On the timing of non-renewable resource extraction with regime switching prices: A stochastic optimal control approach Margaret Insley Department of Economics, University of Waterloo September 2015 Presentation at the University of A Coru˜ na
On the timing of non-renewableresource extraction with regime
switching prices: A stochastic optimalcontrol approach
Margaret Insley
Department of Economics, University of Waterloo
September 2015
Presentation at the University of A Coruna
lecture 2
Optimal decisions for a firm managing anatural resource asset
• This paper uses a “real options” paradign to examine a firm’s
optimal decisions about extracting a non-renewable resource
over time and final abandonment of the project.
• An oil sands project is used as an example.
• Real options paradign uses concepts from finance for valuing
financial options, and applies these to other types of
investment decisions where irreversibility and uncertainty are
key.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 1
lecture 2
Applying option theory to other types ofinvestment decisions
1980s - a surge of interest in applying option theory to the
firm’s decision about investments in real assets:
• Dixit (Quarterly Journal of Economics,1989) , “Hysteresis,
import penetration, and exchange rate pass-through”
• Brennan and Schwartz (J. of Business, 1985): an early
paper using a no-arbitrage approach and stochastic control
theory to value a prototype mining project - the real options
approach
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 2
lecture 2
• Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988, Quarterly Journal of
Economics) , “Option valuation of claims of real assets: the
case of offshore petroleum leases”
• Morck, Schwartz and Strangeland (1989, Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis), “The Valuation of Forest
Resources under Stochastice Prices and Inventories”
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 3
lecture 2
More recent literatureA huge literature in economics and business using real options.
• Mason (JEEM, 2001) extended Brennan and Schwartz
by examining a firm’s decision to commence or suspend
extraction of a non-renewable resource
• Chen and Insley (JECD,2012) examine optimal forest
harvesting with regime switching stochastic lumber prices
• Slade (JEEM, 2001) - optimal extractions from copper mines
- option theory compared to actual firm decisions
• Conrad and Kotani (REE, 2005) - considered whether to
allow drilling in wildlife refuge in the Arctic
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 4
lecture 2
Future development of the literature
• In economics the focus has been on problems with analytical
solutions.
• Development of computational approaches to solving HJB
equations allows us to analyze more complex decision
problems.
• Modelling approach is now much less constrained by our
ability to find closed form analytic solutions.
• Theory of viscosity solutions has put the solution of HJB
equations on a firm mathematical footing. No need to use
Markov chains and other probabilistic approaches
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 5
lecture 2
Future development of the literature
• Better models of stochastic prices or costs - regime switching,
jumps, stochastic volatility
• Comparing actual firm decisions to optimal action
• Implications of the real options paradigm for public policy
decisions when there is significant uncertainty - i.e. climate
change
• Real options and game theory to analzye firms’ strategic
decisions under threat of preemption
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 6
lecture 2
Issues that motivate this paper
• Pace of natural resource extraction depends on volatile
commodity prices - boom and bust cycles
• Serious environmental consequences of many resource
extraction projects
• Environmental regulations may not be adequate for a sudden
ramp up in operations
• Environmental damages may change through the life of the
project
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 7
lecture 2
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
U.S. $/bbl
Figure 1: West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil Futures Price
with one month expiry, U.S. $/barrel, Monthly data
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 8
lecture 2
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
1973
1975
1977
1979
1981
1983
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
$ millions
Pre‐1997 total
Upgraders
Mining
In‐situ
Upgraders
Mining
In‐situ
Figure 2: Alberta Oil Sands Capital Expenditures. Data Source:
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 9
lecture 2
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
$160
