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WASHINmN, D,C., 27 December 1971

W?ERATIONS OF ARMY FORCES IN THEIFIELD

I@I 100-5, 6 September 1968, is changed as folIow3:b

;1. @his change substitutes a new Chgpter 7, Air Movements and Airborne Operations, for the old@.~pter ?, Airborne operations. It changes the title of chapter 10 from Air Operations to Airspace@utilization and @ordination. Paragraphs &34.1 and 4-34.2 are added. Paragraphs 4-34, 5-26, 10-2,10+ and N-6 are changed. Appendix A, References, is revised to deIete some field manuals and toadd others, and the index has been revkd.2, New or changed material IS indicated by a star.3. Remove old pages and insert new pages as indicated below.

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4. File this change sheet in front of the publication for reference purposes.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

OfflciaI:‘VERNE L. BOWERS,Majo~ (%wal, United Statm Amy,The Adjutant GenemL

W. C. WESTMORELAND,GeneraZ, United States Amy,Chief of Staf.

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Distribution:

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HEADQUARTERSDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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OF ARMY FORCES IN THE FIELD

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STRATBGYANDMILITABYFORCEGeneral ---------------------------- ---.-- 1-1—1-6

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Elementsof the operationalenvironmentand their eteots --.---------------------- &892-7

COMMANDThe commander------------------.---.. a--Chainof command----------.----------- _-Commandandstaffrelationships_--.----.--

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Decieionmaking---------------------------Planningandexecution____________Joint andcombinedoperations----------ORGANIZATIONAND CHARACTERIS-

TICSOF THE ARMYIN TEE FIELDGeneral-----------------------------------Organizationof theater (area) of

operation -------- —------ ------------”-

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OPERATIONALCONGEPTSPrinciple8of war ----------------------. ---Combatpower-----------------.--—--— ---Relatedfactors ------------------------- ---Subsidiaryand supportingoperations-------

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Organisktionandmissionof airlift forces. . ..-StPategicair movements----------------Basicplanningconsiderations_________Plannin&andconductingairmovementsand

airborneoperations----------------------Combatservicesupport for airborne

operations --------------------------- ---

AIRMOBILEOPERATIONSGeneral-------------------------- ---------Conceptof Armyairmobileoperations-----Applicationof the principlesof war to air-

mobileoperations -------------------- ---

AMPHIBIOUSOPERATIONSGeneral-------------------------------- ---Organizationandcommand-----------------Intelligence-------- -----------------------Plansand operations-----------------------Combatservicesupport-------------------- -

AIRSPACEUTILIZATIONANDCOORDINATION

General------------ -------------------- ---Air superiority------------------------ ----Army participationin air superiorityoperations ----------------------- ----- ---

Air defense------------------------ -------Air tralllc regulation------------------.----

UNCONVENTIONALWARFAREGeneral---------------------- ---------- ---UWin supportof conventionalmilitary

operations ------------ ------------ ------Guerrillawarfa’re---------------------- ----Evasionand escape------------------------Subversion---------------------------- ----

COLDWAR OPERATIONSGeneral------------ ------ -----------------Basic considerations-----------------------Intelligenceand security -------------Employmentof forces ---------------------

STABILITYOPERATIONSGeneral------------------------- ----------Employmentof the U.S.ArrnY-----------Military intelligence-----------------------Combatservicesupport---------------------ci@l ldkirs ---------------------------- ---Psychologicaloperation8_..--_-----------

REFERENCES ----------------------- -----

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FM 100-S�

!, By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

W, C. WESTMORELAND,General, United States ATWW,chief of stag.

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,MiziorGemmZ,U@ed Matee Aww,The Adjutant GeneM.

Distribution:To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 requirements for Field Service Regula-tion-Operations.

* IL& (XW~NMENT PRINTXNG OFFIOBt 1968-846-6WS818A

CHAPTER 1

STRATEGYAND MILITARY FORCE

Section 1.

1-1. Purpose and Scopea. This manual is a guide for operations of

U.S. Army forces in the field. The doctrine con-tained herein applies to all levels of commandin a theater of operations, and particularly tolevels above division. Military operations areactions, or the carrying out of strategic, tacti-cal, service, training, or administrative mili-tary missions. They encompass all combat ac-tivity, including movement, supply, attack de-fense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objec-tives of any battle or campaign. The discussionof military operations is necessarily broad inscope but provides a basis for common under-standing and the conduct of training. The pro-cedures discussed herein are flexible,

b. The contents of this manual are applicableto the following levels of conflict-

(1) General war, to include considerationof the employment of and probction from nu-clear, biological, and chemical (NBC) muni-tions; and operations in NBC environments.

(2) Limited war.(3) Cold war, to include stability opera-

tions.c. This manual is in consonance with the fol-

lowing international standardization agree-ments, which are appropriately identified bytype of agreement and number at the begin-ning of each chapter in the manual: STANAG2082, SEASTAG 2082, and SOLOG 49R, Reltifof CombatTriwpa; STANAG 2088, SJBASTAG2083, and SOLOG 128, R~b@aJ Haxanb;STA.NAG 3088 and SOLOG 108,Batt&@Zd ILlwhudion; STANAG 2099 and SEASTAG2099, Fire Coordination in the Ltmd/Air Bat-#te; STAZVAG 2101, SEASTAG 2101, andSOLO(? 104, ~tim%iites ati ~TOC8dW@$for ~8-tabl~lting Liaiwtt; and STANAG 2104 and

AGO6M8A

GENERAL

SOLOG 180, Friendly Nuclear Strike Warningto Armed Forces operating on Lad.

d. Users of this manual are encouraged tosubmit recommendations to improve its clarityor accuracy. Comments should be keyed to thespecific page, p~ragraph, and line of the text inwhich the change is recommended. Reasonsshould be provided for each comment to insureunderstanding and complete evaluation. Com-ments should be forwarded direct to the Com-manding General, U.S. Army Combat Develop-ments Command Institute of Combined Armsand Support, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027.Originators of proposed changes that wouldconstitute a significant modification of ap-proved Army doctrine may send an informa-tion copy, through command channels, to theCommanding General, U.& Army Combat De-velopments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia22060, to facilitate review and followup.

1-2. TerminologyTerms used in this text are in accordance withthe Army, joint, and general dictionaries.

1-3. National O~ectivesa. Each nation establishes broad objectives,

the attainment of which further its nationalinterest. These objectives serve as the bases forthe formulation of policies designed to controlgovernmental actions, including internal func-tions and external relations.

b. No two nations have precisely the sameobjectives. In a given set of circumstanc~ eachwill react according to its needs. National ob-jectives may bring a nation into conflict w%hother nations whose goals &4er. Conversely,these objectives may lead a nation into allia-nces with other nations whose aims are simi-lar.

1-1

.+

1-4. National 5trute~yNational strategy is the long-range planthrough which a nation applies its strength to-ward the attainment of its objectives. A na-tional strategy, in its broadest sense, is applic-able to either peace or war. It encompasses andemploys all the elements of national power—political, economic, psychological, sociological,and military-and exploi~ other national as-sets, such as geographic location and spiritualand cultural attitudes. Although it is flexibleand adaptable to the contingencies of the mo-ment, a national strategy is basically stable. Itscharacter rarely changes as long. as it resultsin progress toward the ultimate objectives ofthe nation concerned.

1-5. US. National O~ectives and NationalStrategy

In brief, the national objectives of the UnitedStates are to insure its security and freedomand to establish and maintain worldwide condi-tions of peace, security, and justice. U.S. na-tional strategy is to attain these objectivesthrough peacef u] measures; it rejects aggres-

sion as an acceptable course of action. TheUnited States emphasizes deterrence of war;however, it is capable of waging war at anylevel of conflict should deterrence fail.

14. Military Strategya. Military strategy is the art and science of

using the armed forces of a nation to secure theobjectives or the national policy by applyingforce or the threat of force. It directs the de-velopment and use of the military means thatfurther national strategy through the direct orindirect application of military power. Militarystrategy is derived from and is an integral partof national strategy in either peace or war.

b. Because the purpose of war is to Ettainnational objectives, military strategy must begeared to these objectives. Although militaryconsiderations enter into the development ofnational strategy, in the final analysis nationalobjectives shape both national and militarystrategy. In consequence, a nation’s militaryoperations must complement and be compatiblewith its national objectives.

Section Il. NATURE OF CONFLICT !

1-7. Categories and CharacteristicsofConflict

Conflicts between nations may vary from meredisagreements and conflicts of interest to basicand irreconcilable differences in national ideol-ogies and objectives. The former are often sub-ject to resolution by arbitration or concessionand do not necessarily result in hostilities be-tween the nations concerned. The latter type ofconflict may be considered a form of warwhether characterized by the employment ofmilitary force or by the application of nationalpower short of military force.

1-8. The Spectrumof warThe spectrum of war encompasses the fullrange of conflic~old, limited, and generalwar—and reflects the nature and magnitude ofviolence involved in each form. At one end ofthe spectrum is cold war, in which militaryforce is employed up to the point of openarmed conflict involving regular military

forces. The other end of the spectrum is gen-eral war in which unrestricted military forceis applied. The central portion of the spectrumis limited war in which the wide ~*angeof con-flicts between cold war and general war occurs.The U.S. Army must be capable of conductingoperations under each or all of these forms ofwar in all geographic areas of the world.

1-9. Cold WarCold war is a state of international tensionwherein political, economic, technological, so-ciological, psychological, paramilitary, andmilitary measures short of overt armed conflictinvolving regular military forces are employedto achieve national objectives. Cold war in-cludes the complete scope of actions, otherthan limited or general war, that can be usedin a power struggle between contending na-tions or coalitions. The contending powers mayseek an advantage in many ways, employingnot only political, economic, and psychological

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styengths, but military strength as well. Mili-tary forces have important cold war functionsand can directly or indirectly contribute to theattainment of national objectives. Reservesmay be mobilized or active forces deployed todeter another nation from use of force. Mili-tary forces may be used to encourage afriendly government in difficulty, to stabilizean unsettled area, to maintain or restore order,to assist in nation-building activities, or to pro-tect personnel and property. Although the

- basic characteristic of cold war is the absenceof overt armed conflict between the militaryforces of the contending nations, the dividingline between cold war and limited war is nei-ther distinct nor absolute. Regular militaryforces may be required to conduct cold war op-erations that involve incidents.

1-10. Limited WarLimited war is armed conflict short of gen-

eral war, exclusive of incidents, involving theovert engagement of the military forces of twoor more nations. Limited war is characterizedby conscious restraint on the part of the bellig-erents with regard to one or more of its m+pects; e.g., objectives, weapons, locale, or par-

ticipants. The scope, intensity, and duration oflimited wars may vary widely, depending onthe degree of restraint applied. The term “lim-ited” does not imply that this type of war issmall from the standpoint of geographic areaor the number of military forces involved, orthat the results of such a conflict are of minorconsequence when viewed from a national orinternational level. It is impossible to locatewith precision the point at which relaxation ofrestraints will transform limited war into gen-eral war. The upper limits of limited war arenot exceeded until one belligerent concludesthat it is in his national interest to discard allrestraints.

1-11. General WarGeneral war is armed conflict between majorpowers in which the total resources of the bel-ligerents are employed and the national sur-vival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. It ischaracterized by a lack of restraints and mayinclude the use of NBC operations against thehomeland of the major belligerents. Generalwar is the category of conflict most likely to beundertaken in response to a direct and immedi-ate threat to national survival.

Section Ill. THE NATURE OF MILITARY POWER

1-12. Genera!Military power is that element of nationalpower which is designed to apply force in theimplementation of national policy and in theattainment of national objectives. The effec-tiveness of military power is measured by itscapability to support the national objectives.Military power is subordinate to and must becompatible with national policies and objec-tives. Military forces, the operating element ofmilitary power, must be capable of exertingphysical force in a manner and on a scale thatwill insure the attainment of these goals.

1-la. Characteristics of Wtlitary %cesMilitary forces consist of men organized,equipped, and trained to conduct military oper-ations. ‘I’hey reflect the objectives of their na-t~on and its international commitments and thenahre of the threat it faces. Thu% no two na-

AGO6318A

tions provide themselves with precisely thesame types of forces or organize for combat inprecisely the same manner. In nations wherethe predominant threat is internal, the forcesmay be organized principally to maintain orde~*and promote stability. Allies and members ofcoalitions often attain some degree of standard-ization in weapons and materiel, in general-organization, and in doctrine. They may evenrely on one another for certain specializedfunctions; e.g., nuclear weapon support or lo-gistic support.

1-i4. U.S. Military Powera. In the purmdt of its national objectives,

the United States has worldwide commitmentsto other nations. As a consequence, its ArmedForces must not only be capable of insuringthe security of the United States, but must alsobe designed to-

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FM 1W-5

(1) Deter aggression at any level; (2) Defeat aggression wherever and in

whatever form it may occur; and, (3) Support both military and nonmili­

tary programs of the United States and, selec­tively, those of its allies,

b. To meet these broad and complex require­ments, the United States must maintain land, sea, and air forces that can—

(1) Defeat aggression short of general war in a manner that reduces the risk of the conflict expanding to general war. A portion of the forces that provide this capability is de­ployed overseas; the remainder is held in stra­tegic reserve in the United States, The latter reinforces the deployed forces or intervenes rapidly in threatened areas where U.S. forces are not regularly statio~ed. Whether deployed or held in strategic reserve, all forces must be capable of operations with or without NBC weapons.

(2) Deliver devastating nuclear attack upon any aggressor, even after sustaining the first strike in a general war. Strategic nuclear strike forces are the primary offensive element of this capability; air defense forces, protect­ing the key population and production centers, are the active defensive element. To gain and maintain control over the people and land areas necessary to achieve U.S. objectives, bal­anced ground, sea, and air forces either in being or readily mobilized must be available to follow up advantages gained from the initial nuclear attack.

(3) Meet thelogistic requirements created by the various forms of war by strategically positioning stockpiles of supplies.

(4) Sustain themselves in combat, build­ing up rapidly to required levels by mobilizing high-quality reserve forces and employing a sound training base.

(5) Assist, through the Military Assist-a~ce Program, in developing military strength and economic and political stability of selected friendly nations.

1-15. Emplo ment of Militaryw$Wces L General. I1ilitary force mm be employed

in any form of conflict. For~m the threat of force, is common in relati~ @.tween nations

4’

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when major conflicting objectives are involved. However, military forces cannot effectively apply force, or credibly threaten to apply it, unless they can do so selectively. The type and degree of force available must be compatible with the nature and setting of the conflict at hand and the objectives sought. Forces, strat­egy, doctrine, an’d weapons should possess flexi­bility that enables them to serve national pol­icy in any contingency and at any selected level of conflict. However, limitations on the degree of force applied do not diminish the force and vigor with which military operations are exe­cuted.

b. Flexibilit~ and Adaptability in Employ­ment.

(1) U.S. military forces must be able to operate effectively across the entire spectrum of war, in any area where conflict may occur, and under any foreseeable restraints, employ­ing military power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed lin~ita­tions. The force applied must be sufficient to achieve the assigned objectives. U.S. military forces must, therefore, be capable of operating concurrently and effectively throughout the world in one or more situations short of gen­eral war while retaining a capability for con­ducting general war. The forms of conflict in­volved in these situations may vary widely, as follows :

(a) Cold war situations in which ten­sion or violence might at any time increase in scope to a more intense form of conflict.

(b) Limited wars in many combinations of locale, intensity, duration, and participants. These may be nonnuclear war, with little or no threat of nuclear conflict; nonnuclear war, in which nuclear operations are a clear and immi­nent threat \ or limited, tactical nuclear war. In each case, U.S. military forces will be em­ployed in a manner best calculated to achieve the national objectives and to prevent limited war from spreading to general war.

(c) General warfare growing from lim­ited war, or initiated with a sudden nuclear weapon exchange.

(2) A wide range of political and military considerations determines the limitations on the use of military force in war. Normally, it

AGO 6318A 1

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will be impossible to predict the precise natureof these limitations and to determine with cer-tainty whether NBC weapons will be availableto the military commander. It is impractical,however, to develop new types of forces orweapons after the enemy has initiated theiruse, or national authority has modified originalrestraints. U.S. military forces must be able toadapt to any form of conflict instantly. Theymust, therefore, have an existing multicapabil-ity. They must be organized, equipped, andtrained for immediate and successful employ-ment with or without NBC weapons. The fol-lowing doctrine applies to the employment’ ofmulticapable forces:

(a) The disposition of any militaryforce depends on the commander’s assessmentof the threat, to include the danger of nuclearattack, the requirements of the mission, andthe means and time available to effect the dis-position required. Evaluating the risks in-volved, the commander determines the extentto which the force will disperse, and the loca-tion and state of readiness required of his nu-clear delivery means.

