Operational Resilience Analysis and Capacity Building in ......Operational Resilience Analysis and Capacity Building in the US Virgin Islands David L.Alderson, PhD Associate Professor,

OperationalResilienceAnalysisandCapacityBuildingintheUSVirginIslands

DavidL. Alderson,PhDAssociateProfessor,OperationsResearchDepartment

Director,CenterforInfrastructureDefenseNavalPostgraduateSchool

Workshop:FundamentalsofMicrogrid AnalysisandDesignSandiaNationalLaboratories&UniversityoftheVirginIslands

St.CroixCampus(24Oct2018)&St.ThomasCampus(26Oct2018)Unclassified.Distributionunlimited.Materialcontainedhereinrepresentsthesoleopinionoftheauthoranddoes

notnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseoritscomponents.

NavalPostgraduateSchool(NPS)America'snationalsecurityresearchuniversity

HistoryHighlights1909 Founded at U.S. Naval Academy

1951 Moved to Monterey, CA Operations Research Curriculum

• Facilitiesofagraduateresearchuniversity

• FacultywhoworkfortheU.S.Navy,withclearances

• Studentswithfreshoperationalexperience

FY2017:• 65M.S.and15Ph.D.programs• 612faculty• 1432residentstudentsincludes

(166international/47countries)• 909distributedlearningstudents

• OperationsResearch(OR)isthescienceofhelpingpeopleandorganizationsmakebetterdecisionsusing– mathematicalmodels,statisticalanalyses,simulations– analyticalreasoningandcommonsensetotheunderstandingandimprovementofreal-worldoperations.

• ORoriginatedduringWorldWarII.ThemilitaryusesORatthestrategic,operational,andtacticallevels.

• BiggestusersofOR:moderncorporations– Supplychainlogistics– Manufacturingandproductionplanning– Scheduling

• NPShastheoldestORinstructionalprogramintheU.S.

OperationsResearchatNPS

3

NPSCenterforInfrastructureDefense(CID)OperationsResearchDepartment

DavidAldersonAssociateProfessor,ORDirector,NPSCenterfor

InfrastructureDefensePh.D.,StanfordUniversity,

2003

GeraldBrownDistinguishedEmeritus

Professor,ORMember,NationalAcademy

ofEngineeringPh.D.,U.C.L.A.,1974

W.MatthewCarlyleProfessor&Chair,OR

Ph.D.,StanfordUniversity,1997

JavierSalmerónAssociateProfessor,OR

Ph.D.,UniversidadPolitécnica (Spain),1998

RobertDellProfessor,OR

Ph.D.,S.U.N.Y.Buffalo,1990

DanielEisenbergResearchAssistant

Professor,OR

Ph.D.,ArizonaStateUniversity,2018

DanNussbaumVisitingProfessor,ORChair,NPSEnergy

AcademicGroup

Ph.D.,MichiganStateUniv.,1971

4

AlanHowardDeputyDirector,NPSEnergyAcademicGroup

MBA/MIMinInternationalManagement,2000

NPSEnergyAcademicGroup(EAG)JackTempletonProgramManager,NPSEnergyAcademicGroup

MSMDefenseSystemsAnalysis,NPS,2013

WhatisCriticalInfrastructure?• CriticalInfrastructure(CI):“systemsandassets,whetherphysicalorvirtual,

sovitaltotheUnitedStatesthattheincapacityordestructionofsuchsystemsandassetswouldhaveadebilitatingimpactonsecurity,nationaleconomicsecurity,nationalpublichealthorsafety,oranycombinationofthosematters” --Section1016(e)oftheUSAPATRIOTActof2001

4

CriticalInfrastructureSystems:NPShasauniqueperspectiveandcapability

• Wehavebeenstudyingcriticalinfrastructurefordecades.

• Welookatourowndomesticinfrastructurethroughtheeyesofintelligentadversaries.

