Oil painting Tragic Prelude by J.S. Curry Structural-demographic causes of political instability.

Oil painting Tragic Prelude by J.S. Curry

Structural-demographic causes of political

instability

Obama Faults Spy Agencies’ Performance in Gauging Mideast Unrest, Officials Say

By Mark MazzettiPublished: February 4, 2011

Rebellions and RevolutionsCauses of such outbreaks of political

instability may be separated into:• Structural conditions

– build up slowly and somewhat predictably – amenable to analysis and forecasting

• Triggering events– very hard, perhaps impossible to predict– example: self-immolation of the fruit

vendor that triggered Tunisian revolution• Focus on: structural conditions

Structural-demographic causes of political instability

• Popular immiseration and discontent• Elite overproduction• State fiscal distress

1. Introduction: The Theoretical Background

2. Medieval England: The Plantagenet Cycle (1150-1485)

3. Early Modern England: The Tudor-Stuart Cycle (1485-1730)

4. Medieval France: The Capetian Cycle (1150-1450)

5. Early Modern France: The Valois Cycle (1450-1660)

6. Rome: The Republican Cycle (350-30 BCE)

7. Rome: The Principate Cycle (30 BCE-285 CE)

8. Russia: The Muscovy Cycle (1460-1620)

9. Russia: The Romanov Cycle (1620-1922)

10.General Conclusions

Plan of the talk

• The dynamics of structural-demographic variables in the U.S., 1780–2010– demography and well-being– elite dynamics– socio-political instability

• Modeling the Antebellum Period• Lessons for today?

General principles from the structural-demographic theory:

I. Well-Being

• Excessive supply of labor drives down its price– consequence: falling living standards for

the commoner (nonelite) population, popular immiseration and discontent

Immigration: a major driver of labor oversupply

Col 1 vs Col 2

Percentage of population born outside the U.S.

1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Pe

rce

nt

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16 Including the illegal immigrants

Measuring Well-Being

• Economic measures– real wages

• problematic for XIX c. because of rapidly evolving basket of consumables

– wages in relation to GDP per capita• an index of the share of GDP going to workers

• Biological measures– population stature (average heights)– average expectation of life

Demographic characteristics

1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980

Ave

rage

Hei

ght

168

170

172

174

176

178

180

Life

Exp

ect

ancy

of

10

y-o

ld

45

48

51

54

57

60

63

Stature (plotted at age=10)Life expectancy (plotted at age = 30)

Immigration and Stature

1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Pro

port

ion

For

eign

Bor

n

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Ave

rage

Hei

ght,

cm

168

170

172

174

176

178

180

immigrationstature

Note: stature is plotted by year when reaching age=10

This 1888 cartoon in Puck attacks businessmen for welcoming large numbers of low-paid immigrants, leaving the American workingman unemployed

Demography and Well-Being: summary

• 1780–1830– low immigration– GDP share to workers rising– increasing stature – increasing life expectation

• 1830–1920– high immigration– GDP share to workers falling (to 1910)– declining stature (to 1900)– declining life expectation (to 1890)

The Antebellum Model

• Purpose: to test the logical coherence of the argument not an empirical test, because data are

used in model construction a descriptive, rather than predictive

model

• The population component Rural population = growth – migration Urban population = growth + migration

The Antebellum Model, cont.

Labor dynamics:

• Demand for labor: D = growth at 3% p.a.

• Wage/GDP Index: W = (D/U)β

1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880

Pop

ulat

ions

, m

illio

n

0

1

2

3

4

5

Wag

e/G

NP

inde

x

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Rural population, mlnUrban population, mlnwage/GNP index (right scale)

Figure 7.1

1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880

Pop

ulat

ions

, m

illio

n

0

1

2

3

4

5

Wag

e/G

NP

inde

x

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Rural population, mlnUrban population, mlnwage/GNP index (right scale)

General principles, cont. (elites)• Low price of labor means not only

immiseration of a large segment of population, but also enrichment of those who consume labor – the elites and elite aspirants– elite numbers (and appetites) grow– high rate of upward social mobility

The Antebellum Model, cont.

