October is the Cruelest Month: The Curse of the Bambino, The …beatleyweb.simmons.edu/scholar/files/original/329a5fa... · 2019. 2. 8. · namely the, Curse of the Bambino.” This

October is the Cruelest Month: The Curse of the Bambino, The Boston Red Sox, and the

Collective Memory of Failure

By

Dylan Drolette December 14, 2017

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Arts in History

Dual-Degree Program in History and Archives Management Simmons College

Boston, Massachusetts

The author grants Simmons college permission to include this thesis in its Library and to make it available to the academic community for scholarly purposes.

Submitted by

___________________________

______________________ _______________________ Prof. Stephen Ortega Prof. Stephen Berry

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Acknowledgements

I could not written this thesis without the help of several people. They kept me sane and

they kept me on task through some troubling times.To Peter, thank you for listening to my rants

on baseball history and for always being caring confidant. To Michael, thank you for tolerating

me sending you weird newspaper articles about obscure baseball players at odd hours...and also

for listening to my rants on baseball history. To the Chocobros, thank you for providing me with

the just the right amount of distractions.

To Professor Ortega, thank you for being willing to work with me and for helping devise

a much needed structure for my arguments.To my sister, thank you for always being there and

for always being willing to send me cute animal pictures. To my parents, thank you for always

sticking by me and my weird decisions. Above all else, I would not have accomplished this

without the curiosity which you inspired in me from a young age. You will always have a place

in my heart

Ab Imo Pectore,

Dylan

Drolette 2

For reasons that are not always apparent, narratives, storylines, and anecdotes often

triumph over factual accounts of historical events. The desire to understand the events of the

world is so powerful that society can create a version of history which fits preconceived notions

and provides satisfying explanations. The way in which collective memory develops can have a

significant impact on how an event or series of events is understood by later generations.

Unfortunately, this development also often obscures how events were understood in their own

time. The process of narrativizing historical events smooths out rough patches, highlights issues

that were of less importance at the time of the event, and produces a neat timeline which often

does not necessarily correspond to how events actually unfolded.

The effect of this process is particularly prominent when it comes to events of cultural

relevance. Over the course of the last century, professional sports have become an important

cultural touchstone for American society. While the ubiquitous nature of modern reporting has

certainly heightened the profile sports and their athletes in other cultural arenas, professional

sports in themselves are a fruitful area for collective memory. Generally tied to individual

franchises or players, the collective memories of certain events can very easily bleed into the

greater collective memory of society at large.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and evaluate the formation of the franchise

wide collective memory of the Boston Red Sox professional baseball team produced after 1986;

namely the, Curse of the Bambino.” This will be done through an examination of the Boston

media responses to the failures of the team in two earlier periods: 1920-1921 and 1946-1949. As

will be discussed below, these periods were central to the argument which created the framework

for the, “Curse of the Bambino.”

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Between 1986 and 2004, the dominant framework for the collective memory of the

franchise was the, “Curse of the Bambino”. Pioneered by various sports writers in the late 1980’s

and popularized by Dan Shaughnessy’s The Curse of the Bambino first published in 1990, the

curse ideology presents a supernatural explanation for the team's failures in the years between

1918 and 2004. The curse presents a timeline which starts with sale of Babe Ruth’s contract to

the New York Yankees in late 1919 and initially concluded with the Red Sox’ traumatic loss in

the 1986 World Series. The timeline would eventually include the cathartic end of the Red Sox

ending the, “curse,” by winning the 2004 World Series.

The mechanism of the “Curse of the Bambino” is presentist interpretation that

de-emphasizes the immediate response in favor of a larger narrative. It a narrative which built

upon those which came before, but the end product obscured original storylines and magnified

certain elements for the purpose of creating a defined framework. The curse’s ideology

attempted to overwrite the highly periodized nature of Red Sox history and connect those periods

in ways which previously had not existed.

An examination of the Boston media response to the failures of the Red Sox in the

periods of 1920-1921 and 1946-1949 will demonstrate the self contained nature of the collective

memories of the Red Sox prior to the introduction of the, “Curse of the Bambino,” in the late

1980s. These two periods are cited by Shaughnessy and others as crucial to the development of

the curse ideology. In actuality, the collective memory in each period was concerned with the

historical realities of the time. There was no overarching narrative thread that connected the

coverage of the team across these periods. In this context, it becomes clear that the, “Curse of the

Bambino,” was a collective memory device produced by the highly mediated environment of the

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late twentieth century which was retroactively applied to previous periods in order to construct a

franchise wide collective memory.

Historiography

Collective Memory

Collective memory is a widely discussed topic in the fields of historiography and

sociology. On the broadest level, collective memory can be defined as the way in which a society

chooses to remember a given historical event (or set of events, era, etc.). The accuracy of the

collective memory can vary wildly depending the event due to a number of factors including (but

not limited to) media coverage at the time, the amount of trauma involved in the event, or later

re-interpretation by historians or political groups. Collective memories are not limited by scale of

event, subject, or even by group size. An example of a relatively innocuous collective memory

can be seen in the wide scale misremembering of the revealing of Darth Vader as Luke’s father

in Star Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back. Often quoted as, “Luke, I am your father,” the

actual line is, “No, I am your father.”

One of the most important works on the topic was written by author Maurice Halbwachs.

First published five years after his death, On Collective Memory (1950) explores the inherently

social nature of memory. Halbwachs most prominent point in On Collective Memory is that

memory and recollection are defined primarily by their social context. Interactions with other

individuals and with society at large provide the framework for how individuals remember the

past. Rejecting the idea that individuals create memories in isolation to the people and

environments around them , Halbwachs instead argues that the source of collective memories is

in fact society. Writing about the process of recalling memories, Halbwachs writes:

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There is no point in seeking where they [memories] are preserved in my brain or in some nook of my mind to which I alone have access: For they are recalled to me externally, and the groups of which I am a part of at any time give me the means to reconstruct them, upon condition, to be sure, that I turn toward them and adopt, at least at the moment, their way of thinking [...] It is in this sense that there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection. 1

By Halbwachs logic, the process of recalling an individual memory is given meaning through the

interaction with others . Halbwachs goes on to argue that these frameworks are both external to

passage of time and captivated by it. The frameworks themselves are eternal, but the way in

which groups and individuals interact with those frameworks acts to create different

reconstructions of the past. These reconstructions are then adapted by various groups to suit 2

their needs, often to promote a particular image of the past.

