

(Benoit,1997).TheSituationalCrisisCommunicationTheoryoffers

communicationstrategiesfordenying,evadingandreducingreputational

threatsduringacrisis,manyofwhichwereadaptedorbasedonthetwo

previoustheories,andassuchwillbeusedastheoverarchingtheoryinthis

paper.

2.1Pre-CrisisReputation Acorporatecrisishasthepotentialtoinflictreputationaldamage,which

canresultinanincreasedunfavorableviewoftheorganization.Onewayof

protectinganorganizationagainstnegativecrisisfalloutisbybuildingand

maintainingapositivereputationbeforeacrisisoccurs(pre-crisisreputation)

(Coombs,2007a).Wehavealreadydiscussedthemeritsofapositivereputation

fororganizations:attractiveness,trust,credibilityandimprovedfinancialgains

(Coombs,2007a,VanRiel&Fombrun,2007,ch2.).Thismeansmaintaininga

positivereputationisanassettoanorganizationthatwillaiditinappeasing


16

stakeholdersandimprovingbusiness.Ontheotherhand,anegativereputation

will(generally)negativelyaffectbusinessandcausestakeholderstochoose

alternativeorganizationswhenpossible.

Apositivereputationcanhelpaidacompanyinminimizingnegative

reputationfalloutfollowingacrisis.Afavorablepre-crisisreputationactsasa

bufferof‘reputationalcapital’duringcrisesandallowstheorganizationtosuffer

lessdamageandreboundquicker(Coombs,2007a;Fombrun&vanRiel,2004;

Knight&Pretty,1999;Gregory,1999).Companiesthathaveahigherpre-crisis

reputationwillalsohaveahigherpost-crisisreputationthantheircounterparts

withalowerpre-crisisreputation(Decker,2012,Fombrun&Foss,2004;Tucker

&Melewar,2005)Researchintotheeffectivenessofpre-crisisreputationon

negativereputationfalloutfollowingacrisisconfirmsthisandindicatesthat

thosewhohaveabetterpre-crisisreputationwillhaveamorefavorablepost-

crisisreputationthanorganizationsthathadanunfavorablepre-crisis

reputation(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015;Coombs&Holladay,2001;2002;2006;

Decker,2012;Sheldon&Sallot,2009).Thiscouldbeexplainedbyareluctanceof

thestakeholderstochangetheirpre-existingattitudeaboutanorganization,

evenattributinglessresponsibility,andgoingasfarasthatapositivepre-crisis

reputationcanprotecttheorganizationagainstnegativepublicityandexternal

allegationsfollowingacrisis(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015).

CoombsandHolladay(2006)callthisthe‘Haloeffect’.Thisreferstothe

powerofpre-crisisreputationindeterringnegativereputationfallout:the

organizationisbasicallysogooditreachesalevelof‘sainthood’.Theystatethis

haloeffectactsasashieldratherthana‘benefit-of-the-doubt’factor,meaning

thestakeholderwillbelesslikelytochangetheirowncognitionorexpectation

biasduetoacrisis(deflectedofftheshield).Thisdoesnotmeanthatpre-crisis

reputationcancompletelyomitthenegativefalloutfromacrisis.Volkswagen

hadapositivereputationbeforetheiremissionscrisisbutduetoimproper

managementandresponsetothecrisis,lostalargeportionoftheirpositive

reputation.AstudybytheReputationInstitute(2016b)foundthatpeoplewere

initiallynotthatfazedbythecrisisanditdidnotdamageVW’sreputation

greatly,butatalaterpointreportedalossoftrustandwillingnesstopurchase

VW’sproductsduetothewayVWrespondedtothecrisis.


17

Strongreputationsmightthusprotectanorganizationduringinitialcrisis

responsesbutmismanagementatalaterlevelcanstillresultinreputational

damage.Wecanthereforesaythatastrongreputationprotectsanorganization

bygivingitareservoirofgoodwill,butthatthatreservoirdoesrunoutatsome

pointwhennoactionsaretakentoreducetheoffensivenessofthecrisis.Suchan

assetofpositivereputationisthereforeofprimeimportancefororganizations

who,besidestheusualbenefitsoutsideoftimesofcrisis,willalsobebetter

protectedwhenacrisisdoesarise.

2.2.ReputationHistory,RelationshipsandThreats Everycrisishasitsownlevelofreputationalthreat.Thelevelof

reputationalthreatposedbyacrisisisinfluencedbythreedifferentfactors.The

firstistheinitialcrisisresponsibility.Thisisrelatedtotheattributiontheory

thatstatesthatwhenaneventhappens,peoplewillattributeresponsibility

aboutthecauseofacrisisinvaryingdegreestoanorganization(Kelley&

Michela,1980;Coombs,2007b&2006).Moreattributionthusmeansthata

greaterreputationalthreatisformedbecausestakeholdersthinkthecompanyis

toblameandguiltyofthecrisis.Thesecondandthirdfactorsarethe

organization’scrisishistoryandpriorrelationalreputation.Crisishistoryrefers

topastcrisesthatmighthavebeensimilarinshape,formandattributionand

priorrelationalreputationreferstothepastinteractionsbetweenthe

stakeholdersandtheorganization.

Whenpositive,thesefactorscanhelpreducetheorganizations’crisisand

evenhelppreventthem,muchlikeapositivepre-crisisreputationcan(Bundyet

al,2016;Coombs,2007a;Kahnetal,2013;Ulmeretal,2011)Ontheotherhand,

whennegative,thesesituationfactorsactasintensifiersforreputationalthreats

andcrisisattributionandthuscanthoroughlyescalatethesituation(Coombs&

Holladay,2001;Coombs,2006;2007a).Everycrisisisanaccumulationof

differentsituationalfactors,actionsandresultsanditisthereforeimpossibleto

deviseauniformityof‘bestpractices’ortoevenpredictwithassuranceifacrisis

willbesevereornot(Coombs,2015).

Levelofreputationalthreatisanimportantaspectofcrisis

communicationand,asmentionedbefore,isstronglytiedtoWeiner’sattribution


18

theory(1985).Duringareputationalcrisisitisthusimportanttofirstassessthe

levelofattributionandreputationalthreatanorganizationmightbesubjectto

fromsaidcrisis.Humanresponsewhenfacedwithanegativeeventistoseekout

thecauseofsaidevent(Weiner,1985).Causalityisthusgenerallythefirst

questionraisedwhenacrisisarises(Kelley,1967).Highlevelsofattribution

indicateaninternalcausality(itistheorganizationsfaultfordeviatingbehavior)

whilelowlevelsindicateanexternalattribution(theorganizationbehaved

normallybutwasinfluencedbyoutsidesituationalfactors).Higherlevelsof

crisisattributionareplacedonorganizationsthatcausedthecrisisinternallyand

willthereforeexperienceamoreseverecrisisthreat(Bundy2016;Coombs,

2007a;2004;Kimetal,2009).

Researchhasshownthatcrisishistoryalsohasaninfluenceonthe

reputationalthreat,andthatpastcrisescanintensifythecurrentlevelof

reputationalthreat(Bundyetal,2016;Coombs,2004;Jeong,2009;Siscoetal,

2010).Anegativerelationshipcanalsomakestakeholderslessforgivingbecause

theywillalreadyhaveanegativeopinionoftheorganizationandthecrisismight

helpreinforcethisbelief(Bundyetal,2016;Coombs,2004;2007a).Ontheother

hand,apositivehistoryorrelationshipwillactasanassettotheorganizationin

timesofcrisis,causethepublictobemoreacceptingofthecrisisresponseand

minimizethelong-termfallout(Decker,2012).Anorganizationmusttherefore

firstunderstandhowthepublicperceivesthecrisisbasedontheirreputation

historyandthelevelofattributionbeforechoosingaresponsestrategy(Coombs,

2007a;Choi&Chung,2013).

2.3.CorporateCrisistypes&ResponsesTheSCCTaimstoofferguidelinesforpractitionersbasedonempirically

testedevidence.Coombs(2007a)identifiesthreedifferenttypesofreputational

crisisthatarebasedontheimagerestorationtheory(Benoit,1995)andwhich

aresupportedinempiricalresearch(Coombs&Holladay,2004).Inthevictim

cluster,theorganizationisalsothevictimofthecrisisandexperiencesaweak

attributionofresponsibilityandthusamildreputationalthreat.Intheaccidental

cluster,thecrisiswasunintentionallycausedbytheorganizationandthus

minimalattributionscanbemadeandamoderatereputationalthreatis


19

experienced.Thefinalcluster,andtheonethatposestheseverestreputational

threatandattributionofcrisisresponsibility,isthepreventablecluster.Inthis

typeofcrisis,theorganizationknowinglytookinappropriateactionsorcouldat

leasthaveavoidedthem.

Oncethelevelofreputationalthreatandtypeofcrisishasbeenidentified,

theSCCToffersdifferentcrisisresponsestrategiesaimedatreducingthe

negativeaffectandpreventnegativebehavioralintentions(Coombs,2007a).The

centralthemeinthisisresponsibility,whichinturnrequiresaccountabilityfor

thecrisis-attributionplacedontheorganizationbythestakeholders.Thetypeof

responsestrategytheorganizationusescangreatlyinfluencetheresulting

stakeholderevaluations(Bundy&Pfarrer,2015;Bundyetal,2016;Coombs,

2007a).

TheSCCT’scrisisresponsestrategiescanbedividedintoprimaryand

secondarycrisisresponsestrategies.Theprimarystrategiesarebasedondenial,

diminishandrebuild(Coombs,2006;2007a).Thesecondaryresponsestrategy

istheBolsteringstrategyandwillbediscussedlateron.Thedenialstrategy

attemptstoremoveanyconnectionbetweenthecrisisandtheorganization.This

strategyismostusefulinthevictimcluster,whentheconnectionbetweenthe

organizationandthecrisisisuntrueoratleastcannotbeproven.Thediminish

strategyaimstoconvincestakeholdersthatthecrisisis‘notthatbad’orthatit

occurredoutsideoftheorganizationscontrol.Finally,therebuildingstrategy

aimstominimizethereputationaldamagebyshowingsympathyoroffering

compensation.


20

CrisisType Victim Accidental Preventable

Attribution Low Medium High

Examples • Natural

disasters

• Workplace

violence

• Rumors

• Accidents

• Producterrors

• Disputeswith

stakeholders

• Humancaused

accidents

• Humancaused

producterrors

• Misdeeds

Crisis

Response

(Primary)

Denial

• Attackthe

accuser

• Deny

• Scapegoat

Diminish

• Excuse

• Justification

Rebuild

• Apology

• Corrective

action

Figure1:SCCTcrisistypes,attributionsandresponsesoverview

Researchintotheuseofthesedifferentcrisisresponseshaslargely

confirmedtheSCCT.Oneresearchattemptedtoempiricallyprovethevalidityof

theSCCTbystudyingtheeffectivenessofthethreedifferentcrisistypesmatched

withdifferentcrisisresponsesinanexperimentresearchdesign(Claeys,

Cauberghe&Vyncke,2010).Itwasfoundthatcorporatereputationismost

underthreatwhenfacedwithapreventablecrisisandthattherebuildstrategyis

mosteffectiveinmitigatingnegativereputationfalloutfollowingacrisis.

Surprisingly,itwasalsofoundthatcrisesintheaccidentalorvictimclusterwere

treatedthesamebytheirrespondentsandresultedinsimilarreputational

effects.Finally,theyfoundthatthedenystrategywasonlymarginallyless

effectivethantherebuildstrategyandthatpersonaltraitsofrespondentsmight

beanimportantfactorinthis.

OtherresearchhasalsodealtwiththeSCCT,anditwasalsofoundthatthe

rebuildstrategywasthemosteffectiveinmitigatingnegativereputationfallout,

regardlessofcrisistype,whilethedenialordiminishstrategieselicitedthemost

negativeresponses(McDonald,Sparks&Glendon,2010).Resultsalsoshowed

thatthecrisis-causeandcrisis-responsibilityappearedtobemoreimportant

thanresponse.Thismeansresponsestrategyislessimportantthanifthe

organization(willingly)causedthecrisisornot.Theresponsethatattributesthe

mostresponsibilitytotheorganization,therebuildstrategy,actuallyresultsin

thestakeholderthinkingtheorganizationislessresponsible,oratleastthe


21

stakeholderthinkstheyarelessguilty.Thevice-versaeffectcanbeobservedfor

thestrategiesthataimtoreducetheperceptionofresponsibilityandactually

increasetheattributionreportedbyrespondents.Itseemsthattaking

responsibility,displayingtransparencyandremorsearethemosteffectivecrisis-

responsestrategies.Organizationsthattrytocorrectmistakesmadenomatter

what,likehowJohnson&JohnsonreactedtotheTylenolcrisiswiththepublicin

mindandnottheirprofits,areconsiderablylessaffectedbycrises.

Similarresultswerefoundinotherresearch.Cultural,personalor

relationalattributeswerefoundtobeimportantfactorsincrisiscommunication

responseeffectiveness(Verhoevenetal,2014;Luoma-aho,Moreno&

Verhoeven,2017).Responseswithalowlevelofaccommodation(denial)are

generallyregardedaslessethicalthanresponseswithamoderate(diminish)or

high(rebuild)levelofaccommodationtowardsthestakeholder(Coombs,1999;

Coombs&Holladay,2005;Coombs,Holladay&Claeys,2016;Decker,2012).

AnotherstudyinTaiwanfoundthattimely,consistentandactiveresponsestoa

crisisaremoreimportantthantheactualresponsestrategyused(Huang,2008).