(b) Basic limitations on the use of mili-tary force, such as the use of NBC or otherweapons, may be imposed at the national level.Nevertheless, within such limitations, fieldcommanders are allowed some latitude. To ex-ercise this discretion properly, these command-ers should be thoroughly conversant with thenational objectives underlying whatever re-straints have been applied.

(c) Control of weapons capable of deliv-ering nuclear fires is decentralized to the low-est level consistent with efficiency and in com-pliance with national restraints.

c. Readines8.(1) The destructive power of modern

weapons and the speed with which they can beemployed have increased the importance ofreadiness. All active and reserve forces and

their materiel must be maintained in a readi-ness condition commensurate with their as-signed readiness capability.

(2) Accurate, complete, and timely Mel-ligence is vital both to readiness and to successin military operations. Detailed intelligence onactual or potential theaters (areas) of warmust be available to commanders at all levelsand must include intelligence on enemy disposi-tions, composition, strength, recent and presentsignificant activities, peculiarities and weak-nesses, capabilities, and probable courses of ac-tion. Timely and thorough assessments of thesefactors are of particular importance in coldand limited wars. It is essential to avoid sur-prise by sudden changes in the scope, type, orintensity of confiict. Contingency pkmningshould be complete and current, with particu-lar attention given to base development in un-derdeveloped areas of the world.

(3) The readiness of combat forces for de-ployment can be increased by propositioningcertain items or complete unit equipment instrategically advantageous locations.

d. Employment in Combined Militaw Ac-tions.

(1) In combined military actions, two ormore nations commit their military and otherstrengths to the attainment of a common objec-tive. These objectives are generaily similar to,if not ideWical with, the national objectives ofthe participating nations.

(2) The success of combined military ac-tions depends on mutual purpose, mutual confi-dence, and sound organization and planning.These require the existence of flexible and di-verse military power. Both membership andparticularly leadership in multinational ac-tions normally require the commitment ofmilitary forces that can contribute materiallyto meeting the threat under zmyof a wide vari-ety of circumstances.

Section IV. THE NATURE AND ROLE OF LAND FORCES \

1-160 GeneralLand forces are organized, trained, and

sista of the earth’s land surfaces and the contig-uous water boundaries and layers of air. Land

equipped for sustained combat operations in forces, therefore, include ground units and cer-the land environment. This environment con-

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FM 100-5

tain ground/air systems and waterborne ele-ments.

a. The Department of Defense is organizedon the premise that land, sea, and air powerare interdependent elements to be appliedunder unified direction and command towardthe attainment of U.S. objectives.

b. Land power is the power to exercise di-rect, continuous, and comprehensive controlover the people living on the land. In peace,land power is the basis of the stability and in-ternal security essential to a free society. Inwar, the ultimate and decisive act occurs whenone nation imposes its will on another. The ul-timate aim of both sea and air power is to in-fluence the situation and operations on land;land power makes permanent the otherwisetransient advantages gained by air and navalforces.

c. The nature of the environment in which amilitary force operates has a marked effect onits philosophy and doctrine. The land is a sur-face of infinite variety that is complicated byvegetation, by climatic extremes, and by thepresence of man. The problems of land combat,therefore, are not susceptible to simple solu-tion; no formula or rule of thumb can be ap-plied in all circumstances. There is, therefore,no simple dogma or slogan that captures theessence of land power. Planning for land oper-ations is inevitably complex, detailed, andhedged with provisions for various contingen-cies. Similarly, the tactics and organization ofland forces are complicated and cannot readilybe evaluated by mathematical methods. An ef-fective military force must be adaptable to theenvironment in which it operates, to the enemyit faces, and to the national policy it serves.

3-17. The Roleof U.S. land ForcesThe fundamental purpose of U.S. militaryforces is to preserve, restore, or create an envi-ronment of order or stability within which theinstrumentalities of government can functioneffectively under a code of laws.

a. Cold War.(1) Worldwide stability, law, and order

are important to the attainment of U.$, na-tional objectives. The nonmilitary foreign as-sistance programs of the United States are de-

, 1-6

signed to foster freedom in such an atmos-phere. U.S. Armed Farces support these pro-grams by conducting complementary militaryassistance, operations, and military civic actionor by assisting host countries in such activities,

(2) Land forces are particularly adaptableto establishing and maintaining stability, tohandling disorders, and to providing supportof legal authority. Land forces in oversea areasare a real and credible deterrent to war and ameans by which the United States can assistits allies in dealing with disorders inspired anddirected by hostile states. Over and above theirphysical contribution, these forces play an im-portant role in the psychology of deterrence.The presence of armed and disciplined men in-hibits violence as no other manifestation of na-tional power can. These forces are also a tangi-ble, visible guarantee that the United Stateshonors its international commitments. U.S.land forces deployed under collective securityarrangements are a visible example of this mu-tual trust and confidence upon which collectivesecurity—an essential ingredient of US. secur-ity-depends. A strategic reserve of landforces must be available to perform similarfunctions in areas where U.S. land forces arenot regularly stationed or to supplement thosealready located in oversea areas.

(3) U.S. land forces also play a predomi-nant part in the U.S. military effort to encour-age and assist indigenous armed forces in theirnation-building role. The armies of mostemerging nations are not merely securityforces, but are forces in the forefront of themodernization process within their countries.Such programs assist in the prevention andsuppression of insurgency. In those nations notfaced with a real external threat, this may bethe primary mission of the national armedforces concerned. U.S. land forces organize ad-visory and support eflorts for such armies ac-cordingly and assist in the planning and execu-tion of military civic action and other aspectsof internal development programs.

b. Limited War. Limited aggression presentsa double problem. On one hand, aggressionmust be opposed promptly and forcibly. On theother hand, force must be applied in a mannerthat reduces the risk of the conflict expanding

AGO 6318A

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—

into general war. Military objectives alwaysstem from national objectives; thus, militaryoperations must be conducted within the limitsestablished by national policy. The flexibilityand versatility of land forces offer the UnitedStates a variety of military measures fromwhich to select a course of action both appro-priate to the aggression and compatible withthe national security interests. From a rein-forced company to a force of several Armycorps, a land farce can field self-containedunits organized for the tasks that may face theUnited States and its allies, These forces canbe provided any of several major capabilitiesand may be—

(1) Basically armor or infantry.(2) Heliborne, airborne, or amphibious as-

sault forces.(3) Provided nuclear fire support to sup-

plement their conventional fires.(4) Provided the combat support and com-

bat service support that make them capable ofsustained combat operations.

c. Gemnd War.(1) General war normally is conducted in

two phases. Either phase may precede theother or both may be initiated concurrently.One phase involves unrestricted nuclearweapon exchange. The other consists of opera-tions in which each belligerent attempts to im-pose his will on the enemy by consolidation andexploitation of any advantage to bring the con-flict to conclusion on his own terms.

(2) The United States and its allies mustbe prepared to fight a general war and to con-clude it on terms most advantageous to the freeworld. This requires equal attention to bothphases, for while effectiveness in the nuclearexchange is important, it is the consolidationand exploitation phase that will be conclusive.Any advantage gained in the nuclear exchangephase would be dissipated should the UnitedStates and iti allies be unable to capitalize onit. Also, and equally serious, a potential enemymight come to believe, to the detriment of thedeterrent, that he could recoup or counterbal-ance losses caused by the nuclear exchange

FM 100-5

through unopposed conquest in the subsequentphase.

(3) Land forces play a significant part indeterring a general war. For example, theU.S. Army’s air defense weapons reduce U.S.vulnerability to enemy Iong-range strikeforces. The Army’s deployed forces, in con-junction with allied forces, stand between po-tential aggressors and critical resources, serv-ing notice that there will be no easy conquestsfollowing a nuclear exchange. The strategic re-serve of land forces lends weight and authorityto the deterrent effect of US. and allied landforces throughout the world.

(4) In the event of general war, the mili-tary forces of the United States and its alliesmust be capable of devastating retaliationagainst the aggressor, while at the same timeminimizing domestic damage and aiding in theprocess of recuperation; of withstanding con-ventional aggressor forces in their inevitablesurge toward key strategic areas; and of un-dertaking military operations that will estab-lish the degree of control over hostile popula-tions necessary to conclude the conflict onterms compatible with U.S. and free world in-terests. In all these actions, armies will play amajor role and in some they will be the deci-sive force. Air defense forces will reduce dam-age to key control, population, and productioncenters. Both active and reserve forces will aidand support civil authority in national recuper-ation. Armies will provide the backbone of thedefense of the free world perimeter, denying tothe aggressor and securing for the free worldthose resources that will later facilitate deci-sive operations. This initially defensive mis-sion is all important, for control of residual re-sources of the post-strike world, natural andmanmade, will be essential to survival. Incombination with control of strategic areasand routes, these resources will give the deci-sive advantage to whichever belligerent con-trols them. Land forces provide a means of in-suring that rquired resources, routes, andareas are available to the United States and itsallies.

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FM 100-5

CHAPTER 2

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section 1.

2-1. Sco erThis chap er deals with the operational envi-

ronment confronting military forces in a the-ater (area) of operations and the elements thatshape and influence it. The specific areas dis-cussed include national policy, the operationalarea, local government and population, the op-posing forces, and weapon systems.

2-2. Basic Considerationsa. The operational environment is a compos-

ite of the conditions, circumstances, and influ-ences that affect the employment of militaryforces and that bear on the decisions of thecommander. Major elements comprising theoperational environment include-

(1) National objectives sought throughconduct of operations and the supporting na-tional policy considerations that influence themanner of accomplishing these objectives.

(2) The military objectives of the opera-tion.

(3) The physical features of the opera-tional area and the characteristics and atti-tudes of its government and people.

(4) The composition and missions of theopposing forces.

(5) The weapon systems employed or con-templated.

The operational environment not only influ-ences the manner in which military forces areemployed, but also the size, composition, andcommand and organizational structure of theseforces.

b. The elements comprising the operationalenvironment involve a wide range of conditionsand circumstances within which militaryforces must be capable of operating effectively.It is the intangibles in or resulting from thewide environmental spectrum that make it im-possible to reduce the conduct of military oper-ations to a series of precise axioms and simpledirections.

c. The operational environment imposes cer-tain limitations on the freedom of action ofcommanders at all levels. These restrictionsare normal and occur in all forms of militaryoperations. The restraints imposed in generalwar, however, are less frequent and less spe-cific than those imposed in limited or cold war,

d. While subs~uent chapters of this manualset forth broad principles and concepts for theconduct of military operations, the applicationof these principles and concepts is qualified bythe operational environment that prevails at agiven time. Their application requires employ-ment of sound professional military knowledgeand judgment.

isect~onJ[, E~E~~NTs ~~ THE opERA’floNAL ENvlRo~ME~ AND T~El~ EFFECTS

2*3. hl~tb~af Policy include the constraints within which they op-a. National policy translates national objec- crate. National policy also influences relations

