On Mamba Station · Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. 1995 A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996. ... Chapter 2- Preparing

On Mamba Station

U.S. Marines in West Africa, 1990 – 2003

U.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

byMajor James G. Antal

U.S. Marine Corpsand

Major R. John Vanden BergheU.S. Marine Corps

History and Museums DivisionUnited States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.2004

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for publicRelease; Distribution is unlimited

Other Publications in the SeriesU.S. Marines in Humanitarian Operations

Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation ProvideComfort. 1995

Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. 1995

A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996. 2003

PCN 19000413300

This monograph tells the story of thousands of U.S. Marines who supported Operations Sharp Edge,Assured Response, Quick Response, Noble Obelisk, and Joint Task Force Liberia, the noncombatant evac-uation operations in 1990, 1991, 1996, and 2003 from Liberia, in 1996 from the Central African Republic,and in 1997 from Sierra Leone.

The traditional concepts of employing Marines predicated their involvement in West Africa on protect-ing American lives and property that might be in danger. Before its actions in West Africa, the MarineCorps was frequently called on for noncombatant evacuation operations. Classic examples of whichinclude recent evacuation operations in Cyprus in 1974, South Vietnam in 1975, Cambodia in 1975, andLebanon in 1982 and 1984. Marine involvement in the Liberian evacuations during the country’s 14 yearsof civil war went beyond the permanent presence of the Marine Security Guard detachment at the U.S.Embassy in Monrovia, requiring a total of six Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and one Fleet AntiterrorismSecurity Team platoon to deploy in Liberia. Supporting elements were present in Sierra Leone, Sengal,and Spain. As a testament to operational flexibility, the Marines in Liberia reached as far as the CentralAfrican Republic, when a Marine Air-Ground Task Forces successfully launched an additional noncom-batant evacuation operation from the Liberia area of operations to support the evacuation of U.S. citizensfrom Bangui. The civil war in Liberia from 1989 to 2003 caused much bloodshed, death, suffering, anddestruction. The Marine Corps efforts focused on protecting Americans lives and property and resulted inthe evacuation of Americans and foreign nationals from the violence and chaos of civil war.

The authors of this volume, Majors James G. Antal and R. John Vanden Berghe, served as historicalwriters assigned the History and Museums Division. Major Antal previously served in a variety of infantryand intelligence billets and commanded the Marine Corps Security Force Company in Naples, Italy. Heretired from active duty in 1998. Major Vanden Berghe, an infantry officer, served as the assistant opera-tions officer and the operations officer of Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, during thatunit’s participation in Operation Sharp Edge. He retired from active duty in 2002.

In pursuit of accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes comments frominterested individual.

John W. RipleyColonel

United States Marine Corps (Retired)Director of Marine Corps History and Museums

Foreword

iii

This monograph examines the decisions, deployments, and actions of United States Marine Corpsforces in Liberia associated with Operations Sharp Edge, Assured Response, and Joint Task Force Liberia,and in the Central African Republic with Operation Quick Response and Noble Obelisk in Sierra Leone.The United States Marine Corps’ support of the American Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia, during the coun-try’s civil war (1989 to 2003) involved six different Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. The study begins withinteractions between the Marine’s forward command element and the embassy staff from May throughAugust 1990. Reviewed in detail are significant actions leading up to the embassy’s 4 August 1990 deci-sion to evacuate and draw down selected sites. Marines conducted security, support, and noncombatantevacuation operations from 5 August 1990 to 15 February 1991. The concurrent actions of West Africanpeacekeeping forces and Liberian peace efforts are included to provide the context of Marine actions inMonrovia. A short discussion of the interim civil war years follows. With the reintroduction of Americanforces in April 1996 comes the arrival and deployment of the Marines as a joint task force. Accordingly,the study examines the deployment, command relationships, political-military relationships, the fighting,and Marine’s actions at the embassy. Next is an account of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground TaskForce, the last Marine unit in Liberia. Included is a narrative of the unit’s deployment, turnover, actionsashore, and their final phased withdrawal from the embassy on 3 August 1996. The account of the May1996 evacuation (Quick Response) from the Central African Republic provides a related example ofMarine responsiveness in noncombatant evacuation operations. This monograph illustrates the flexibilityand utility of naval expeditionary forces, specifically, Marine expeditionary units, to conduct noncombat-ant evacuation operations in an uncertain world.

This monograph could not have been published without the professional efforts of the staff of theHistory and Museums Division. The authors would like to thank Mr. Charles D. Melson, Mr. Charles R.Smith, Dr. David B. Crist, and Mrs. Wanda J. Renfrow for their meticulous review and corrections to bothstyle and content, and Mr. Charles R. Smith, for his contributions to the text. We also would like to thankMs. Evelyn A. Englander, the research librarian, Mr. Frederick J. Graboske and his staff in the ArchivesSection, and the Reference Section, headed by Mr. Danny J. Crawford.

Preface

v

James G Antal R. John Vanden Berghe

Table of Contents

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................iiiPreface .......................................................................................................................................vTable of Contents ....................................................................................................................vii

Part I - Operation Sharp Edge 1990-1991

Chapter 1 - Liberian Unrest Turns Violent .......................................................................1The Geography of Liberia ........................................................................................................1Samuel Doe’s Rise to Power ....................................................................................................4Civil War Begins ........................................................................................................................5The Need for U.S. Involvement ...............................................................................................5First Look at Monrovia ..............................................................................................................8

Chapter 2 - Preparing for Operation Sharp Edge .........................................................11From Predeployment Training to the Mediterranean ...........................................................11Point Men in Monrovia ...........................................................................................................12Circling at Mamba Station .......................................................................................................16Frantic Negotiations Fizzle ......................................................................................................19Marines Poised for Insertion ..................................................................................................21The Call to Evacuate ...............................................................................................................23

Chapter 3 - Evacuation Operations ..................................................................................27A Rainy D-Day ........................................................................................................................27Into the Embassy .....................................................................................................................30West African Peacekeepers Arrive .........................................................................................35Evacuation from Buchanan ....................................................................................................38Rotation of Marine Forces ......................................................................................................41Turnover and Departure .........................................................................................................42

Chapter 4 - Operation Sharp Edge ...................................................................................43Deployment of the 26th MEU ................................................................................................4326th MEU and the Formation of the CMAGTF in Liberia ....................................................46Peacekeepers, Fighters, and Contigency MAGTF...................................................................47Rotation and Reduction of CMAGTF Marines ........................................................................62Completion of Sharp Edge .....................................................................................................63The Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team and the Departure of the Marines .......................64

Part II - Continuing Operations 1996-2003

Chapter 5 - 22d MEU in Operation Assured Response .................................................67Civil War Continues .................................................................................................................67Introduction of American Forces ...........................................................................................69Marines Take the Reins ...........................................................................................................73Actions Ashore ........................................................................................................................74

vi

Marines Return Fire .................................................................................................................76Reduction of Marine Forces ..................................................................................................83

Chapter 6 - Operation Quick Response ...........................................................................85Violence to the East ................................................................................................................85Call in the Marines ..................................................................................................................88Marine Operations in Bangui .................................................................................................90Planning for Reinforcements ..................................................................................................93Reduction of Presence and Withdrawal ................................................................................94

Chapter 7 - Planning, Deployment, and Action ............................................................95Special Purpose MAGTF Deploys ..........................................................................................95The Special Purpose MAGTF as the Assured Response Joint Task Force ..........................98Marines Draw Down and Depart .........................................................................................100

Epilogue - A Stabilizing Presence.....................................................................................103

Notes .....................................................................................................................................117

Appendices

Appendix A: Chronology ......................................................................................................129Appendix B: Command and Staff List ..................................................................................135Appendix C: Citations ...........................................................................................................137Appendix D: Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations ...........................................................139

Index .....................................................................................................................................141

vii

The Geography of Liberia

Liberia is geographically situated betweenSierra Leone, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast on thewestern bulge of Africa. In total landmass, thecountry is slightly larger than the state ofPennsylvania. Its narrow coastal strip, from 20 to50 miles wide, is interlaced with swamps, tidallagoons, and marshes. The coastal areas lead torolling hills that range from 400 to 1,200 feet highand are covered with dense broadleaf and ever-green forests. Timber and rubber plantationsabound in these areas of abundant naturalresources. Along Liberia’s northern border, therugged Guinea highlands divide the Niger River

basin to the northeast from streams flowing acrossthe country. The dominant mountain ranges ofthe Wologisi and Nimba, with elevations to 5,748feet, are found along the country’s eastern andnortheastern borders. Both of these mountainranges, as well as the lower Bong Hills, are richwith iron ore deposits and littered with goldmines. The country’s six major rivers drain north-east to southwest into the Atlantic Ocean. Threeof the country’s seven significant diamond minesare located near the Lofa River. Major port citiesinclude Buchanan, Harper, Monrovia, andRobertsport. The tropical climate has very distinctwet and dry seasons. During the wet season,which runs between April and November, the

Chapter 1

Liberian Unrest Turns Violent

average accumulation of rainfall is between 150and 170 inches with almost daily torrential thun-derstorms in the late afternoon. In the capital city of Monrovia, the mean temperature is 82degrees Fahrenheit with an average humidity of90 percent.

Liberia traces its origins back to the 1816 estab-lishment of the American Colonization Society.Intended to sponsor the repatriation of formerAmerican slaves to West Africa, this organizationestablished its first successful settlement on CapeMesurado in 1821. That site grew into the city of

2 ON MAMBA STATION

Monrovia. By 1847, more than 45,000 freed men,as well as Africans rescued from slave ships, hadsettled there. Most of these settlers died of diseaseor in conflicts with local tribesmen. The settlersdeclared independence from the AmericanColonization Society’s jurisdiction in 1847 andestablished a republic constitutionally modeledafter the United States. European nations quickly

recognized the new country, but the United Statesfailed to establish diplomatic ties until 1862.1

Liberia’s seemingly democratic structure was,in fact, a façade. Territory claimed by African-American settlers and their descendents (Americo-Liberians) and those rescued from slave ships(Congoes) extended eastward into the interior,which was populated by at least 16 indigenoustribal groups. The ruling Americo-Liberian elitehad no interest in assimilating the African popula-tion and referred to them as the “Country People.”Adopting the attitudes and lifestyle of antebellumsoutherners, Americo-Liberians regarded thenative Afro-Liberians as uncivilized inferiors.Although Liberians considered their stateChristian, only about 10 percent of the populationbelonged to one of the Christian denominations;20 percent were Muslim, and the remaining 70percent maintained traditional African beliefs.English is the official language, but there are morethan 20 dialects derived from Niger-Congo lin-guistic groups. A pidgin “Liberian English” is thecommon tongue.

The True Whig Party, which represented theinterests of a small group of interrelated familiesthat dominated the country, monopolized politicalpower for 133 years. This group comprised only5 percent of the population. This ruling classresided mainly in the coastal urban centers, prin-cipally Monrovia, and exploited Liberia’s naturalresources of rubber, iron ore, and lumber usinglabor coerced from the rural population. FirestoneTire and Rubber Company established the world’slargest rubber plantation at Harbel in 1936,heralding a period of increased American eco-nomic involvement in the country. An Open DoorPolicy, implemented after the election ofPresident William S. Tubman in 1944, led toincreasing foreign investment and modest pros-perity. During World War II, the United Statesbuilt Roberts Airport and the Freeport ofMonrovia, further developing the county’s infra-structure.

Unfortunately, more emphasis was placed onexporting raw materials than on expandingLiberia’s industrial capacity. In addition, aNational Unification Policy aimed at assimilatingrural Afro-Liberians fell short of incorporating thenative population into the political power struc-ture. Tubman, in fact, had no tolerance for anyform of political opposition. When formerPresident Edwin James Barclay’s IndependentWhig Party challenged Tubman in the 1955 pres-idential elections, his supporters were harassed

LIBERIAN UNREST TURNS VIOLENT 3

Photo courtesy of the authors

In government since 1935, William RichardTolbert, Jr., succeeded to the presidency of Liberiaupon William S. Tubman’s death in 1971.Instituting reforms to close the disparity betweenAmerico-Liberians and indigenous tribesmen,Tolbert raised expectations while the economyfailed, stimulating opposition and a militarycoup.

4 ON MAMBA STATION

and Barclay’s party was eventually banned.Although Liberia prospered, only the True Whigoligarchy benefited and repression maintainedthe chasm between them and the majority of thepopulation. This situation continued during thepresidency of William K. Tolbert, who assumedoffice upon Tubman’s death in 1971. But discon-tent led to organized opposition and theMovement for Justice in Africa was formed at theUniversity of Liberia in 1973. Then in 1975,Liberian students in the United States organizedthe Progressive Alliance of Liberia. An unpopularincrease in the cost of rice led to a demonstrationon 14 April 1979, which escalated into rioting,looting, and the deaths of nearly 100 people inMonrovia.

Samuel Doe’s Rise to Power

A year later, Tolbert died when 17 noncom-missioned officers, led by Master Sergeant SamuelKenyon Doe, stormed the Executive Mansion.They murdered the president in bed and killed 26members of his security guard. After advising trib-al soldiers not to obey Americo-Liberian officers,the enlisted men assumed control of the govern-ment and proclaimed themselves the People’sRedemption Council. The public initially wel-comed the end of 133 years of Americo-Liberianrule with enthusiasm, but the televised executionof 13 Tolbert Administration officials by drunkensoldiers foreshadowed the imposition of a militarydictatorship. Doe promised a return to civilianrule by 1985; political activity was banned until1984. Of 14 political parties that were organized,only four were allowed to participate in the pres-idential and legislative elections held on 15October 1985. Many of Doe’s opponents weredetained or otherwise harassed, and when theelection still seemed to turn against him, repre-sentatives of his own National Democratic Partyof Liberia manipulated the vote count and pro-claimed him the victor with 50 percent of thevotes (80 percent of the legislative seats beingclaimed by his party). Meanwhile, Doe removedmany of his fellow 1980 coup conspirators fromthe government, increasing the concentration ofpower to members of his own Krahn tribe. TheKrahn, like the Americo-Liberians before them,became a despised minority ruling over arepressed majority. On 12 November 1985, formerPeople’s Redemption Council member GeneralThomas Quiwonkpa led an unsuccessful coupattempt. Quiwonkpa’s failure led to his execution

and that of 16 of his supporters, followed bywidespread persecution of their Gio and Mano tribesmen. Approximately 3,000 were killed,especially in Quiwonkpa’s own Nimba County.Many fled the country to await an opportunity forrevenge.2

During the early 1980s, Liberia was viewed asa bastion against Soviet expansionism and Libyaninfluence in Africa and American aid flowed intothe country. The end of the Cold War and increas-ing alarm over Doe’s abysmal human rightsrecord led to a reduction of aid by the end of thedecade. This decline, coinciding with decreases inthe value of Liberia’s exported raw materials andthe corruption and incompetence of the regime,resulted in economic chaos and widespreadunemployment.

Then came Charles Taylor. An Americo-Liberian educated in Massachusetts, Taylor was anexpatriate opponent of the Tolbert regime.Present in Liberia during the 1980 coup, hisdegree in economics and glib personality earnedhim the leadership of the General ServicesAdministration, which was responsible for cen-tralized government purchasing. He was accusedof embezzling about $1 million U.S. dollars in


Leaders of the voilent 1980 military coup thatoverthrew President Tolbert were: (left) SgtNicholas Podier, who became speaker of the inter-im National Assembly; Sgt Thomas “Strongman”Quiwonkpa, commander of the Armed Forces ofLiberia; MSgt Samuel Kenyon Doe, head of state;and Sgt Thomas Weh Syen, deputy head of state.All died violently. Three were killed on orders ofSamuel Doe, and Doe himself was killed in themidst of the 1990 civil war.

1983 and fled to the United States, where he livedas a fugitive until he was arrested by U.S. mar-shals. In September 1985, Taylor escaped fromMassachusetts’ Plymouth County Jail, where hewas awaiting extradition. He made his way toLibya where Muammar Qadhafi allowed him totrain an insurgent force. After additional trainingin Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, Taylor’sNational Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) crossedthe border into Nimba County on Christmas Eve,1989.3

Civil War Begins

Initially, few in the government took the threatseriously. By late December, however, Doe sentthe 2d Battalion of his army to suppress the guer-rillas. Targeting Gio and Mano tribesmen associat-ed with Quiwonkpa’s 1985 attempt, the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) alienat-ed the population with indiscriminate murder,rape, and pillage. As civilians began to fear gov-ernment soldiers more than the NPFL, Taylor’sforce grew. Many soldiers likewise fled to therebels, taking their weapons with them. Theinsurgents lured some AFL units into ambushes bypassing false messages on captured radios, gain-ing more arms in the process. Children as youngas 10 years old fought as well, some to avengeslain family members and others simply becausethey had no option.4

As popular support grew, the NPFL expandedits initial focus on killing government troops andofficials to persecution of Doe’s Krahn and theirMandingo associates. By 6 January 1990, morethan 10,000 refugees had fled to the Ivory Coast,spreading word of atrocities committed by bothgovernment and rebel forces. Meanwhile, Doetightened his own security by establishing numer-ous checkpoints throughout Monrovia and dis-patching additional troops into the interior.5

The insurgents successfully eluded Doe’sforces, moving across mountains and throughforests to seize the town of Tapeta, which gavethem control of the coastal road and split thecountry in half. On 7 March, the United StatesCongress passed House Resolution 354, con-demning atrocities committed by both parties inthe conflict.6 On 24 March, an American mission-ary was killed in crossfire. In Monrovia, govern-ment troops began harassing Liberians employedby the American Embassy. Threats directedagainst embassy officials over the security guards’radio net culminated in the burning of an

embassy warehouse by two disgruntled employ-ees on 29 March. As Taylor’s forces advanced intoGrand Gedeh County in early April, the numberof Liberians seeking refuge in neighboring coun-ties grew to more than 140,000.7 On 23 April, anembassy travel advisory stated the security situa-tion was deteriorating as random acts of violenceagainst foreigners increased. Three days later, thevoluntary evacuation of official dependents andnonessential personnel was authorized. Within aweek, the official American community shrankfrom 621 to 143 as embassy families, Peace Corpsvolunteers, and employees of the Voice ofAmerica and the United States Agency forInternational Development (USAID) left the coun-try.8

Meanwhile, Doe urged Krahn chiefs to: “gettheir cutlasses and single barrel guns and get intothe bush and pursue the rebels,” prompting fur-ther atrocities.9 Loyalist troops arrested 150 Gio

soldiers suspected of treason. Many of Monrovia’sprimarily Mandingo taxi drivers fled to SierraLeone and Guinea while AFL troops manning agrowing number of checkpoints throughout thecity detained, harassed, and extracted bribes frommotorists. In addition, the number of mutilatedcorpses multiplied. On 24 May, the U.S. StateDepartment issued another travel advisory order-ing all nonessential personnel to leave.

The Need for U.S. Involvement

As the situation continued to deteriorate, theJoint Chiefs of Staff began looking at four possi-ble actions that had been presented by the U.S.European Command. The maritime option includ-ed the employment of a Marine amphibious force.The other three involved Army airborne or U.S.Special Operations Command forces seizing


During the early 1980s, Liberia wasviewed as a bastion against Sovietexpansionism and Libyan influence inAfrica and American aid flowed intothe country. The end of the Cold Warand increasing alarm over Doe’sabysmal human rights record led to areduction of aid by the end of thedecade.

Roberts International Airport. The AmericanEmbassy in Monrovia wanted a military optionavailable, but did not favor a direct military pres-ence ashore. Personnel were still being evacuatedby commercial charter flights, and although therewas no government opposition to their departure,nor any apparent physical threat, numerous road-blocks had to be negotiated on the way to the air-port. Evacuees traveled in convoys escorted bythe embassy’s regional security officer and locallyhired guards. While it appeared a noncombatantevacuation operation conducted by U.S. forceswas unnecessary, the maritime option providedthe most viable contingency force. After review,President George H. Bush, with the advice of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GeneralColin L. Powell, and the Secretary of Defense,Richard B. Cheney, approved the European Com-mand’s plan to station off the Liberian coast 2,500Marines equipped for an amphibious landing.

On 25 May 1990, the 22d Marine ExpeditionaryUnit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)),as part of its Landing Force Sixth Fleet deploy-ment 2-90 (the second MEU deployed to the

Mediterranean that year), was training at Camp deCanjuers near the port of Toulon in southernFrance. The MEU comprised a command element(the MEU staff); Battalion Landing Team 2dBattalion, 4th Marines (BLT 2/4); Marine MediumHelicopter Squadron 261 (HMM-261); and MEUService Support Group 22 (MSSG-22), the MEU’slogistical support element. When the deploymentorder came in from General Powell, the MEU’sMcDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier detachment,based ashore at Hyeres Naval Air Station east ofToulon, abruptly shifted its focus from routinetraining to “mounting out” on board ship. The fol-lowing day, Admiral Jonathan T. Howe,Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe,

issued the deployment order directing theMediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)with the 22d MEU to proceed to the vicinity ofMonrovia. Upon arrival off the Liberian coast, theMarines would prepare for evacuations and secu-rity operations at U.S. installations ashore to beconducted with or without permission from theLiberian government. Colonel Granville R.“Granny” Amos, commanding officer of 22d MEU,had been monitoring the situation for some timeand immediately directed that equipment and per-sonnel be embarked in compliance with a 12-hour standby plan.10

Government and rebel forces continued fight-ing at the key towns of Garbande and Buchanan.*The rebel tactics were to first attack checkpointsand convoys outside a town, then encircle it.Once surrounded, government troops usuallyretreated into the town, haphazardly firing mor-tars, rockets, and machine guns. The terrorizedcivilian population suffered most. Doe’s troopsgenerally deserted or fled, allowing the rebels towin easy victories.11 Taylor’s rebels employedthese very tactics on 26 May to seize the city ofKakata, about 30 miles northeast of Monrovia.Arbitrary arrests and detentions in Monrovia con-tinued, as did the indiscriminate killing of Giosand Manos by Krahn soldiers. As fighting drewcloser, more refugees flocked into the capital.Seeking protection from the violence, a largegroup gathered outside the compound of theUnited Nations Development Program (UNDP).U.N. personnel granted entry to about 1,500.

