Opposition's Labour's Lost? Minority Rights in Slovakia, 1994-2012

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567291

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Opposition’s Labour's Lost?

Minority Rights in Slovakia, 1994-‐20121

Erik Láštic2

(First Draft)

This paper analyses rights of parliamentary opposition3 in 1994-‐20124 period,

that includes five complete legislative terms. The paper is structured as follows.

The introduction provides the empirical account of Slovak political system with a

specific focus paid to the composition of the parliament and to the unity of

parliamentary party groups (PPGs), measured by defection rate of their

membership and roll-‐call voting analysis. The second part provides an analysis

of procedural rules that govern the role of opposition political parties in the

political system. The attention is paid to the formal rights of PPG’s and individual

MPs in 1994-‐2012 as established by the 1996 Standing Order of the Parliament

and its subsequent amendments. The realtime use of these rights is presented on

1 Paper accepted for ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Workshop: Minority Rights and Majority Rule in European Legislatures, Antwerp, Belgium, 10-‐15 April 2012 2 Contact info: Erik Láštic, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia. Email: [email protected], Gondova 2, P.O.Box 1, 811 02, Bratislava 16, Slovakia 3 This paper uses the term “opposition” to describe members of the parliament that voted against or abstained during the investiture vote on a new government. These MPs are grouped on party bases and form parliamentary party groups. 4 Most of the data used for the paper include 1994-‐2010 period -‐ that is four complete legislative terms. In some instances, the paper includes data for 2010 and 2012 legislative term (interpellations, parliamentary questions, distribution of posts in the parliament). The roll call analysis is based on data for three legislative terms between 1998 and 2010. All data, if not stated otherwise, were compiled and calculated by the author from publicly accessible websites of the National Council and the Constitutional Court.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567291

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data in the third part, by covering legislative area and rights connected to the

control of the government. The fourth part examines opportunities provided for

the opposition outside the parliament in a form of referendum and constitutional

review The final part summarizes main findings and discusses possibilities for

further research.

1. The context and empirical evidence on nature of coalition and

opposition parties in Slovakia

Velvet Revolution of 1989 that started the transition to democracy in former

Czechoslovakia was characterised by mass civil protests that gave rise to two

informal movements, OF (Civic Forum) in Czech Republic and VPN (Public

Against Violence) in Slovakia. In a matter of days both of them transformed

themselves to voices of extra-‐parliamentary opposition that represented the

public during round table talks in November and December 1989. By using only

their influence OF and VPN managed to reconstruct both federal and national

governments and nominate their people to control transition of the country to

the first democratic parliamentary elections. In a visible demonstration of

opposition’s informal power, the communist federal parliament unanimously

elected V. Havel, former “enemy of state” and leader of new opposition, as the

new president of Czechoslovakia. The electoral law of 1990 abolished the

majoritarian system of the Communist regime and reintroduced the proportional

representation system based on party lists that had existed in the first

Czechoslovak Republic between 1918 and 1938. The golden era of non-‐political

politics ended with first parliamentary elections in June 1990 that produced

coalition governments, parliamentary party groups and parliamentary

opposition. The public financing of political parties was introduced as a necessity

to rebuild the country’s party system and allow newly established political

parties to compete equally.

The founding constitution of 1992, approved during the dissolution of federal

state, established Slovakia as a parliamentary democracy in which the

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government is responsible to the parliament. The Parliament (National Council)

is a unicameral body consisting of 150 members elected for a four-‐year term.

The Parliament is selected under a proportional electoral system in a single

nationwide constituency (since 1998). Voters choose a party or a coalition list of

candidates. They may additionally express a preferential vote for not more than

four candidates on the chosen list. The parliament has right to initiate a vote of

non-‐confidence against an individual minister or the Prime Minister. An absolute

majority of votes, 76 out 150 is needed for a successful vote.

TABLE 1 HERE: Governments, coalition and opposition, 1994-‐2012

Slovakia is characterised by relative executive stability, especially in comparison

with other CEE countries (see for comparison Rommel et.al., 2004; Somer-‐Topcu,

Williams, 2008) All but one (I. Radičová, 2010-‐12) governments were able to

finish their full legislative term. The same stability applies to the composition of

coalition and opposition during respective legislative terms. However, this level

of stability is accompanied by the relative instability of political parties in the

parliament and instability of their support from electorate. A brief look at the

composition of coalition and opposition also shows significant alternations of

parties between coalition and opposition. The only exception here is the 2002

elections, when three centre-‐right parties remained in the office for successive

term.

The instability of parties is best illustrated through the party tree of Slovak

parties and their development over time.5 “Most [relevant Slovak] parties have

emerged inside parliament [through splitting off from their mother parties] and

their caucuses, or seeds of new parties, were often directly involved in

supporting or even forming new ruling coalitions”(Rybář, 2004). Parties in

Slovakia often emerge and even operate without having built a proper party

organisation. In other words, they are established “from above” and often perish

before they manage to build proper party structures (i.e. ZRS, SOP and ANO, all

5 See Appendix 1

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once coalition parties). There are two more explanations needed. First, the

effects of the electoral law of 1998, through which coalition parties, especially

the largest HZDS, attempted to strengthen their position in 1998 parliamentary

election were visible in 1998-‐2002 legislative term. The law forced opposition

parties to create electoral parties (SDK and SMK) to overcome strict conditions

of the electoral law for establishment of coalitions. Second, parliamentary

elections in Slovakia produced one or two new parliamentary parties in every

election between 1994 and 2002 and then again in 2010 and 2012. Some of these

new parties were established by MPs that left their mother parties in previous

legislative terms (i.e. ZRS in 1994, SMER in 2002, MOST in 2010 and OLaNO in

2012), others were established outside the parliament (SOP in 1998, ANO in

2002 and SAS in 2010). With two exceptions (SMER in 2002, OLaNO in 2012) all

of them became coalition parties.

Voting patterns in parliamentary elections show a high degree of voter

fluctuations; with the sole exception of the SDKÚ, KDH and SMK in 2002, not a

single political party has ever remained in the government after the following

parliamentary elections. However, as appendix 2 shows, voting blocs remain

relatively stable over the time, especially for centre-‐right and ethnic Hungarian

parties that formed or were part of coalitions in three legislative terms (1998-‐02,

2002-‐06 and 2010-‐12). Two remaining voting blocs are more fluid (decline of

national parties and rise of economic left), but as Keegan-‐Krause argues “these

two developments are almost perfectly reciprocal, and the overlap of themes

suggests a high degree of compatibility between the voters in these two blocs.”

(Keegan-‐Krause, 2012). This degree of compatibility was also translated into

2006-‐10 coalition between SMER, SNS and HZDS.

TABLE 2 HERE: Parliamentary party groups, 1994-‐2012

The degree of stability of political parties in the parliament can be measured by

the stability of parliamentary party groups and defection rates of MPs. The table

2 provides a historical survey of changes within the PPGs. The discipline problem

characterises both coalition and opposition PPGs, albeit not in the same manner.

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The rate of defections from PPGs’ peaked in 1998-‐2002 term, when 20% of MPs

defected their mother PPGs, since then it decreases gradually. There are two

distinct patterns observable. The first can be characterised as a period of general

defections (1998-‐2002, 2002-‐2006, 2010-‐12) during which stability was

problem for both coalition and opposition parties. The second period is

opposition defection, during which coalition parties (their PPGs) remained stable

during full legislative term (1994-‐1998, 2006-‐2010), but opposition PPGs were

unstable. In the latter scenario it is reasonable to expect the role of opposition

parties to be limited, as coalition parties are disciplined during the full legislative

term. The former scenario is more complicated, as the coalition PPGs are

unstable and number of the MPs belonging to the coalition is decreasing (e.g.