tives inta broad courses of action. It affects as- with allied military forces, the command andsignment of objectives to military forces, the organization of combined forces, and relationssize and @mpos!tion of the forces, the re- with local populations and governments.suuxces with which the forces are provided, b. National policies are frequently temperedanti the manner in which they are employed, to by international coalition% alliances, and

~~~ 6S18A 2-1

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agreements and by the additional influence ofopinions and attitudes of neutral nations. Theinflwmceofthese extranational factors maybereflected in confinement of the theater (area)of operations, limitations in military objec-tives, or restrictions in the employment of cer-tain weapons.

2-4. The Theater (Area) of Operationsa. The physical features, population density

and distribution, climate and weather of thetheater (area) of operations affect the organi-zation and composition of military forces andthe manner in which they are employed.

&.The size, composition, and organization offorces are affected by the size and configura-tion of the theater (area) of operations, whichmay vary from an island or archipelago to alarge, continental landmass. Closely allied tosize and configuration are the resources availa-ble in the theater; the existing highway nets,rail systems, port facilities, and airfields; andthe length of lines of communications. Otherimportant factors include the density and dis-tribution of the population and the number andlocation of critical areas that must be held toinsure control. These interrelated factors de-termine the number of troops that can be em-ployed and sustained, as well as the proportionof combat to combat support and combat ser-vice support forces. This, in turn, affects theorganizational and command structure. Theconfiguration of the terrain and the extent andtype of vegetation in the operational area in-fluence the type of forces assigned, especiallywhere these factors present difficulties in theoperation, support, and maintenance of heavyequipment or require that special equipment beissued the troops.

c. Such factors as natural obstacles and ex-‘ tremeconditionsof weather and climate reducehtke operational capabilities of troops and in-b,~&~a~e the difficulty of supporting them. For~t$is reason~ modification of the operational~~~~ob~eptsin chapter 5 and the tactical princi-~tili% in chapter “6 is frequently necessary tol$X&4t local conditions. Paragraphs 6-40#bMxmgh 649 aofitain a detailed discumion of$V~%l]eunder special conditions.\’-

1

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2-5. Local Government and PopulationThe local government and population in thetheater (area) of operations exert considerableinfluence on the operational environment andtheir attitudes, actions, and capabilities facili-tate or hinder military operations. The re-quirements of the population for food, medicalsupport, and assistance in rehabilitating thegovernment and reestablishing municipal oper-ations, such as water supply, sanitation, andpower must be planned. Where the populationis actively sympathetic to the enemy, it maybecome necessary to commit a significant num-ber of combat troops to rear area security.Civil affairs and psychological operations unitsprovide the commander with additional meansof controlling and influencing the population,

2-6. Opposing Forcesa. Missiom. The missions assigned their

respective military forces by opposing belliger-ents may be similar or widely divergent. Eachmay seek the ultimate subjugation of the otherand the destruction of his warmaking poten-tial. In general war, there is relatively littlerestraint in the means employed by the bellig-erents. In situations short of general war, onebelligerent may seek the destruction of theother, or seek to restore some prior situation,such as location of an international boundary;or each belligerent may seek to gain control ofa limited area or to deny the area to the other.In other situations, where dissident elementsin a country are supported covertly by an ex-ternal power in their attempts to overthrowthe government, military forces may be em-ployed to maintain internal security and tohelp eliminate the root causes of disaffectionamong the population. The threatened govern-ment may sesk military assistance from othernations; this assistance may be provided uni-laterally or by an international organization.In every situation, the means employed by mil-itary forces and the manner of conducting op-erations are influenced by the missions as-signed the opposing forces.

b, Strength axd CmnposWon.(1) Enemy forces may consist of loosely

organized bands of irregular forces, massive

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FM 100-5

formations of par~military forces providedwith minimal equipment and marginal combatand combat service support, highly trainedarme~ forces with ample combat and combatservice support, or combinations of any ofthese. To operate effectively against the spe-cific enemy force encountered, US. forces musthave a high degree of flexibility to permitchanges in tactics, organization, and proce-dures.

(2) U.S. forces assigned to an area mayvary from relative] y small advisory organiza-tions or task forces to large land, sea, and airforces. The U.S. Army element in the friendlyforce structure may vary from a division orless to one or more army groups with the nec-essary combat, combat support, and combatservice support. The command and organiza-tional structure will vary directly in complex-ity with the size of the force and the extent ofparticipation by other Services and a~liedforces.

2-7. Influence of Weapon Systemsa. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon

systems exercise an intensive influence on theconduct of operations. When the authority toemploy these munitions is granted, the combatpower available to commanders is increasedtremendously. Nevertheless, the concept ofcoordinated fires and maneuver continues toapply, and sufficient troops must be in place to

exploit the advantages of these munitions. Theresults of an engagement may be determined infar less time than would otherwise be required.These factors, moreover, dictate special meas-ures to reduce the vulnerability of friendlyforces and installations and of civilian popula-tions. Dispersion, mobility, decentralization ofcontrol, rapid exploitation, and reduction ofreaction time are primary considerations.

b. The availability to either force of nuclearweapons (often referred to as mass-destructionweapons) and biological or chemical agents,which may affect personnel over large areas,exercises considerable influence on the opera-tional environment. The degree of influence de-pends on the imminence of employment. Insome situations, the likelihood of employmentmay be of major concern in the developmentand execution of operation plans. Again, thethreat may be so remote that it is of small con-cern. Operation plans must be based on the sit-uation at hand with due regard to probabilityof a sudden change in the operational environ-ment brought about by the decision to initiatenuclear warfare or to employ biological orchemical munitions.

c. Further discussion of the effects of mass-destruction and mass-casualty weapons on theoperational environment is contained in para-graphs 6-3 through 6-6.

2=3

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FM 100-5

CHAPTER 3

COMMAND

(STANAG 2101, SEASTAG 2102, AND SOLOG 104)

This chapter addresses the subject of command and covers the relationships and responsibilitiesinherent therein. The sections below discuss the ‘commander~ the chain of command, commandand staff relationships, decisionmaking~ planning and execution) and joint and combined opera-tions.

Section1. THE COMMANDER

3-lI. GeneralThe authority vested in an individual to direct,coordinate, and control military forces istermed “command.” This authority, which de-rives from law and regulation, is accompaniedby commensurate responsibility that cannot bedelegated. The commander alone is responsiblefor the success or failure of his commandunder all circumstances.

3-2. AuthorityIn discharging his responsibility, the com-mander exerts authority to direct those actionsand to establish those standards that insure ac-complishment of his mission. In so doing, thesoundness of his judgment and the principlesand techniques that he employs determine theeffectiveness of his leadership.

3-3. LeademhlpLeadership is a personal and intangible qualitythat is a combination of example, persuasion,a.~d compulsion. It is an extension of the com-mander’s self, his personality, and his charac-ter. In exercising leadership, the commandermust devise means ti project his character andperwnality to create a positive impression onthe individuals and units of his command, Thebasic ccmmpt of leadership envisions a leaderWaled by a continuing consideration of l@er-sltip traits amd principles, his own strengthsafid weaknesses, iMividual and group charac-teristics of subordinates, and the circumstancesand physical environment that prevaiL

M106818A

.

3-4. Personal CharacteriskHigh moral purpose is an indispensable char-acteristic of leadership in the American sys-tem. Leadership characteristics and traits in-clude bearing, physical and moral courage, de-cisiveness, dependability, endurance, enthu-siasm, initiative, integrity, judgment, justice,knowledge, loyalty, tact and unselfishness. Thecommander’s demonstration of these character-istics and traits in his daily Activities helps toinspire and to earn the respect, confidence,willing obedience, and loyal cooperation of hiscommand.

3-5. The Human ElementDespite advances in technology, man remainsthe most essential element on the battlefield.The commander must be acutely sensitive tothe physical and mental condition of histroops, and his plans must take account oftheir strengths and weaknesses. He must makeallowance for the stresses and strains thehuman mind and body are subjected to in com-bat, His autions must inspire and motivate hiscommand with the will to succeed under themost adverse conditions. He must assure histroops that hardship and sacrifice will not beneedlessly imposed and that their w~l-being isof primary comoern to him.

N. Employmentof Subordi-The accomphshrnenti of the command are thesum of the accomplishments of its componentelements. Each subordinate commander and

s-l

@it7 mexpber is an effective instrument in the,. +..-~WMs of the commander. The degree of skill“and tmW.Mxmdingwith which the commandere~plbys his subordinates is reflected in the ope~.ati~nsof his command. Subordinates must beqqrefully trained and motivated, and full ad-ya~lage must be taken of their individual qual-ities and capabilities.

3!*7. T@t~niq~esa, The successful commander insures mission

accomplishment through personal presence, ob-se~-~ation, and supervision. However, he does

Section Il. CHAIN

‘3+8, GeneralThe successive commanders through whichcommand actions are channeled form the chainof corml?md that extends downward from su-perior to subordinate. Effective military opera-tions demand strict adherence to the chain ofcommand. Violation of the chain of commandustirps the prerogatives of the intermediatecd,rnmander concerned and abrogates his au-thority without a commensurate lessening ofhia responsibility.

3!% 8ypassing the Chain at Command‘Under unusual or extreme conditions, such as

“the imperative need for speed of action orwhen communication with intermediate unitsis lost, the commander may bypass echelons ofthe chain of command. ”The senior commanderbypassing the chain of command assumes re-sponsibility for the order he has given to a sub-ordinate commander. In such an event, the nor-

not oversupervise. While his direct personaltouch wfth subordinates is essential to effectivecommand, he must establish policies withinwhich his staff can take action during his ab-sence. He fosters initiative and self-confidencein subordinate commanders by permittingthem appropriate latitude within the scope oftheir responsibilities.

b. Modern warfare demands prompt action,decentralization, qud a high degree of individ-ual initiative. Detailed instructions must fre-quently give way to broad direction that subor-dinates can interpret and implement.

OF COMMAND

mal chain of command must be reestablishedat the earliest opportunity and the interme-diate commanders informed of the actiontaken.

3-10. InitiativeOn occasion, the loss of communications maypreclude a subordinate commander’s receivingspecific orders or direction. In this event, he isexpected to dedu~ the action required based onhis knowledge of the existing situation and acton his own initiative.

3-11. Continuity of CommandCommanders at all echelons must make ade-quate provision for uninterrupted perpetuationof the chain of command. The succession ofcommand must be prescribed for all contin~n-cies, ranging from the temporary absence ofthe commander to the loss of the commanderand staff.

Section Ill. COMMAND AND STAFF REU4TIONSHIPS

b. Details belong to the staff. The com-mander addresses his attention to the broad es-sentials critical to the problem at hand. He re-lies on his staff to develop the detailed consid-erations required for his estimates, plans, andorders.

c. The SW acts within the policies and con-cepts established by the commander. In theabsence of policy, the staff refers to the com-mander for guidance. If the commander is una-

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FM 100-5

~vail~ble to provide guidance, the staff bases its a~tions on an interpretation of what the com­mander’s policy would be.

d. The advice provided the commander by his staff is calculated solely to further accom­plishment of the mission. Complete honesty of opinion and frankness of presentation are es­sential, Staff recommendations must carry the courage of conviction until the commander makes his decision. Thereafter, full and com­plete staff effort is devoted to supporting the decision.

3-14. Staff Relationships a, Maximum efficiency is achieved when the

commander and his staff function as a single entity in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect. In establishing this relationship, howev~r, the commander must preserve his identity. He must remain sufficiently detached to retain his perspective and to insure prompt response to his orders.

~. In its relations with subordinate com­mands, the staff operates in a spirit of service, cooperation, and assistance. It translates the commander’s decision into timely, concise, and understandable directives. It keeps abreast of the situation, circumstances, and problems con­fronting the command and advises the com­mander accordingly. By so doing, the staff serves the troops as well as the commander. In establishing the relationship between his staff and subordinate commanders, the commander must insure that prerogatives for direct deal­ing by subordinate commanders are not usurped by the staff.

c. Proper staff relations with higher and ad­jacent headquarters contribute materially to operational efiiuiency. Frequent contact and M] exchange of information among staffs as­sist in mutual understanding, in keeping com­manders abreast of the overall situation, and in appnising the commanders of future plans on which they oan take timely and appropriate action,

3-15. Liaison L Liaison is that contact or communications

maintained between elements of the Armed Forces to insure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. It is often aided by exchange of personnel since this facilitates exchange of information. Liaison also is main­tained to insure cooperation and understanding between commanders and staffs of headquar­ters or units that are working together and to insure tactical unity and mutual support of ad­jacent combat units.

b. Liaison can be achieved by one of the fol­lowing or a combination thereof:

(1) Personal contacts between command­ers and staffs.

(2) Exchange of liaison officers or liaison detachments.

(3) Agreement on mutual support be­tween adjacent units.

c. Establishment of liaison k facilitated by planning, by assignment of bound~ries a~d de­termination of responsibility for the bounda­ries themselves, by definition of points where physicai or visual contact will be established, and by agreement on positioning of reserves.

d. Liaison should, when possible, be recipro­cal between higher, lower, and adjacent units, Liaison must be reciprocal when a unit is placed directly under the command of a com­bined headquarters, or a headquarters of a different nationality, and when units of bat­talion size or larger of different nationalities are adjacent,

e. When liaison is not reciprocal, responsibil­ity for establishing it is governed by the fol­lowing principles:

(1) From left to right. (2) From superior to subordinate. (S) From supporting to supported. (4) From national command not assigned

to a combined command to field army or other major tactical command as applicable,

%~tioti IV. DECISIONMAKING

~i:lfh Genmd ity of command, All military operations are ‘IXecbionmalcing is a f undarnental respon8ibil­ based on decisions. The sequence of activities

4(XY6318A 3-3

‘ of the commander and his staff in making mili-‘ t~~y decisions is delineated in FM 101-5,

Sound deeisions contribute to successful opera-tions. While decisions are required in all areasof military activity, this section addresses it-self only to major decisions incumbent on acommander under operational conditions.

3-I -7, Buses for DecisionsDecisions are based on the requirements of themission, the courses of action open to the com-mander, and consideration of the factors thatbear on the two. Certain of these factors maybe clearly defined while others may be cloudedby inaccurate, incomplete, or even a total lack@ information.

MlHI 8$ T!Ie h!hkwl‘ $@$it$ifig tit a ikmision, the commander’s

basic consideration is the mission. The missionis usually stated in terms sufficiently broad topermit the commander considerable freedom indetermining his course of action. As the opera-tion progresses, modifications and changes inmission may be anticipated, As the situationbecomes more fluid, the mission may be corre-spondingly broadened, with increased relianceplaced on the initiative of subordinate com-manders.

3-1 !?. Other Considerations Affecting theDecision

As they relate to the mission, other importantconsiderations affect the commander’s decision.Among these are characteristics of the opera-tional area and dispositions and relativecombat power of opposing forces. (Furtherdiscussion of combat power is contained inparagraphs 6-12 and 5-1!3.) ln developing thei~formation required to evaluate these con-siderations, the commander relies on the advice

of his staff, His staff provides him detailedinformation obtained from higher, lower, andadjacent units.

3-20. Intangibles of BattleIn arriving at a decision, the commander isconfronted with certain ‘intangibles. Amongthese are troop morale, unit effectiveness, andthe enemy’s capability and will to resist. Al-though no precise method exists for gagingthese factors, they have a direct bearing on thecommander’s decision.

3-21. A I)ecisionmaking Processa. The process by which the staff evaluates

the pertinent factors of the mission and thesituation, formulates possible courses of action,and presents a recommendation to the com-mander is termed “the staff estimate of the sit-uation.” The process by which the commanderapplies his own knowledge and con$klets therecommendation of his staff in arriving at adecision is termed “the commander’s estimateof the situation,”

b. The decision must be reevaluated con-stantly and changed in the light of new direc-tives or instructions, additional information,and other factors that are developed as thebattle progresses. Thus, the estimate of the sit-uation by both the commander and his staff isa continuing process.

c. For detailed discussion of the estimate ofthe situation, see FM 101-5.

3-22. The DecisionThe commander’s decision is the result of asubjective analysis of all factors involved. Itssoundness is a reflection of the commander’sprofessional competence, experience, intelli-gence, perception, and strength of character.

SectionV. PLANNING AND EXECUTION

@23, .iUanninga. When the oommander’s deoision is made,

~ pkms a~e prepared to implement it. These$@@ns ptovide guidance or form the basis for!-“’$@’@@@riate orders to subordinate commanders.~’ “b+Planning is a progressive and continuing%,.v,

process, During the course of the current oper-ation, plans and alternate plans are developedfor future operations, as well as plan~ for allforeseeable contingencies. The planning proc-ess must not, however, interfere with the con-duct and supervision of the current battle,

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FM 100-5

3_2iia Exewjion diate attention and supervision of both theIntelligent and diligent execution is essential to commander and his staff. The commander mustthe plan’s success. Once undertaken, the execu- sense critical actions as the battle progressestion of the operation assumes paramount im- and bring to bear thereon the full effect of hisportanoe and must receive the close and imme- leadership and authority.

Section V1. JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

