On technical security issues in cloud computing

On Technical Security Issues in Cloud Computing

Presented by:

Sashikanta Taorem1RV09SCS16

M.Tech – CSE, 2nd Semester

Outline

• Introduction

• Literature Survey

• Cloud computing security issues

• Conclusion and Future works

Introduction

• What is Cloud Computing?

• Security concerns in Cloud Computing.

What is Cloud Computing?

• C - Common Platform

• L – Location Independent

• O – Online Services

• U – Utility

• D – On Demand

Cloud Layers and Access Technology

• SaaS –  Fortiva's email archiving service • PaaS – Google app engine• IaaS – Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)

Cloud Computing Security Concern

• Relying the own data and execution tasks to an external company.

• Different country with a different regulatory.

• Focus – Data Confidentiality, Data Safety, Data Privacy

Literature Survey

• Web Service Security

• Transport Layer Security

Web Service Security

• For a SOAP (Simple Object Access protocol) message, It defines how to provide – Integrity– Confidentiality– Authentication

• WSS defines a SOAP header – carries WSS security extensions

• Defines XML security standards which apply to SOAP messages, like– XML signature– XML Encryption

XML Signature

Transport Layer Security

• TLS – Secure Sockets Layer

• Cryptographic protocols that provide security for communications over networks such as the Internet.

• TLS and SSL encrypt the segments of network connections at the Transport Layer end-to-end.

• Use in applications like web browsing, electronic mail, Internet faxing, instant messaging and voice-over-IP (VoIP).

Cloud Computing Security Issues

• XML Signature

• Browser Security

• Cloud Integrity and Binding Issues

• Flooding Attacks

XML Signature

• Issue: XML Signature Element Wrapping

• In 2008 it was discovered that Amazon’s EC2 services were vulnerable to wrapping attacks.

SOAP message with signed SOAP body

SOAP message after attack

Browser Security

• The Legacy Same Origin Policy (SOP)

• Attacks on Browser-based Cloud Authentication

• Secure Browser-based Authentication

• Future Browser Enhancements

Same Origin Policy

• Allows Read/Write operation from the same origin.

• Where Origin is define by the Tuple (domain name, protocol, port)

• Problems:– DNS caches can easily be filled with bogus data.– Since DNS heavily relies on caching, domain names

become unreliable.

Attacks on Browser-based Cloud Authentication

• Since the browser itself is unable to generate cryptographically valid XML tokens to authenticate against the cloud, this is done with the help of a trusted third party.

• Federated Identity Management (FIM) protocols, eg: Microsoft’s Passport

Attacks on Browser-based Cloud Authentication

• Current browser-based authentication protocols for the Cloud are not secure, because

– the browser is unable to issue XML based security tokens by itself, and

– Federated Identity Management systems store security tokens within the browser, where they are only protected by the (insecure) SOP

Secure Browser-based Authentication

• Is done by integrating TLS and SOP, and securing FIM protocols.

• 4 ways:– TLS federation – uses X.509 client certificate– SAML 2.0 holder-of-key assertion profile– Strong Locked same origin policy – uses

server’s public key instead of DNS– TLS session binding

Future Browser Enhancements

• By adding two enhancement to the browser security API

1. XML Encryption

2. XML Signature

• In addition the API should be powerful enough to support all standard key agreement methods specified in WS-security family of standards

Cloud Integrity and Binding Issues

• Cloud Malware Injection Attack

• Metadata Spoofing Attack

Cloud Malware Injection Attack

• Injecting a malicious service implementation or virtual machine into the cloud system

• Requires to create its own malicious service implementation module (SaaS/PaaS/IaaS) and add it to cloud system

• Solution:

– A service instance integrity check prior to using a service instance for incoming requests.

– This can be done by storing a hash value on the original service instance’s image file.

Metadata Spoofing Attack

• Aims at maliciously reengineering a web services metadata descriptions.

• Example: – Modifying a WSDL (Web Service description

document) so that a call to a deleteUser operation syntactically looks like a call to another operation, say setAdminRights

• Solution:– Hash based integrity verification of the metadata

description file prior to usage is required.

Flooding Attack

• Direct Denial of Service

• Indirect Denial of Service

• Accounting and Accountability

Conclusion and Future Work

• Improving Cloud Computing security consists in strengthening the security capabilities of both Web browsers and Web Service frameworks, at best integrating the latter into the first.

References1. On technical security issue in cloud computing – Meiko, jorg, Nils,

Luigi, IEEE 2009

2. M. Jensen and J. Schwenk, "The accountability prob lem of flooding attacks in service-oriented architec tures," in Proceedings ofthe IEEE International Con ference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES),2009.

3. N. G uschka and L. Lo Iacono, "Vulne able Cloud: SOAP Message Security Validation Revisited," in ICWS '09: Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Web Services. Los Angeles, USA: IEEE, 2009.

4. Google, "Browser security handbook," 2009. [Online]. Available: http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/

5. ] M. Jensen, N. Gruschka, and N. Luttenberger, "The Im pact of Flooding Attacks on Network-based Services," in Proceedings ofthe IEEE International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), 2008.

6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WS-Security 7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soap 8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML_Signature 9. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_layer_security

Thank You