On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships Steven Drucker Columbia Business School & Manju Puri Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.

On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending RelationshipsLending Relationships

Steven DruckerSteven Drucker

Columbia Business SchoolColumbia Business School

&&

Manju PuriManju Puri

Fuqua School of Business, Duke UniversityFuqua School of Business, Duke University

September 2006September 2006

2

MotivationMotivation

Loan selling is important for banks and the economyLoan selling is important for banks and the economy Trading Volume: $154.8 billion in 2004 vs. $8.0 billion in 1991Trading Volume: $154.8 billion in 2004 vs. $8.0 billion in 1991

Diversification; Comply with Risk-Adequacy RegulationsDiversification; Comply with Risk-Adequacy Regulations

Allows Origination even when Funding ConstrainedAllows Origination even when Funding Constrained

Loan Selling Fundamentally Alters LendingLoan Selling Fundamentally Alters Lending

Borrower

Screening, Monitoring, FundingScreening, Monitoring, Funding

LenderUpfront Fees, Interest PaymentsUpfront Fees, Interest Payments

Borrower

Loan Buyer

Interest PaymentsInterest Payments

Loan Seller

Monitoring, FundingMonitoring, Funding

ScreeningScreening

Upfront FeesUpfront Fees

3

Main IssuesMain Issues

Loan Sales Separate Origination from FundingLoan Sales Separate Origination from Funding

Agency ProblemsAgency Problems Moral Hazard Moral Hazard (Pennacchi 1988; Gorton & Pennacchi 1995)(Pennacchi 1988; Gorton & Pennacchi 1995)

Adverse SelectionAdverse Selection

How do banks overcome these problems?How do banks overcome these problems? Loan ContractingLoan Contracting

Access to Loans and Lending RelationshipsAccess to Loans and Lending Relationships Harm?Harm?

Reduce interaction that is critical to benefitsReduce interaction that is critical to benefits (Diamond 1991) (Diamond 1991)

Help?Help? Increased Capital From Non-BanksIncreased Capital From Non-Banks

Risk-Management Risk-Management Flexibility in Future Loan Origination Flexibility in Future Loan Origination

4

OutlineOutline

Data, Sample Selection, and Descriptive StatisticsData, Sample Selection, and Descriptive Statistics

Loan Sales and Loan ContractingLoan Sales and Loan Contracting Secondary Market Sales and CovenantsSecondary Market Sales and Covenants Agency Problems or Signaling?Agency Problems or Signaling?

Loan Sales, Access to Loans, and Lending RelationshipsLoan Sales, Access to Loans, and Lending Relationships Current LoansCurrent Loans Lending Relationships and Future LoansLending Relationships and Future Loans

Summary Summary

5

Data and Sample SelectionData and Sample Selection

Sample Period: 1999 - 2004Sample Period: 1999 - 2004

Data from four sources with some data matched by handData from four sources with some data matched by hand

Loans & Lending Relationships (LPC Loans & Lending Relationships (LPC DealScanDealScan))

Identify Traded Loans (LSTA Mark-to-Market Pricing)Identify Traded Loans (LSTA Mark-to-Market Pricing)

Borrower Financial Characteristics (Compustat) Borrower Financial Characteristics (Compustat)

Equity Market Data (CRSP)Equity Market Data (CRSP)

Sample Sizes Sample Sizes (link)(link)

NNoott SSoolldd LLooaannss SSoolldd LLooaannss FFuullll SSaammppllee 66,,118866 11,,007755 NNeett WWoorrtthh SSaammppllee 22,,447700 220044 CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSaammppllee 554444 1177

6

Sold Loans and Information AsymmetrySold Loans and Information Asymmetry

Sold Borrowers are larger and rated Sold Borrowers are larger and rated (link)(link)

Information TransparencyInformation Transparency

Sold Loans are Term Loans instead of Credit LinesSold Loans are Term Loans instead of Credit Lines

MonitoringMonitoring

Lead Lender on Sold Loan has Higher Market ShareLead Lender on Sold Loan has Higher Market Share

ReputationReputation

LLooaann SSaallee MMeeaann // %%

NNoo LLooaann SSaallee MMeeaann // %%

TT--RRaattiioo

AAsssseettss 33998811..3399 22334444..7788 88..1166******

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg 8888%% 3399%% 2299..8822******

SSaallee %% NNoo SSaallee %% TT--RRaattiioo TTeerrmm LLooaann 6644%% 2244%% 2266..8866******

SSaallee MMeeaann NNoo SSaallee MMeeaann TT--RRaattiioo LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 1155%% 99%% 1144..5511******

7

OutlineOutline




Summary Summary

8

Secondary Market Sales and CovenantsSecondary Market Sales and Covenants

Selling Loans Can Induce Agency ProblemsSelling Loans Can Induce Agency Problems

Financial Covenants Reduce Reliance on Seller’s InformationFinancial Covenants Reduce Reliance on Seller’s Information Monitoring MechanismMonitoring Mechanism

Buyer Exercises Control When Firm Performs PoorlyBuyer Exercises Control When Firm Performs Poorly

Borrower

Loan Buyer


Loan Seller


ScreeningScreening


9


Univariate Relationship Between Covenants and Loan SalesUnivariate Relationship Between Covenants and Loan Sales

Multivariate Logit Model (Table 4) Multivariate Logit Model (Table 4) (link)(link)

