On the Formal Structure of Esthetic Theory

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On the Formal Structure of Esthetic Theory Author(s): Jerome Stolnitz Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Mar., 1952), pp. 346-364Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103989Accessed: 14-04-2015 15:44 UTC

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ON THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF ESTHETIC THEORY

This paper does not undertake to consider any particular problem within the subject matter of esthetics proper. Nor is it written from the standpoint of any single esthetic theory. It attempts, rather, to define those separate theories which must enter into any esthetic which lays claim to compre- hensiveness, and, more especially, to trace out the relations which obtain among them. It is intended that this investigation shall demonstrate that there are certain logical and empirical criteria of adequacy which are bind- ing upon all esthetic theories. These criteria are not exhaustive, but they are put forth as being indispensable. For, as will be argued, these criteria must be employed, in order to determine the degree of consistency and scope with which an esthetic system treats of that body of linguistic and empirical data which any esthetic whatever seeks to account for, and clarify, and to which, ultimately, any esthetic is responsible. So far, this paper is an essay in the theory of esthetics, or, if you will, meta-esthetics.

"The formal structure of esthetic theory," as used throughout this paper, denotes the inter-relationships between the three distinct theories which comprise any esthetic, in divorce from the particular doctrines advanced in these areas of inquiry by any single system. More specifically, it refers to the logical framework made up of the theory of art, the theory of esthetic experience, consisting of the theories of esthetic attitude and esthetic response, and the theory of esthetic value and criticism, and the inter-relationships between them. It is not because of any quasi-Kantian preoccupation with architectonic that esthetics is held to be made up of these various theories. Rather this classification rests on the widely recognized fact that artistic and esthetic experience embraces, at once, creative, contemplative, and axiological-judgmental activities.

This paper is devoted to an analysis of the two most crucial relationships within the formal structure of esthetic theory. These are: (1) the relation between the theory of art and the theory of esthetic experience; (2) the relation between the theory of esthetic attitude and the theories of esthetic response and value. It is here urged that the distinction between these theories has been blurred in much of traditional esthetics, and that the failure to delineate the relationships between them has given rise to serious theoretical inadequacies. Throughout the following discussion, reference will be made to several of the leading esthetic theories to sub- stantiate this contention.

346


ON FORMAL STRUCTURE OF ESTHETIC THEORY 347

I (1) At the outset, the nature of the theories of art and esthetic experience

will be discussed briefly. Then an attempt will be made to ascertain how, if at all, these theories are related to each other.

The theory of art, by analysis and definition of the expression "fine art," seeks to delimit a certain class of objects. All of these objects are to be differentiated from natural and fortuitously produced objects, as well as those objects of art which are thought to lack the differentia of "fine- ness." It is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of writers in esthetics have sought to define "work of fine art" -in terms of the unique mode of its production. Further, they are united in regarding this process of art or technW, as a process of skilled and deliberate manipulation of, or operation upon, some material medium, in order to achieve some specified end.' The precise nature of this end, as realized within the art-object, is taken to be definitive of "fine art." There is, patently, extraordinary heterogeneity and disparity among the various conceptions of "the artistic," in esthetic literature. Thus there may be cited, at random, those theories- of "the artistic" which take it to be "embodiment of an Idea or essence," or "expression of 'emotion' or 'value,'" or "imaginative wish- fulfillment," or "faithful reproduction of common perceptual phenomena." But common to all these views is the conception of the process of art as a skilled, plastic, and constructive activity; this may be implicit in the theory, or it may be explicit and conspicuous, as in Dewey and Samuel Alexander.

The theory of esthetic experience attempts to analyze the unique contemplative and appreciative experience, and the objects which enter into such experience. Most frequently, and especially in contemporary writings, that which is definitive of such experience has been considered a peculiar mode of attention or interest, directed, potentially, toward any object of awareness whatever. "The esthetic" has also been used to denote the experience of only some kinds of objects, which are taken to be exclusively qualified to figure in such experience. Common to both these schools, however, is the conception of esthetic experience as defined by a unique mode of awareness or "looking." In this interpretation of the term "esthetic," as connoting perception or the perceptible, the etymological meaning of the term has been retained, at least partially. On either view, "the esthetic" is intended to circumscribe an area of experience which, as "common- sense" mutely recognizes, differs from that proper to moral or "practical" activity.

I Croce is, perhaps, the most notable exception.


348 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Now what, precisely, is the logical nature of the relation which obtains between the theory of art and the theory of esthetic experience? Since (and, perhaps, in large measure, because of) Plato's preoccupation with technW, or artistic "making," in the broadest sense, the theory of art has frequently been considered to be central in the formal structure of esthetic theory. That is to say, the theory of art in much of the literature of esthetics, has been established as logically primordial and presuppositional to the theory of esthetic experience, so that the former theory being given, it has been thought that, in the absence of any further premises, certain inferences can be drawn for the latter. In these writings, once the nature of art has been decided upon, inference is made directly to the theory of esthetic experience.2 This takes the form of arguing that those properties which constitute certain objects "works of art" are also present in the objects of the perceptual-appreciative experience, and, moreover, qualify such experience, uniquely and definitively. Esthetic perception is, in this way, taken to consist in the apprehension of those properties which have been asserted as definitive of fine art. This inference from "the artistic" to "the esthetic" is, frequently, not explicit; rather, the theorist's con- clusions to the theory- of esthetic experience are, generally, made un- critically. In either case, a theory of the perceptual-contemplative experience is arrived at, without an independent examination of such experience in its own right, and of such conditions of its occurrence as cannot be disclosed merely by inference from the theory of art.