2002-‐2006), but the opposition PPGs are unstable as well. This leads to a rise of

unaffiliated MPs that characterises every Slovak parliament since 1994. Take for

an example the 2002-‐2006 legislative term. The slim-‐majority government (79

to 71), composed of four centre-‐right parties, lost its absolute majority in 2005.

The coalition PPGs consisted of 68 MPs, those of opposition of 58 MPs. The group

of unaffiliated MPs included 24 MPs.

There are significant differences between individual PPGs as well. Take example

of party groups of two largest parties, HZDS and SMER. HZDS, led by Mr. Mečiar,

dominated the Slovak political scene in the 1990s. SMER, led by Mr. Fico,

dominates the political scene since 2006. While HZDS gradually lost electoral

support over time and was unable to control its MPs in successive legislative

terms, SMER gradually increased electoral support from 2002 onward, when the

party stood election for the first time, but also kept 100% discipline between

2002 and 2012. In that period SMER survived two terms in opposition (2002-‐06,

2010-‐12) and one in coalition (2006-‐10). This is remarkable especially if we

consider the size of the PPG and the lack of formal instruments available to

political parties to discipline their MPs. Moreover, the constitutions stipulates

explicitly that MPs are representatives of citizens and that they execute mandate

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personally, according to their conscience and conviction, and are not bound by

orders.6

TABLE 3 HERE: Coalition and Opposition, Roll-‐Call Analysis, 1998-‐2010

How does the unity look like when measured by roll call voting by coalition and

opposition PPGs?7 Table 3 provides a general picture of voting behaviour of

coalition and opposition parties in Slovak parliament for three legislative terms

between 1998 and 2010. It follows voting patterns for coalition and opposition

parties in three scenarios: voting for government bills (most frequent); voting

for bills proposed by coalition MPs and voting for bills proposed by opposition

MPs. The relative support of coalition parties for governmental proposals is high,

from 94.04% in 1998-‐2002, 97.67% in 2002-‐2006 up to the 99.02% in 2006-‐

6 The 1994 attempt of HZDS to introduce “imperative mandate” as a referendum question was not successful. During the 1994 election campaign HZDS used letters of commitment, which were presumed to be symbolic and unenforceable. In November 1996, the MP F. Gaulieder resigned from the coalition HZDS parliamentary party club. In December, the Immunity and Mandate Committee received a letter of resignation, allegedly signed by F. Gaulieder along with two other letters, also from him, which stated that he did not wish to resign. The fact that the date on the letter of resignation apparently was added with a different typewriter seemed to confirm public suspicions that HZDS forced candidates to sign letters of commitment. The Immunity and Mandate Committee, in which HZDS held a majority, voted to accept Gaulieder’s resignation. This decision was later confirmed in a floor vote that passed a resolution accepting the resignation. F. Gaulieder appealed his dismissal to the Constitutional Court. The court ruled in July 1997 that the parliament violated the constitutional rights of F. Gaulieder. However, according to the court, he was only being able to resume his mandate after the parliament cancels its own resolution, which the parliament refused. 7 Roll-‐call voting is the only method of voting when it comes to the legislation in Slovak parliament. Legislative voting in Slovak parliament is relatively straightforward, as it does not provide multiple voting options for parties to consider to be used as disciplining devices. This lack of options also makes legislative roll call analysis representative. The votes for individual MPs are publicly recorded and are available through the website of the parliament, except for the 1994-‐1998 term. The only exceptions are situations, in which constitution, or Rules of Procedure request a secret ballot. This procedure is used exclusively for personal nominations. The data used for this paper were compiled for three legislative terms: 1998-‐02, 2002-‐06, 2006-‐10. They include final voting on individual bills, which may occur during first reading or third reading. Third reading after the president vetoed a bill is also included.

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2010 term.8 The data also show clear division between voting patterns of

coalition and opposition parties.

The aforementioned characteristics of the nature of coalition and opposition

parties measured by unity show no significant differences between coalition and

opposition parties. The nature of party competition and voter fluctuations

influences the temporary character of majorities and minorities and significant

alternations of parties in coalitions from legislative term to term.

2. Procedural Rules: The nature of changes and effects

This section attempts to establish a better understanding of procedural rules and

rights that influence the existence of opposition parties in the parliament.

Neither constitution, nor Rules of Procedure acknowledge existence of

“opposition”. All rights that are granted by these norms belong either to

individual MPs, group of MPs or parliamentary party groups. The main focus is

paid on Rules of Procedures. As the 1992 Slovak Constitution introduces only a

handful of rights9 and only in general terms, the main focus is paid to Rules of

Procedure.

8 While I acknowledge existence of the Rice Index as a standard measure for unity (and its problems, see Sieberer, 2006), this paper limits data analysis to simple arithmetic. The relative support in this paper is calculated YES/YES,NO, ABSTAINED, DID NOT VOTEDx100%. The reason for including “DID NOT VOTED” is following. The roll call voting in Slovak parliament is two-‐step process. First, an MP inserts hers card into voting slot and presents her. That determines number of MPs present and number of votes needed for proposal to pass (simple majority). Second step is vote itself, any vote other than YES goes against the proposal; therefore “DID NOT VOTED” has to be included. The absolute support is calculated as a number of YES votes/TOTAL number of YES, NO, ABSTAINED, DID NOT VOTED, ABSENT x100%. The absolute support drops to 79.51% for 1998-‐02 term, but remains high (94.27%) for 2002-‐06 and 92.09% in 2006-‐10 legislative term. 9 The right for legislative initiative is guaranteed to government, parliamentary committees and MPs; the constitutional review may be initiated, beside other actors, by at least one-‐fifth of all MPs. The majorities for different types of legislation, investiture and confidence votes are established by the Constitution as well.

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TABLE 4 HERE: Rules of Procedure and their Amendments, 1996-‐2012

The founding version of rules, discussed and approved by the parliament

between 1995 and 1996, was subjected to lengthy discussions. While the draft of

the RoP were prepared by coalition PPGs, with assistance of one opposition PPG

(SDL), during the second reading on the floor coalition parties introduced

additional 33 changes, 30 of them were passed only with support of coalition

parties PPGs. On the other hand, only 11 out of 57 changes introduced by

opposition parties were approved. In the final third voting, RoP were supported

almost unanimously by coalition (one abstained) and by eight MPs from

opposition parties (KDH). The rest of opposition MPs voted against the proposal

(22), or abstained (21).

As table 4 shows, the RoP were amended 18 times between 1996 and 2011. This

suggests that procedural rules are subject of interest for the parliament,

therefore a majority, which implies that the content of these amendments would

be redistributive, rather than effective (Tsebelis, 1990). Amendments to the RoP

were not distributed proportionally across the time. Most of them were passed

during centre-‐right coalitions with slim majorities. One possible explanation may

be that of Dion (1997) that slim majorities feel threatened and are more

interested in restricting minority rights, which also may explain frequent

changes in rules.10 The content and voting analysis on individual amendments

paints a different picture (Chovancová, Láštic, 2012). First, a substantial number

of amendments is of technical nature and is connected to institutional changes

outside the parliament. Some of changes are directly connected to the EU

accession and membership. These reflect mostly legitimacy conflict, through

which parliament “struggles for recognition” (Koss, 2011:9); as illustrated by

amendments that aimed to strengthen the role of the parliament in EU affairs.11

Only one amendment (2000) explicitly addressed the need for efficiency in 10 Binder (1997) argues the opposite. According to her only large majorities tend to curb rights of minority, because they can do so. 11 See 2004 and 2011 amendments.