An example of this type of type of reconstruction is explored by Barry Schwartz, Yael

Zerubavel, Bernice Barnett, and George Steiner in a 1986 article entitled, “The Recovery of

Masada: A Study in Collective Memory.” Schwartz argues that the siege and ultimate capture of

the Jewish fortress of Masada by Roman forces in 73 A.D was not considered to be a significant

historical event within the Jewish community until the late 1920’s. With the rise of Zionism and

the beginnings of extensive Jewish settlement within Palestine, Masada acquired a new cultural

currency which it had previously lacked. 3

The actual siege of Masada was a minor historical event which ended with the Jewish

garrison fulfilling a suicide pact in order to deny the Romans the prize of their captivity.

1 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis A Coser (Chicago, University of Chicago press, 1992), 38. 2 Ibid, 182. 3 Barry Schwartz, Yael Zerubavel, Bernice M. Barnett, and George Steiner, “The Recovery of Masada,” The Sociological Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1986): 151

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Extensively citing the 1927 poem Masada: A Historical Epic by Isaac Lamdan, Schwartz argues

that the mixed message of resolve and despair resonated with the Jewish settlers of the time:

"Madada's" negative tone moved Lamdan's contemporaries because the conditions of Palestine during the 1920s. The reality of the articulated (I) the settler's sense of being in a situation of "no choice"; that the Zionist cause was a last stand against fate; (3) their sense main body of the Jewish people; (4) their despair and the essential commitment to one another and to their new homeland; and (5) the that the second Masada would fall in the same manner as did Thus the effect of the poem was not only to make the more hopeful, or to bolster the collective ego-its effect was also to meaningful. 4

The use of Masada as a literary device for a political purpose is not surprising in itself, but the

way in which Lamdan uses the event to evoke a complicated set of emotions and beliefs sheds

light on the complicated nature of collective memory.

The closest comparison to Masada in American history would be the siege and capture of

the Alamo during the Texan revolt against Mexican rule in 1836. After it’s capture, the Alamo

became a militant rallying point and spawned the famous slogan, “Remember the Alamo!”.

Schwartz points out how that Masada had come to to occupy a similar militant role in Israeli

society by the time of the publication of their article in 1986, but at the time of Lamdan’s poem

in 1927 the militancy of the event was not meant to be the focus of the story. This hits upon the 5

ex-temporal nature of societal frameworks for memory which Halbwachs discussed. The

historical details of Masada did not change between 1927 and 1986.. Both societies were

working with the same basic materials, yet created wildly different collective memories around

the event. As time passed Lamdan’s poem itself became a tool in the collective memory with

Israeli nationalist selectively citing the poem, especially the provocative line, “Never again shall

4 Ibid, 159. 5 Ibid, 151.

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Masada fall!” Schwartz addresses why such transformations might occur in the conclusions of 6

their article:

Just so, collective memory is drawn not to that which is useful but to that which is appropriate. When a society’s expectations are high, when its conceptions of a bright future seem justified, then glorious origins, past achievements, and heroic recoveries from misfortune become plausible objects of collective identification. But when the future is uncertain, when the very survival of society is doubtful or, at best, problematic, a different kind of past is appropriated, one that matches and articulates the insecurity as well as the hopes of the present, one that provides revelation as well as inspiration. 7

The malleable nature of collective memory allows societies to adapt and readapt memories to

suit new and evolving situations.

The memories of both Masada and particularly the Alamo were eventually reduced to

slogans by later societies. In the aftermath of the siege, the phrase ,”Remember the Alamo!,’ was

used a rally cry to evoke public support (in both Texas and abroad) for the Texan cause. The

Mexican army under Santa Anna had executed the Texan survivors of the siege, which may or

may not have included former American congressman Davy Crockett. In the long term, the

Alamo has been adopted as a sign of American resilience against all odds, of the American’s

willingness to fight to the last man for something they believe in. Despite the fact that the

American government was not technically involved in the Texan revolution, the most notable

event of the conflict has come to have wide cultural currency within the United States. While this

type of adaptation of collective memory can be used of for grand political purposes, the more

interesting - and usually less obvious- transformations occur when the subject is part of a cultural

institution.

6 Ibid, 159 7 Ibid, 160-161.

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Sports and Collective Memory

Sports, particularly in the United States, have come to occupy a central role in domestic

life. Beyond watching professional or semi-professional sports for entertainment, the majority of

Americans are exposed to organized sports as young individuals. A 1991 study by Joseph F.

Healey entitled, “An Exploration of the Relationships Between Memory and Sport,” addresses

the role of sports in American society and how sports affects the development of a larger

collective memory.

Working from the assertion that, “Memory provides a record of social experiences that

anchor the individual in the framework of group roles and relationships with others,” Healey set

out to test the impact of sports in the development of a larger collective memory within

American society. Healey posed a simple question to a group of 123 individuals who were aged 8

six and above: What was their single clearest memory of sport. From this question, Healey 9

developed four ex post facto hypotheses about what people would recall when asked the study’s

question.

1. Emotionally significant groups and relationships, particularly teams and teammates. Frequent reference to emotionally significant groups, such as family or childhood friends, is also expected.

2. Turning points and discontinuities in their personal lives, especially movements between significant groups or from role to role.

3. Sports memories will be self-revealing in the sense that they will be part of the raw material from which identity is constructed and maintained.

4. The nature of memory of sport will be associated with the respondent’s present orientation toward the institution of the sport 10

8 Joseph F. Healey, “An Exploration of the Relationships Between Memory and Sport,” Sociology of Sport Journal 8, (1991): 214. 9 Ibid, 218. The full table of respondee ages and the percent of the study they made up can be found on this page. 10 Ibid, 215-216

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The fourth hypothesis is the most closely related to collective memory and is worthy of more

examination. Healey states:

Memory does not consist of recollections that are forever fixed and unchanging. Our memories are plastic and assume varying shapes as required by our needs in the present. For example, individuals who become alienated from sport by present-day scandals may reassess and revise memories of their experiences accordingly. The ways in which people think about and remember their personal experiences in sport will reflect their current attachments to the institution of sport. 11

The results of the events described by the interviewees did not change, but it is very possible that

their interpretations of those events did shift because of the evolving societal context. Healey

readily admits that his project could not test this hypothesis and that ideas such as collective

memory and identity are hard to operationalize for formal study, but the the results of his study

do seem to bear out, at least on part, this fourth hypothesis.

Healey’s study contains 4 tables, of which table 4 attempts to compare the respondents

level of interest in sports to the themes revealed by their stories. Healey used the simple metric of

asking the respondents to identify their level of interest in sports as either high, moderate, or low.