Thisisgenerallysupportedinotherresearchthatfoundthatoneofthemost

detrimentalresponsestoacrisisfororganizationalreputationisgivingno

responseatall(Coombsetal,2016;Park&Reber,2010;Coombs,2006).Decker

(2012)alsomentionsthatthedenialstrategyisbetterthannoresponse,butonly

whenthereisapositivepre-crisisreputationthatcanhelpshieldthe

organization.

Itisnotsurprisingthatwefinddiscrepanciesbetweenstudiesandthe

SCCT.TheSCCTwasdevelopedasaguidebasedonempiricalresearch,which

couldbeappliedintoeverycrisissituation.Thisdoesnotaccountforsituational

factorslikeculture,geographyorspecificcrisesorcrisishistories.Nonetheless,

theSCCTremainstodatethemostinclusiveandcompletetheoryforcrisis

communicationandremainsvalidduetoitsextensivetestingandinclusioninto

multipleempiricalstudiesforwhichitlaidthegroundwork.


22

2.4.SecondaryCrisisResponses:BolsteringStrategyThesecondarycrisisresponsestrategy,whichisgenerallyconsideredan

additiontotheprimarystrategies,consistsoftheBolsteringresponsestrategy

(Coombs,2007a;Weber,etal,2011).Bolsteringisunderstoodtobethepractice

ofstressinggoodpastdeedsandtraitsofanorganizationintimesofcrisisto(re)

buildtheimageandreputation(Benoit,1997;Coombs,2007a;Weberetal,

2011).Coombs(2007a)saysthebolsteringstrategyoffersa‘minimal

opportunitytodevelopreputationalassets’whileotherresearchhasindicated

thatbolsteringisnotjustoneofthemostusedcrisisresponsestrategies,but

possiblyalsooneofthemosteffective(Kimetal,2009;Sheldon&Sallot,2008;

Weberetal,2011).Thispastresearchandindicationsfromthereal-worldcrisis

managementpracticescouldbeanindicationofbolsteringbeingunderplayed

withintheSCCT,andthereforefurtherresearchisrequired.

Benoit’s(1995)imagerestorationtheory,onwhichtheSCCTisbuilt,

claimsthebolsteringstrategyisbestusedwhenanorganizationisaccusedof

wrongfulactionsandwantstoreducetheoffensivenessofthecrisis.Wecanfind

anexampleinthisintheresponsefromanExxonchairmanaftertheValdezoil

spill:‘Exxonhasmovedswiftlyandcompetentlytominimizetheeffectthisoil

willhaveontheenvironment,fishandotherwild-life’(Benoit,1997).Although

thiswasoneofthemostdisastrousoilspillsinhumanhistory,Exxonstill

thoughtthatthebolsteringstrategywouldprotecttheirreputation.

TheSCCTclaimsthebolsteringstrategyisbestusedtosupportoneofthe

threeprimarycrisisresponsestrategies(deny,diminish,rebuild).Itistherefore

notavalidresponsestrategybyitself,andshouldalwaysbeusedincombination

withoneofthethreeprimarystrategies.Bolsteringstrategiesarestrategiesofan

opportunisticnaturebecausetheycanonlybeusedwhenanorganizationhas

donepastgoodwork(Coombs&Holladay,p.41,2011).Thismeansthata

companythathasdonenogoodworksimplyhasnothinggenuinetobolster

aboutwhileacompanythat,forinstance,haskeptahighservicestandard,won

awardsoradaptedaCSRstrategy,canbolsteraboutanyorallofthesepastgood

deeds.Bolsteringworksbyoffsettingthenegativeinformationbyadding

positiveinformationandthereforerequiresthepresenceofpositiveinformation

(goodpre-crisisreputation)tobepresent(Coombs,2015).


23

Incrisiscommunicationpractice,itwasfoundthatbolsteringwasthe

mostoftenusedfirstcrisisresponseandthatitwasusedmostoftenin

combinationwiththedenialstrategy,followedbythecorrectiveactionstrategy.

Itwasalsofoundthatbolsteringwasmostoftenadoptedinthepreventable

cluster,meaninginsituationswithahighlevelofinternalattribution(Kimetal,

2009).Thisindicatesthatbolsteringisaprevalentstrategyinreal-lifecrisis

communication,asalsobecomesclearwhenlookingatothercasestudy

orientatedresearch,andcouldbeexplainedbytheorganizations’reluctanceto

share(only)negativeinformationaboutthemselves(Kim&Jung,2014;Sheldon

&Sallot,2008;Wan,2004;Weberetal,2011).Thisisunsurprisingasthe

incorporationofbolsteringcanreduceperceptionsofguiltandwrongdoingand

increasedtrustandtruthfulness(Kazoleas,2008)Furthermore,theimplication

thatbolsteringisusedmostoftenincombinationwiththedenialstrategy

directlycounterstherecommendationsmadeintheSCCTthatbolsteringworks

bestwiththediminishandrebuildstrategies,althoughitisnotdirectlystatedit

shouldnotbeusedwithdenial(Coombs,2007a;Kimetal,2009).

Astheprevalenceofthestrategyamongstpractitionersinsinuates,

bolsteringmightthusbeanimportanttoolincrisiscommunication.Itappears

bolsteringisanalmostnaturalreactionformanycorporationswhenfacedwitha

crisis.Ithas,despiteitsprevalenceamongstpractitioners,notbeenstudied

sufficientlyinacademicliterature,andthereforeitseffectivenessremainslargely

unproven(Ma&Zahn,2016).Otherresearchhasindicatedthatatwo-sided

responsethatcombinesanegativeaspect(thecrisis)withapositiveone

(bolstering)ismoresuccessfulthanone-sidedones(Kim&Sung,2014).

Furthermore,itisinterestingthatpractitionersusethestrategyofbolstering

mostincombinationwithdenial,whilethisisindirectcontrasttotheSCCT

(Coombs,2007a).Consideringtheuseofbolsteringinpracticethisresearchwill

aimtodiscoverbolstering’svalueincrisiscommunicationfurtherbylookingat

theuseofbolsteringincombinationwiththetwomostusedcrisisresponsesby

practitioners,thecorrectiveactionstrategywhichisrecommendedbytheSCCT

andthedenialstrategywhichistheoreticallyadvisedagainstintheSCCT.

Wehypothesizethatanorganizationthatincorporatesbolsteringinto

theircrisisresponsewillhaveahigherlevelofpostcrisiscorporatereputation


24

forbothstrategiesthanorganizationsthatdonotincorporateabolstering

strategy.

H1a:Organizationsthatincorporatethedenial+bolsteringstrategywill

haveahigherlevelofpositivepostcrisisreputationafterapreventablecrisis

scenariothanorganizationsthatonlyusethedenialstrategy.

H1b:Organizationsthatincorporatethecorrectiveaction+bolstering

strategywillhaveahigherlevelofpositivepostcrisisreputationaftera

preventablecrisisscenariothanorganizationsthatonlyusethecorrectiveaction

strategy.

2.5.Social-MediatedCrisisCommunication TheInternethasbecomeincreasinglyimportantforcrisis

communicators.Monitoringandreactingtocrisesunfoldingonlineisaneffective

strategyinidentifyingandmanagingcrises.TheSocial-MediatedCrisis

CommunicationModeldealswiththeinfluenceofmediatypeoncrisis

communication,whichwasnotincludedintheSCCT,andhighlightsthe

importanceofsocialmediaduringacrisis(Austin,Fisher&Jin,2012).Themodel

identifiesthewayinwhich(young)adultsseekoutsocialmediaafteracrisisfor

insiderinformationandusethemtocommunicatewithfriendsorfamily.The

modelwasoriginallynamedtheBlogMediatedCrisisCommunicationModel,but

wasrenamedafterresearchindicatedanincreaseofimportanceforplatforms

likeFacebookandTwitter,andadecreaseintheuseofblogs(Austinetal,2012;

Jinetal,2010;2011).

IntheSMMCAustin,Fisher&Jin(2012)positthatindividualswithlittle

stakeintheorganizationinitiateandfulfillPRactivitiesthroughonline

interactivity.Normally,gettingotherpeopletotalkaboutyourorganization

positivelyisamuchsought-afterPRtool.However,duringtimesofcrisisthis

alsomeansthatanyoneonsocialmediacanbecomeaninfluentialintimesof

crisisbyspreadingmessagesonline(secondarycrisiscommunications)totheir

followers.Researchhasindicatedthatonlinebehaviorinacrisisisoften

replicatedinofflinebehavior,meaningthatonlineopinionsarereproducedand

repeatedinofflineword-of-mouth,andvice-versa(Dutta-Bergman,2006).

Furthermore,duringcrisisthepublicwilllooktowardsorganizations’social


25

mediachannelsforinformation,incombinationwithtraditionalmediathatis

stillfavoredandtrustedoveranorganizationssocialmediachannel(Austinetal,

2012,Jinetal,2010;2011).Otherresultshaveindicatedthatsocialmediause

amongststakeholdersandtheorganizationincreasesduringacrisis,further

highlightingitsimportanceincrisiscommunication(Bietal,2014;Schultzetal,

2011;Macaisetal,2009;Veiletal,2011)

Thisstudywillfurtherexploretheuseofsocialmediaasatoolfor

reputationmanagementbyfocusingoncrisisresponsesonsocialmedia,in

specificFacebook.Incontrasttoface-to-faceinteraction,socialmediahas

changedthecommunicationactivityintoadynamicandreal-timeprocessin

whichoneusercansharetheiropinionswithmanywiththesingleclickofa

buttonandwithoutinterferenceofjournalistsorothergatekeepers(Bietal,

2014;Veiletal,2011).Bystudyingcrisisresponsesonsocialmedia,wewill

attempttofindoutwhattypeofonlinesecondarycrisiscommunication-

commenting,sharingorinforming-iselicitedbydifferentcrisisresponse

strategies.SecondaryCrisisCommunicationsarethusunderstoodasthe

willingnessofstakeholderstospreada‘messageofcrisis’.Ideally,an

organizationwouldprefertonotseemessagesabouttheircrisisspread.The

toneofthemessage(negativeorpositive)andfollowingbehavioralactionsare

discussedinthenextchapteraboutSecondaryCrisisReactions.

Wehypothesizethatorganizationsthatusethebolsteringstrategyin

combinationwithanothercrisisresponsestrategywillexperiencelessnegative

secondarycrisiscommunications.Incorporationofthebolsteringstrategywill

resultinlowerwillingnesstoengageinsecondarycrisiscommunicationon

socialmediatowardstheorganizationduetobolstering’scrisis-diminishing

attributes(Benoit,1995,Coombs,2007a;Sheldon&Sallot,2008;Weberetal,

2011).


experiencelessnegativesecondarycrisiscommunicationafterapreventablecrisis



strategywillexperiencelessnegativesecondarycrisiscommunicationaftera


26

preventablecrisisscenariothanorganizationsthatonlyusethecorrectiveaction

strategy.

2.6.SecondaryCrisisReactionsTheSCCTisbuilttoofferguidelinesthatcouldbeusedtorepairthe

reputationandreducethenegativeeffectsforanorganizationafteracrisis.

Theseaspectshavebeendiscussedintheprevioussectionofthisessay,butthere

isonemoreaspecttheSCCTattemptstoreducethenegativefalloutof,namely

thesecondarycrisisreactionscausedbyacrisis(Coombs,2007a;Schultzetal,

2011;Weberetal.2011;Stockmyer,1996).Themainbehavioralintentionsthat

crisiscommunicationattemptstoinfluenceareminimizingreputationaldamage,

maintainingpurchasingintentionandpreventingnegativeword-of-mouth

(Coombs&Holladay,2014;Stockmyer,1996).

Researchintosecondarycrisisreactionsfollowingcrisesonsocialmedia

hasgainedinnumbersascrisesarepubliclydisplayedinanopendialogueform

onsocialmediasites(Coombs&Holladay,2014;Schultzetal.2011;Sweetzer&

Metzgr,2007).Theeaseofonlineword-of-mouthcommunicationmakessocial

mediaafacilitatoringrowingcrises,butalsoatoolforidentifying,managingand

communicatingaboutcrises(Coombs,2008;Coombs&Holladay,2014;Schultz

etal.2011).Organizationsmightreceivesupportorcondemnationfrompublics

onlineandfromthoseopinionsmighthypothesizeiftheircrisismanagement

strategyisrejectedoraccepted(Coombs,2007a&2008;Coombs&Holladay,

2014).

Indicatorsoftheacceptanceorrejectionofthecrisisaccountcouldbe

foundinonlineword-of-mouth(Secondarycrisiscommunication,asdiscussed

previously)andthetoneofsaidword-of-mouthorofflinepurchasingintentions

(Secondarycrisisreactions)(Coombs,2008).Oneexampleofasecondarycrisis

reactionisboycottingtheorganizationandpersuadingotherstodothesameor

byspreadingnegativeword-of-mouthabouttheorganization(Schultzetal,

2011).Anotheraspectofthesecondarycrisisreactionsispurchaseintention,

whichentailsthemotivationorintenttodobusinesswiththeorganizationinthe

future.Secondarycrisisreactionsarethusdistinctfromsecondarycrisis


27

communicationinthatthereactionsareintendedbehaviorsintheformof

purchaseintentandtoneofword-of-mouth(recommendingorcondemning)

whilethesecondarycrisiscommunicationsareabouthowthestakeholderuses

socialmediadirectlyfollowingacorporatecrisis.Secondarycrisis

communicationsarethustheactionsofcommenting,sharingorinformingpeers

onsocialmedia,howthemessageisspread,whilesecondarycrisisreactionsare

theactionstakenbythestakeholdertoeithersupportofcondemnthe

organizationintheformoftheirpurchasingintentionsandtoneofword-of-

mouth,whatissaidinthemessage.