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legislative process, by limiting rights for replies on the floor and introduction of

possibility for strict time limits on the length of discussion. Except for 2000 and

2011 amendments, in which voting results followed coalition-‐opposition

division, the rest of amendments were approved by surplus majorities with

support of opposition parties (Chovancová, Láštic, 2012).

(S)election of office-‐holders in the parliament: Informal rules in display

While rules (and rights) that govern legislative procedure in the parliament and

control of the government are explicitly stated in the constitution and in RoP, the

rules that govern hierarchy conflicts cover only procedures for selection of

officeholders12, required majorities and types of voting procedures. The actual

ratio of distribution of parliamentary offices between coalition and opposition

parties is based on political negotiations.13

TABLE 5 HERE: Distribution of parliamentary offices, 1994-‐2012

The table 5 provides data for parliamentary offices distribution since 1994. The

logic behind distribution of these posts changed over time. In the first legislative

term, 1994-‐1998, coalition parties used majoritarian logic for distribution of

offices. None of positions in the presidency, or chair positions in committees was

given to opposition parties. Moreover, the coalition parties “packed in” dozens of

opposition MPs to Environmental and Human Rights committees, two weakest in

the parliament. This application of majority rule was subject of a harsh criticism

by European Commission and was one of the main political reasons behind

12 It includes position of Chair and Vice-‐Chairs of the Parliament and Chairs of parliamentary committees. Any MP may nominated a candidate for office position. Officeholders are elected during the first session of newly elected parliament by using a secret vote ballot. An absolute majority is needed for a candidate to be elected. 13 There are a few exceptions. Rules of procedure require that the Mandate and Immunity Committee, the EU Committee and special committees have to be established on proportional basis.

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exclusion of Slovakia from the first round of EU accession talks in 1997.14

The experience of 1994-‐1998 legislative term was internalized by the new

coalition in 1998-‐2002 legislative term. Former opposition parties, that formed a

coalition government with a constitutional majority, moved away from pure

majoritarian model of posts´ distribution in the parliament. Four informal

principles were established and are since more or less followed by every

majority in the parliament. First, all coalition and opposition parties negotiate

the posts´ distribution before the voting on distribution takes place. The result is

that individual nominations for offices are uncontested. Second, the opposition

parties have a right to at least one vice-‐chair of the parliament. Third, opposition

parties have a right to chair positions in committees; the actual number is

determined by the size of the opposition. Fourth, opposition parties are entitled

to chair special committees that monitor SIS (Slovak Information Service), VOS

(Military Defence Service) and NBÚ (National Security Authority). As table 5

shows, posts distribution logic is now more close to a proportional one.

However, the coalition parties still remain in control by applying two strategies.

First, they control chair positions in most important committees, i.e.

Constitutional committee or Financial committee. Second strategy is to distribute

membership in individual committees in a way that ensures that coalition parties

14 Just a few months after the establishment of the independent Slovakia in 1993, the EU diplomats urged the cabinet of PM V. Mečiar to be reliable when it comes to the democratic reforms. A year later, in a second démarche, the EU expressed its worries about the increasing powers of the cabinet in Slovak politics, combined with attempts to limit the control role of the parliament. The EU expressly pointed out the fact that the cabinet was bound by the Association Treaty, and Slovakia had to meet the Copenhagen criteria to get into the EU. In 1997, when the EC published its first views on the applicant countries, all of them, except Slovakia, were judged to have met the political criterion. The report concluded that although the institutional framework defined by the 1992 constitution corresponded to that of a parliamentary democracy with free and fair elections, the situation regarding the stability of the institutions and their integration into political life was unsatisfactory. Within a two-‐year period, however, Slovakia managed to fulfill the political criterion as laid down by the Copenhagen summit due to a change of the cabinet that agreed to abide by democratic procedures after the 1998 election (Bilčík, 2005, Malová-‐ Rybář, 2004).

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have a majority in all of them. This is achieved by using double membership in

committees. While occasionally there are conflicts over posts distribution, it is

safe to argue that actual process is becoming more consensual over time and is

closer to a proportional distribution.15

3. Opposition Rights Exercised

How do opposition parties exercise the rights that belong to individual MPs,

group of MPs or party groups? This section provides empirical account of rights

used by opposition parties in the parliament. It covers two areas, in which the

role of opposition, and that of the parliament, is most important: legislative

process and control of the government. Within legislative area we look at the

legislative initiative of opposition parties between 1998 and 2010, namely, with

what frequency opposition MPs use their right to initiate legislation, how

successful they are and what level of support provide coalition and opposition

PPGs to these proposals. As showed earlier in table 3, the level of unity of

coalition PPGs when supporting government's proposals is relatively high, which

effectively eliminates any chance for opposition PPGs’ to kill the government’s

proposal. There are only handful of examples for 1998 and 2010 period, in which

the government’s proposal failed. These almost exclusively included either

withdrawal of the proposal or situations in which legislation was vetoed by the

president. As only an absolute majority could override veto, slim majorities may

be presented with a potential trouble.

TABLE 6 HERE: Opposition and legislative initiative, 1998-‐2010

As table 6 shows, most of legislative initiatives of opposition are voted down,

usually in the first reading. There are differences between individual legislative

terms, the highest success rate for opposition proposals was recorded between

15 This is not only case of actual posts distribution but also voting support for individual candidates. See for example recent voting on posts distribution in 2012 parliament.

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1998 and 2002, the lowest in 2006 and 2010 term, when only two bills16 by the

opposition were approved. In the latter case the unity of coalition parties was

highest (see table 3). There were several instances, when the content of a failed

opposition bill was revitalised by the coalition MPs and resubmitted into the

legislative process. The data also show different voting patterns between

opposition PPGs when voting on their own initiatives. While not successful, the

opposition PPGs in 2006 and 2010 remained supportive to their proposals and

level of support for them is relatively high. In comparison, between 1998 and

2002, opposition PPGs support was inconsistent and the most frequent voting

strategy was not participating in voting at all.

Although the data made it clear that the role of opposition parties in Slovak

parliament is not a legislative one, in the reality the legislative role of opposition

is not as bleak. It is because roll-‐call analysis does not provide a whole picture. It

does not cover voting on individual changes that are introduced to proposals

during second reading (in committees and on the floor). It also does not explain

content of these changes, compromises achieved behind closed doors and their

impact on voting behaviour of opposition MPs during the final third reading.

Control of the Government: Investiture, Confidence and No Confidence

By the constitutional tradition, the president appoints the leader of winning

party of the parliamentary elections to start coalition talks. If the leader is

successful in forming a coalition, the president appoints the leader as the Prime

Minister and other cabinet members as submitted by coalition parties. The newly

formed government is constitutionally obliged, within thirty days of its

formation, to present itself to the parliament and submit to them its manifesto,

thus initiating an investiture vote. An absolute majority (76 out of 150) is needed

for the cabinet to be voted into the office. As the table 7 shows, so far all

appointed cabinets managed to get investiture vote in the first attempt, differing

only in the number of votes in favour of the cabinet. The vote is public and

16 One was subsequently vetoed by the president and voted down.

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signals future coalition and opposition in the parliament, as the MPs not

belonging to coalition vote either against the new government or abstain from

vote.