On the evening of 29 May, government AFLtroops broke into the compound firing automaticweapons, wounding two guards and killing athird. Between 30 and 40 men and boys, includ-ing Gio and Mano UNDP employees, wereforcibly removed. At least eight were tortured,executed, and mutilated on a nearby beach.Michael Heyn, the U.N. representative in Liberia,described the attack as “incredible, and a violationof international law.”12 On 30 May, the U.N. evac-uated its entire staff. Although Doe visited thecompound the following day, promising the sur-vivors he would find the culprits, he either couldnot, or had no intention of, controlling his army.

Prior to this incident, the commander of theSixth Fleet, Vice Admiral James D. Williams, USN,authorized the dispatch of the 22d MEU’s forward

6 ON MAMBA STATION

* Buchanan is a port linked by road and rail to both Monroviaand the interior.

On the evening of 29 May, governmentAFL troops broke into the compound fir-ing automatic weapons, wounding twoguards and killing a third. Between 30and 40 men and boys, including Gio andMano UNDP employees, were forciblyremoved. At least eight were tortured,executed, and mutilated on a nearbybeach.

command element to Liberia. Serving as a liaisonbetween State Department personnel and theMEU, the employment of a forward command ele-ment is standard procedure for any evacuationoperation.13 Unfortunately, the embassy inMonrovia had not requested the forward com-mand element, which made coordination difficult.The team’s five original members were reduced totwo due to problems with travel arrangements.Encumbered by personal weapons, ammunition,pyrotechnics, satellite communications equip-ment, cryptology gear, rations, uniforms, andcivilian clothes, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen J.Labadie, Jr., the 22d MEU’s executive officer, andMajor Glen R. Sachtleben, executive officer of BLT2/4, flew from the USS Saipan (LHA 2) by heli-copter on 29 May.

After landing at Rota Naval Station in Spain, thepair sought transportation for themselves andtheir equipment to Liberia. Commercial trans-portation presented several problems. Not onlywas it extremely expensive, but their equipmentwould be difficult to pass through customs. Theyalso had no visas, and the circuitous route (con-necting at Madrid, Paris, and Amsterdam) wouldtake 46 hours to complete. A Navy Beech D-12Super King airplane was available, but it couldnot carry both them and all their baggage. Theofficers considered crossing to Morocco, renting acar, and driving to Monrovia. Meanwhile, ColonelAmos decided to send the three remaining for-ward command element members: Captain DavidJ. Mollahan, officer in charge of the MEU’s airnaval gunfire liaison company detachment;


DVIC DN-SC-90-08850

A port view of the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2). In the Mediterranean participating withthe 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit in NATO southern region exercise Dragon Hammer ’90, the Saipanand other ships in the amphibious ready group would be ordered to waters off Liberia.

Lieutenant Commander Robert Peterman, officerin charge of the Amphibious Squadron 4’s(Phibron 4) naval special warfare group detach-ment; and Sergeant Scott R. Widdifield, from theMEU’s radio battalion detachment. While the triotraveled to Rota, Major Sachtleben metCommander Phillip G. Hobbs, the commandingofficer of Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 22(VR-22), a Navy Lockheed C-130 Herculessquadron based at the naval station. That night,the two officers agreed that a VR-22 Herculeswould fly the forward command element toMonrovia, provided each got the approval of theirrespective chains-of-command. While the forwardcommand element spent 30 May getting vaccina-tions and Malaria pills, VR-22 helped them obtainpersonal clearances to travel to Liberia and sub-mitted an aircraft clearance request. At 0500 on 31May, their C-130 left Rota for Monrovia.

First Look at Monrovia

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie, Major Sachtleben,and the remaining members of the forward com-

mand element arrived at 1205 local time. The air-craft spent only 15 minutes on the ground, justlong enough to quickly offload its passengers andtheir equipment. Roberts International Airport, 35miles from Monrovia, was closed to commercialtraffic due to nearby rebel attacks. LieutenantColonel Bruce Newman, USA, assistant chief ofthe military mission at the embassy welcomed theforward command element. The five-man teamthen drove to the embassy’s Greystone com-pound, where Lieutenant Colonel Labadie direct-ed them to establish communications with the 22dMEU while he met with the embassy staff.14

The staff briefed the forward command ele-ment on the current situation. At the meeting ofthe Economic Community of West African States on 30 May in Banjul, Gambia, the participantscalled for an immediate ceasefire and establisheda standing mediation committee to help resolvethe conflict. But the insurgents had alreadyreached Harbel (site of the former Firestone rub-ber plantation, now Japanese owned), bringingthem within 20 miles from the capital. Thisadvance effectively closed all air traffic to Roberts

8 ON MAMBA STATION


Armed Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia soldiers drive past the American Embassy onUnited Nations Drive. The rebel soldiers belonged to one of two factions challenging government forcesfor control of the capital.

International Airport. In addition, Taylor’s NPFLhad split into two factions, which further compli-cated the situation. Former army captain and eth-nic Gio, Prince Yormie Johnson, broke withTaylor in February to form a new faction calledthe Independent National Patriotic Front ofLiberia (INPFL). This group was challenging boththe government forces and their former comradesfor control of the capital. Control of more thantwo-thirds of the country was now split betweenthe two rebel factions, each of which continued toadvance in spurts, pausing to reorganize betweenattacks.

On 26 May, the 22d MEU completed loading itspersonnel and equipment on the ships of theARG, which sailed from Toulan the following day.As the group passed Rota, HMM-261 helicopterspicked up additional personnel, supplies, andmaps of Liberia. The ships then headed southafter taking on fuel and supplies. The Saipan andUSS Sumter (LST 1181) proceeded together whilethe USS Ponce (LPD 15), delayed by repairs, fol-lowed later.

Recognizing the MEU might be given a contin-gency mission in Liberia prior to receipt of thedeployment order, Colonel Amos directed theMEU staff to refine their plans. Using rapid plan-ning techniques, they were a day ahead when theorder was received on 26 May. The following day,the staff briefed General James P. McCarthy, USAF,Deputy Commander in Chief, EuropeanCommand; Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA,Commander, Special Operations Command,Europe; Admiral Jonathan Howe, USN,Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe;and Vice Admiral James D. Williams, USN,Commander, Sixth Fleet, on board the Saipan.The briefing detailed various courses of actionopen to the MEU, should it be called upon to exe-cute a noncombatant evacuation operation inMonrovia, now designated Operation Sharp Edge.

Reports on the deteriorating situation led to anall-out effort to get the Marines to Liberia quickly.Accompanying the ships of Phibron 4, whichformed the ARG, was the destroyer USS Peterson(DD 969). The MEU transferred a reinforced pla-


DVIC DN-ST-90-11228

The American Embassy in Monrovia became the focal point for American citizens and other foreignnationals to gather in preparation for evacuation during Liberia’s political unrest and civil war.

toon of Marines and one helicopter to thedestroyer so they could arrive prior to the rest ofthe task force. These 75 Marines would providequick reinforcement if called upon, and includedan evacuation control center to coordinate anevacuation. A detachment of Navy SEALs (Sea,Air, Land) from Naval Special Warfare Group 2 also boarded the Peterson. Traveling at 30 knots,the destroyer arrived off Liberia on 2 June.

The operation order for Sharp Edge directedthe task force to be ready to conduct an evacua-tion within 24 hours of notification. It alsoassigned Admiral Williams, the commander of theSixth Fleet, as the commander of the joint taskforce (JTF).15 The JTF, now officially formed,comprised approximately 2,300 Marines from the22d MEU and 1,900 sailors from the ARG. Whenthe Saipan and Sumter arrived on 3 June, theMarines on the Peterson returned to the Saipan.With the arrival of the Ponce on 4 June, the JTFwent into a modified location at sea, designatedMamba Station.*

The embassy compound was located on apeninsula at the western edge of Monrovia withthe ocean to the west and south and theMesuardo River to the north. To the east were thebusiness district, central market, Tubman Stadium,and the AFL’s Barclay Training Center. TheExecutive Mansion and Capitol were southeast ofthe training center. Tubman Boulevard, the city’s

main thoroughfare, passed eastward through theSinkor District, Spriggs-Payne Airport, and CongoTown. Tubman Boulevard branched off atPaynesville. Traveling northeast, it was eight milesto the U.S. Omega navigation transmitter site and22 miles to the Voice of America transmitter. Sixmiles further east the road forked again, leadingeither northeast to Kakata or southeast to Herbel.

The other fork in Tubman Boulevard led eastwardalong the coast toward the U.S. telecommunica-tions transmitter and Roberts InternationalAirport. Two bridges crossed the Mesuardo Rivernorth of Monrovia, connecting the capital withBushrod Island where the Freeport was located.The road continued north across the St. PaulRiver, passing through Brewersville to the Voiceof America receiving station and Americantelecommunication office receiver site.

The American community was spread outamong the city of 400,000 people. An embassywarehouse was on Bushrod Island.16 The USAIDlibrary was located in the central business district.The Graystone compound was located one blockeast of the Mamba Point embassy compound and housed diplomatic personnel. The embassy’sMarine Security Guard detachment lived at MarineHouse on United Nations Drive. A U.S.Government Services Organization warehousewas within a block of the Barclay Training Center,while the American Cooperative School, USAIDHeadquarters, Peace Corps Office and trainingcenter, and housing for several embassy staffmembers and other American citizens were locat-ed in Sinkor and Congo Town. Americans work-ing in outlying areas such as the Omega andVoice of America transmitter sites lived in eitherMonrovia or its suburbs.

Both the embassy staff and senior Navy andMarine commanders of the task force were clear-ly aware of U.S. policy toward the Doe regime.During the 1980s, approximately $500 million ineconomic, military, and social aid flowed intoLiberia, making it West Africa’s largest per capitarecipient of American assistance.17 Because of thecountry’s long-standing ties with the UnitedStates, and the Cold War access to Africa it gavethe American government, the two nations hadstrong mutual interests.** Yet the Doe regime’scorruption, incompetence, and appalling humanrights record could not be ignored.18 As the rebelfactions closed in on Monrovia, Marines andsailors waiting off the coast faced an increasinglycomplex and volatile situation.

10 ON MAMBA STATION

** United States aircraft could land and refuel in Liberia on 24hours’ notice. The Omega navigation station assisted interna-tional shipping by providing navigational fixes, while theAmerican telecommunications relay site provided communi-cations for diplomatic traffic between embassies in sub-Saharan Africa. The Voice of America relay station transmittedbroadcasts throughout the region.

* Mamba Station was named for Mamba Point, the location ofthe U.S. Embassy in Monrovia.

During the 1980s, approximately $500million in economic, military, and socialaid flowed into Liberia, making it WestAfrica’s largest per capita recipient ofAmerican assistance.

From Predeployment Training to theMediterranean

In the course of training for its deployment, the22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (SpecialOperations Capable) practiced three noncombat-ant evacuation operations. For the 22d MEU’s“graduation” special operations exercise, BattalionLanding Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4) conducted two dif-ferent site noncombatant evacuation operationsconcurrently. One evacuation took place at amock embassy and the other at an outlying site.Using rapid planning techniques, the MEU exe-cuted the multisite noncombatant evacuationoperations exercise at Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina, within six hours of receiving the warn-ing order. Company E performed the outlying sitemission and Company H the mock embassy mis-sion.19 By coincidence, the exercise mirroredclosely the subsequent actions of the unit inLiberia.

Before the deployment, the staff studied anumber of contingency areas, including Liberia.The MEU’s intelligence officer, Major Stephen L.Sayko, explained: “Prior to the deployment westarted to take a look at the map, and Africa kindof stood out at us.” If a contingency arose thatneeded a maritime option, “the Med MEU wouldbe the only game in town.” The intelligence sec-tion took the standard contingency planningmaterials for West Africa, which includedLiberia.20

The 22d MEU’s deployment began on 8 March1990 when it sailed from Morehead City, NorthCarolina. As the next unit in the normal rotationto the Mediterranean, they steamed across theAtlantic and arrived at Naval Station, Rota, Spain,on 26 March. While at Rota, the staff received itsfirst dispatch on Liberia, which reported anAmerican citizen had died from a gunshot woundto the leg. After this initial message, the MEU staffbegan receiving other reports from the embassy

in Liberia, including information on the 29 Marchburning of the U.S. Embassy warehouse inMonrovia.

By 23 April, in Cannes, France, the MEUlearned that the State Department had issued atravel advisory on Liberia. The advisory recom-mended that American citizens leave the country,and noted the start of a reduction of official per-sonnel at the embassy. That same day, the FleetMarine Officer at the U.S. Navy’s European head-quarters, Colonel Willis H. “Bill” Hansen, togetherwith U.S. European Command representatives,briefed the MEU staff. Colonel Hansen had led afour-man European Command assessment teamto Liberia earlier that month and had acquired anexcellent understanding of the embassy’s situationas well as possible evacuation sites.21 The first-hand assessment gave the MEU commander andhis staff helpful planning information and accessto recent pictures taken in Liberia. ColonelHansen reviewed all possible force options avail-able to European Command if an evacuation wasrequired, but the staff focused on the one mar-itime option that included the MEU. With this newand updated information, Major Sayko’s intelli-gence section began to develop detailed supportplans in earnest.22 * Meanwhile, the Marines con-tinued their scheduled training and exercises inthe Mediterranean.

In the first week of May, the MEU participatedin Dragon Hammer, a North Atlantic TreatyOrganization exercise in Sardinia. After the exer-cise, the MEU sailed to San Rapheal, France, andoff-loaded equipment and personnel on 16 Mayfor training at nearby Camp de Canjuers. Whenthe Mediterranean-based Amphibious ReadyGroup (ARG) anchored in Toulon on 17 May, theMEU split for training and liberty. While one halftrained for 10 days at Camp de Canjuers, the other

Chapter 2

Preparing for Operation Sharp Edge

* The planning included obtaining the embassy’s EmergencyAction Plan from U.S. European Command.

half enjoyed liberty in Toulon. With messagesfrom the American Embassy in Monrovia indicat-ing a steadily worsening situation, ColonelGranville Amos wanted his Marines prepared toreact quickly. He directed his staff and subordi-nate commanders at Camp de Canjuers to readyplans for a possible 12-hour return to the ships atany point in the training cycle. Realizing the seri-ousness of the deteriorating situation, ColonelAmos, a veteran of the evacuations of PhnomPenh and Saigon, as well as operations inGrenada and Beirut, wanted to be ready for anyeventuality.23

Early on the morning of 25 May, Colonel Amosofficially learned about the possible contingencymission in Liberia. The alert order issued by theChairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the22d MEU and Amphibious Squadron 4 (Phibron4) to get under way for Liberia.24 The ships sailedtwo days later after a quick loading of equipmentand personnel back on board. As they steamedout of the Mediterranean, the ships received fueland fresh supplies. The Marines received person-

nel augmentation.* On the way to Liberia, theMEU received European Command’s OperationOrder Sharp Edge while conducting mass casual-ty drills and evacuation operation receptionrehearsals.25 The orders directed the MEU to beprepared to protect and evacuate American citi-zens and other foreign nationals from Liberia.

Point Men in Monrovia

In preparation for the evacuation, the MEUsent a five-man forward command element to theembassy in Monrovia to assess the situation.Arriving on 31 May, the team’s reception indicat-ed that many of the embassy officials consideredtheir presence premature. Gathering at their quar-ters on the day of their arrival, Lieutenant ColonelStephen J. Labadie’s team met with Colonel DavidStaley, USA, the chief of military mission in

12 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-11531

Stationed off the coast of Liberia, Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit practice body-searchtechniques on the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2) in preparation forOperation Sharp Edge.

* Personnel augmenting the joint task force included intelli-gence specialists, such as a four-man joint intelligence liaisonelement.

Monrovia. Colonel Staley instructed the team onits conduct, to whom the team could talk, whatthe members could wear, and where it could go.Essentially, the forward command element couldtalk to anyone, but if it needed to talk to anyArmed Forces of Liberia personnel, the team hadto first clear coordination with Colonel Staley.Directed to wear only civilian clothes, the teamcould travel freely unless going to some unusualplace. In those cases, the team needed advanceclearance for the visit from the chief of militarymission. Speaking frankly, Staley stated he reallydid not know why the Marines had come, andsaid the embassy had a good handle on the situ-ation. He further informed the team the embassyexpected a coup and anticipated it would taketwo or three days. That would likely be followedby a great deal of killing and other acts of retri-bution for the excesses of the Doe government.Once that was over, Staley said the U.S. wouldrecognize the new government and the embassywould go back to business as usual.* ColonelStaley did not anticipate any need for an evacua-tion because the embassy had already drawndown staff and dependents. He then expressedthe hope that Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and hisMarines would have a nice stay, however brief,and reaffirmed that he would support the team inany way he could.26

Given the nature of the alarmist message traf-fic coming out of the embassy, the forward com-mand element reacted with surprise. Major GlenSachtleben put it plainly:

Of course we were shocked. Weexpected to land and fight ourway to the Embassy and thensaw that it wasn’t that way. Thecheckpoints we went throughwere very quick, no problems atall. The soldiers we saw walkingaround all had weapons, butthey were all lackadaisical look-ing. There was no feeling thatthis country was falling apart inour first impression.27

Their dismay at the low level of urgency deep-ened as the team met other embassy officials dur-ing the remainder of that first day. Most of theembassy staff, including the deputy in charge ofmission, members of the defense attache office,and the chief of station appeared surprised to seethem, unconvinced and unsure of why Marineswere there. Only Larry Hartnett, the regional secu-rity officer, and Colonel Staley appreciated theMarines’ presence and fully understood their mis-sion. Major Sachtleben felt the attitude among theembassy staff was that of “this isn’t going to hap-pen guys.”28 The forward command element teammembers knew their tasks and wanted to get towork. The tasks included conducting liaison andassessing the overall situation, surveying helicop-ter landing zones and landing beaches, determin-ing the number of evacuees, and estimating thelevel of hostilities likely to be encountered duringan evacuation. Unfortunately, the prevailing opin-ion of the staff, that an evacuation was not nec-essary, led to a reluctance of certain key embassypersonnel to support the Marines’ effort.Personality conflicts among the embassy staff alsolead to certain members of the staff obstructingthe team’s efforts simply because of its associationwith another staff member.29 All of this made thework of the team more difficult.30

The forward command element met with theMarine security guard detachment, which washeaded by Staff Sergeant Timothy Love. Teammembers noted that Guard Post One was locatedat the main entrance to the chancery. At the post,the Marine guard on duty monitored local com-munications and functioned as the net control sta-tion for one of the five radio nets at theembassy.31** The posted Marine was the commu-nication link for Lieutenant Colonel Labadie’steam when they conducted reconnaissance for-ays. As the violence escalated, the Marine securi-ty guard detachment’s quick relaying of messages

PREPARING FOR OPERATION SHARP EDGE 13

* This line of thinking originated from past Liberian events.Samuel K. Doe’s bloody but successful coup in Monrovia, 12April 1980, ended quickly. The city also rapidly returned tobusiness as usual after a failed coup attempt on 12 November1985.

** For official Americans and government employees, theseradio nets allowed the passing and receiving of messages towarn them of potential problems. In case of emergencies ordangers, most official and nonofficial U.S. citizens receivednotification or warnings by radio using a tiered contact sys-tem. Nonofficial (non-government employed U.S. citizens)Americans in Liberia maintained contact through a wardensystem with the missionary radio networks, or through com-mercial companies’ communications with their Monroviaoffices. Backup for nonofficial Americans was by telephone orshort wave radio. “Liberia Emergency Planning Handbook,”dtd 1990, Annex B (Sharp Edge HistColl, MCHC, Washington,D.C.).

and reassuring assistance when called helpedembassy staff and forward command elementpersonnel in potentially life threatening situations.In addition to the Marine security guard detach-ment, the embassy’s local guard force stood postoutside the gate and inside the embassy com-pound. The embassy employed a very loyal con-tract guard force composed of Liberians hired byWackenhut Corporation. Darrell M. Lowe, aretired Marine lieutenant colonel, oversaw the 550guards, who carried only nightsticks.32 This forcemanned more than 200 posts throughout the cap-ital to protect official American citizens and prop-erty.33* Stationed at all U.S. properties, the guardsproved to be a source of local information to theMarines, passing on reports as to who controlledcertain areas and what types of activities tookplace during the fighting.34 As a testimony of theirloyalty, throughout the crisis many of the guards

remained on post and reported information evenafter the rebels had overrun the surroundingareas. Some guards were beaten and others werekilled in the violence.

With the destroyer USS Peterson (DD 969)steaming toward Liberia, members of the forwardcommand element were almost certain EuropeanCommand would select the maritime evacuationoption that included the Marines. Once thedestroyer arrived, the MEU and ARG constitutedthe quickest response for the emergency and ren-dered the three other European Command forceoptions irrelevant. Lieutenant Colonel Labadiebelieved the Marines on board Navy ships just off-shore and over the horizon best suited the em-bassy’s diplomatic intentions. Colonel Staley as-sured Lieutenant Colonel Labadie that the deputychief of mission, Dennis C. Jett (in charge of theembassy in the absence of the ambassador),would not allow the U.S. Army to bring in troopsand simply leave them at the airport, which couldenflame an already delicate situation.35

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and MajorSachtleben found the State Department’sapproach extremely frustrating, often putting

14 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC SN-DT-90-11420

Officers of the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit gather in the Marine Expeditionary Unit commander’s officeon board the USS Saipan (LHA 2) for a briefing on the situation in and around Monrovia.