Dependent Variable: Indicator for Loan is SoldDependent Variable: Indicator for Loan is Sold

Key Independent VariablesKey Independent Variables # of Financial Covenants (+)# of Financial Covenants (+) Net Worth Slack (-)Net Worth Slack (-)

Control VariablesControl Variables Lender Market Share; Borrower and Loan VariablesLender Market Share; Borrower and Loan Variables

LLooaann SSaallee MMeeaann

NNoo LLooaann SSaallee MMeeaann

TT--RRaattiioo

## ooff FFiinnaanncciiaall CCoovveennaannttss 33..4411 22..7711 1155..6622******

NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk 00..0077 00..1144 --99..5533******

CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSllaacckk 00..4477 00..7733 --11..9977****

10


Changes in Predicted Probabilities Changes in Predicted Probabilities (link)(link)

One Std. Dev Change Around the Mean (t-stats in parentheses)One Std. Dev Change Around the Mean (t-stats in parentheses)

FFuullll SSaammppllee NNeett WWoorrtthh SSaammppllee ((11)) ((22)) ((33))

## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 1122..4411%%****** 1111..7755%%****** ((77..0055)) ((33..5566))

NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --1111..6677%%****** --1100..0099%%****** ((33..0055)) ((22..5599))

Key Results:Key Results: More Covenants More Covenants Increases Probability of Loan Sale Increases Probability of Loan Sale

Tighter Covenants Tighter Covenants Increases Probability of Loan Sale Increases Probability of Loan Sale

11

Are Loans Structured to Sell to Others?Are Loans Structured to Sell to Others?

Sold Loans are Nearly Always Syndicated (Primary Market)Sold Loans are Nearly Always Syndicated (Primary Market)

Loans are Sold Close to the Loan Origination Date Loans are Sold Close to the Loan Origination Date (link)(link)

SSaallee %% NNoo SSaallee %% TT--RRaattiioo LLooaann iiss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd 9999%% 6699%% 2200..0099******

FFiirrsstt SSaallee:: TTiimmee SSiinnccee OOrriiggiinnaattiioonn ## SSoolldd CCuumm.. %% 11sstt mmoonntthh 559933 6611..88%% 22nndd mmoonntthh 5522 6677..22%% 33rrdd mmoonntthh 3355 7700..88%% 44tthh –– 66tthh mmoonntthh 8800 7799..22%% 77tthh --1122tthh mmoonntthh 8822 8877..77%% 22nndd yyeeaarr 7755 9955..55%% 33rrdd yyeeaarr 2233 9977..99%% 44tthh yyeeaarr aanndd lloonnggeerr 2200 110000..00%%

12

Are Loans Structured to Sell to Others?Are Loans Structured to Sell to Others?

Banks are Banks are notnot dumping poorly performing loans dumping poorly performing loans

Distribution of Initial Sale PricesDistribution of Initial Sale Prices

Performance of Sold Borrowers: Origination to SalePerformance of Sold Borrowers: Origination to Sale

PPeerrcceennttiillee 11%% 1100%% 2255%% 5500%% 7755%% 9999%% %% ooff PPaarr 5588..2255 9955..2255 9988..7788 9999..7788 110000..4444 110011..9944

CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinnggss -- %% ooff SSoolldd LLooaannss DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt CChhaannggeess

NNoo RRaattiinngg CChhaannggee 9933..5500%% MMeeddiiaann 00..0000

UUppggrraaddee 00..7755%% MMeeaann 00..006688

DDoowwnnggrraaddee 55..7755%%

13

Agency or Signaling?Agency or Signaling?

Syndication: Primary Market SalesSyndication: Primary Market Sales

Additional Mechanisms for Mitigating Agency Problems Additional Mechanisms for Mitigating Agency Problems Hold Larger Piece of Loan Hold Larger Piece of Loan (e.g. Dennis & Mullineaux 2000)(e.g. Dennis & Mullineaux 2000)

Syndicate Structure and Composition Syndicate Structure and Composition (Lee & Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2005)(Lee & Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2005)

Expect Smaller Agency ProblemsExpect Smaller Agency Problems

Empirical PredictionEmpirical Prediction # of Covenants / Tighter Covenants have # of Covenants / Tighter Covenants have LESSLESS influence on influence on

probability of loan syndication (compared to loan sale)probability of loan syndication (compared to loan sale)

Empirical Model: Probability of Syndication (Table 5)Empirical Model: Probability of Syndication (Table 5) link)link)((

14

Primary Market Sales and CovenantsPrimary Market Sales and Covenants

Changes in Predicted Probabilities Changes in Predicted Probabilities (link)(link)

One Std. Dev Change Around the Mean (t-stats in parentheses)One Std. Dev Change Around the Mean (t-stats in parentheses)

Compared to Secondary Market Sales:Compared to Secondary Market Sales:

More Covenants – Similar EffectMore Covenants – Similar Effect

Tighter Covenants – Weaker EffectTighter Covenants – Weaker Effect

FFuullll SSaammppllee NNeett WWoorrtthh SSaammppllee CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSaammppllee ((11)) ((22)) ((33)) ((44)) ((55))

## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 55..1133%%****** 99..5555%%****** 1166..2211%%****** ((88..5566)) ((66..6622)) ((33..2233))

NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --22..3311%%** --22..1122%% ((11..7777)) ((11..2277))

CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSllaacckk --44..7711%% --88..1100%%** ((11..0066)) ((11..7777))