The cabinet is collectively responsible for the exercise of its powers to the

parliament, which may initiate a vote of confidence at any time. There are two

types of votes: a vote of confidence and a vote of no confidence. Only the

government may initiate the confidence vote. The cabinet may attach the vote of

confidence to the vote on a government’s proposal, being it a legislation or

international treaty. This procedure was used only twice. First, in 2008, when

the government led by Mr. Fico attached the confidence vote to the 2009 budget

bill. The vote was used as a public demonstration of unity of coalition parties and

preempted a motion by opposition MPs that called for vote of no confidence few

days later. In the second case, the confidence vote was initiated by the PM

Radičová in October 2011 and attached to the vote on EU treaty that established

European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It was used as an (unsuccessful)

pressure instrument on junior coalition party SAS that refused to support EFSF.

The government lost the confidence vote and the parliament subsequently

agreed on early elections in March 2012. The second, successful vote on EFSF

was held a few days later, with the main opposition party SMER providing its

MPs to support the treaty.

TABLE 7 HERE: Investiture, confidence and no confidence votes, 1994-‐2012

The no confidence vote may be initiated by at least one-‐fifth of members of the

parliament. The MPs may request a special session of the parliament to be

convened within seven days, if no such request is made; the Speaker is obliged to

call a session to debate the motion not later than thirty days after such request.

The no confidence vote may be initiated against an individual cabinet member,

or against the Prime Minister. In the latter case, the dismissal of the Prime

Minister results in the removal of the government as a whole. As Table 7 shows,

after 1994 none of the votes resulted in the removal of the cabinet, or its

individual members. Not that there was no turnover in the government

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composition. Rather than risking a situation, in which opposition parties

somehow manage to get enough support for no confidence vote, the coalition

pre-‐empts it with the removal of the minister, or, more often, waits after the

opposition motion fails and removes a minister on its own terms. To a large

extent it is a perception game. Exclusively opposition parties initiate no

confidence votes. As it is not a problem to get enough MPs support for calling a

session, the opposition traditionally uses no confidence vote as a PR event.

Coalition parties counter-‐react with procedural measures at their disposal to

weaken the media appeal of special session. The Speaker may, as often does,

convene a special session for late evening, thus preventing most of the coverage

of the discussion for the media cycle. Another measure, used more sporadically,

is the boycott of the session by the majority, which effectively prevents to open

the floor debate. The RoP define this votes as a public, however, if proposed by

an MP, a no confidence vote may be secret. This motion was used often between

1994 to 1998, after that all votes were taken publicly.

Other instruments for the control of the government

The constitution provides other mechanisms to control the cabinet. All of them,

interpellation, question time and initiatives17 or observations allow MPs to

demand answers from the PM and cabinet members. The parliament, a

committee or an MP may initiate an interpellation. The parliament may demand

from the cabinet the submission of reports on issues within cabinet’s powers;

reports shall be produced within thirty days. The committees may request

reports to be submitted by the members of the cabinet, these reports are to be

delivered to these committees within thirty days. Finally, an MP may interpellate

a cabinet member; in that case it is to be submitted in writing to the Speaker who

refers it to the cabinet member, to the Prime Minister, and to the PPGs. A written

17 During the committees sessions an MP may submit initiatives or observations to cabinet on matters within their powers. If the initiatives or observations have not been explained during the debate in a committee, the chairperson of the committee will refer the matter to the appropriate member of the cabinet requiring her to provide notification within thirty days of the measures taken on their basis. The MP will be informed about these measures at the next committee meeting.

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response is to be submitted to the MP and the Speaker within thirty days.

TABLE 8 HERE: Interpellations, 2002-‐2012

A Question Time of one hour is included in the agenda of each session of the

parliament, during which the first 15 minutes are reserved for the PM and the

rest for cabinet members. The questions have to be submitted by the MPs before

12 a.m. of the day preceding the Question Time. A lot determines which

questions are asked during session. If the question is not answered immediately

during the Question Time it has to be answered in writing within 30 days. During

the committees sessions an MP may submit initiatives or observations to cabinet

on matters within their powers. If the initiatives or observations have not been

explained during the debate in a committee, the chairperson of the committee

will refer the matter to the appropriate member of the cabinet requiring her to

provide notification within thirty days of the measures taken on their basis. The

MP will be informed about these measures at the next committee meeting.

Table 9 HERE: Parliamentary Questions, 2002-‐2012

Some of the information provided by the cabinet to the MPs may be of

importance, in cases when cabinet for example refuses to grant the access to

information to citizens; it has to answer to MPs’ requests. The overall impact of

both mechanisms on the ability of the parliament to control the cabinet is

limited. Furthermore, controlling nature of these mechanisms is diminished by

their actual use. As tables 8 and 9 show, coalition parties, at least some of them,

are as interested in the governmental business as opposition parties are. For

example, the largest coalition PPG in 2006-‐2010 term, SMER, over-‐flooded the

question time with their own questions, effectively decreasing chances of

opposition questions being asked.

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4. Opposition Rights outside Parliament: Referendum and Constitutional

review

The previous section analysed rights of opposition that are literally confined to

the buildings of the parliament. The following section presents two additional

instruments, referendum and constitutional review that are used by opposition

parties to counterbalance coalition parties and their dominance in the

parliament.

Referendum

Beside the obligatory referendum that must be held on country’s entry into a

state union [Art. 93.1], a referendum may be held on an important issue of

public interest, with budgetary questions, taxes and basic human rights and

freedoms being excluded [Art. 93.2.]. It can be initiated either through a

request tabled and approved by members of parliament, or through a public

petition supported by the signatures of at least 350,000 Slovak citizens. The

result of a referendum is only valid if more than 50 percent of eligible voters

take part. As Láštic (2011) argued in his book on referendum in Slovakia, the

referendum device was successfully used by political parties, especially

opposition, and allowed them either to leave parliamentary confines and

traditional parliamentary procedures by moving policy and political conflicts

in front of the voters (1997, 2000, 2004), or by providing an ideal

communication platform for newly established parties to strengthen their

electoral support (1994, 2010).

TABLE 10 HERE, REFERENDUM

1997 Referendum

In December 1996, fearing a political crisis that would arise if the President

could not be elected in 1998 by a polarised parliament, opposition parties

initiated a petition calling for a referendum proposing direct presidential

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elections.18 The coalition parties opposed the referendum initiative and

argued that the possibility of amending the constitution by a referendum was

not explicitly provided by the constitution.19 Coalition partied did not restrict

their criticism to mere legalese, but countered the opposition’s initiative by

their own. In January 1997 coalition parties in the parliament introduced and

passed the resolution that asked the President to call a referendum on NATO

membership, nuclear weapons and military bases. The opposition initiative

for direct presidential elections collected more than 521,000 signatures, and

President Kováč decided to join both referendums and called for one

referendum for May 1997, with four questions on the ballot. The merging of

both referendums into one increased political tensions between President

Kováč and Prime Minister Mečiar. Both sides appealed to the Constitutional

Court to interpret the constitutional articles on the referendum. Two

problems were to be decided. First, whether it was possible to merge the

referendum petition and the parliamentary resolution into one referendum.