In opposition to this method of developing an esthetic, which has been recurrent in traditional thought, the following will now be argued: From the theory of art, no inference can legitimately be drawn concerning the theory of esthetic experience. Otherwise stated, the theory of "the artistic "-a unique mode of "making"-implies nothing necessarily for the theory of "the esthetic"-a unique mode of "looking." It is entirely possible that there should be some coincidence between the ends sought and realized by the artist, and the generic characteristics of the objects of esthetic perception. But whether this is true cannot be determined merely by inference from the theory of art. Because the theories of art and esthetic experience are, in this way, logically independent of each other, each of these theories must be developed separately. Failure to recognize this, it will be urged, has given rise to profound errors in much esthetic speculation, and has been a chief source of misunderstanding and distortion of the nature of the esthetic experience.

It should first be pointed out that inference from "the artistic" to "the esthetic" implies that the activities denoted by these terms are

2 Certain notable examples in traditional esthetics will be considered shortly.



concerned with the same kind of objects. I.e., if the ends of the artistic process, in terms of which "work of art" is defined, are taken to be definitive of the objects of esthetic perception, as well, then the activities of creation and contemplation must be, so far, related. Yet, there is, on the very face of it, what appears to be a profound difference between the activities of art and esthetic experience. And this difference has been pointed up in the foregoing discussion. The activity of artistic creation is a "practical" one, in the sense that problems of medium and technique must be overcome, before the ends of creation can be achieved. By contrast, one who is engaged in esthetic experience is concerned precisely to apprehend the object of awareness, without engaging in such constructive activities, or any other kind of "practical" activity. "The esthetic," then, denotes a kind of "looking" which differs, prima facie, from artistic "making." Now, might it not be the case that so far from bearing a necessary relationship to each other, these activities are, toto genere, dissimilar? For so much is at least suggested by the uncritical distinction between "making" and "looking." It is then a viable and significant possibility that the objects with which artistic "making" and esthetic "looking" are concerned, differ, correlatively with the difference in these activities. It is a corollary of the foregoing that, in the absence of an examination of esthetic perception, in divorce from the theory of artistic creation, it is unjustifiable simply to assume that these activities are concerned with the same kind of objects.

The preceding comments suggest, but do not, however, demonstrate the independence of "the artistic" and "the esthetic." The argument now to be advanced against taking the theory of art to be foundational in the formal structure of esthetic theory, is intended to be utterly con- clusive. What has here been called the inference from "the artistic" to "the esthetic" is equivalent to the assertion that those properties which the artist seeks to realize in the art-object, and which are therefore taken to be definitive of the class of "works of art," are also necessarily definitive of the class of "esthetic objects." But now it must be pointed out, and underscored, that the latter class is greater than the former, and that insofar as there are objects which are members of both classes, they comprise a sub-class of esthetic objects. This is as much as to say that there are a great many objects of esthetic perception which are not also works of fine art. And the justification of this statement is to be found in the testimony of that large area of universal and uncritical human experience which, if only we can get clear about it, is, ultimately, the crucial touch- stone of esthetic analysis and reflection. So much, at least, is manifest within this corpus of evidence: experiences of the sort universally ac- knowledged to be "esthetic" in character, by those who are not concerned



to propound any theory, are frequently had in the face of natural and fortuitously produced phenomena. It is, accordingly, incumbent upon any esthetic theory which lays claim to empirical scope and adequacy-that is to say, any esthetic theory whatever-to make room for the esthetic perception of cumulus cloud-formations, the artless grace of a child, the "primrose by a river's brim." Now this is, at once, obviously true, and of the first importance for the analysis of the formal structure of esthetics. For we are now in a position to see that any direct inference from "the artistic" to "the esthetic" must necessarily be logically invalid.

Such inference takes the specified end of artistic creation, e.g., "formal unity," "emotional expressiveness," "pleasing sensory surface," or whatever, to be generically characteristic of all objects of esthetic perception, in the absence of an independent investigation of the latter. Those esthetic objects which are works of art are differentiated from those which are not, so far as the former are products of skilled and deliberate activity. Both classes of objects, however, are taken to be "esthetic" by reference to that property which is the end of such activity, although only the artistic objects possess this property as a consequence of skilled, deliberate cre- ativity. It is this property which is taken to be central to, and definitive of, all esthetic perception. But this is clearly illegitimate, for it fails to recognize the genuine logical possibility that this defining property of fine art may not be present generically in those esthetic objects which are not products of skilled creation. Thus it is overlooked that "the esthetic" may be located in some group of characteristics other than those singled out as essential to "the artistic." In this manner, the esthetic theory in question is guilty of an invalid inference which vitiates its theory of esthetic experience. Consider, e.g., an esthetic which takes the theory of art to be logically foundational, and defines- "art" by reference, let us say, to the "formal unity" of some kind, attained by the artist; it is then inferred that all members of the larger class of objects of esthetic perception possess this sort of formal unity. The fallacy in such an inference will be seen immediately. It should' be seen simultaneously that in no case is any inference warranted from the theory which defines the class of art-objects to that which defines the class of esthetic objects.