Evidence is consistent with agency viewEvidence is consistent with agency view

15


Lower Reputation Lender Lower Reputation Lender Increased Agency Problems Increased Agency Problems Gorton & Haubrich (1987); Pichler & Wilhelm (2001)Gorton & Haubrich (1987); Pichler & Wilhelm (2001)

Empirical PredictionEmpirical Prediction Low Reputation Lender Low Reputation Lender # of Covenants / Tighter Covenants # of Covenants / Tighter Covenants

have have LARGERLARGER influence on probability of loan selling influence on probability of loan selling

Modify Loan Sales Model (Table 6)Modify Loan Sales Model (Table 6) (link)(link)

Interact Reputation Indicators with Covenant VariablesInteract Reputation Indicators with Covenant Variables

16

Lender ReputationLender Reputation

Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Selling Loans Changes in Predicted Probabilities of Selling Loans (link)(link)

One Std. Dev Change Around the Mean (t-stats in parentheses)One Std. Dev Change Around the Mean (t-stats in parentheses) ((33)) ((44))

LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 ** ## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 1166..8811%%****** 1100..9911%%****** ((77..1199)) ((22..6611))

LLeennddeerr NNOOTT iinn TToopp 1100 ** ## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 1100..0011%%**** 2200..7788%%****** ((22..5500)) ((33..2222))

LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --44..4499%%** ((11..8888))

LLeennddeerr NNOOTT iinn TToopp 1100 ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --1122..8822%%****** ((22..5588))

Key Result:Key Result:

Tighter Covenants Tighter Covenants Increases Probability of Loan Increases Probability of Loan

Sale when lenders have Sale when lenders have LOW REPUTATIONLOW REPUTATION

Evidence is consistent with agency viewEvidence is consistent with agency view

17


Does Restrictive Covenant Package Does Restrictive Covenant Package SignalSignal Borrower Quality? Borrower Quality?

Empirical PredictionEmpirical Prediction High Risk High Risk Covenants have LARGER influence on probability of Covenants have LARGER influence on probability of

loan selling loan selling

Modify Loan Sales Model (Table 7) Modify Loan Sales Model (Table 7) (link)(link)

Interact Distance-to-Default Indicators with Covenant VariablesInteract Distance-to-Default Indicators with Covenant Variables

KEY RESULTS: Largest Effect on Loan Sale Probability KEY RESULTS: Largest Effect on Loan Sale Probability # of Financial Covenants: LOW RISK BORROWERS# of Financial Covenants: LOW RISK BORROWERS

Net Worth Slack: MID RISK BORROWERSNet Worth Slack: MID RISK BORROWERS

Evidence is NOT consistent with signaling viewEvidence is NOT consistent with signaling view

18

OutlineOutline




Summary Summary

19

Loan Sales and Access to LoansLoan Sales and Access to Loans

Restrictive Covenants / Loan Sales Impose Costs on BorrowersRestrictive Covenants / Loan Sales Impose Costs on Borrowers

Managerial FlexibilityManagerial Flexibility

Additional Lenders Additional Lenders Renegotiation Costs Renegotiation Costs

Why do Borrowers Agree to Restrictive Covenants / Loan Sales?Why do Borrowers Agree to Restrictive Covenants / Loan Sales?

EXPLORE: Access to Private Debt CapitalEXPLORE: Access to Private Debt Capital

Loan Buyers are Usually NonBanks Loan Buyers are Usually NonBanks Additional Capital Additional Capital

20

Current LoansCurrent Loans

TTaabbllee 88

BBoorrrroowweerr HHaass LLooaann SSoolldd

NNoo LLooaann SSaallee

22 YYeeaarrss BBeeffoorree SSoolldd LLooaann

11 YYeeaarr BBeeffoorree SSoolldd LLooaann

YYeeaarr ooff

SSoolldd LLooaann

11 YYeeaarr AAfftteerr SSoolldd LLooaann

AAllll YYeeaarrss

SSaalleess (($$ mmiill)) 22332244..0099 22446600..2266 22662233..5522 22771144..1133 11009944..0011

MMaarrkkeett--ttoo--BBooookk 22..4411 22..4411 22..4477 22..1166 22..3366

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..4433 00..4433 00..4466 00..4433 00..2255

IInntteerreesstt--BBeeaarriinngg DDeebbtt (($$ mmiill))

11552255..8822 11661100..5555 11889988..4477 11775500..1188 444466..1100

PPrriivvaattee DDeebbtt IIssssuuaannccee (($$ mmiill))

441199..4422 440099..3322 887788..6699 331100..9922 112255..6600

Key ResultsKey Results Sold Borrowers are Growing and Debt-dependentSold Borrowers are Growing and Debt-dependent

Sold Year: Increase in Private Debt IssuanceSold Year: Increase in Private Debt Issuance

21

Loan Sales and Lending RelationshipsLoan Sales and Lending Relationships

Loan Sales Separate Origination from Monitoring / FundingLoan Sales Separate Origination from Monitoring / Funding

Harm Access to Future Credit / Relationships?Harm Access to Future Credit / Relationships? Reduced Ongoing InteractionReduced Ongoing Interaction (Diamond 1991; Boot & Thakor 1994)(Diamond 1991; Boot & Thakor 1994)

Help Access to Future Credit / Relationships?Help Access to Future Credit / Relationships? New Source of CapitalNew Source of Capital