* In addition to the unarmed guards at the embassy, otherunarmed guards manned posts at the Graystone compound,U.S. Information Service (USIS) building, USAID Library,USAID compound, Peace Corps compound, DoD military mis-sion, American Cooperative School, official Americans’ resi-dences, and the navigation and communication site facilities.

them at odds with embassy officials. According toMajor Sachtleben: “We think of things in terms ofseconds, minutes, hours, and days, and then weroll in on top of the State Department who havea totally different philosophy. They think of thingsin terms of weeks, months, years, and decades. Sohere were these two different elements, theDepartment of Defense and the Department ofState, kind of bucking up against each other. So itwas extremely frustrating.”36*

Despite the hindrances, members of the for-ward command element set out to collect infor-mation for a possible noncombatant evacuationoperation. They began by surveying helicopterlanding zones.** Traveling in civilian clothes,Lieutenant Colonel Labadie, Captain Mollahan,and Sergeant Widdifield visited every designatedlanding zone (LZ) in the area. The site surveysincluded the American TelecommunicationsOffice, the Voice of America, the Barclay TrainingCenter (AFL compound), and the AmericanCooperative School. The team gathered updatedinformation on size, slopes, obstacles, directionsof flight access and egress, surface materials, anddominant terrain of each landing zone. That infor-mation was then relayed to the MEU throughmessages and phototelesis.37

The results of the survey excluded some land-ing zones from the list of evacuation sites. Thepresence of AFL soldiers at the Barclay TrainingCenter and the extensive overhead wires support-ing the antennas at Voice of America sites elimi-nated these landing zones from consideration.The survey also identified some new landingzones, such as the basketball court in the embassycompound. Named LZ Magic after the profession-al basketball player “Magic” Johnson, the basket-ball court became the primary helicopter landingzone for Operation Sharp Edge.38

Because the evacuation could employ eitherhelicopters or landing craft, Lieutenant Colonel

Labadie felt it prudent to survey possible landingbeaches. Lieutenant Commander Robert Petermanand Major Sachtleben were assigned to this task.The two officers, dressed in civilian clothing andcarrying concealed weapons, hiked to seven areabeaches. Aware of the delicacy of the situation—traveling the countryside without visas and look-ing at beach landing sites for what could be con-strued as an evacuation or an invasion, depend-ing on your point of view—both men acted ascircumspect as possible. They looked at everydesignated landing beach and Peterman conduct-ed a swimming survey in the surf zone at most ofthem. The two officers discovered hidden rocks,undertows, and plunging surf at every beach. Theteam especially concentrated on the beach next tothe compound, known as Red Beach, conductingsurf observations twice each day for severalweeks. When the AFL put the beach under sur-veillance, the surf observations for Red Beachstopped. The team recommended Navy SEALs

conduct a comprehensive beach survey beforeusing Red Beach as a landing site.39

The chief of station, Jim McWilliams, opposedthe idea of conducting further beach surveys. Intheir first meeting, McWilliams assured LieutenantColonel Labadie that special operations personnelfrom European Command already had assessedthe beaches and approved them for evacuation.Lieutenant Colonel Labadie knew the beachesrequired a more detailed hydrographic survey,but McWilliams and the military attache did notagree. With Jett’s initial support, LieutenantColonel Labadie submitted the proposal up the


* Deputy Chief of Mission, Dennis C. Jett, expressed anembassy staff viewpoint of the forward command elementafter about a month ashore. Jett stated that “embassy relationswith the military were beginning to fray” by July. Dennis C.Jett, “Evacuations During Civil War, Liberia 1990,” in EmbassiesUnder Siege: Personal Accounts by Diplomats on the FrontLine, Joseph G. Sullivan ed. (Washington: Brassey’s, 1995), p.138.

** The forward command element brought with them a copyof Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) IntelligenceSupport Handbook (NISH) that contained imagery and dataon key landing zones, landing beaches, routes, and locationsin Liberia for a NEO.

“We think of things in terms of seconds,minutes, hours, and days, and then weroll in on top of the State Departmentwho have a totally different philosophy.They think of things in terms of weeks,months, years, and decades. So herewere these two different elements, theDepartment of Defense and theDepartment of State, kind of bucking upagainst each other. So it was extremelyfrustrating.”

— Major Glen Sachtleben

chain-of-command.* Higher headquarters disap-proved the request and the Marines made duewith the results of the forward command ele-ment’s limited surveys.40

Work such as reinforcement of the embassystill required the team’s attention. The forwardcommand element planned for the reinforcementof the embassy, which included specific posts todefend and harden. The regional security officerclosely cooperated with the team on its plan. Toidentify specific embassy evacuation responsibili-ties, the team worked with the consular section.The rush for visas as people tried to leave thecountry kept the consular office extremely busy.Despite the surge of people, the consular officer,Mrs. Penny McMurtry, coordinated with the for-

ward command element. Incrementally, theMarines gained the required information andcompleted the basic reinforcement plan by thetime the ARG arrived.41

The team also worked with the embassy staffin planning a more detailed evacuation than whatwas in the embassy’s emergency evacuation plan.This, too, proved difficult because almost all theembassy staff thought an evacuation was unnec-essary. The staff believed its draw down arrange-ments to be sufficient. No one at the embassyactively obstructed the Marines’ efforts, but manyon the staff simply did not feel an evacuation planconstituted an urgent priority or merited theirimmediate attention. Despite this indifference, theteam completed a detailed evacuation plan.42

Circling at Mamba Station

Once off the coast of Liberia, the ARG waitedin the overpowering heat and humidity at a posi-tion officially designated Mamba Station. For the

16 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-11412LtCol Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., commanding officer of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261, deliv-ers a pre-operation brief to his officers and pilots in the squadron ready room on board the USS Saipan(LHA 2).

* Deputy Chief of Mission Dennis C. Jett later stated, “since thesurveys would have been conducted within site of theExecutive Mansion and the army’s main base, an armed con-frontation was entirely possible.” The forward command ele-ment eliminated this particular beach early in the planning forthe same reason.

next two months, while the ships steamed slowlyin a circular ocean track, the embarked Marineskept busy. Virtually every day they rehearsed var-ious evacuation plans with all units and consid-ered all location options. One particularly sensi-tive plan concerned the extraction of PresidentDoe if he decided to leave Liberia. The MEU prac-ticed the contingency based on two differentoptions. The first involved a helicopter evacuationfrom the embassy, while the second was a directflight from Spriggs-Payne Airport by fixed-wingaircraft. In both options, once evacuated, Doewould fly in one of the MEU’s Lockheed KC-130Hercules aircraft to a country that would providehim sanctuary.43 A maritime special purpose force(MSPF), composed of the MEU’s Marine forcereconnaissance detachment and the ARG’s SEAL

detachment, repeatedly primed for these options,conducting day and night full dress rehearsals.Acting as the covering force for the MSPF,Company H also practiced its role in the prepara-tions. The plan remained on stand-by and in earlyJuly the group’s alert times shortened temporarilyto a one-hour alert to execute.* During June, mostof the cabinet officials fled their posts, with theexception of one or two ministers, whilePresident Doe doggedly maintained he couldreverse the growing victories of the rebels inLiberia.

In anticipation of the evacuation, the designat-ed commander of the joint task force ordered the


DVIC DN-ST-90-11421

Marines of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit gather in the hanger bay of the USS Saipan (LHA 2) for abriefing on the situation in Monrovia. Also outlined were the rules of engagement governing their mis-sion once ashore.

* Although the vacillating President Doe eventually refused aU.S. offer for safe passage, the Marines remained ready.

establishment of a forward logistics site at Lungiairfield in Freetown, Sierra Leone.* The MEUbased its KC-130 aircraft detachment from MarineAerial Refueling Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) atLungi. Two aircraft arrived on 5 June with themission of providing aerial refueling and support-ing the logistical air bridge between Rota or Dakarand Freetown. Marine and Navy helicopters also

began conducting short-range logistics flightsfrom the ARG ships to the airfield. Later, theFreetown forward logistics site would serve as atransit point for evacuees arriving by helicopter orship.44

At the beginning of June 1990, the Monroviaembassy staff maintained its daily routine, includ-ing shopping in town. The staff appeared toreflect the city’s “wait and see” outlook. Since allthe fighting between armed factions had takenplace in the countryside, Monrovia appeareddeceptively calm. Gradually, however, the fight-ing outside Monrovia started to disrupt the calmfacade. Rebels overran the city’s satellite earth sta-tion and international telephone service ceased.45

The voluntary draw down turned mandatory afterthe Department of State granted the embassy’srequest for an authorized departure status.(Authorized departure status implied there wasimminent danger to State Department employeesor their dependents.) Sunday charter flights con-tinued to depart with American citizens from theirtemporary homes in Monrovia, most leaving withjust suitcases. Organized convoys of Americansdeparted from the embassy to the airport in town,Spriggs-Payne, with the regional security officerand his local guards providing security.Approximately 1,450 Americans remained inLiberia, down from 10,480 five months earlier.46

By 7 June, Taylor’s NPFL forces controlledHerbel and the international airport areas. Theadvancing fighters established roadblocks andcamps to the east of Monrovia. Denied access tothe international airport, many foreigners trying toleave crowded onto the remaining commercialflights at Spriggs-Payne Airport. On 10 June, theU.S. Embassy extricated 360 more Americansusing charted Air Guinea Boeing 737 aircraft.47

Colonel Amos decided to send three membersof the MEU’s radio battalion detachment toMonrovia by boat to augment the forward com-mand element. Embassy officials turned down ahelicopter insertion feeling it would frightenLiberians or draw attention to the embassy andsend the wrong message about American inten-tions.48 A helicopter-announced arrival mighthave confused many Liberians involved in theconflict, as word had gotten out to local newspa-pers that a Marine task force waited offshore.Liberians, especially those who came from theinterior where most of the NPFL troops originat-ed, may never have seen or heard a helicopterbefore. For them, such a sight might incite fear,curiosity, or both. Many Liberians wanted the

18 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-11540

Marines prepare to fire automatic M249 lightmachine guns, known as Squad AutomaticWeapons or SAWs, during weapons training heldon the stern of the USS Saipan (LHA 2). Fielded inthe 1980s, the SAW filled the void created by theretirement of the Browning Automatic Rifle.

* Among the Commander of Fleet Air OperationsMediterranean’s (ComFAirMed) responsibilities was position-ing and operating the forward logistics site, supported by aCH-53E helicopter detachment from the Navy helicoptersquadron, HC-4. The site periodically received additionallogistic help from Navy Lockheed C-130 Hercules and DouglasC-9 Skytrain aircraft. (JO2 William Davis, “HC-4 ContinuesOperation Sharp Edge Support,” Signature (Naval Air Station,Sigonella), 26Oct90, p. 1; HMM-261 ComdC 1 Jul-31Dec90, p.3; HC-4 ComdHist 1990, encl., p. 3).

Marines to come ashore primarily as a peace-keeping force to stop the fighting and relieve thesuffering. Some factions wanted the Marines tosupport President Doe, and others wanted theMarines to remove President Doe and allow theNPFL to take over the government.49

On 12 June, Colonel Staley, Thomas J. White,the embassy’s economics officer, and the fourmembers of the forward command element wentout to the Saipan. They made the trip to the ship,located below the horizon off the coast ofMonrovia, in a 21-foot sailboat belonging to thestation chief. The group conferred with ColonelAmos and his staff on board the Saipan for abouttwo hours. They conveyed Jett’s thoughts on whythe embassy did not feel a sense of urgency asexpressed in earlier and recent messages. ColonelStaley, White, and members of the forward com-mand element explained that rather than conductan immediate evacuation, as the MEU had antici-pated, the Marines needed to wait. The quintes-sential force, the MEU could hold at MambaStation until the situation ashore reached a crisispoint.50 Following the briefings, the forward com-mand element, White, and Colonel Staley, accom-panied by three previously selected members ofthe radio battalion detachment, headed back toMonrovia.

Once at the embassy, the radio battaliondetachment, headed by Sergeant Kenneth M.Sharp, set up their intercept equipment. With anabundance of unsecured chatter on Motorola-typehandheld radios, the detachment listened to theradio nets of the various fighting factions in andaround Monrovia.51 The Liberian’s lack of opera-tional security made the collection effort easy.Most government and rebel forces spoke LiberianEnglish, although they spoke in dialects whenthey wanted a secure conversation. The rebelsincorrectly believed the Americans could nottranslate these dialects. During the entire MEUoperation in Liberia, the detachment provided theSaipan useful daily reports for analysis.52

Frantic Negotiations Fizzle

As the rebels gained ground and moved intothe Monrovia area, Doe’s AFL forces responded tothe increased pressure by engaging in randomshootings, beheadings, mutilations, and otheratrocities. In the Clay-Ashland District of centralMonrovia, an AFL squad executed 14 Americo-Liberians. On 14 June, a group of more than 1,000

Liberians conducted a peace march in Monroviaand stopped in front of the embassy. The Marinesecurity guard detachment and extra StateDepartment security personnel deployed through-out the chancery and compound in defensive andobservation posts. Fortunately, the demonstrationled by church officials did not turn violent. Theembassy, meanwhile, on 16 and 17 June, flew out210 more American citizens by chartered air-craft.53

With the situation in Monrovia worsening rap-idly, respected Liberians frantically made anattempt at peace negotiations. The LiberianCouncil of Churches, encouraged by outsideorganizations such as the Organization of AfricanUnity and the Economic Community of WestAfrican States, organized and chaired the meeting.Negotiations sponsored by the InterfaithMediation Committee of the Liberian Council ofChurches met in Sierra Leone but failed to reachan agreement. Apparently, Taylor’s delegation


DVIC DN-ST-90-11402

Marines are led to one of Marine MediumHelicopter Squadron 261’s Boeing CH-46E SeaKnight helicopters on board the USS Saipan (LHA2) during a rehearsal for Operation Sharp Edge.

believed their forces were about to achieve a mil-itary victory and saw no need for further discus-sion and arrogantly walked out of the talks.

The fighting by 23 June had advanced to theoutskirts of Monrovia. Johnson’s INPFL rebelsattacked Taylor’s NPFL rebels from positions just13 miles northeast of the capital city inBensonville and Careysburg. A large crowddemonstrated for peace on 26 June, calling for aceasefire and demanding the Liberian presidentleave the county. About 500 Liberians broke offfrom the main body demonstrating downtown,marched to the gates of the American Embassy,and chanted for the U.S. to intervene while diplo-matic security personnel and the embassy’sMarine security guards took up defensive posi-tions. But the demonstration remained nonvio-lent.54 The next day in central Monrovia, AFL sol-diers fired on another peace demonstration killingand wounding many in the crowd near the U.S.General Services Organization compound. Duringthe shooting and ensuing panic surrounding themarch, stray rounds penetrated the chancery andricocheted off some of the taller buildings in thecompound. One round hit the bulletproof glass infront of Corporal James Landherr’s standing postone.55

The following afternoon, the NPFL, many inbizarre costumes such as carnival masks, wigs,football helmets, women’s dresses, shower caps,and even toilet seats, attacked Liberian army posi-tions at Roberts International Airport.* On 28 June1990, the new American Ambassador, Peter DeVos, arrived in Monrovia. By this time the Sundaycharter flights had reduced the official embassystaff to approximately 40 essential personnel.56 Asif to welcome him, the INPFL seized the hydro-electric plant at the Mount Coffee Dam the nextday and cut off electricity to the city.

Early July found Taylor’s rebels firmly in con-trol of most of the Liberian countryside, includingthe cites of Buchanan and Gbarnga. The offensivetemporarily halted to replenish supplies. A fewdays later, Prince Johnson’s INPFL rebels clashedagain with Taylor’s NPFL fighters outsideMonrovia. Formerly allies, now opposing forces,both meant to destroy the other and Doe.57

Fighting on 8 July moved to the city’s suburbswith heavy fighting occurring at the Spriggs-Payne

Airport and the Sinkor area just west of the U.S.military mission quarters. The city’s populationfeared the rebels and the daily random searches,arson, looting, shooting, executions, and rapescommitted by government soldiers. Rebeladvances resulted in rice and gasoline shortagesand cut off water in the city. Embassy water andfuel tank trucks ran a daily gauntlet of hostilecheckpoints and the effort became progressivelymore difficult as the month continued.58 For safe-ty, the Ambassador moved all official U.S. per-sonnel inside the compound or to the Sam and Ebuilding across the street from the embassy.

The resumption on 5 July of peace talks, nowmediated by the Economic Community of WestAfrican States, offered only a glimmer of hope forthe citizens of Liberia. During talks in Freetown,Sierra Leone, the NPFL demanded that Doe stepdown before the fighting could stop. The talksbroke off the latter part of July due to the lack ofagreement and progress among the warring par-ties.

Fighting continued among all three factionsthroughout the month of July with the armyattacking the NPFL near Paynesville and CampSchiefflin. Prince Johnson’s and Charles Taylor’sfighters fought near Bensonville on 9 July.Another violent clash between the INPFL andNPFL near Careysburg and Paynesville took placeas Johnson’s INPFL moved south from the BongMine area toward Monrovia. As a result, the U.S.Omega station went off the air and the stationoperators subsequently abandoned the site. WithOmega off the air, ships and aircraft could nolonger receive navigation fixes from that station.**Thousands of uprooted and homeless Liberiansswamped the Omega and Voice of America sitesseeking protection. Jett, in a letter to his wife,stated: “There are displaced people anywherethey feel safe: 500 came over the wall of theAmerican Community School: 6000 at the Voice ofAmerica: 2000 at Omega.”59

In Monrovia on 12 July, Taylor’s fighters invad-ed the Nigerian Embassy. To prevent the massacreof their citizens, Ghana and Nigeria sent ships toaid in the evacuation. Guinean soldiers crossedthe Guinea border into Nimba county to evacuateand protect that country’s citizens. The AmericanEmbassy continued to schedule chartered flights

20 ON MAMBA STATION

* Many fighters wore these items as symbols of good luck orgood “juju.” Skulls of victims often decorated checkpoints orvehicles to show the fighter’s ruthlessness and to frightenpotential enemies.

** Although the Liberian Omega station was off the air, theAmphibious Ready Group’s ships and aircraft received accu-rate Omega fixes from other stations located around theworld.

for Americans wanting to leave. Throughout thecountry, foreigners and Liberians fled from thefighting.

On 14 July, the embassy requested approxi-mately 20 additional Marines from the MarineSecurity Guard Battalion.60 The June convoyescorts, peace marches and groups of refugees atthe embassy had taxed the two-dozen diplomaticsecurity personnel brought in to assist the region-al security officer.61* By mid-July, the increasedviolence prompted Larry Hartnett, the regionalsecurity officer, to direct his diplomatic securitypersonnel to man posts along the perimeter andconduct night patrols inside the compound. Onthe roofs of buildings near Gate One and GateTwo, diplomatic security personnel set up defen-sive positions and placed American flags over theprotective cinder blocks.62 Many Liberians andsome Americans mistook the armed diplomaticsecurity personnel for Marines.63 The request foradditional Marine security guard personnel high-lighted the embassy’s need for extra security. Theforward command element had advised De Vos tobring in a rifle company from off-shore andobjected to the request, but the Ambassadorbelieved Marine security guard augmentationunder Harnett offered the best solution.**

Marines Poised for Insertion

Marines offshore were placed on two-houralert to reinforce the embassy on 20 July afterPresident Doe accused Colonel Staley, the chief ofthe military mission, of directing rebel attacksagainst the government. President Doe’s accusa-tion sparked a new wave of anti-American senti-ment within the disillusioned, disintegrating army.Declaring him persona non grata, Doe orderedColonel Staley to leave the country.64 Colonel

Staley departed the next day and flew toFreetown, Sierra Leone, where he provided up-to-date information to an awaiting MEU debriefingteam.

Late in the morning on 20 July, PrinceJohnson’s forces crossed the St. Paul River bridgesto Bushrod Island, increasing the pressure onMonrovia. Traveling in a protected convoy,Ambassador De Vos visited President Doe the fol-lowing day. Approximately 25 AFL soldiersstopped De Vos’ vehicle at gunpoint and threat-ened the Ambassador. After a heated argumentthat almost escalated into gunfire between DeVos’ security and the AFL, the troops allowed thevehicle to proceed to the Executive Mansion.65

Two days later, while the MEU rehearsed the Doeextraction and the reinforcement of the embassy,President Doe, holed up in his mansion, accusedthe United States of again siding with the rebelfactions and saying a U.S. submarine had shelledthe Executive Mansion. The Ambassador denied


DVIC DN-ST-90-11544

A plane director signals to the pilot of aMcDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier II aircrafttaxiing on the flight deck of the USS Saipan (LHA2) during Operation Sharp Edge rehearsals. Thesix-plane Harrier detachment was part of the 22dMarine Expeditionary Unit’s composite helicoptersquadron.

* Primarily there to provide personal protection service, thediplomatic security special security team focused its attentionon security for ambassadors and key embassy officials. Theteam performed other security missions such as escortingAmericans leaving the country under authorized departure sta-tus as well as escorting the water and fuel trucks attemptingto make daily runs in town.

** On 24 July, 20 Marines left Quantico, arriving on board JTFshipping on 28 July. By the time they arrived, the 22d MEUcould not bring them in by helicopter because of fightingaround the embassy. The augmentation remained on boardship the entire time the MEU operated ashore. When analyz-ing what size force was needed to replace the 22d MEU,European Command staff considered a Marine Security Guardaugmentation option.

the preposterous submarine attack accusation butDoe had again fueled his soldiers’ anti-Americansentiment.

Prince Johnson’s INPFL took control ofBushrod Island and brought the war into down-town Monrovia. Crossing over the Mesurado Riverbridges from the north on 23 July, INPFL rebelsentered Crown Hill, the central business districtand the capital by-pass areas. Fierce firefightstook place between INPFL and government sol-diers as droves of civilians fled Monrovia by ship,vehicle, and foot. With more than 32,000 dis-placed and homeless Liberians concentrated in

the city, large groups wandered about looking forshelter in local churches, schools, internationalnongovernmental organization compounds, andabandoned U.S. Embassy properties.66 In ahumanitarian gesture, the embassy openedGraystone compound to the frightened andhomeless Liberians, who quickly filled the area.