Secondarycrisisreactionswillberesearchedinthispaperinpresenceor

absenceofthesecondarycrisisresponsestrategybolstering.Wehypothesize

thatincorporatingbolsteringwithoneoftheothercrisisresponsestrategieswill

resultinlessnegativesecondarycrisisreactions.Meaningthatrespondents

presentedwiththebolsteringresponseswillbelesslikelytotalknegatively

abouttheorganization.


experiencelessnegativesecondarycrisisreactionafterapreventablecrisis



strategywillexperiencelessnegativesecondarycrisisreactionafterapreventable

crisisscenariothanorganizationsthatonlyusethecorrectiveactionstrategy.


28

Belowistheconceptualmodelforthispaper.

Figure2:Researchoverview

DenialStrategy+Bolstering

Correc3veAc3onStrategy+Bolstering

•  SecondaryCrisisReac3ons

•  SecondaryCrisisCommunica3on

•  PostCrisisReputa3onH1a+

H1b+H2a-

H2b-

H3a-

H3b-


29

3.Methodology

ThisstudyconsistedofanonlineexperimentdesignedusingQualitrics

andaimedatinvestigatingtheeffectofthebolsteringstrategyonpostcrisis

reputation,secondarycrisiscommunicationandsecondarycrisisreactions.

Participantswerepresentedwithafictionalcrisisforanexistingcompany

(Sony)withagoodpriorreputation,asthisiswhenbolsteringismosteffective.

Respondents’werethenrandomlyassignedtooneofourfourcrisisresponse

conditions.Questionsrelatedtotheirpriorrelationshipandreputational

perceptionofSonywereincluded,aswellasanattributionofguiltcheck.Other

questionsrelatedtothemeasuresofthisstudy,likepost-crisisreputation,

secondarycrisiscommunication&reactionswereoperationalizedaswritten

below.

3.1.ResearchDesignAcademicresearchintocrisiscommunicationcangenerallybedivided

intotwomainmethods,thecasestudythatexaminesrealpastcrises,and

experiments(surveys)inwhichsubjectsarepresentedwithslightlydifferent

scenarios(conditions)fromwhichtheiropinionsandintentionsareasked

(Averyetal.2010).Becausethisstudywillexaminebehavioralintentions,under

theinfluenceofdifferentstimuli,ofstakeholdersonsocialmedia,wewillusean

experimentdesignintheformofanonlinesurvey.Thechoiceforan

experimentaldesignwasmadebecauseexperimentsofferustheopportunityto

studycausality,inthiscasetheinfluenceofa(secondary)crisiscommunication

strategy,inacontrolledandrelevantdesign(Averyetal,2010).

Thisresearchisdesignedbasedona1crisistype(Preventablecrisis)X2

primarycrisisresponsestrategies(Denial/Correctiveaction)X2theuseof

secondarycrisisresponsestrategies(usingbolstering/notusingbolstering)

between-subjectdesign,asshowninthefigurebelow.

Denial CorrectiveAction

NoBolstering Condition1 Condition3

WithBolstering Condition2 Condition4

Figure3:ResearchConditions


30

3.2.ExperimentalScenariosTheexperimentconsistedofonefictionalcrisisscenariointroducedina

shortnewsarticle,followedbyashortFacebookpostfromthecompany,the

initialcrisisresponse.Thecompany‘Sony’isaJapaneseproducerofconsumer

electronicsthatoperatesworldwide.The2016RepTrakreportplacesSonyas

number9intheworld’smostreputablecompanies(ReputationInstitute,

2016a).Weusedanexistingcompanybecausereputationisaconstructbuilt

overtimeandconstantlychanging,somethingwecouldnotadequatelysimulate

inourexperimentalsetting(Fombrun,Gardberg&Sever,2000).Sony’sgood

priorreputationandlackofanysimilarcrisishistoriesisanessentialaspectof

thebolsteringstrategy,andassuchwehavedecidedtouseSonyasourcompany

offocus.

Thefictionalcrisisthatweintroducedisbaseduponthecrisisrecently

experiencedbySony’scompetitor,Samsung,whohadissueswiththebattery

explodinginoneoftheirphonemodels.Forthisresearch,weintroduceda

similarcrisisinwhichSonylaunchedtheirnewlaptop,butafterwhichconsumer

reportedthebatterieswereexploding.ThereportalsomentionedthatSony

knowinglydidnottesttheirnewproductenoughbecausetheywantedtolaunch

ittogetherwiththenewApplecomputer,makingitapreventablecrisiswith

internalattribution(seeAppendixA1).

Afterreadingthereport,respondentswerepresentedwithoneofthefour

possibleresponsesbySonyonFacebook.Theseresponseswere‘denial’,‘denial+

bolstering’,‘correctiveaction’and‘correctiveaction+bolstering’(seeappendix

A2).Thedenialresponsesdeniedtheinternalattributionofthecrisis,whilethe

corrective-actionresponseattemptedtosolvetheissuebyofferingreplacement

partstostakeholdersaswellasanapology.Allresponsesincludedwordsof

sympathyandinformation,asrecommendedintheSCCTforcrisisresponses

(Coombs,2007a).

Thebolsteringaspectofthecrisisresponseswasconstructedbasedon

threefields.BolsteringtheproductbyhighlightingthatSonyproduces‘award

winning’laptops.BolsteringthecompanybyhighlightingthatSonyisdedicated

toitsCorporateSocialResponsibilityinitiativesandfinally,agenericcorporate


31

statementinwhichSonybolstersthattheyhavealwaysprovidedgoodservice

andwillcontinuetodosointhefuture.

Figure4:ExampleofFBpost-Denial+Bolstering

3.3.DataCollection Priortodistribution,aPre-testwasconductedtoensureclarityofthe

researchdesignandhighlightanypointsofconfusion.ThePre-testwas

conductedonasmallsampleof10respondentsandbasedontheirexperience

theexperimentwasadapted.Theseresultswerenotincludedinthefinaldataset.

Nomajorchangeswereneededandtheexperimentwasdistributed.

Thisexperimentwasdistributedonlineintheresearchersownsocial

medianetwork(Facebook)usinganon-probabilityconveniencesampling

techniqueinwhichrespondentsonsocialmediawereaskedtopartakeinashort

experiment(Fricker,2008;Heckathorn,2011).Thispartofthedatacollection

tookplacebetweenApril5th2017andApril21st2017andtherequestwas

postedonthreeseparateoccasionswithinthistimeperiod.Sincethisstudy

largelyconcernedsocialmedia,distributingourexperimentsonsocialmedia

ensuredthatwereceivedrespondentsthataresocialmediausers,thus

guaranteeingtheyarefamiliarwiththemedium.

ThesecondmethodofdatacollectionwasthroughtheAmazon

MechanicalTurkprogram.ThisonlytookplaceonApril21standalldatawas

collectedwithinafewhours.MechanicalTurkisanautomatizedserviceinwhich

researcherscaneasilycollectrespondentsfortheirsurveyorexperimentby

offeringasmallmonetarycompensationforevery‘hit’.MechanicalTurkhas


32

beenusedbymanyresearchersandisgenerallyconsideredavalidandreputable

sourcefordatacollection(Lowryetal,2016).MechanicalTurkparticipantsare

generallydemographicallymorediverseandthecollecteddatacanbetreatedas

atleastasreliableastraditionalmethods(Buhrmester,Kwang&Gosling,2011).

Theexperimentwasdesignedinsuchawaythattherespondentreceived

oneofthefourconditionsatrandom.Eachconditionrequiredanywhere

between30-40respondents,puttingthetotalrespondentsataround140,asis

recommendedforexperiments(Box,1980).

Atotalof121respondentswerecollectedthroughtheconvenience

samplingonsocialmediamethodovertheperiod5-21April2017.The

researcherpostedarequesttofillinthesurveyonthreeseparateoccasionson

hisownsocialmediaprofile.Aftercleaningthedataforincompleteresponses,

thisresultedinatotalof102validresponses.

60responseswerecollectedthroughtheAmazonMechanicalTurk

Programon21stofApril2017.Respondentswereaskedtofillinthesurveyin

exchangeforamonetaryrewardof0.25euro.Aftercorrectingforinvalid

responses,thisresultedin45validresponses.Thetotalnumberofvalid

responsesandourfinalsamplesizeisthus(N=)147.

3.4.Operationalization Theindependentvariablesinthisstudythatweremanipulatedinthe

experimentweretheprimaryresponsestrategiesandthesecondaryresponse

strategyofbolstering.

Thisstudyoperationalizedmultipleconceptsintodependentvariables,

namelypostcrisisreputationlevel,secondarycrisiscommunication,secondary

crisisreactions.Furthermore,thelevelofpriorreputationwillbedetermined

amongsttherespondentsaswellasatesttodeterminethelevelofguiltthey

attributedtotheorganizationandtheirownhistoryandrelationshipwiththe

company.

3.4.1.Pre-CrisisReputation

Pre-CrisisReputationwasmeasuredwithfourquestionsfromRepTrak.

Thesequestionsaimtoassessthepublic’sopinionofacompanyandmeasure

howmuchthepubliclikes,trustsandadmiresacompany(Fombrun;Ponzi&


33

Newburry,2015;Ponzi,Fombrun&Gardberg,2015).Theseweremeasured

usingaseven-pointLikertscaleandare:‘Ihaveagoodfeelingaboutthe

company’,‘Itrustthecompany’,‘Iadmireandrespectthecompany’and‘the

companyhasagoodoverallreputation’.Ponzi,FombrunandGardberg(2015)

reportedaCronbach’salphaof0.96forthesemeasuresbasedon4separate

studies.Thisindicatesahighreliabilityforthismeasure.

3.4.2.AttributionofGuilt,History&Relation

Respondentswereaskedthreequestionsrelatedtothelevelofperceived

organizationalresponsibilitybasedonthestudyperformedbyLee(2004).These

questionsweremeasuredona7-pointLikertscaleandwere:‘Towhatdegreedo

youthinktheorganizationistoblame’,Sonycouldhaveavoidedthecrisis’and

‘thecrisiswascausedbyaprobleminsidetheorganization’.InherresearchLee

(2004)reportedaCronbach’salphaof0.85,makingthisareliablescale.

Themeasureforcrisishistorywasonequestionrelatingtoifrespondents

knowofanypastsimilarcrises.Astherearenonewecouldfind,weexpect

respondentstonotknowofanysimilarcrises.

Relationwillbemeasuredthroughthreequestions,namely:‘Iown(ed)

Sonyproducts’,‘Sonyhasalwaysofferedgoodservicetome’and‘Iamsatisfied

withtheSonyproductsIown(ed)’.Thesewillbemeasuredona7-pointLikert

scale.

3.4.2.Post-CrisisReputation

Coombs&Holladay(2002)offerfivemeasuresonorganizational

reputation.Wewillusethesemeasurementstoassessthereputationafterthe

crisisresponseona7-pointLikertscaletodeterminethedifferentinfluencesof

thestimuli.Thesefivemeasuresare:‘Theorganizationisconcernedwiththe

well-beingofitspublics’,‘Theorganizationisbasicallydishonest’,‘Idonottrust

theorganizationtotellthetruthabouttheincident’,‘Undermostcircumstances,

Iwouldbelikelytobelievewhattheorganizationsays’and‘Theorganizationis

notconcernedwiththewell-beingofthepublics’.Thesefivemeasureswere

reportedtohaveCronbach’salphaof0.86byCoombs&Holladay(2002).


34

3.4.3.SecondaryCrisisCommunication

Secondarycrisiscommunicationwasmeasuredusingthreeindicators

developedbySchultzetal(2011)butwasadaptedslightlyforourfocuson

Facebook.Subjectswereaskedhowlikelytheyareonaseven-pointLikertscale

tosharethemessageonFacebook,informtheirpeersonFacebookandtoleavea

reactionorcommentonFacebook.Notethatthissectiondoesnotconcernthe

opinionofthestakeholderbutmerelytheirreactionandwillingnesstotake

certainactions.Sotheactionofinforming,reactingorsharingandnotthe

reflectionoftheirownopinions.Schultzetal(2011)didnotreportaCronbach’s

alphaforthismeasure.

3.4.4.SecondaryCrisisReactions

SecondarycrisisreactionsmeasurementswereadaptedfromCoombs&

Holladay(2008).Theyofferthreemeasurementsofcrisisreactions:‘Iwould

encourageothersnottobuyfromorganizationX’,‘Iwouldsaynegativethings

aboutOrganizationXtootherpeople’and‘IwouldrecommendOrganizationXto

someonewhoaskedmyadvice’.Thesequestionsthusaimtodistinguishthe

respondents’opiniononthecompanyfollowingthecrisis.Thesemeasureswere

alsomeasuredusingaseven-pointLikertscale.ReportedCronbach’salphafor

thesemeasureswas0.86.

Purchaseintentionsweremeasuredusingthreemeasures.These

measureshavebeenadaptedfromStockmyers’(1996)purchaseintention

measures.Stockmyers’measuresdealwithfuturebehavioralintent,andfocuson

‘wouldpurchaseagain’,‘likelihoodofpurchase’and‘continuationofpurchasein

thefuture’.Thesewerealsomeasuredonaseven-pointLikertscale.Stockmyer

(1996)reportedaCronbach’salphaof0.91

3.5.ManipulationCheckAsamanipulationcheckweaskedaquestionthatrelatestoifthe

participantnoticedthebolsteringactinthecrisisresponseoftheorganization.