Reduced Exposure to Individual Borrowers Reduced Exposure to Individual Borrowers Flexibility Flexibility

Borrower

Loan Buyer


Loan Seller


ScreeningScreening


22


Univariate Results (Table 9)Univariate Results (Table 9)

LLooaann SSaallee NNoo LLooaann SSaallee ZZ--rraattiioo %% RReecceeiivvee AAnnootthheerr LLooaann 8844..7744%% 6688..7755%% 1100..6688******

CCoonnddiittiioonnaall oonn RReecceeiivviinngg AAnnootthheerr LLooaann,, %% KKeeeepp SSaammee LLeeaadd BBaannkk

8833..5533%%

7755..8833%%

55..0033******

Sold Borrowers areSold Borrowers are

More Likely to Receive Future LoansMore Likely to Receive Future Loans

More Likely to Continue Lending RelationshipsMore Likely to Continue Lending Relationships

23


Explore: Risk Management Explore: Risk Management Lending Flexibility Lending Flexibility Do Loan Sales Increase Relationship Durability for High Risk Do Loan Sales Increase Relationship Durability for High Risk

Firms? High Reputation Lenders?Firms? High Reputation Lenders?

Univariate Results (Table 9):Univariate Results (Table 9):Conditional on Receiving Another Loan, % that Keep Same Lead BankConditional on Receiving Another Loan, % that Keep Same Lead Bank

LLooaann SSaallee NNoo LLooaann SSaallee ZZ--rraattiioo HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8855..8800%% 8866..9933%% --00..5500

MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8844..7755%% 7755..1111%% 33..5577******

LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 7799..5588%% 6644..1100%% 55..3366****** LLeennddeerr iiss RRaannkkeedd iinn TToopp 1100 8877..6622%% 8844..0022%% 22..4455****

LLeennddeerr iiss NNOOTT RRaannkkeedd iinn TToopp 1100 6633..1166%% 5599..0044%% 00..9988

24


Nested Logit Model (Table 10) Nested Logit Model (Table 10) (link)(link)

Independent Variables: “Borrow Again” Independent Variables: “Borrow Again” Borrower Characteristics; Year Fixed EffectsBorrower Characteristics; Year Fixed Effects

Independent Variables: “Borrow Again” and “Keep Lender” Independent Variables: “Borrow Again” and “Keep Lender” Loan is SoldLoan is Sold; Lender Market Share; Prior Lending Relationship; Lender Market Share; Prior Lending Relationship

Borrow Borrow AgainAgain

Don’t BorrowDon’t Borrow

AgainAgain

KeepKeepLenderLender

Don’t KeepDon’t KeepLenderLender

25

OutlineOutline




Summary Summary

26

SummarySummary

Loan Selling Separates Origination and FundingLoan Selling Separates Origination and Funding Agency Problems Agency Problems Loan ContractingLoan Contracting

Access to Loans and Lending RelationshipsAccess to Loans and Lending Relationships

Sold Loans Have Additional, Tighter CovenantsSold Loans Have Additional, Tighter Covenants Consistent With Covenants Used When Agency Problems Are LargerConsistent With Covenants Used When Agency Problems Are Larger

Signaling Not SupportedSignaling Not Supported

Sold Borrowers: Debt-Dependent, Receive Additional Private DebtSold Borrowers: Debt-Dependent, Receive Additional Private Debt Benefit to Offset Costs of Restrictive Covenants / Loan SalesBenefit to Offset Costs of Restrictive Covenants / Loan Sales

Sold Borrowers get Future Loans, Keep Lending RelationshipsSold Borrowers get Future Loans, Keep Lending Relationships Additional Capital and Flexibility for LendersAdditional Capital and Flexibility for Lenders

27

TablesTables

28

Table 1: Loan Sample Summary Statistics Table 1: Loan Sample Summary Statistics (link)(link)

FFuullll SSaammppllee NNeett WWoorrtthh SSaammppllee

CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSaammppllee

VVaarriiaabbllee MMeeaann // MMeeddiiaann oorr PPeerrcceennttaaggee

MMeeaann // MMeeddiiaann oorr PPeerrcceennttaaggee

MMeeaann // MMeeddiiaann oorr PPeerrcceennttaaggee

LLooaann iiss SSoolldd ((00,,11)) 00..114488 00..007766 00..003300

## ooff FFiinnaanncciiaall CCoovveennaannttss 22..881133 // 33..000000 33..338866 // 33..000000 33..880044 // 44..000000

NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk 00..113322 // 00..110011

CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSllaacckk 00..772277 // 00..440044

BBoorrrroowweerr CChhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss AAsssseettss 22558877..0088 // 554477..6622 11553355..0000 // 228822..6699 660099..1199 // 116633..8811

NNeett IInnccoommee--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..000022 // 00..000077 00..000033 // 00..000077 00..000055 // 00..000099

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..332244 // 00..330088 00..228800 // 00..226633 00..228855 // 00..223388

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 22..330044 // 11..992222 22..111100 // 11..884411 11..998888 // 11..773366

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg ((00,,11)) 00..446600 00..331100 00..115533

LLooaann CChhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss LLooaann SSiizzee (($$ mmiill)) 220022..882277 // 8855..992255 113333..662266 // 4455..776644 7777..002211 // 2222..7733