Elite dynamics:

• Upward mobility: µ = µ0 (W-1 – 1)

• Elite numbers = pop. growth + µ

W: Wage/GDP Index

Estimated numbers (and proportion of population) of adult American males with wealth $10,000 or greater

year nn %

1850 85,000 1.7

1860 220,000 3.1

1870 365,000 4.2

General principles, cont.• Growing elite numbers and appetites

eventually overshoot the productive base– large segments of the elites find themselves

lacking resources to maintain status

• Since the number of power positions is limited, segments of elites/elite aspirants must be denied access to them

• Rise of the counterelites: “surplus” elites must challenge the established elites, even by violent means

• As a result, elite overproduction drives up sociopolitical instability

1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

Pol

ariz

atio

n In

dex:

Firs

t D

imen

sion

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Intraelite conflict

1856. Rep. Preston Brooks beating sen. Charles Sumner with a cane

General principles, cont.• Popular immiseration and elite overproduction

drive increasing sociopolitical instability

Figure 7.4

1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880

Po

litic

al S

tre

ss C

ompo

nen

ts

0

5

10

15

20

MMPEMP

III. Instability

• Political Instability Event: lethal group-level conflict within a state

• Database: compiled from historical sources and compu-terized searches of newspapers

Political Violence: Main Types

1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

even

ts p

er 5

y

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

allriotslynchingsother

Components of instability: The Urban Riots ~1000 people were killed in riots between 1840 and

1860

1838 21 Missouri Mormon War (Haun's Mill massacre, Battle of Crooked River)

1844-5

2 Mormon War in Illinois and the Mormon Exodus

1857 120 Utah Mormon War (Mountain Meadows massacre)

Prelude to the Civil War: A War of Religion

1858. Kansas. Marais des Cygnes massacre

Components of instability: Sectional violence1855 1 KS Wakarusa War (Bleeding Kansas)

1856 5 KS Pottawatomie Massacre (Bleeding Kansas)

1856 5 KS Battle of Osawatomie (Bleeding Kansas)

1858 5 KS Marais des Cygnes Massacre (Bleeding Kansas)

1859 6 VA Harpers Ferry Raid (John Brown)

1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880

Inst

abili

ty I

ndic

es

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Predicted PSIObserved InstabilitySectional Conflict

The Puzzle of the American Civil War

• There is no concensus among historians about the causes of the Civil War

• The role of slavery still debated• Why did the democratic process fail?

Structural-demographic theory: the key role of the elites

The American Civil War:the demographic-structural view

• Established elites: southern slaveowners, supported by northern seaboard merchants

• Counterelites: the “capitalists” (railroads, manufactures, mining, etc)

• Outcome: a social revolution– the antebellum ruling class destroyed– replaced with the new Upper Class of

northern “bourgeoisie”• manufacturers, bankers, wholesalers,

corporate lawyers, top professionals, etc

The “Slave Power”The southern domination of national politics, 1789-

1861• 12 out of 18 presidential terms

– plus northern “doughfaces” such as Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, etc

• >50% of the top government posts – 51% under John Adams, 56% under Jefferson,

57% under Jackson• Control of the Senate (but not the House)

– aided by northern “doughfaces”• 57% of Supreme Court Justices

and economic power:• 70% of the wealthiest Americans in 1860• In 1850 there were 300,000 slave owners

out of the total population of 20 mln.

The American Civil War:(1861-1865)

• not an isolated failure of policy• but a culmination of demographic-

structural trends during 1840s and 1850s:– popular immiseration – elite overproduction– elite fragmentation and conflict– increasingly lethal political violence

Lessons for Today?

• Elite overproduction was a common predictor of instability waves in all historical case studies examined in Secular Cycles

Overproduction of youths with advanced degrees

• Appears to be an excellent proxy for elite overproduction in the modern world

• It is statistically associated with revolutionary situations, e.g.– revolutions of 1848-49– USSR collapse in 1991

Egypt: proportion of the cohort aged 20-29 with tertiary education (World Bank data)