3-25. Generala. Joint operations are those in which two or

more Services of the Department of Defenseparticipate. Combined operations are those inwhich the armed forces of two or more alliednations participate. Both types of operationsmay be embodied in a single operation.

b. The successful conduct of joint and com-bined operations requires coordination of effortand sound direction of participating forces.The principles of command and organizationfor joint forues are contained in JCS Pub. 2,Unified Action Armed Forca (UNAAF). Thecommand and organizational structure forcombined forces is determined by internationalagreement between the nations concerned (DAPam 310-35 and DA Pam 310-86).

3-26. Unity of EffortThe requirement for unity of effort in jointand combined operations is best achieved bythe designation of a single commander. Thiscommander must be provided authority and re-sources commensurate with his responsibili-ties.

3-27. Command of Joint and CombinedOperations

a. Joint and combined forces are character-ized by certain inherent differences that existin the military systems of the componentforces. Among the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates, certain divergencies exist in doctrine,techniques, and customs. Similar variations areenooun.ered in combined forces. Differences inpdli$i~l systems, religion, language, culturalb~~k~ounds, and philosophies add complexityto the operations.

b. ‘ll%e commander of a joint or combinedf~re~ -~~~t recognize and appreciate those di-veygeacies and variations that may oause mis-u~’tle~~tatidin-gs and differences of opinion. Hemust combine tact with determination and pa-ti’wwe with enthusiasm to insure maximum OP

erational efficiency of the force. If necessary,he must subordinate his methods and proce-dures to the common unity. In combined opera-tions, the commander must also insure thatlimited interpretations of national interests arenot permitted to prevent proper decisions. Hemust insist on the exercise of commandthrough established channels regardless of thedifficulties imposed by procedural differencesand language barriers.

3-28. Staff for Joint and Combined Farcesa. Commanders of joint forces are provided

a joint or augmented staff in accordance withthe provisions of JCS Pub. 2.

b. In combined forces, a combined staff maybe established, or the staff of the commanderof the largest allied force may be augmented togive balanced representation to the other alliedforces assigned.

3-29, Combat Service Support for doint andCombined Forces

a. Combat service support for Service com-ponents of a joint force is primarily the re-sponsibility of the parent Service. The degree ofcombat service support provided one Servicecomponent by another is directed by the Secre-tary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, aunified or specified commander, or as mutuallyagreed among the component Services con-cerned. A component commander may provideall, or part, of the common combat service sup-port for all theater component,

b. Combat service support for nationalforces is a responsibility of the nation con-cerned. Within the provisions of U.S. nationalpolicy and international agreements, alliedforces in a theater (area) of operations maybeprovided U.S. combat service support. Withinthese agreements and policy, the theater comm-ander specifies the degree of support to beprovided and the procedures to be followed.

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<,‘t ‘1. ,mwf” L . - ‘ ,

CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARMY IN THE FIELD

Section 1.

4-1. ScopeThis chapter deals with the Army in the fieldunder operational conditions and in a theater(area) of operations, The Army in the fie]d in.eludes all elements of the Department of theArmy organized, equipped, and trained for de-ployment to a theater (area) of operations. Itdoes not include headquarters, commands, in-stallations, or activities located in the conti-nental United States (CONUS), except as theUnited States may become a theater (area) ofwar.

4-Z. Doctrinal BasisThe doctrine in this chapter is based on JCSPub. 2 and JCS Pub. 3.

4-3. Territorial Organizationu. T%eater (Area) of War. The theater

(area) of war is that area of land, sea, and airwhich is, or may become, involved directly inthe operations of war. It is subdivided in ac-cordance with the nature of the operationsplanned or in being.

b. Theater (A~ea) of Operatiow. The the-ater (area) of operations is that portion of atheater (area) of war necessary for militaryoperations, either offensive or defensive, pur-suant to an assigned mission, and for the ad-ministration incident to such military opera-tions. More than one theater (area) of opera-tions may comprise a theater (area) of war.The geographic limits of a theater (area) of

operations are established by the President,through the Secretary of Defense, and withthe advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.

c. Zone of interior. The zone of interior isthat part of the U.S. national territory not in-cluded in the theater (area) of operations.

d. CONUS. CONUS is the U.S. territory, in-cluding the adjacent territorial waters, locatedwithin the North American continent, betweenCanada and Mexico.

e. CONUS Armies. The CONUS armies arebasically territorial commands charged withprimary functions associated with the develop-ment and employment of the national mobiliza-tion and training bases. Included in these pri-mary functions are organization, training, andequipping of Army forces for the conduct ofsustained combat operations. Additionally, theCONUS armies must plan for and conduct op-erations, as required, in ground defense, civiidisturbances, disaster relief, and civil defensesurvival and recovery operations.

4-4. Employmentof Army ForcesArmy forces may be employed in operations in.volving oniy the Army, in operations involvingtwo or more of the Armed Forces of the UnitedStates (joint operations), in operations involv-ing the armed ~ervices of two or more alliednations (combined operations), or any combi-nation of the above.

SectionIl. OltGAtWATION OF THEATER (AREA) OF OPERATIONS

-4+5D qmwaltL WMle them is no standard organization

~vfdr a theater [area) of operations, the theater-.b~;;%-normally divided geographically into a com-f“: ‘ AGO li81SA..

bat zone and a communications zone(COMMZ). The combat zone is that area required by combat forces for the conduct of op-erations. It is the territory fmvard of the field

4-1

army rear boundary. The COMMZ is the rear~a~t of a theater (area) of operations that isbehind and contiguous to the combat zone. TheGOIVMZcontains the lines of communications,establishments for supply and evacuation, andother ~gencies required for the immediate sup-port and maintenance of the field forces. Ini-tially, a theater (area) of operations may con-sist of a combat zone, with combat service sup-port provided by facilities and installations inthe zone of interior or offshore bases.

Z).A theater (area) of operations may beunder the command and control of a combinedheadquarters formed by coalition agreement.Another method of providing command andcontrol is through either a unified or specifiedcommand established by the United States.

c. The authority that establishes a theater(area) of operations will designate the com-mander, assign the mission, determine theforce structure, assign or direct the assignmentof forces, designate the area of responsibilityor function, and may designate a secon$in-command.

d. The organization of the theater (area) ofoperations may require the establishment ofsubordinate commands by the theater com-mander. When this is required, areas of re-sponsibility of subordinate commands should beclearly delineated.

4-6. Organizational Considerationsa. The task of organizing a theater (area) of

operations may be complicated by differencesin national policies of the nations involved andby differences in concepts between the U.S.Service components assigned. The staff organi-zation established must include personnel withwide knowledge and experience in their ownService and thoroughly familiar with themathods, capabilities, and characteristics ofother Service or national forces assigned.

b. The command structure established must‘be simple and must insure a manageable spanof control with a minimum number of com-~am! <echelons. While a single individual mayfr’equentl-yaut concurrently as commander of atini=S,erviceforce, a joint force, and/or a com-.bi~~d force, a U.S. unified commander may act$WOas the commander of a Service component

or subordinate unified command when author-ized by the establishing authority,

4-76 Organizational Principlesa. The command structure established must

insure centralized direction of the entire opera-tion, but must also insure the maximum degreeof decentralized execution to provide flexibilityand freedom of action to subordinate com-manders.

b. Clear lines of control and positive delinea-tion of command responsibility should be es-tablished in the theater (area) of operations.

c. Operational commands should be orga-nized to accomplish specific tasks without du-plication of effort and overlapping of func-tions.

d. The organizational structure of combatservice support units should be oriented on anddesigned to support combat operations,

e. Combat service support should be orga-nized to provide maximum common, joint, orcross-servicing within a national force.

f. Combat service support of national forcesshould normally be provided on a nationalbasis.

4-8. Organization of S~bordinateCommands

a. To accomplish its assigned mission, themajor command may require subordinate com-mands.

b. When the mission assigned a subordinatecommand requires the capabilities inherent inmore than one U.S. Service, it is essential thatunity of command be insured by the designa-tion of a single commander, The organizationunder this commander may take the form of asubordinate unified command or a joint taskforce. When the capabilities of the armedforces of more than one nation are required, acombined command may be established or coor-dinated operations may be conducted,

o. Unity of effort in subordinate comrnand~should be insured by the provision of dear-cutdirection from the theater commander to Ser-vice components thereof by the theater com-mander upon their assignment, and by agree-ment by all services. The staffs of subordinate

AGO 6318A

unjfl~d commands should includerepresentation from all represented

appropriateServices.

FM 100-5

4-11. Mutual Supporta General. Army field forces operate as a

team with other U.S. and allied forces of the

4+ OrgcmizatiQn of the Combat Zonea, The combat zone should include sufficient

maneuver area to permit deployment of all ele-ments of the major combat force and establish-ment of essential combat service support facili-ties without congestion.

b. The forward limits of the combat zoneshould extend to the distance necessary for thecommander to exploit fully all means under hiscontrol.

c, Major force commanders must be providedthe means and authority to direct land, sea,and air operations against the enemy and tocontrol the population in their operationalareas, Procedures and facilities must be pro-vided to regulate air traffic over the combatzone and ground traffic in the combat zone.

4-10. Organization of the COMMZa. The COMMZ contains the principal com-

bat service support installations and lines ofcommunications facilities for the theater(area) of operations. It provides the connect-ing link between the combat zone and the zoneof interior.

b. Combat servicequently have combatversely, some elementscombat support, such

support activities fre-support aspects; con-

whose major function isas air defense artillery

units, may be located in the COMMZ. TheCOllMZ should include sufficient area for thelocation, without congestion, of required instal-lations or units. It may be located on the samelandmass as the combat zone or in whole or inpart on an offshore base.

c. Routine details of combat service supportnot involving theater policy are handled di-rectl y by the Service components with theirsupport structure in the zone of intxrior.

d, Port and air terminal operations normallyare assigned to uni-service commands, withnecessary augmentation from other Servioes.

e, l?or detailed discussion on joint logisticssee J’QS Pub. &

theater (area) of operations. Economy and ef-ficiency dictate minimum duplication of effortamong Services. Functions that can be per-formed by one Service for the other Servicesshould normally be performed by that Service.Service cooperation is in accordance with thepolicies announced by the Secretary of De-fense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and command?ers of unified commands or joint task forces.

b. Army Support. Army support to otherforces in the theater (area) of operations in-cludes long-range artillery and missile fires,operations against land objectives, intelligence,rear area protection, air defense, communica-tions, combat service support, and civil affairsand other support as directed by the com-mander.

c. Nuva2 Support. Naval support includes airsupport from carrier striking forces and land-based Navy or Marine aircraft; air defense bymanned aircraft or surface-to-air missiles; as”sault shipping; antisubmarine protection, mine-sweeping, maintenance of sea lines of com-munications, and surface protection of coastalflanks; naval gun fire and missile support; Ma-rine Corps combat support; and combat servicesupport as directed by the theater commander.

d. Air Force Suppo~t. Air Force support in-cludes close air support, interdiction with mis-siles and aircraft, reconnaissance, battlefield il-lumination, air defense, intertheater and intra-theater airlift, weather service, and combatservice support as di~*ected by the theater com-mander.

4-12. Support From Other GovernmentAgencies

a. State Department. A State Departmentpolitical adviser is sometimes provided for thestaff of the senior commander in a theater(area) of operations. In those situations inwhich the StxAe Department has primary res-ponsibility for policy concerning political ac-tivities and civil affairs, the U.S. ambassadorexercises these responsibilities. For additionalinformation, see FM 41-5 and FM 100-20.

AGO6938A 44

;.,,.,,

b, Other Agencies. The senior military com-mander also normally receives support fromthe Central Intelligence Agency; Agency forInternational Development which exercisescontinuous supervision and general directionover nonmilitary assistance programs and isresponsible for coordination of the militaryand economic assistance programs; the U.S.Information Agency; and other U.S. Govern-ment agencies as appropriate.

c. Civilian Resources. Resources from the ci-vilian population and economy must be used inevery legal manner consistent with nationalpolicy. It must be anticipated “that the enemywill use these resources to the maximum extentpracticable. For doctrine pertaining to the em-ployment of civilian resources, see FM 41-5

and FM 41-10. For doctrine pertaining to con-trol of the population and resources and theirdenial to the enemy, see FM 31-23,

d. COIMW Team. The country team isheaded by the chief of the diplomatic missionand includes in-country representatives of U.S.Departments and Agencies, except U.S. mili-tary forces operating in the field under an areacommander. The country team assists the hostcountry in preparing the internal defense andinternal development plan. This plan forms thebasis for a coordinated US. effort. The chief ofthe military assistance advisory group is theDepartment of Defense representative to thecountry team and in this capacity is responsi-ble for recommendations and coordination con-cerning military assistance to the host country.

Section Ill. ORGANIZATION OF ARMY FORCES

4-13.Army

Generalforces assigned to a theater (area) of

operations include appropriate control head-quarters and necessary elements of the severalarms and services. The latter consist of com-bat, combat support, and combat service sup-port elements. These forces are combined in ac-cordance with the requirement of the missionand the nature of the operation. The character-istics of various Army units and the principlesof organizing them into efficient forces arediscussed in succeeding paragraphs.

4-14. Allocation of ForcesThe numbers and types of forces provided sub-ordinate commanders in the theater is depen-dent on the mission. These forces may be aa-signed, attached, or placed in support of theuommand concerned,

a. Forces for which there is a continuing de-mand are usually assigned.

b. Forces required for specific taslw or for aWnited period of time are normally pooled at‘h~g’herechelons and attached as required.

o. Forces whose capabilities exceed the re-quirements of a single command or whose at-

> @ahment to a subordinate command would un-duly burden the commander thereof are heldunder centralized control and placed in supportof one or more subordinate commands.

4-15. Multicapable ForcesThe organization of Army forces must providethe capability to conduct successful operationsin all forms of conflict as well as in a widerange of environments without major changein organization and equipment. This multicap-ability is provided by combining units capableof providing effective intelligence; mobility;firepower; command, control, and communica-tions; and combat service support. Specialstructuring of forces and the provision of spe-cial equipment may be required under certainfunctional or environmental conditions.

4-16. Larger Army Operational CommandsThe army group, the field army, and the corpsare the largest Army operational commands.Exceptionally, the theater army may be as-signed an operational mission. None of these“has a fixed composition; each is organized toaccomplish specific missions, and each canserve as the nucleus of a joint or combinedforce. Details on the conduct of operations oflarger uni~ are contained in FM 100-15.

4-17. The Army GroupAn army group normally is organized to directthe operations of two or more field armies. Itsresponsibilities are primarily tactical and in-clude planning and allocation of means.

‘4=4 AGO 5918A

FM 100-5H

+&4@. ?lw Field ArmyThe field army headquarters directs tacticaloperations and provides for combat servicesupport of assigned and attached units. Thefield army consists of a headquarters, head-quarters company, and special troops; a varia-ble number of attached corps; a field army suP-port command (FASCOM); a variable numberof divisions normally attached to corps; andother attached combat, combat support, andcombat service support units. A field army maybe organized with a small number of divisionswithout using the corps echelon.

4+9. The CorpsThe corps-is essentially a large task force con-sisting of” a variable number of divisions andother combat and combat support uniti. Fre-quently, corps will be reinforced by the attach-ment of combat service support elements. Acorps so reinforced approaches the capabilitiesand characteristics of a small field army and isreferred to as an independent corps. When op-erating as part of a field army, a corps is pri-marily a tactical organization and normallyhas few combat service support respon&ibili-ties, receiving such support directly from theJ?ASCOM.

4-20. The DivisionThe division is the basic Army unit of the com-bined arms and services. Like the army group,field army, and corps, the division is organizedfor the environment and the accomplishmentof specific missions. It has both tactical andcombat service support functions. The divisionnormally conducts operations as part of alarger force, usually the corps; however, it iscapable of independent operations for rela-tively short periods of time, or for prolongedperiods when augmented with additional suP-port forces. The division obtains flexibilitythrough the grouping of its components tomeet taotical and strategic requirement andthro@ its capability to vary its organizationfor combat Exceptionally, it may serve as theftiunework of a combined or joint force. Armydivisions we designatedniz~d infantry, armored,Mile, These divisions are

A(m6918A

as infantry, mecha-airborne, and airmo-capable of operating

independently or in conjunction with one an-other in all forms of war. Additional details ondivision operations are contained in FM61-100.

a. 2nfmztqy Divi8ion. The infantry division iscapable of sustained ground combat under allconditions of weather and terrain. It is formedby the assignment of a predominance of infan-try units. It readily conducts airmobile or air-landed operations. Appropriately reinforcedwith ground or air transport means, the infan-try division can conduct highly mobile opera-tions.

b. MechunizecZInfantr~ Divtiion. The mech-anized infantry division is formed by the as-signment of mechanized infantry and tankunits, with a predominance of mechanized in-fantry units. This division is capable of cover-ing extended frontages and relatively deepzones of action and of operating in widely dis-persed formations. The organic vehicles of thesubordinate units of the division provide ahigh degree of tactical mobility. This divisionis more sensitive to terrain than the infantrydivision. The bulk and weight of the armoredvehicles of the mechanized infantry divisionare disadvantages in strategic movement Themechanized infantry division is organized fordeployment to theaters (areas) of operationsthat permit the exploitation of their inherentcapabilities of ground mobility and armorprotection. While the shock efiect and fire-power of the mechanized infantry division maybe somewhat les6 than that of an armored divi-sion, the mechanized infantry division is espe-cially suited for operation in conjunction withthe armored division.