This does not preclude the possibility that the defining properties of "the artistic" and "the esthetic" are' the same-"formal unity," "emotional expressiveness," or whatever. However, -as has been urged Paore than once, we can never be assured of this, except by developing the theories of art and esthetic experience in logical 'independence of each other. Still, if it were, as a matter of fact, true that the ends of artistic creation and the essential properties of all esthetic objects were the same, any theory which proceeded by inference from the former to the latter



would enjoy a specious plausibility. It would, then, merely by extension of the theory of art, have ascertained the nature of "the esthetic," although, as has just been shown, such an inference is logically unwarranted. On the other hand, it may well be the case that works of art are also members of the class of esthetic objects, by virtue of a property which is unrelated to the unique mode of their coming-into-being. This might prove to be, e.g., that they are sometimes the objects of a unique mode of perceptual interest which may be directed upon them, or upon non-artistic objects indis- criminately, and which constitutes all objects "esthetic"; and, further, apart from this, it might well be that artistic and non-artistic objects have nothing at all in- common. If this should prove to be the case, then the theoretical inadequacies attendant upon formulating the theory of esthetic experience by inference from the theory of art would be nothing less than fatal to the system in question. For then what purports to be a theory of esthetic experience would wholly misconstrue the nature of such experience, and would be thoroughly false to the facts of such experience, as will be seen in the historical theories to be considered presently.

A number of well-known esthetic' theories, all of which endeavor to -establish a relation of some intimacy between "the artistic" and "the esthetic" must now be briefly considered. However, none of them is guilty of deriving the theory of esthetic experience from that of art. Thus, it should be of some value to see how the theories of "the artistic" and "the esthetic" may be related in an esthetic system which does not commit the logical error just delineated.

The first theory to be mentioned incorporates "the esthetic" within the very definition of "art" by affirming that, as one exponent of this position puts it, "Fine art is the creation of objects for aesthetic experience."3 A second theory of art holds that the artist must engage in esthetic perception of his work to guide his creative activity, and thereby determine whether his effort is successful. So Ducasse concludes, "The notion of aesthetic contemplation (is) thus involved in the conception of art formulated."4 Finally, the so-called "re-creative" theory of esthetic experience is represented in Kate Gordon's statement: "The production of a work of art is a progress 'from emotion to form.' . . . The appreciation of art is a process of appropriating emotion through the medium of the artistic image or form."I Now, whether any or all of these theories are

3D. W. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order (University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. xii. Cf., similarly, pp. 29-31.

4 C. J. Ducasse, The Philosophy of Art (Dial Press, New York, 1929), p. 134. Cf., similarly, Henry R. Marshall, Aesthetic Principles (Macmillan, New York, 1895), p. 73.

5 Esthetics (Henry Holt, New York, 1909), p. 6.



sound, is not germane to the present essay. What is here in question is solely the contention that the soundness of these views can only be established by virtue of an independent investigation of the peculiarities of esthetic perception. Whether, as in the first two theories cited, the theory of esthetic experience is presupposed in the theory of art, or, as in the third, there exists some "matter of fact" relationship between these theories, in no case is there an illegitimate inference to the theory of esthetic experience from that of art.

The foregoing argument rests upon the unexceptionable assertion that some esthetic objects are not artistic objects. Attention is now directed to the far less obvious, but at least logically plausible assertion that some artistic objects are not esthetic objects. This 'proposition does not bear upon the kind of theory currently being criticized, inasmuch as the as- sumption that all artistic objects are esthetic objects is implicit in all such theories. If, however, the foregoing analysis of such theories is well- taken, then no further criticism is demanded. The possibility of non- esthetic artistic objects is raised at this time, rather, chiefly for heuristic purposes, in order to emphasize the logical independence of the theories of art and esthetic experience. It rests upon the consideration that some objects frequently denominated "works of art" in uncritical, everyday discourse, either because of the artist's intention, or for other reasons, prove themselves incapable of serving as esthetic objects. Whether such usage is to be sanctioned in esthetic theory will, of course, depend upon the categorial analysis carried out by the esthetician, and the precise meanings which he assigns to "art" and "esthetic." It is strongly urged, however, that such usage implying the possibility of non-esthetic artistic objects should not simply be overlooked, in the course of developing esthetic theory. The theorist's recognition of, and sensitivity to, such usage will help to obviate the facile identification, or confusion, of "the artistic" and "the esthetic," which becomes most pronounced, and effects the most grievous logical and empirical inadequacies, in those esthetic systems which infer directly to the theory of esthetic experience from the theory of art.

(2) Two well-known esthetic theories, each of which incorporates the formal structure criticized in the preceding section, will now be analyzed. An investigation of this sort seems imperative if the previous discussion is not to appear vacuous. For it may legitimately be questioned whether any esthetic theory has, as a matter of fact, ever been developed by direct inference from the theory of art to the theory of esthetic experience. It will now be demonstrated that such theories have been advanced, and that, because of their logically untenable formal structure, they have



embraced an unsound theory of esthetic experience. Neither of the theories now to be discussed is contemporary. This is no coincidence, for most modern esthetics have treated "the esthetic" in its own right. But consideration of "the esthetic" in its own right appears fairly late in the history of esthetic reflection. Hence, the arguments advanced previously must be turned chiefly, though not exclusively, on the philosophy of antiquity.

(a) Nowhere does Plato develop a systematic or comprehensive esthetic. The concepts of "fine art" and "esthetic experience," as currently employed, are unknown to him, as to the Greeks generally. Hence, any discussion of Plato, within this area, can only proceed by collating some of his frequent, though scattered, references to the creation and appreciation of art. Moreover, Plato's esthetic philosophy, such as it is, is developed "von Oben herab," from the ontology of the theory of Ideas. This may be seen most immediately in his well-known theory of art as imitations The Demiurgus who employs the immutable Ideas as his model in creating the world ("Timaeus" 28-29 C) serves as the exemplar for other, less lofty artists. So, in the case of the "thing-making" arts, the carpenter who makes a shuttle does not "look to" the material shuttle, but to the form, which may "be justly called the true or ideal shuttle" ("Cratylus" 389 A).8

Similarly, Plato classifies what would now be called the "fine arts" as "imitative." The model for such imitation is either the non-sensuous eidos, or a particular sensory object in which, however, this form may be obfuscated by contingent material circumstances. This distinction is set forth by Plato when he speaks of "some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know" ("Sophist" 267). That Plato recognizes the possibility that the artist might have genuine knowledge of the "reality" of his model is indicated at a number of points; e.g., at "Re- public" X, 598 E, Plato insists that the good artist "must have knowledge of what he creates, if he is to create beautifully.'9 Those artists who rise above doxa in their imitations, provide a vision of the various forms, which furthers the ascent into the real world.10 In his most prolonged

I Reference to these theories here, as throughout this paper, must necessarily be cursory. It is to be hoped, nevertheless, that in all instances the exposition and criticism of these theories does justice to the respective systems.