LLooaann TTeennoorr ((mmoonntthhss)) 4400..661166 // 3366..003333 3377..558877 // 3366..003333 3366..779944 // 3366..000000

LLooaann iiss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd ((00,,11)) 00..773377 00..664433 00..447766

LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 00..110000 // 00..003344 00..008833 // 00..002244 00..005533 // 00..000055 NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 77226611 22667744 556611

29

Table 2: Univariate Analysis- Sold Loans vs. Not Sold LoansTable 2: Univariate Analysis- Sold Loans vs. Not Sold Loans ))

++ UUssiinngg NNeett WWoorrtthh SSaammppllee:: 220044 LLooaann SSaallee;; 22,,447700 NNoo LLooaann SSaallee ++++ UUssiinngg CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo CCoovveennaanntt SSaammppllee:: 1177 LLooaann SSaallee;; 554444 NNoo LLooaann SSaallee

LLooaann SSaallee MMeeaann

NNoo LLooaann SSaallee MMeeaann

DDiiffffeerreennccee

TT--RRaattiioo oorr ZZ--RRaattiioo

## ooff FFiinnaanncciiaall CCoovveennaannttss 33..4411 22..7711 00..7700 1155..6622******

NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk ++ 00..0077 00..1144 --00..0077 --99..5533******

CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSllaacckk ++++ 00..4477 00..7733 --00..2266 --11..9977****

BBoorrrroowweerr CChhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss AAsssseettss 33998811..3399 22334444..7788 11663366..6611 88..1166 ******

NNeett IInnccoommee--ttoo--AAsssseettss --00..000022 00..000033 --00..000055 --55..8866******

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..4477 00..3300 00..1177 2200..0088******

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 22..1133 22..3333 --00..2200 --44..8822******

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg ((00,,11)) 00..8888 00..3399 00..4499 2299..8822******

LLooaann // LLeennddeerr CChhaarraacctteerriissttiiccss LLooaann SSiizzee (($$ mmiill)) 332299..1133 118800..8888 114488..2255 1111..7777******

LLooaann TTeennoorr ((mmoonntthhss)) 6622..2211 3366..8866 2255..3355 3344..7744******

LLooaann iiss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd ((00,,11)) 00..9999 00..6699 00..2299 2200..0099******

LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 00..1155 00..0099 00..0055 1144..5511******

NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 66,,118866 11,,007755 ((ccoonnttiinnuueedd))

30

Table 2 (continued):Table 2 (continued):Univariate Analysis - Sold Loans vs. Not Sold Loans Univariate Analysis - Sold Loans vs. Not Sold Loans (link)(link)

LLooaann SSaallee PPeerrcceenntt


PPeerrcceenntt

DDiiffffeerreennccee

TT--RRaattiioo

oorr ZZ--RRaattiioo LLooaann TTyyppee ((00,,11))

CCrreeddiitt LLiinnee 00..3344 00..7733 --00..3399 --2244..9900******

TTeerrmm LLooaann 00..6644 00..2244 00..4400 2266..8866******

OOtthheerr LLooaann TTyyppee 00..0022 00..0044 --00..0022 --22..7777******

LLooaann PPuurrppoossee ((00,,11)) AAccqquuiissiittiioonn PPuurrppoossee 00..2277 00..1155 00..1122 99..9988******

GGeenneerraall PPuurrppoossee 00..3366 00..4488 --00..1122 --77..0099******

OOtthheerr PPuurrppoossee 00..0044 00..1111 --00..0066 --66..5588******

RReeccaappiittaalliizzaattiioonn PPuurrppoossee 00..2222 00..2211 00..0011 00..8877

LLBBOO PPuurrppoossee 00..0055 00..0011 00..0033 77..1155 ******

MMiisscceellllaanneeoouuss PPuurrppoossee 00..0066 00..0044 00..0011 22..0088 ****

NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 66,,118866 11,,007755

31

Table 3: Sold Loans – Timing, Pricing, and PerformanceTable 3: Sold Loans – Timing, Pricing, and Performance ))

PPaanneell AA:: TTiimmee ttoo FFiirrsstt SSaallee ## ooff SSoolldd LLooaannss CCuumm %% 11sstt mmoonntthh 559933 6611..7777%%

22nndd mmoonntthh 5522 6677..1199%% 33rrdd mmoonntthh 3355 7700..8833%%

44tthh ttoo 66tthh mmoonntthh 8800 7799..1177%% 77tthh ttoo 1122tthh mmoonntthh 8822 8877..7711%%

22nndd yyeeaarr 7755 9955..5522%% 33rrdd yyeeaarr 2233 9977..9922%% 44tthh yyeeaarr 1155 9999..4488%%

55tthh yyeeaarr aanndd lloonnggeerr 55 110000..0000%%

PPaanneell BB:: PPrriiccee aatt FFiirrsstt SSaallee

DDiissttrriibbuuttiioonn PPeerrcceennttiillee 11%% 55%% 1100%% 2255%% 5500%% 7755%% 9900%% 9955%% 9999%%

PPrriiccee ((%% ooff PPaarr)) 5588..2255 8877..2255 9955..2255 9988..7788 9999..7788 110000..44 110011..00 110011..33 110011..99

PPaanneell CC:: PPeerrffoorrmmaannccee ooff SSoolldd LLooaannss bbeettwweeeenn OOrriiggiinnaattiioonn aanndd SSaallee RRaattiinnggss CChhaannggeess