c. Amnored LMWon. The armored division isformed by the assignment of armor and mech-anized infantry units, with the former predom-inating. The armored division is capable ofcovering extended frontages and relativelydeep zones of action and of operating in widelydispersed formations. me organic vehicles ofthe subordinate units of the division provide ahigh degree of tactical ground mobility. Thisdivision is more sensitive to terrain thaninfantry division. The bulk and weight ofarmored vehicles of the armored division

thetheare

4+

~di~ailv~ntages in strategic movement. The ar--mhred division is organized for deployment tothixvbrs (areas) ofoperations that permit the

. exploitation of their inherent capabilities.They are primarily powerful offensive forces,normally having a higher ratio of tank unitsthan the mechanized infantry division.

is e~pecially trained and equipped for airbornea$sault and air-landed operations. Air trans-port means must be provided in these roles.While the airborne division has a greater de-gree of strategic mobility than other divisions,tlmir capability for tactical mobility is rela-tive] y restricted, and appropriate reinforce-ments are required to provide them capabilitiesfor sustained combat comparable with those ofinfantry divisions. Airborne forces are particu-larly vulnerable to enemy armor attack due tolimited antitank protection means.

e. Airmobile Divtion. The airmobile divisionis especially trained and equipped for airmo-bile operations. This division is characterizedby flexibility and responsiveness in the accom-plishment of tactical mimions. It is capable ofproviding surprise action at widely separatedpoints on the battlefield in either successive orconcurrent airmobile attacks. It is particularlyadaptable to reconnaissance and security mis-sions, raids, feints and demonstrations, opera-tions against irregular forces, and overobstacleassault operations. As part of a larger force, itis effective, if suitably reinforced, in other of-fensive and defensive operations and in retro-grade operations. For sustained combat, the di-vision requires augmentation of its land andair vehicular transportation and supportingforces. Airmobile forces are particularly vul-nerable to enemy armor attack due to limited

. mtitank weapon firepower.

.?$::,: . ~. An Army d%sile command is a mobile or-&@zatikm designed primarily to furnish nu-&.qjeax fires in support of land forces of allied@!@kms, J4 missile command may also be em-!!k..“=+m

ployed by the theater or other appropriatecommand to provide nuclear fires in supportof U.S. ground forces in designated criticalareas.

b. In fulfilling its mission, each missile com-mand provides fire support, liaison, languageinterpretation and translation, target acquisi-tion, target analysis, signal communications,intelligence, internal security, and limited com-bat service support. When a missile commandoperates with allied forces and is removedfrom U.S. support facilities, it may requireaugmentation to provide additional combat ser-vice support, local security, air defense, and in-telligence support.

c. The commander of the missile commandkeeps the supported force commander in-formed of the capabilities of his command andmakes recommendations concerning its em-ployment. Within the limitations prescribed byUS. and theater policy, the missile commandprovides fires requested by the supported forcecommander.

4=22. Combat Service Support CommandsThe principal organizations designed to pro-vide broad combat service support are the the-ater army support command (TASCOM), theFASCOM, the independent corps support com-mand (COSCOM), and the division supportcommand (DISCOM). The particular composi-tion of each type of combat service supportcommand depends on its mission. The head-quarters of the command, as well as the head-quarters of major subordinate mission andarea commands, brigades, and groups, providescommand and control elemen~ and a minimumnumber of trained logisticians and other com-bat service support staff personnel. Assignedand attached operational battalions, compa-nies, and detachments insure performance ofthe assigned mission. The capability of beingmodified to meet the requirements of varyingmissions is a valuable characteristic of thesecommands.bat serviceseries.

For additional discussion on com-support commands, see the FM 54-

&

AGO SS18A

443. Genwal

Section iV. COMBAT

a. A combat element is distinguished by itsability to employ fire and maneuver to closewith the enemy in combat. Its mission may betQ destroy or capture the enemy; secure ordeny terrain; protect a larger force; or gaininformation, It uses both direct and indirectfires, Combat elements are trained, organized,and equipped to operate in direct contact withthe enemy. The infantry, mechanized infantry,airborne infantry, tank, and airmobile infantrybattalions and the armored and air cavalrysquadrons are the basic elements from whichcombined arms teams are organized, Theseteams include infantry, armor, artillery, sig-nal, and combat engineers and may include airdefense artillery, intelligence, and aviationunits.

b. The mission and operational environmentdictate the organization of the combat elementsof a force, Force composition should be adapta-ble to a variety of environments without majorchange. Unit composition may include combatelements of a single type or various combina-tions of types. The composition of combat ele-ments in a larger force may be modified by at-tachment or detachment as required.

c. The fighting units take the greatest risksand endure the greatest hardships. Combatforces require the highest order of leadership,training, discipline, endurance, tenacity, andes@t de corps. The relative contribution ofcombat forces to the success of the Army incombat far exceeds their proportion of Armystrength. In combat all other components ofland forces exist to support these forces.

4-24, Basic MissionsA combat element is designed to perform ei-ther infantry, tank, or cavalry missions. Thesemissions may overlap, or a force designed forone mission may perform another. A combatelement possesses the following characteristicsin varying combinations and degrees:

m Mobility, varying from the individual sol-dier on foot, through complete mechanization,to complete air mobility.

b. Firepower, varying from small individual

FM 100-5

ELEMENTS

weapons, through crew-served weapons of var-ious sizes,’ to tank armament and armed air-craft, Combat elements may have organic orattached nuclear delivery means.

c. The capability to communicate rapidly andeffectively with superior, subordinate, and sup-porting elements and with adjacent combatunits,

4-25. Infantrya. The basic infantry mission is to close with

and destroy the enemy by fire, maneuver, andshock effect. The essential characteristic of in-fantry combat elements is the ability to fighton foot in all types of terrain, under all condi-tions of weather, and to move and fight withany means of mobility provided. Infantry pro-vided maval or air transport can conduct am.phibious, riverine, airborne, or airmobile oper-ations. A high degree of training is required toachieve and maintain these capabilities.

b. Besides basic infantry missions, mecha-�ized infantry can, in conjunction with tanks,perform an armor mission.

c. Infantry secures, holds, or controls groundby physical occupation or by the use of fire-power. Infantry can maneuver in adverseweather and over terrain impassable to armor.The ability of infantry to move in small, incon-spicuous formations in all types of terrain ena-bles it to take advantage of covered routes of

approach and variations of the ground to over-come strong positions, to infiltrate the enemyposition, or to perform long-range patrol activ-ities. Its characteristics make it suitable foruse in operations in developing areas. Withoutprotection, infantry is particularly vulnerableto the effects of nuclear weapons. It reducesthis vulnerability by avoiding detectionthrough the use of cover, concealment, camou-flage, deception, dispersion, and appropriatecommunications and electronic security mea-sures.

d. See the FM 7-series for additional details,

4-26. Armora. GeneTat. Armor conducts highly mobile

AGO 6818A

. .

4-7

—

land environment warfare, primarily offensivein nature and c~~~ac~rized by a predominanceof mounted combat through the use of groundvehicles and aircraft, Armor forces includetank, armored cava!vg, and air cavalry units.Armor combat forces are particularly wellsuited for offensive operations that capitalizeon their ability to close with and destroy theenemy, to exploit the success of other units, orto exploit the effects of nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) weapons. These forces canconcentrate or disperse rapidly over extendeddistances in combat-ready formations, andtheir organization for combat and direction ofefl%rt can be quickly changed. Armor habitu-ally applies the combined arms concept; rarelywill tank elements operate without infantryfor wctended periods. Armor units can fight inall phases of war, in all forms of combat, andunder adverse conditions of weather and ter-rain by organizing combined arms forces tomeet specific situations. Armor forces require alarge amount of combat service support, prin-cipally in maintenance and in supply of ammu-nition, fuel, and lubricants.

b. Tank Units. The mission of tank uniti isto close with and destroy enemy forces, usingfire, maneuver, and shock effect in coordinationwith other arms. Because of their inherent fire-power, mobility, armor protection, and shockeffect, tank units can participate in all formsof operations and all types of maneuver. Tankunits are capable of maneuvering under fire,destroying enemy armor, exploiting break-throughs and effects of mass-destruction weap-ons, providing organic nonnuclear fire support,supporting mechanized infantry and infantry,and conducting combat operations under lim-ited visibility conditions. Tank units can fight

in all types of weather and terrain; however,maneuver is restricted in jungles, forests, andmountainous terrain. Although the tank units’vehicles and equipment provide excellentground mobility, their bulk and weight entail asignificant strategic lift requirement.

c. Caval~ Units. The basic missions of cav-alry units are reconnaissance, surveillance, se-curity, and use in economy-of-force roles. Toaccomplish these missions, cavalry units mustpossess a higher degree of mobility than re-lated friendly and enemy combat forces. Cnv-alry units can fight mounted, jn ground or airvehicles, or dismounted,

(1) Armored. Because of its varied capa-bilities, armored cavalry is an important infor-mation-gathering means. The command andcontrol facilities of armored cavalry unitsmake them sound structures around which toorganize task forces. In performing their basicmissions, cavalry units may reconnoiter, screenor protect larger units, act as part of the re-serve, maintain contact with the enemy or be-tween friendly forces, defend, delay, conductraids in the enemy rear, or make harassing ordiversionary attacks.

(2) Air. The air mobility of air cavalryunits greatly extends and improves their re-connaissance, security, and surveillance capa-bilities and permits the rapid transport oflightly armed elements with little regard forterrain restrictions. Air cavalry, in conjunctionwith armored cavalry elements equipped withlightly armored amphibious vehicles, providesa special capability for operations in develop-ing areas.

d. See the FM 17-series for additional de-tails.

Section V. COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS

4-2% Gemwal& Althou,gh cQmbat elements are the pri-

-mary source of combat power of a force, tom-%@ support elemmts provide ewmntial contri-%ut~ons to the accomplishment of the oomhatmi~~ion, (lo~’bat support is that operational as-$i@ance furnished db?~~tly to combat elements%mdmay be a major source of combat power. It

;@:

.“

facilitates the combat task of applying pres-sure against the enemy and is peculiar to thecombat mission, Each force structure includescombat support units appropriate to its re-quirements.

b. The allocation of combat support unitsmust be carefully controlled tocal and efllcient use. Normally,

insure economi-combat support

At306318A

elements are assigned at force level and eitherattached to, or placed in support of, subordi-nate units to perform required tasks.

c, Some units have the sole mission of prov-iding combat support, such as field artilleryunits. Others may perform both combat sup-port and combat service support missions; e.g.,transportation units. For this reason, distinc-tion between the missions of combat supportand combat service support is not precise. Dis-cussion of combat support elements in succeed-ing paragraphs is limited to those whose pri-mary mission is combat support.

d. At each echelon of command, the plan foremployment of combat support must be inte-grated with plans for employment of the com-bat elements. These plans must insure thatcombat support is both appropriate and re-sponsive to the requirements of the combat ele-ments.

4+!, Field Artillerya. Field artillery, organized basically into

battalions, provides the principal surface-to-surface fire delivery systems of the Army.

b, Field artillery units are equipped withcannon, free rockets, or guided missiles. Theysupport the combat elements by neutralizing ordestroying with fire those targets most likelyto hinder accomplishment of the mission.

c. Within the division, organization of thefield artillery is relatively fixed, although itcan be varied by attachment of additionalunits. Artillery support is normally providedby placing units in support of, or attachingthem to, the combat elements,

& At corps and field army levels, there is noorganic field artillery. Fire support is providedby attaching or assigning the numbers andtypes of field artillery units required by the sit-uation and the mission. Corps and field armyartillery may be retained in support of the en-tire force, or it may be employed to reinforcesubordinate elements of the force. When divi-sion artillery is insufficient in numbers or typesto provide the necessary fire support, elementsof the corps artillery may be attached to thedivisions.

e, Field artillery is more effective when con-trol is centralized at the highest level consist-

ent with its capabilities and the requirementsof the mission. When control is thus central-ized, maximum flexibility is achieved, and max-imum support to each subordinate element ofthe command is provided.

/. In mobile operations, stability operations,and particularly when the enemy employs nu-clear weapons, the increased dispersion offorces, the quickened tempo of action, and thedecentralization of control of maneuver ele-ments may militate against centralized controlof field artillery. This is especially true withrespect to weapons of shorter range. As thelevel of usage of nuclear weapons increases, oras the battle becomes more fluid, a correspond-ing requirement is normally created for cle-creasing central ized control, resulting in at-tachment of field artillery to the combat ele-ments.

g. For additional details on field artillerytactics and techniques, see FM ($-20-1 and FM&20-2.

4-29. Air Defense Artillerya, Air defense artillery consists of weapons

and equipment for combating air targets fromthe ground. Air defense artillery provides theprincipal means for active air defense by theArmy, The composition, in terms of units, ofair defense artillery echelons above battalion isflexible and is determined by the requirementsof a specific situation.

b. Air defense artillery materiel includessurface-to-air missile systems, fire distributionsystems, and automatic weapon systems.

c. The Army air defense artillery fire unit isthe key element for effective air defense incombat. lt must have the capability to accom-plish autonomously all the following engage-ment functions:

(1) Detection of potential airborne tar-gets,

(2) Identification of unknown flyingobjects.

(S) Interception of enemy aircraft,(4) Destruction of the hostile air threat,

d. Air defense artillery is most effectivewhen it operates under the doctrine of central-ized direction and decentralized execution,Control is exercised primarily by standing op-

i4G0 6318A 4+9

m?ating procedure; however, extensive com-n%tinkations are required to permit timely re-sponse to command requirements and for ex-~hange of operational information.

e. Air defense artillery weapons and con-certed effort of organic automatic and small-@F~s fire can provide local, limited protectionfor ground forces.

~. Certain air defense artillery missiles andautomatic weapons have a surface-to+urface&apability. FTowever,diversion from their ~ri-mary role of air defense is dependent on theair defense situation.

g. See FM 44-1 for additional details on theemployment of ah defense m*tillery units.

h. Details on the integration of air defenseartillery into the overall air defense system, isdjscussed in paragraphs 10-12 through 10-22.

440. SignalSignal elements provide communications-elec-tronics support for Army forces h the field.Communications-electronics support embracesdesign, development, installation, operation,and maintenance of electronic and electl ome-chanical systems associated with the collecting,transmitting, storing, processing, recording,and displaying of data and information asso-ciated with all forms of military communica-tions, to exclude the responsibility for informa-tion and data systems and equipment that hasbeen otherwise assigned, Signal elements prov-ide communications to Army forces down tobrigade level and to other commands as re-quirecl. This support is provided by electroniccommunications means and by messenger.Communications at combat brigade and lowerlevels are provided by organic communicationselements, The signal function also includesprovision of photographic support. Combatsupport photography includes still and mo-t-ion-picture services (except reconnaissanceand military intelligence photography), pho-tography from Army aircraft, and processingservices for operaticmal, technical, informa-tio~ and intelligence purposes. For additionaldetails, see FM 11-20, FM 11-40, and FM2A10

support includes the per-

formance of construction and destruction tasksthat improve the mobility, combat effective-ness, and defensive strength of friendly forceswhile impeding the mobility of the enemy andcontributing to his destruction. Engineer com-bat support includes the following tasks:

a. Support of gap and river crossings, am-phibious, denial and barrier, camouflage, andtactical cover and deception operations.

b. Construction and maintenance of routes ofcommunications.

c. Provision of water supply, terrain intelli-gence and evaluation and surveys and mapping.

d. Construction, restoration, and mainte-nance of Army aviation facilities, roads,bridges, ports, and field fortifications.

e. Employment of conventional and atomicdemolition munitions.

f. Provision of area damage control and dis-aster relief operations.

Engineer units are trained to fight as infantrywhen required by the commander. For add i-tional details, see FM 5-1 and FM 5-26.

4-32. Army AviationArmy aviation combat support includes aerialfire support; observation, surveillance, recon-naissance, and target acquisition; airlift forairmobile operations; command and control, li-aison, and communications; and Army air traf-fic control over the ground combat area. Toprovide maximum flexibility, some aviationunits are pooled at a higher level and allocatedto subordinate units as required. For additionaldetails, see FM 1-5, FM 1-60, and FM 1-100.

4-33. ChemicalChemical combat support includes technicaladvice and assistance to commanders and staflkin the employment of, and defense against,biological and chemical agents, flame, smoke,and radioactive fallout. It includes tactical sup-port in the employment of smoke-generatingequipment for the production of large sxnoke-screens to obscure enemy observation and con-ceal friendly activities. For additional details,see FM 3-10, FM 8-1OA, FM 3-1OB, FM 3-12,FM %50, FM 20-83, and FM 21-40.

AGO 6818A

i*&l!+,Ihtdligence

$@@$ligtmce is the product resulting from thecoll~tiion~ evaluation, analysis, integration, and$nt~~.preti~tion of all avaiiable information whichtXij@i3pM3one or more aspects of foreign nation6 oraze~. and which is immediately or potentially sig-nifi!%ht to the development and execution ofplans, pdicimj and ope~ations. It includes currentBridfuture eu~my capabilities) vulne~abiliti~~ and~~~b~ble couMes of adion. The commander’s deci-~iofi is strongly influenced by intelligence. Intelli-gence and operations must be integrated. The in-t~lligence effort of the command must provide thetimely intelligence required to make decisions,prepare plans~ conduut operations, and avoid sur-~~ise, Priority is given in the intelligence effort tothose aspects of tihe situation that represent thegreatest prospect of success and the greatestthreat to accomplishment of the mission. System-atic procedures and effective communications areessential for collection of information and use ofintelligence. Intelligence is of importance to allelennentsof the command and to higher and adja-cent commands.