7The following discussion will be concerned with this central issue in Plato's treatment of art, to the exclusion of such other phases of his treatment as the criticism of the emotional and hedonic effects of art, the moral function of art and its place in the ideal state, and the axiological criterion of "simplicity."

8 This, and all other quotations from Plato, are in the Jowett translation. 9 Cf., also, "Republic" III, 401 B-C; V, 472-3. lo Cf., "Republic" V, 479 D-E; "Symposium" 210-212; "Phaedo" 99 C-100 E.



discussions of the creation of "fine art," however, Plato charges "the imitative tribe" with ignorance of the eidos, and indiscriminate duplication of the eidolon. Thus, Plato likens the artist to one who purports to "make" all things-"not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things"-by revolving a mirror ("Republic" X, 596 B-E). But all such imitations are of things "as they appear," not as they are "in reality" ("Republic" X, 598).1" -

It is from this mimesis-theory of art that Plato infers directly to the theory of esthetic experience. Given the conception of the creation of art as a skilled activity whose end is a copy or embodiment of some model, it is concluded that the apprehension of art is a cognitive, or more precisely, a recognitive process. I.e., the mimetic character of the object, which is a defining property of fine art, is taken to be central to the experience of esthetic perception. Thus the esthetic percipient is described as seeking to relate the art-object to the model of which it is a copy. This theory is most clearly indicated in those passages in which Plato harangues "the ignorant multitude" who become so far engrossed in "the image" that they take it for the very object of which it is a copy (e.g., "Republic" X, 602).12 By contrast, Plato demands that the perception of art must be informed, governed by knowledge of the model: "may we not say that in everything imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge... must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is?" ("Laws" II, 669 A).'3 Applying this criterion in the judgment of art, Plato indicts Homer on the grounds of the poet's ignorance of statesman- ship,.military science, and education ("Republic" X, 599 C-E; "Ion" 537-539).

It falls outside the province of this essay to criticize Plato's theory of the nature of art, although this theory is itself subject to the most severe strictures. Criticism of his theory of the appreciation of art is demanded, however, in order to make clear the empirical inadequacies attendant upon developing a theory of "the esthetic" by inference from the theory of art. Such criticism is undertaken from the standpoint of the conception of "the esthetic," as an attitude of "disinterested attention and contemplation," to be elaborated and defended later in this paper. According to this widely-held theory, it is a necessary condition of all esthetic experience that the object of awareness is of immediate interest, "for its own sake alone." Hence, it is not the concern of the percipient to relate it to any-

11 Cf., similarly, "Republic" X, 601-602; "Sophist" 233 E-234. Other statements of the mimesis-theory of art are found at "Laws" II, 655 E; "Statesman" 288 C, 306 C.

12 Cf., similarly, "Sophist" 234 B-E; "Republic" X, 598 B-C. 13 Cf., also, 668; "Critias" 107 D.



thing beyond itself, or to contemplate it for any purpose transcending the very experience of contemplation itself. But now, if this be indeed an accurate rendering of the facts of esthetic perception, then the glaring inadequacies of the Platonic doctrine are revealed at once.

For where esthetic perception is taken to be recognitive, the object of perception ex hypothesis is not of interest in its own right. If the percipient is constrained to relate the object to the model of which it is a copy, whatever the nature of the model, then he cannot focus attention upon the object for its own sake alone. Thus, on Plato's view, the art- object, when contemplated, is of mediate, rather than intrinsic interest, because it must serve to stimulate cognition of its paradigm. But, it must be insisted, esthetic experience is subverted when the presentation to awareness is considered a mnemonic cue, in order to realize some end transcending the contemplative experience. If the perceptual object is not of concern in its own right, then it simply is not an esthetic object. The shortcomings of Plato's theory of esthetic experience are accentuated when we consider those art-forms which can hardly be said to imitate anything, e.g., much of post-Impressionist art.14 Yet Plato's theory is inadequate as well when applied to the contemplation of all other art- forms, and indeed, non-artistic objects. The failure of Plato's thinking on this crucial issue is the result of his attempt to derive the theory of esthetic experience from his theory of art.

(b) The second system to be criticized is that of Eugene V6ron. Writing after the initial development of modern esthetics, he employs the concepts of "fine art" and "esthetic perception." But the manner in which he develops his esthetic system is diametrically opposed to that which has been urged in this paper: he explicitly makes the theory of art logically foundational in the formal structure of esthetic theory. V6ron says, at the beginning of his Aesthetics, that he seeks to draw up a definition of ''art," "of which the whole subject of Aesthetics shall be no more than the development.""

V6ron begins by defining "art" in terms of the "genius" or "clearly indicated individuality" which it expresses. Thus he asserts that "the determinant and essential constituent of art, is the personality of the artist."'6 He says. again: "The influence of man's personality upon his

14 In this connection, it is interesting to note Schuhl's, conjecture that Plato was provoked by the development of an Impressionist movement in his day. Cf., Pierre- Maxime Schuhl, Platon et t'art de son temps (Paris, Alcan, 1933), p. 10.