NNoo rraattiinngg CChhaannggee 9933..5500%% UUppggrraaddee 00..7755%%

DDoowwnnggrraaddee 55..7755%%

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt CChhaannggeess MMeeddiiaann 00..0000 MMeeaann 00..006688

SSttaannddaarrdd DDeevviiaattiioonn 00..770066 (link)

32

Table 4: Probability of Selling Loans Table 4: Probability of Selling Loans (link)(link)

SSyynnddiiccaatteedd && SSoollee--LLeennddeerr LLooaannss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd LLooaannss OOnnllyy

((11)) ((22)) ((33)) ((44)) ((55)) ((66))

## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 00..335511****** 00..441133****** 00..333377****** 00..337766****** ((77..0055)) ((33..5566)) ((66..5599)) ((33..2277)) NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --33..446611****** --33..007711****** --33..000099**** --22..883322**** ((33..0055)) ((22..5599)) ((22..5566)) ((22..2288))

LLoogg ooff AAsssseettss 00..330011****** 00..442200****** 00..552244****** 00..330011****** 00..442255****** 00..551166******

NNeett IInncc--ttoo--AAsssseettss --1100..006677****** --33..993388 --22..004455 --1100..554422****** --55..660077 --33..556611

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 11..004433****** 00..771166****** 00..774488****** 11..666633****** 11..883322**** 11..442244**

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt --00..332299****** --00..224411**** --00..118855 --00..228866****** --00..119988** --00..116611

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg 11..229933****** 11..554499****** 11..445566****** 11..222244****** 11..339999****** 11..336644******

LLoogg ooff LLooaann SSiizzee 00..554411****** 00..774422****** 00..775533****** 00..553311****** 00..669944****** 00..772244******

LLoogg ooff LLooaann MMaattuurriittyy 11..553333****** 11..662288****** 11..556644****** 11..559966****** 11..661199****** 11..555566******

LLooaann iiss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd 11..776655****** 22..113333****** 11..884400****

LLeennddeerr MMrrkktt SShhaarree 00..995500 00..666655 11..112200 00..995588 00..558844 00..998888

CCoonnssttaanntt --2277..116699****** --3355..226677****** --3399..111166****** --2266..003388****** --3333..007733****** --3366..665577******

FFiixxeedd EEffffeeccttss:: IInndduussttrryy,, YYeeaarr,, PPuurrppoossee,, TTyyppee

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

LLoogg LLiikkeelliihhoooodd --11660066..88 --334499..5555 --334400..9977 --11554433..3388 --334422..7777 --333355..9922 PPssuueeddoo RR--SSqquuaarreedd 00..4477 00..5522 00..5533 00..4422 00..4455 00..4466 NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 77226611 22667744 22667744 55335522 11772200 11772200

33

Table 5: Probability of Loan Syndication Table 5: Probability of Loan Syndication (link)(link)

FFuullll SSaammppllee NNeett WWoorrtthh SSaammppllee CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSaammppllee ((11)) ((22)) ((33)) ((44)) ((55))

## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 00..338855****** 00..449933****** 00..552233****** ((88..5566)) ((66..6622)) ((33..2233)) NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --11..007722** --00..778888 ((11..7777)) ((11..2288)) CCuurrrreenntt RRaattiioo SSllaacckk --00..117700 --00..229944** ((11..0066)) ((11..7777))

LLoogg ooff AAsssseettss 00..444488****** 00..446699****** 00..448899****** 00..660055****** 00..661133******

NNeett IInncc--ttoo--AAsssseettss --00..771188 55..776622** 22..882222 11..998822 11..224488

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..445533**** 00..339900**** 00..333399**** 00..005522 --00..442211

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 00..005555 00..004488 00..007700 --00..110000 --00..009966

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg 00..110066 00..226688 00..332233 --00..220044 00..004477

LLoogg ooff LLooaann SSiizzee 00..996611****** 11..220099****** 11..223399****** 11..335544****** 11..449911******

LLoogg ooff LLooaann TTeennoorr 00..445533****** 00..550033****** 00..441144****** 00..666666****** 00..550022

LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 55..444411****** 55..883322****** 55..225566****** 77..443388****** 77..446688****

CCoonnssttaanntt --2277..221155****** --3311..774499****** --3333..881144****** --3355..881144****** --3399..777733******

FFiixxeedd EEffffeeccttss:: IInndduussttrryy,, YYeeaarr,, PPuurrppoossee,, TTyyppee

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

YYeess

LLoogg LLiikkeelliihhoooodd --22003399..7766 --776622..0000 --772288..3366 --117711..00 --116622..1166 PPssuueeddoo RR--SSqquuaarreedd 00..5511 00..5566 00..5588 00..5566 00..5588 NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 77226611 22667744 22667744 556611 556611

34

Table 6: Probability of Selling Loans - Lender Reputation Table 6: Probability of Selling Loans - Lender Reputation (link)(link)

((11)) ((22)) ((33)) ((44)) ## ooff FFiinnaanncciiaall CCoovveennaannttss 00..335544****** 00..440055****** ((77..0066)) ((33..5533))

NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --33..005500**** ((22..5566))

LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 ** ## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 00..339944****** 00..333377****** ((77..1199)) ((22..6611))

LLeennddeerr NNOOTT iinn TToopp 1100 ** ## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 00..224422**** 00..666633****** ((22..5500)) ((33..2222))

LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --22..448822** ((11..8888))

LLeennddeerr NNOOTT iinn TToopp 1100 ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --55..779999****** ((22..5588))

LLoogg ooff AAsssseettss 00..331122****** 00..554411****** 00..331122****** 00..554444******

NNeett IInnccoommee--ttoo--AAsssseettss --1100..111100****** --22..112266 --99..996644****** --22..222222

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 11..004466****** 00..775500****** 11..004444****** 00..774400******

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt --00..332255****** --00..117711 --00..332222****** --00..118877

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg 11..228822****** 11..445500****** 11..228888****** 11..442200******

LLoogg ooff LLooaann SSiizzee 00..554411****** 00..776644****** 00..554466****** 00..775588******

LLoogg ooff LLooaann MMaattuurriittyy 11..553388****** 11..557766****** 11..553377****** 11..558877******

LLooaann iiss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd 11..771188****** 11..886644**** 11..778800****** 11..662200****

LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 00..330022** 00..009988 --00..223333 11..222200

CCoonnssttaanntt --2277..552200****** --3399..770099****** --2277..668855****** --4400..332244****** FFiixxeedd EEffffeeccttss:: IInndduussttrryy,, YYeeaarr,, PPuurrppoossee,, TTyyppee YYeess YYeess YYeess YYeess

LLoogg LLiikkeelliihhoooodd --11660055..9911 --334411..5522 --11660033..9955 --333399..6655 PPssuueeddoo RR--SSqquuaarreedd 00..4477 00..5533 00..4477 00..5533 NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 77226611 22667744 77226611 22667744

35

Table 7: Probability of Selling Loans – Borrower Risk Table 7: Probability of Selling Loans – Borrower Risk (link)(link)

((11)) ((22)) ((33)) ((44))

## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 00..335599****** 00..441188****** ((77..1199)) ((33..6611)) NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --33..006600**** ((22..6622))

HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** ## ooff FFiinn CCoovveennaannttss 00..771166****** 00..662200****** ((88..6699)) ((33..8888))

MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** ## ooff FFiinnCCoovveennaannttss 00..330066****** 00..441177**** ((44..0011)) ((22..2244))

LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** ## ooff FFiinnCCoovveennaannttss 00..119955****** 00..331144** ((22..7711)) ((11..9900))

HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --22..558855 ((11..1144)) MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk --88..553355****** ((44..5511)) LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** NNeett WWoorrtthh SSllaacckk 00..778800 ((00..4455)) LLoogg ooff AAsssseettss 00..330000****** 00..552277****** 00..332299****** 00..551144****** NNeett IInnccoommee--ttoo--AAsssseettss --1111..554444****** --11..557722 --1100..332299****** --22..662277 DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 11..004400****** 00..776600****** 11..004477****** 00..775511****** LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 00..774455****** 00..554488 22..337766****** 11..339988 MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 00..446699****** 00..117733 11..668877****** 11..332255 HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg 11..229977****** 11..444433****** 11..228811****** 11..443355****** LLoogg ooff LLooaann SSiizzee 00..553344****** 00..775522****** 00..553333****** 00..880099****** LLoogg ooff LLooaann MMaattuurriittyy 11..550088****** 11..557733****** 11..550044****** 11..556611****** LLooaann iiss SSyynnddiiccaatteedd 11..777755****** 11..887722**** 11..778855****** 11..774422**** LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 00..779955 11..110011 00..884455 11..117722 CCoonnssttaanntt --2288..449977****** --3399..664422****** --2299..883333****** --4411..110022****** FFiixxeedd EEffffeeccttss:: IInndduussttrryy,, YYeeaarr,, PPuurrppoossee,, TTyyppee YYeess YYeess YYeess YYeess LLoogg LLiikkeelliihhoooodd --11661199..8822 --334400..4488 --11559999..4466 --333333..2266 PPssuueeddoo RR--SSqquuaarreedd 00..4477 00..5533 00..4477 00..5544 NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 77226611 22667744 77226611 22667744

36

Table 8: Loan Sales and Debt CapitalTable 8: Loan Sales and Debt Capital

BBoorrrroowweerr HHaass LLooaann SSoolldd


22 YYeeaarrss BBeeffoorree SSoolldd LLooaann

11 YYeeaarr BBeeffoorree SSoolldd LLooaann

YYeeaarr ooff

SSoolldd LLooaann

11 YYeeaarr AAfftteerr SSoolldd LLooaann

AAllll YYeeaarrss

SSaalleess (($$ mmiill)) 22332244..0099 22446600..2266 22662233..5522 22771144..1133 11009944..0011

MMaarrkkeett--ttoo--BBooookk 22..4411 22..4411 22..4477 22..1166 22..3366

IInntteerreesstt--BBeeaarriinngg DDeebbtt (($$ mmiill))

11552255..8822 11661100..5555 11889988..4477 11775500..1188 444466..1100

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..4433 00..4433 00..4466 00..4433 00..2255

PPrriivvaattee DDeebbtt IIssssuuaannccee (($$ mmiill))

441199..4422 440099..3322 887788..6699 331100..9922 112255..6600

NNuummbbeerr ooff OObbsseerrvvaattiioonnss 557711 557755 556677 442288 1100,,886677

37

Table 9: Univariate Analysis - Keeping the Same LenderTable 9: Univariate Analysis - Keeping the Same Lender