Jan‐02
Oct‐02
Jul‐0
3
Apr‐04
Jan‐05
Oct‐05
Jul‐0
6
Apr‐07
Jan‐08
Oct‐08
Jul‐0
9
Apr‐10
Jan‐11
Oct‐11
Jul‐1
2
Apr‐13
Jan‐14
Oct‐14
$ Ca
nadian
per barrel
WTI at Cushing
Heavy oil (Bow River at Hardisty)
Differential
Figure 3: Heavy oil differential: WTI at Cushing in $C/bbl,
Heavy oil price at Hardisty, Alberta, Data Source: CAPP
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 10
lecture 2
Objectives of this paper
• To examine the impact of volatile prices and boom/bust
cycles on the optimal decisions of non-renewable resource
producer
• Use a regime switching model to capture oil price dynamics
• Use a switching model of resource investment - construction
and operations can be paused and restarted
• Consider implications for environmental regulation
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 11
lecture 2
Model of a firm’s optimal decisions
• Specify a Hamilton-Jacob-Bellman partial differential
equation to model the decision to construct a resource
extraction project - oil sands in situ project
• Construction happens over a period of several years
• Once operational the project can be mothballed temporarily
at a cost and reactivated at a further cost
• Can also be abandoned at a cost
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 12
lecture 2
Models of resource price
A general Ito process
dP = a(P, t)dt+ b(P, t)dz
a(P, t), b(P, t) = known functions
dz = increment of a Wiener process
dz = ε√dt, ε ∼ N(0, 1)
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 13
lecture 2
Common models of commodity prices
• Geometric Brownian Motion
dP = αPdt+ σPdz
• Processes with mean reversion in the drift
dP = η(P − P )dt+ σPdz
dP = η(µ− log(P ))Pdt+ σPdz
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 14
lecture 2
Looking for better models
• Various researchers have sought improvements to these
simple models.
• Criteria:
– Ability to match the term structure of futures contracts
– Simple enough to be useful in pricing options
• Schwartz (J. of Finance, 1997) compared three different
models
– One factor mean reverting
– Two factor with stochastic convenience yield
– Three factor adding in a stochastic interest rate
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 15
lecture 2
Looking for better models
• Stochastic volatility models - allows the variance of the
process generating the time series to change at discrete
points or continuously.
• Larsson and Nossman (Energy Economics, 2011) use
stochastic volatility with jumps to model oil prices.
• Used WTI spot prices to estimate the parameters of their
model.
• To price assets, parameters of the price model should be
estimated under the Q-measure, risk adjusted process.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 16
lecture 2
An alternative - a regime switching model
• Empirical analysis indicates that drift and volatility
parameters are not constant
• A regime switching model accommodates changes in drift
and volatility by defining different regimes and specifying
probabilities of switching between regimes
• Some empirical studies find strong evidence of regime
switching for crude oil price volatility (eg. Zou and Chen,
2013, Canadian Journal of Statistics)
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 17
lecture 2
Specification of regime switching model
• Two regimes:
dP = ηj(P j − P )dt+ σjPdz (1)
j = 1, 2;
• ηj is the speed of mean reversion in regime j
• P j is the long run price level in regime j
• σj is the volatility in regime j
• dz = increment of a Wiener process
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 18
lecture 2
Probability of switching regimes
• The term dXjl governs the transition between j and l:
dXjl =
{1 with probability λjldt
0 with probability 1− λjldt
• There can only be one transition over dt
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 19
lecture 2
Futures Prices
• In order to estimate risk-adjusted parameters, the parameters
in the above equation are calibrated using market natural gas
futures prices and options on futures.
• Let F j(P, t, T ) denote the futures price in regime j at time
t with delivery at T while the spot price resides at P
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 20
lecture 2
Futures Prices
• The futures price equals the expected value of the spot price
in the risk neutral world:
F j(p, t, T ) = EQ[P (T )|P (t) = p, Jt = j]
j = 1, 2.
where EQ refers to the expectation in the risk neutral world
and Jt refers to the regime in period t.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 21
lecture 2
Futures Prices
• Applying Ito’s lemma results in two coupled pde’s for the
futures price, one for each regime, j = 1, 2:
(F j)t+ηj(P j−P )(F j)P+
1
2(σj)2P 2(F j)PP+λjl(F
l−F j) = 0.