15 Aesthetics, tr. Armstrong (Chapman and Hall, London, 1879), p. 2. 16 op. cit., p. xxiv. Cf., also, p. 139. This definition can readily be shown to be

formally inadequate, and V6ron later offers another definition of "art" (cf., pp. 89, 380). His theory of "the esthetic," however, is based upon the former definition.



work ... this is the unique and solid basis of all aesthetics."'7 From this theory of art, V6ron infers directly to the theory of esthetic experience. He construes esthetic response as determined by the direction of attention to this defining property of fine art, so that "personality," which is definitive of art, is also taken to be definitive of the esthetic object. In his terminology, "the esthetic" is defined by reference to "admirative pleasure," viz., "(the) sentiment of sympathetic admiration of the artist whose talent or genius has produced a work capable of affording us so lively a satisfaction."' V6ron makes it clear that, on his view, it is the "individuality" of the artist, rather than the art-object itself, which en- gages and sustains esthetic attention: "That which strikes us in a work of art and stirs our emotions; that which we admire in the artistic expression of moral and physical life: is not really that life itself, but the power and originality shown by the artist in interpreting the impression made by it upon him."'9

V6ron's theory of esthetic experience is, once again, patently inadequate, from the standpoint of the conception of "the esthetic" as "disinterested attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone." "Admirative pleasure" can be experienced if and only if attention is not directed to the object of awareness "for its own sake alone." On VWron's view, the art-object is only of mediate interest, for it is approached for clues to the unique talents and capacities of its creator. The attention of the percipient must thereby be diverted away from the immediately apprehended object, in order to trace out its relations to the process whereby it came into being. But such preoccupation with that which transcends the immediate perceptual situation simply destroys the genuinely esthetic attitude. Such interest in the artist may well be fostered in the course of analyzing and evaluating the work of art. But this ex post facto critical process must be distinguished from the act of contemplation itself. Similarly, the work of art may be employed as the source of investigation into the evolution of the artist's medium, or the Zeitgeist of his culture. However, as will now be urged in greater detail, such extra- and anti-esthetic interests must be carefully distinguished from the distinctively esthetic experience, if we are to do justice to the peculiar nature and value of this experience.

17 Ibid., p. 104, n. 1. 18 Ibid., p. 65. VWron advances another theory of "esthetic pleasure" which inter-

prets it as agreeable sensory gratification (cf., pp. 33-36, 128). He says, however, of "sympathetic admiration" that it is "more properly speaking, aesthetic pleasure" (p. 52), and it is to this theory of "the esthetic" that he chiefly devotes himself.

19 Ibid., p. 156. Cf., also, pp. 107, 337.



II (1) The thesis just argued-that the theory of esthetic experience is

logically independent of the theory of art-has been very largely accepted in modern esthetics. The lion's share of modern thinkers, par- ticularly since Kant's third "Critique," have analyzed the meaning of "esthetic" in divorce from the theory of art.20 With surprising agreement, they have settled upon some such definition of "the esthetic attitude" as that given earlier in this essay-"disinterested attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone." By contrast, there has been marked divergence among the various formula- tions of those further theories which are demanded for any comprehensive esthetic, viz., the theories of esthetic response, value, and criticism. The theory of esthetic attitude and that of esthetic response together comprise the theory of esthetic experience. The theory of response investigates the diverse psychological states aroused upon adoption and prolongation of the esthetic attitude, to determine which of these, if any, occur necessarily and definitively. The theories of value and criticism seek to set forth those axiological and judgmental principles which are required for analysis and evaluation of the esthetic experience and its objects.

The discussion which now follows undertakes first to defend the conception of the esthetic attitude advanced earlier. Then, the nature of the logical interrelationships between the theory of esthetic attitude, and the theories of esthetic response, value, and criticism is investigated. From these discussions there emerge certain empirical and logical criteria of adequacy which hold for all esthetic systems. As before, some well-known esthetic systems are singled out, to illustrate the theoretical inadequacies attendant upon failure to satisfy these criteria.

Though the definition of "the esthetic" as an attitude of "disinterested contemplation" employed earlier, sums up much of post-Kantian thought, it cannot, assuredly, be justified by a simple argumentum ad verecundiam. Neither can it be defended as being "merely stipulative." Rather, like all definitions in the empirical disciplines, its use can only be justified on the grounds of its empirical scope and explanatory power. It is now urged that this conception of "the esthetic" best enables us to organize and interpret the large areas of uncritical experience and discourse which

20 It is interesting to contrast, in this connection, the organization of Veron's Aesthetics, in which, as has been pointed out, the theory of "the esthetic" is a corollary of the theory of art, with a representative contemporary work, such as, H. N. Lee, Perception and Aesthetic Value (Prentice-Hall, New York, 1938). Lee begins with a discussion of the "aesthetic attitude" (Chap. II) and does not treat of "art" until better than halfway through the book (Chap. IX).



have generally been considered, in some sense, the proper object of esthetic analysis. For the above definition seems to answer to the tacit under- standing of "the esthetic" in those who are not concerned with reflective theory. Insofar as the latter conception, uncritical and generally unvoiced, can be analyzed, it appears to involve two beliefs, both of which are in- corporated in the above definition. Primarily, the kind of experience usually considered "esthetic" is thought to differ in kind from other experiences such as the "practical," moral, and scientific, which are concerned with the object of perception only so far as it bears upon that which is ulterior to itself. But the esthetic experience, uniquely, is one in which, as the poet says, one "stands and stares." The foregoing definition attempts to hit this off by reference to "disinterestedness," and apprehension of the esthetic object "for its own sake alone." Further, it is widely thought that the "experience of Beauty" takes objects of the most diverse and heterogeneous kinds. Phenomena as unlike as the odor of fresh leather, cumulus cloud-formations, Bach's "Italian Concerto" nevertheless have in common that they are all esthetic objects. The above definition seeks to take account of the pervasiveness of "the esthetic" by its reference to "any object of awareness whatever."