Thisquestionwasaskedaftertherespondenthadbeenpresentedwiththe

conditionattheendofthesurveytoavoidprimingthesubjects(Kidd,1976)

Hereby,itwaslogicalifrespondentsthathadaconditionwithnobolstering

answeredthattheydidnotnoticeanybolstering,whiletheoneswhodidfillin


35

oneofthebolsteringconditionswilllikelyhavenoticedit.Basedonthis

manipulationcheck,weformeda‘robustdataset’(N=53)fromwhichwe

comparedtheresultwithourfulldataset.

3.6.ComputedVariables:Reliability&FactorAnalysis Onceourdatawascollectedweproceededtocomputeouroverarching

measuresbasedontheoperationalizedquestionsfoundintheprevioussection.

Areliabilityanalysiswasconductedoneachmeasuretocheckforinternal

consistencyofthescales.Herebyanalphaof>0.7couldbeconsidered

satisfactory(Bland&Altman,1997).

AfterourreliabilityanalysisweconductedaPrincipalComponentFactor

Analysis(Varimax)todeterminetheunderlyingdimensionsandhelpus

constructouroverarchingmeasures.


Themeasure‘Pre-CrisisReputation’wasbasedonthefourquestions

derivedfromtheRepTraksystemofmeasuringreputation(Cronbach’sα=

0.889).OurFactoranalysisonthesefourmeasuresfoundthatonecomponent

hadaneigenvalueof3.022andexplained75.6%ofthevariance.Theother

componentswerenegligible(eigenvalue<1).

Table3.6.1:Pre-CrisisReputationFactorLoadings

IhaveagoodfeelingaboutSonyasacompany 0.819

ItrustSony 0.881

IadmireandrespectSony 0.884

IthinkSonyhasagoodoverallreputation 0.890

Basedonthisanalysiswecomputedanewoverarchingmeasure:Pre-Crisis

Reputation.Fromourquestionsthatmakeupthismeasurewecantreat‘Pre-

CrisisReputation’asascaleinwhich1=mostnegative,4=neutraland7=most

positive.

3.6.2.Relation

Themeasure‘Relation’wasbasedonthethreeoperationalizedquestions

relatingtothepastrelationshipoftherespondentwithSony(Cronbach’sα=


36

0.861).Ourfactoranalysisofthethreemeasuresfoundthatonecomponenthad

aneigenvalueof2.349andexplained78.3%ofthevariance.Theother

componentswerefoundtobenegligible(eigenvalue<1).

Table3.6.2:RelationFactorLoadings

Sonyhasalwaysofferedgoodservicetome. 0.884

IamsatisfiedwiththeSonyproductsIown. 0.875

Sonyoffersgoodvalueformymoney 0.895

Basedonthisanalysiswecomputedanewoverarchingmeasure:Relation.From

ourquestionsthatmakeupthismeasurewecantreat‘Relation’asascalein

which1=mostnegative,4=neutraland7=mostpositive.

3.6.3.Attribution

Themeasure‘Attribution’wasbasedonthreequestionsderivedfrom

Lee’s(2004)questionstoassesstheperceivedlevelofguilt(attribution)

(Cronbach’sα=0.794).Ourfactoranalysisofthesethreemeasuresfoundthat

onecomponenthadaneigenvalueof2.128andexplained71%ofthevariance.

Theothercomponentswerefoundtobenegligible(eigenvalue<1).

Table3.6.3:AttributionFactorLoadings

TowhatdegreedoyouthinkSonyistoblameforthecrisis? 0.876

SonycouldhaveavoidedtheCrisis. 0.820

Thecrisiswascausedbyaprobleminsidetheorganization 0.830

Basedonthisanalysiswecomputedanewoverarchingmeasure:Attribution.

Fromourquestionsthatmakeupthismeasurewecantreat‘Attribution’asa

scaleinwhich1=internalguilty,4=neutraland7=notinternalguilty.

3.6.4.PostCrisisReputation

‘PostCrisisReputation’wasmeasuredaccordingto5questionsderived

fromresearchbyCoombs&Holladay(2002)(Cronbach’sα=0.815).Ourfactor

analysisofthesefivemeasuresfoundthatonecomponenthadaneigenvalueof

2.890andexplained58%ofthevariance.Theothercomponentswerefoundto

benegligible(eigenvalue<1).


37

Somequestionshadtheirscalereversedinourdatabecausetheywere

themselvesalreadyreversedquestions.Allfivequestionshadtofollowtherule

that1=mostnegativeand7=mostpositive.Questionsthatwerereversedhave

beenmarkedassuchinthebelowtableandwereincludedintheirreversedform

inthereliabilityandfactoranalyses.

Table3.6.4:PostCrisisReputationFactorLoadings

Sonyisconcernedwiththewell-beingofitsconsumers 0.759

Sonyisbasicallybeingdishonest.(REVERSED) 0.761

IdonottrustSonytotellthetruthaboutthesituation.(REVERSED) 0.832

UndermostcircumstancesIwouldbelikelytobelievewhatSonysays. 0.602

SonyisnotconcernedwiththeWell-beingofitsconsumers(REVERSED) 0.824

Basedonthisanalysiswecomputedanewoverarchingmeasure:PostCrisis

Reputation.Fromourquestionsthatmakeupthismeasurewecantreat‘Post-

CrisisReputation’asascaleinwhich1=mostnegative,4=neutraland7=most

positive.

3.6.5.SecondaryCrisisCommunication

ThemeasureSecondaryCrisisCommunicationwasbasedonthree

questionsderivedfromthestudybySchultz(etal,2011)aboutactionsonsocial

media(Cronbach’sα=0.862).OurFactoranalysisofthethreemeasuresfound

onecomponentwithaneigenvalueof2.352thatexplained78.41%ofthe

variance.Theothercomponentswerefoundtobenegligible(eigenvalue<1).

Table3.6.5:SecondaryCrisisCommunicationFactorLoadings

IwouldsharethepostonFacebook 0.910

IwouldinformmyfriendsorpeersonFB 0.897

IwouldcommentunderSony’sFBpost 0.849

Basedonthisanalysiswecomputedanewoverarchingmeasure:Secondary

CrisisCommunication.Fromourquestionsthatmakeupthismeasurewecan

treat‘SecondaryCrisisCommunication’asascaleinwhich1=unlikelyto

communicate,4=neutraland7=mostlikelytocommunicate.


38

3.6.6.SecondaryCrisisReactions

ThemeasureSecondaryCrisisReactionswasbasedonthreemeasures

introducedbyCoombs&Holladay(2008)andaimedtomeasurewhatpeople

mightcommunicateaboutthecrisis.Thereliabilityanalysisforthismeasure

resultedinaCronbach’salphaofα=0.674.Inaddition,deletinganyitemdoes

nothelpimprovethealphatothe0.7thresholds.Accordingtoourpreviously

statedcutoffofα=0.7forasatisfactorynumber,wecouldthereforesaythe

reliabilityofthismeasureisquestionable(Bland&Altman,1997).Considering

theproximitytoour‘satisfaction’numberandresearchthatindicatesanalphaof

0.6couldbeseenasacceptable,wewillhoweveracceptourlowerCronbach’s

alphabuthavetonotethereliabilityis‘questionable’(Loewenthal,p:60,2001;

Lance,Butt&Michels,2006).

Wecontinuedtoperformourfactoranalysisonthethreemeasuresand

foundonecomponentwithaneigenvalueof1.836thatexplained61.2%ofthe

variance.Theothercomponentswerefoundtobenegligible(eigenvalue<1).

Somequestionshadtheirscalereversedinourdatabecausetheywere

themselvesalreadyreversedquestions.Allthreequestionshadtofollowtherule

that1=mostnegativeand7=mostpositive.Questionsthatwerereversedhave

beenmarkedassuchinthebelowtableandwereincludedintheirreversedform

inthereliabilityandfactoranalyses.

Table3.6.6:SecondaryCrisisReactionsFactorLoadings

IwouldrecommendSonytosomeonewhoaskedmyadvice. 0.561

IwouldencourageothersnottobuySonyproducts.(REVERSED) 0.851

IwouldsaynegativethingstoothersaboutSony.(REVERSED) 0.892

Basedonthisanalysiswecomputedanewoverarchingmeasure:Secondary

CrisisReactions.Fromourquestionsthatmakeupthismeasurewecantreat

‘SecondaryCrisisReactions’asascaleinwhich1=negativereaction,4=neutral

and7=positivereaction.

3.7.Description&Demographics Thedatawecollectedconsistedof(N=)146respondentsofwhich52%

wasmaleand46.5%wasfemale(Gender:M=1.49,SD=0.528).31%of


39

respondentswerefromtheNetherlandsfollowedby19%fromtheUSAand13%

fromIndia.Theremaining27%ofrespondentswerefromothercountries.85%

hadboughtorownedSonyproductsinthepast(M=1.15,SD=0.359)and71%of

ourrespondentsclaimedtouseFacebookonadailybasis(M=4.35,SD=1.154).

33%ofrespondentsalsoreportedthatFacebookisanimportantsourceoftheir

news‘mostofthetime’(M=2.89,SD=1.3).Themedianageoftherespondents

was25yearsold(M=28.84,SD=10.032).

Table 3.7.1. Demographic Descriptives

AGE GENDER FB USE FB NEWS OWNED SONY

Mean 28.84 1.49 4.35 2.89 1.15

Median 25.00 1.00 5.00 3.00 1.00

Std. Deviation 10.032 .528 1.154 1.293 .359

Table 3.7.2. Correlation Matrix

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 1

2 BOLSTERING_WITH_OR_WITHOUT 0.013 1

3 PRE_CRISIS_REPUTATION 0.053 0.016 1

4 RELATION_SONY(N=124) 0.021 -0.01 .756** 1

5 ATTRIBUTION_CRISIS 0.097 -0.085 0.011 0.028 1

6 POST_CRISIS_REPUTATIOn -0.095 0.023 .327** .251** -.198* 1

7 SECONDARY_CRISIS_COMMUNICATIONS -0.01 -0.124 .166* .214* -0.08 .191* 1

8 SECONDARY_CRISIS_REACTIONS 0.203* 0.113 .281** .338** -0.112 .491** -0.138 1

9 Age 0.009 0.082 0.037 -0.013 0.123 .168* 0.106 0.141 1

10 Gender 0.065 -0.118 -0.1 -0.028 0.16 -0.054 -0.034 0.024 0.076 1

11 Facebook_Use 0.07 -0.16 0.088 -0.004 0.126 0.004 -0.059 0.12 -0.099 0.111 1

12 FB_as_News_Source -0.076 -0.089 0.055 0.02 -0.051 0.083 .290** -0.067 -0.106 .211* .308***Correlationissignificantatthe0.05level(2-tailed).

**Correlationissignificantatthe0.01level(2-tailed).

Ourcorrelationmatrixshowsthat‘RelationSony’iscorrelatedwith‘Pre-

CrisisReputation’atthep<.01levelandwithastrongstrengthofr=0.756.‘Post-

CrisisReputation’iscorrelatedwith‘Pre-CrisisReputation’and‘Relation’atthe

p<.01levelswithamediumrelation(r=0.327;r=0.252).PostCrisisReputationis

negativelycorrelatedwithAttributionatthep<.05levelswithasmallnegative

relation(r=-0.198).SecondaryCrisisCommunicationsiscorrelatedwithPre-Crisis

Rep,RelationandPostCrisisReputationatthep<.05levels.Aweakrelationwas


40

observed(r=0.166;r=0.214;r=0.191).SecondaryCrisisReactionsiscorrelated

withResponseStrategyatthep<.05levelwithaweakrelation(r=0.203).SCRis

alsocorrelatedwithPreCrisisReputation,RelationandPostCrisisReputationat

thep<.01levelandwithaweak-to-mediumrelation(r=0.281;0.338;0.491).Age

wasfoundtobecorrelatedwithPost-CrisisReputationatthep=.05levelwitha

weakrelation(r=0.168).FacebookasNewsSourcewasrelatedtoSecondaryCrisis

CommunicationsandFacebookUseatthep<.01levelwithamediumrelation(r=

0.290;r=0.308).FacebookasNewsSourcewasalsorelatedtoGenderatthep<.05

levelwithaweakrelation(r=0.211).

Toadjustoursixcomputedvariablesforvariancesinthescales,weused

SPSStostandardizeourvariables.Thesestandardized(z-score)variableswillbe

usedinthefollowinganalysischapterfortheregressions.


41

4.Results

Byaskingparticipantstocorrectlyidentifyeachoftheconditions,weare

abletoassessthesuccessofthemanipulations.Thiswasdonewithtwo

questionstowardstheendoftheexperiment.Onequestionaskedthe

respondenttoidentifythecorrectresponsestrategyoutoffouroptionsofwhich

twowerenotusedinanycondition.Thesecondquestionaskedrespondentsif

theynoticedanyBolsteringintheresponsebySony.Achi-squaretestconfirmed

thatthemanipulationofResponseStrategywassuccessful,χ2(4)=34.513,p<

.001.SuccessoftheBolsteringStrategywastestedinthesameway,χ2(2)=

37.111,p<.001.

4.1.Hypotheses1:TheeffectofBolsteringonPost-Crisis

ReputationToanalyzeiftheuseornotuseofBolstering(FixedFactor1)in

combinationwitheitheroneofourtworesponsestrategies(FixedFactor2)has

aneffectonPost-CrisisReputation(DV)weperformedtwo-wayanalysisof

variance(ANOVA).Levene’stestindicatedequalvariances(F=0.031,p=.993).