• Boundary condition: F j(P, T, T ) = P , j = 1, 2.
• Substituting a solution of the form
F j(P, t, T ) = aj(t, T ) + bj(t, T )P
into the pde and boundary condition results in an ode system
which can be solved.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 22
lecture 2
Calibration Procedure
• This ode system can be used to find the model implied
futures price for different parameter values
• A suite of parameters must be estimated such as θ =
{ηj, µj, σj, λjl | j, l ∈ {0, 1}}• In addition the current regime, J(t) must be estimated.
• On each observation day, t, there are futures contracts with
a variety of different maturity dates, T
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 23
lecture 2
Calibration
• The parameter values minimize the sum of squared
differences between model-implied futures prices and actual
futures prices.
minθ,j(t)∑t
∑T
(F (J(t), P (t), t, T ; θ)− F (t, T ))2
where F (t, T ): market futures price on observation day t with
maturity T and F (J(t), P (t), t, T ; θ) is the corresponding
model implied futures prices.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 24
lecture 2
Calibration
• A difficult optimization problem, with no unique solution
• Bounds are placed on the parameter estimates to achieve
reasonable results
• Calibration is done using monthly data for futures prices of
various maturities, 1995 - 2014.
• The speed of mean reversion η, long run equilibrium price
P , and probability of switching regimes λjl are calibrated
independently of volatility, σ
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 25
lecture 2
Calibration
• For the assumed Ito process volatilities are the same in the
P-measure and Q-measure
• Volatilities are estimated separately using the spot price.
• Use Matlab code written by Perlin (2012) for P-measure
estimation of Markov state switching models.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 26
lecture 2
Base Case Parameter EstimatesRegime 1 Regime 2 lower bound upper bound
ηj 0.29 0.49 .01 1
P j, 50 98 0 200
λjl 0.45 0.47 0.02 0.98
σ 0.28 0.34
Table 1: dP = ηj(P j − P )dt+ σjPdz, j = 1, 2.
• Risk adjusted parameter estimates
• Probability of switching regimes is λjldt
• The average error is $8.85.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 27
lecture 2
Simulation of the price process
0 5 10 15 20 25 300
50
100
150
200
25010 realizations
Time (years)
Ass
et P
rice
Figure 4: Simulation of base case regime switching price
process, U.S. $/barrel, 10 realizations
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 28
lecture 2
Resource Valuation Model
• V (P, S, δ) - value of the resource asset; P is resource price,
S is the size of the resource stock, and δ is the plant stage.
• M possible plant stages, δm such as: 0 percent complete,
partially complete, fully operational, mothballed, abandoned.
• The firm chooses the timing of extraction as well as the plant
stage to maximize V .
• Denote annual extraction by R. Then dS = −Rdt; A path
dependent variable
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 29
lecture 2
Objective Function
The value of the project in regime j and stage m is V jm(p, s, t).
V jm(p, s, t) = maxR,δm
EQ{ T∫t0
e−rt′ [πjm]dt | P (t) = p, S(t) = s
},
m = 1, ...,M ; j = 1, ..., J
subject to
∫ T
t0
R(:, t)dt ≤ S0.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 30
lecture 2
V between decision dates
Standard contingent claims arguements derive a system of pde’s whichdescribe V between decision dates.
∂V jm∂t
= maxR∈Z(S)
{− 1
2bj(p, t)2∂
2V jm∂p2
− aj(p, t)∂Vjm
∂p+Rjm
∂V jm∂s− πjm(t)+
J∑l=1,l 6=j
λjl(V lm − V jm)− rV jm
}j = 1, 2; m = 1, ...,M
where aj(p, t) is the risk adjusted drift rate conditional on P (t) = p and λjl
is the risk adjusted transition j to regime l from regime .