• Wehaveconductedover150“redteamanalyses”toplanattacksonourowninfrastructure(anddeterminehowtomounteffectivehardeninganddefensiveefforts)

5


GoalsForThisSession• 10keyideas forhowtoassessandimproveoperationalresilienceofcriticalinfrastructures

• OngoingworkinapplyingtheseideastotheUSVI




5

6

Idea#1:Startbyfocusingondeliveryofservices,not mitigationofhazards/threats

• Electricity• Fuels• Transportation• Communications• Water&Wastewater• Emergencyresponse

Whatweneedtodo(operation)

6



• ExtremeWeather– CoastalFlooding– RainfallFlooding– Wind– Drought

• Humanaccident• Technologicalfailure• Deliberateattack


Whatcangowrong(interdiction)

6







6


Idea#2:Avoidgettingstuckonpredefinedthreatscenarios.• SurpriseHappens.Thingswehavenotimagined.• Tunnelvision(onthelastdisaster).Needtobeproactive,notreactive.

“Wewillnotbeabletodeterallterroristthreats,anditisimpossibletodeterorpreventnaturalcatastrophes.Wecan,however,mitigatetheNation’svulnerabilitytoactsofterrorism,otherman-madethreats,andnaturaldisastersbyensuringthestructuralandoperationalresilienceofourcriticalinfrastructureandkeyresources”(p.27)

“Wemustnowfocusontheresilienceofthesystemasawhole– anapproachthatcentersoninvestmentsthatmakethesystembetterabletoabsorbtheimpactofaneventwithoutlosingthecapacitytofunction” (p.28)

U.S.NationalStrategyforHomelandSecurity(2007)

Apolicyshifttoward“operationalresilience”

Most recently: U.S. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013.

7

“systemasawhole”and“capacitytofunction”

8


• Alistofassets• Aninterconnected(network)system thatworkstoachieveaparticularfunction

HowtoThinkAboutCriticalInfrastructure(CI)

8



✖✔


8



✖✔

Wewanttomakeouroperations(publicandprivate)resilienttodisruptiveevents.

Weneedourinfrastructuresystemstocontinuetofunctionevenwhen“badthings”happen.


Idea#3:Weneedtothinkintermsofsystems.

8

• DODDirective3020.40:MissionAssurance(2016)

DODhasrecentlyreorganizeditseffortstoprotectdefense-relatedcriticalinfrastructureunderabroaderprogramofmissionassurance

• Keyrecognition

– Assets worktogetherassystems toprovidefunction

– Functionenablescapability

– Capabilitysupportsmission

• Focusneedstoremainontherelationshipbetweentheinfrastructureassetandthemissionsitsupports

Ashifttoward“operationalresilience”

Idea#3:Weneedtothinkintermsofsystems.






9






9

Idea#4:Resilienceisnotaboutwhatyouhave,itsaboutwhatyoudo!Thisisacommonmisperception.(Thinkofsafety asanotherconceptwiththisfeature…)

Idea#5:Takean”operational”perspective

11




11



Needtounderstandthedemandsofthepopulation• Demographics• Geography• Populationdensity• Specialneeds


11




Movegoods/servicesfromareasofsupplytodemands:• Mustincludeinfrastructure

ownersandoperators• Bothpublicand private!


11






Idea#6:Oftenrepresentedasflows throughnetworks.


11






Idea#6:Oftenrepresentedasflows throughnetworks.

Idea#7:Measure performance.Definemissionsuccess.

BUT…SystemsAreComplicated,SometimesComplex

• Interactionsoftennon-additiveandnon-intuitive.

• Aneventinonelocationcanoftenaffectthingsthatarefaraway,anditcanbehardtopredicthowthishappens.

• Thecontribution/importanceofasinglecomponenttosystemfunctionmaydependoninteractionswithothercomponents.

12

BUT…SystemsAreComplicated,SometimesComplex

• Interactionsoftennon-additiveandnon-intuitive.

• Aneventinonelocationcanoftenaffectthingsthatarefaraway,anditcanbehardtopredicthowthishappens.

• Thecontribution/importanceofasinglecomponenttosystemfunctionmaydependoninteractionswithothercomponents.

Idea#8:Guessingatwhatis“mostcritical”ispronetoerror

12

• Whendetermininghowbesttoprotectsystems,anaturalquestionis,“Whatcomponentsaremostcritical?”

• Betteryet:Whichcomponents,iflost,wouldbemostdisruptivetosystemfunction?

Definition:Acomponentiscritical iflosingitwouldsignificantlyreducesystemfunction(relativetothereductionfromlosingothercomponents).