It 'is the empirical catholicity and explanatory fecundity of this conception of "the esthetic" that warrants asserting the criterion of adequacy that any definition of this term must be shown to possess empirical scope not less than that of the foregoing definition. This criterion is of vital importance, since the meaning assigned to "esthetic" serves to delimit the area to be studied by the theories of esthetic response, value, and criticism. But if the claims made on behalf of the above definition are sound, then any narrower definition would entail a gratuitous restriction upon the area of experience and discourse which ought properly to be investigated by these theories. What is here intended by a "narrower" definition of the term is illustrated by those esthetics in which the area of- esthetic experience is constricted in either of two ways, broadly speaking. Either the esthetic percipient is thought to exercise a particular faculty or capacity uniquely, e.g., sensation, intellect, or only a particular group of objects of awareness is thought to be qualified as "esthetic." Neither approach, it is here urged, does justice to the facts of esthetic experience. On the one hand, any or all psychological capacities e.g., sensory, conceptual, emotional, etc., may be called into play during esthetic experience, as in witnessing a great tragedy, whereas the experience may be preponderantly sensory, as in apprehending an odor or texture, or chiefly intellectual. What renders all such experiences veritably esthetic, it is insisted, is the unique psychological disposition of "disinterested contemplation" which governs them. On the other hand, there



appear to be no objects which are wholly recalcitrant to esthetic perception. To be sure, objects differ among themselves in the degree to which they solicit and retain esthetic interest, but here again the gamut extends from the prosaic yellow chair immortalized by van Gogh to the medieval Weltanschauung celebrated by Dante.

It has been argued that the universe of discourse of "the esthetic" must be circumscribed by reference to the attitude of "disinterested attention and contemplation." Whenever the term "esthetic" is used, it must be understood to connote this attitude. It follows that such expressions as "esthetic response" and "esthetic judgment" must be understood to have, in all instances, an implicit reference to this attitude. For, apart from such reference, these and similar expressions are simply mean- ingless. So, the phenomena denoted by "esthetic response" and "esthetic value" are contingent upon the adoption of the esthetic attitude, in the absence of which they could not exist. Now, the implications of these considerations for the formal structure of esthetic theory should be ap- parent. The theory of esthetic attitude must be, of necessity, logically presuppositional to the theories of esthetic response, value, and criticism. The nature of the esthetic attitude must be elucidated prior to the development of these theories, since it is upon this analysis that the very meaning of "esthetic response" and "esthetic value" depend.

The nature of this relation between the theory of esthetic attitude and the theories of response and value dictates a criterion of adequacy which is not less important because it appears to have been so frequently overlooked by contemporary estheticians. It is this: since esthetic response and value are had or occur if and only if the esthetic attitude is main- tained, that which is asserted as definitive of response and value must be present in all instances of the experience which ensues upon adopting and sustaining the esthetic attitude. It has been argued that the term "esthetic" may be predicated of any state of response, and any feature of the object of awareness, which enters into the experience governed by this attitude. It is now urged that those elements of the total experience which are taken to be definitive of esthetic response and value, must be shown to occur universally, when the "set" of "disinterested contemplation" is taken toward an object. This criterion of adequacy may be summed up by saying that the denotative reference of the defining properties of esthetic response and value must be as great as that of "the esthetic attitude."

(2a) In formulating a comprehensive emotionalist esthetic, C. J. Ducasse attempts to demonstrate that emotional states, or "feelings,"' are present

21 As this term is used by Ducasse, the psychological states which it denotes are algedonic as well as emotional. Op. cit., pp. 192-193, 195-196, 199.



generically in all esthetic response. So far, he seeks to satisfy the criterion of adequacy asserted just above, viz., he seeks to prove that "feeling," which he considers definitive of esthetic response,22 is experienced, in all instances, whenever the esthetic attitude is adopted. It is here urged that Ducasse's argument rests upon an excessively restricted, and therefore untenable conception of the nature of the eAthetic attitude.

Ducasse purports to offer "a direct empirical examination of the state of aesthetic contemplation."23 He finds that it involves "(throwing) one- self open... to the advent of feeling."24 It is, more precisely, "(endotelic) 'listening' or 'looking' with our capacity for feeling."25 It must be carefully noted that, on Ducasse's view, the percipient does not attend to the "feeling." Rather, the object of awareness is "the content of attention," but "our interest," Ducasse says, "is in its feeling-import to us"; thus "feelings, or emotional states" are made "the center of one's interest... as states to be simply 'tasted' to the full."26 The percipient having made himself "receptive to" the advent of feeling, "the occurrence of it (feeling) constitutes the completion, the success of the contemplation."27

Now, before charging Ducasse with distortion of the nature of esthetic contemplation,. it is important to point out those respects in which he is not subject to such criticism. Primarily, he distinguishes esthetic perception from perception which is concerned with its object only to the extent that it bears upon some ulterior goal.28 Moreover, Ducasse holds that "there is no entity whatever towards which it is a priori impossible to take the aesthetically contemplative attitude."29 On both issues, his view accords with that advanced earlier. Further, Ducasse does not restrict "the esthetic" to any particular group of "feelings": "... there is no feeling which may not on occasion acquire the aesthetic status."30