o. Combat Intelligence. Combat intelligence is?tnowledge of the enemy, the weather, and the ter-‘~ain used in planning and conducting tactical op-ei%+tions.Combat intelligence seeks to reduce theunknown aspects of the enemy and the opera-tional area. It contributes to accuracy of evalua-tion of risks and successful application of combatpower. Logical conclusions concerning the area ofoperations and enemy capabilities and vulnerabili-ties permit the determination of their probableeffect on courses of action. See FM 80-6 for addi-tional details.

b. Strategic lnteUigence. Strategic intelligenceis that intelligence which is required for the formu-lation of policy and military plans at national andinte~national ]evds. Its sources may provide in-@Mn8tion of particular significance in tactical op-61@MM and pwchologioal operations. StrategicMIWgence and aombat intdligence are oloselyre-lakd~ the pri?naw difference is in the level ofr~~cxl~ction and utilizatim, Strategic intelligenceIk oriented on national objectives and is usuallyp>EOdUCedS1OWIYby study and assw@@ of a large~O1ti-~eOf detailed ihf’ormation, combat intelli.g~n@ U$W1lYinvolves rapid evaluation and inter-,~l~t$’ion of current lnfOrnlation.

O*RWcal and BXwwn$c hteU$gence. Politicaland”&conomiox%tdligence are components of stra-t~~i~ inte!ligenoe, I?olitical intelligence deals with

domestic and foreign relations of governmentalorganizations, while economic intelligence dealswith the extent and utilization of the natural andhuman resources and the industrial potential ofnations. Political and economic factors are impor-tant considerations in planning military opera-tions and are of particular importance in cold andlimited war. These factors especially influence theaspects of intelligence, civil affairs, psychologicaloperations, and combat service support and may,in many circumstances, influence decisions per-taining to maneuver and fire plans.

d. Technical [email protected] intelligenceis that knowledge concerning foraign technologi-cal developments and the performance and opera-tional capabilities of foreign materiel which have,or eventually may have, a prnctical applicationfor military purposes. Technical intelligence is theend result of the processing of technical informa-tion. The intelligence effort must consider techni-cal intelligence as part of the overall effort, bothfor immediate tactical applicability and for stra-tegic importance. See FM SO-16 for additional de-tailA

*e. Terrain Intelligence. Terrain intelligence isprocessed information on the militarily significantnatural and manmade characteristics of an area.Terrain intelligence may be classified either stra-tegic or combat intelligence. Included in strategicterrain intelligence are descriptions and analysesof beaches, water terminals, rivers, towns, andmajor terrain features; transport~tion and com-munications systems; and cross-country move-ment conditions, soils, types of rocks, under-ground installations, climate and weather, vegeta-tion, state of ground, and hydrography. Thesestudies provide field commanders with initial in-telligence concerning the theater (area) of opera-tions on the outbreak of hostilities. Combat ter-rain intelligence is produced for use in planningand conducting tactical operations within a speci-fied area. It is based on locally secured informa-tion md is concerned primarily with the effects ofweather and terrain on the particular operationsof the unit.

*f. Police Intelligence. Police intelligence isone of the elements of intelligence available to thecommander. Police intelligence is processed infor-mation relating to criminal activities (criminalintelligence), police law enforcement and security,and incidents that disrupt law and order (policeoperational intelligence). Special development andprocessing of police information can directly con-

,: ‘~$fi.!lteto military intelligence in the early detec-ij~~~ of itisurgent activities, infiltrators, md,&ieltlyactivities in the rear art!~6

...~g. Couttterintelligencev Signed Security, andO~&iMon9 Securi@ Counterintelligence (C1),~igflal security (SIGSEC ), and operations SeCU-%~$v(OPSEC ) are measures taken to deny infor-

. iii$tio~ to the enemy. They include integrated de-fefisive and offensive measures designed toredtwe, neutralize, or destroy the effectiveness ofthe enemy’s intelligence collection effort, whethertbisefiort isconduoted from controlled or deniedareas, They are a fundamental requirement forsurprise and security. All personnel must bethor-o~ghly trained in the importance of CI, SIGSECand OPSEC, and the measures contributing totheir effectiveness,

Ah Target Acquisition. Acquisition of targetsis one of the more important intelligence tasks.Target acquisition is that part of intelligenceactivities which involves accurat? and timely de-tection, identification, and location of targets insufficient detail for the purpose of target analysis,target evaluation, and effective employment ofweapons. Target acquisition results from applyinginformation collected from all sources and agen-cies for this specificpurpose.

~i. Air Intelligence. Information concerningenemy air activity is of such criticality to friendlyoperations and is of such a iiransitory nature thats~eoial provisions must be made for its collection,processing, and dissemination. Continuouslyactive channels of communications must be availa-ble to report information on enemy air activity toair defense command posts, where it is screenedand processed for relay to air defense artilleryunits to enhance active countermeasures. Otherfriendly units in the area must be notified so thata~p~opriate active or passive air defense mea-SUresmaybe initiated,

*j. Ii?econnaissance.(1) Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken

tw~htain, by visual observation or other detection:;IM@thods,inform~tion about the activities and re-wmrces of an enemy or a potential enemy andtih.a concerning the weather, terrain, and otherafivironmental faotors pf a particular area. It isalso directed toward locating or verifying the lo-@@ttofisof friendly units. Accurate knowledge ofWelmxition of all friendly troops operating in thec~~ander’s zone ot responsibility is necemwy

~‘fdr effecthm employment of complex weapon sys-tenm.

(2) MOStunits have reconnaissance capabili.ties; however, certain elements are specifically or-ganized for reconnaissance operations, To be fullyeffective, reconnaissance operations require free-dom of maneuver, a favorable mobility differen-tial over the enemy, and effective communications.Reconnaissance efforts are directed toward gain-ihg and maintaining contact. ~nformation is ob-tained by stealth, if possible; however, it may benecessary to fight to get information. ~econnais-sance operations are facilitated by use of elec-tronic equipment.

*(3) Division and higher units normally aresupported by surveillance units for search, inter-ception, and monitoring of enemy electronicmeans. These units extend the depth of observa-tion and contribute significantly to target acquisi-tion, Reconnaissance is an inherent part of sur-veillance.

*k. Recon?Mi88ance by Fire ov in .Fo?ce.Recon-naissance by fire or in force may be used whenstealth is not essential. Reconnaissance by fire isused ag~inst suspected enemy locations to destroycamouflage and cause the enemy to reveal himselfby movement or byreturning thef ire; it has theimportant advantage of speed. Reconnaissance inforce isalimited-objective operation by a sizableforce to discover and test the enemy’s dispositionsand strengths or to develop other intelligence. Thecommander directing such an operation must beprepared to exploit success. He must, however,consider that either the reconnaissance in force orbv fire may disclose his own dispositions and pro-voke a strong enemy reaction.

*L Ai~Reconnaimance. Air reconnaissance isthe acquisition of intelligence information of mili-tarysignificance employing aerial vehicles in vis-ual observation or the use of sensory devices. Airreconnaissance is capable of providing rapid cov-erage of large areas; however, it may be limitedby enemy defensive measures and weather condi-tions. An effective intelligence system requires theavailability of timely air reconnaissance respon-sive to the requirement of each eohelon.

*m. Countevreconnais8anof3. Counterrecon-naissance includes all measures taken to deny orneutralize enemy reconnaissance. Offensive coun-terreconnaissance seeks out and destroys theenemy reconnaissance forces, Defensive counter-reconnaiswmce denies, by combat if necessary,enemy access to certain areas. Counterrecon-naissance forces are echeloned in depth and ori-ented and adjusted to friendly dispositions.

Mioa180A

j~i~, G%m&atSu46tie#tance.Combat surveillance$~W~passes all tedmiques of accomplishing a?i~tjnuous (all-weather, day and night), system-at~o watch by visual, elwhronic, and photographic‘~qatis over the battle areas to provide timely in-~(n$w~tiofifor tactical ground operations. Combat$u~veillance is the integration of all available“~eafisof battlefield surveillance, inoluding air re-co~n~issance. It is capable of rapid and continu-OUScoverage and is characterized by immediateresponsiveness to the needs of the tactical com~mander.

~o. Aflencies. All individuals and units have anMtelligence function. This function is organic tocombat and combat support elements and is inse-p~rable from operations. Specialized intelligenceu~its also provide the commander with informs-‘tiOhon the enemy, the weather, and the terrain.Military intelligence units provide trained special-ists for support of tactical units. U.S. Army Secu-rity Agency units provide communications andelectronic intelligence. For additional details, seeFM 5-30, FM 30-6, FM 80-9, FM 30-10, FM&&16, FM 80-18, and FM 32-10.

*P. Long-Range Patrok. The infantry long-ra~ge patrol company is especially organized,trained, and equipped to perform the combat sup-port functions of reconnaissance, surveillance,and target acquisition in the dispatching unit’sarea of interest. These companies, when wthor~ized by the Department of the Army, are providedto corps and field army and may be placed in4~p.p~rt of subordinate elements. Details on em.ployment of long-range patrol companies are con-tained in FM 31-18.

+:#M34,1. ElectronicWarfare

@hMxmic warfare (EW) support is militaryaotiioninvolving the use of electromagnetic energyto determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile~u~~of the electroma~netic spectrum. There arelih~~e divisions within lllW: electronic support~Sastires (ESM), ccdleotionof EW intelligence;@$ctroniccountermeasures (lilCM), jamming andtl$cepticm; and dectronic coumter-countermea-$urw @K!CM),protection,

G 1, FM1OO-5

#@-8Ak& Si$d h@!igetW

As the battlefield environment g~owsmore sophis-ticated, tactical commanders are provided withever-increasing numbers of electronic and elec-tro~optical devices to aid in the execution of com-mand and control functions, to obtain intelligenceand information, and to perform routine adminis-trative operations, This results in an increasingnumber of electronic and electro-optic devicesbeing used for various communications and non-communications functions. The enemy’s use ofthese devices may be detected, analyzed, and ex-ploited as a source of signal intelligence (SIG-INT). The product derived from SIGINT opera-tions is one of the most valuable single sources ofinformation available to the tactical commander,Information pertaining to SIGINT operationsand to USASA units that perform these opera-tions may be found in FM 32-1 and FM 32-10.

=S, Special Forces

*a. The basic mission of Special Forces is un-conventional warfare. Special Forces are strategicforces employed under the direction of designatedunified, specified, and subordinate unified com-mand; joint task force; and contingency forcecommanders. They provide such commanders witha capability to conduct unconventional warfareoperations to further national objectives and tofacilitate accomplishment of the mission of theforce.

b. Speciai Forces groups are allocated to stra-tegic regions of the world in response to nationalrequirements and objectives. These organizationsare multicapable and mission oriented and possessa flexiMlity that permits structuring for a partic-ular mission or area of deployment, Deploymentfor operations may involve only selected individu-als or detachments possessing special capabilities,or it may require one or more Special Forcesgroups. Special Forces units may be used to train,organize, supply, direct, coordinate, and controlindigenous forces in guerrill~ warfare and stabil-ity operations, In a theater (area) of operations,Special Forces may be employed on independentmissions or in support of the operations of otherforces or agenciea.

Section Vi. COMBAT SWWW SUPPORT ELM/W+lTS‘~3& Genwcd service support in a theater (area) of operations.

They may be part of, or prepared to become parta. Qombat service support elements are those of, the theater, command, or task force formed

ele~mts vvhos~ p~imary missions are to provide for combat operations.

AMMIMA 4-13

~, Combat service support elements perform t~~$e fu~ctions that are essential to the conduct Qf sustained combat operations, These functions include personnel and administrative, chaplain, fi~~nce, civil affairs, legal, maintenance, medical, ~i~itiwy TX3WM,supply, tinsportdion, wmstruc­@Xl, field services, and other ]ogistic services6 The ‘distinctions between combat service suppoti, Vot@batsupport, and combat operations are not dbsolute, Moreover, all units have certain combat @vise support functions that they must perform ih accomplishing their major missions.

o. organizational and operational doctrine forcorhbat service support operations is contained inFll 100-10, FM 101-6, FM 101-10-series, FM54=series, and FM 3-1 (Test).

Ad. When considering combat service support, the commander must be fuily aognizant of the functions of rear area protection and their direct impact on the accomplishment of the overall combat service support mission. Rear area protec­tion is given detailed coverage in chapter 6, section VI.

+37. Combat Service Support Units andOrganizations

~a. Combat Zwza. In the combat zone, combat service support to divisional forces is provided by the DISCOM. Corps nondivisional troops and the I)ISCOM are provided combat service support by FASCOMelements, namely the corps support bri­gade and, in some instances, the area support bri­gade. Additionally, cellular teams (TOE 600- and 600-series) are provided when necessary.

& COMMi?. In the COMMZ, combat service support is provided by units assigned to the TASCOM.These units are provided as necessary to support the missions assigned to TASCOM’S subordinate command.

448. Gorntrol of Combat Service Suppwt Activities

&intwQl of combat service support activities ,~ithin the field forces involves three major con­@i~~ations-command responsibility, techniques of Control, and facilities.

&Command ~88~~~’b~l~tl/. All commanders are responsible for control of the combat service sup­

port activities and organizations assigned or at. tached to their commands, This responsibility en­compasses the adequacy and timeliness of combat service support provided their subordinates, aa well as timely presentation of valid requirements to higher echelons. The corps, when operating as part of a iarger force, rarely has combat service support units assigned or attached to it. Com­mand responsibility for combat service support at the corps level is normally limited to establishing priorities for allocation of combat service support resources provided by the field army support com­mand,

b, Techniques of Control. ‘I’heeffectiveness of control of combat service support activities is largely dependent on the various techniques of communications, packaging, recording, reporting, data analysis, data display, and decisionmaking, Knowledge by the commander of current tech­niques of control of combat service support activi­ties is essential not only for effective control, but also for the establishment of valid plans and re­quirement

*o. FaoiZitie$. Facilities include medical treat­ment installations, storage installations, ports and beaches, airfields, railways, waterways, and trans­portation means. Effective control of combat serv­ice support activities in the area of operations is largely dependent on the facilities available for receipt, storage, protection, and distribution of supplies and the availability of personnel. Effec­tive control of personnel support activities in the area of operations is also dependent on the facili­ties and personnel available for insuring continu­ous collection, evacuation, treatment, and rapid disposition of the sick and wounded and for unin­terrupted and rapid movement of personnel re­placements to their units of assignment. Gener­ally, the absence of indigenous facilities in less developed areas of operations will limit the qual­ity and quantity of available combat service sup. port until the needed facilities have been pro­vided. Similarly, with the dispersion of combat forces and the inoreased use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, less reliance should be placed on indigenous and fixed facilities for purposes of combat service support. Consequently, other alter­natives must be exploited and developed to de­mxwse dependence on indigenous and fixed facili­ties.

MO 8180A

:>1=’r;

. . h

FM 100-5

449, tihcitwf~tisb ~f ~~mbut WviteS.qqxwt E’ihmmts

Cih@Xit !wrvkx Wpport elements must possessti~~t~tional fiex!b~lity and the ability to ftmc-thn under varying environmental conditions,~~~y mUSt Wko advantige of the l$test techno~ldglaal advances and managerhtl aids to in-cfetiso the support capability.

& l%ed Capabilities. Combat service sup-port organizations have finite capabilities, usu-ally translatable into time, space, or tonnageli~itations, In emergencies, and for short pe-riods of time, exceptional support efforts canbe demanded and expected,

b, VulnewWtt~. While generally capable ofdefending their own installations, combat ser~vice support organizations are highly vulnera-Me to determined enemy attack. This vulnera-bility is in direct proportion to the degree ofdispersion required for effective operations. onthe other hand, concentration of combat ser-vice support activities for protection againstgraund aotion may reduce their support capa”Mlity and increase their vulnerability to enemyattaok by conventional and nuclear fires. Theseconflicting conditions and their impact on ac-ownplishment of the combat service supportmkision require oareful evaluation and oom”mand decision of the degree of vulnerabilityand risk that can be accepted.

c. PZanning Faotors. Realistic planning fac-tors should be used to determine the require-ments for combat service support elements.

bat forces in general war. A high order of or-ganizational flexibility is required to satisfythe wide variety of possible combat servicesupport requirements.

c, Combat service support ~ctivities that areestablished and operated in peacetime must befully compatible with those required underwartime conditions. Transition from peacetimeto wartime conditions, as required by anychange in operational environment, is accom-plished with minimum change in concept, or-ganization, and procedures.

441. Dispersion

a. The dispersion of tactical forces, both lat-erally and in depth, requires a correspondingdispersion of combat service support facilitiesto provide adequate support, Dispersion ofcombat service support facilities is also re-quired as a measure to reduce the effectivenessof NBC weapons.

h Rapid movement of combat and combatsupport forces and the relative immobility anddispersion of combat service support facilitiesmay result in considerable separation betweencombat and combat support forces and the var-ious combat service support facilities. Areasbetween installations may be extensive and in-fested with enemy guerrilla forces, bypasgedenemy groups, and brigands. Only that degreeof control that is required for the operation ofinstallations and the movement of personneland supplies between them is exercised overthese areas. The ability to cope with problemsof dispersion and distance is a key factor in ac-complishing the combat service support mis-sion,

o. The effects of attacks by NBC weaponsmay be reduced tirough the provision of multi-pie, small installations; the establishment ofalternate key faci~ities; the proper arr&nge-ment of materiel being stored; the use of cam-ouflage and dummy positions; ttwget analysisof the installation lomition plan; the attain-ment of maximum dispersion consistent withcontrol and risk; the utilization of protectivefeatures to include terrain, barricades, revet-ments, and underground ~heiters; and theprovision of adequati planning for RAP.

Am mm 415

CHAPTER 5

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

(STANAG 2088, YFANAG 2099, SEASTAG 2099, AND SOLOG 108)

Section 1. PRINCIPLESOF WAR

5-1. Scope