Table 4 shows the level of respondents who identified themselves as highly interested within

each theme. The theme with the highest percentage was Heroic efforts with 58.8% and the

themes with the two percentages were Failure with 26.9% and Pain with 20.8%. Again, this is

not necessarily a surprising result. What is surprising is the raw numbers. Between Failure and

Pain there were 50 total responses, but only 11 of those respondents remained highly interested

in sports. This seems to agree with the idea set out with the fourth hypothesis that memories were

affected by their current orientation toward the sport. Again acknowledging the difficulty of

operationalizing a concept collective memory, it seems that negative stimuli do have a

11 Ibid, 216.

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non-insignificant impact on how sectors of society interact with and remember certain cultural

institutions such as sports.

Collective Memory and Nostalgia

A closely associated topic to collective memory in sports is collective nostalgia.

Nostalgia can be roughly defined as a feeling of emotional attachment to the past; usually this

attachment is positive in nature. Eldon E. Snyder investigated the role of nostalgia on the

development of the collective memories in American sports in a 1991 article entitled “Sociology

of Nostalgia: Sports Halls of Fame and Museums in America.” Arguing that the primary purpose

of Halls of Fame is to glorify the heritage of their respective sports, Snyder identifies a conflict

that many of these institutions face. Caught between the typical educational missions of most 12

museums and the pressures of presenting the history of their games in certain ways, particularly

when corporate sponsors are involved, different sports halls of fame are active shapers of

collective memory in ways that are not always obvious.

When a patron comes to a hall of fame, they often have very set pre-conceived notions of

what the history of the history of their favorite sport should be like. They expect the exhibits to

include (and exclude) certain players and moments and for the timeline of history to be neatly

arranged with a clear beginning and end. While this is to an extent true of every museum, the

nostalgia tied in with sports is more likely to play a significant role in the way in which a patron

interacts with a hall of fame. Snyder argues that halls of fame produce a context for nostalgia for

their respective sports. In this light, the visitor experience at a hall of fame has a strong 13

possibility to create a nostalgic feeling or, conversely, to reinforce a visitor's nostalgic view of

12 Eldon E. Snyder, “Sociology of Nostalgia: Sports Halls of Fame and Museum in America,” Sociology of Sport Journal, 1991, no.8 (1991): 229 13 Ibid, 229

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the game's past if they are presented with a contrary narrative. Alternatively, this context can be

considered a societal framework in which the collective memory of these sports is created and

shaped.

Snyder also touches upon a closely related topic that provides insight into the

development of the collective memory of Red Sox failures. Citing the work of Fred Davis,

Snyder argues that while tragic or traumatic events do not in themselves produce nostalgia in the

same way as a positive memory might, they do have the capacity to encourage the development

of a nostalgic perspective. A society may choose to forget the pain and suffering associated 14

with something like a natural disaster, but the response to that disaster may be remembered as a

positive moment. Whether it be an outpouring of donations or the appearance of political

motivations being set aside in the name of unity, or some other sort of pan-societal response, the

idea of triumphing over a colossal challenge could hold wide appeal. In the context of sports, this

could provide insight into why certain fan bases have seemed to almost thrive on failure. In

baseball alone, the fans of the Brooklyn Dodgers, the Boston Red Sox, and the Chicago Cubs all

formed almost insular societies which drew their identities from the lack of on field success by

their favorite team.

The eventual World Series victories of these teams in (respectively) 1955, 2004, and

2016 have come to be definite markers on the timeline of professional baseball in the United

States. They are suppose to represent not only on field success after abnormally long stretches of

failure, but also the elation of the fans of those franchises. The collective memory of baseball has

absorbed this elation and as a result has the suffering of those fans was then granted an official

14 Ibid, 231

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status and folded into the history of the game itself. While it would be impossible to argue that

any particular World Series might mean more than any other to an individual fan, the fact

remains that certain championships have come to occupy positions of higher importance in the

collective memory of baseball. The role of institutions like the Baseball Hall of Fame have

certainly played a part in this process, but it is more helpful to consider the role of cultural

valorization.

Cultural Valorization

The organization responsible for organizing the annual induction vote for the Baseball

Hall of Fame is the Baseball Writers Association of America (BBWAA). The requirements for

appearing on the ballot are relatively light: a player must have played for at least ten seasons ,

must be retired for at least five seasons, and the player must not be on the MLB’s ineligible list.

Voters are asked to consider the accomplishments of players as well as the moral character of the

player. To be inducted, a player must receive 75% of the writers’ votes. If a player is not

inducted after ten years on the ballot, they are no longer considered for induction by the

BBWAA. Additionally, players may be inducted by special committees convened to examine

particular eras of the game and induct players that they deem to have been overlooked by the

voters.

It has become clear over time that there is no definite statistical standards that guarantee

that player will or won’t be inducted into the Baseball Hall of Fame. Human factors and the

desire to create specific narratives combined with inconsistent voting practices have drastically

impacted how the collective memory of professional baseball has developed.

Baseballreference.com, one of the authoritative sources for baseball statistics, has attempted to

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adjust for these inconsistencies when trying to declare which players may be hall of famers. On

each player’s page on the website there is a section called “Hall of Fame Statistics”. Two of the

metrics in this section are called, “Hall of Fame Monitor,” and, “Hall of Fame Standards.” The

former metric attempts to understand how likely (but not how deserving) a player is to be

inducted into the hall of fame while the latter attempts to determine a player’s worthiness based

on their statistics to other hall of famers. The existence of these types of metrics indicates the 15

discrepancy between historical facts of a player’s career and the way in which society at large

chooses to remember them.

Nicholas L. Parsons and Michael J. Stern explore this phenomenon in a 2012 article

titled, “There’s No Dying in Baseball: Cultural Valorization , Collective Memory, and Induction

into the Baseball Hall of Fame.” Parsons and Stern use quantitative analysis to test a theory of,

“summative cultural valorization,” across professional baseball. While Parson and Stern tested 16

numerous variables in their study, the variable which is most pertinent to the idea of collective

memory is the so called “,death boost.” The, “death boost,” refers to the idea that players who

die during or before their hall of fame eligibility will see a significant boost in the amount of

votes received at the next induction. Parsons and Stern found that the,”death boost,” does exist,

but that it affects different types of players in different ways. Separating players into the broad

categories of hitters and pitchers, it was determined that hitters receive a roughly ten percent

boost if they die during or before their eligibility. Conversely, they found that pitchers don’t 17

15 “Leaderboard Glossary,” Baseball Reference, Accessed on 10/22/2017, https://www.baseball-reference.com/about/leader_glossary.shtml#hof_monitor This web page offers more in depth explanations of both terms. 16 Nicholas L. Parsons and Michael J. Stern, “There’s No Dying in Baseball: Cultural Valorization, Collective Memory, and Induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame,” Sociology of Sport Journal 29, (2012): 71. 17 Ibid, 76.