Highlighting the deteriorating situation, on 24July gunfire one block from the embassy causedapproximately 30 to 50 people to rush the gatesand scale the outside wall.67 Some of the pan-icked crowd gained access to the courtyard infront of the administrative annex. Alerted Marinesecurity guards moved to defensive positions inthe interior of the chancery.* The crowd desper-ately “crawled through every conceivable crackand opening in that embassy wall and were insidewithin seconds because the embassy simply wasnot ready to defend itself,” Major Sachtlebenrecalled.68 A diplomatic security guard fired fiveshots into the air to disperse the crowd and tocontrol the situation inside the compound.69 Theincident ended without bloodshed with diplomat-ic and contract security guards finally rounding upthe intruders.

While rebel forces infiltrated further into thecity, government soldiers looted the central busi-ness district supermarkets and the U.S.Information Service building. Roving bands ofgovernment soldiers entered an International RedCross-protected compound and the John F.Kennedy Hospital. They captured, beat, andkilled those of Gio and Mano tribal backgroundswho did not escape.** President Doe furtherinflamed the situation with more absurd asser-tions, accusing the United States of sending blackMarines to assist the rebel forces. These falseassertions fueled yet another wave of anti-American sentiment in the AFL, who thought theU.S. favored the rebels. With no celebrating, theAFL spent Liberian Independence Day, 26 July,conducting house-to-house searches for rebelsand rebel sympathizers, and black “Marines.” AGhanaian ship from Freetown, Sierra Leone,arrived to evacuate 1,500 of its citizens.Thousands more refugees now crowded into var-ious abandoned American properties in an effortto escape the AFL.

Fighting between the AFL and the INPFL inten-sified on 27 July as the INPFL moved deeper intodowntown Monrovia from its base on BushrodIsland. The fighting included exchanges of rocketbarrages as well as small arms fire. On the otherside of town, AFL soldiers efficiently looted thePeace Corps compound, bringing in trucks to takethe property away.70 Government soldiers at theBarclay Training Center conducted beachfrontexecutions of opponents, dumping many bodiesinto the ocean.*** The Agence France Pressereported rebel forces within sight of the presiden-tial palace on 29 July.71 Just five blocks from theU.S. Agency for International Development head-quarters in Monrovia, government soldiers burstinto St. Peter’s Lutheran Church on 29 July andreportedly killed 200 and wounded 70 or 80 othercivilians who sought shelter.72**** In one of theworst atrocities of the war, AFL soldiers fired intoa crowd until they ran out of ammunition; thetroops then killed the survivors with machetes.73

22 ON MAMBA STATION

** Government soldiers rounded up some 250 medical stu-dents and executed them at the end of Spriggs-Payne Airportrunway. Visiting U.S. Coast Guardsmen and British andNigerian reporters viewed their skeletal remains in February1991.*** Many Marine helicopter crews routinely reported seeingbodies floating offshore in August.**** United Nations officials in October 1990 confirmed thenumber killed. Returning U.N. officials investigated the mas-sacre and directed the interment of approximately 600 bodiesin the church.

* The Marine security guard detachment responded to 16 sep-arate internal defense alerts and five emergency recalls fordemonstrations between 25 May and 2 October 1990.

Roving bands of government soldiersentered an International Red Cross-protected compound and the John F.Kennedy Hospital. They captured, beat,and killed those of Gio and Mano tribalbackgrounds who did not escape.

In desperation, a large group fleeing from thekillings broke through the perimeter fence of theU.S. Agency for International Development com-pound looking for safety. The embassy could notconfirm the exact numbers killed because of theheavy fighting taking place in the city.

The U.S. controlled Graystone compound nowhoused more than 5,000 refugees. Because of thegeography of the city, the compound received agreat deal of overhead small arms fire. The streetfighting intensified with all three factionsexchanging automatic weapons fire and rocket-propelled grenade barrages. Corpses littered thestreets. INPFL fighters maneuvered by foot andvehicles down United Nations Drive directly infront of the embassy late in the morning on 30July.74 A short time later, the sound of heavymachine guns and small arms fire echoed in thecompound and numerous stray rounds passedoverhead. Elements of the Liberian army engagedINPFL forces just below the Marine House downthe street from the embassy and killed approxi-mately a dozen men. This type of sporadic butvicious fighting continued intermittently through-out the city during the latter part of July.75

By 2 August, the city was indeed a battle-ground, with violent clashes frequently occurringbetween the two rebel groups near the AmericanEmbassy. On the afternoon of 3 August, De Vosdirected all mission personnel temporarily to thechancery’s ground floor after several artilleryrounds landed near the embassy.76 CorporalPhillip L. McClaine, a member of the Marine secu-rity guard detachment, recalled the roundsimpacting just south of the compound near theBritish Embassy.77 The intensity of the fightinghalted all flights out of the city’s Spriggs-PayneAirport and many of the AFL units broke apart asthe rebels advanced.

The INPLF leader, Prince Johnson, held aninterview with the press on 4 August at his fieldheadquarters on Bushrod Island, boasting of hisintention to force a U.S. intervention by takingAmerican or British citizens hostage. Located inINPFL controlled territory, the Americans at theAmerican Telecommunications Office receiver sitewould make excellent potential hostages. Johnsonemphatically stated he wanted to “create an inter-national incident so that foreign troops can inter-vene.”78 Reinforcing his ruthlessness, a burst fromhis AK-47 assault rifle resulted in the summaryexecution of a Liberian International Red Crossworker handcuffed to a French relief worker.Described as an “alcoholic psychopath,” Prince

Johnson appeared that day to live up to thedescription.79

Embassy officials had no choice but to react toJohnson’s publicized threats against American cit-izens. At 1400 on 4 August, Ambassador De Voscalled Lieutenant Colonel Labadie and MajorSachtleben into his office to discuss an evacuationof the embassy. The ambassador proposed threecourses of action: one diplomatic and two mili-tary. After discussions with the country team andappropriate officials, the State Department decid-ed not to negotiate directly with Johnson. Instead,they looked to two military options—evacuatingand closing down the embassy or drawing downthe staff while simultaneously reinforcing securi-ty.80

The Call to Evacuate

Lieutenant Colonel Labadie notified ColonelAmos at 1820 that Ambassador De Vos had rec-ommended through State Department channelsthat Marines would assist in an evacuation ofAmerican citizens from Monrovia.81 Colonel Amosthen alerted BLT 2/4 of the imminent possibilityof an evacuation. All subordinate units of theMEU began preparations, in particular the com-pany commanders of Companies H and E. Atapproximately 2035, the Ambassador used a for-ward command element radio to personally callColonel Amos to notify him of the necessity of anevacuation.82* De Vos specifically informed theMEU commander and the JTF commander that theState Department had approved a draw down andreinforcement of the embassy beginning themorning of 5 August. De Vos and Colonel Amosdecided that landing hour would be at 0900.83

After the Ambassador’s call, the MEU com-mander ordered his staff to prepare for a totalevacuation option plus a draw down and rein-forcement option.** Approval came for the secondoption that involved the evacuation and closing of


* According to LtCol Emerson N. Gardner, Jr., the Ambassadorcalled directly to the ship using the forward command ele-ment satellite communications only two times. The firstoccurred the day before, when he talked with the MEU’sexecutive officer, LtCol Labadie. LtCol Emerson N. Gardnerintvw, 24Oct90 (OralHistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.). 22dMEU Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC) Watch Log,5Jun-21Aug90, 3Aug90 (Sharp Edge HistColl, MCHC,Washington, D.C.).** With President George H. Bush’s approval, the nationalcommand authority directed the geographic combatant com-mander, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, to implement hisexecute order.

the American Telecommunications Office receiverand transmitter sites, the draw down of theembassy staff, the insertion of a reinforced riflecompany into the embassy, and the provisioningof logistic support to the embassy. At 2100, theMEU and ARG staffs convened a crisis action teammeeting to review and refine the existing plans.The meeting on board the Saipan went into theearly morning hours.

As the crisis action team met, the commandingofficer of BLT 2/4, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L.Pugh, tasked his company commanders to pre-pare for the two branch plans of the approvedreinforcement and draw down option. Later thatnight, the Marines adjusted their orders when theembassy decided not to use the AmericanCooperative School as an evacuation site.Embassy officials eliminated the site because theywere unsure if any significant numbers wouldshow up due to the short notice. Catching up withMEU actions at 0043 the next morning, EuropeanCommand issued the execute order. The landingforce operations center finally received the mes-sage at 0223.84 The Navy and Marine staffs

adjourned at 0300 on 5 August and agreed tomeet again at 0500 for a final confirmation brief.

The final plan called for securing each evacua-tion site with a reinforced platoon and the estab-lishment of a hasty defense. Led by its companycommander, Captain Gary R. Oles, the force forthe receiver site consisted mainly of the 3dPlatoon, Company E. Company E’s 2d Platoonwould secure the transmitter site. Each rifle pla-toon received reinforcements, including amachine gun squad, two shoulder-launched mul-tipurpose assault weapon teams, and a firepowercontrol team from the MEU’s air naval gunfire liai-son company detachment.* Each 45-man platoonincluded a small command element. In addition tothe transport helicopters supporting the companyat both sites, the plan called for an escort consist-ing of two Bell AH-1T Cobra attack helicopters.The attack helicopters would remain over the

24 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-10898

Alerted by Col Granville R. Amos, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit’s commander, of the imminent possi-bility of an evacuation, Marines of Battalion Landing Team 2/4 gather on the hanger deck of the USSSaipan (LHA 2) to draw ammunition and load their magazines.

* The 83mm man-portable, shoulder-launched multipurposeassault weapon is used to destroy bunkers or other fortifica-tions. With the dual mode rocket model, it also can destroyarmored vehicles.

ocean in a ready and on-call status. Oles antici-pated 18 evacuees at the receiver site and threeevacuees at the transmitter site.85

The MEU’s composite squadron, commandedby Lieutenant Colonel Emerson N. Gardner, Jr.,would take Company E Marines to the receiversite. The plan required three Boeing CH-46E SeaKnight helicopters filled with Marines and twoempty CH-46Es to provide transportation for theevacuees. The Marines would disembark first andabout two minutes later two empty helicopterswould land and embark the evacuees, if ready. Athird helicopter of Marines would land if required.Until called for, all helicopters not used in the ini-tial landing were to remain a few miles away overthe water. Surrounded by an encampment ofapproximately 5,000 to 6,000 displaced Liberians,the Marines and Americans at the site believed itwas important to evacuate quickly. No one knewhow the refugees, or the INPFL in the area, wouldrespond to the helicopters or the presence ofMarines. Fortunately, the excellent communica-

tions with the potential evacuees at the receiversite allowed the Marines to pass on their require-ments to expedite the evacuation.

A similar plan for the transmitter site involvedthree transport helicopters; two loaded withMarines and one empty for evacuees. Two Cobraattack helicopters would escort the transport he-licopters and remain over the water within sightof the Marines in the landing zone. In the firstwave, two helicopters, a Boeing CH-46E SeaKnight and Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion loadedwith Marines, would land, unload passengers, andthen take off immediately. Establishing hastysecurity, the Marines would concurrently conducta quick screening of the evacuees. If the evacueeswere ready, the Marines would quickly call in thethird empty helicopter, a CH-46, to pick up theevacuees. Again the plan called for all helicoptersnot used in the initial landings to remain over thewater until called. Although the company execu-tive officer, First Lieutenant Richard E. “Ted”Anders, did not have direct communications with


DVIC DN-ST-90-11339

Standing by on the USS Saipan (LHA 2), Marines make final adjustments prior to boarding MarineMedium Helicopter Squadron 261 helicopters for the short flight to Monrovia where they would augmentsecurity and assist in the evacuation of American and foreign nationals.

the site, the Marines had more time to accomplishthe task since there were no nearby refugees andonly three evacuees at the site.

As the outlying evacuations occurred, two CH-53 helicopters would fly to the embassy to deliv-er Company H Marines, who would provide secu-rity and assist in the draw down. Two Bell UH-1NHuey helicopters would provide escort.Lieutenant Colonel Pugh intended to establish allpositions within the compound since the MEU didnot have authority to move outside the embassy.86

Colonel Amos wanted the insertions to take placesimultaneously so the fighting factions would nothave time to react.

Because of limited launch space on board theSaipan, the CH-53s were to lift off first and orbitabove the ship as other helicopter waves formed.The Sea Stallion helicopters held more fuel andcould remain airborne longer than the CH-46s.With the CH-53s off, the flight deck crewsplanned to launch the CH-46 helicopters, alongwith the four escort gunships. Upon clearing theSaipan of all helicopter assault waves, the launch

plan called for the spotting of fully-armed AV-8BHarrier jets on the flight deck that could be air-borne at a moment’s notice. The Saipan’s heli-copter direction center staff and squadron staffplan reflected detailed planning and critical timingsince it entailed the launching of 22 helicoptersfrom two ships.87

At 0500 on 5 August 1990, MEU officers attend-ed a confirmation brief held in the wardroom. By0600, the companies had staged in the hangar bayof the Saipan, ready to draw ammunition andload onto the helicopters. Once the confirmation brief ended, the bands on the ammunition crateswere cut and the company gunnery sergeantssupervised the issue of ammunition to theirMarines. At 0730, the helicopter launch cyclebegan and the Marines loaded on to the CH-53sin 15 minutes. The heavy lift helicopters carriedCompany H Marines slated for the embassy andsome of the Company E Marines for the transmit-ter site evacuation. Loaded and ready at 0800, theCH-53 helicopters launched from the deck of theSaipan.88

26 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-90-10896

Marines board a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter on the flight deck of the USS Saipan (LHA 2). Two AH-1WBell Cobra attack helicopters and fully armed AV-8B Harrier jets were on stand-by should the Marinesencounter resistance.

A Rainy D-Day

Although the weathermen on board the USSSaipan had predicted clear skies for 5 August,Mother Nature had other ideas and greeted thepilots of HMM-261 with a rainy, cloudy day.Lieutenant Colonel Emerson N. Gardner, Jr.,squadron commander of the “Raging Bulls” ofHMM-261, planned to have the helicopters ren-dezvous in the appropriate groupings for thescheduled landings as soon as all the aircraft lift-ed off the ship, but the low ceiling and rain pre-vented the squadron helicopters from flying

through the clouds in specific groups. Instead,Gardner directed the helicopters to take radarvectors through the storm system and meet up inlanding groups on the other side. As Gardnerrecalled: “We did that, and it worked out realwell.”89

During the flight through the clouds, the heli-copter direction center vectored the helicopters toprevent mid-air collisions and then helped sortout the helicopters once they arrived on the otherside of the rain clouds. Once in the clear, the hel-icopters grouped together according to landingsites. The direction center’s effort to keep the two

Chapter 3

Evacuation Operations

Photo courtesy of BGen Granville R. Amos

At Landing Zone Magic, Marines of Company H quickly exit a Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion and fan outto cover Gate One and Gate Two and establish several blocking positions just outside the AmericanEmbassy compound.

CH-53s together caused some initial confusion,but that was quickly sorted out and the helicop-ters and Marines they carried sped on their waytoward the Liberian coast. The passage throughthe storm caused a six-minute delay, which didnot prove to be critical.90

Led by Lieutenant Colonel Gardner, the heli-copter group of five CH-46s and two AH-1Tsarrived by 0906 at the AmericanTelecommunications Office receiver site north ofMonrovia.91 Three of the CH-46s carried CompanyE Marines to provide site security for the evacua-tion while the two empty CH-46s carried 18 setsof life vests and protective helmets for the evac-

uees. The Marines got their first glimpse of thesite, a huge cleared area covering about twosquare miles, as the helicopters carefully navigat-ed the approach around support cables and otherantenna field hazards. The extensive receiver siteencompassed three different landing zones.Within the site, a small perimeter fence encloseda cluster of cement communications and supportbuildings. Outside the fence line surrounding thesite were thousands of refugees living in a largemakeshift shantytown of plastic sheeting andpalm frond lean-twos.92 The designated landingzone, named Dove, was located inside the com-munications site fence line and stood out like an

28 ON MAMBA STATION

island among the sea of refugees. The landingzone provided enough room for two helicoptersto land in front of the two-story main building.

Two helicopters landed and Marines quicklyunloaded and secured the interior perimeterfence. The helicopters took off again as soon asthe last Marine was out. Hundreds of refugeespressed up to the perimeter fence line to see whatall the activity was about. Some Liberians attempt-ed to climb the fence and were warned: “Stayback! We are U.S. Marines!”93 While the twoempty CH-46s landed, the fifth loaded helicopterremained airborne with the Cobras to kept watchon the situation on the ground. Jack Quin, part ofthe embassy’s communications support unit at thereceiver site, already had divided his personnelinto two nine-man groups, or “sticks,” for loadingonto helicopters. The Marine company command-er, Captain Gary R. Oles, and Quin quickly veri-fied the identities of every civilian on the evacua-tion list while the evacuation control team, head-ed by Staff Sergeant Effard T. Henson, searchedand screened the evacuees for weapons using

hand held metal detectors. The evacuees, theirequipment, and four escorting Marines lifted offin two helicopters at 0913. With their task com-pleted, the Marines pulled back and boarded thehelicopters at 0919.94 As the last helicopter left thezone, Captain Oles observed two men with shot-guns running toward the gate of the compound.Fortunately, no shots were fired and the Marinesdeparted without incident.95 The rapid evacuationof the American Telecommunications Officereceiver site completed one task of the MEU’smission.

Seven minutes after the receiver site evacua-tion, the evacuation of the AmericanTelecommunications Office transmitter site south-east of Monrovia began. As the helicopter-borneforce approached Landing Zone Condor,Company E Marines observed about 20 armedmen within 400 meters of the landing zone alongthe main road to the south. A few of the menbegan moving toward the transmitter site along anentrance road. Once on the ground, the Marinesfanned out and established a hasty perimeter.

EVACUATION OPERATIONS 29


A Marine rifle squad positioned atop the American Embassy’s Gate Two overlooking United Nations Drive,the main thoroughfare running the full length of the Embassy compound.

Second Lieutenant Michael S. Bodkins’ platoonspotted seven NPFL rebels moving along theentrance road leading into the site. The site’sunarmed local security guard and two Marineswaved and yelled at the approaching rebels,ordering them to stop and turn around. Therebels complied and made no further attempt tointerfere with the evacuation operation. (TheMarines later learned a radio intercept had over-heard the rebels being told to “blast” any U.S. hel-icopters.) While a Cobra gunship orbited nearby,the evacuation control team identified the threeevacuees by their passports, scanned them withmetal detector wands, and embarked them on thewaiting CH-53. About 11 minutes after landing,the 2d Platoon collapsed the landing zone securi-ty and extracted at 0936.

The evacuees from the receiver site arrived at0935 on the Saipan. Minutes later, the shipreceived radio confirmation of the evacuation ofthe transmitter site. By 0950, all evacuees andMarines from both sites were on board. With theirmission complete, the Marines of Company Estood down and turned in their ammunition.96

Into the Embassy

While evacuations were underway at thetelecommunications sites, the MEU began its maineffort at the American Embassy in Monrovia withMarines from Company H, BLT 2/4, setting downat Landing Zone Magic at 0910 to reinforce thesecurity and draw down the embassy staff.97 Thefirst wave involved two CH-53 with each suc-ceeding wave consisting of two CH-46 aircraft.When the first wave landed, LieutenantCommander Robert Peterman of the forward com-mand element notified the 3d Platoon command-er, First Lieutenant Gary S. Johnston, about apotential threat outside Gate Three. Johnstonordered one squad to immediately cover GatesOne and Two, while he and another squad fol-lowed Peterman through Gate Three to establisha blocking position near the corner of UnitedNations Drive and Sekou Toure Avenue. Thesounds of sporadic gunfire echoed in the com-pound as they moved out. Captain Daniel S.Rogers, commanding officer of Company H, metMajor Glen Sachtleben in the landing zone.Rogers received a quick update on the possiblethreat outside Gate Three. He immediatelyresponded by ordering First Sergeant Luther T.Rymer to inform incoming platoons of the situa-tion upon their arrival in the landing zone.98

While establishing security, Marines climbing aladder to a defensive position on the building atGate One spotted a cluster of INPLF fighters com-ing down the road about 50 meters to the north.Someone quickly parked a nearby armoredSuburban sideways and the fire team took uppositions behind it. A newly arrived squad from3d Platoon swiftly moved outside Gate One andturned north toward the threat on United NationsDrive. Captain Rogers, his radio operator, andMajor Sachtleben followed the squad. The rebelspaused when Major Sachtleben warned them bybullhorn to turn around. The Marine squad beganto leapfrog toward the fighters with fire teamsmoving from one covered position to the next. AFrench journalist that had been walking with theINPFL group joined the Marines as they tacticallymoved up the street. The rebels, observing theadvancing Marines, backed away slowly upUnited Nations Drive and moved into a house atthe junction of Benson Street, a main thorough-fare. Major Sachtleben then gave another bullhornwarning, telling the INPFL troops to leave thebuilding; a few obeyed. To eliminate the threatthe fighters posed to the Marines, the squadleader, Sergeant Todd Alverson, ordered his mento clear the building. Fire teams lead by CorporalDennis Tuzinoski and Corporal Sean Collinsmethodically cleared each room, forcing theremaining fighters to escape out the rear of thebuilding. With the house clear, the squad movedeast down Benson Street and set up positionscovering the road. The squad’s position lookedstraight down Benson Street, the left flankanchored at the Masonic Temple grounds and theright anchored by a deep ditch next to the wall ofthe Graystone compound.99

By this time, 2d Platoon had arrived andrelieved the 3d Platoon squad at the corner ofSekou Toure Avenue and United Nations Driveand Gate Three.100* The 3d Platoon squad thenmoved up United Nations Drive to establish athird blocking position just north of the UnitedNations Drive and Benson Street intersection. Thisnorthern-most blocking position had its rightflank anchored on the rock quarry and the leftflank extended up the slope of Mamba PointLighthouse Hill, giving the squad a clear view to

30 ON MAMBA STATION

* Sekou Toure Avenue was named after the despotic ruler ofGuinea who led the fight for independence from France in1956 and ruled the country from independence to 1984. Heclaimed to be a descendent of the legendary Malinke chief,Samori Toure, a Guinean guerrilla leader who fought theFrench in the 19th century.

monitor the movement of vehicles approachingfrom the north.