This chapter deals with the principles of waruncl operational concepts that must be consid-ered in the conduct of military operations.Combat power, related factors, and subsidiaryand supporting operations are treated in detail.This chapter establishes a basis for discussionsof various military operations in succeedingohapters.

5-2. GeneralThe principles of war are fundamental truthsgoverning the prosecution of war. Their properapplication is essential to the exercise of com-mand and to the successful conduct of militaryoperations. These principles are interrelatedand, depending on the circumstances, may tendto reinforce one another, or to be in conflict.Consequently, the degree of application of anyspecific principle will vary with the situation.

5-3, principle of the Obiective

Every military operation must be directed to-ward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainableobjective. The ultimate military objective ofwar is the defeat of the enemy’s armed forces.The objective of each OPeratiOn IXNWtContrib-ute to the ultimate objective, Each interme-diate objective must be such that its attain-ment will most directly, quiokly, and economi-cally ooht~ibute In the purpose of the opera-tion. The selection of an objective is based onammidera$ion of the mission, the means availa-Mei the e~wnv, and the operational ar~e EverYwmmand~ must understmd and clearly definehis objeiutive and consider each contemplatedaction in light thereof,

5-4. Principle of the Offensive

Offensive action is necessary to achieve deci-sive results and to maintain freedom of action.It permits the commander to exercise initiativeand impose his will on the enemy, to set thepace and determine the course of battle, to ex-ploit enemy weaknesses and rapidly changingsituations, and to meet unexpected develop-ments. The defensive may be forced on thecommander, but it should be deliberatelyadopted only as a temporary expedient whileawaiting an opportunity for offensive action orfor the purpose of economizing forces on afront where a decision is not sought. Even onthe defensive, the commander seeks every op-portunity to seize the initiative and achieve de-cisive results by offensive action.

5-5. Principle of Mass

Superior combat power must be concentratedat the critical time and place for a decisivepurpose. Superiority results from the propercombination of the elements of combat power.Proper application of the principle of mass, inconjunction with the other principles of war,may permit numerically inferior forces toachieve decisive combat superiority.

$4. P~ificiple~f Economy of Force

Minimum essential means must be employed atpoints other than that of the main effort. Thisprinciple is the reciprocal of the principle ofmass. Economy of force does not imply hus-banding, but the measured allocation of availa-ble combat power to the primary task as wellas to supporting tasks, such as limited attacks,defense, cover and deception, or even retro-

Acm6918A 5-1

—

; $t~de action, to insure sufficient combat power/~ ~$the point of decision.

X+7, Principle of Maneuver‘Maneuver is an essential ingredient of combattp.ower. It contributes materially in exploiting~ucce$ims and in preserving freedom of actionand reduoing vulnerability. The objeot of ma-neuver is to dispose a force in a manner thatpl~ce$ the enemy at a relative disadvantageand thus achieves results that would otherwisebe more costly in men and materiel. Successfulmaneuver requires flexibility in organization,combat service support, and command and con-trol. It is the antithesis of permanence of loca-tion and implies avoidance of stereotyped pat-terns of operation.

5-8. Principle of Unity of Command

The decisive application of full combat power~equires unity of command, Unity of commandobtains urkity of effort by the coordinated ac-tion of all forces toward a c(nnmon goal, Whilecoordination may be attained by cooperation, itis best achieved by vesting a single commanderwith the requisite authority.

5-9. Principle of Security

Security is essential to the preservation ofcombat power. Security results from the meas-ures taken by a command to protect itselffrom espionage, observation, sabotage, annoy-ance, or surprise. It is a condition that results

.—

ffom the establishment and maintenance ofprotective measures that insure a state of in-violability from hostile acts or influences.Since risk is inherent in war, application ofthe principle of security does not imply unduecaution and the avoidance of c~lculated risk.Sewrity frequently is enhanced by bold seizureand retention of the initiative, which reducesthe enemy’s capability to interfere.

5-10. Principle of Swprise

Surprise can decisively shift the balance ofcombat power. By surprise, success out of pro-portion to the effort expended may be obtained,Surprise results from striking an enemy at atime and place and in a manner for which he isunprepared. It is not essential that the en~mybe taken unaware, but only that he becomesaware too late to react effectively, Factors con-tributing to surprise include speed, cover anddeception, application of unexpected combatpower, effective intelligence and counterintel-ligence (to include communications and elec-tronic security), and variations in taotics andmethods of operation.

5-11. Prirlcipla of Simplicity

Simplicity contributes to successful operations,Direct, simple plans and clear, concise ordersreduce misunderstanding and confusion. Otherfactors being equal, the simplest plan is pre.ferred,

S~ction Il. COMBAT POWER

o. The degree of combat power attained re-flects the commander’s imaginative planningand leadership and the wgankdkm, Winiwand discipline of hig forces M well m theirmorale, em~t b Oow, av&*ltillle firepawer}mobility, cc+mmtmications, cndition of equip-ment, and status of supply. The SUQCWW1wplication of combat power requires vigorousexeauticm.

H% Fire $qqjwt& The availability and prQper use of fire

support are important fact~m in the applioR-tion of aombat power. Supporting fires are

wwd to neutralize Or destroy thase targets that81% ktmst likely to hinder accompli~hment ofthe mission, They provid~ a commander with a$bwerftd means of rapidly influencing theCOurseof battle; of adding depth to the battle-d~ld by using cotmterfires and by attackingI&ile reserves and rear installations; and ofisolating the battlefield by restricting the en-emy’s movement in rear areas and by disrupt-ing his command, control, and transportationfacilities.

b, At each echelon of command, th~ plan foremployment of fire support must be integratedwith the plan for employment of the maneuverelements. These combined plains must insurethe application of appropriate corribat powerand the responsiveness of? fire Support to ther~q~irements of the maneuver elements.

c. The types of fires are as indicated in (1)through (4) below,

(1) Nuclear fires provide the commanderhi$ most powerful fire support means, They ~reavailable in a wide range of yields, A nualearairhurst produces blast, thermal radiation, andnuclear radiation and will probably produce in-Muxd residual radiation. Surface bursts pro-duce the same effects to a lesser extent and alsoproduce radioactive fallout, which createslarge areas of radiological contamination. Sur-face and upper air winds iq the vicinity of thetarget area, akmg with thb weapon yield, de-termine the extent and shape of the falloutpattern. Governing considerations in the use ofa surface burst are—

(4) Biological and chemical agenta can beused to achieve casualty effects when nuclearfires are not used or, like high-explosive fires,to complement nuclear fires, Chemical agentscan be used to deny areas to the enemy, limithis use of terrain, and contamhte suppliesand equipment. The use of biological and chem-ical agents can produce a wide range of seelected effects on personnel without destroyingmateriel and facilities. Casualties vary fromimmediate to delayed and from lethal to mildincapacitation. Biological and chemical agentscan be employed ~gainst personnel well pro-tected from other fires.

d. Supporting fires may bo delivered by anumber of means, which are discussed in (1)through (6) below.

(1) Guided missiles generally are res-tricted to the delivery of nuclear fires. Missilesare less vulnerable to weather and enemy coun~termeasures than manned aircraft, Guided mis-siles vary in range, accuracy, velocity, and VU1+nerabilit y to weather and enemy countermeas-ures.

(2) Free rockets are capable of deliveringhigh-explosive, chemical, and nuclear fires,These missiles are generally characterized byhigher mobility, less accuracy, and less rangethan guided missiles,

($) Cannons are capable of delivering alltypes of fires. They are characterized by fiexi+bility in employment, accuracy, the ability toshift fires quickly, a high rate of sustained fire,and the ability to mass large volumes of firefrom dispersed pwdtions under all conditionsof weather and terrain. Cannons have re-stricted mobility in difikmlt terrain, relativelyshort ranges, and comparatively heavy tcmnagerequirement for ammunition.

(4) Mortars have capabtiities similar tocannons. They diffe~ from oannan$ primarilyin their higher trajectory, shorter minimumand maximum ranges, and gmmtw volume offire per tube, ThQy are readily moved by airand can be ~mplacwl in positions inaccessibleto ground vehicles. They ~r~ useful in provid.ing kmge volumes of fire in support of combatforces.

(5} Manned ailwraft are capahlg of deliv-ering all types of fires, Their ability to attack

WI mu-s

f$@n any direction and to establish visual con- ground force commander, they may not be taot with the target provides great flexibility completely responsive to his requirements. in delivery. Aircraft are limited, however, by (6) Certain air defense artillery weaponsv~hm~ability to enemy countermeasures, ad- can be used in the surface-to-surface role, Di­verse weather conditions, and deli ve~y errors version from their primary role of air defenseinherent in some munitions. Since they are not is dependent on the air defense situation.always under the operational control of the

Section Ill. RElATE13 FAC?ORS

6d 4, General

Certain factors bear directly on combat power, When properly applied, and in consideration of the principles of war, these factors insure full development and decisive application of combat power.

6-15, Terrain

a, Terrain is an important factor in the ap­plication of combat power. Proper utilization of terrain—

(1) Provides observation while denying this opportunity to the enemy.

(2) Creates favorable opportunities for the employment of weapons to generate maxi­mum combat power.

(3) Provides cover and assists in conceal­ing the activities of the friendly force, thereby contributing to its security.

(4) Assists in the development of mass through economy of force,

(5) Provides the lines of communications essential to decisive maneuver and the support thereof,

(6) Can force the enemy to operate in un­favorable areas.

(7) Provides favorable avenues of ap. preach for oflensive operations,

(8) I%rrnits the commander to control the battle.

& The significance of terrain varies with the Guhelon ofwmmwnd and the nature of theop-QYWW The cmmnander evaluates the terrain in eomjunation with MB mission and seeks to ww the teut~in to MS advantage,

O,The cont?o] of high ground pe~?llit$ obser­v~tion over the surro~nding area and denies stwh obmwmtion to tha enemy. It pravides fam vot%ble+positions for Iine-of’+dght weapons. It is dsu significant in view of the line-of-sight

chm*acteristics of modern communications and electronic surveillance equipment. The occupa­tion of high ground usually places the friendly force in a favorable tnctical position in relation to the enemy. Control of high ground is not necessarily dependent on its occupation, Under suitable conditions, high ground may be neu­tralized or denied the enemy by fire or by the employment of chemical agents, radiological effects, and smoke.

d. Such major barriers as rivers, lakes, mountains, forests, and swamps exert a signifi­cant influence on military operations, Cross compartments interfere with the progress of offensive operations and generally favor the defense. Obstacles, including those artificially created, may form barriers and permit defense with minimum forces, while forcing the at­tacker to develop greater relative combat power. Conversely, favorable avenues of ap­proach facilitate offensive action and permit the application of combat power through ma­neuver.

e. The significance of terrain in counterguer­rilla operations differs from that in operations against regular forces. In the latter, the de­fender places greater importance on high ground, observation, and long-range fields of fire. The guerrilla, however, places greater im­portance on cover, concealment, and restric­tions of terrain and seeks to take advantage of these. Generally, the aounlierguerriHa force must orient operations on th~ guerrilla rather than on the seizure of particular terrain.

to Tactical uw of terrain in a nuclear envi. ronment may vhry from that in a nonnuclear environment where only conventional weapons are used. A detailed discussion of the influence of tw~ain on rmalear weapon efleots is found in FM 101-4WL

5+6, Government atid Il#ation

a. The attitude, behavior, structure, and dis-podtion of the government and population of atheater (area) of operations are importantconsiderations in the application of combatpower, Ideological, cultural, religious, and gov-ernmental patterns affect the planning and ex-ecution of military operations and have a di-rect bearing on military requirements and theUtilization of military resources.

& The presence or absence of hostile atti-tudes may affect the disposition of combat andcombat support forces and the requirement fortheir use in a rear area security role. Apathy,indifference, doubt, or suspicion, as opposed toa spirit of cooperation, adversely afFect theavailability and reliability of intelligence in-formation and the use of local labor and re-sources.

c. Population disposition and densities mayadversely affect the fire plan, particularly theuse of nuclear, biological, and chemical weap-ons. The impact of mass civilian casualties andrefugee columns may seriously impede the con-duct of military operations.

5-w. Climate and Weathera, Climate and weather have a significant ef-

fect on all types of military operations.Weather affects observation, trafficability, con-trol, performance of personnel, functioning ofmateriel, air support, and the range and effectsof weapons. Both climate and weather affectcombat service support requirements. As withterrain, $he commander seeks to take advan-tage of climate and weather in developing andapplying combat power in the pursuit of hisobjectives.

b, Information on current weather condi-tions a~d climatology in the operational area isp~cwided by the Air Weather Service to assistthe commander in operational planning. Small,llwbile weather s~ppmt lxwns are normally at-taahed to uniti of division size or larger toprovide this service.

54& Gowdituitkm and Cantml

a. The efktive application of combat powerrequires full coordination of effort throughoutall echelons. Coordination is a basic function of

command and is particularly significant in de-riving full advantage from fire and maneuver.Coordination of all fire support means insuresthe maximum benefit from available firepowerresources and enhances the effectiveness of ma-neuver.

b. Coordination of effort requires adequatemeans of control. The various control meansapplied by commanders to insure the maximumefforts of the command are directed toward therapid and economical accomplishment of themission. Control means available to command-ers include-

(1) Orders. Orders must be timely, simple,clear, and concise. Mission-type orders are usedto the greatest practicable extent and shouldprovide the commander’s concept or intent toinsure that subordinate commanders, acting ontheir own initiative, direct their efforts to at-tainment of the overall objective. Issuance ofwarning or fragmentary orders permits subor-dinate commanders time for planning andpreparation. Liaison officers are used, when re-quired, to insure that orders are understood orthat coordination is accomplished.

(2) Cornmwie@iOw. Signal communica-tions must be flexible and capable of support-ing maximum operational requirements, Provi-sion of communications support is based onsuch fundamental principles and considera-tions as reliance on alternate signal means andlocations, restriction of signal means to usesfor which intended, and maximum communica-tions security. Increasing use of equipmentgenerating electromagnetic radiation necessi-tates the establishment of priorities for specificneeds and a command decision in cases of fre-quency incompatibility.

(8) Command and uovtvol fudities.Com-mand posts form the nerve centers of all unitsand provide physical facilities for exercise ofcontroL Command posts must be mobile, capa-ble of continuous operation, and secure fromenemy action. The location of command postsmust facilitate communications with higher,adjacent, and subordinate headqwn%em.

c. Other measures employed by the com-mander in maintaining control a~e—

(1) Objeot@m Objectives are assigned toprovide unity of effort, to phase an operation,

AGOW8A 5-5

or to facilit~~.e a change in direotion, Objec-tives assigned should be easily identified. Theirde$firuction or capture mwt be possible withinthe time and space limitations imposed andmuatbe within the capability of the force towhich they are assigned.

(Z) PhaAg. At the higher echelons offield command-+orps and field army--it isnormal to phase operations based on the ex-pected duration, complexity, the friendly orenemy situation, terrain, or the scope of themission. A phase is a distinct period of an op-eration, at the conclusion of whiuh the natureand characteristics of the action change. Asanaid in planning and controlling an operation,Dhasing is used to simplify a lengthy action,Phasing is normally necessary when a com-mander is unable to visualize the operationthrough its completion or contemplates amajor organizational change. Phasing of anoperation may be described in terms of time(e.g., preparatory fire phase), distance (e.g.,attainment of an intermediate objective orphase line), terrain (e,g., crossing of an obsta-ole), or the occurrence of a specific event (e.g.,commitment of the reserve).

(3) Phase tines. Phase lines are establishedto control progress of units, to coordinate anoperation, and to assist in executing contin-gency plans, Phase lines are normally keyed toeasily recognizable terrain features.

(4) Checkpoints. Checkpoints are usefuIfor orientation and for making situation re-ports in the clear, Checkpoints may be used tosupplement phase lines or in lieu of phaselines.

(5) l?oumhzties, Boundaries are used to fixarea responsibility, delineate areas of opera-tions, and assist in the coordination and con-trol of flre$ and maneuver, Bound~ries extendfo~ward to the depth required to coordinatefi~e$~~d to d~pict the proposed plan of maneu-WW,Bmmda~ies are wctmd~cl rearward to the@@ necessary to insure mlfiicient maneuverrmrn ‘for the force and adequate space for OOm-b~$support ~nd combat service support units.

(6) Axtti of advwm An axis of advance 18a line of atlwmce amigned for purposes of con-trol; often it is a road or a group of roads or atkwi’&Med series of locations extending in the

direction of the enemy, A commander assignedan axis of advance may maneuver his troopsand supporting fires freely to either side of theassigned axis to bypass obstacles or to engageor bypass enemy uniti, providing such maneu-ver does not interfere with adjacent units andthe unit remains oriented on its objective. Thecommander of a force advancing on an axismust inform higher headquarters of any devia-tion from the axis.

(7) Direction of attack. A direction of at-tack indicates the specific route along whichthe commander issuing the order wants a sub-ordinate commander to center his main attack,The unit is restricted and required to attack RSindicated and is not normally allowed to by-pass the enemy. Because the direction of attackis a restrictive control measure, it should beused only when necessary. The direction of at-tack is used primarily in counterattacks or toinsure that a supporting attaok makes themaximum contribution to the main attack.

(8) Fire support coord%dion l{ne(FSCL). The FSC!L is a line established by theappropriate ground commander, normally thecorps commander, to insure coordination of firenot under his control, but which may affect cur-rent tactical operations, The FSCL should fol-low well-defined terrain features. The estab-lishment of the FSCL is normally coordinatedwith the appropriate tactical air commanderand other supporting elements.

(9) Fi~e axwdination he, The fire coordi-nation line is a line between two forues beyondwhich fire may not be delivered without coordi-nation with the affeoted forces,

(10) lVo-j’irehe. The no-fire line is a lineshort of which artillery units or ships do notfire except on request of the supported com-mander, but beyond which they mav fire at anytime without danger to friendly troops,

(11) Contact point. In land warfare, thecontact point is an easiiy identifiable point onthe terrain, where two or more units are re-quired to make wmtaut.

(12) Coovditwting point. The coordinatingpoint is a designated point at which, in alltypes of combat adjacent units or formationsmust make contact fa purposes of control andcoordination.