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seem to benefit from any sort of, “death boost.” Additionally, it does not seem that a hitter’s 18

age at the time of their death had any significant impact on the , “death boost.” 19

The presence of a , “death boost,” is an example of how the collective memory of

baseball has adapted to traumatic events. Induction into the hall of fame obviously cannot undo a

player’s death, but is possible that voters see voting for that player as a way to fix the trauma of

the event itself. By constantly remembering a player, his achievements attain an almost 20

mythical status. Players, teams, and events are thus made part of the collective memory of the

game by deliberate action.

The line between deliberate action and natural growth, however, is hard to determine.

While it is without doubt that certain influential institutions can impact the collective memory

directly, the way in which collective memory develops on the organic level is harder to

understand. The point at which commonly shared stories overtake factual accounts is not always

clear, especially when it comes to emotionally charged events such as sport. The large scale of

professional sports in the modern United States means that there could be hundred, if not

thousands of different individual recollections of a single event. The concept of ,”Mental

Postcards,” can help to explain how individuals interact with each other in the context of sporting

events to create a collective memory

Mental Postcards

In the article, “ Just Watching It Again Now Still Gives me Goose Bumps!: Examining

the Mental Postcards of Sports Spectators,” Gerald Griggs, Kathryn Leflay, and Mark Groves

define a, “Mental Postcard,” as an iconic moment which has private significance for an

18 Ibid, 79. 19 Ibid, 78. 20 Ibid,70.

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individual. Putting the idea in the context of a highly mediated society, Griggs explains that the 21

inherently, “tellable”, nature of an individual's recollection helps to perpetuate memories within

the context of collective memory. While an individual's memories of a specific event will more

than likely differ from those of another spectator at the same event, Griggs’ study found that

people’s memories of iconic events could be characterized into four themes: What a Hero, Never

Say Die, Being There, and We Won. 22

Griggs’ study indicates that an individual's memory of an experience can sometimes be

contrary to the general collective memory. In Griggs’ words, “[...] we posit that reviewing iconic

images performs a transformative act of moving from the shared and potential homogenized

public view to the privatized view of the individual.” This does not, however, necessarily 23

undermine the collective memory. In this context it is clear that,“Mental Postcards,” contribute

to a constant re-evaluation process in which collective memory is re-created according to

evolving societal conditions.

In the collective memory of Red Sox franchise, certain moments of failure have been

emphasized over others largely due to their iconic nature. The, “Mental Postcards,” which

spectators have formed around these moments are in general more negative than the results of

Griggs’ study, but it clear that retroactive re-evaluations of this nature played a role in forming

the collective memory. It could be argued that the memory of the traumatic losses caused by

New York Yankees shortstops Bucky Dent’s home run in the 1978 American League Playoff

21 Gerald Griggs, Kathryn Leflay, and Mark Groves, “Just Watching It Again Now Still Gives Me Goose Bumps!”: Examining The Mental Postcards of Sports Spectators,” Sociology of Sport Journal 29 (2012): 89 22 Ibid, 91-92. 23 Ibid, 93. Griggs’ results differ from Healy’s in that they are all related to positive memories, but this may be in part due to the fact that Healy’s respondents were participants and Griggs’ were spectators.

Drolette 16

game home run or of Yankee third baseman Aaron Boone’s home run in game 7 of the 2003

ALCS are equally as iconic in the collective memory of the Red Sox as the triumphal moments

of Red Sox catcher Carlton Fisk’s game winning home run in the twelfth inning of game 6 of

the 1975 World Series or Red Sox outfielder Dave Roberts steal in the bottom of the ninth of

game 4 of the 2004 ALCS because of the mediated environment described by Griggs. These 24

moments have been repeatedly reintroduced into the collective memory and individuals have

been asked them to evaluate them again and again. As a result, the initial response to these

events (and others) have been distorted to fit larger narratives. An example of how this distortion

affects the collective memory of the Red Sox can be seen in the emergence of the, “Curse of the

Bambino,” ideology in the late 1980’s.

The curse was a popular method for understanding Red Sox history between 1986 and

2004, but it seems more than likely to have been an artificial creation rather built upon the bones

of previous thought rather than a universally accepted truth. An examination of the Boston area

newspaper accounts of the events outlined by Shaughnessy and others as “curse events” will

provide insight into how prominent Red Sox failures were understood at the time that they

occurred, particularly between 1920 and 1949.

The ideology of the “Curse of the Bambino” did not begin with the trade of Babe Ruth in

1920, rather it was a method adopted by fans to understand seemingly inexplicable failures in the

heightened media environment of the late twentieth century. In this context, the on-field effects

of the the trade are less important. Rather, the area of interest is on how the psychological

24 As I was in the process of writing this thesis, the Yankees hired Aaron Boone as their new manager for the 2018 season. The decision was announced across social media platforms, accompanied by videos or pictures of is home run in the 2003 ALCS..

Drolette 17

impact of the transition of the Red Sox from a highly successful franchise to one that would

struggle for decades manifested itself in media representation.

Chapter 1

The Curse of the Bambino and the Creation of a Franchise Collective Memory after

1986

In the eighteen years between 1986 and 2004, the most prominent collective memory

device for the Red Sox franchise was the ideology of the, “Curse of the Bambino.” Pioneered by

author Dan Shaughnessy, this idea provided a supernatural explanation for the lack of Red Sox

success by claiming that a “curse” was placed on the franchise when owner Harry Frazee sold

the contract of Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees. The highly mediated environment of the

late twentieth century combined with the dramatic and repeated nature of the Red Sox’ failures

over the previous decades had created a framework for providing an external explanation for the

lack of success. After another traumatic loss in the 1986 World Series, Shaughnessy and others

began the process of creating a structure for the collective memory of the Red Sox franchise that

addressed all period of Red Sox history . “The Curse of the Bambino,” connected eras of Red

Sox history which had previously been highly periodized and self contained.

The 1986 World Series

Much as they had done in 1967, the Red Sox defied expectations in 1986. After finishing

18.5 games out of first place in 1985, the Red Sox won the American League East by 5.5 games

and never trailed after May 13. After a dramatic seven game victory over the California Angels

Drolette 18

in the American League Championship series, the Red Sox would face the New York Mets in the

World Series. 25

The Red Sox would ultimately lose the series in seven games, but the defining moment of

the series happened in game 6. Leading the series three games to two, the Red Sox had a five to

three lead going into the bottom of the tenth inning. Red Sox pitcher Calvin Schiraldi recorded

two quick outs before allowing three straight hits and a run. Red Sox manager John McNamara

then brought in pitcher Bob Stanley to face Mets outfielder Mookie Wilson. Stanley threw a wild

pitch which allowed the Mets to tie the game at five. Mookie Wilson then hit a slow ground ball

towards Red Sox first baseman Bill Buckner. Buckner misplayed the ball, allowing it to roll in

between his legs. The winning run scored as a result. The Mets would defeat the Red Sox in

game seven two days later.