In the embassy compound, 1st Platoon set upas the company’s reserve, manning observation

posts on the west side of the embassy at GatesFour and Five. The platoon established a tempo-rary blocking position outside the northwest cor-ner of the compound to cover a secondary land-ing zone near the quarry north of the embassy.Weapons Platoon set up 60mm mortar positionsin an open area just south of the embassy’sLanding Zone Magic. Roving patrols initiated by1st Platoon covered the interior of the compoundand 2d Platoon occupied defensive positions atGate Three. The Marines established observationposts in the compound and across the street inthe Wellington apartment building and the Samand E building. The observation posts outside theembassy gave them better visibility and providedan early warning position if any armed personnelapproached the embassy.*

The small size of the makeshift landing zonemeant helicopters could only come in one at atime. By 1100, 237 Marines equipped with fastattack vehicles occupied defensive positions.

Each of the six fast attack vehicles (modified andreinforced jeeps) had a .50-caliber machine gunor 40mm Mark 19 grenade launcher mounted tothem. The Marines positioned one vehicle at eachof the northern blocking positions and two morevehicles at the southern blocking position.Constituting the reserve, the remaining two vehi-cles were directly behind Gate Two. The Marinesthen strung concertina wire across the road at allthree blocking positions. Heavy machine guns,medium machine guns, antitank weapons, and arifle squad at each roadblock protected the criti-cal approaches to the embassy.101

Marines from Company H established threeblocking positions outside the embassy, whileinside the compound they began the hasty evac-uation of waiting noncombatants. The infantry-men, working with the embassy staff, evacuated38 employees by helicopter at 1045.102

Company H Marines moved to man gate secu-rity positions and observation posts, and a reac-tion force was positioned in the compound. Theunit manned additional observation posts across


* According to the monthly status report from the regionalsecurity officer, Department of State diplomatic security per-sonnel began manning the observation posts in the apartmentbuildings outside the embassy on 6 August. (AmEmbassyMonrovia msg to SecState WashDC, 171109ZSep90)

the street in the Sam and E apartments near GateOne and at the Wellington apartments near GateThree. Upon learning that his Marines mannedblocking positions outside the embassy, the BLTcommander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Pugh,provided reinforcements ashore with the 81mmMortar Platoon from Weapons Company and theLight Armor Infantry Platoon, constituting an addi-tional reserve.*

The MEU received word later that afternoon itdid not have authority to put blocking positionsoutside the embassy. European Command direct-ed the Marines located at the roadblocks to pullback into the embassy and remain on American-controlled property.103 Concerned about exposureand another Beirut-type bombing, Vice AdmiralJames D. Williams and Colonel Granville Amoscame ashore to assess the situation. They walkedthe ground and supported the employment ofblocking positions.

By 1730, the MEU had ordered Company Hback into the compound.104 Abandoning theblocking positions, the Marines assumed securitypositions within the embassy grounds that afford-ed less observation, narrower fields of fire, andless reaction time. A couple of nearby buildingsdominating the embassy and the Graystone com-pound caused serious concern for the companycommander. Small arms or rocket-propelledgrenade fire could easily be directed at theembassy from the buildings near the com-pound.105

But evacuations continued in earnest, and by1535 the control center evacuated 14 moreemployees.106 By the end of the day, the 22d MEUhad accomplished two goals: the evacuation of 74noncombatants and the establishment of defen-sive positions at the embassy.** President GeorgeH. Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater,explained the Marines’ actions at a morning pressconference: “The purpose of this operation is to

32 ON MAMBA STATION

* Capt Daniel S. Rogers and LtCol Robert L. Pugh decided laterthat additional reinforcements were not needed and withdrewthese Marines the next day. ** The MEU flew 51 of the evacuees to Freetown, Sierra Leone.


Two modified and reinforced jeeps, each mounting a .50-caliber machine gun, were used by the Marinesto buttress the blocking positions protecting vital approaches to the American Embassy.

safeguard lives, to draw down the number ofAmericans at the embassy staff and to providesecurity for those who remain....The Marines’presence does not indicate or constitute anyintention on the part of the U.S. Government tointervene militarily in the Liberian conflict. We callon all parties in that conflict to ensure the safetyof American citizens.”107

In the days that followed, the MEU continuedto provide security and evacuate Americans andforeign nationals and worked on defensive posi-tions within the compound. They also strung tele-phone lines to ensure redundancy in communica-tions. The company used Motorola or MX-300hand-held radios, tactical radios, and field tele-phones to link each position with the company,BLT, and MEU headquarters.

On 7 August, quick action by Company H pre-vented a potential firefight in front of theembassy. An AFL patrol of 30 to 60 men appeared

in camouflage uniforms and helmets and armedwith assault rifles and a few machine guns andstarted slowly advancing north up United NationsDrive toward the embassy. The Marines warnedthe AFL troops not to continue and advised themto turn around. Readying their weapons and CSriot control agents (tear gas), the Americansrepeated they allowed no armed foot traffic in

front of the embassy. The Liberian soldiers pausedand passed the warning to their commander, aMajor Tilley, who could be distinguished by a“Rambo-like” headband. Clearly, if his men con-tinued up the road they risked a confrontationwith the Marines.108 Using a bullhorn, the Marinestold the fighters they would employ tear gas if thesoldiers continued. To his credit, Major Tilleyordered his soldiers to turn around. Less than aminute later on the same United Nations Drive, asmall INPFL patrol appeared north of the embassyand started moving south. Immediately after the



Col Granville R. Amos (foreground), the Marine expeditionary unit commander, and LtCol Thomas W.Parker, his operations officer, walked the ground visiting each security position inside and outside of theAmerican Embassy compound. Col Amos came away supporting the initial tactical decision establishingblocking positions outside the embassy.

Liberian soldiers had disappeared, the Marineswarned the INPFL patrol to turn around. As withthe first group, the INPFL patrol left.

Concerned about this incident, the Ambassadorconferred with the MEU staff. He made it clear hedid not want the Marines to threaten or use teargas. The published rules of engagement did allowfor the escalation of force, except under certaincircumstances.* Although the embassy had a copyof European Command’s rules of engagement, theAmbassador’s initial interpretation was morerestrictive. The Marines felt bullhorn warningswere effective only when accompanied withdirectly threatening action. First Lieutenant JamesD. Chaney, 2d Platoon commander, was frustrat-ed that riot control agents, while authorized byEuropean Command, were “no longer a viable

option.”109 To the Marines on post it seemed theMEU’s nonlethal option consisted only of verbalwarnings. The initial word passed to Company Hwas clarified in a subsequent meeting betweenthe Ambassador and ground commanders, whichresolved the misunderstanding.110 Daily meetingsbetween Captain Rogers, the BLT executive offi-cer, the Ambassador, and security officer wereheld to review the posture and make necessaryadjustments.

To prevent similar incidents from happening,the Marines posted signs outside the embassy anddistributed written standardized verbal warnings.The MEU’s nonlethal inventory consisted of a setof proportional, escalating force; first verbal warn-ings, then CS gas, and finally warning shots.Ambassador De Vos agreed to allow the use of CSgas or smoke grenades if the new verbal warningsdid not work. While fighters from both factionscontinued to travel by foot on United NationsDrive, the embassy also directed the Marines toallow vehicles to use the road if they showed nohostile intent and did not stop. If the vehicle didstop, the Marines told the vehicle occupants tomove on. The Ambassador accepted the risk of afirefight directly outside the embassy by allowingthe factions to use the road next to the embassy.

34 ON MAMBA STATION


Marines and American Embassy personnel ready a group of noncombatants for evacuation. From theassembly point near the embassy they would be taken to the landing zone and loaded onto a helicopterfor the flight to Freeport, Sierra Leone.

* BLT 2/4 handed out copies of the rules of engagement to itsMarines. The handout stated: “In the event that the host nationis unable or unwilling to provide the necessary protection toU.S. forces, the military on-scene commander will employ thefollowing to overcome the threat: 1. Warning to demonstra-tors. 2. Show of force, including the use of riot control for-mations. 3. Use of riot control agents. 4. Warning shots firedover the heads of hostile elements. 5. Other reasonable use offorce necessary under the circumstances and proportional tothe threat.” (BLT 2/4 ROE, Aug90 [Sharp Edge HistColl,MCHC])

That evening, Marines watched the trajectoriesof 122mm rockets launched from the Capitol Hillarea and heard the impacts in the Crown Hill,Vaitown, and West Point sectors. The AFL attempt-ed to stop the advance of Johnson’s fighters in the

center of the city. Prince Johnson seized a num-ber of foreign hostages, including an American,24 hours after the initial Marine helicopter land-ings. He released 28 foreign hostages by 8 August,unharmed, due to pressure from the U.S. andother embassies and after receiving informationabout a soon to be deployed peacekeepingforce.111

West African Peacekeepers Arrive

One day after the Marines came ashore, theEconomic Community of West African States metto establish the peacekeeping force. At the sum-mit in Banjul, Gambia, the Economic Communityof West African States standing mediation com-mittee held its first ever session and called on allparties in Liberia to observe an immediate cease-

fire.* The committee also established an EconomicCommunity of West African States CeasefireMonitoring Group to deploy to Liberia.**Observers from the Organization of African Unityapproved the establishment of a multinational


Photo: DVIC DN-ST-91-00814

Two Marines man a security post on the roof of the American Embassy. The Marine on the right is armedwith an M16 rifle, while the other Marine is leaning on an M136 AT4 light anti-armor weapon coveredwith a poncho.

* The standing mediation committee’s purpose in case of adispute or conflict by member states included initiating medi-ation procedures. Conflicts occurring within states whenaction was sustained or supported from the outside allowedfor the provision of a collective defense to be invoked accord-ing to Articles 17 and 18 of the Economic Community of WestAfrican States security protocol. The Liberian situation prompt-ed the establishment of the committee.** The decision to send the peacekeeping force was made bythe members of the standing mediation committee, not the fullmembership of the Economic Community of West AfricanStates. Objections by the Bukinaban head of state noted thecommittee had no “competence to interfere in member statesinternal conflicts, but only in conflict breaking out betweenmember states,” (Weller, Regional Peacekeeping, doc. no. 59,p. 89.) Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo made up thecommittee’s members. Nigeria led the effort to send thepeacekeeping force. The decision played on the existing rival-ries between African English speaking and French speakingcountries in the region.

West African force, knowing it signified the firstreal attempt of a regional organization to assumea peacekeeping role. The two-day summit’s finalcommuniqué embodied a strong humanitarianrationale.112 It called for a ceasefire, surrenderingof all arms and ammunition, the secession of armsimports, release of all prisoners and cooperationwith the monitoring group.113 President Bush’sannouncement on the same day that the UnitedStates would send troops to Saudi Arabia to haltIraqi aggression in Kuwait overshadowed the his-toric 7 August decision. The West African coalitionconsisted of 2,500 troops from Gambia, Ghana,Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The commander statedmilitary force would not be used to contain thesituation in Monrovia.114

Meanwhile, in Monrovia, the Marines observed122mm rockets impacting indiscriminately in theMamba Point and Bushrod Island areas nightly.Foreign embassies urgently requested Americanassistance to evacuate their citizens and officials

due to the escalating level of chaos. On 8 and 9August, the Marines evacuated the British andFrench ambassadors and other foreign diplomaticpersonnel. By the end of the day on 11 August,199 persons had been evacuated and flown firstto the Saipan and then on to Lungi Airport atFreetown.

A large part of the MEU’s mission included pro-viding parts and supplies needed for the embassy.To that end, KC-130 detachment flights deliveredcritical parts and supplies to Freetown. Helicoptersorties from the MEU then picked up the suppliesand shuttled them from Freetown to the ship andthen to Monrovia. The economic counselor offi-cer, Thomas J. White, acknowledged the impor-tance of the supply runs, commenting, “we weregetting real low and might have run out of every-thing.”115 All outside commercial flights hadceased, which left the embassy entirely depend-ent on the MEU. According to the commandingofficer of MEU Service Support Group 22 (MSSG-

36 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-00810

Marines unload boxes of medical supplies and foodstuffs. With the cancellation of all outside commer-cial aircraft flights, the American Embassy was entirely dependent on 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit forresupply.

22), Lieutenant Colonel James W. Head: “ColonelAmos wanted to get the embassy to a level of self-sufficiency. Food, fuel, and water were the threebig areas they needed support.”116 For more thana week, Marine working parties labored in theheat and humidity to unload 30 pallets of foodand medical supplies.117 The MEU Marinesamassed more than 30 days of supplies at theembassy.

Lieutenant Colonel Head’s Marines spent muchof their time providing fuel for the embassy.When the embassy’s underground fuel tanksdropped to a dangerously low level, the Marineskept the generators running by flying CH-53s in around robin pick up and fuel delivery serviceusing the 500-gallon bladders of helicopter expe-ditionary refueling systems. Marines of the MSSGdelivered and pumped more than 35,000 gallonsof fuel while in Liberia.

The MEU also flew in a reverse osmosis waterpurification unit to draw water from the nearbyocean. It could produce 600 gallons of potable

water per minute from a raw water source.However, the cliffs below the embassy and therough surf prevented MSSG-22 engineers fromgetting the unit to function despite repeatedattempts. The MEU solved the problem by flyinga 400-gallon water trailer (commonly called awater buffalo or water bull) in daily to support theembassy. The MEU also consolidated all five-gallon water cans onto pallets and flew them inwhen needed.

The three factions continued to clash through-out the city while Marines provided security andsupport for the embassy.* Marines heard the dis-jointed sounds of automatic weapons in MambaPoint, the whomp of mortars, and rocket explo-sions from the battle raging near the Executive



Marines of Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 supervise the pumping of diesel fuel from500-gallon bladders into a truck for distribution. More than 35,000 gallons of fuel was delivered by he-licopter to the American Embassy compound during Operation Sharp Edge.

* No major ground firefights took place at night. ManyLiberian fighters believed in “juju,” and that harmful eventscould happen to them if they fought at night. Juju is magicattributed to or associated with jujus, which are fetishes,charms, or amulets of West African peoples.

Mansion and Spriggs-Payne Airport. Marine obser-vation posts also sighted black smoke from burn-ing buildings and explosions. Charles Taylor’sNPFL fighters sacked many of the embassies,including those of Guinea and Nigeria. TheMarines also received reports the NPFL fired onand scattered the occupants of the German andSwedish Embassies. The NPFL took charge of alarge number of these European diplomatic per-sonnel, essentially holding them hostage. On 11August, Taylor announced he would grant safepassage out of Monrovia to the European diplo-mats. He then took them over land to Buchanan,stopping along the way at the refugee filled, non-functioning Omega site.

Evacuation from Buchanan

Responding to Taylor’s movement of foreigndiplomatic staff to Buchanan, EuropeanCommand issued an execute order to the JTF toconduct an evacuation from Buchanan.118 On 12August, the Saipan and USS Peterson traveled

down the coast of Liberia to Buchanan. On board,the MEU staff developed a plan for the evacuationthat called for both a boat and a helicopteroption. The plan, as approved in the confirmationbrief, called for Lieutenant Commander Petermanand a Navy SEAL security force to come ashore bylanding craft. Once in the port of Buchanan,Peterman’s mission included establishing contactwith the NPFL and finding a landing zone for theevacuation. Aerial photography revealed a num-ber of potential landing zones, but intelligencereports deemed these unacceptable due to possi-ble mining.119 Once a landing zone had beenidentified, a helicopter would fly in with the com-mander of noncombatant evacuation operations,Lieutenant Warren T. Parker, and a team ofMarines. The evacuation would begin uponagreement with the NPFL.

At 0630 on 13 August, with the blazing sunalready dominating the eastern morning sky,Commodore Stanley D. Gastar, the AmphibiousReady Group (ARG) commander, made radio con-tact with the NPFL in Buchanan. In calm seas,

38 ON MAMBA STATION


LtCol Thomas W. Parker (left center), 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit operations officer, meets with oneof rebel leader Charles Taylor’s officers at the port of Buchanan, south of Monrovia, to facilitate the evac-uation of foreign diplomatic staff.

Lieutenant Commander Peterman and the accom-panying SEALs departed from the Saipan onboard a LCM-8 landing craft (know to Marines asa Mike boat) and moved toward Buchanan’s gen-eral cargo quay. Docking at 0825, Peterman metwith members of the NPFL.120 After confirming asuitable landing zone, Peterman called in the hel-icopter carrying Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W.Parker, the 22d MEU’s operations officer. Theembassy’s consular officer and two other StateDepartment representatives accompanied theMarines to assist in the sensitive negotiations. Thehelicopter also carried Parker’s team, which con-sisted of a security detachment, a radio operator,the battalion air officer, the air, naval gunfire liai-son company detachment assistant officer incharge, two photographers, and the MEU’s flightsurgeon. The flight surgeon accompanied theteam because one of the evacuees, the SpanishAmbassador to Liberia, had a heart condition.121

The Marines did not arrive with a display ofoverwhelming force because they did not wantthe highly sensitive NPFL fighters to get theimpression they posed a threat or wanted to

invade. Even so, the NPFL appeared offended bythe weapons the Marines carried, which impliedthe NPFL could not be trusted to protect the citi-zens that were to be evacuated. The NPFL leadersmade it clear they thought Marines posed a dan-ger to NPFL soldiers. Illustrative of the level ofsuspicion, some of the fighters closely followedLieutenant Colonel Parker everywhere he went.Parker ignored the intrusive followers.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker and NPFL represen-tatives discussed the precise manner of evacua-tion in a beach house compound in Buchanan,one of several such compounds owned by theAmerican Mining Company the NPFL had occu-pied. To reduce tension, Parker gave the NPFLdelegation, led by a “General Major,” some ciga-rettes as he talked. According to LieutenantColonel Parker: “After some negotiation aboutwho, what, when, and where, we reached a gen-eral agreement about how we would conduct theevacuation. They had [the] people. I couldn’t seewhere they were, but they had them staged off. Iasked them to bring them to me 15 at a time tothe LZ and I would only fly one helicopter into



Evacuees from the German Embassy carry their belongings to a waiting helicopter on the beach atBuchanan. After being given protective helmets and life jackets, a group of 15 boarded the CH-46E he-licopters for the 10-minute flight to the USS Saipan (LHA 2).

the LZ at a time so as not to present a confusingpicture to these people.”122

Having reached an agreement, Parker suggest-ed to Colonel Amos that the number of Marineson the ground in Buchanan be reduced despitethe presence of several hundred NPFL troops, allarmed with Communist bloc weapons. WithAmos’ approval, Parker sent the security detach-ment back. With the detachment’s departure, theonly personnel left were Lieutenant ColonelParker, Lieutenant Commander Peterman, the bat-talion air officer, the air, naval gunfire liaison offi-cer, the radio operator, the photographers, andthe flight surgeon. Once both sides were satisfiedwith the situation, NPFL escorts began moving theforeign diplomats and their families toward theevacuation landing zone.

The NPFL brought 96 evacuees, in groups of 15and surrounded by 30 to 40 armed troops, to thelanding zone. Once in the landing zone, the Ma-

rines swept the evacuees with a metal detectorwand and searched their baggage for contraband.A few dignitaries, including the SpanishAmbassador, the Swiss Charge’ de’Affairs, and thePapal Nuncio received no inspection. After beinggiven protective helmets and life jackets, eachgroup of evacuees boarded a CH-46E helicopterand lifted off for the Saipan, a 10-minute flight.The helicopter flights ferried out one at a time,taking all but three of the evacuees, who left byLCM-8 and arrived on board the Saipan at about1400 that afternoon, thus concluding the evacua-tion.

Scared, tired, and glad to see the Marines,many of the evacuees expressed their relief theordeal had ended. The diplomats and Americansexperienced a harrowing and exhausting time inthe hands of the ruthless and highly volatile fight-ers. They never knew from one moment to thenext what the NPFL troops might decide to do. As

40 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-00811

A squad of Marines from Company H, Battalion Landing Team 2/4, boards a CH-46E Sea Knight heli-copter on the grounds of the American Embassy, beginning of the process of the 22d MarineExpeditionary Unit’s relief.

Lieutenant Colonel Parker put it: “They [the NPFL]would not hesitate to shoot somebody. Theywould not have hesitated, under the right circum-stances, to shoot those diplomats and take achance on blaming it on somebody else.”123

While the Buchanan evacuation was takingplace, the Marines at the embassy in Monroviaevacuated 12 people. That same day, the MEUreduced the size of the security force in theembassy compound to a reinforced rifle platoon.When the INPFL learned of the cooperationbetween the NPFL and the Marines in theBuchanan evacuation, they issued a variety ofthreats against the United States, although nonewere carried out.124

Rotation of Marine Forces

On 14 August, Company E, which had con-ducted the evacuations of the two American

Telecommunications Office sites nine days earlier,relieved Company H from security duties at theembassy. Despite the heavy fighting aroundMonrovia, the size of the security force ashoreremained at about 90 to reduce the chance ofMarine casualties from frequent stray rounds.Company E assumed security duties by manningthree main posts: Gate One, Gate Two, and theroof of the American Telecommunications Officebuilding. The Marines then began a routine ofpatrolling the compound, manning observationposts and defensive positions, and maintaining asmall reaction force. The MEU actually establishedguard orders for all posts.125 While the embassywas still well protected, Company E could call forreinforcements and firepower from the ships ifthe need arose.

On 15 August, another 12 individuals wereevacuated, including the Italian Ambassador toLiberia, and Marines monitored a peaceful



Wearing a protective helmet and life jacket, a young boy clutches a box of his possessions on the flight tosafety. During its stay in Liberia, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit evacuated more than 3,200American citizens, foreign nationals, and Liberian citizens.

demonstration of 500 Liberians outside theembassy under INPFL guard.126 The next day,Marines processed 359 people, mainly Indiannationals, the largest group evacuated to thatpoint.127 One woman gave birth to a baby afterreaching the safety of the Saipan.