Let’suseahistoricalexampletoillustrate…

Idea#8:Guessingatwhatis“mostcritical”ispronetoerror

13

TheRussianRailNetwork(circa1955)

DatafromFigure7of:Harris,T.E.,andRoss,F.S.(1955),FundamentalsofaMethodforEvaluatingRailNetCapacities(SECRET,

declassified1999),RM-1573,RANDCorp.

14

WhatisthecapacityoftheUSSRtodelivermaterieltoEuropeviarail?

14

2

52

3W 3E 2S

13N

12

ORIGIN

ORIGIN

originnodesdestinationnodes minimumcapacitycut

13SB

2

3

9

3

6


3025.04.2018- Alderson- NPS 14

2

52

3W 3E 2S

13N

12

ORIGIN

ORIGIN

originnodesdestinationnodes minimumcapacitycut

13SB

2

3

9

3

6


KeyInsight:Thecapacityofanetworkisequaltothesizeofthesmallestbottleneck.(a.k.a.“max-flow,min-cuttheorem”)

Butwhatarcsare“mostvital”?

25.04.2018- Alderson- NPS 14

Findingthe“MostVital”Arc(s)isnottrivial!• Itrequiresyoutoconsidernotonlythecurrentpathsthroughthenetworkbutalsoanyalternatepaths

• Because…thesystemcanadjustitsflowsinresponsetoadisruption!

15



Possible“guessingrules”fordeterminingwhatismostvital(Ahuja,Magnanti,andOrlin,“NetworkFlows”,Prentice-Hall,1993)

• Anarchavingthelargestcapacity• Anarccarryingthelargestflowintheoptimalsolution• Anarchavingthelargestcapacityinaminimum-capacitycut• Anymost-vitalarcisinsomeminimum-capacitycut

15



Possible“guessingrules”fordeterminingwhatismostvital(Ahuja,Magnanti,andOrlin,“NetworkFlows”,Prentice-Hall,1993)

• Anarchavingthelargestcapacity• Anarccarryingthelargestflowintheoptimalsolution• Anarchavingthelargestcapacityinaminimum-capacitycut• Anymost-vitalarcisinsomeminimum-capacitycut

Ingeneral,noneofthese“guessingrules”work!

15

counter-example:guessingtofindmostvitalarc

(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i j(flow, capacity)

16


(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i j(flow, capacity) 2minimumcapacitycuts!

16


(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc

2minimumcapacitycuts!

16


(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc

arcswithlargestflowinoptimal(maxflow)solution


16


(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc



arcswithlargestcapacityinmincapacitycut

16


(15,20)

(5,5) (10,10)

(0,100)

(20,50)(20,50)(5,5) (10,10)

(10,10)1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i j(flow, capacity)

largestcapacityarc



arcswithlargestcapacityinmincapacitycut

mostvitalarc

Ingeneral,youcannotreliablyguess.Instead,determiningamostvitalarcrequiressolvinganetworkinterdictionproblem.

16

Idea#9:Useanattack-based(adversarial)perspectiveforplanning.(Thisisalsosometimescalled“redteaming”.)

17

OurApproachinaNutshell1. Usingalimitedbudget,wewanttoinvestsothatwe

stillachievemissionsuccessevenwhenbadthingshappen(operationalresilience)

10




2. Tolearnhowto“defend”thesesystems,firstfigureouthowtoattack them

10





3. TolearnhowtoattackCI,firstlearnhowittooperateit(i.e.,howitworks)

10





3. TolearnhowtoattackCI,firstlearnhowittooperateit(i.e.,howitworks)

WecalltheseAttacker-DefenderandDefender-Attacker-Defendermodels.

10


WecalltheseAttacker-DefenderandDefender-Attacker-Defendermodels.

10


•Ithelpstofocusesonsystemoperation.•Ithelpstodiscovervulnerabilities.•Ithelpstouncoverinterdependencies.•Ithelpstothinkaboutmitigation.

Ourexperience:Large-scale,long-terminterruptionsincriticalinfrastructureservicescanbecausedbythingsmuchsmallerthantwoCategory-5hurricanes!