The “Curse of the Bambino” before Shaughnessy

The traumatic nature of the Red Sox defeat in the 1986 World Series would be the prove

to be the catalyst for the formation of the, “Curse of the Bambino,” as a structure for collective

memory. Dan Shaughnessy became the primary author of the curse ideology after the publication

of the Curse of the Bambino in 1990. That being said, he was not the first to connect the idea of

Red Sox failures to the sale of Babe Ruth on a supernatural level. In 1986, three different authors

made mention of a curse in connection to the sale of Babe Ruth: Boston based poet and speech

writer Dick Flavin, New York Times columnist George Vecsey, and New York Times columnist

Michael Martinez.

25 The Red Sox were losing 5-2 in the top of the ninth of game 5 while trailing the Angels three games to one. The Red Sox scored 4 runs in the inning and eventually won the game. The Red Sox then won the next two games to win the series.

Drolette 19

On June 21, 1986, NBC’s game of the week was a Saturday matchup between the

Boston Red Sox and the Baltimore Orioles. Before the game, studio announcer Marv Albert 26

held a brief interview with Flavin who was on site at Fenway Park. Albert opens the interview by

describing Flavin as , “ [a person] who personifies the die-hard Boston Red Sox fan, a man who

has rooted and feared impending disaster.” When asked about how he feels about the Red Sox 27

season, Flavin responds:

Marv, all I know is that I’m nervous. Whenever things are going well for the Red Sox we fans know that they can only get worse. Yeah, that’s what happened year after year. It seems this team is cursed, it's something supernatural I think. I don’t know whether this Fenway Park is built over an old Indian burial ground and that the spirits are haunting us or whether it’s just God’s way of keeping us humble after the basketball season every year or whether the day we sold Babe Ruth to the Yankees we also sold our souls to the devil, I have no idea but it’s got to be supernatural. 28

Here Flavin vocalizes what many Red Sox fans must have felt at the time. Memories of the 1975

and 1978 season would have been still fresh in many fans’ minds; the result of the 1986 World

Series could only have reinforced this idea.

After the Red Sox lost game six of the 1986 World Series due a fielding error by first

baseman Bill Buckner, George Vecsey wrote a column entitled, “Why the Mets Are Still Alive.”

Framing the Met’s unlikely comeback against the backdrop of notable baseball failures by New

York teams in the early twentieth century, Vecsey writes:

In 1912, the Giants lost the last game of the World Series after Fred Snodgrass muffed a fly [ball] in the bottom of the 10th. They lost to the Red Sox by the way- this was before Harry Frazee incurred the Curse of Babe Ruth by selling the slugger to the Yankee early in 1920. 29

26 It should be noted that the Red Sox were leading the AL East by 6 games going into the game 27 Dick Flavin Invents Curse of the Bambino June 1986, video, 0:54, original interview on June 21, 1986, uploaded to youtube on October 25, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNQgRGxvwyc 28 ibid. 29 George Vecsey, “Why the Mets Are Still Alive,” New York Times (New York, NY), October 27, 1986.

Drolette 20

Vecsey deliberately capitalized the phrase and uses it casually, as if expecting his readers to

understand his meaning with little further explanation. In a World Series post-mortem published

the next day entitled, “Babe Ruth Curse Strikes again,” Vecsey elaborates:

But there are a lot of haunted memories in this franchise [The Red Sox], which won the first world series in 1903, and then won it in 1912, 1915, 1916, and 1918, acquiring the child of nature, George Herman Ruth, who became the the best left-handed pitcher on the team and potentially the greatest slugger in the game. Yet the owner sold him to the

lowly New York Yankees to finance one of his broadway shows, and for 68 years it has never been the same. Any Boston fan can fill in the gruesome details [...] . 30

Here is the first time where an important part of the core of the curse ideology is seen in print.

Vecsey mentions the misconception that Ruth was sold to finance a theater production and

heavily implies that the sale of Ruth led directly to future Red Sox failures. The day after this

column was published, fellow New York Times columnist Michael Martinez wrote a piece called,

“Red Sox Ran the Gamut,” which also made prominent mention of curse, including quotes from

Red Sox players. For better or worse, the curse had become a part of the collective memory 31

John McKeon

One other notable pre-Shaughnessy curse advocate was a man named John Mckeon.

McKeon is the man whom Shaughnessy cites as his inspiration for The Curse of the Bambino.

After the 1986 season, Mckeon and a number of his friends created a book called the, “Baseball

Hall of Pain,” which described the Red Sox’ failures between 1918 and 1986. They then

proceeded to sell the book outside of Fenway Park in the early days of the 1987 season. When

Shaughnessy asked McKeon about the curse while writing The Curse of the Bambino, McKeon

provided this explanation:

30 George Vecsey, “Babe Ruth Curse Strikes Again,” New York Times (New York, NY),, October 28, 1986 31 Michael Martinez, “Red Sox Ran the Gamut,” New York Times (New York, NY), October 29, 1986.

Drolette 21

“We’ll never win, we’ll never be free of this warped, evil cycle. This is the curse of the Bambino. Once a fan accepts this fate and understands the cycle, he can make peace with himself and accept any loss, any disappointment because he knows it is coming. The joy of being a Red Sox fan now becomes the thrill of marveling, not at great plays and dramatic moments, but at the creative ways the Red Sox bring about disappointment. 32

Echoing both Flavin and Vecsey, McKeon’s sentiment would be be the fuel of Shaughnessy’s

main argument.

The Curse of the Bambino

Dan Shaughnessy’s version of the curse as as set forth in The Curse of the Bambino is

the most common form of the curse ideology. Shaughnessy takes a chronological approach to

explaining the curse. Starting with the circumstances surrounding the Ruth Sale, Shaughnessy

then goes on to examine in detail each notable failure in Red Sox history. The events which

Shaughnessy focuses on are:

● The sale of Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees in 1920 ● Game 7 of the 1946 World Series ● The American League tie breaker game in 1948 ● The late season collapse of the Red Sox in 1949 ● The American League East tie breaker game in 1978 ● Game 6 of the 1986 world series. 33

For all intents and purposes, these dates and events have attained an almost canonical status

when discussing the collective memory of the Red Sox. Shaughnessy places the initial blame on

owner Harry Frazee and then goes on to argue in detail that each subsequent failure could be

traced back to Frazee’s initial decision. It is clear, however, that while these events are

undoubtedly important occurrences in themselves, there was no long term narrative,

supernatural or otherwise, which tied these events together. As will be discussed in detail below,

32 John McKeon as quoted in Curse of the Bambino, 19. 33 Later editions of the book would also include a treatment of the game seven of the 2003 ALCS.