TheinteractionbetweenbolsteringandresponsestrategyonPost-Crisis

Reputationwasnotfoundtobesignificantatthep<.05level:F(1,142)=0.661,

p=.417.OurresultsalsoindicatedthatBolstering/NoBolstering(p=.767)and

DenialStrategy/CorrectiveActionStrategy(p=.269)allhavenosignificanteffect

onPost-CrisisReputation.

Table 4.1: Results of two-way ANOVA Post-Crisis Reputation (N= 146)

Sum of

Squares

df Mean

Square

F p η2

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 1.240 1 1.240 1.232 .269 0.009

BOLSTERING_WITH_OR_WITHOUT .089 1 .089 .088 .767 0.001

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE *

BOLSTERING_WITH_OR_WITHOUT

.666 1 .666 .661 .417 0.005

Error 142.942 142 1.007

Total 145.000 146

*p<.1,**p<.05,***p<.01


42

ThiswouldmeanthatthedifferencebetweenusingDenialwith(M=

3.213,SD=0.922)orwithout(M=3.046,SD=0.948)bolsteringorCorrective

Actionwith(M=3.258,SD=0.852)orwithout(M=3.335,SD=0.907)bolsteringis

statisticallyinsignificantonPost-CrisisReputation.Becauseofthis,weaccepted

ournullHypothesis1thatstatesthereisnodifferenceoftheeffectbetweenthe

responsestrategiesandtheuseornouseofbolsteringonPost-CrisisReputation.

WetherebyalsorejectedbothourH1aandH1bastheresultsfromthisanalysis

indicatedthatusingcorrectiveaction+bolsteringordenial+bolsteringto

minimizethenegativeeffectsofapreventablecrisisonorganizationspost-crisis

reputationdonotyieldsignificantresultscomparedtothesamestrategies

withoutbolstering.

4.2.Hypotheses2:TheeffectofBolsteringonSecondaryCrisis

Communication Weperformedanothertwo-wayanalysisofvariancetoassessifthereis

aneffectoftheuseofBolsteringorNoBolstering(FixedFactor1)andourtwo

ResponseStrategies(FixedFactor2)onSecondaryCrisisCommunications(DV).

Levene’stestindicatesequalvariances(F=0.150,p=.929).Ourresultsforthis

analysisalsoindicatedthatthereisnointeractionbetweentheuseofBolstering

/NoBolsteringandDenial/CorrectiveActionStrategiesonSecondaryCrisis

Communicationatthep<.05significancelevel:F(1,142)=0.022,p=.882.The

resultsalsoindicatedtheseparateBolstering/NoBolsteringconditionwas

insignificant(p=.140),aswellastheDenial/CorrectiveActionstrategies(p=

.916).


43

Table 4.2.1: Results of two-way Secondary Crisis Communications (N= 146)

Sum of

Squares

df Mean

Square

F p η2

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 0.11 1 0.11 0.11 0.916 0.00

BOLSTERING_WITH_OR_WITHOUT 2.213 1 2.213 2.201 0.140 0.015



0.022 1 0.022 0.022 0.882 0.00

Error 142.756 142 1.005

Total 145.000 146

*p<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01



Actionwith(M=2.411,SD=1.475)orwithout(M=2.761SD=1.578)bolsteringis

statisticallyinsignificantonSecondaryCrisisCommunications.Ourresults

indicatedtheeffectofBolsteringandResponseStrategyonSecondaryCrisis

Communicationsisinsignificant.WethereforeacceptedthenullHypothesis2and

assumedtherenodifferenceoftheeffectbetweentheresponsestrategiesand

theuseornouseofbolsteringonSecondaryCrisisCommunications.Thismeans

wealsorejectedourH2aandH2bastheresultsindicatedthatusingcorrective

action+bolsteringordenial+bolsteringtominimizethenegativeeffectsofa

preventablecrisisintheformofSecondaryCrisisCommunicationsdonotyield

significantresultscomparedtothesamestrategieswithoutbolstering.

However,wealsonotedthattheincorporationofthebolsteringstrategy

isclosetosignificantatthep<.1levels(p=.14).Whenomittingthetypeof

responsestrategy,wecanseethatusingtheBolsteringstrategy(M=2.377,SD=

1.506)isslightlylessefficientinreducingthelikelihoodofSecondaryCrisis

CommunicationthannotusingBolstering(M=2.766,SD=1.63).Accordingtothis

result,bolsteringactuallyincreasesthelikelihoodofstakeholdersengagingin

SecondaryCrisisCommunicationscomparedtowhennotusingbolstering.We

reportedtheplotbelowtohighlightthisandshowthedifferenceinheight

betweenthetwoconditions.


44

Table4.2.2:BolsteringPlot

4.3.Hypotheses3:TheeffectofBolsteringonSecondaryCrisis

ReactionsAfinaltwo-wayanalysisofvariancewasperformedwiththeuseorno

useofbolstering(FixedFactor1)andresponsestrategies(FixedFactor2)on

SecondaryCrisisReactions(DV).Levene’stestindicatedequalvariances(F=

0.371,p=.774).Theresultstoldusthereisnosignificantinteractionoftheuseof

Bolstering/NoBolsteringandDenial/CorrectiveActiononSecondaryCrisis

Reactionsatthep<.05significancelevel:F(1,142)=0.23,p=.632.Theseparate

Bolstering/NoBolsteringconditionwasalsofoundtobeinsignificant(p=.178)

but,surprisingly,theDenial/CorrectiveActionconditionswerefoundtobe

significantforthisanalysis(p=.016).


45

Table 4.3.1: Results of two-way Secondary Crisis Reactions (N= 146)

Sum of

Squares

df Mean

Square

F p η2

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 5.769 1 5.769 5.769 .016** 0.040

BOLSTERING_WITH_OR_WITHOUT 1.765 1 1.765 1.829 .178 0.013



0.222 1 0.222 .230 .632 0.002

Error 137.039 142 0.965

Total 145.000 146

*p<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01



Actionwith(M=3.428,SD=0.992)orwithout(M=3.103SD=1.119)bolsteringis

statisticallyinsignificantonSecondaryCrisisReactions.Theseresultsindicated

theeffectofBolsteringandResponseStrategyonSecondaryCrisisreactionsis

insignificant.ThenullHypothesis3isthereforeacceptedandwecanassume

thereisnodifferenceoftheeffectbetweentheresponsestrategiesandtheuseor

nouseofbolsteringonSecondaryCrisisReactions.Thismeanswealsorejected

ourH3aandH3bastheresultsindicatedthatusingcorrectiveaction+bolstering

ordenial+bolsteringtominimizethenegativeeffectsofapreventablecrisisin

theformofSecondaryCrisisReactionsdoesnotyieldsignificantresults

comparedtothesamestrategieswithoutbolstering.Whatisinterestingtonote

fromthisanalysisisthat,althoughbolsteringandbolsteringincombinationwith

ourresponsestrategiesisinsignificant,itappearsthattheeffectoftheresponse

strategyonSecondaryCrisisReactionsissignificant.Evenmoreinterestingisthe

findingthatitappearsasiftheDenialStrategy(M=3.696,SD=1.072)ismore

effectivethantheCorrectiveActionstrategy(M=3.257,SD=1.066)inminimizing

negativeSecondaryCrisisReactions.

However,wealsonotedthattheincorporationofthebolsteringstrategy

isclosetosignificantatthep<.1levels(p=.178).Whenomittingthetypeof

responsestrategy,wecanseethatusingtheBolsteringstrategy(M=3.602,SD=

1.036)isslightlymoreefficientinreducingthelikelihoodofSecondaryCrisis


46

ReactionsthannotusingBolstering(M=3.355,SD=1.128).Accordingtothis

result,bolsteringdecreasesthelikelihoodofstakeholdersengaginginSecondary

CrisisCommunicationscomparedtowhennotusingbolstering.Wereportthe

plotbelowtohighlightthisandshowthedifferenceinheightbetweenthetwo

conditions.

Table4.3.2:BolsteringPlot

4.4.AdditionalResultsonPost-CrisisReputation ToinvestigatetheeffectonPost-CrisisReputation(DV)byotherfactors,

weperformedaLinearRegressionanalysis.WewantedtodiscoverhowPre-

CrisisReputation,LevelofAttribution,Bolstering,ResponseStrategy,Age,

Gender,FBUseandFBNews(IV’s)influencethePost-CrisisReputationandin

whatway.ThePre-CrisisReputation,Attribution,FBUseandFBnewsIV’sfor

thisregressionanalysisandtheonesfollowingarestandardizedvariables.The

samegoesforthePost-CrisisReputationDVinthisanalysisandtheSCCandSCR

variablesinthenextanalyses.Asignificantregressionequationwasfound(F(8,

145)=4.117,p=.00)withanR2of0.194.


Pre-CrisisReputationwasasignificantpredictorofPost-CrisisReputation(β=

0.321,t=4.126,p=.00).PostCrisisReputationincreasedwith0.321(ona7-point


47

scalefrom1=negativeto7=positive)foreverypointincreaseinPre-Crisis

Reputation.ThismeansastrongerPre-CrisisReputationwillminimizethenegative

effectsofacrisisonPost-CrisisReputation.

4.4.2.LevelofAttribution

Levelofattribution(howguiltytheorganizationisperceived)wasa

significantpredictorofPost-CrisisReputation(β= -0.213, t=-2.666, p=.009).ThismeansthatforeveryincreaseinperceivedAttributionofthecrisis,

Post-CrisisReputationdecreaseswith-0.213.Thismeansthatthemore

attribution(guilt)canbeascribedtoanorganization,thelowerthe

organization’sreputationwillbePost-Crisis.

4.4.3.Age

AgeoftherespondentappearstobeanothersignificantpredictorofPost-

CrisisReputation(β= 0.19, t= 2.466, p=.016).Post-CrisisReputationincreased0.019foreveryextrayear(Age)oftherespondent.Thismeansthat

olderpeople,thosewithmoreyears,appeartobemorelenientwhenitcomesto

judgingacompanyduringacrisis,aswecanseefromtherelationshipwithPost-

CrisisReputation

4.4.4.Gender,Bolstering,ResponseStrategy&Facebook Gender(p=.875),theuseornouseofBolstering(p=.9),thetypeof

ResponseStrategy(p=.264)andtheamountofFacebookUsed(p=.934)orthe

importanceofFBasaNewsSource(p=.42)wereallnotfoundtobesignificant

predictorsofPost-CrisisReputation.Gendertherebyseemstonotmatteratall

withbothmalesandfemalesbehavingsimilarly.InterestingisthatBolstering

andResponseStrategyseemtohavenoeffect,whichwealreadyknewfromour

previousanalysis.


48

Table4.4:Post-CrisisReputationInfluencers

Unstandardized

B(Effect)

Standard

Error

Standardized

B

t-value p(sig.)

Pre-CrisisRep 0.321 0.078 0.321 4.126 0.00***

Attribution -0.213 0.080 -0.213 -2.666 0.009***

Age 0.019 0.008 0.192 2.446 0.016**

Gender -0.024 0.154 -0.013 -0.158 0.875

ResponseStrategy -0.174 0.155 -0.034 -1.121 0.264

(No)Bolstering -0.020 0.157 -0.087 -0.125 0.9

FBUse 0.007 0.083 0.007 0.082 0.934

FBNews 0.068 0.084 0.068 0.809 0.420

R-Square 0.194

F-Test 4.117 0.000

*p<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01

4.5.AdditionalResultsonSecondaryCrisisCommunicationsToinvestigatetheeffectonSecondaryCrisisCommunication(DV)by

otherfactors,weperformedaLinearRegressionanalysis.Wewantedtodiscover

howPre-CrisisReputation,LevelofAttribution,Bolstering,ResponseStrategy,

Age,Gender,FBUseandFBNews(IV’s)influenceSecondaryCrisis

Communicationsandinwhatway.Asignificantregressionequationwasfound

(F(8,137)=3.783,p=.000)withanR2of0.181.


Pre-CrisisReputationwasasignificantpredictorofSecondaryCrisis

Communications(β=0.147,t=1.877,p=.063),butonlywhenweadjustthe

significanceleveltop<.1.SecondaryCrisisCommunicationsincreasedwith0.147

(ona7-pointscalefrom1=Unlikelyto7=Likely)foreverypointincreaseinPre-

CrisisReputation.ThismeansastrongerPre-CrisisReputationwillactually

increasethelikelihoodofsharing,commentingorinformingfollowingacrisis.

4.5.2.BolsteringStrategy

TheuseoftheBolsteringstrategywasasignificantpredictorofSecondaryCrisis

Reactions(β=-0.302,t=-1.912,p=.58),butonlywhenweadjustthesignificance


49

leveltop<.1.SecondaryCrisisCommunicationsdecreasedwith0.302(ona7-

pointscalefrom1=Unlikelyto7=Likely)whenusingtheBolsteringstrategy.

ThismeansusingtheBolsteringstrategywilldecreasethelikelihoodofsharing,

commentingorinformingfollowingacrisis.Thisiscontrarytoourprevious

analysis,whichprovedthebolsteringstrategyhasnoeffectonSecondaryCrisis

Communications.

4.5.2.Attribution,Age,Gender&ResponseStrategy

OurregressionanalysisfoundnosignificanteffectforAttribution

(p=.453),Age(p=.127),Gender(p=.241)andResponseStrategy(p=.661).It

appearsasifthechosenelementsdonotpredictSecondaryCrisis

Communications.