Second, whether the constitution could be amended by a referendum. The

constitutional court, caught in the middle of the conflict, refused both the

motions of the Government and the President for procedural reasons,

however, did rule on a third motion submitted by the group of coalition MPs.

In May 1997, just a few days before the referendum vote was to take place,

the court ruled that the referendum on direct presidential elections was legal

and that a change to the Constitution could be the subject of a referendum.

However, the court added that it was not possible to amend the constitution

18 In the case of parliament failing to elect a President, the 1992 Constitution had stipulated a shift of certain presidential powers to the cabinet. However, since the powers of dissolving parliament, promulgating laws, and appointing the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers and other principal officers had not been transferred to the cabinet by the 1992 constitution, the opposition feared that the situation would create a serious constitutional turmoil. 19 The opposition based its initiative on the provisions of Article 2 of the constitution, according to which state power derives from the citizens, who execute it either through their elected representatives or directly. Another constitutional article that favoured the referendum initiative was Article 93.3, which restricted the use of the referendum only in the case of basic rights and freedoms, taxes, levies, and the state budget.

18

18

directly merely based on the outcome of the vote. In it’s reasoning, the court

explained that the result of referendum amending the constitution creates

only a recommendation to the parliament. The confusing decision of the

court, with its concept of “recommendation”, contradicted the concept of free

mandate as defined by the constitution. Both coalition and opposition parties

described the Court’s decision as their victory. The government seized the

opportunity, provided by the Court’s unclear decision, and dropped the

question on direct presidential elections from the ballot and subsequently

distributed a ballot with only three questions proposed by coalition PPGs.

The majority of the voters refused to vote, when presented with a ballot with

only three questions. On 26 May 1997, the Central Referendum Commission

announced that the referendum was marred and the vote was invalid.

According to the Commission, the referendum did not comply with the rules,

because four questions should have been included on the ballots.

2000 and 2004 Referendums as No confidence votes

Two of the referendums of 2000 and 2004, both initiated by then largest

opposition parties, were seeking dissolution of the parliament and early

parliamentary elections. Using an unclear provision in the constitution, which

provides for referendum on important issues of public matters, they

promoted referendum as a de facto no confidence vote on the government.

In April 2000, the promoters had gathered more than 700,000 signatures for

the petition calling for the referendum on early elections to the parliament.

The organisers had then waited four more months before finally submitting

the petition to the president, clearly to avoid a summer date for the vote. The

vote took place on November 11 and the referendum was invalid, with a

turnout of only 20%. Despite the failure of the vote the opposition managed

to get a significant media attention through 200020 and forced coalition

parties to postpone the introduction of a major constitutional amendment.

In the fall of 2004 largest opposition party SMER, supported by the Trade

20 See Láštic, 2011. The referendum became most covered topic in Slovak media in 2000.

19

Union Confederation (KOZ), used the same strategy. The promoters gathered

more than half-‐million signatures and asked for a referendum to end the term

of centre-‐right coalition that had taken office in September 2002. President R.

Schuster, who was seeking re-‐election in presidential elections scheduled for

April 2004, and who was then a bitter opponent of the centre-‐right coalition,

called the referendum on the same day as the first round of the presidential

elections. The ruling coalition had to communicate a rather difficult message

to their supporters: Do not take part in the referendum vote; but do turn out

to vote for our presidential candidate. The referendum was invalid due to a

low turnout, yet the opposition managed to get its two candidates into the

second round of the presidential contest.21

Opposition MPs before Constitutional Court

A possibility to challenge a legislation approved by the parliament before the

Constitutional Court (CC) is given to several institutional actors by the 1992

constitution. A group of at least 30 MPs (out of 150) may bring a petition to the

CC and ask for an ex-‐post constitutional review. As a TABLE 11 shows, members

of parliament are the most active in asking the CC for review of law22. Moreover,

an analysis of individual cases shows that it is the opposition that is using a

review to influence policies of the coalition. There are distinct differences in the

use of the review by the opposition. First has to do with the 2001 constitutional

amendment, which allowed the CC to suspend legislation under the review until

the final decision is declared. In other words, the group of opposition MPs may

challenge the law that was recently passed by the parliament and also ask the

Court for a temporary injunction that suspends effectivity of the legislation

under review pending the final verdict.

21 The coalition candidate, E. Kukan, who was favoured by all public polls, fell short in first round by a few hundreds votes. 22 In the first period, 1993-‐06/2001, total of 67 motions for review were filled by eligible subjects. The President submitted 7, the government 2, MPs 37, Attorney General 12 and general courts 9 motions. In the second period, after the introduction of temporary injunction (07/2001-‐2012) the President submitted 4, the government 2, MPs 44, Attorney General 37, general courts 43 and the ombudsman 1 motion.

20

20

TABLE 11 HERE: Constitutional Review, 1993-‐2012

Therefore, there are two distinct periods of the use of constitutional review by

the opposition parties. Between 1993 and 2001, when a temporary injunction

was not possible, the legislation remained effective until the final verdict was

issued by the CC. As the average length of the review was around 18 months, the

use of review by opposition parties was more a symbolic challenge to the

legislation approved by the majority. This is especially the case during the

Mečiar’s government (1994-‐1998), when the majority approved several laws,

especially in economic area, that were challenged by opposition parties and later

declared as unconstitutional. In the meantime, the government implemented

legislation and made irrevocable decisions in economy, i.e. privatisation. Due to

the nature of majority-‐minority relations however, the constitutional review

remained one of the few powers accessible to the opposition in 1994-‐98.

The introduction of temporary injunction in 2001 increased importance of the

constitutional review and its use by opposition parties. As the review of the cases

after 2001 shows, however, the Constitutional Court is hesitant to use temporary

injunction and in a significant number of cases opposition MPs did not even ask

for it. It is also visible from the case list, that opposition parties use the

constitutional review to pinpoint legislation that is connected to flagship

initiatives of coalition parties. Between 2002 and 2006, it was series of motions

by the opposition that challenged healthcare reform of the government. In 2006

and 2010 opposition parties challenged two bills that were widely publicised by

the government. In the first case, the Constitutional Court reviewed legislation

proposed by Mr. Fico’s government that amended highway construction

legislation and permitted the state to begin building highways on privately

owned land before the land expropriation process was completed. The

opposition in 2008 challenged the law, but the CC refused to grant a temporary

injunction, causing significant criticism by media, prominent lawyers and NGO’s.

The media reports also alleged in 2010 that the CC deliberately postponed its

final ruling after the parliamentary election in June 2010, in order not to

21

influence the elections.23 When the Court published its decision in January 2011,

in which it ruled 10 to 2 that the law was unconstitutional, it faced a substantial

criticism for length of the review, which took almost three years to decide and

another few months after that to produce a written ruling. The second case

involved a legislation passed in 2007 that prohibited private health insurers

from paying dividends to their shareholders or deciding what to do with their

profits. The law was challenged by the opposition and, as in the case of

“expropriation” law, the Constitutional court decided after the parliamentary

election in January 2011, again in favour of the opposition.

Overall, constitutional review option is used most frequently by the MPs, and in

the most of the cases by opposition. While in 1994-‐1998 period the review was a

Hail Mary option for the opposition to counteract the coalition24, after 1998 it is

used more strategically to challenge legislation that is considered to be

important by the coalition.