The criticism now to be presented is not intended to deny that the attitude of esthetic contemplation is oriented toward the advent of "feeling." Rather, it is here urged that it is not to this particular psychological state, exclusively, that the esthetic percipient makes himself receptive. For though he "throws himself open" to the arousal of emotion, it must be insisted that, by the same token, he is predisposed to experiencing

22 Ibid., pp. 123-124. 23 Ibid., pp. 139-140. 24 Ibid., p. 140, italics in original. 25 Loc. cit., italics in original. Cf., also, p. 136. 26 Op. cit., pp. 140-142, italics in original. 27 ibid., p. 142. 28 Ibid., pp. 110-111, 144. 29 Ibid., p. 156. Cf., similarly, pp. 223-224. 30 Ibid., p. 190.



any or all of the psychological states which may be evoked, by contemplation of the esthetic object. Apart from the hedonic and emotional elements of response, sensory, imaginative, conceptual, and memorial states are frequently aroused." It is, assuredly, the case that one's "interest" in any or all of these may well be, and frequently is, at least as great as one's "interest" in "feeling." Since this is true, there can be no justification for singling out the latter, exclusively, as the "center" of esthetic "interest."

To be sure, in any single case, the percipient's interest in one dimension of response may be dominant, depending upon the nature of the object. Yet there appear to be no good grounds for the contention that this element of response is, in all instances, the algedonic-emotional. It might be claimed, with as much justice-but no more-that this unique status is to be ac- corded to the sensory, or the imaginative, element of esthetic response. Each of these particularistic theories, however, does violence to the nature of the esthetic attitude, so far as it asserts that the esthetic percipient is, initially and in all instances, "interested in" any single element of the complex of intimately inter-related qualia which is the esthetic response. When these psychological states are experienced by the percipient, all are veritably "esthetic," all are of "interest" to him, and just so long as none of them impedes or subverts the prolongation of the esthetic attitude, all of them contribute toward, and enter into, the "success" of the esthetic contemplation.

It should be seen that the foregoing argument does not preclude the possibility of a genuinely valid emotionalist theory of esthetic response. It remains an open possibility that emotion uniquely (or, for the matter of that, any other element of response) may be shown, on other grounds, to occur universally in esthetic experience. The foregoing argument is intended to invalidate Ducasse's attempt to establish "feeling" as definitive of esthetic response, by considering the "set" of the percipient to be oriented toward it uniquely.2 It follows that rejection of the latter theory of esthetic attitude, for the reasons just presented, leaves the theory of response without any justification. It may be concluded, generally, that no theory of esthetic response whatever can be accepted, if it rests upon a theory of esthetic attitude which prejudices and distorts

31 This is clearly recognized by Ducasse; cf., e.g., p. 177. 32 It is worth mentioning that Ducasse, in his later writings, appears to have ex-

panded his conception of the range of esthetic "interest," since he no longer holds that the "listening" is for "feeling-import" exclusively. Cf., C. J. Ducasse, "Aesthe- tics and the Aesthetic Activities" (in: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. V., No. 3 [March, 1947], pp. 165-176), p. 166. The foregoing criticism is directed solely against the earlier "Philosophy of Art."



the conception of the esthetic attitude upheld earlier, on the grounds of its fidelity to the peculiarities and range of esthetic experience.3

(b) Criticism of the final esthetic theory to be considered will illustrate the application of the second criterion of adequacy advanced above, viz., those properties of the esthetic experience taken to be definitive of esthetic response and value must be shown to occur universally upon adoption of the esthetic attitude. Santayana adopts substantially the conception of this attitude outlined earlier, as when he says that "in the perception of beauty, our judgment is necessarily intrinsic and based on the character of the immediate experience, and never consciously on the idea of an eventual utility in the object."34 "The aesthetic" falls within the area of "perceptions of value ... when they are positive and immediate."36 On Santayana's hedonistic axiology, pleasure is present universally in all esthetic response, and constitutes the value of the esthetic experience. "All pleasures are not perceptions of beauty"; however, "pleasure is indeed the essence of that perception."36 The differentia of pleasure which is alone "esthetic" is its "objectification": "Beauty is an emotional element, a pleasure of ours, which nevertheless we regard as a quality of things.""7 By contrast, it is true of non-esthetic hedonic experience that the pleasure is "recognized as an effect and not as a quality of the object."38

Now, whether pleasure occurs universally in esthetic experience, as Santayana holds,39 is a genuine question in its own right, but one which cannot be treated within the confines of the present paper.40 At present,

33 It will be seen that the contemporary "formalists"-Bell, Fry, F. E. Halliday- are subject to similar criticism. Their contention that sui generis emotion is definitive of esthetic response rests upon a severely restricted conception of the esthetic attitude as being oriented solely toward the non-representational aspects of the art- object-a theory which excludes from consideration those large areas of artistic and esthetic experience which have been characterized by sympathetic attention to "subject matter."

3 George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (Scribners, New York, 1936), p. 20. Cf., similarly, p. 39. It remains true that there is genuine agreement between Santaya- na's conception of the esthetic attitude, and that urged in this paper, despite San- tayana's repudiation of what he calls "disinterestedness" as a characteristic of esthetic experience. He takes it to refer to "unselfishness" of enjoyment. He then argues both that esthetic enjoyment "is, or ought to be, closely related and prelim- inary to" the desire to possess the esthetic object, and that even the so-called "un- selfish" interests must be the interests of some self. (Op. cit., pp. 30-32).