While the Marines involved themselves withlocal security and evacuations, fighting continuedin the city. A mortar round hit the KoreanEmbassy while Taylor’s NPFL again attempted toseize the nearby Spriggs-Payne Airport. Fightingclosed the German and Italian Embassies andstranded the Ghanaian Ambassador in hisembassy. In the midst of the fighting, the govern-ment’s AFL forces shot an American Baptist mis-sionary in the legs and captured him. He laterdied and the AFL allowed embassy personnel torecover his body from the Executive Mansion inMonrovia, where the besieged President Doeremained holed up, guarded by AFL troops.128

The MEU received assistance on 17 Augustfrom an unexpected source when the amphibiousreadiness group welcomed the USS BarnstableCounty (LST 1197) to Mamba Station. On boardwere Marines of a two-platoon detachment fromCompany D, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 2dMarine Division, who received orders to divertfrom their course home to assist the MEU inLiberia. Serving as part of the West Africa TrainingCruise 90 and commanded by First LieutenantJoseph F. Augustine, III, they officially joined theLiberian evacuation effort.129

On 17 August, an additional 88 people leftfrom Landing Zone Magic. The evacuees told Ma-rines that AFL members were actively seeking outAmericans. The evacuees also related horrific sto-ries of AFL soldiers rampaging in the Sinkor andCongo Town areas.130 On 18 August, the evacua-tion control center and consular personnel pro-cessed 754 people, making that day’s evacuationthe busiest day the MEU had experienced.131* TheMEU intelligence section used interrogator trans-lators who spoke Arabic and French to assistevacuation control center Marines in communicat-ing with the Lebanese nationals, who made upthe majority of the evacuees. Sadly, the body ofthe Baptist missionary shot two days earlier byAFL troops went out that day with the evacuees.As the rush to evacuate continued, the MEU flew

109 more third-country nationals to JTF ship-ping.132

Normally, after some additional processing anda two-hour flight from shipping, the evacueesarrived at Freetown. Later, the larger groups ofrefugees were transported to Freetown by ship.By mid-August, the Queen Elizabeth quay in theport of Freetown and Lungi Airport bustled withactivity. Commercial jets, Marine and Navy heli-copters and fixed-wing aircraft, and NigerianLockheed C-130s delivering West African peace-keepers shared the airport runway. The WestAfrican monitoring group picked Freetown as thestaging area for its soldiers heading to Liberia. Thetroops waited in assembly areas, cooked, listenedto radios, and lounged at the port as additionalforces arrived by plane and ship. Five ships fromthe West African countries anchored at the QueenElizabeth quay after passing the ARG on their wayto Freetown. These included Nigeria’s NNS Ambeand Ghana’s MV Tano River troop transports,jammed full with trucks, supplies, and ammuni-tion destined for Monrovia.133

Turnover and Departure

As the West African ships sailed towardFreetown, Mediterranean-based ARG 3-90 sailedtoward the West African coast to relieve ARG 2-90.On 20 August, the 22d MEU welcomed its relief toMamba Station by evacuating eight civilians to the26th MEU’s ships. The 22d MEU conducted adetailed briefing for the 26th MEU on board theSaipan. The next day, the 26th MEU officiallyrelieved the 22d MEU in a blue-water turnover offthe shore of Liberia. The 21 August turnover at theembassy went smoothly with Company E, BLT2/4 relieved of its duties by Captain James K.Shannon’s Company K, BLT 3/8. The 22d MEUand ARG 2-90 left Liberian waters after evacuating1,648 civilians: 132 American citizens and 1,516foreign nationals.134

As Colonel Amos left the embassy, he bidgoodbye to Ambassador De Vos. LieutenantColonel Pugh, the BLT 2/4 commander, said: “Theperformance of the troops, especially the smallunit leaders, was truly magnificent. It was a goodplan and the extraction and reinforcement wereexecuted flawlessly.”135 One evacuee, before shecarried her baby on board a waiting helicopter,summed it up: “Thank God for the United Statesand the Marines. They’re always there to helpwhen people are helpless.”136

42 ON MAMBA STATION

* The 18 August flight manifest, 22d MEU Manifest, August 18Flights, Drawdown Evacuation 1990 (Sharp Edge HistColl,MCHC, Washington, D.C.), however, listed 802 evacuees.

Deployment of the 26th MEU

As Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 3-90, thethird group deployed in 1990, and the 26th MEU sailed toward the West African coast to relieveARG 2-90 and the 22d MEU, ships loaded withWest African peacekeepers also sailed towardFreetown, Sierra Leone. The Marines of the arriv-ing MEU and the soldiers of the EconomicCommunity of West African States MonitoringGroup would soon encounter one another inMonrovia, Liberia.

Departing on 7 August, Marines of 26th MEUleft Morehead City, North Carolina, to relieve the22d MEU. A large crowd of journalists and televi-sion cameramen met the Marines that morning asthey arrived at the port to embark on board theirships. The recent invasion of Kuwait creatednational interest in any deployment with journal-ists asking where the Marines and sailors of 26thMEU were going. Many of the Marines did notknow themselves if their unit’s mission wouldchange or remain focused on Liberia. Adding tothe Marines’ uncertainty, President George H.Bush had announced that morning he intended tosend troops to Saudi Arabia. While America’sattention was focused on Saudi Arabia, ColonelWilliam C. Fite III, commanding officer of the 26thMEU, concentrated on his unit’s mission toLiberia, which included providing security to theembassy and conducting noncombatant evacua-tions and limited humanitarian relief operations inbenign or hostile conditions.

Dispatching the 26th MEU to Liberia posedoperational concerns. Sending it to the WestAfrican coast left the Mediterranean without anamphibious ready group. General John R. Galvin,USA, Command in Chief, Europe, LieutenantGeneral Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commanding General,Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and Admiral PowellF. Carter, Jr., Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet,questioned the ability of the ready group and

MEU to respond quickly to other crises whileinvolved in Liberia. The start of American involve-ment in the Gulf War raised the possibility ofunrest spreading to the southern Mediterraneancoast. If the ARG and MEU remained floating offLiberia, the U.S. European Command would nothave an equivalent force available for contingen-cies in the Mediterranean. The Sixth Fleet’samphibious force could not redeploy rapidly tothe Mediterranean. According to the EuropeanCommand Joint Historian: “On 14 August 1990, aninteragency meeting hosted by the Department ofState on the Liberia crisis concluded that the with-drawal of the Marines from Liberia should takeplace. The participants in the Washington, D.C.meeting could not agree as to when.”*

Three things appeared to point to the missionending soon: the build-up of Operation DesertShield forces; the economic embargo of Iraq; andthe threat of terrorism in the Mediterranean. At theoperational level, the continued presence of theMarines in Liberia seemed unlikely givenPresident Doe’s refusal to leave, the fact that mostof the Americans had been evacuated, and theimpending deployment of West Africa peacekeep-ers. The commander of the Sixth Fleet, AdmiralJames D. Williams, thought the remaining opera-tions in Liberia would be short-lived. As ColonelFite recalled: “They just decided that the bulk ofthe work had been done, and the threat would beso reduced they could afford to get some pres-ence back in the Mediterranean or possibly moveforces on to the Persian Gulf and still handle theproblem down in Liberia.”137 Consequently, theAtlantic Fleet and European Command consideredsplitting the ready group and embarked expedi-tionary unit to deal with both the Mediterraneanand Liberia.

Chapter 4

Operation Sharp Edge

* EuCom JHO, The Politics of NEO: Sharp Edge, undated.(Chapter Two, EUCOM JHO NEO manuscript, Sharp Edgefiles, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

Colonel Fite expressed reservations in a planthat would break up a well-trained team andemploy subcomponents that did not normallyconduct independent operations. Considering theserious developments in Southwest Asia, he didnot know if the 26th MEU would join the assem-bling forces in Saudi Arabia. Fite viewed condi-tions in Liberia as dangerously volatile and wasunsure whether the Marines left at the embassy inMonrovia could deal with a worst-case scenario, adeliberate attack. Each of the three warring fac-tions in the Liberian civil war had proved to beerratic and unreliable when it came to keepingagreements. With each faction’s strength estimat-ed at approximately 1,000 combatants, no matterhow incompetent the factions appeared, Fite con-sidered any sustained attack by the fighters to bevery dangerous.138

Colonel Fite wanted the remaining Marines notonly to be able to defend themselves and theembassy, but to do so while carrying out a non-combatant evacuation against a hostile force. The

embassy guards needed quick reaction forceswith firepower. As Colonel Fite commented: “Iwas reasonably sure that with the whole MEUthere, that we could come in there whether they[Liberian factional fighters] liked it or not, eitherinto the compound or on the little beach besidethe embassy and conduct an evacuation.”139

In the end, European Command’s security con-cerns for the Mediterranean littoral and the desiresof Admiral Williams, the Sixth Fleet commander,outweighed the reservations expressed byColonel Fite. European Command decided to splitARG 3-90, which was composed of AmphibiousSquadron 2 (Phibron 2) and the 26th MEU. Onlyabout 400 Marines and sailors of the expedi-tionary unit, Contingency Marine Air-Ground TaskForce (CMAGTF) 3-90, would remain off the coastof Liberia, “to maintain presence on station, con-tinue with the evacuation, and maintain supportand security for the embassy.”140 While CMAGTF3-90 remained, the rest of the MEU would steamto the Mediterranean to satisfy the security and

44 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05943

Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit wait on board the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41) to betransferred to other ships off the coast of Liberia, during cross-decking operations to reconfigure theamphibious ready group for the upcoming mission ashore.

scheduled exercise requirements of the Sixth Fleetand the European Command.

The decision to split the 26th MEU resulted inColonel Fite consulting his staff on how best todivide the force based on its mission, capabilities,available shipping, logistics, and personnel. Thestaff also considered Colonel Fite’s guidanceimportant to accomplishing the reconfigurationwith the least amount of movement of Marinesand equipment between ships at sea. Dividing aMarine expeditionary unit normally not organizedto operate in two parts meant risking not havingthe proper depth in equipment or personnel. TheMarine and Navy staffs both worked energeticallyon the plan to ensure both portions could per-form all required missions. Guidance fromAdmiral Williams included the assumption “thatwhoever stayed back wouldn’t have to stay therevery long.”141

The right ship mix for both missions alsorequired careful consideration. Early in the mis-sion planning, Colonel Fite conferred with theready group’s commander, Commodore StanleyD. Gastar, USN, about designating a ship for thecontingency task force.* The USS Whidbey Island(LSD 41) provided the best platform consideringthe overall needs for aviation, logistics, and per-sonnel support. Forming CMAGTF 3-90 requiredthe designation of command, air, ground, andcombat service support elements, the commonbuilding blocks to all Marine air-ground taskforces. On board the USS Inchon (LPH 12), the26th MEU commander named Major George S.Hartley, the executive officer of Battalion LandingTeam (BLT) 3/8, to lead CMAGTF 3-90.

The aviation personnel and assets came fromMarine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 (HMM-162). The commanding officer of HMM-162“Golden Eagles,” Lieutenant Colonel Darrell A.Browning, assigned Major Daniel P. “Doc”Johnson to lead the aviation detachment. The avi-ation aircrews consisted of six officers and 22enlisted men. The detachment also included land-ing zone control, helicopter maintenance, andhelicopter support teams. Three of the squadron’sCH-46E helicopters completed the air combat ele-ment.

After consultations with his staff and the BLTcommander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Essink,Colonel Fite determined that a reinforced rifle

company provided enough combat power anddepth to allow for the rotation of the Marines.Lieutenant Colonel Essink picked Company K’scommanding officer, Captain James K. Shannon,as the ground combat element commander.Although Shannon’s Marines formed the bulk ofthe ground combat element, he received aug-mentation from the BLT’s Headquarters andService Company, Battery G, Weapons Company,as well as the Amphibious Assault Vehicle andCombat Engineer Platoons on board the USSBarnstable County (LST 1197).

A difficult decision involved the mix of combatservice support personnel and supplies.Lieutenant Colonel Jonathon W. Stull, the com-manding officer of MEU Service Support Group26 (MSSG-26), was concerned he did not have thenecessary depth of manpower and adequate sup-plies to support both CMAGTF 3-90 and theremainder of the MEU. Stull selected the engineersupport platoon to form the bulk of the combatservice support detachment (CSSD) since its mis-sion included utility support for the embassy. Theengineer support platoon commander, ChiefWarrant Officer 3 Edwin E. Deering, was selectedas the officer-in-charge, and the detachment rein-forced with aviation support, water supply, andbulk fuel personnel.

Embassy support was a large part of the 27-man CSSD’s mission in Liberia. Since theembassy’s logistical support needs were difficultto anticipate, the Marines did not hold a largesupply block afloat. For the Marines ashore, antic-ipated supplies included food, barbed wire, andsand bags. The MSSG staff picked two largepieces of support equipment to go ashore, areverse osmosis water purification unit and a gen-erator pump capable of pumping 600 gallons perminute. This left the MEU with one water purifi-cation unit to support later Mediterranean exer-cises. As Lieutenant Colonel Stull explained:“Dividing that up between Mamba Station and theMed made things precarious to sustain support inboth locations. It came out okay, but those twoareas were probably the trickiest—supply andequipment density.”142

The 26th MEU reached Mamba Station on 19August following 12 days in transit. The incomingunit received turnover briefings from 22d MEU onboard the USS Saipan (LHA 2) the next day. Onthe morning of 21 August, helicopters flew the 2dPlatoon of Captain James Shannon’s Company K,BLT 3/8 ashore, where they assumed embassyduties from Captain Gary Oles’ Company E, BLT

OPERATION SHARP EDGE 45

* Captain Stanley D. Gastar, while in command of theAmphibious Ready Group, held the title of commodore.

2/4. The relief went smoothly and took a littlemore than two hours for Company E to turn overall defensive positions and ammunition. Aroundnoon, the last of the 22d MEU left Company Kwith 90 Marines in defensive positions to guardthe embassy and departed Monrovia fromLanding Zone Magic.143 The 22d MEU completedthe blue-water turnover at approximately 1400 on21 August and left Mamba Station, officiallyrelieved.144

26th MEU and the Formation of theCMAGTF in Liberia

Colonel Fite went ashore after the turnover andmet with his forward command element andAmbassador Peter De Vos. Upon arrival, hereceived a briefing from his team, who hadalready been ashore for 12 days. The eight-man

team, headed by the executive officer of the 26thMEU, Lieutenant Colonel Richard H. Kunkel, Jr.,had flown to Liberia the day before the MEUsailed from Morehead City and had observedevacuations, transmitted updated information,and familiarized themselves with the personalitiesat the embassy during their interim stay.

As the turnovers took place, work to reconfig-ure the amphibious ready group began. Personnelwere transferred to and from the designated flag-ship of the task force, the Whidbey Island. Thenew load plan to accommodate the contingencytask force required the concerted effort of allhands. At one point, the combined Marine andNavy effort resulted in the entire deck of the LSDbeing covered with vehicles, ConEx boxes,105mm howitzers, and other MEU equipment.*The reconfiguration, undertaken at sea, required

46 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05947

During the shift of personnel and equipment among the ships of the amphibious ready group, Marinesfrom the USS Inchon (LPH 12) disembark from a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter of Marine MediumHelicopter Squadron 162 on the flight deck of the USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41), their temporary home.

* A ConEx box is a large metal shipping container.

numerous helicopter lifts and night runs with air-cushioned landing craft and well-deck operationsto transfer all the equipment, supplies, and per-sonnel. Helicopters with loads slung beneathrepeatedly transferred equipment between theWhidbey Island and other ready group ships. TheInchon, USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS NewportCounty (LST 1179), and USS Fairfax County (LST1193) also experienced changes to billeting andload-plan configurations. The MEU’s 155mm how-itzers below the main deck and deep within theWhidbey Island remained on board, impossible tomove. During the reconfiguration, the MEU couldnot pull all other equipment and supplies from infront of the guns to allow for their transfer off theship. The artillery pieces remained on board eventhough “there was absolutely no prospect of thembeing used there [Liberia].”145 Most of the BLT’svehicles also remained below decks on theWhidbey Island for the same reason.146 TheMarines and sailors completed the task after threedays of labor-intensive cross-decking, movingequipment, countless tons of supplies, and hun-dreds of men.

As the reconfiguration started, the MEU’s exec-utive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kunkel, andmembers of the forward command element con-tinued to monitor the situation at the embassy.The chancery conference room, filled with radiosthat allowed communications with each post, theflag ship and U.S. European Command headquar-ters, served as the command post. The locationgave the command element quick access to keyembassy personnel. Later that week, CaptainShannon moved in to the conference room as theprimary on-scene commander for the groundcombat element of CMAGTF 3-90.

Other elements of the forming task force joinedCompany K ashore. The CSSD arrived at theembassy and found people awaiting evacuation.As Chief Warrant Officer Deering stated: “Welanded on the 23d of August and immediatelytook care of the processing and loading of theawaiting evacuees.”147 In the first lift, an Americanand 30 foreign evacuees flew on a CH-53 heli-copter to Freetown, Sierra Leone.148

The final transfer separating CMAGTF 3-90from the 26th MEU ended when three CH-46 hel-icopters landed on the Whidbey Island.149 Withthe completion of cross-decking on 24 August andthe movement of the Marines, sailors, and equip-ment ashore, the task force assumed its mission.Most the task force remained on board theWhidbey Island and Barnstable County in support

or reserve.* 150 Late in the afternoon, the 26thMEU sailed for Rota, Spain, leaving the task forcebehind in Liberian waters.151

The movement of helicopters to the WhidbeyIsland was significant since the ship normally didnot house a permanent aviation detachment.Because of this and the lack of a hangar, theMarines stored some aviation supplies on theflight deck in front of landing spot one.** Thecrew helped the aviation Marines settle into workspaces not designed for an aviation detachment.As far as anyone on board knew, the arrival of thehelicopters constituted the first instance of an avi-ation detachment embarking on a landing shipdock for extended operations.152 The ship alsopresented the newly arrived aviation Marines withsome practical challenges. First, the ship did nothave an air boss or someone accustomed to run-ning an air control tower. Fortunately, a few ofthe sailors on board did have flight deck experi-ence, so they operated the tower for a few weeksuntil the amphibious squadron sent an experi-enced air traffic controller. Second, with the heli-copters positioned on the exposed flight deck, thefirst few rainy weeks complicated routine mainte-nance—plastic sheeting and ponchos helpedsomewhat.

Peacekeepers, Fighters, andContingency MAGTF

While the MEU completed forming the contin-gency task force, transport ships loaded withtroops and equipment of the five-nationEconomic Community of West African StatesMilitary Observation Group (ECOMOG) enteredthe port of Monrovia.*** During the afternoon of24 August, Nigeria’s NNS Ambe (LST 1123) andGhana’s MV Tano River maneuvered to the mouth


* U.S. European Command limited the number of Marinesashore, gradually reducing that number as the deploymentcontinued into the fall and early winter of 1990.** The air detachment normally launched one aircraft at atime. In case it needed to launch two helicopters, spot twowas shifted further aft. The lower flight decks of the WhidbeyIsland and Barnstable County received increased salt spray asaircraft approached or departed. Frequent inspections by thedetachment and increased maintenance hours identifiedpotential corrosion problems.*** An emergency meeting of the Economic Community ofWest African States Standing Mediation Committee composedof Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, and Gambia took place from 5July to 20 July in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The committee dis-cussed the concept of deploying a ceasefire monitoring forceto Liberia, but reached no agreement.

of the jetty area of Freeport.153 They temporarilywithdrew after receiving some sporadic mortarfire and reentered the port later that evening.After docking, a small mix of troops debarked.Awaiting the peacekeepers on the dock, PrinceJohnson, head of the INFPL, attempted to contactthe embassy over a Motorola radio, possibly onestolen from the embassy’s local guards. Johnsonasked for U.S. help in welcoming the Africanpeacekeepers and securing the port.154 TheMarine security guard on duty, monitoring all theradio networks at Post One in the chancellery, didnot respond to the request.

Later that night the military observation groupcommander, Ghanaian Lieutenant General ArnoldQuainoo, met with Prince Johnson. The WestAfrican soldiers ashore bivouacked haphazardlyin abandoned warehouses in the port area.*General Quainoo viewed his force’s mission as

peacekeepers to assist the warring factions inobserving a ceasefire.155

Regardless of the peacekeepers actions, themission of the Marines encompassed: providingsecurity for the compound; evacuating designatedAmericans and foreign nationals; providing limit-ed logistic support to the embassy; and support-ing limited humanitarian relief operations.156

Major Hartley, the Marine task force commanderresponsible for accomplishing the mission, report-ed to Captain Francis. P. Grause, USN, the com-mander of Joint Task Force (JTF) Sharp Edge.**Colonel Martin R. Berndt from the U.S. EuropeanCommand assisted the JTF commander for a fewweeks in the embassy as the military liaison to theWest African peacekeeping force.

Joining their forces ashore, the remaining WestAfrican troops moved off their ships and venturedinto greater Monrovia. This 25 August attempt tobegin the mission of enforcing a ceasefireinvolved some collaboration with Prince

48 ON MAMBA STATION


A Nigerian armored vehicle patrols the streets of Monrovia. While one rebel faction assured unfetteredpassage to members of the five-nation West African peacekeeping force, other factions attempted to pre-vent their deployment throughout the capital.

* The rapidly formed force lacked supply support. Manynewly arrived soldiers did not have personal weapons, uni-forms, and boots. Prince Johnson, leader of the INPFL, laterprovided uniforms and boots as gifts to the Nigerian troops,according to Major General C.Y. Iweze, “Nigeria in Liberia:The Military Operations of ECOMOG,” in Nigeria inInternational Peacekeeping, p. 231.

** Since the turnover on 21 August, Commander Thomas L.Breitinger, the commanding officer of the Whidbey Island,temporarily commanded the JTF until the arrival of CaptainFrancis P. Grause, who previously commanded Naval BeachGroup Two.

Johnson’s INPFL, which controlled BushrodIsland. The negotiations allowed the 2,500 peace-keepers to move freely through INPFL areas.Leaving the port area, a Nigerian battalion movednorth and secured the St. Paul River bridges whilea Ghana and Sierra Leone battalion deployed justshort of the north end of the Mesurado River bridges.