5. Conclusion

Previous sections provided an account of opposition rights and their real life use

23 SME www.sme.sk/c/5257195/ustavny-‐sud-‐chce-‐o-‐vyvlastnovani-‐rozhodnut-‐az-‐po-‐volbach.html , 24/2/2010, [Accessed on 17/11/2011]. 24 This is the case even after the change of the government. See for example the Special Court decision, in which legislation that established the Special Court and was introduced by the government of Mr. Dzurinda in 2004 was challenged before the court in 2008 by the MPs that represented a new coalition led by Prime Minister Mr. Fico. The ruling declared Special Court unconstitutional. The decision of the Court was subjected to a substantial criticism, not only by a minority, who wrote a dissenting opinion, but also opposition, media and NGO. The parliament subsequently adopted a new law that addressed the Constitutional Court's reasoning for declaring the Special Court unconstitutional. See for example: Dissenting Opinion by the Constitutional Court, 20/5/2009, available at: http://www.concourt.sk/rozhod.do?urlpage=dokument&id_spisu=320442 [Accessed on 17/11/2011]; SME, Špeciálny súd zrušili. Mafia oslavuje.(Special Court Is Abolished. The Mafia Celebrates.) 21/5/2009, available at: http://www.sme.sk/c/4851429/specialny-‐sud-‐zrusili-‐mafia-‐oslavuje.html [Accessed on 17/11/2011];

22

22

in political system. The nature of opposition is determined by the nature of the

executive-‐legislative relations, which are dominantly influenced by the inter-‐

party mode of relations. The political parties are the key source of opposition in

what is essentially regular parliamentary system of government (Kopecký-‐

Spirova, 2008:154). Due to the prevalence of the inter-‐party mode, actual powers

of opposition parties are influenced by the strength of the party discipline of

coalition parties and their cohesiveness, especially in legislative area. From

1994, opposition parties were unable to bring down ministers or whole

governments through no confidence vote. The only time this happened, the

wound was self-‐inflicted when the government of Mrs. Radičová asked for

confidence vote and was brought down by the internal conflict. In this case the

role of opposition parties was reduced to provide the government with “enough

rope to hang itself with” (Birch, 1991:131).

As the data showed, despite some variance between the levels of PPGs unity,

coalition parties’ support for governmental legislation remained strong over

time, with little influence of the changing nature of majority. A case of second

Dzurinda government (2002-‐2006) during which coalition parties lost absolute

majority in the parliament provides an interesting topic for further investigation.

That is of the role and the influence of unaffiliated MPs in the executive-‐

legislative relations and between coalition and opposition. What do we know

about their voting behaviour, how are they influenced by their former affiliations

and to what incentives they react when asked for voting support?

As part 4 showed, opposition rights outside the parliament may be of more use

to opposition in counterbalancing coalition parties. Sometimes these rights are

the only way how opposition parties may (symbolically) influence anything (as

1994-‐1998 term proves), other time they provide opportunities to challenge

government’s policies outside the parliament.

The partial and wholesale alternations of the governments in Slovakia, with

exception of 2002-‐06 term, also suggest that opposition parties are “in it

together”. Opposition parties from 1994 and 1998 term formed a government

after winning elections in 1998. Two largest opposition parties from 2002 and

2006, SMER and HZDS, formed, together with SNS, the government in 2006.

23

While in the government, SMER, managed to monopolise its position on centre-‐

left, and in 2010 elections sent once omnipotent HZDS of Mr. Mečiar to the

history, while at the same squeezed substantial number of voters from SNS, main

nationalistic party. The same party also managed to spend two different

legislative terms in the opposition, maintaining 100% party discipline, and came

back victorious back to the government. The last, 2012 comeback of SMER

translated into a single party government with an 83 majority. On the other

hand, a bloc of centre-‐right parties that governed between 1998 and 2006, and

2010-‐12 is unstable. There is no dominant party on centre-‐right, and the core of

the three parties that formed three governments (1998-‐02, 2002-‐06 and 2010-‐

12) had to be supported every time by a new party that entered the parliament

from outside (SOP in 1998, ANO in 2002, SAS in 2010). In comparison with

SMER, the centre-‐right parties had more difficult time to keep their MPs

disciplined (whether in government or in opposition).

The parliamentary system of Slovakia produced so far clear majorities and

minorities. All majorities behaved cohesively in support of government’s

legislation and managed to sustain their position even if challenged with non-‐

confidence vote by opposition parties. Despite multiple amendments of RoP

rights of opposition parties were mostly left intact. Other contextual changes

increased powers of opposition parties over time, especially the option for

temporary injunction and the introduction of free access to information, that

provided “oxygen of publicity” that is used not only by the media and NGO, but

by opposition parties.

The nature of coalition-‐opposition relations also changed dramatically over time.

From winner takes all approach of 1994-‐1998 coalition, that reduced

parliamentary presence of opposition parties to bare minimum, best signified by

the transfer of opposition MPs to the parliamentary committee for environment

and no chair position for opposition parties, the distribution of the posts in the

parliament is more reflective of the majority/minority ratio, even if coalition

parties use traditionally double membership to ensure they achieve majority in

committees.

24

24

6. References

Binder, Sarah A. (1997): Minority Rights, Majority Rule. Partisanship and the Development of Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Birch,A. (1991): The British System of Government. London: HarperCollins, 8th edn. Chovancová, K., Láštic, E. (2012) Institutional Adaptation of Slovak Parliament: Rules of Procedure and their amendments. Bratislava, unpublished manuscript. Deegan-‐Krause, K. (2012): 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia: The Building Blocs of Success. Available at: http://www.pozorblog.com/2012/03/2012-‐parliamentary-‐elections-‐in-‐slovakia-‐the-‐building-‐blocs-‐of-‐success/ Dion, Douglas (1997): Turning the Legislative Thumbscrew. Minority Rights and Procedural Change in Legislative Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Goetz, K., Meyer-‐Sahling, J.M. (2008): The Europeanisation of National Political Systems: Parliaments and Executives, in: Living Reviews in European Governance 3, http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-‐2008-‐2 Helms, L. (2004): Five Ways of Institutionalising Political Opposition: Lessons from the Advanced Democracies’, Government and Opposition, 39 (2004), pp.22–54. Kam, Ch. (2009): Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. King, A. (1976): Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (1976), p.11. Kopecky, P., Spirova, M. (2008): Parliamentary Opposition in Post-‐Communist Democracies: Power of the Powerless’. Journal of Legislative Studies. 14(1/2): 133-‐159. Koß, Michael, The Evolution of Parliamentary Minority Rights in Western Europe (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1900860 Muller-‐Rommel, F., Fettelschoss K., Harfst P. (2004): Party Government in Central European Democracies: A Data Collection (1990-‐2003). European Journal of Political Research 43:869–93. Müller, W.C. (2000): Political parties in parliamentary democracies; Making delegation and accountability work. European Journal of Political Research 37: 309-‐333. Müller, W.C.-‐ Bergman, T.-‐ Strom, K.(2003): Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems. In Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, edited by K. Strom, W. C. Müller and T. Bergman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Olson, D. M., Norton, P. (2007): Post-‐Communist and Post-‐Soviet Parliaments: Divergent Paths from Transition’. Journal of Legislative Studies, 13(1). Olson, D.M., Norton, P. (1996): The New Parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe’, special Issue of Journal of Legislative Studies, 2(1) 1996. R.B. Andeweg, R.B., Nijzink,L. (1995): “eyond the Two Body Image: Relations between Ministers and MPs’, in H. Doring (ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in