4.5.3.Facebook&SecondaryCrisisCommunications

TheamounttherespondentusedFacebook(β=-0.176,t=-2.098,p=.038)

andtheimportanceofFacebookastheirnewssource(β=0.358,t=4.247,p=.00)

werebothsignificantpredictorsofSecondaryCrisisCommunications.FBUsage

andNewsSourcewerecodedasafrequencyrangingfromdailytonever.

LikelihoodofSecondaryCrisisCommunicationsdecreased-0.176themore

frequenttherespondentwasonFB(FBUse)andincreasedwith0.358themore

importantFBwasasanewssource(FBNews)totherespondent.Thismeans

thatthemorefrequentarespondentwasonFB,thelesslikelytoshare,comment

orinform.Vice-versaistrueforFBasNewsSourceastheresultsindicatethe

moreimportantFBwasanewssourcetoourrespondents,themorelikelythey

weretoshare,commentorinform.


50

Table4.5.1:SecondaryCrisisCommunicationsInfluencers

Unstandardized

B(Effect)

Standard

Error

Standardized

B

t-value p(sig.)

Pre-CrisisRep 0.147 0.079 0.147 1.877 0.063*

Attribution -0.61 0.080 -0.061 -0.753 0.453

Age 0.015 0.008 0.148 1.869 0.064*

Gender -0.183 0.155 -0.096 -1.178 0.241

ResponseStrategy -0.069 0.157 -0.034 0.439 0.661

(No)Bolstering -0.302 0.158 -0.151 -1.912 0.058*

FBUse -0.176 0.084 -0.176 -2.098 0.038**

FBNews 0.358 0.084 0.358 4.247 0.00***

R-Square 0.181

F-Test 3.783 0.000

*P<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01

4.6.AdditionalResultsonSecondaryCrisisReactionsToinvestigatetheeffectonSecondaryCrisisReactions(DV)byother

factors,weperformedaLinearRegressionanalysis.Wewantedtodiscoverhow

Pre-CrisisReputation,LevelofAttribution,Bolstering,ResponseStrategy,Age,

Gender,FBUseandFBNews(IV’s)influenceSecondaryCrisisReactionsandin

whatway.Asignificantregressionequationwasfound(F(8,137)=4.08,p=.000)

withanR2of0.192.


Pre-CrisisReputationwasasignificantpredictorofSecondaryCrisis

Reactions(β=0.266,t=3.416,p=.001).SecondaryCrisisReactionsincreasedwith

0.266(ona7-pointscalefrom1=negativeto7=positive)foreverypoint

increaseinPre-CrisisReputation.ThismeansastrongerPre-CrisisReputation

willminimizethenegativeeffectsofacrisisonSecondaryCrisisReactions.

4.6.1.Attribution

AttributionofguiltwasasignificantpredictorofSecondaryCrisis

Reactions(β=-0.179,t=-2.249,p=.026).SecondaryCrisisReactionsincreased

with0.179(ona7-pointscalefrom1=negativeto7=positive)foreverypoint


51

increaseinAttributionofguilt.Thismeansmoreattributionofguiltwillincrease

thenegativeeffectsofacrisisonSecondaryCrisisReactions.

4.6.3.ResponseStrategy

TypeofResponseStrategy(DenialorCorrectiveAction)wasasignificant

predictorofSecondaryCrisisReactions(β=0.355,t=2.281,p=.024).Secondary

CrisisReactionsincreasedwith0.355(ona7-pointscalefrom1=negativeto7=

positive)whenusingtheDenialStrategy(ResponseStrategy).Thismeansthe

DenialstrategywillminimizethenegativeeffectsofacrisisonSecondaryCrisis

Reactions.Thisalsobecameclearfromourpreviousanalysis

4.6.4.FacebookUseThefrequencyofFacebookusewasasignificantpredictorofSecondary

CrisisReactions(β=0.166,t=1.997,p=.048).SecondaryCrisisReactions

increasedwith0.166(ona7-pointscalefrom1=negativeto7=positive)when

frequenciesofFBuseincreases.ThismeanspeoplewhofrequentlyuseFacebook

arelesslikelytospreadthenegativeeffectsofacrisisonSecondaryCrisis

Reactions.

4.6.5.Age,Gender,Bolstering&FBNews

Age(β= 0.014, t= 1.787, p=.076)couldbeconsideredsignificantwhenadaptingoursignificanceleveltop<.1.Agedisplaysasmallprediction,

meaninglikelihoodofSCRactionsincreasesby0.014foreveryyearolderthe

respondentwas.Gender(p=.348),FBasNewsSource(p=.152)andtheuseorno

usesofBolstering(p=.185)wereallnotfoundtobesignificantpredictorsof

SecondaryCrisisReactions.

InterestingisthatAttribution(guiltoforganization)wasfoundsignificant

andnegativelyrelatedtoSCR.Thismeansmoreguiltresultsinahigher

likelihoodofstakeholdersspreadingnegativemessagesabouttheorganization.

Genderseemstonotmatteratallwithbothmalesandfemalesbehaving

similarly.InterestingisthatBolsteringseemstohavenoeffectwhiletypeof

responsestrategydoesseemtomatterforSecondaryCrisisReactions.


52

Table4.6:SecondaryCrisisReactionsInfluencers

Unstandardized

B(Effect)

Standard

Error

Standardized

B

t-value p(sig.)

Pre-CrisisRep 0.266 0.078 0.266 3.416 0.001***

Attribution -0.179 0.080 -0.179 -2.249 0.026**

Age 0.014 0.008 0.141 1.787 0.076*

Gender 0.145 0.154 0.077 0.942 0.348

ResponseStrategy 0.355 0.155 0.178 2.281 0.024**

(No)Bolstering 0.209 0.157 0.105 1.333 0.185

FBUse 0.166 0.083 0.166 1.997 0.048**

FBNews -0.121 0.084 -0.121 -0.121 0.152

R-Square 0.164

F-Test 4.549 0.00

*P<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01

4.7.RobustnessCheck Theresultsintheprevioussectionsindicateourassumptions

(hypotheses)appeartoberejected.Tocontrolourresults,wewillperforma

robustnesscheckinwhichweonlyincluderesultsinwhichtherespondentgot

ourattentioncheckright.Thismeansthatweonlyincludedataforwhicha

respondentwho,forexample,hadDenial+Bolsteringasaconditionalso

answeredtheattentioncheckaboutthetypeofresponsestrategyandthe

questionaboutthepresenceofbolsteringright.Thesetypesofrobustness

checksareacommonpracticeinempiricalresearchandaimtodistinguish

evidenceofstructuralvaliditybyomittingcertaininfluencersthatmighthave

compromisedthedataset(Xu&White,2014).Inthiscase,weomitresponsesfor

whichwearenotsureiftherespondentpaidenoughattentionbyfilteringfor

correctattentionchecks.Thisresultedinadatasetof53(N=53)respondents.

4.7.1.H1:PostCrisisReputation

Weperformedthesametypeofanalysis(two-wayANOVA)onthis

correcteddatasetasinsection4.1.Theinteractionbetweenresponsestrategies,

useofbolsteringandpostcrisisreputationwasonceagainfoundinsignificantat


53

thep>0.05level:F(3,49)=2.396,p=.079.Levene’stestindicatedequal

variances(F=0.272,p=.845).Noothersignificantresultswerefound.

Table4.7.1:Results of two-way ANOVA Post-Crisis Reputation (Robust N= 53)

Sum of

Squares

df Mean

Square

F p η2

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 3.837 1 3.837 3.721 .060* 0.071




1.506 1 1.506 1.461 .233 0.029

Error 50.522 49 1.031

Total 58.093 53

*P<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01

However,wecanalsonotethatdifferentresponsestrategiesarecloseto

significantatthep<.1levels(p=.06).WhenomittingtheBolsteringstrategy

conditions,wecanseethatusingtheDenialstrategy(M=2.766,SD=1.007)isless

efficientinreducingnegativePost-CrisisReputationfalloutthanusingthe

CorrectiveActionStrategy(M=3.381,SD=0.869).Accordingtothisresult,

CorrectiveActionasaresponsestrategyresultsinahigherPost-Crisis

ReputationlevelthanwhenanorganizationwouldusetheDenialstrategy.We

reporttheplotbelowtohighlightthisandshowthedifferenceinheightbetween

thetwoconditions.


54

Table4.7.2:ResponseStrategyPlot(RobustN=53)

4.7.2H2:SecondaryCrisisCommunications



useofbolsteringandSecondaryCrisisCommunicationswasonceagainfound

insignificantatthep>.05level:F(3,49)=1.460,p=.237.Levene’stestindicated

equalvariances(F=0.698,p=.558).Noothersignificantresultswerefound,

althoughwecouldnoteasimilarresultfortheBolsteringstrategyasinsection

4.3inwhichthesignificanceofthisfindingisneartothep<.1levelsanddisplays

thesamekindofinteraction:Bolsteringresponsesresultsinalowerlikelihoodof

engaginginSecondaryCrisisCommunications.

Table4.7.2:Results of two-way ANOVA Secondary Crisis Com. (Robust N= 53)

Sum of

Squares

df Mean

Square

F p η2

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 0.990 1 0.990 1.571 .216 0.031




0.018 1 0.018 0.028 .867 0.001

Error 30.863 49 0.630

Total 35.923 53

*P<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01


55

4.7.3H3:SecondaryCrisisReactions



useofbolsteringandSecondaryCrisisReactionswasonceagainfound

insignificantatthep>.05level:F(3,49)=0.156,p=.926.Levene’stestindicated

equalvariances(F=2.762,p=.052).Noothersignificantresultswerefound.

Table4.7.3:Results of two-way ANOVA Secondary Crisis Reactions (Robust N= 53)

Sum of

Squares

df Mean

Square

F p η2

DENIAL_OR_CORRECTIVE 0.006 1 0.006 0.006 .940 0

BOLSTERING_WITH_OR_WITHOUT 0.01 1 0.01 0.01 .920 0



0.468 1 0.468 0.462 0.5 0.009

Error 49.647 49 1.013

Total 50.864 53

*p<.1,**p<.05,***p<.01

4.7.3.AdditionalResultsfromtheRobustData

Asimilarlinearregressionasinsection4.4wasperformed.Asignificant

regressionwasfound:F(8,52)=3.632,p=.03withanR2of0.398.

PostCrisisReputationwasonceagainasignificantpredictor(β=0.492,

t=2.75,p=.009).PostCrisisreputationincreasedwith0.492(ona7-pointscale

from1=negativeto7=positive)foreverypointincreaseinPre-CrisisReputation.

Thisisinlinewithresultsfromourpreviousregressionalthoughtheeffectis

largerinourcontrolleddataset(0.492vs0.321).

Attribution(ofguilt)alsoseemstobeasignificantpredictorwhen

assumingp<.1(β=-0.295,t=-2,p=.052).Thismeansthatforeveryincreasein

perceivedattributionofthecrisis,Post-CrisisReputationdecreaseswith-0.295.

Thismeansthatthemoreattribution(guilt)canbeascribedtoanorganization,

thelowertheorganization’sreputationwillbePost-Crisis.Thiseffectisonce

againlargerinourcontrolleddata(-0.295vs-0.213).

Theothervariableswereallnotsignificant.

Table4.7.3.1:Post-CrisisReputationInfluencers(RobustN=53)


56

Unstandardized

B(Effect)

Standard

error

Standardized

B

t-

values

p(sig.)

Pre-CrisisRep 0.492 0.179 0.355 2.75 0.009***

Attribution -0.295 0.148 -0.266 -2 0.052*

Age 0.005 0.019 0.039 0.283 0.799

Gender -0.312 0.274 -0.149 -1.136 0.252


(No)Bolstering -0.398 0.282 -0.19 -1.410 0.146

FBUse -0.004 0.152 -0.004 -0.27 0.979

FBNews 0.024 0.158 0.023 0.151 0.88

R-Square 0.397

F-Test 5.055 0.00**

*p<.1,**p<.05,***p<.01

Asimilarregressionasinsection4.5wasalsoperformed(secondary

crisiscommunications).Nosignificantregressionwasfound:F(8,52)=1.85,

p=.093withandR2of0.252.Theregressioncouldhoweverbeconsidered

significantatthep<.1level.

FacebookUseprovedtobetheonlysignificantvariablefromthis

regression(p=.033).ThismeanslikelihoodofSCCdecreasesby0.285themore

therespondentusedFacebook.Thisisinlinewithourpreviousresultthatthe

likelihoodofSecondaryCrisisCommunicationsdecreasesthemorefrequenta

personisonFacebook.Thiseffectwasalsolargerinourcontrolleddata(-0.285

vs-0.17).

Table4.7.3.2:SecondaryCrisisCommunicationInfluencers(RobustN=53)


57

UnstandardizedB

(Effect)

Standarderror StandardizedB t-values p(sig.)

Pre-CrisisRep 0.046 0.152 0.044 0.304 0.762

Attribution -0.137 0.125 -0.162 -1.094 0.280

Age 0.013 0.016 0.129 0.849 0.4

Gender -0.187 0.233 -0.117 -0.803 0.426


(No)Bolstering -0.287 0.240 -0.18 -1.2 0.236

FBUse -0.285 0.129 -0.354 -2.203 0.033**

FBNews 0.141 0.134 0.175 1.048 0.3

R-Square 0.252

F-Test 1.85 0.093*

*P<.1,**P<.05,***P<.01

Finally,asimilarregressionasinsection4.6wasperformed(secondary

crisisreactions).Nosignificantregressionwasfound:F(8,52)=1.456,p=.102

withanR2of0.209.Nosignificantresultswerefoundinthisregressionandthey

arethereforenotreportedhere.