‘m AG(J 6818A

—.

5-1% Vvlfiwctbllity and Risk

u. Vulnerability is the susceptibility of aforce to damage by enemy action. The exten-sive qwm of destruotian resulting from nuclearweapon attack requires special attention to thereduction of vulnerability, Such measures asdo~eption, dispersion, cover, concealment,movement, speed of reaction, electronic coun-termeasures, air defense, cmmterbattery fires,intelligence, and control may assist in reducingvulnerability. However, measures to reducevulnerability to one form of attack may in-crease vulnerability to other forms of atta~k,They may also detract from the effectivenessof the force and endanger accomplishment ofthe mission. Dispersion, increases vulnerabilityto infiltration and defeat in

Section IV.

5-20. Genera!

detail. Mobility

.

FM 100-S

and the offensive are effective means of reduc-ing vulnerability,

& Risk is inherant in war and is involved inevery mission, Risk also is related to gain; nor-mally, greater gain involves greater risk, Riskis common to both aation and inaction, In a nu-clear war, the destructive power of nuclearweapons multiplies the magnitude of both riskand g~in, and the consequences of mistakes aregreater. Although the commander avoids un~necessary risks, accomplishment of the missionis his most important consideration. He care-fully evaluates each course of action in termsof relative vulnerability and risk, If the risksare unacceptable, he must revise the plan. Thecommander must recognize risks to be assumedby subordinate commanders in accomplishingtheir missions,

SUBSIDIARY AND $UPPORT\N~ OPERATIONS

Certain subsidiary and supporting operationsare significant in relation to all types of miJi-tary operations. Subsidiary operations are de-signed to support the basic operation and tocontribute to the development and applicationof combat power.

5-211, Civil J’kffairs OperatiOma. General. The military commander employs

civil affairs (CA) operations to obtain essen-tial civilian cooperation and support or to re-duce civilian interference with his assignedmission. CA operations involve the relation-ship between the military forces and the civilauthorities and population of the country orarea in which these forces are employed, CAo~orations may involve the performance bymilitary forces of some or all of the functionsnoYxxMllYperformed by oivil government.

b. 0143X@i~itit38 u?td Lindtationa ~CA opera-tkms are employed h insure maximum utiliza-tion, within limiti set by natiOnal or theaterp.alioy, intemmtiomd agrwmmt and the laws ofland wtirfare, of load resotmxw, inoluding ma-te~i~l, facilitkw, and labor. Thay enhance rear$w~a prote~tkm wM minimum diversion ofCOIMMforces by promotingeffective relation-

ships with the Ioml authorities and people toreduce subversion, espionage, sabotage, andguerrilla activity, These hostile activities posea major threat or problem to a modern armywhen they are supported, actively or passively,by a significant fraction of the local popula-tion. CA operations alone cannot accomplishall these objectives, but are dependent on suc-cessf u] accomplishment of psychological opera-tions (PSYOP), intelligence, and counterln-telligence activities, other rear area protectionmeasures, and the attitude and conduct of allUS. and allied military personnel toward thecivilian populace.

o. Support of th IWekt ATWW.CA operationsare designed to utilize resources available fromcivilian communities and to reduce the prob-lems oaused by refugee movements, civilianmass ca~ualties, and the requir~menti of inter-natkma] law for the pr~viskm Qf tn!nimt!m MI-quirements of civili~n supply and the protec-tkm and treatment of noncombatants,

d: Suppcwt of uwmvmtioNd Wwf(w? Ope?’”dim. During the later stages of! UW opiwa-tions, CA persomml maybe introduwd into un-conventional warfare operational areas to as=sist Special Forces personnel in the conduct ofcivil-military relatiwmhlps, As friendly forcesassume control over these operational areas$

fi-7

—

m 100-5

CA personnel assist in the procurement oflocal supplies and facilities, the recruitment ofpersonnel, the demobilization and rehabilitmtion of former guerrillas, and the preparationof the local population for self-government.CA personnel assist ihtdlligence agencies in thegathering of information.

e. Support of Cold Wav and Stabilit~ @era-tions. CA activities in support of cold war andstability operations are discussed in chapters12 and 13, respectively.

f. l?eference$. For additional details on CAoperations, see FM 41-5 and FM 41-10.

6-22. P5YOPu. General. The military commander con-

ducts PS YOP as a coordinated element of stra-tegy to influence the attitude and behavior ofthe people in ways that will help accomplishhis mission. The lines of persuasion he employsmust be carefully selected to contribute to themilitary objective and must be consistent,timely, and c~*edible. Accordingly, he coordi-nates these lines with other agencies of gov-ernment and with related activities of the com-mand, including cover and deception, counter-intelligence, communications security, censor-ship, command information, character guid-ance, public information, community relations,and CA. The effects of PSYOP are cumulative.PSYOP are planned and coordinated to sup-port all operations. For detailed discussion ofPSYOP, see FM 33-1 and FM S%5.

h. Propaganda and Psy~holo@cal Measures.PSYOP include the planned and directed use ofpropaganda and psychological measures to in-fluence people so that they will behave in thedesired manner. Propaganda is any form ofoommtmioation designed to influence the opin-ions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of anygroup, in order to benefit the sponsor either di-rectlyor hMreotly. It is prepared and dissemi-nated by IWYOP units, assisted by other ele-ments of the command as directed. Psychologi-cal measures are military, politiwd, ecmomic,and sooial actions, that are conducted primar-ily for their psychological impaat to assist inaccomplishing the uommand mission.

0. C%q7abttttiea and MWW07a8. PSYOPtweamduoted to reduce the morale and combat ef-

ficiency ofdence and

enemy troops and to promote dissi-defection, They may be used also to

assist in stabilizing the civil population to pre~elude interference with tactical operations.They support the cover and deception plan.They are employed to abet and coordinate re-sistance against a hostile regime, to influenceneutrals, to sustain the morale of allies, and tocounter enemy subversion and propaganda+They cannot by their own force accomplishmilitary objectives; they cm’ion]y support ac-complishment of objectives. Their employmentis limited by security requirements, policy re-strictions, inadequacies of communicationsmedia, language barriers, prejudices of the au-dience, and enemy countermeasures, Many ofthese limitations are overcome by farsightedmeasures based on effective specialized intelli-gence and evaluation.

d. Support of the Field Army. PSYOP insupport of the field army are designed primar+ily to reduce the combat effectiveness of enemyforces and must be immediately responsive tothe tactical situation, Operations are mobileand decentralized and provide direct support totactical units. Psychological opportunities, cle-termined through the continuous evaluation ofintelligence are quickly exploited, Close cooper-ation and coordination are required betweenoperations, intelligence, and PSYOP staffofticers to insure maximum effectiveness,

e. Support of UMonventionul Warfare Oper-ations. PSYOP support all phases of unconven-tional warfare, Prior to the infiltration of Spe-cial Forces teams, PSYOP originate outsidethe planned operational area and are employedto create and develop resistance. Following theinfiltration of Special Forces teama, these oper.ations are supplemented by the P$YOP ccm-ducted by guerrilla forces. Specially trainedpropaganda teams may be infiltrated to assistoperations of resistance elements, During ex-ploitation and consolidation, l?SYOP may as-sist CA efforts to insure an orderly transition,culminating in the demobilization of guerrillaforces and the establishment of a stable gov-ernment,

f. l%- of CA @MTaMnuI.CA operationsare supported by PSYOP to promote maximum

A(W) M18A

@6pert&ionfrom the civil populace. In areas sub.jeot to enemy subversion, PSYOP in support of afriendly govemnent are one of the first eflectivezn~ansthat the military commander has for main-t@ning stability. During hostilities, PSYOP helpto prevent espionage, sabotage, and enemy uncon-ventional warfare operations.

~g. %pport of Cold Wav Operatiom, In coldw~~, ~SYOJ? assist in achieving the force objec-tive and are concluded to win the support of the~~pulation. Unobtrusive demonstration of mili-tary power, efficiency, good will, and sincere inter-est in mutual security are some of the ~ctivitieswhich may be conducted in support of cold waroperations. PSYOP are undertaken in alose coor-dination with the civilian agencies of governmentand public information media. Indigenous mili-tary forces are trained and assisted in operationsdesigned to counter enemy subversion and gainpublic support, Details on PSYOP support of coldwar operations are contained in chapter 12.

h, Suppoti of Stabilitg Operations. PSYOP sup-port of stability operations is discussed in chapter13*

~5-Q3. Electronic Warfare Operations

Electronic warfare (EW) is that division of themilitary use of electronics involving actions takento prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use ofradiated electromagnetic energy and actions takento insure effective friendly use of radiated electro-magnetic energy. EW also involves actions takento search for, intercept, locate, record, and aria.lyze enemy radiated electromagnetic energy forthe purpose of exploiting such radiations in sup.port of military operations. This EW informationis used for threat detection, warning, avoidance,target acquisition, and homing. EW is an integralpart of operations, It can reduce the enemy com-mander’s control by impairing or denying hismeans of communications and use of electronicemitters at a critioal time, or it can mislead himby$ransmitting deceptive data. Tactical command-ers conduct EW in conjunction with fire and ma-neuver to accomplish their rnisdcms. Commandersof unified and specified commands are responsiblefor planning and conducting EW operations insupport of objectives, missions, and tasks ars-signed by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Authorityto employ electronic countermeasures (ECM) maybe delegated to subordinate commanders of uni-tkd and speoitled oommands or joint task forces.Cmmnandersat all echelonshave authority to em-phy dwtronio support measures (RSM) and elec.

tionio counter-countermeasures (ECCM). Arm~tactical commanders exercise operational controlover all assigned and attached EW resources,

5-24. Denial Operations and Barriers

a, Generat, A denial operation is designed toprevent or hinder the enemy’s use of or benefilfrom an area, personnel, facilities, or materiel,Denial operations are basically strategic irconcept, A barrier is a coordinated series of ob=stacles designed or employed to canalize, direct,restrict delay, or stop the movement of an oppos~ing force and to impose additional losses in per.sonnel, time, and equipment on the opposingforce. Barriers are basically tactical in concept,Both denial operations and barriers have as theircommon objective reduction of the rate of advanceand diminution of the combat power exerted bythe enemy against friendly forces.

b. DeniaJ Operations. Denial operations are de.signed to prevent or hinder enemy occupation of,or benefit from, areas or objects having strategicvalue, The theater commander establishes policiesgoverning denial operations in the theater anddelegates planning and execution to the Servicecomponent commanders and to subordinate jointforce commanders. The conduct of denial opera~tions in the combat zone is based on theater denialpolicies and plans, Denial operations may vary Inscope from those of a ‘{scorchedearth” policy tothose that place a temporary limitation on enemyuse of an area or facility. Denial targets of tacti-cal significance usually are assigned to the tacticalcommanders (divisions) for preparation and exe-cution and include such targets as major bridges,tunnels, and dams. Other types of denial targets,such as industrial plants, airfields, and ports, maybe assigned to special engineer demo~ition teamsor to other special units operating under the con-trol of field army or higher headquarters, Generaland special staff responsibilities for denial opera-tions are similar to those for the employment ofbarriers, wherein the G$ has primary generalstafl responsibility and the engineer special staffresponsi~ility. In retrograde operations, engineerunits support tactical units by planning, prepar-ing, and executing denial targets-usually demoli-tion—with conventional explosives or atomic de-molition munitions. AII troops participate in cer-tain aspects of denial operations by destroying orremoving organic equipment and supplies to pre-vent capture.

o. Barrier8.

(1) The basio principle underlying the em-

$M$ 8NQ4c S-9

@oYtIIentof bar~iet~ in tactical ope.tiationsis that@ $tigmefiting the combat effeativefies$of availwblo fdrces to the maximum extent. The employ-rn~nt of barriers is not r~tricted to any one typeof tadical operation fior to any one type of barrier.Btifriers may incorpmwte the use of chemical@gents when authorized. Although barriers aretk@Nwiw by nature and have their greatest appli-@@ionin defensive and retrograde operations~thd~ t~fi b~ gainftilly employed iti the offensive,~ki]l$ol knitting of nutural and artificial obstaclesinto bar~iers ohanges the military characteristicsof the terrain~ increases th~ commander’s chancesof gaitiing relative superiority in mobility,achieve$, security and economy of force~and per-mits more effective massing of combat power forQffefisiveaction. Well~designed md well-locatedharriers c~n’ipelthe enemy either to concentrate‘his forces to break the barriers--thus presentinga ]~~t$tive target to friendly nucIear and nonnu-W$8rfires~or to bypii~sthe Mtrriek’s.

~(z) on the battlefield, the commanderwillw%lomhave enough time, laborYmaterials, trans-~o~.tatit)fi,or equipment to construct all the obsta-cles he dmi~es. This is particularly true in thed~fehs~ because of the requirements gmerated bycmstruction of fieldfortifkations, organization ofth~ ground, combat service support 0wr~tiOh8,atid rdated tasks, As an example, to assist inmeeting these requirements, the mmmander$Mu[d consider use of wwlally delivered mines.

~(3) An overall p~im!ity must be accordedthe barriers, and individual obstacles must begiven an order of priority for construction, Prior-ities are gefierally deti.rrnined on the basis of aparticular obstacle% contribution to accomplish-ment of the unit% mission, Generally, these priori-ties are from front to rear, with initiai efforts~imeotedtoward the pkwing of obetackmto protecta w!itical flank, block likely enemy avenues of ap-proaah, or deny across to certain key terrain. All

obstacles must be under friendly observation, cov-ered by fire and integrated into the unit% firesupport plan to be fully effective,

*(4) In the forward porti(ms of the combatzone, personnel and materiel resources are nor-mally committed almost exclusively to the tasks ofcombat and combat support. An ideal barrier istherefore fare, except where natural obstacles arecompletely effective in themselves or require littleimprovement or augmentation with artificial ob-stacles. Extensive barriers are necessary in therear portion of the combat zone to block deepenemy penetrations or envelopments, to assist informing massed ~nemy targets, and to providespace for the timely employment of counterattackforces.

A(6) In planning the employment of bar-riers, sufficient fire-protected? obstacle-free a~ea$must be provided to insure that essential move-mentsof friendly forces inthe battle area, execu~tion of counterattacks, and combat service SUP*port activitl~ are not unduly impeded.

d. References. Additional details on denial oper-ations and barriers are contained in FM 31-10.

*s-2& Ta~ticcd Cc)vertmd Deception

a, Tactical cover and deception contribute tosecurity and surprise and enhance the likelihoodof operational success by misleading the enemyand causing him to react in a manner advanta-geous to the friendly force. T~ctical cover anddeception may be used to compensate for ~ela-tively inferior combat power and to permit eco-nomical use of men, materiel, and time. The com-mander employs tactical cover and deception todisguise orconcetd histrue dispositons, capabili-ties, and intentions, and to further his passive airdefense effectiveness.

a. Tactical cover and deception plans are an

AW 8180A

FM 1004

ifitigral part of all operational planning. In de-veloping these plans, the commander must vi-sualize and understand the enemy viewpoint,and he must take into consideration the impacton his own operations should the deceptionfail, The plans adopted must be such that, ifufisuocessful, they will not cause the operationto fail. Coordination of tqctical cover and de-ception plans with higher, adjacent, and lowerUtdt$l is essential to insure against compromiseof other operational or deception pltms,

c, All units undertake. rn~asures to concealtheir positions and operations from enemy vis-ual, photographic, sonic, and electronic detec-tion. Techiiical assistance in the planning andexecuthm of tactid cover and deception maybe provided by specially trainedu~its qvailable in the field army.

d, For detailed discussion ofand deception, including levelssee FM 81440.

6-26, Intwdic!ion

u. The purpose of interdiction

and equipped

tactical coverof authority,

is to deny orhinder enemy use of areas or routes. Successfulinterdiction restricts enemy movement and in-terferes with the command and control of hisforces. It binders or prevents enemy movementinto, out of, or within the commander’s area ofinterest. It contributes to security by prevent-ing sudden and unfavorable changes in relativecombat power. .

b. Interdiction is accomplished by the use offires, combat troops, guerrilla forces, and denial operations and barriers, Ch@mioalagentsand high-yield nuclear weapons provide anarea-interdiction capability against large,poorly defined targeta,

O,A successful interdiction MPort is charac-terized by tlmrough and imaginative planning,~hnely and acwwati intelligence, and coordi=hated aceuutim Conthuous surveillance of the8MMof interdiMm k necessary to assess the~flmthmness of the d!kmt ahd to develop newtargets. The enemy may be expected to adoptmwumx%sd~signwl to thwart the i~tirdiotioneffwk The avail@li$y M resouroes and the ca=pabflity of weapon a$~tems will rwely permitcomplete interdiction. The appiicatkm of re-sources tQ inhrdiotkm must be weighed

against the overall requirements of the mis-sion,

d. Interdiction plans must be designed to in-sure timely contribution to accomplishment ofthe mission and must concentrate on targetsthat have a significant effect on the combatpower of the enemy forces directly opposingthe command concerned. Each successivelyhigher echelon focuses its interdiction effort ata greater range. Higher echelons integrate andexpand the interdiction effect of subordinateelemmts.

5-27. Battlefield Illuminaticm

Battlefield illumination is the lighting by arti-ficial means of the zone of action of groundcombat and combat support troops, The princi-pal requirement for battlefield illumination isto overcome the limitations imposed onfriendly forces by the absence of light. The fol-lowing principles apply:

a. The use of battlefield illumination is acommand responsibility.

b. Battlefield illumination in support offriendly forces should be provided whereverand whenever needed, in the intensity of illu-mination required, and throughout the periodof time required,

c. I!kttle!leld illumination should, whereverpossible, be provided by an independent sourceof illumination to allow unik full use of theirweapona,

d. Illumination should be provided by thehighest level practicable to conserve the illumi-nants available to lower echelons,

e. Each ground unit engaged in combat thathas a specific need for illumination should haveorganic means sutilcient to meet its normal il-lumination requirement until this mission canbe assumed by a higher echelon.

f. Alternative means of illumination shwWibe prmzided, if av~ilable.

g. All battlefield illumination must be coordi-nated to prevent disclosure to the enemy of theopwations ~f attjaoent friendly units, Coordi-nation will normally be accomplished by thecommanders having operational control of theillumination means and may necessitate re-strictions being placed cm the units’ organiomeans.

—.—

niquea as part of deception plans may be prof-itable on occasion.

j. 13attlefield illti~ination should be plmmedand coordinated with the use of infrared equip+ment in such a way that tio damage will beaaused to the infrared ~qtiipmant by exposureto direct, intens~ white light; that it will be re~duced to the minimum when inf~m%d op6ra-tion$ are being coruluoted; and that rapidchanges from infrared to battlefield illumina-tion, or vice versa, can be perfo~med,

k. For additional details on battlefield lllu-min~tion, see Flkl 20-80.

AGO8918A