25

Western Europe (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1995), pp.152–78. Russo, F., Wiberg, M. (2010): Parliamentary Questioning in 17 European Parliaments: Some Steps towards Comparison, in: Journal of Legislative Studies 16: 215-‐32. Rybář, M. (2006): Powered by the State: The Role of Public Resources in Party-‐Building in Slovakia. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2006, pp. 320-‐340. Rybář, M.(2004): Organizácia nových politických strán na Slovensku: Niekoľko úvah o vnútrostraníckom živote SDKÚ, ANO a Smeru” [‘Organization of New Political Parties in Slovakia: Contemplations on Intraparty Mechanisms of the SDKÚ, ANO and Smer’] in Rybář, Marek (ed.): Politické stranpy ako organizácie: Prípady zo Slovenska [Political Parties as Organizations: Case Studies from Slovakia], Bratislava: Katedra politológie FF UK. Sieberer, U. (2006): Agenda Setting in the German Bundestag. A Weak Government in a Consensus Democracy, in: German Politics 15: 49-‐72. Sieberer, U. (2006): Party unity in parliamentary democracies. A comparative analysis. Journal of Legislative Studies, 2006: 12, number 2, p. 150-‐178. Sieberer, U., Müller, W.C., Heller, M. (2010): Reforming the Rules of the Parliamentary Game: Measuring and Explaining Changes in Parliamentary Rules in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, 1945-‐2010, Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft, Sektionstagung Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Duisburg, 20-‐22 September. Somer-‐Topcu, Z., Laron W. (2008): Survival of the Fittest? Cabinet Duration in Post-‐Communist Europe. Comparative Politics 40:313–329. Tsebelis, George (1990): Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zubek, R. (2011): Negative Agenda Control and Executive-‐Legislative Relations in East Central Europe, 1997-‐2008, Journal of Legislative Studies 17: 172-‐93.

Table 1: Governments and Opposition in Slovakia, 1994-2012

Government Period and Prime Minister

Parties in Government and Number of Seats, out of 150

Seats No. of parties

Parties in Opposition Seats, total

No. of parties

1994-1998 Mečiar (HZDS) HZDS 61, SNS 9, ZRS 13 83 3 KDH 17, DU 15, SDL 18, SMK 17 67 4

1998- 2002 Dzurinda (SDK)

SDK 42, SDL 23, SMK 15, SOP 13

93 4 HZDS 43, SNS 14 57 2

2002-2006 Dzurinda (SDKU)

SDKU 28, KDH 15, SMK 20, ANO 15

78 4 HZDS 36, SMER 25, KSS 11 72 3

2006-2010 Fico (SMER) SMER 50, SNS 20, HZDS 15 85 3 SDKU 31, KDH 14, SMK, 20 65 3

2010-2012 Radičová (SDKU)

SDKU 28, SAS 22, KDH 15, MOST 14

79 4 SMER 62, SNS 9 71 2

2012-? Fico (SMER) SMER 83 83 1 SDKU 11, KDH 16, SAS 11, MOST 13, OLaNO 16

67 5

Table 2: Parliamentary party groups, 1994-2012

PPG 1994 1998 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 2012 2012

Term I.term II.term III.ter

m IV.term V.

term VI. term

grey indicates PPG's in GOV

HZDS 61 61 43 43 43 43 37 36 26 26 22 22 15 16 15 15 15

SNS 9 9 14 14 13 13 - 20 19 19 19 18 9 7 7

ZRS 13 12

KDH 17 16 - - - 9 9 15 15 15 15 15 14 13 9 9 9 15 14 14 16

SMK 17 17 15 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 15

DU 15 13

SDĽ 18 18 23 22 22 21 18

SDK 42 42 28 24 25

PSNS - - - - 8

SOP 13 13 12 16 8

SDKU 28 21 22 23 22 31 31 28 28 28 28 28 28 11

SMER 25 25 25 27 27 50 50 50 50 50 62 62 62 83

KSS 11 10 9 9 9

ANO 15 12 12 10 9

SaS 22 18 18 11

MOST 14 14 14 13

OLaNO 16

Independ - 10 - - -

Unaffil. - 4 1 17 9 30 - 11 21 24 25 - 1 9 14 15 7 7

Coalition/Opposition 83/67 82/64 93/57 92/57 77/56 85/56 75/45 78/72 68/61 69/60 68/58 67/58 85/65 85/64 84/57 85/52 84/52 79/71 74/69 74/69 83/67

- grey indicates coalition PPG

TABLE 3: Coalition and opposition and government's bills, 1998-2010 1998-2002, 415 out of 448 2002-2006, 487 out of 546 2006-2010, 442 out of 479

Coalition PPGs GOV bills,

votes Relative/ Absolute GOV bills,

votes Relative/Absolute GOV bills,

votes Relative/ Absolute

YES 70.96 94.04% / 79.51% 77.54 99.02% / 92.09% 66.94 97.67% / 94.27% NO 0.15 0.31 ABSTAINED 0.4 0.94 DID NOT VOTE 0.21 0.35 PRESENT 75.46 78.3 68.54 ABSENT 5.9 2.47 TOTAL 89.25 84.2 71.01 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010

Opposition PPGs GOV bills,

votes Relative/ Absolute GOV bills,

votes Relative/Absolute GOV bills,

votes Relative/ Absolute

YES 15.93 60.23% / 24.78% 21.83 45.12% / 36.10% 9.61 21.32% / 17.57% NO 13.26 9.52 ABSTAINED 12.92 25.5 DID NOT VOTE 0.37 0.44 PRESENT 26.45 48.38 45.07 ABSENT 12.09 9.61 TOTAL 64.29 60.47 54.68

TABLE 4: Rules of procedure and their amendments, 1996-2012 Legislative Term 1994-1998 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010

2010-2012

77/1998 Z.z.

86/2000 Z.z.

100/2003 Z.z.

199/2007 Z.z.

153/2011 Z.z.

138/2002 Z.z.

551/2003 Z.z.

38/2010 Z.z.

191/2011 Z.z.

215/2004 Z.z.

187/2011 Z.z.

360/2004 Z.z.

237/2011 Z.z.

253/2005 Z.z.

69/2012 Z.z.

320/2005 Z.z.

79/2012 Z.z.

261/2006 Z.z.