58

5.Discussion

ThisresearchwasgroundedintheSituationalCrisisCommunication

Theory(Coombs,2007a),whichisatheorythataimstoprovidepractitionersin

thereputationindustrywithguidelinesonhowtorespondtoorganizational

crisesbasedonacademicresearch.Thistheoryimpliesthatthebolstering

strategy(asecondarycrisisresponse)isasupplementalstrategytobeusedwith

oneoftheprimarycrisisresponsesthatoffersa“minimalopportunitytodevelop

reputationalassets”.(Coombs,2007a)Thisstatementwascontraryto

indicationswereceivedfromotherresearch.Mostnotablewasanextensive

studyofcasestudiesincrisiscommunicationthatindicatedthat,inpractice,the

mostusedresponsestrategywasinfactbolstering.Bolsteringwasusedmost

oftenincombinationwiththedenialorcorrectiveactionstrategies(Kimetal,

2009).Otherresearchintothematteralsoindicatedthatbolsteringmighthave

beenunderplayedintheSCCTbutdidnotstudythestrategyoritseffectiveness

inminimizingnegativereputationfalloutfollowingacrisisspecifically(Sheldon

&Sallot,2008;Wan,2004;Weberetal,2011).Thepremiseofthisstudywas

thereforetostudythebolsteringstrategyastheoryandpracticeseemedto

displayadifferenceinascribedeffectiveness.

Ourresearchsetouttoinvestigatetheinfluenceoftheuseofbolsteringas

asupplementarycrisisresponsetechniqueonthreedifferentfactorsthatmight

beinfluencedbyacrisis.ThesefactorswerePost-CrisisReputation,Secondary

CrisisCommunicationsandSecondaryCrisisReactions.Theeffectofthe

bolsteringstrategywasmeasuredusinganexperimentalresearchdesignwith

fourconditionsinwhichtwoinitialcrisisresponses(denialandcorrective

action)incombinationwithbolstering(usingbolsteringornotusingbolstering)

werepresentedtorespondentsrandomly(N=146).Ourresultsindicatethat

thereisnosignificanteffectoftypeofresponsestrategyandtheincorporationof

bolsteringonanyofthethreefactors.Wedidfindconfirmationofexisting

researchthatindicates(apositive)Pre-CrisisReputationisthemostimportant

factorinminimizingnegativereputationfalloutdirectlyfollowingacrisis.Our

researchquestionwas:


59

Towhatextent,ifany,doesthebolsteringstrategyaffectpostcrisisreputation,

secondarycrisiscommunicationsandreactionsduringtimesoforganizational

crisis?

Basedonthefindingsfromthisresearchwecananswerourresearch

questionandsaythatthereisnone,ornegligible,effectofthebolsteringstrategy

onpost-crisisreputation,secondarycrisiscommunicationsandsecondarycrisis

reactions.

TheSCCTincorporatesanumberoffactorsrelatedtoreputationfor

whichitaimstominimizethenegative:Post-CrisisReputation,SecondaryCrisis

CommunicationsandSecondaryCrisisReactions.Hypotheseswereconstructed

aroundthesefactorsandthesewillbediscussedbelow,aswellasotherfindings,

basedonourresultsandanalysis.

5.1.H1:Bolstering&Post-CrisisReputation TherecommendationsmadeintheSCCTareaimedatminimizingthe

negativeeffectsofacrisisonpostcrisisreputation(Coombs,2007a).Thismeans

thatusingtherightstrategywillresultinmoreforgivingstakeholderswith

betteropinionsoftheorganizationthanwhenusingthewrongstrategy.The

designofourresearchsomewhatchallengedtheserecommendationsaswe

basedourconditionsonwhatpractitionersinthefieldofcrisiscommunication

usemostoften(Kimetal,2009).Wechoosedenial(notrecommendedtobeused

withbolsteringintheSCCT)andcorrectiveaction(recommendedintheSCCT)

asourtwoprimaryresponsestrategiesandtestedtheseincombinationor

absenceofbolsteringasasecondarycrisisresponsestrategy(supplement).

Basedontheprevalenceofbolsteringamongstpractitioners,mostused

duringpreventablecrises,wehypothesizedthatincorporatingbolsteringwith

eitherofourprimaryresponsestrategieswouldresultinlessreputational

damageafterthecrisis:ahigherpost-crisisreputationthanwhennot

incorporatingthebolsteringstrategy.Basedonourfindingswerejectedourfirst

hypothesesandcanthereforestatethattheincorporationofbolsteringhasno

significanteffectonPost-CrisisReputation.Itwasfoundthatthetypeofprimary

responsestrategyandtheincorporationofbolsteringdonothelpinlimiting

negativefalloutontothepost-crisisreputationfactor.


60

Wedidfindaresultsignificantatthep<.1levelsinourrobustdatasetthat

onlyincludedcorrectanswersfromourmanipulationchecks.Thisresult

indicatedthatusingthecorrectiveactionresponsestrategycauseshigherPost-

CrisisReputationthanwhenusingthedenialstrategy.Thiscouldbeduetothe

factthattheserespondentspaidbetterattention,hencetheygotthe

manipulationchecksright,andasaresultweremoreawareoftheinternalguilt

oftheorganizationwhichasaconsequencemadethedenialstrategyless

effectivethanthestrategythataimstoadmitandcorrectafaultbyan

organization.ThisisalsoinlinewithrecommendationsmadeintheSCCT

(Coombs,2007a).

5.2.H2:Bolstering&SecondaryCrisisCommunications ThesecondthingtheSCCTaimstominimizeistheintenttocommunicate

aboutthecrisis(Coombs,2007a).However,theSCCTislimitedinthis

incorporation,asitdoesnotspecificallydealwithmediatype.Socialmediaisan

increasinglyimportantsourceofnewsandcommunicationtool,andoffersthe

opportunitytoeasilyreacttoorspread,amongstothers,organizationalcrises.

Tosupplementthis,weusedtheSocialMediatedCrisisCommunicationModel

thatdealswithhowstakeholderscommunicateonsocialmediafollowingacrisis

(Austinetal,2012).

WehypothesizedthattheincorporationoftheBolsteringsecondarycrisis

responsestrategywouldminimizethelikelihoodofourrespondentstoshare,

commentorinformpeersaboutthecrisis,effectivelyhelpingtocontainthe

crisis.Ourresultshoweverindicatethatthetypeof(primary)responsestrategy

andtheincorporationofabsenceofbolsteringhavenoeffectonsecondarycrisis

communications.Wethereforerejectedoursecondhypothesesand,basedon

thisstudy,canstatethatresponsestrategyandbolsteringdonotinfluencethe

likelihoodofourrespondentstoengageinsecondarycrisiscommunications.

Wedidhoweverfindaresultthatcouldnotbeconsideredsignificantat

thep<.1levels,butcomesclosetoit.Wealsofoundasimilarsignificancelevelin

therobustdatasetanalysisforSCC.ThisresultindicatedthatusingBolsteringin

theinitialcrisisresponseresultsinalowerlikelihoodofstakeholdersengaging

inSecondaryCrisisCommunicationsthanstrategiesthatdonotuseBolsteringin


61

thecrisisresponse.Thiscouldindicatethebolsteringstrategyiseffective,but

remainsunprovenandcouldthereforewarrantfutureresearch.

5.3.H3:Bolstering&SecondaryCrisisReactions ThefinalfactortheSCCTaimstominimizethenegativefallouton

followingacrisisisthesecondarycrisisreactions(Coombs,2007a).Secondary

CrisisReactionsrefertothebehavioralintentionsastakeholdermighthave

followingacrisisandincludethewaytheymighttalkaboutanorganization

(negativeorpositiveword-of-mouth)oradapttheirpurchaseintentions

followingacrisis(Schultzetal,2011;Stockmyer,1996).TheSCCTaimsto

minimizethespreadofnegativeopinionsaboutanorganizationandalsoto

ensurepeoplekeeponbuyingtheorganizationsproducts.

OurhypothesisassumedtheincorporationoftheBolsteringstrategy

wouldresultinlessnegativesecondarycrisisreactionsamongstour

respondentsbutwasfoundtobeincorrect.Wethereforerejectedourthird

hypothesesandcanstatethat,basedonourresearch;incorporatingbolstering

doesnothelpreducethenegativeeffectsofacrisisonsecondarycrisisreactions.

Wedidhoweverfindasignificantresultfortheresponsestrategyonsecondary

crisisreactions.Thedenialstrategyprovedtobe(slightly)moreeffectivethan

thecorrectiveactionstrategyinreducingsecondarycrisisreactions.Asurprising

resultasthiswouldmeandenyingattributionduringacrisishelpstoreducethe

intenttospreadnegativeword-of-mouthoradaptpurchaseintentions.This

resultwasalsofoundduringfurtheranalysis.Thisisacounter-intuitiveresult

andcouldwarrantfutureresearchintothematter.

Inthisanalysiswealsofoundaresultthatcouldnotbeconsidered

significantatthep<.1levels,butcomesclosetoit.Thisresultalsoindicatedthat

usingBolsteringintheinitialcrisisresponseresultsinalowerlikelihoodof

stakeholdersengaginginSecondaryCrisisReactionsthanstrategiesthatdonot

useBolsteringinthecrisisresponse.Thisresultwasnotreplicatedinourrobust

analysis,however.Aswehavenowfoundtworesultsthatareclosetosignificant

thatindicateBolsteringmightbeeffectiveinatleastminimizingthelikelihoodof

stakeholdersengaginginSCCorSCC,wehighlyrecommendfutureresearchto

furtherexplorethisinteraction.


62

5.4.Pre-CrisisReputationShieldsOrganizationsfromNegative

ReputationFallout ResearchintotheimportanceofPre-CrisisReputation,thereputation

heldbyanorganizationpriortoacrisis,indicatedthathavingapositivepre-

crisisreputationcanhelpminimizethenegativeeffectsofacrisisonthe

reputationheldbyandorganizationafteracrisis(Claeys&Cauberghe,2015;

Coombs,2007a;Coombs&Holladay,2001;2002;2006;Sheldon&Sallot,2009).

Thissocalled‘Halo-Effect’(Coombs&Holladay,2006)statesthatapositivepre-

crisisreputation(‘beinggood’)canactasashieldinreflectingnegativefallout

ontothepost-crisisreputationbecausestakeholdersarereluctanttochange

theirowncognitionorexpectationbias.

Ourresearchconfirmsthisonmultiplelevels.Pre-CrisisReputationwas

foundtobeasignificantpredictor(p<.05)ofPost-CrisisReputationand

SecondaryCrisisReactions.Thismeansthatahigher(morepositive)pre-crisis

reputationwillminimizethenegativeeffectsofacrisisonpost-crisisreputation

(perceptionofthecompanypost-crisis)andsecondarycrisisreactions(toneof

communication).Asignificanteffectwasalsofoundatalowersignificancelevel

(p<.1)forthepredictivepowerofPre-CrisisReputationonSecondaryCrisis

Communications.ThismeansthatahigherPre-Crisisreputationalsoreducesthe

likelihoodofourrespondentstoshare,commentorinformpeersonthecrisis

andeffectivelyaidsincontainingthecrisis.

Thesefindingsareinlinewithpreviousresearchandwecanconfirmwith

almostcertaintythatthemostimportantfactorinreducingtheinitialnegative

effectsofacorporatecrisisishavingapositivereputationpriortosaidcrisis.

Pre-CrisisReputationdoesindeedactasashieldagainstcorporatecrisesand,as

ourresultsindicate,willresultinahigherreputationafterthecrisis,lesslikely

stakeholderswhomightsharenegativeinformationandalowerlikelihoodof

communicatingaboutsaidcrisistotheirpeers.

Theseimplicationsarenotnovelforbothacademicsorprofessionalsbut

doconfirmthatitisimportant,ifnotvital,fororganizationstomaintaina

positivereputationasitwillprotecttheorganizationfromnegativityfollowinga

crisisandalsoresultinbenefitsforthecompanywhennotincrisis(vanRiel&

Fombrun,2007,ch2).


63

5.5.OtherFindings Wefoundmultipleothereffectsbesidespre-crisisreputationofour

measuresonPost-CrisisReputation.Attribution,thelevelofguiltascribedby

ourrespondenttotheorganization,wasapredictorofpost-crisisreputation.The

mainfindingherewasthattheguiltiertherespondentthoughttheorganization

was,thelesspositivetheywouldbeabouttheorganizationafterthecrisis.This

isinlinewiththeSCCT,whichstatesthatahigherlevelofattributionresultsina

greaterreputationalthreatfortheorganization’spost-crisisreputation(Coombs,

2007a).

Anotherfactorfoundtobeasignificantpredictorofpost-crisisreputation

wastheageoftherespondent.Itwasfoundthattheolderrespondentsappeared

tobemorelenienttowardsthecompanyandascribedthemwithahigherpost-

crisisreputationthantheiryoungercounterparts.Thisissomethingthathasnot

beenstudiedyetinthefieldofreputationmanagement,andthereforewecannot

giveavalidatedreasonforthisfinding.Wecan,however,imagineanolder

respondentmighthavebecomemore‘jaded’thantheyoungeronesdueto

possiblybeingexposedtomorecrisesintheirlife.