Drolette 22

there are no significant mentions of supernatural explanations for the failures of the Red Sox in

the the two periods which Shaughnessy relies upon as the foundation of his argument :1920-1921

and 1946-1949. The history of the team is highly periodized and the responses of the media in

those time periods addressed the historical realities of the environment in which the Red Sox

were competing in their respective periods.

In this light, The Curse of the Bambino should be seen as the starting point for the

formation of the collective memory which addresses Red Sox history as a whole. Shaughnessy

largely uses newspaper account for the earlier periods while relying more heavily upon player

testimonials for the later periods.Shaughnessy thus creates a linear narrative which connects

previous periods of Red Sox history in an artificial yet effective framework. Particularly through

player interviews, Shaughnessy attempts to take the curse from the realm of the abstract to the

realm of the real. He repeatedly cites former Red Sox players such as Bill Lee and Carl

Yastrzemski as being the players who believed in there being a paranormal explanation for the

Red Sox failures. Lee was particularly vocal in his belief, explaining the curse in an interview

with Shaughnessy:

My theory is that it happened because of a curse from an orphan child from Baltimore. I remember the day I first said that. I gave a speech and said, ‘Until they exhume the body of Babe Ruth and publicly apologize for selling him to New York, where he became an alcoholic, the city of Boston will never win a major baseball championship. 34

While these testimonies do not make the curse any more likely to be true, they do make the story

of the curse much more personal and lend the narrative an empathetic power which it would

otherwise lack. The narrative presented in The Curse of the Bambino is therefore not just a list of

34 As quoted in Curse of the Bambino, 22.

Drolette 23

dates and results, but rather a story which alternates between in-depth analysis of baseball

decisions and commentary on the New England culture and psyche.

It is perhaps for this reason more than any other that the Curse of the Bambino remains an

important resource for understanding the collective memory of the Red Sox. The book provided

a continuity to the history of the history of the team which it had hitherto lacked. Whereas

previously each period of Red Sox history had existed essentially independent of each other, the

Curse of the Bambino provided a framework through which the entirety of Red Sox history could

be considered as unified whole.

Responses to Shaughnessy

The environment in which Shaughnessy made his argument propelled the curse

ideology into the forefront of public thought. The publication of the first edition of The Curse of

the Bambino in 1990 set off a fourteen year public dialogue in which the merits of the curse

were widely debated. The book spawned countless responses and imitations in various media

forms. Writing about the phenomenon in 2005 follow up book called Reversing the Curse,

Shaughnessy describes the deluge of curse related media as a , “cottage industry.” That phrase 35

is no exaggeration. In addition to the many editorial responses seen in local newspapers, the

curse was brought into the national consciousness through documentaries and video treatments.

The curse was briefly addressed in episode three of Ken Burns’ seminal documentary Baseball

(1994), it was the subject of two separate HBO documentaries named Curse of the Bambino

(2003) and Reverse the Curse of the Bambino (2004), and it even was the subject of a hollywood

35 Dan Shaughnessy, Reversing the Curse (New York : Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 9.

Drolette 24

adaptation of a story originally about soccer called Fever Pitch (2005). The circumstances 36

surrounding the origin of the curse was also addressed in length in Glenn Stout and Richard

Johnson’s Red Sox Century (2005).

The proliferation of the curse ideology also produced a vocal denials of the curse,

particularly from Boston Red Sox fans. Usually localized in the Boston area, fans resented the

idea that they were unable to process the failures of the Red Sox in normal terms. The Boston

Herald published a piece on August 29, 1995 which seems to be clear evidence that the curse

ideology was unfounded. Paul Sullivan interviews Ruth’s adopted daughter, Julia Ruth for an

article called, “Babe’s Daughter Calls of ‘curse’ on the Red Sox.” When as her opinion, Ruth

responded:

Heavens, no, my father wouldn’t think of putting a curse on the Red Sox. [...] He had fond memories of Boston; after all that's where he played first. He thought Boston was a great place. 37

Additionally, John Mckeon, one of Shaughnessy's inspirations, eventually retracted his previous

endorsement of the ,“curse,” in an interview with the Worcester Telegram and Gazette. In an

article from September 1, 1995 titled ,”Swearing at the Sox Curse,” journalist John Gearan wrote

that, “Nonetheless, McKeon, today an English teacher at Bishop Stang High and freelance

writer, disavows such cynicism rooted in any curse and views his quote as an error of

Bucknerian proportions.” 38

36 Frank R. Ardolino, “From the Curse to Its Reverse: Red Sox Nation in films, 1992-2005,” Nine 16, no .1 (2007): 108-128. Ardolino offers reviews and insights into a few other movies that are not about the curse, but address the curse in some way. 37 Paul Sullivan, “Babe’s daughter calls off ‘curse’ on the Red Sox,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), August 29, 1995 38 John Gearan, “Swearing at the Sox Curse,” Worcester Telegram and Gazette (Worcester, MA), September 1, 1995

Drolette 25

Aside from these, “official,” denials, there was significant backlash against the curse in

the fan response.

The clearest example of this mindset can be seen in Bill Simmons’ Now I can Die in

Peace. Quoting a 2001 column which he had written for ESPN.com. Simmons writes;

We need to set the record straight about the Curse for three reasons: 1.) It’s the Blair Witch Project of sports legends. In other words, the vast majority of

people don’t understand it, so it has assumed a life of its own 2.) The only people who keep mentioning The Curse are members of the media and

uneducated non-Boston Fans. 3.) Sox fans don’t discuss the Curse--not because we’re afraid of it, but because it’s

so absurd, we wouldn’t bother discussing it in the first place. The Curse rose to prominence with Dan Shaughnessy’s 1990 book about the history of the Red Sox, coincidentally titled, The Curse of the Bambino. [...] he [Shaughnessy] keeps bringing up The Curse in his highly visible Globe columns. And since casual fans and outsiders believe everything they see in print, they mistakenly believe that Shaughnessy’s Curse-laden rhetoric represents the thoughts of every Red Sox fan. Trust me, it doesn’t. 39

Simmons is a part of the school of thought which rejects every part of the curse. To this sector of

fans and media, the curse just seems to be too artificial to have been anything other than a

convenient explanation.