35 Ibid., p. 28. 36 Ibid., p. 29. 7 Ibid., p. 37. Cf., also, pp. 38-41.

38 Ibid., p. 38. Cf., also, p. 40. 39 Ibid., pp. 21, 39, 167-170. 40 The interested reader will find an extended discussion of this issue in a paper

by the present author entitled "On Ugliness in Art," published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XI, No. 1 (September, 1950), pp. 1-24.



attention is directed solely to the theory that, in all cases, the esthetic experience "retains the emotional reaction, the pleasure of the perception, as an integral part of the conceived thing."'4' As to this, it is here urged that "objectification" cannot justifiably be considered definitive of esthetic response, for neither is it logically entailed by the theory of "disinterested attention and contemplation," nor is it, as a matter of fact, true that it always characterizes the hedonic and emotional states experienced upon adoption of the esthetic attitude. There are, to be sure, instances of the esthetic experience in which this phenomenon does take place, in which, as we say, we "lose ourselves" in the object. But the esthetic object is not always so "absorbing," and we are not always "caught up in" the object in this fashion. More frequently, perhaps, when we apprehend an object non-relationally and "for its own sake alone," the hedonic and emotional states which we experience are recognized as being the effects, within us, of the esthetic object.

This argument is not simply "speculative," for there is, happily, a substantial body of corroborative empirical evidence to be found in the experimental investigations of "perceptive types," carried on by Edward Bullough and others. In undertaking to classify the types of response, experienced in the face of single colors, to which an esthetic attitude is taken, Bullough found that his subjects fell into four groups, of which only two are pertinent here.42 The so-called "character"-type subjects did experience states of response which were felt as intrinsic to the object. However, such "objectification" did not take place, in the case of the "physiological" or "subjective" type, whose judgments were' framed in terms of the bodily response of the subject. This type, which was found by Bullough to characterize the largest number of responses, propor- tionately, did not achieve thoroughgoing absorption in the object, although a veritably esthetic experience was had. This distinction between types, in terms of the presence or absence of "exteriorization," has been upheld, despite relatively minor differences, in many later experimental investigations, e.g., those of Bullough,41 Myers,4" Valentine,45 and Feasey. 4

41 Op. cit., p. 38. 42 "The 'Perceptive Problem' in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Single Colours" (in:

The British Journal of Psychology, Vol. II, pt. 4 [October, 1908], pp. 406-463). 43Edward Bullough, "The 'Perceptive Problem' in the Appreciation of Simple Col-

our-Combinations," The British Journal of Psychology, Vol. III, pt. 4 (December, 1910), pp. 406-447.

44 Charles S. Myers, "Individual Differences in Listening to Music," The British Journal of Psychology, Vol. XIII, pt. 1 (July, 1922), pp. 52-71.

45C. W. Valentine, An Introduction to the Experimental Psychology of Beauty (Jack, London, 1913), pp. 33-34, Chap. VII.

46 L. Feasey, "Some Experiments on Aesthetics," The British Journal of Psychol- ogy, Vol. XII, pt. 3 (December, 1921), pp. 253-272.



It may be concluded that no theory of esthetic response is adequate, which takes "objectification" to be a definitive characteristic, for it does not accompany universally the attitude of "disinterested attention and contemplation."

JEROME STOLNITZ.

COLGATE UNIVERSITY.

EXTRACTO Lo "artistico" y lo "est6tico" son conceptos logicamente independientes.

Una- inferencia que vaya de la teoria del arte a la teoria de la experiencia est6tica resultaria invalida, porque las obras de arte comprenden sola- mente una clase subordinada de objetos est6ticos. Por no haberlo recono- cido asi, Platon y Veron llegaron a conclusiones empiricamente infundadas, a saber, que la experiencia est6tica sea esencialmente recognoscitiva y "admirativa," respectivamente. La definici6n de la "actitud est6tica" no debe restringirse gratuitamente, sino que debe poseer suficiente ampli- tud empirica, como por ejemplo: "atenci6n desinteresada hacia un ob- jeto cualquiera del que nos demos cuenta, y por si mismo exclusivamente." Se critica a Ducasse porque consider que la actitud est6tica esta orientada unicamente hacia la promocion de un "sentimiento," y no hacia todos los estados de reacci6f o respuesta. Aquellos rasgos de la experiencia total que se lleguen a considerar definitivamente constitutivos de la experiencia y el valor estiticos tienen que producirse siempre que dicha actitud este- tica se adopte. Se muestra que la teoria de la "objetivacion" de Santayana no cumple con este criterio te6rico.


Article Contentsp. 346p. 347p. 348p. 349p. 350p. 351p. 352p. 353p. 354p. 355p. 356p. 357p. 358p. 359p. 360p. 361p. 362p. 363p. 364

Issue Table of ContentsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Mar., 1952) pp. 317-463Front Matter [pp. ]Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer [pp. 317-345]On the Formal Structure of Esthetic Theory [pp. 346-364]The Character of Philosophy in Canada [pp. 365-376]Some Remarks on Philosophy in Denmark [pp. 377-391]Free Will and Voluntary Action [pp. 392-405]The Scholastic Realism of C. S. Peirce [pp. 406-417]DiscussionOn Inscriptions and Concatenation [pp. 418-421]Some Recent Literature in Philosophy of Religion [pp. 422-430]

ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 431-434]Review: untitled [pp. 434-436]Review: untitled [pp. 436-442]Review: untitled [pp. 442-445]Review: untitled [pp. 445-447]Review: untitled [pp. 447-448]Review: untitled [pp. 448-450]Review: untitled [pp. 450-451]Review: untitled [pp. 451-454]Review: untitled [pp. 454-455]Review: untitled [pp. 455-456]Review: untitled [pp. 456-457]Review: untitled [pp. 457-459]

Notes and News [pp. 460]Recent Publications [pp. 460-463]Back Matter [pp. ]