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 31
lecture 2
Decision dates for switching plant stages
Each year the firm checks to see if it is optimal to switch to a differentstage of operations. Switching stages incurs a cost, but so does staying inthe current stage.
• Stage 1: Before construction begins
• Stage 2: Project 1/3 complete
• Stage 3: Project 2/3 complete
• Stage 4: Project 100 % complete and in full operation
• Stage 5: Project is temporarily mothballed
• Stage 6: Project abandoned
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 32
lecture 2
Choosing the optimal plant stage
The optimal switching decision is given by:
V (t−, δm) = max{V (t+, δ1)−Cm1, ... , V (t+, δm)−Cmm, ... , V (t+, δM)−CmM
}
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 33
lecture 2
Solution Approach
• A stochastic optimal control problem requiring a numerical
solution
• A standard finite difference approach plus a semi-Lagrangian
scheme
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 34
lecture 2
Production* 30,000 bbl/day, in situ, SAGD
Reserves* 250 million barrels
Lease length 30 years
Variable costs (energy):* 5.28% of WTI price
Variable costs (non-energy):* $5.06/bbl
Fixed cost (operating)* $34 million
Fixed cost (mothballed) $21.9 million
Cost to mothball and reactivate $ 5 million
Construction costs* $960 million over three years
Corporate tax: Federal/Prov 15% / 10%
Carbon tax $40 per tonne
*CERI (2008, 2009, 2012) & Plourde (2009, Energy Journal)
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 35
lecture 2
• Royalty rates are based on pre-payout rate.
• Adds considerable complexity to calculate post-payout
royalties, as it depends on price, which is stochastic.
• Assume bitumen price is 65% of the price of WTI.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 36
lecture 2
Case 1: Project value pre-construction versusprice and reserves
0200
400600
8001000
050
100150
200250
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
P
Solution Surface at t = 0, Regime 1
S
$ m
illio
n
(a) Regime 1
0200
400600
8001000
050
100150
200250
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
P
Solution Surface at t = 0, Regime 2
S$
mill
ion
(b) Regime 2
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 37
lecture 2
Value of beginning construction (left) andfinishing construction (right)
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
0 50 100 150 200
CDN
$ m
illio
ns
US$/barrel, WTI crude
Base case: Value of beginning construction, Regimes 1 and 2
R2 Stage 2 less cost
R1, Stage 2 less costR1, Stage 1
R2, Stage 1
(c) Stage I - II
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
0 50 100 150 200
Cdn $, m
illion
U.S. $/barrel, WTI crude
Base case: Value completing construction and begining production, Regimes 1 and 2
R2, Stage 3
R1, Stage
R1, Stage 4 less cost
R2, Stage 4 less cost
(d) Stage III - IV
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 38
lecture 2
R1: η = 0.29, P = 50, λ12 = .45 ; R2: η = 0.49, P = 98, λ12 = .47
S0 = 250 S0 = 125Critical Prices for Transition from: R1 R2 R1 R2
Stage I to Stage II: Begin construction 20 0 62 32.5Stage II to Stage III: Continue 40 15 68 45
Stage III to Stage IV: Finish, Begin production 66 52 88 74Stage IV to Stage V: Mothball 52 37.5 69 55
Stage V to Stage IV: Reactivate 54 40 71 57Stage IV or V to Stage VI: Abandon NA NA NA NA
• Critical prices are lower in regime 2 - higher long run price
and more rapid speed of MR.
• Critical prices to reopen are higher than critical prices for
mothballing - hysteresis.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 39
lecture 2
• At these levels of reserves there is no price at which the
resource would be abandoned. (To be further discussed
later.)
• Critical prices are higher when stock is lower
• Critical prices rise as construction proceeds.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 40
lecture 2
Why do critical prices rise as reserves fall?
These figures show ∂V∂S versus remaining reserves for two prices levels.