The peacekeepers already knew CharlesTaylor’s NPFL would likely try to prevent theirdeployment. Taylor opposed the idea of a cease-fire and his delegation at the Banjul, Gambia,talks of 6 and 7 August 1990 flatly stated that untilPresident Doe resigned, no agreement on a cease-fire could be reached. As the peacekeepingtroops deployed throughout the day, Marines onpost heard sporadic machine gun fire and theexplosions of mortars and rocket-propelledgrenades. Despite the fighting, Marine CH-46 he-licopters flew their first mission into Landing ZoneMagic as members of CMAGTF 3-90 delivered fuelfor the embassy generators.157

As the fighting flared on and off, one NPFLgunner’s rocket-propelled grenade hit a Nigerianarmored car. The attack near the St. Paul bridgeswounded two Nigerians.158 The peacekeepersasked the embassy if the Americans could evacu-ate the two seriously wounded Nigerian soldiers.A Marine helicopter crew went on stand-by thatevening, awaiting the result of the embassy’s con-sultation with Washington. The State Departmentdenied the peacekeeper’s evacuation request thefollowing day.159

On the morning of 26 August, Marine helicop-ters evacuated an American citizen who arrived atthe embassy with a group of refugees. Previously,a detachment of Navy Sikorsky CH-53E SuperStallion helicopters picked up evacuees and flewthem directly to Freetown. That evening, the pathof the evacuation switched from direct flights toFreetown to a more judicious route. The JTFestablished the procedure of flying evacuees tothe Barnstable County and placing a Marine heli-copter on board. The ship would then sail to


DVIC DN-SC-91-06093

A Marine shows a group of evacuees how to properly don helmets before boarding a helicopter on thegrounds of the American Embassy. From the embassy they would be flown to one of the ships off shore.

Freetown, Sierra Leone. After arriving inFreetown, the CH-46 would fly the evacuees toLungi Airfield for further processing and transfer.The Marines and sailors at the Lungi forwardlogistics site loaded the returning helicopter withcritical parts, supplies, and mail for the ship. Onceall the evacuees had departed the ship, theBarnstable County with its helicopter steamedback to Mamba Station. The combination of LSTand helicopter evacuations effectively managedthe flow of evacuees for the contingency taskforce. The Marines repeatedly used this methodfor about three weeks until the Navy helicopterssupporting the operation, which had previouslybeen grounded, could fly again.160*

On 26 August, evacuation control centerMarines administratively processed 90 persons. Toprocess the evacuees, embassy staff passed theword by radio and telephone about scheduledhelicopter lifts and the available passenger seats.On the appointed day, potential evacuees came tothe embassy (with their passports) and filled outan application. Consular personnel screened theapplicants, giving priority to citizens of the UnitedStates, followed by foreign diplomats, foreignnationals associated with a foreign embassy, andother third-country nationals.

While the evacuees’ administrative documentswere being processed, the evacuation controlcenter Marines concentrated on security andpreparing evacuees for the flight.** Working on aconsular computer, Marines recorded the evac-uees’ names and nationalities for the flight mani-fests. On the day of the flight, Marines searchedthe evacuees for contraband, which involvedsearching each person and their baggage for anydrugs or weapons. Despite the anarchy and vio-lence in the city, the Marines found only oneweapon, a pistol. However, “suspicious-looking

50 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05963

Four civilians disembark from a Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 Sea Knight helicopter at LungiAirport, just north of Freetown, Sierra Leone. The civilians were processed on board a U.S. Navy ship offthe coast of Liberia before being flown to Sierra Leone.

* Earlier in Sharp Edge operations, evacuees departed theembassy for Freetown, Sierra Leone, on Sikorsky CH-53ESuper Stallion helicopters belonging to the Navy’s HelicopterSupport Squadron 4 (HC-4). The two-aircraft HC-4 detachmentroutinely flew from Sierra Leone to Liberia laden with sup-plies, mail, and other cargo. Once helicopters landed at theembassy in Liberia, they off-loaded supplies and returned toSierra Leone loaded with evacuees. The Navy C-130 or C-9 air-craft flew numerous flights to Freetown bringing supplies orig-inating in the Mediterranean or continental United States. Inlate August, both HC-4 helicopters were temporarily ground-ed for parts and maintenance. With the number of refugeeswanting to leave increasing, the CMAGTF took over this criti-cal role using the Barnstable County and one CH-46.

** The State Department charged third-country nationals a feefor the evacuation, reportedly $300 for evacuation toFreetown.

powders in bags” were found on several differentevacuees.161 Like the pistol, the Marines deliveredthe confiscated bags to the regional security offi-cer for disposal. The luggage was staged after thesearch and each person was issued a flight hel-met. Once a helicopter landed, Marines led theevacuees, assisting the young and the old, on tothe aircraft. The helicopter launched after all evac-uees had buckled their seat belts.

Along with processing evacuees, the combatservice support detachment attempted to solvethe problems experienced earlier in supplying theembassy with fresh water. With the end of therainy season coming, the CSSD again attempted todraw water from the ocean using the water purifi-cation unit left by the 22d MEU. At the top of acliff directly above the ocean, the engineers wres-tled with the water purification unit and pumpand concluded the existing pump lacked the nec-essary power. The engineers were able to drawseawater to the water purification unit at the topof the cliff after having a helicopter place a morepowerful pump on shore, but the problem ofdrawing the water from the ocean still remained.

The purification unit used a suction pipe runningfrom the shore out into the ocean, but severe surfaction repeatedly broke the pipe. Consequently,the detachment was only able to pump waterfrom the ocean at high tide when there was lesssurf action. The pump achieved strong suction athigh tide on 26 August, which allowed the unit toproduce about 6,000 gallons of potable water.Chief Warrant Officer Deering said: “Weprocessed the water and it turned out to be realexcellent water.”162 The Marines gave samples ofthe water to the embassy staff, whose concernsabout quality were eased by the surprisinglyagreeable taste of the water. Unfortunately, theexceptionally heavy surf action at Mamba Point ripped the plumbing out of the pump within theweek and washed it away. No longer able to relyon purified ocean water, the Marines looked forother sources to supply the compound. Collectingrainwater was the obvious choice, since in Augustit rained quite frequently. To that end, engineersset up a couple of 3,000-gallon bladders on lowspots in the embassy compound and placed pipesto channel the water into the bladders. It rained


DVIC DN-SC-91-06073

Marines scan United Nations Drive, the main street bordering the American Embassy compound, from asandbagged guard post on the roof of an embassy building.

hard enough to collect 6,000 gallons of water intwo hours. The accumulation, processed by thepurification unit, delivered clean drinking waterfor the Marines.*

Marines continually worked to maintain defen-sive positions, which rapidly deteriorated in therainy weather. While CSSD Marines worked onwater and power, Captain Shannon’s infantryimproved its defenses. Marines rotated in a newrifle platoon about every seven days. The pla-toons, reinforced with machine gunners and60mm mortar men, set up three rotating guardshifts of eight hours each. Once familiar with theposts, the platoon sergeants and squad leaders ofCompany K rotated men among the posts toreduce boredom.

To augment these infantrymen, snipers fromthe Surveillance and Target Acquisition platoon ofBLT 3/8 came ashore. After assessing the limitedfields of fire from inside the compound, thesnipers concluded the Wellington and Sam and Eapartments outside the compound afforded betterobservation of the city. Unfortunately, Marinesnipers from the previous command had alreadybeen withdrawn from those positions underEuropean Command orders to remain inside thecompound. But diplomatic security personnel,although not as well trained in tactical surveil-lance techniques as the snipers, did not have thesame restrictions and were directed to man obser-vation posts in both apartments. The diplomaticsecurity outposts afforded an excellent view ofstrategic parts of the city and indirectly gave theMarines early warning when fighting broke out.

Evacuees slowly trickled in and Marines evac-uated two American citizens and three foreignnationals on 27 August. The next day, SergeantBrian J. Bonfiglio, a member of the WeaponsCompany detachment, stopped a group of armedLiberians from summarily executing a fellow citi-zen. The incident began when a group of fightersstarted yelling, kicking, and brutally beating theirvictim. Quickly grabbing a loudspeaker and usinga commanding voice, Sergeant Bonfoglio per-suaded the group of fighters to stop and let theindividual live. Since the action was not directed

at them or other Americans, the Marines could notuse force.

The rules of engagement, the same used by the22d MEU, allowed for an escalation of force if afighter or a group of fighters initiated hostileaction against Americans or the embassy.163

Undisciplined Liberian fighters frequently pointedweapons at everyone, not realizing their actionsconstituted a hostile act. Individual Marines han-dled the leeway given to them by the rules ofengagement with restraint. As Captain Shannonstated:

There were many times wherethe INPFL or some AFL guyswould ride in front of the U.S.embassy on [United Nations]Drive, and not aim in but pointtheir weapons in a very sarcasticmanner at the Marine positions.The Marines had the presence ofmind to discern who was kid-ding and who may not be kid-ding. Though the [rules ofengagement] allowed them tofire at any of those vehicles whoshowed hostile intent such aspointing a loaded weapon,which had a magazine in theweapon, at the positions.164

Flights evacuating third-country nationals con-tinued, and on 29 August, the Barnstable Countyleft Liberian waters for Sierra Leone carrying evac-uees and one of the air combat element’s threehelicopters. As fighting escalated the followingday, 76 evacuees transferred to the BarnstableCounty and made the trip to Freetown. At theembassy in a recreation cabana hut located closeto Landing Zone Magic, a stray 7.62mm round hitLance Corporal Davis J. Cassady. The round camethrough the open-sided hut’s roof and bouncedoff the floor. Fortunately, it was deflected byCassady’s flack jacket.

The forces fighting for control of Liberia rangin September with heavy fighting near the AFL’sBarclay Training Center and Spriggs-PayneAirport. Stray rounds from small arms fire passedover and through the compound. As CaptainShannon explained: “Where we were positionedin the embassy compound, [which was at the endof a] beaten zone along the gun-target line, whichmeans you are in receipt of many small arms.Regardless of whether they’re firing at you or not,you’re going to receive a lot of small arms, as well

52 ON MAMBA STATION

* The embassy cistern system also collected rainwater. Byusing a complex system of gutters on the roofs of severalembassy buildings, the water flowed by pipes into two under-ground reservoirs in the embassy compound. Between thetwo reservoirs, the embassy water storage capacity equaledabout 200,000 gallons; a three-week supply at the rate theembassy used water.

as automatic fire.”165 During a daytime rovingpatrol, Marines found a small hole in the fencedirectly behind the recreation center and twomore American citizens and 21 foreign nationalswere evacuated.166

The fighting among opposing sides in the civilwar continued on 2 September, with 20 artillery,mortar, and high-angle rocket-propelled grenaderounds impacting close to the embassy. The ran-dom shelling increased the number of noncom-batants seeking evacuation. U.S. forces evacuatedsix more American citizens and 57 foreign nation-als during a lull in the fighting.167 That night, theBarnstable County again left for Freetown carry-ing evacuees to safety and bringing back suppliesand mail.168

Monrovia appeared calmer for a few days asthe West African peacekeepers renewed efforts todeploy throughout the city. On 3 September,Marines spotted the first observation group footpatrol, who waved as they passed the embassy.169

The brief calm allowed Marine helicopters to

assist in replenishing the Whidbey Island’s sup-plies from the USNS Henry J. Kaiser (T-AO-187).170 On 5 September, a Marine observationpost watched a NPFL fighter shoot at a passingcivilian vehicle in front of the Wellington apart-ments. The routine rotation of rifle platoons andcombat service support Marines took place on 6September and the helicopters evacuated sixmore American citizens and 73 foreign nationals.Filled with refugees, the Barnstable County madeyet another trip to Freetown that night.171

On 9 September, the Armed Forces of Liberiashelled the Freeport area from the Capitol Hill area. The exposed peacekeeper’s ships temporar-ily withdrew from the port. The following morn-ing, a convoy of INPFL fighters passed theembassy and headed south on United NationsDrive. At Barclay Training Center, meanwhile, 50to 75 Liberian army troops formed up to escortPresident Doe to the peacekeeping force’s head-quarters. Both forces met and exchanged smallarms fire just a few blocks east of the embassy.



The American Embassy’s recreation hut housed the Marine command post until a stray round from out-side the compound hit one Marine, who was not injured in the incident.

One of the INPFL fighters passing by a Marinepost accidentally discharged his weapon, butimmediately apologized to the Marines on post.172

President Doe ventured out of the ExecutiveMansion later that morning for the first time sinceJune to visit the peacekeepers’ headquarters. AfterDoe arrived at the headquarters at Freeport,INPFL fighters in a number of trucks pulled upand started arguing with the guards. Gunfireerupted and the fighters of Prince Johnson’sINPFL forced their way into the building andbegan shooting at Doe’s bodyguards. In the fray,the soldiers ran for cover while Prince Johnson’smen searched from room to room for Doe and hismen (members of the Krahn tribal group).Johnson’s fighters killed more than 60 men fromDoe’s escort, wounded and captured Doe andtook him to their base at Cadwell.173 Word of thecapture spread quickly throughout Monrovia andresulted in evacuees flocking to the gates of theembassy. Marines heard sporadic exchanges ofsmall arms fire throughout the day, and by night-fall, Marines had evacuated nine more Americancitizens and 87 foreign nationals.174

Returning to Cadwell, Prince Johnson torturedand killed President Doe while his men recordedthe grisly event on video. Amidst Doe’s screams,Prince Johnson questioned him and narrated thevideo while drinking a beer. Foreign observersthought President Doe’s death would signal theend of the fighting.

That same evening, the peacekeeping forceasked for American assistance to evacuate someof their casualties, prompting the aviation Marinesto prepare their aircraft for the expected mission.As Major Daniel P. “Doc” Johnson stated: “Wewere scrambling around at that time trying to gethelicopters ready, trying to get them spotted, try-ing to get crews together to go in, at night, to theembassy and extract these casualties of the ECO-MOG forces.” While the Marines got ready, therequest for a decision went up the chain-of-command. It took about four hours before theJoint Chiefs of Staff approved. “We all knew thatif it was going to be done,” Johnson continued, “itwas going to be done at night. Well, about 10:00[PM] they came down and said, ‘We’re cleared todo it, but do it tomorrow morning.’” The Marines

54 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-06094

A Marine buckles the chinstrap on a child’s helmet before a group of evacuees board a helicopter for theflight to the initial processing center offshore.

spotted their aircraft and retired for the night,anticipating a launch before first light the nextday. The medical evacuation plan called for themost seriously injured to be treated on theWhidbey Island while those who could travelsafely were to go to the Barnstable County forfurther passage to Sierra Leone. According toJohnson: “The next morning [10 September] wegot up and started briefing and getting aircraftready. We were all strapped in, ready to go, and[the embassy] called back and said the ECOMOGforces decided to take care of their own wound-ed and send them back by one of their ownships.”175 During the remainder of the day, theMarines on post watched numerous convoys ofarmed peacekeepers and INPFL troops drive pastthe embassy. As night fell, the Barnstable Countysailed to Sierra Leone with 96 evacuees.176

On 11 September, the sounds of sporadic firefrom artillery, mortars and close heavy machineguns echoed throughout the embassy grounds. Afirefight between INPFL and AFL flared up about200 meters from the embassy gates with a barrage

of stray small arms rounds impacting inside thecompound. U.S. Ambassador DeVos, in the inter-im, met with Charles Taylor to discuss ways toend the conflict.177

Attempts to control the Barclay Training Centershifted the fight to the east, but the embassy com-pound took an increasing volume of fire duringthe next two days. Small arms fire hit both PostTwo (Gate Two), and Observation Post One,located on the top floor of the Sam and E apart-ment building across the street from Gate One.Artillery rounds landed in the water behind theBritish Embassy. Several Marines had close callswith one round passing through a trouser leg andother rounds impacting the sand bags arounddefensive positions. Reacting to the increasedfighting, Major George S. “Steve” Hartley aug-mented security inside the compound andbrought 60mm mortars ashore. Conducting theweekly rotation, 75 Marines returned to the shipand 92 Marines came ashore. During the rotation,the evacuation control center evacuated 12 moreAmerican citizens and eight foreign nationals.


DVIC DN-ST-91-05978

A woman carries her daughter across the flight deck of the USS Barnstable County (LST 1197) after dis-embarking from a CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter.

While Marines reinforced, Ambassador DeVos again met with NPFL leader Charles Taylor in theembassy.178

The fighting shifted closer on 14 Septemberand bullets hit Post One and Gate One. Otherembassy posts received a peppering of small armsfire, but with no effect. Bloated bodies washed upon the beach below the embassy.179

Later in the morning, INPFL leader PrinceJohnson conducted his first embassy visit. As ashow of force, Major Hartley mobilized all avail-able Marines and placed them in visible locationswhere the Marines could be seen cleaningweapons and manning posts. More than 60 ofPrince Johnson’s armed fighters waited outsidethe embassy on United Nations Drive while hemet with the Ambassador. After Johnson’s depar-ture, intermittent firefights in the city increased.The infantrymen on post spent the night listeningto the largest volume of rounds passing overheadthus far in the operation.180

On 15 September, fighting came very close tothe embassy. Incoming indirect fire becameextremely heavy, especially at Post Two. A gunbattle occurred near Gate Two, which continuedsporadically throughout the night as INPFL unitsmaneuvered to within a block of the embassy.With fighting so close, even the most juniorMarines realized they would be in Liberia for anextended period.181

Firing started early on the morning of 16September at about 0430 with a small armsexchange just south of the embassy. PrinceJohnson arrived later that morning and met againwith the Ambassador for continued discussions.He brought a crowd of about 90 INPFL fighters,who waited outside the embassy on UnitedNations Drive. Meanwhile, the volume of firelanding in the compound and passing overheadheld steady. Rounds hit the telecommunicationsoffice located in the southwest corner of the com-pound. In spite of all the stray rounds, Marines

56 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05981

A civilian lifts his arms to be searched by a Marine while being processed on board the USS BarnstableCounty (LST 1197). Marines also conducted a quick search of luggage brought on board and providedthe evacuees with refreshments.

evacuated six more American citizens and 46 for-eign nationals. Later, Marines observed sustainedheavy machine gun fire aimed at the BarclayTraining Center from Mamba Point’s LighthouseHill.182

Late in the morning of 17 September, PrinceJohnson, accompanied by his bodyguard of 50

INPFL fighters, returned to the embassy and metwith the Ambassador in what had become almosta daily routine. All appeared calm until just beforenoon.

The Marine task force’s intelligence chiefashore received a report that indicated a strongAFL force was moving toward the embassy, pos-sibly to engage Prince Johnson’s bodyguard.Responding to the report of 150 AFL soldiers andone armored vehicle (a Romanian armored per-sonnel carrier) moving toward the embassy,Captain Shannon called for a “Sparrow Hawk”reaction force consisting of a reinforced rifle pla-toon.183 Calling to the Whidbey Island, heexplained to Major Hartley that it made sense to

reinforce with the infamous and unpredictableMajor Tilley now leading the AFL fighters.*

Major Hartley quickly sent a rifle platoon byhelicopter to the embassy and the reaction forcedeployed inside the compound within 34 min-utes. The same helicopters also evacuated threeawaiting American citizens and 46 foreign nation-

als during a pouring rain. In addition, CaptainShannon mobilized the combat service supportMarines ashore, who stopped their work andquickly manned their assigned positions.Supporting the Marines, Captain Francis P. Grausemoved his ships to within sight of the city.Fortunately, the AFL soldiers encountered otherfighters as they advanced up United Nations Drive


* Major Tilley of the Armed Forces of Liberia reportedly direct-ed the massacre of more than 600 Liberians in late July 1990at St. Peter’s Lutheran Church in Monrovia, a designated RedCross shelter. Captain James K. Shannon intvw, 15Apr91, p.10. (Oral HistColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.).

DVIC DN-ST-91-00663

Two air crewman from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 carry an elderly woman from theirCH-46E Sea Knight helicopter after arriving at Lungi Airport in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

and never appeared. The platoon of reinforce-ments stood down later that day.184

Prince Johnson received an escort from theWest African peacekeeping force during his sec-ond meeting at the embassy that day. Marineswatched the escort, who waited outside the com-pound like Johnson’s men earlier. The meetingsresulted in an appointment for Johnson to meetwith Herman Cohen, the Under Secretary of Statefor West African Affairs.185

Under Secretary Cohen arrived by Marine heli-copter the next day to conduct an assessment ofthe situation and meet with the factional leaders.The embassy saw the Marine force as an enabler,allowing the State Department to exercise a con-tinuing influence in the negotiations between thefactions and the interim government. The UnderSecretary’s visit underscored the American com-mitment to finding a solution to the crisis. Thatsame day, the Marines conducted a normal rota-tion as sporadic small arms fire periodically flewover and through the embassy compound.

By 18 September, the West African states decid-ed to support the reinforcement of its contingent,

which eventually doubled the size of the force.The new field commander of the force, NigerianArmy Major General Joshua Dogonyaro,announced the force’s mandate had changed frompeacekeeping to peace enforcement. The recentartillery attacks on the force’s positions may haveinfluenced his decision. A call for reinforcementsresulted in new Nigerian and Ghanan battalionsjoining up in Freetown and embarking on ships toMonrovia.186

On 21 September, Charles Taylor announcedhis acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire tobegin the next day. While Marines listened to thesounds of gunfire, the number of dead buried onthe grounds of the nearby refugee-crowdedGreystone compound reached 45.187 More than300 civilians fleeing the Liberian army gathered infront of the embassy about mid-day. The largecrowd pleaded for assistance and refuge. But thecrowd quickly became agitated and started to cre-ate a disturbance. As Marines readied for a con-frontation in the face of the unpredictable situa-tion, the embassy’s local guard force commander,Dan Showalter, a retired Marine lieutenant

58 ON MAMBA STATION


West African peacekeepers not only guarded vital facilities throughout Monrovia, they transported thehead of the differing factions to the American Embassy compound for discussions with State Departmentpersonnel concerning a ceasefire.

colonel, quietly walked outside the compoundgate and into the hostile crowd. Speaking firmly,he first calmed and then persuaded the Liberiansto disperse after explaining how to apply forevacuation.188 At first light the next morning, acrowd of about 100 Liberians gathered at theembassy gate with their documents in hopes ofbeing evacuated.189

Arriving to review the Marines’ situation on 23September, Rear Admiral Layton W. “Snuffy”Smith, USN, J-3 of the European Command, wentashore to meet with Ambassador DeVos. MajorHartley noted during the discussions that AdmiralSmith strongly encouraged the Ambassador toconserve resources because of ContingencyMAGTF 3-90’s limited logistical capabilities.190

Almost as a reminder of the efforts to support theembassy in the face of logistical limitations, theBarnstable County departed Liberian waters withevacuees for another trip to Freetown.191

While Charles Taylor had announced he wouldaccept a ceasefire two days earlier, it took until 23September for the NPFL leader to actually agree toadhere to that ceasefire.192 But the American-brokered halt in the fighting lasted only until thenight of 25 September. That night, several roundspassed through the embassy compound and theMarines on post spotted numerous muzzle flash-es in town. Clashes again took place in theMamba Point area over the next few days. On 27September, Marines at Post One observed shotsfired from a house across the street, and early thenext day, artillery and mortars impacted east andnortheast of the embassy. The Marines saw spo-radic firing arc through the helicopters’ approachpath later that afternoon. Inside the compound,the intense overhead fire sounded very close.193

The new escalation of intense fighting near thecompound temporarily halted all evacuations.