LLooaann SSaallee

PPeerrcceennttaaggee


PPeerrcceennttaaggee DDiiffffeerreennccee

PPrrooppoorrttiioonn tteesstt

ZZ--rraattiioo

PPAANNEELL AA:: PPeerrcceennttaaggee tthhaatt RReecceeiivvee AAnnootthheerr LLooaann FFuullll SSaammppllee 8844..7744 6688..7755 1155..9999 1100..6688******

HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8866..5544 7755..8800 1100..7744 44..3311****** MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8866..0011 6677..5533 1188..4477 66..9933****** LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8822..2222 6622..6699 1199..5533 77..5577******

LLeennddeerr iiss RRaannkkeedd iinn TToopp 1100 8866..1155 7766..6655 99..5500 66..1177****** LLeennddeerr iiss NNOOTT RRaannkkeedd iinn TToopp 1100 7788..3355 5566..7766 2211..5599 55..8877****** PPAANNEELL BB:: CCoonnddiittiioonnaall oonn RReecceeiivviinngg AAnnootthheerr LLooaann,, %% tthhaatt KKeeeepp tthhee SSaammee LLeeaadd BBaannkk

FFuullll SSaammppllee 8833..5533 7755..8833 77..7700 55..0033******

HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8855..8800 8866..9933 --11..1122 --00..5500 MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 8844..7755 7755..1111 99..6644 33..5577****** LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 7799..5588 6644..1100 1155..4488 55..3366******

LLeennddeerr iiss RRaannkkeedd iinn TToopp 1100 8877..6622 8844..0022 33..6600 22..4455**** LLeennddeerr iiss NNOOTT RRaannkkeedd iinn TToopp 1100 6633..1166 5599..0044 44..1122 00..9988

38

Table 10: Nested Logit Models- Keeping the Same LenderTable 10: Nested Logit Models- Keeping the Same Lender““KKeeeepp LLeennddeerr”” vvss.. ““DDoonn’’tt KKeeeepp LLeennddeerr”” BBaassee

MMooddeell DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt

LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree

((11)) ((22)) ((33)) LLooaann iiss SSoolldd ((00,,11)) 00..119966****

((11..9922))

HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** LLooaann iiss SSoolldd

--00..006644 ((--00..3322))

MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** LLooaann iiss SSoolldd

00..335588**** ((22..0000))

LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** LLooaann iiss SSoolldd

00..440022****** ((22..6611))

LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 ** LLooaann iiss SSoolldd

00..229999****** ((22..4455))

LLeennddeerr NNOOTT iinn TToopp 1100 ** LLooaann iiss SSoolldd

00..003322 ((00..1177))

PPrriioorr LLeennddiinngg RReellaattiioonnsshhiipp ((00,,11)) 00..668822****** HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** PPrriioorr LLeennddiinngg RReellaattiioonnsshhiipp 11..111144****** MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** PPrriioorr LLeennddiinngg RReellaattiioonnsshhiipp 00..884477****** LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** PPrriioorr LLeennddiinngg RReellaattiioonnsshhiipp 00..116655 LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 ** PPrriioorr LLeennddiinngg RReellaattiioonnsshhiipp 00..666600****** LLeennddeerr NNOOTT iinn TToopp 1100 ** PPrriioorr LLeennddiinngg RReellaattiioonnsshhiipp 00..993388****** LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 66..771133****** HHiigghh DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 88..551155****** MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 44..339944****** LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt ** LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree 66..11..2288****** LLeennddeerr iinn TToopp 1100 11..223344****** CCoonnssttaanntt 00..117799****** 00..119977****** --00..003399

39

Table 10 (continued): Table 10 (continued): Nested Logit Models – Borrowing Again Nested Logit Models – Borrowing Again (link)(link)

““BBoorrrrooww AAggaaiinn”” vvss.. ““DDoonn’’tt BBoorrrrooww AAggaaiinn”” BBaassee MMooddeell

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt

LLeennddeerr MMaarrkkeett SShhaarree

((11)) ((22)) ((33))

LLoogg ooff AAsssseettss 00..448833****** 00..448811****** 00..447711******

NNeett IInnccoommee--ttoo--AAsssseettss 33..556655****** 33..336611****** 33..330055******

DDeebbtt--ttoo--AAsssseettss 00..332266****** 00..334433****** 00..331166******

DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt 00..007744****** 00..007777******

LLooww DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt --00..339911******

MMiidd DDiissttaannccee--ttoo--DDeeffaauulltt --00..445566******

HHaass CCrreeddiitt RRaattiinngg 00..225599****** 00..227733****** 00..225577******

FFiixxeedd EEffffeeccttss:: IInndduussttrryy,, YYeeaarr YYeess YYeess YYeess

IInncclluussiivvee VVaalluuee:: IIVV((BBoorrrrooww AAggaaiinn)) 00..550000****** 00..550088**** 00..551111******

LLRR TTeesstt:: IIVV((BBoorrrrooww AAggaaiinn))==11 55..7700**** 33..6611** 66..3366**** LLoogg LLiikkeelliihhoooodd --66000000..0088 --55993377..2233 --66003344..7744 NNuummbbeerr ooff LLooaannss 77662211 77662211 77662211

On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships Steven Drucker Columbia Business School & Manju Puri Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.

Documents

loan contracting loan

sold loans

loan contracting access

future loan origination

primary market loans

probability of loan

funding constrained

larger piece of loan