0 50 100 150 200 2500
5
10
15
20
25
remaining reserves, million barrels
Cdn
$
dV/dS for Regime 1, prices of 30 and 75
ValR1P30m4ValR1P30m5ValR1P75m4ValR1P75m5
(e) Regime 1, Vertical axis: Million
dollars, Horizontal: millions of barrels
0 50 100 150 200 2500
5
10
15
20
25
remaining reserves, million barrels
Cdn
$
dV/dS for Regime 2, prices of 30 and 75
ValR2P30m4ValR2P30m5ValR2P75m4ValR2P75m5
(f) Regime 2, Vertical axis: Million
dollars, Horizontal: millions of barrels
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 41
lecture 2
Why do critical prices rise asconstruction proceeds?
• Compare benefits versus costs of delaying the next stage of
capital investment
• Benefits of delay
– Delay in construction spending
• Costs of delay
– Delay in receiving revenue from production
– Maintenance costs while construction is mothballed
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 42
lecture 2
Why do critical prices rise asconstruction proceeds?
• Construction is begun at a critical price lower than that at
which it would be optimal to begin production.
• Getting construction underway is like exercising an option
which moves the firm one step closer to production.
• Costs of delay are higher at an earlier stage of construction
since the firm is unable to quickly finish the project and get
production underway in the event of a sudden surge in oil
prices.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 43
lecture 2
Why do critical prices rise asconstruction proceeds?
• This pattern of critical prices is not a general result - depends
on the nature of price process involved.
• Cost of delaying construction depends on the stochastic price
process.
• This pattern is typical for prices following a mean reverting
process - want to be able to respond quickly to temporary
upswings.
• For GBM process, critical prices start high and then fall as
construction proceeds.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 44
lecture 2
Importance of regime switching
Weighted Average Price (Case 2) andZero Probability of Switching Regimes (Case 3)
Case 1 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 3Regime 1 Regime 2 Weighted Average Regime 1 Regime 2
η 0.29 0.49 0.39 .29 .49P 50 98 73 50 98λjl .45 0.47 NA 0 0σ 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.34
Cases 1, 2, and 3 parameter values. dP = ηj(P j −P )dt+σjPdz, j = 1, 2.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 45
lecture 2
Importance of regime switchingWeighted Average Price (Case 2) and
Zero Probability of Switching Regimes (Case 3)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
0 50 100 150 200
CDN $ m
illions
US$/barrel, WTI crude
Case 1, R1
Case 1, R2
Case 2
Case 3, R1
Case 3, R2,
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 46
lecture 2
Comparing critical prices, Cases 1, 2 and 3
20
0
20
37.5
0
40
15
32.5
37.5
17.5
66
52 53
45
61
52
37.540
30
47.5
54
4042.5
32.5
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Base Case, R1 Base Case, R2 Wted Average Price No regimesswitching, R1
No regimesswitching, R2
U.S.
$/ b
arre
l, W
TI
stages 1-2 stages 2-3 stages 3-4 stages 4-5 stages 5-4
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 47
lecture 2
Comparing critical prices, Cases 1, 2 and 3
• Project values are lower in Case 2 (weighted average)
compared to the base case.
• Critical prices differ across the three cases - ignoring price
regimes would result in non-optimal decisions.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 48
lecture 2
Impact of a carbon tax
• IPCC has suggested a global carbon price that increases to
around $200 per tonne of CO2 is needed by the middle of
this century.
• Consider two additional cases:
– Case 4: Tax increasing gradually from $40 to $200 per
tonne over 15 years– Case 5: Tax increasing immediately to $200 per tonne
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 49
lecture 2
Impact of a carbon tax: Project value
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
0 50 100 150 200
CDN $ m
illions
US$/barrel, WTI crude
Case 1, R1
Case 5, R1
Case 4, R1
(g) Regime 1
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
0 50 100 150 200
CDN $ m
illions
US$/barrel, WTI crude
Case 4, R2
Case 5, R2
Case 1, R2
(h) Regime 2
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 50
lecture 2
Impact of a carbon tax: Critical prices, R1
20
0
68
40
1
73
66
40
92
52
27.5
73
54
30
72
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Base Case, R1 Carbon tax, gradual increase, R1 Carbon tax, sudden increase, R1
U.S.