An examination of the critical reviews on The Curse of the Bambino’s Amazon.com page

bears out much of the same type of thinking. Dating from between 2000 and 2012, the reviews

encapsulate the cynical response to Shaughnessy’s work. A brief overview of the reviews will

show titles like, “Feeding the Collective Narcissism”, “Nice annuity for Shaughnessy-but far

from the real story,” “Marketing overtakes reality,” “Curse is a misnomer,” and, perhaps the

most direct, “The Stupidest Book Ever Written About Baseball.” 40

39 Bill Simmons, Now I Can Die in Peace (New York: ESPN Books, 2009), 120-121. 40 “The Curse of the Bambino Critical Reviews”. Amazon.com. Accessed on 9/28/2017. https://www.amazon.com/Curse-Bambino-Dan-Shaughnessy/product-reviews/0142004766/ref=cm_cr_getr_d_paging_btm_1?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews&pageNumber=1&filterByStar=critical

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The Role of Harry Frazee

An important element in the curse ideology is the role of owner Harry Frazee.

Shaughnessy and others, most notably George Vecsey, single out Frazee as the primary

antagonist in the narrative established by the curse. The story goes that his financial

mismanagement and preference for his theater interests led him to sell Ruth to the Yankees, thus

damning the Red Sox to ignominy and failure as the Yankees went on to be the become the most

successful franchise in baseball. While Frazee and his finances were always the subject of

speculation, his role in causing the long term struggles of the franchise was greatly emphasized

through the emergence of the curse ideology. His true culpability, however, has been the subject

of great debate for several decades. There are two schools of thought when it comes to the role of

Harry Frazee: those who blame Frazee for his financial management and those who sympathize

with Frazee’s circumstances. The majority of sources and the larger popular narrative fall into

the “blame” camp. This is largely due to the work of journalist-historian Frederick G. Lieb.

Lieb was involved in professional baseball for over 70 years, working as a journalist and

author for various new outlets from 1909 up until his death in 1980. During this time he

produced eleven books, seven of which were detailed team histories. One of these histories was

The Boston Red Sox published in 1947, which was up to date through the end of the 1947 season.

In The Boston Red Sox, Lieb takes a decidedly anti-Frazee stance. Lieb had two chapters

which directly covered Frazee and the sale of Babe Ruth called, “Evil Genie from Peoria Enters

Picture,” and , “The Rape of the Red Sox.” Describing the sale of the franchise from Lannin to

Frazee, Lieb opens with the the phrase, “A black shadow fell across the Boston baseball picture a

Drolette 27

few months after the winning of the second straight world championship.” To his credit, Lieb 41

does not attempt to say that his perspective from thirty years afterwards was attitude adopted by

media at the time. Although grudgingly, Lieb even admits that the initial reaction to Frazee’s

ownership was positive.

Lieb’s most lasting contribution to the historiography of Red Sox failure is his claim that

the sale of players was directly tied to attempting to keep his theater interests financially

supported. In particular, his mention of the musical No! No! Nanette! would help to fuel the

misconception that Frazee sold Ruth in order to fund this particular musical. No! No! Nanette

was a musical produced by Frazee which had a long run of success on Broadway that began in

1925. As a result Frazee became wildly wealthy once again, making a taxable income of

$238,662.07 in 1925. Frazee had kept himself solvent in his last years as owner of the Red sox 42

by selling players and this huge success only two years later only contributed to the idea that

Frazee had sold players specifically to fund his theater productions. Lieb writes:

Though Harry latter produced one of musical comedy’s biggest hits, No! No! Nanette, with its tuneful “Tea for Two,” which had five companies on the road at one time, there was a period of time after the war when flop followed flop. [...] And when Harry would sell another ballplayer to the Yanks, Johnny Drohan of the Boston Traveler would exclaim “Well, another one of Frazee’s road companies will eat for the next few weeks.”

43

To be clear, Lieb himself never claimed that Ruth was sold the Yankees to finance No! No!

Nanette, nor does he ever make mention of any sort of curse. It is unclear where the

misconception began, but the very fact that Lieb mentions the musical in his account indicates

41 Lieb, 155 42 Levitt, Amour, and Levitt, 31. This was an improvement of over $200,000 from 1924 and over $230,000 from 1923 (his last year as owner of the Red Sox) 43 Lieb, 178

Drolette 28

that the musical and the sale had become associated in the public mind after the show’s run of

success in 1924-1925.

Unlike later authors, Lieb does not blame Frazee or the sale of Ruth for the long term

struggles of the Red Sox. From his perspective in 1947, Frazee’s actions were responsible for the

short term failures of the early twenties and contributed to the troubles the franchise experience

under owner Bob Quinn from 1923-1932. Lieb goes so far as to characterize future owner Tom

Yawkey as a savior who ended the troubles of Frazee’s and Quinn’s ownerships. For all that,

Lieb is harsh and uncompromising in his condemnation of Frazee. This style of condemnation

was adopted by many later authors, most notably by Dan Shaughnessy.

Frazee Sympathizers

In the intervening years between Lieb and the present, certain authors have come to

Frazee’s defense.The most prominent author who operates in opposition to Lieb’s point of view

is Glenn Stout. Working from the late 20th century to the present, Stout defends Frazee in

defiant terms. Stout writes in Red Sox Century from 2005 :

The accepted account of the remainder of Frazee’s reign holds that after 1918 a string of theatrical failures put him in financial difficulty. Then, to stay afloat, he crassly sold the human assets of the Red Sox to prop up his stage interests, resulting in the nefarious sale Babe Ruth and others to the New York Yankees for far less than they were worth. [...] Yet this popular account is almost pure fiction, an incomplete story that leaves an entirely false impression and ignores ample evidence to the contrary. Frazee never had a run of theatrical failures and was never in serious financial trouble. And his many deals with New York Yankees were neither one sided nor part of some sort of fiendish conspiracy. 44

Stout’s argument rests on the idea that Frazee’s moves look sinister or incompetent only in

hindsight. Stout claims that Frazee’s moves were sound business moves motivated to make his

club stronger and that Frazee was forced to deal almost exclusively with the New York Yankees

44 Stout and Johnson, 137.

Drolette 29

due to a dispute with Ban Johnson related to the initial sale of Carl Mays. Stout offers this 45

explanation for why the Ruth deal in particular was a good move for Frazee.:

He [Frazee] accepted the Yankee offer of cash and notes only after Ed Barrow told him there were no players on the New York Roster he wanted. The deal still worked for Frazee on several fronts.It rid him of a problem [Ruth and his attitude], strengthened his coalition with New York in the war with Johnson, and gave him the cash he knew he’d need to rebuild his ball club. 46

Stout’s arguments are not without merit and they pass the general logic test. The Red Sox won

marginally more games in the two seasons after the Ruth trade and the Frazee was indeed

feuding with Johnson during the period. Stout’s claims, however, are thoroughly undermined by

another of his arguments.