The official announcement to end the ceasefirecame on 29 September. Despite the danger posedby indirect small arms fire, evacuations resumed.Major Johnson flew a CH-46 that broughtCommodore James M. Drager, USN, the tempo-rary commander of the joint task force, and MajorHartley ashore. Rounds started popping in thegrassy areas around the landing zone as the heli-copter touched down and Major Hartley ran backto the helicopter after clearing the aircraft rotorblades and pointed out to the commodore therounds impacting into the water. CommodoreDrager and Major Hartley could hear the smallarms fire even over the sound of the helicopterengines.

Believing the fire came from inside the com-pound, Major Hartley ordered Captain Shannon tofind its source.194 Captain Shannon alerted anddeployed his reserve element, and after a thor-ough search, the Marines discovered the source ofthe rounds impacting around the landing zone didnot originate from anyone in the compound. Thelanding zone, the recreation hut (sometimesreferred to as Oceanside hut), and the communi-cations building appeared to be at the end of thebeaten zone for a nearby firefight.195

Later rounds struck the sandbags surroundingPost One and Post Two. Marines on post initiallythought someone deliberately fired at them, butwithout being able to pinpoint the source, theMarines held their fire. The firing died down afterabout three hours, but not before a 12.7mm roundshattered the office window of the deputy chief ofmission.196 The small arms fire continued inter-mittently the next day but moved away from theembassy.197

The sounds of occasional artillery and gunfiresignaled the start of October. The West Africanforce commander, Major General Dogonyaro, ini-tiated a series of actions against NPFL forces togain control of the city. Although the Marinesheard rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, the amountof small arms fire around the embassy droppedoff dramatically. During the first week of themonth, Marines observed long convoys of INPFLvehicles and West African troops passing by theembassy. Nigerian peacekeepers establishedroadblocks nearby, one north of the embassy atthe intersection of United Nations Drive andBenson Street and the other south of the embassyat the intersection of United Nations Drive andSekou Toure Avenue.198 Not surprisingly, theylocated the roadblocks near locations where the22d MEU had set up roadblocks on 5 August.Cooperating with the West Africans, the INPFLcommenced attacks against the NPFL. Even theAFL, holed up in the Barclay Training Center andExecutive Mansion, launched probes againstCharles Taylor’s NPFL forces.

Fighting around the embassy continued todecrease as October progressed. The Nigerianforces gained loose control over central Monroviawhile Charles Taylor’s undisciplined NPFL fighterswithdrew to the eastern suburbs of the city. Thepeacekeepers’ trucks, loaded with soldiers, andPanhard AML-60 reconnaissance vehicles fre-quently drove by the compound’s posts. AfterWest African aircraft bombed the city ofBuchanan, the NPFL retaliated by shelling the


Freeport area. Marines watched GhanaianAermacchi MB-339 jets flying ground attack mis-sions. Later in the month they observed NigerianDassault/Dornier Alpha Jets fly overhead almostdaily.199*

These developments allowed task forceMarines to settle into a quieter routine whileassisting in the periodic evacuation of noncom-batants. Working smoothly with Edward J. Fisher,the consular officer, Marines also helped processthe administrative paperwork of those wishing toleave the country. The Marines received addition-al training on screening, identification, and pass-ports to assist in determining who would be evac-uated. The embassy staff efficiently “would getthe word out to the people in the street to comein and fill out an application and bring their nec-essary paperwork, which eliminated a lot of theadministrative burden.”200

Among the challenges faced by the Marineswas the cancellation of scheduled flights. On sev-eral occasions, weather and maintenance prob-lems interfered with the times helicopters werescheduled to arrive. The CSSD Marines would getthe evacuees processed and down to the landingzone and the helicopter would never arrive.According to Chief Warrant Officer Deering, whenunexpected cancellations of evacuation flightsoccurred, “You’d have to tell the people, ‘So sorry.Come back in three days,’ which wasn’t a big dealfor us, but if you were one of the people trying toget out of Liberia, and you just sold your soul towhomever to get on board this helicopter and getout of the country it was a very depressingsight.”201 The Marines knew cancellations frustrat-ed the evacuees, especially after they had beenthrough the entire preparation process. Deeringnoted that, “we would have to send the peopleback out. At certain points it was dangerous outin the streets and these people had, obviously,come some distance to get in the embassy andwere anxious to get out [of Liberia].”202

Parts and supplies for the helicopters camefrom a long, thinly stretched supply line.** A dif-

ficult maintenance problem for the air combat ele-ment occurred at the end of October when theMarine helicopters needed a mandatory rotorhead modification. The sleeve on the hubs of therotor heads of CH-46 helicopters had a tendencyto crack and all the helicopters in the Departmentof the Navy were limited to lifting 22,000 poundsof gross weight instead of the usual 24,300pounds until they were equipped with the modi-fication. After receiving a Naval Aviation SystemCommand message requiring all CH-46 helicop-ters to be modified, Major Johnson’s helicoptersgot top priority.

Unfortunately, the ship was not equipped witha crane capable of lifting the rotor heads, so themodification maintenance crew could not per-form the work on board. The forward logistic siteon Lungi Airfield secured a crane and the spaceneeded to make the modifications. The helicop-ters were flown to Freetown one at a time for themodification. However, the modification team atFreetown encountered other problems, includinga lack of the necessary spare parts. Only two hel-icopters remained available while work continuedon the third. The project took longer than expect-ed and it was two weeks before all three helicop-ters were modified and back to Liberian waters.203

The West African soldiers continued to makeheadway and attacked the NPFL using the INPFLas allies.204 By 30 October, some signs of a returnto normalcy in Monrovia appeared when thepower briefly came on.205 The number of Marinesashore providing security gradually declined withthe fighting. Based on input from Captain Grauseand Major Hartley that the worst appeared to beover, European Command reduced the number ofMarines allowed at the embassy. The next ques-tion was how long the Marines would have tostay.

Logistics support grew as the direct threat tothe American Embassy shrank. A large part of theMarine task force’s logistic support in OperationSharp Edge involved diesel fuel, which poweredthe embassy’s generators. With the power grid inMonrovia shut down, the five generators ranalmost around the clock and used 800 to 1,200gallons of diesel fuel each day. To support thislevel of consumption, the aviation detachmentbrought the fuel ashore in 500-gallon bladders,which weighed about 3,000 pounds each whenfilled.206

Supporting the embassy’s fuel needs required atremendous amount of work. Before theyrepaired the rotor heads at the end of October,

60 ON MAMBA STATION

* The Nigerians deployed four Dassault-Breguet/DornierAlpha Jets to replace the Ghanaian jets after 20 October. Theaircraft is a tandem seat jet designed for reconnaissance, train-ing, and light ground attacks.** Parts came from worldwide naval aviation supply activities.Normally routed to Rota, Spain, these critical supplies wouldbe flown by Navy aircraft to Freetown, Sierra Leone. To com-plete the 3,500-mile journey, the helicopters of HC-4 ferriedthe parts to the Marine aviation maintenance detachment offthe coast of Liberia.

the CH-46 helicopters were limited to 22,000pounds gross weight. Because of the fuel’s weightand the distance the aircraft had to travel, a heli-copter carrying a fuel bladder could not carry afull load of fuel for itself. As such, a helicopterwould take on as much internal fuel as it couldmanage, fly the fuel bladder to the embassy, andthen return to the ship. After refueling, the heli-copter could then carry another bladder. Sinceeach flight and unloading process took betweenthree and four hours, transferring the fuel madefor a long flight day.207

The fuel supply effort kept the onshore sup-port Marines busy. Helicopters brought in 2,000gallons three times a week to satisfy theembassy’s needs. As each 500-gallon bladderarrived in the landing zone, the bulk fuel handlersfrom the CSSD Marines took over. Using twopumps (one pumped at 125-gallons per minuteand the other pumped at 50-gallons per minute),they would transfer the fuel from the bladder intoa fuel truck, which held 2,000 gallons. Once the

truck was full, it would be driven to the genera-tor sites where the fuel would be pumped into thegenerators’ tanks.208

Performing both their evacuation and logisticsresponsibilities, service support Marines helped tobring in tons of foodstuffs and dry goods for theState Department’s commissary and exchange. ByNovember, the embassy supply flights routinelybrought in luxury items such as 50 pallets of beerand liquor, 500 gallons of ice cream, and petfood.* The Marines occasionally felt like hiredhands. But Chief Warrant Officer Deering said hisMarines “didn’t feel bad about showing themwhat they could do.” Some of the CSSD Marineswent beyond the required effort, helping to poura concrete slab from the landing zone to the road,as well as undertaking wiring and electrical trou-bleshooting for the embassy.209


DVIC DN-SC-91-06066

A Marine CH-46E Sea Knight helicopter lowers a fuel bladder onto Landing Zone Magic in the continu-ing effort of the amphibious ready group to supply the embassy.

* The Marines also delivered pallets of carbonated beveragesto the embassy. Initially, the embassy sold a can of soda to theMarines for 50 cents and then raised the price to $1. As aresult, the Marines stopped buying the embassy’s stock.

Rotation and Reduction ofCMAGTF Marines

A relatively quiet Monrovia resulted in only 62Marines ashore during November. On 3November, the USS Newport County (LST 1179)arrived at Mamba Station bringing Company L,BLT 3/8 to relieve the Marines of Company K. Theplatoon commanders and squad leaders went inafter receiving a situation orientation for theturnover. Within days of the Newport’s arrival, thejoint task force commander released theBarnstable County, which departed Liberianwaters with Marine combat engineers onboard.On 14 November, Captain William F. Crenshaw’s,Company L assumed security responsibilitiesashore. Company K remained in reserve onboardthe Whidbey Island to support Company L with astandby reaction force.

As the month progressed, the number of week-ly evacuees dwindled. The combat service sup-port Marines onboard continued to provide logis-tics assistance to the embassy and the Marinesashore. Helicopters from the forward logistic site

in Freetown delivered pallets of rice and babyfood to the embassy as part of a humanitarian aidpackage. The stable situation allowed the WestAfrican force, along with some Liberian support,to fill the vacuum left by Doe’s death as an inter-im government was appointed. The government’sreal power, however, extended only to the out-skirts of the city. Ambassador DeVos attended the22 November ceremony together with the peace-keeping force commander and his soldiers.Subsequent negotiations lead by the EconomicCommunity of West African States resulted in allfactions agreeing to another ceasefire on 28November.210

On 30 November, the USS Nashville (LPD 13)arrived at Mamba Station to rotate the commandelement of the Contingency MAGTF. MajorHartley, his staff, and subordinate commandersbriefed their replacements on the current situationin Liberia. While the briefings took place, the nec-essary transfers of equipment and personneloccurred. During the transition that day, fightingflared up briefly between the AFL, INPFL, andpeacekeepers at the Barclay Training Center. The

62 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-SC-91-06089

Marines at the American Embassy unload a container of hot food. All outside commercial aircraft flightshad been cancelled, making the embassy dependent on 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit for resupply.

firefight resulted in stray rounds hitting the U.S.-leased Sam and E apartment building just outsidethe compound. At Post Two, one of the roundshit a Marine, knocking him down and creating athree-inch crease in his Kevlar helmet. Unharmed,the round resulted in only a bruised forehead.The lance corporal and his scarred helmetbecame the object of much attention according tohis platoon commander, First Lieutenant Walter E.Lavrinovich, Jr.211

Command of the Contingency MAGTF changedon 1 December with the executive officer of the26th MEU, Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Kunkel,assuming command from Major Hartley. The tran-sition was completed early on the morning of 2December, when the Whidbey Island with theMarines of the original Contingency MAGTF 3-90left Mamba Station.

As the Nashville arrived in Liberian waters, aEuropean Command modification to the executeorder directed a reduction in Marine presenceashore. Although the total number for the taskforce remained constant, only about 40 Marinesremained onshore. Evacuation criteria changedwith the new State Department policy that virtu-ally eliminated most remaining applicants.Lieutenant Colonel Kunkel recalled the Marinesevacuated less than 50 people duringDecember.212* The leadership at EuropeanCommand, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and theMEU believed the time to pull the Marines outhad arrived.

A sense of peace returned in the streets of thecity. Many of the markets reopened and peoplemoved about conducting their daily activities.Deployed throughout the city and manningcheckpoints, the West African peacekeepers’ pres-ence improved the security situation. The INPFLremained at their Cadwell base area and the AFLat the Barclay Training Center. The calm allowedsome of the Marine task force staff to venture outand view the wholesale destruction firsthand. AsLieutenant Colonel Kunkel noted: “The first timewe went out, it was clearly a city that had been atwar. It looked like Berlin: you know, burned outbuildings, collapsed buildings, streets blocked,burned out cars.”213 The look and mood of thecity, however, changed within weeks as the newMarine task force commander noted:

The city was getting back to nor-mal: lots of people out andabout, open-air markets....Vehicles moving: taxicab very,very busy.... Local police startedcoming out of the woodworkand back on duty. There was aconcerted effort to clean the cityup, clean the port up, clean thehousing areas up. It was a mess,but it was slowly getting back tonormal. There was an unofficialceasefire and there was no fight-ing between any of the three fac-tions.214

Other evidence of a return to normalcy includ-ed the reopening of Spriggs-Payne Airport on 8December, when two of the peacekeeper’s AlphaJets landed. This allowed United Nations charterflights to begin using the airfield. Both the INPFLand NPFL opened rice distribution centers inareas under their control.

Completion of Sharp Edge

Preparing to bring their mission to a close inearly January 1991, the task force reduced thenumber of personnel and support equipmentashore. The 26th MEU by this time had evacuated831 noncombatants.215

A notable achievement of the 26th MEUinvolved the logistic support provided to theembassy. Marines brought in countless tons offood, supplies, and more than 100,000 gallons offuel to the compound. Despite the small size ofthe MEU, which made it incapable of being divid-ed, it also successfully operated two geographi-cally separated MAGTFs. Lastly, in the midst ofthe turmoil, the accomplishment of a major in-stream reconfiguration of equipment and transferof forces spoke highly of amphibious ready groupand Marine expeditionary unit teamwork, as wellas the flexibility it gave to the commander of theEuropean Command.

A total of 2,439 persons were evacuated duringOperation Sharp Edge, involving citizens from 59countries. Less than 10 percent of the evacueeswere Americans.216 Dennis Jett, the deputy chiefof mission, summed up the contribution of theMarines by stating: “We could have not main-tained our presence without your efforts. Thatability to remain here allowed us to monitor andinfluence events, to speed relief operations, and


* The Marines also conducted a pet evacuation in which allthe embassy’s pets were evacuated by helicopter.

to evacuate those U.S. citizens and nationals ofother countries who wanted to leave. In doing so,you were responsible for savings hundreds, andprobably thousands of lives.”217

The Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Teamand the Departure of the Marines

Considering the large buildup in the PersianGulf and the apparent stability and security inMonrovia, European Command felt the time wasright to end the mission. The Ambassadorbelieved, however, that a security presence wouldstill be required. Through additional consultationswith the Department of State, an interagencygroup in Washington, D.C., recommended aMarine presence remain at the embassy.European Command requested U.S. AtlanticCommand’s support. Consequently, AdmiralCarter tasked Marine Corps Security ForceBattalion, Atlantic, with the embassy security mis-sion.

Alerted and called off leave on 28 December,the 5th Platoon, Fleet Anti-Terrorism SecurityTeam (FAST) Company, from Marine CorpsSecurity Force Battalion, Atlantic, received thetasking. The 50-man platoon left Norfolk, Virginia,on 6 January 1991 and arrived at Lungi Airfield,Sierra Leone, a day later. They were the first FASTplatoon to support an embassy.218

At the airfield, the platoon transferred theirequipment, supplies, and ammunition from NavyC-130 aircraft to Navy CH-53E helicopters. One ofthe Navy helicopters belonging to HC-4 wasundergoing repairs, leaving only one operationalCH-53E to shuttle the FAST platoon and its equip-ment to Monrovia. The entire platoon arrived bythe afternoon of 7 January, completing a long2,000-mile journey in two days. Once on theground, the FAST platoon commander, CaptainGlen N. Cheatham, together with Company L’scommanding officer, Captain Crenshaw, conduct-ed a turnover and toured the defensive positions.After a quick briefing, Captain Cheatham’s pla-

64 ON MAMBA STATION

DVIC DN-ST-91-05949

A Marine CH-46E helicopter approaches the flight deck of the USS Nashville (LPD 13). With the arrival ofa platoon of the Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team Company, which assumed security responsibilityfrom the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the Nashville departed, officially ending Operation Sharp Edge.

toon officially assumed security responsibilities,manning posts, exchanging frequencies, and sign-ing for ammunition and rations.219

Dressed in civilian clothing, Company L’s liai-son, the defense attache, and FAST Marine repre-sentatives went to Spriggs-Payne Airport to meetan arriving Navy C-130 loaded with the FAST pla-toon’s follow-on equipment, ammunition, andsupplies. Still along the edges of the airstrip werehuman remains; skeletons with rotting flesh stillon them and piles of skulls.220 West Africanpeacekeepers now controlled the airfield, but thecontrol tower had been peppered by small armsrounds during fighting and was not functioning.There also was a gaping rocket-propelled grenadehole in the tower. A Marine forward air controllertalked the arriving aircraft in from the embassyand the Marines quickly unloaded and movedtheir cargo to the compound.

Late that day, Company L Marines flew out ofthe embassy and back to the Nashville. Theturnover was complete with the delivery of addi-tional ammunition stocks on the morning of 8January. Operation Sharp Edge officially came toan end on 9 January when Contingency MAGTF3-90 departed Mamba Station. The Nashville’sdeparture concluded the longest running non-combatant evacuation operation to date.

The arrival of the FAST platoon provided theembassy with a highly trained security force withclose quarters battle capability and robust crew-served firepower. Manning three day posts andfive night posts, they worked on improving select-ed positions. The Marines ate in the embassy’scafeteria and resided in vacant staff quarters. TheFAST command structure also differed from thatof the contingency task force. Reports wentdirectly to the team’s higher headquarters, thecommander of the Sixth Fleet. Daily reports of theplatoon covered the routine movement of thepeacekeepers’ military vehicles and personnel upand down United Nations Drive in front of PostOne and Post Two. Armed factional fighters,mostly located outside Monrovia, never camenear the Marine’s positions. One large, very vocaldemonstration occurred in late January directlyoutside the embassy. The Marines asked theLiberians why they were demonstrating and theyresponded they wanted “U.S. protection.” Thecrowd of 200 to 300 persons eventually dispersed.Even with the apparent normalcy, 5th PlatoonMarines on post heard random shots fired manytimes throughout their stay.

The embassy no longer depended on theMarines for fuel or water. The administrative offi-cer renegotiated contracts for fuel and water outin town. Opening the airport allowed additionalsupplies to come by Navy C-130.* The embassystaff frequently ventured out in the city and air-port to carry on official business. Even the Marinesecurity guards went out routinely to conductphysical training runs.

The cessation of fighting allowed West Africanpeacekeepers to hold a parade for their rotatingbattalions on 9 February. The event was attendedby the interim President of Liberia, the U.S.Ambassador, the defense attache, and the FASTplatoon commander. At the parade, CaptainCheatham noted that Major General Dogonyaro,the peacekeeping force’s commander, remindedhis audience that his Nigerian troops now playeda major part in the control of the city.221

Charles Taylor’s NPFL fighters remained on thecity’s outskirts and Prince Johnson’s INFPL at theCadwell area. Some of the non-governmentalrelief agencies within the city re-established limit-ed services. The formal signing by all factions ofa ceasefire monitoring agreement took place inLome, Togo, on 13 February 1991.222

Monrovia and its environs remained overallpeaceful during January and February 1991. Withthe ongoing buildup of forces in Kuwait, both theJoint Chiefs of Staff and European Commandwanted the Marines to depart. The Joint Chiefs ofStaff directive ordering redeployment of the FASTMarines finally arrived in the second week ofFebruary from the Sixth Fleet. The Ambassador’sreservations were overcome by developments inthe Persian Gulf region, which dictated the mis-sion’s end.

In concert with the United Nations’ 15 Februarydeadline for the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait,the commander of the Sixth Fleet ordered theFAST platoon to depart Liberia the same day byNavy C-130. The morning arrival of the C-130 andC-9 aircraft at Spriggs-Payne Airport signaled thestart of regular semi-monthly supply flights for theembassy. For the Marines, the platoon’s 15February departure ended a 194-day presence ofMarine combat units ashore in Liberia. Marinecombat units would return approximately fiveyears later to the same long-running civil war.


* Navy Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 58 (VR-58) conduct-ed the supply flights into Spriggs-Payne Airport.

On Mamba Station · Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991. 1995 A Skillful Show of Strength: U.S. Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996. ... Chapter 2- Preparing

Documents