$/b
arre
l WTI
stages 1-2 stages 2-3 stages 3-4 stages 4-5 stages 5-4
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 51
lecture 2
Impact of a carbon tax: Critical prices, R2
0 0
40
15
0
5152
27.5
78
37.5
17.5
58
40
20
61
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Base Case, R2 Carbon tax, gradual increase, R2 Carbon tax, sudden increase, R2
U.S.
$/b
arre
l of W
TI
stages 1-2 stages 2-3 stages 3-4 stages 4-5 stages 5-4
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 52
lecture 2
Carbon tax
• With a gradually increasing tax, critical prices are markedly
lower. Construction and production will be speeded up.
• With a sudden tax increase, critical prices increase at all
stages. Construction and production are delayed.
• As in the base case, there are no prices for abandonment at
full reserves. This changes for lower reserve levels.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 53
lecture 2
Critical prices for abandonment versus reserves
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
U.S $/ bbl W
TI
Remaining reserves, million barrels
Comparing prices for abandonment, Regime 1
Case 1: operationalto abandoned
Case 1: mothballedto abandoned
Case 5: operational to abandoned
Case 5: mothballed to abandoned
(i) Regime 1
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140U.S $/ bbl W
TIRemaining reserves, million barrels
Comparing prices for abandonment, Regime 2
Case 1: operational to abandoned
Case 1: mothballedto abandoned
Case 5: mothballed to abandoned
Case 5: operational to abandoned
(j) Regime 2
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 54
lecture 2
Critical prices for abandonment
• Critical prices for abandonment rise as reserve level falls.
• Critical prices for abandonment under a carbon tax of $200
are higher than under a carbon tax of $40.
• The higher carbon tax may cause some reserves to be left in
the ground.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 55
lecture 2
Sensitivity on volatility
Base case: σ1 = 0.28, σ2 = 0.34.Case 7 (high volatility): σ1 = 0.84, σ2 = 1.02
Case 1: Case 6:Base case High volatility
Transition from : R1 R2 R1 R2
Stages 1 to 2: Begin construction 20 0 15 0Stages 2 to 3: Continue 40 15 35 15
Stages 3 to 4: Finish, Begin production 66 52 121 110Stages 4 to 5: Mothball 52 37.5 85 69
Stages 5 to 4: Reactivate 54 40 87 71Stages 4 or 5 to 6: Abandon na na na na
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 56
lecture 2
Sensitivity on mean reversion speed
Base case: σ1 = 0.28, σ2 = 0.34.Case 8 (low mean reversion speed): η1 = 0.02, η2 = 0.02.
Case 1: Case 7:Base case Low speed of
mean reversionTransition from : R1 R2 R1 R2
Stages 1 to 2: Begin construction 20 0 83 83Stages 2 to 3: Continue 40 15 79 78
Stages 3 to 4: Finish, Begin production 66 52 83 86Stages 4 to 5: Mothball 52 37.5 58 59
Stages 5 to 4: Reactivate 54 40 59 61Stages 4 or 5 to 6: Abandon na na na na
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 57
lecture 2
Conclusions
• Modelling resource prices as regime switching stochastic
processes can give insight into optimal investment decisions
in natural resource industries.
• A myopic investor ignoring possibility of regime change can
make suboptimal decisions.
• Uncertainty affects the pace of development. This has
implications if environmental costs are unevenly distributed
over the lifetime of the project.
• The timing of an environmental tax has a significant effect
on the pace of development and how much of the total
resource is extracted.
Presentation at the University of A Coruna 58