Inrelationtosecondarycrisiscommunicationsandsecondarycrisis

reactionswefoundthatourrespondentswerelesslikelytospreadinformation

oropinionduringacrisiswhentheywereonFacebookmorethanthe

respondentswhoreportedbeingonFacebookless.Thisisagainacounter-

intuitivefindingaswemighthaveexpectedpeoplewhoareontheplatform

moretoalsobemorelikelytoexpressthemselvesinonewayoranotheronit.

WealsofoundthatthemoreimportantFacebookisasasourceofnews,the

morelikelyourrespondentsweretoshare,commentorinformpeersabouta

crisis.ThislastresultwasonlyfoundforSCCandnotforSCR.

5.6.Conclusion Basedonthisresearchwecananswerourresearchquestionandstate

thattheeffectofthebolsteringstrategyonpost-crisisreputation,secondary

crisiscommunicationsandsecondarycrisisreactionsisnegligible,ifnotnon-

existent.WecantherebyconfirmtheSCCTisrightwhenitstatesbolsteringisa

minimalopportunityforreputationalgainsandwouldrecommendpractitioners


64

incrisiscommunicationtoconsiderthiswhenrespondingtocrises.This

researchimpliesthatbolsteringhaslittleeffectbesidesallowingpractitionersto

putsomepositiveinformationnexttothenegativeone,butinrealityhasvery

littleeffectontherespondents’opinionsandactionstowardstheorganization

followingthecrisisresponse.Bolsteringisthereforemore‘puffery’andnotso

mucha‘underratedstrategy’.

Whatwedidfind,andthisisimportantforacademicsbutespeciallyfor

practitioners,isthatthemosteffectivewayofreducingnegativefalloutfollowing

acrisisisthereputationanorganizationholdsbeforesaidcrisis.Thisfinding

reconfirmsexistingliteraturethatstatesapositivereputationwillactasa

‘shield’duringorganizationalcrisesandisinlinewithwhatisincorporatedin

theSCCTandotherreputationorcrisiscommunicationresearch.Whatis

interestingtonoteisthattheuseofdifferentresponsestrategiesdidnotseemto

mattergreatlyeitherinourinitialcrisis-responseresearch,althoughitisstated

intheSCCTthatitshould.

5.7.Limitations&FutureResearch Thisresearchwassubjecttoafewlimitationsthat,whilenotdetrimental,

dolimittheimpactofthisstudyslightly.Oneofthemainlimitationswasthe

scopeandsizeofthisstudy.Oursampleof146respondentsisenoughforan

experimentalstudyofthisnature,butahighersamplewouldincreasethe

validityandpossiblygiveusdifferentresults.Ourrespondentsarealsofroma

varietyofnationalitiesandcultures.Futureresearchmightwanttofocuson

specificregionstoaccountforculturalandpersonalfactorswhenstudyingcrisis

communication.Anotherlimitationwecouldnoteistheabsenceofanynovel

findingsinthisstudy.Ourresultsre-confirmthetheorythatPre-Crisis

Reputationshieldsorganizationsduringcrises.

WedidfindthattheincorporationoftheBolsteringstrategyhadan

almostsignificanteffectonbothSecondaryCrisisCommunicationsand

SecondaryCrisisReactions.Becauseoftheproximitytoasignificancelevel,we

recommendfutureresearchfurtherexploretheeffectofbolsteringincrisis

containment,possiblyinadifferentresearchdesign.


65

Whilewedonotknowifadifferentresearchdesignmightgiveus

differentresults,itcouldbethatourdesignandconditionswerenotrefined

enoughforthisresearch.Ourfocusononlytwocrisisresponsestrategies,one

singlecompanywithagoodreputationandacrisisinthepreventableclusterin

combinationwiththebolsteringstrategyisalimitedscopeandfutureresearch

wouldbenefitfromamoreextensivestudythatincorporatesallpossibleaspects

andresponsesintheSCCT.Ouruseofonlyonecompanywithan(near)

impeccablepre-crisisreputationisalimitationofthisstudyasitmightbethat

thishighlevelofreputation‘shielded’ourcompany.Futureresearchmight

replicatethisstudywithacompanyoflowpriorreputationorincorporatea

comparativedesignbetweenhighandlowpre-crisisreputations.

Ideally,futureresearchwouldalsolookattheuseofthebolstering

strategyduringcrisiscommunicationovertime.Ourresearchwasbasedona

‘snapshot’ofacrisisandtheinitialcrisisresponsestrategy.Itmightbethat

bolsteringworksbetterovertimebycontinuouslyrepeatingpositivefactsto

contrastthenegativeones,therebyreducingtheoffensivenessofacrisisinlight

ofpastgooddeeds.Asthisishardtoreplicateinanexperimentalsetting,itcould

beinterestingtostudyareallifecrisisasitunfoldsbypresentingasurveyat

differentintervalstoaselectionofrespondents.Sucharesearchmightreveal

howacrisisunfolds,comestothepublic’sattention,whatthecompanydoesto

reducenegativereputationalfallout,howthepublicreactstoitandhowpublic

opinioncanchangeovertime.

Otherrecommendationsforfutureresearchwecouldmakearean

investigationintotherelationshipbetweenageandorganizationalcrisis,why

ourresultsindicatethedenialstrategypositivelyinfluencessecondarycrisis

reactionsandtherelationshipbetweenFacebookuseandsecondarycrisis

communicationsandreactions.Finally,consideringtheuseofbolsteringby

practitioners,futureresearchmightbenefitfromaqualitativedesignaimedat

understandingsaidpractitioners’motivationsandexperiencewiththe

bolsteringstrategy.


66

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AppendixA-experimentconditionsA1-FictionalNewsPost


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A2-FictionalFacebookPosts

A2.1-Denial:WeregretthestoriesthatarecirculatingtheInternetandcanguaranteeourcustomersthatweareinvestigatingthematter.Ourmanagementfullheartedlydeniestheaccusationsthattheywereinformedofthemalfunctionpriortorelease.

A2.2-Denial+BolsteringWeregretthestoriesthatarecirculatingtheInternetandcanguaranteeourcustomersthatweareinvestigatingthematter.Ourmanagementfullheartedlydeniestheaccusationsthattheywereinformedofthemalfunctionpriortorelease.Ourlaptopsareofaward-winningqualityandwehavecontinuouslyworkedtoincreaseourcorporateresponsibilityefforts.WeatSonyhavealwaysaimedatprovidingourcustomerswithhighendproductsandservices,andwillcontinuetodosointhefuture.

A2.3-CorrectiveActionWeregretthereportsthatarecirculatingtheInternetandcanguaranteeourcustomersthatweareinvestigatingthematter.AnyonewhohasboughtaVAIO7Laptopcanexchangehisorherbatteryforanewonethroughoursite.

A2.4-CorrectiveAction+BolsteringWeregretthereportsthatarecirculatingtheInternetandcanguaranteeourcustomersthatweareinvestigatingthematter.AnyonewhohasboughtaVAIO7Laptopcanexchangehisorherbatteryforanewonethroughoursite.Ourlaptopsareofaward-winningqualityandwehavecontinuouslyworkedtoincreaseourcorporateresponsibilityefforts.WeatSonyhavealwaysaimedatprovidingourcustomerswithhighendproductsandservices,andwillcontinuetodosointhefuture.


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AppendixB-ExperimentSurveyQ1.1Dearparticipant,Thissurveywillaskyouafewquestions.Pleasereviewalltextsbeforeansweringthequestions.Theestimatedtimetofinishthissurveywillbenolongerthan12minutesandallanswerswillbekeptconfidentialandanonymous.Pleasetakeyourtimetoanswerthesequestions.Therearenorightorwronganswers.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsregardingthesurvey,pleasecontactmeviae-mail:359167nl@eur.nlThankyouforyourparticipation.Q2AreyoufamiliarwiththeconsumerelectronicscompanySony?m Yesm Maybem NoQ5Pleaseindicatetowhatdegreeyouagreewiththefollowingstatements:Q3IhaveagoodfeelingaboutSonyasacompany.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ4ItrustSony.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ6IadmireandrespectSonyasacompany.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem Stronglyagree


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Q7IthinkSonyhasagoodoverallreputation.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ8HaveyouboughtanySonyproductsinthepast?m Yesm NoDisplayThisQuestion:

IfHaveyouboughtanySonyproductsinthepast?YesIsSelectedQ9Sonyhasalwaysofferedgoodservicetome.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeDisplayThisQuestion:

IfHaveyouboughtanySonyproductsinthepast?YesIsSelectedQ10IamsatisfiedwiththeSonyproductsIown(ed).m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem Stronglyagree


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DisplayThisQuestion:IfHaveyouboughtanySonyproductsinthepast?YesIsSelected

Q50Sonyoffersgoodvalueformymoney.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem Stronglyagree


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Q51CorporateCrisesaresuddenandsignificanteventsthatcanhaveanegativeimpactonanorganizationsreputation.Q11AreyouawareofanycorporatecrisesSonyhashadinthepast?m Yesm NoDisplayThisQuestion:

IfAreyouawareofanycorporatecrisesSonyhashadinthepast?YesIsSelectedQ12Canyouverybrieflydescribethepastcrisisyouareawareof(max140characters).


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Q13YouwillnowbepresentedwithanewsreportaboutacrisisexperiencedbySony.Pleasereadthisshortarticlecarefullyandproceedtothenextquestions.Theimagemaytakeafewsecondstoload.

Q14


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Q15TowhatdegreedoyouthinkSonyistoblameforthecrisis?m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ16Sonycouldhaveavoidedthecrisis.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ56Thecrisiswascausedbyaprobleminsidetheorganization.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ19DoyouhaveaFacebookaccount?m Yesm No


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Q21NextyouwillbepresentedwiththeresponsefromSonyonthesocialmediasiteFacebook.PleasetreatthisasifyouhadjustreadthenewsarticleandcameacrossthispostfromSonyonyourFacebooktimeline.Q20

Q17

Q22


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Q23

Q24PleaseindicatetowhatdegreeyouagreewiththefollowingstatementsafterhavingreadthenewsarticleandresponsepostfromSony.Q27Sonyisconcernedwiththewell-beingofitsconsumers.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ28Sonyisbasicallybeingdishonest.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ29IdonottrustSonytotellthetruthaboutthesituation.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem Stronglyagree


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Q30UndermostcircumstancesIwouldbelikelytobelievewhatSonysays.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ31Sonyisnotconcernedwiththewell-beingofitsconsumers.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ32PleaseindicatethelikelihoodofyouundertakinganyofthefollowingactionsafterhavingreadSony'sresponse.Q33IwouldsharethepostonFacebook.m Extremelyunlikelym Moderatelyunlikelym Slightlyunlikelym Neitherlikelynorunlikelym Slightlylikelym Moderatelylikelym ExtremelylikelyQ34IwouldinformmyfriendsandpeersonFacebook.m Extremelyunlikelym Moderatelyunlikelym Slightlyunlikelym Neitherlikelynorunlikelym Slightlylikelym Moderatelylikelym Extremelylikely


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Q35IwouldcommentunderSony'spostonFacebook.m Extremelyunlikelym Moderatelyunlikelym Slightlyunlikelym Neitherlikelynorunlikelym Slightlylikelym Moderatelylikelym ExtremelylikelyQ38Pleaseindicatehowlikelyyouwouldbetoundertakethefollowingactions.Q39IwouldencourageothersnottobuySonyproducts.m Extremelyunlikelym Moderatelyunlikelym Slightlyunlikelym Neitherlikelynorunlikelym Slightlylikelym Moderatelylikelym ExtremelylikelyQ40IwouldsaynegativethingstoothersaboutSony.m Extremelyunlikelym Moderatelyunlikelym Slightlyunlikelym Neitherlikelynorunlikelym Slightlylikelym Moderatelylikelym ExtremelylikelyQ41IwouldrecommendSonytosomeonewhoaskedmyadvice.m Extremelyunlikelym Moderatelyunlikelym Slightlyunlikelym Neitherlikelynorunlikelym Slightlylikelym Moderatelylikelym Extremelylikely


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Q43ThelikelihoodofmepurchasingSonyproductsinthefutureishigh.m Stronglydisagreem Disagreem Somewhatdisagreem Neitheragreenordisagreem Somewhatagreem Agreem StronglyagreeQ52InthepostbySony,whichofthefollowingtypesofresponsesdidyounotice?m Denialm CorrectiveActionm Justificationm AttacktheAccuserQ45Pleasereadthefollowingdefinitionofbolstering:Bolstering:Usedtomitigatethenegativeeffectsofacrisisbystrengtheningtheaudience'spositiveideaoftheaccused.Theymayremindtheaudienceofpreviousgooddeedsorgoodreputation.Q46DidyounoticeanybolsteringintheFacebookpostbySony?m Yesm Maybem NoQ45Howoldareyou?Q46Whatisyourgender?m Malem Femalem RathernotsayQ55Whatisyournationality?Q47HowoftenareyouonFacebook?m Neverm Onceaweekm 2-3timesaweekm 4-6timesaweekm Daily


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Q48IsFacebookanimportantsourceofyournews?m Alwaysm Mostofthetimem Abouthalfthetimem Sometimesm NeverQ53Howdidyoucomeacrossthissurvey?m Afriendm SocialMediam Websitem Emailm Other____________________Q47Thankyouforyourhelp,itismuchappreciated.Allanswersrecordedinthissurveyaretreatedwithconfidentiality.Thecrisisandresponsesbroughtforwardinthissurveyareentirelyfictional.NosuchsituationhaseveroccuredwithSonythatwecouldfind.

Organizational Crisis and Bolstering: Underrated …Organizational Crisis and Bolstering: Underrated Strategy or Puffery? An experiment into the effect of the Bolstering strategy in

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