Number of amendments 1 2 7 2 6

TABLE 5: Distribution of parliamentary offices, 1994-2012 Legislative Term I.term II.term III.term IV.term V.term grey indicates coalition 1994-98 1998-2002 2002-2006 2006-2010 2010-2012 Chair HZDS SDL KDH SMER SAS Vice-Chair, COA/OPP 3.0/0 3.00/1.00 3.00/1.00 3.00/1.0 3.00/1 Committees, COA/OPO, TOTAL 14.00/0; 14 16.00/3.00; 19 11/8; 19 12/7; 19 10/9; 19 Constitutional, ratio 10.00/5.00, 15 13/4, 17 9.00/8.00; 17 13/5, 18 7/6,13 Constitutional HZDS SDL ANO SMER KDH Mandates and Immunity ZRS SDL ANO SMER MOST Incompatibility of Offices SNS SMER SMK SMER European Integration SDK SMER HZDS SDKU Finance HZDS SMK SMK SMER SAS Industry, transportation HZDS SDK SDKU SMER SDKU Agriculture HZDS SOP HZDS SNS KDH Public Administration and Regional Dev. HZDS SOP SDKU HZDS SMER Social Affairs SMK KDH HZDS KDH Healthcare ZRS SDK KDH SDKU SDKU Defence and Security HZDS SDK SMER SNS SDKU Foreign Affairs HZDS SDĽ KDH SMER MOST Education, Youth and Science SNS SDK SDKU SDKU SMER Environment HZDS, 3/16.00 SDK KSS Culture and Media SDK - KDH SMER Human Rights and Minorities SMK SMK SMK SNS Special committee, SIS (Slovak Secret Service) HZDS, 5/0 SNS HZDS SDKU SMER Committee for overview of surveillance techniques - - SDKU - Special committee, NBU (National Security Authority) - - SMER SNS SMER Appellate committee for review of NBU's decision - - - SMER SMER Special Committee, VOS (Army Defence Service) HZDS, 5/0 HZDS HZDS KDH SMER

TABLE 6: Opposition and legislative initiative, 1998-2010

Term,&approved&out&of&TOTAL

Coalition&PPGs OPP&bills,&votes Relative/&AbsoluteOPP&bills,&votes Relative/Absolute

OPP&bills,&votes Relative/&Absolute

YES 52,17 71.18%,/,57.97% 22,17 33.46%,/,31.92% 6,16 8.02%,/,7.33%NO 15,22 29,23ABSTAINED 26,49 40,68DID,NOT,VOTE 2,37 0,66PRESENT 73,29 66,25 76,73ABSENT 3,2 7,23TOTAL 90 69,45 83,96

Opposition&PPGs OPP&bills,&votes Relative/&AbsoluteOPP&bills,&votes Relative/Absolute

OPP&bills,&votes Relative/&Absolute

YES 16,93 51.4%/26.41% 38,91 78.18%,/,65.37% 44,48 86.52%/,76.6%NO 5,61 2,92ABSTAINED 4,91 3,33DID,NOT,VOTE 0,34 0,68PRESENT 32,94 49,77 51,41ABSENT 9,75 6,66TOTAL 64,1 59,52 58,07

1998B2002,&5&out&of&26 2002B2006,&20&out&of&132 2006B2010,&2&out&of&257

1998B2002,&5&out&of&26 2002B2006,&20&out&of&132 2006B2010,&2&out&of&257

TABLE 7: Investiture, confidence and non-confidence votes, 1994-2012

Cabinet Investiture

vote

No confidence

vote against PM

Initiated by

No-confidence vote cabinet

memb. Iniated

by For/against No.of Votes Removed No.of votes Removed

V.Mečiar, 1994 - 1998 83/67 0 No 5+2 OPP ?** M. Dzurinda, 1998 -

2002 93/57 3 OPP No 13 OPP No M.Dzurinda II, 2002 –

2006 78/72 1 OPP No 8 OPP No R. Fico, 2006 - 2010 85/65 1+1 OPP+PM No 9 OPP No I.Radičová, 2010-12 79/66 1+1 OPP+PM No/Yes 0

* Vote of confidence initiated by the cabinet in 2007, ** The newly elected parliament removed two cabinet members, although the cabinet already resigned and, as constitutionally obliged, remained in the office until the president appointed a new cabinet

TABLE 8: Interpellations, 2002-2012 Parliamentary Interpellations 2002 200

3 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 201

2

III.term IV.term V.

term

grey indicates coalition PPG's

HZDS 11 33 46 10 22 39 12 12 SNS 0 6 1 2 5 ZRS KDH 0 0 0 0 2 65 41 29 42 SMK 1 0 7 0 2 40 57 40 DU SDĽ SDK

PSNS SOP

SDKU 3 2 1 0 6 37 56 25 13 SMER 26 31 34 5 1 2 0 1 77 KSS 45 36 33 2 ANO 17 1 2 0 SaS 1

MOST 14 OLaNO

Independ 13 4 Unaffil. 6 6 1 1 1 0

TOTAL/To PM 116/25 113/16 129/12 33/2 168/1

6 110/9

TABLE 9: Parliamentary questions, 2002-2012 Parliamentary+Questions

No.$of$PQ$hoursgrey$indicates$PPG's$in$GOV

HZDSSNSZRSKDHSMKDUSDĽSDKPSNSSOPSDKUSMERKSSANOSaS

MOSTOLaNOIndependUnaffil.

Total/AnsweredTo$PM/answered

COALITION/OPPOSITION,$in%

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2011 2012III.term IV.term V.$term

15 11 2 4 14 17 12

116 76 7 11 57 15 110 10 3 5

49 26 2 20 222 118 542 6 2 39 322 244 161

55 51 4 149 459 184 95133 47 11 160 682 530 270125 31 09 0 0

016 14 1 25 13

505/152 251/91 27/24 379/39 1752/112 1119 609/109130/39 65/21 6?/6answ 154/10 748/22 538 252/1823/74 33/61 42.75%/57.25% 48.97%/51.03% 46.96%/53.04%

16

174/463,$počet

27

20

326473

9910

955/154452/31

455/500počet

2051600

20

637/159168/45

78

1048

62

TABLE 10: Referendum in Slovakia, 1993-2012 Date Subject Request/organized Turnout Yes No Result

22.10.1994 Retrospective disclosure of the financial transactions regarding privatizations and auctions

Resolution of the parliament/introduced by MP

19.96 93.64 3.97 Not valid

24.5.1997 1.Creating military bases

2.NATO membership

3. Stationing nuclear weaponry

4. Direct presidential elections

Resolution of the parliament/ petition organized by the block of the opposition parties (Q. 4)

Undeclared

Not valid

26-27.9.1998 No privatizations of strategically important enterprises

Petition; organized by coalition party, HZDS

44.06 84.30 15.70 Not valid

11.11.2000 Early Elections Petition; organized by leading opposition party HZDS

20.03 92.75 4.81 Not valid

16-17.5.2003 EU Membership Resolution of the parliament (unanimous)

52.15 92.46 6.20 Valid

3.4.2004 Early elections Petition; organized by Confederation of Trade Unions and leading opposition party SMER

35.86 86.78 11.93 Not valid

18.9.2010 Abolishment of TV fees; immunity; decrease of num. of MPs; public procurement limits for cars; E-voting; abolishment of right to reply

Petition, organized by extra-parliamentary party SAS

22.84 84.94 9.4 Not Valid

TABLE 11: Constitutional review, Opposition and Coalition, 1993-2012, decided cases Constitutional*Review,*petitions*by*MPs,*decided 1994:98 1998:02 2002:06 2006:10 2010:12Total*number*of*petitions/Succesfull*petitions/Temporary*Injunction*granted 24/18/& 14/7/1 19/4/1.00 13/7/1 2/0/0.00OPPOSITION*MPs 23/18/& 6/2/0.00 13/3/0.00 11/6/1.00 2/0/0.00COALITION*MPs 0/1/& 5/3/0.00 0/0/0 2/1/0.00 0/0/0COALITION&OPPOSITION*MPs 1/0/& 3/2/1.00 6/1/1.00 0/0/0 0/0/0

Appendix 2: Voting blocs in parliamentary elections, 1990-2012

Source: http://www.pozorblog.com/2012/03/2012-parliamentary-elections-in-slovakia-the-building-blocs-of-success/

Appendix 1: Party Tree, Slovakia 1990-2010,

Opposition's Labour's Lost? Minority Rights in Slovakia, 1994-2012

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