Idea#10:Investingforresiliencecanworkbetterwhenyoutothinkaboutthesystemasawhole.•Hardening(reinforcement)•Redundancy(backups,spares)•Capacityexpansion•Newinfrastructure

Thismeansstudyingmorethanjust“howweactuallydoitnow”.

Itrequireswealsoconsider“howcouldwedoitnow(andinthefuture)”!

18

Wehaveusedscoresofthesemodelstoassessresilienceforawiderangeofsystems

OperatorModels• Shortest-pathproblems• Max-flowproblems• Min-costnetworkflowproblems• Multi-commodityflowproblems• Projectschedulingproblems• Linearprograms• Integer-Linearprograms• Nonlinearprograms• Nonlinear-Integerprograms

Applications• Electricpower• Potablewater• Fuelpipelines• Roadwaytransportation• Multi-modalshipping• Ports• Supplychains• Telecommunications

– Underseacables– Wirelessnetworkdesign

• Interdependentinfrastructures

These techniques scale up to realistic size and fidelity, and admit a host of standard models, many already in use by system operators.

20

Case Study: Guam Power Authority

Reference: Salmerón, J., Alderson, D., Brown, G., and Wood, R.K., 2012, Resilience Report: The Guam Power Authority Electric Power Grid: Analyzing Vulnerability to Physical Attack (U), Center for Infrastructure Defense Technical Report NPS-OR-12-002, May. Distribution authorized to DoD and DoD Contractors only due to infrastructure vulnerability analysis (10 May 2012). Other requests for this document must be referred to President, Code 261, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943-5000 via the Defense Technical Information Center, 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944, Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218.

Prepared for: Air Force Research Lab (AFRL), Airbase Technologies Division, 139 Barnes Drive, Suite 2, Tyndal Air Force Base, FL 32403-5323.

BothAttacker andDefender Analysis

Guam Power Authority’s transmission system(115-13.8 kV):

~100 buses~50 HV lines~50 transformers10s of substations 10s of generating units:

>550 MW

21

Case Study: Hawaii

Reference: Salmerón, J., Alderson, D., and Brown, G., 2018, Resilience Report: Analysis of Hawaiian Electric Power Grid to Physical Attack (U), NPS Technical Report NPS-OR-18-001R, February. Restricted distribution (PCII).

Prepared for: Department of Homeland Security, Infrastructure Protection Division.

Attacker, Defender,&SpareParts Analysis

• 10s buses• ~100 high-voltage AC

transmission lines• no DC lines• ~100 transformers• 10s generating units: total

gen. capacity of ~2,500 MW• Total load: ~1,200 MW

• Can a small number of coordinated attacks inflict significant damage for which repair would require considerable reconstitution time? What is the best means of hardening against such attacks?

• How can a limited stockpile of medium- and high-voltage spare transformers contribute most to mitigating vulnerability, i.e., to “increasing system resilience.”

22


GoalsForThisSession• 10keyideasforhowtoassessandimproveoperationalresilienceofcriticalinfrastructures

• OngoingworkinapplyingtheseideastotheUSVI




5

52

Ourresearchispartofabroaderteameffort

OurworkintheUSVI:severalrelatedresearchefforts

Effort1 - Modelingandanalysisofinterdependentcriticalinfrastructuresystems

– Energy(emphasisonelectricpower)– Water(emphasisonpotablestorageanddistribution)– Transportation– Telecommunications

Effort2 - SupportfordevelopmentofanewHazardMitigationandResiliencePlan

– inpartnershipwithUVI/VITEMA

Effort3 - Capacitybuilding&workforcedevelopmentprogram– inpartnershipwithUVI

53

54

27Feb2018 ProjectStart(fundsavailable)21Mar remoteparticipationinUSVIEnergyRoundtable26-30Mar 1st NPSsitevisittoSTX,STT11-15Jun 2nd NPSsitevisittoSTX,STT14-15Jun UVI/VITEMAHazardMitigationWorkshop21Sep MSThesisbyLCDRBrendanBunn20Oct Technicalreport(finaldraft)22-26Oct 3rd NPSsitevisittoSTX,STJ,STT

• BunnBB,2018,“AnOperationalModelofInterdependentWaterandPowerDistributionInfrastructureSystems,”M.S.ThesisinOperationsResearch,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,September2018.

• AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).


55

228proposedinitiativesacrossavarietyofsectors:• ClimateAnalysis(5)• Energy(17)• PrivateSectorComms (14)• PublicSectorComms (11)• Transportation(24)• Water(11)• SolidWaste andWastewater(26)• HousingandBuildings(11)• Health(21)• VulnerablePopulations(12)• Education(20)• Economy(9)• Non-profit,Philanthropy,and

VoluntaryOrganizations(6)• GovernmentResponse(41)

Lotsofproposedchanges!

OpenQuestions:

• Howtoassesstheimpactofthesechanges(good/bad)?

• Howtoprioritize?

https://www.usvihurricanetaskforce.org/


KeyConcept:TheNeedforanOperationalViewofResilience

ReportContributions:1. Explainingthestructure,function,andtensionsassociatedwithcritical

infrastructurethatwerechronicproblemspriortothehurricanes.2. Documentinghurricaneresponse,recovery,andmitigationactivitiesfor

theseinfrastructuresystemsafterthehurricanes.3. Discussingthesechangesinthecontextofpotentialbarrierstoresilience.

56

AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).

WefaceseveralbarrierstoresilienceBarrier1:Wedon’tfullyunderstandhowvulnerableweare.• owners,operators,orcommunitieswhomanageinfrastructureoftendo

nothavecompleteknowledgeabouttheirvulnerabilities

Barrier2:Wedon’tknowhowbesttocreateresilience.• Tradeoffs/tensionsbetweendifferentmechanismstoachieveresilience• Prioritizationisdifficult

Barrier3:Wedon’thaveincentivestocreateresilience.• Hardtoinvestinmitigatingsomethingthathasneverhappened• Moralhazard:disincentivesforinvestment

Barrier4:Wedon’tknowhowtogovernforresilience.• Rules/regulationsworkagainstimplementationofdesiredchanges• mismatchbetweeninfrastructuregovernanceandinfrastructureoperation

57

Reference:AldersonDL,BunnBB,EisenbergDA,HowardAH,NussbaumDE,TempletonJC,“InterdependentInfrastructureResilienceintheU.S.VirginIslands:PreliminaryAssessment,”NPSTechnicalReport,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,October2018(forthcoming).




58

59

60

Power– WaterInterdependencies

61

62

63

a morerealistic(USVI)waterdistributionsystem

64

IEEE13-buselectricitydistributionnetwork

65

BunnBB,2018,“AnOperationalModelofInterdependentWaterandPowerDistributionInfrastructureSystems,”M.S.ThesisinOperationsResearch,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,CA,September2018.

66

Green CayProsperity

Hams Bluff

Sandy Point

Cramer Park

Hannahs Rest

Frederiksted

Christiansted

State Hwy 66

State Hwy 78

Southside Rd

Southshore Rd

Rte-68

North Shore Rd

Rte-622

Rte-66

State Hw

y 669

State Hw

y 75

Carlton Rd

State Hwy 64

Rte-624

State Hw

y 65 Dirth R

d

State H

wy 7

65

River Est

Hogensborg Est

Libanon Hill Est

Hams Bay Est

1st St S

:

0.85

Miles

St. Croix MapFeeder/Sector

August 2014

LEGEND

Device TypeRecloser

Open

Closed

Capacitor

FEMA_SectorsSTX, 1

STX, 10

STX, 2

STX, 3

STX, 4

STX, 4A

STX, 5

STX, 6

STX, 7

STX, 7A

STX, 8

STX, 9 Northside Rd

Rte-74

Rte-70

King St

Hill St

East S

t

Queen S

t

State Hwy 752

Fisher S

t

Prince St

Rte-752

West St

State Hwy 811

Strand S

t

State H

wy 708

Compa

ny St

Market St

Beeston Hill Est

New St

King Cross St

State H

wy 703

Queen Cross StChurch St

Hospital St

Rte-83

Watergu

t St

Richmond Est

Fangselet Est

Grange Est

Sobo

etke

r Ln

Little

Prin

cess

e Hi

ll Rd

Little Princesse Est

Contentment Est

Bulows M

inde Est

Hafensight Est

Orange Grove Est

Peters Farm R

dCon

tent

men

t Rd

Herman Hill Est

Little

Hospita

l St

North St

Bellvue Est

Golden Rock Est

Consti

tution H

ill Est

Sion Farm Est

Frie

dens

thal

Est

Colony Cv

Lobster S

t

Mill Harbour Condos

Sugar

Beach

Res

ort

Little Princess Est

Lagrande Princesse Est

Club S

t Croi

x

Harbor View Apartments

Carib V

illas

Herm

an Hill E

st

Fangselet Est

Lagr

ande

Prin

cess

e Es

t

Herman Hill Est


West St

Consti

tution

Hill

Est

Lagr

ande

Prin

cess

e Es

t

Constitutio

n Hill Est

Little Princesse Est

Lagr

ande

Prin

cess

e Es

tLagrande Princesse Est

Lagr

ande

Prin

cess

e Es

t

Bellvue Est

Lagr

ande

Prin

cess

e Es

t

Golden Rock Est


Constitutio

n Hill Est

Orange Grove Est

Richmond EstOrange G

rove E

st

Herman Hill Est

Herman Hill Est

Gra

nge

Est

Fangselet Est

Little Princess Est

Little Princess Est

Her

man

Hill

Est

Herm

an Hill Est

Little Princess Est

Golden

Roc

k Est

Constitution H

ill Est

Orange Grove Est

Lagr

ande

Prin

cess

e Es

t

C H R I S T I A N S T E D H A R B O RC H R I S T I A N S T E D H A R B O R

Prin

ce St

Dr Eller S

tN

ew S

tTH

E OV

AL

Smith

field Est

FR

ED

ER

I CK

ST

ED

FR

ED

ER

I CK

ST

ED

Q U E E N M A R Y H W Y

Q U E E N M A R Y H W Y

11

22

33

44

4A4A

55

66

777A7A

8899

Feeder 8

Feeder LegendFeeder 01, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609

Feeder 02, Three Phase, 7.96743011474609







Ongoingwork:St.Croixelectric+water




Effort2 - SupportfordevelopmentofanewHazardMitigationandResiliencePlan

– inpartnershipwithUVI/VITEMA

Effort3 - Capacitybuilding&workforcedevelopmentprogram– inpartnershipwithUVI

67

ContactInformation

• Dr.DavidAldersonDirector,CenterforInfrastructureDefenseNavalPostgraduateSchool831-656-1814,[email protected]://faculty.nps.edu/dlalders

• NPSCenterforInfrastructureDefensehttp://www.nps.edu/cid

ReferencesandAcknowledgments• Alderson,D.L.,Brown,G.,Carlyle,W.M.,andWood,R.K.,2017,"Assessingand

ImprovingtheOperationalResilienceofaLargeHighwayInfrastructureSystemtoWorst-CaseLosses," TransportationScience,doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2017.0749.

• Alderson,D.L.,Brown,G.,andCarlyle,W.M.,2015,“OperationalModelsofInfrastructureResilience,” RiskAnalysis35(4):562-586(receivedAwardforBestPaperof2015inRiskAnalysis).

• Alderson,D.L.,G.G.Brown,W.M.Carlyle.2014.“AssessingandImprovingOperationalResilienceofCriticalInfrastructuresandOtherSystems.”A.Newman,J.Leung,eds.,TutorialsinOperationsResearch:BridgingDataandDecision.InstituteforOperationsResearchandManagementScience,Hanover,MD,180-215.

• Alderson,D.L.,G.G.Brown,W.M.Carlyle,L.A.Cox.2013.“Sometimesthereisno‘mostvital’arc:assessingandimprovingtheoperationalresilienceofsystems.”MilitaryOperationsResearch18(1)21-37.

• Brown,G.,Carlyle,M.,Salmerón,J.andWood,K.,2006,“DefendingCriticalInfrastructure,” Interfaces,36,pp.530-544.

ThisresearchwassupportedbytheOfficeofNavalResearch,theAirForceOfficeofScientificResearch,andtheDefenseThreatReductionAgency. 19

Operational Resilience Analysis and Capacity Building in ......Operational Resilience Analysis and Capacity Building in the US Virgin Islands David L.Alderson, PhD Associate Professor,

Documents