In both Red Sox Century and in article for ESPN.com called, “A Curse Born of Hate,”,

Stout claims that Frazee had been treated unfairly because he was thought to be Jewish. Stout

argues that both contemporary executives such as Ban Johnson and later historians such as Fred

Lieb were anti-semitic and therefore dealt with Frazee as they would a Jewish person. Stout’s

evidence for this theory is far from convincing.

For the sake of the historical record, Frazee was not Jewish. He was born in Peoria,

Illinois, raised as a Presbyterian, and later became a Mason. Stout readily acknowledges this fact.

Stout then goes on to claim that references to Frazee as a, “New Yorker” and the, “mystery,” 47

of his religion combined with the fact that he worked in the financially charged theater industry

45 Ibid, 142. Stout offers a full account of the dispute. Carl Mays had left the team without permission after a particularly bad outing during the 1919 season. Frazee traded him to the Yankees when Johnson wanted him suspended. The Yankees took Johnson to court over the issues and won. 46 Ibid, 145. 47 Stout and Johnson, 116 Glenn Stout, “A Curse Born of Hate,” ESPN, published October 3, 2004, http://www.espn.com/mlb/playoffs2004/news/story?page=Curse041005

Drolette 30

made people think that he was Jewish. Stout cites Burt Whitman of the Boston Herald, Nick 48

Flatley of the Boston Evening American, and Paul Shannon of the Boston Post as making these

claims, but fails to cite any particular example. 49

In addition, Stout cites an article from the Dearborn Independent. Published and

supported by well-known anti-semite Henry Ford, the paper published an article entitled, “Jewish

Degradation of American Baseball.” The author of the article alleges that Frazee was Jewish,

using the same rationale that Stout cites writing that, “Frazee, like so many of his kind, was in

the ‘show business’, a manager of burlesque companies.” 50

Response to Stout

In an article entitled, “History versus Harry Frazee: Re-revising the Story,” Daniel R.

Levitt, Mark L. Armour, and Matthew Levitt offer a direct response to Stout’s claims with the

rather blunt statement, “ This article will show that the Stout/Johnson thesis is almost completely

false.” Through an analysis of Frazee’s tax returns as well as his theater profits, Levitt 51

demonstrates that it is clear that the traditional narrative of Frazee struggling with funds is at

least in part true. More importantly, Levitt offers a clear and concise rebuttal of Stout’s 52

accusation of anti-semitism. Addressing the use of the Dearborn Independent as reliable source,

Levitt writes:

The reference in the Independent is the solitary piece of evidence we are aware of suggesting Frazee was Jewish, and it needs to be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. Regarding its accuracy, on occasion Ford referred to people as Jews if he

48 Red Sox Century, 119. “A Curse born of Hate” 49 Red Sox Century, 151 50 “Jewish Degradation of American Baseball,” Dearborn Independent, originally published on September 20, 1921, retrieved from http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/2013218776/1921-09-10/ed-1/seq-9/. 51 Levitt, Armour, and Levitt, 26 52 Ibid, 29-34.

Drolette 31

disliked them and they exhibited Jewish characteristics, even if they were not actually Jewish. 53

Levitt then goes on to challenge the idea that the Dearborn Independent was an influential news

source in the early 1920’s. Citing the Ayer annual directory of magazine circulation, Levitt notes

that the Independent had a circulation of roughly 300,000 in 1920, but that that had dropped to

less than half of that number the next year. Levitt also notes that there were at least 85

magazines in the United Stated with a circulation of 300,000 or larger in 1920. Additionally, the

fact that a piece called, “The Perils of Racial Prejudice”, was printed in hundreds of newspapers

across the country on January 16, 1921 would seem to indicate that the Dearborn Independent

represented, at least theoretically, a minority view in America at the time. The piece explicitly

condemned anti-semitism and was endorsed by more than one hundred well known Americans

such as Woodrow Wilson, William Howard Taft, and Warren Harding. 54

The conclusion of Levitt’s article begins with a statement which best encapsulates the

nature of Stout’s claims of anti-semitism. Levitt writes:

In sum, we find it highly unlikely that the Peoria-born frazee, who sent out Christmas cards and was descended from a long line of Presbyterians, would be mistaken as Jewish. Moreover, the two individual Stout most specifically charged with anti-semitism in their treatment of Frazee-Johnson and Lieb- both knew Frazee well and would have known whether he was Jewish. 55

Stout’s claims are not totally unreasonable. It is possible that people who did not know Frazee

may have thought he was Jewish and may have responded in an anti-semitic manner. But as

Levitt points out, it stretches the bounds of credibility to think that the people who knew and

worked with him would have thought the same thing.

53 Ibid, 37. 54 Ibid, 37. 55 Ibid,38.

Drolette 32

Stout’s revision of the Frazee story seems like an odd attempt to add another element to

the situation surrounding the Ruth sale that was more than likely not there. There does not seem

to be sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim. The fact remains that Frazee was seen as one

of the primary reasons for why the Red Sox would struggle during the 1920’s. His sale of Ruth

and other players destroyed what had been a very competitive ball club and left the next owners

of the team with little to build on. Therefore the question of whether Frazee was to blame for the

Red Sox immediate failures seemed to have been settled by the time that Stout began to defend

Frazee.

The idea that Frazee’s actions were malicious in some way has become a part of the

collective memory of the Red Sox because of the emergence of the curse ideology. Stout would

like to argue that this is because of anti-semitism while in reality it is more likely related to an

amplification of the anger related to his story that came along with the curse ideology in the late

twentieth century. The creators of the curse took Lieb’s criticisms of Frazee and used them to 56

construct a narrative that tied the history of the Red Sox together. When that narrative became

the primary vessel for the collective memory of the Red Sox, the image of Frazee as an

antagonist was disseminated and regurgitated through many different forms of popular media.

Frazee was more than likely not the cartoonish villain that curse ideology portrays him as, nor

was he likely the persecuted businessman that Stout portrays. The truth of his character lies

somewhere in between. All that can be said with confidence is that he occupies a central position

of the collective memory of the Red Sox because of the emergence of the, “Curse of the

Bambino.”

56 The anger surrounding the Ruth Sale and the economic undertones thereof are discussed in chapter two.

Drolette 33

Chapter 2

Harry Frazee and the sale of Babe Ruth, 1920-2921

The Boston Red Sox franchise experienced unparalleled success in its first seventeen

years of existence. Winning five of the first fourteen World Series championships between 1903

and 1918, the Red Sox were arguably the most prominent franchise in MLB during the first

quarter of the twentieth century. This early on-field success, however, had been in large part

manufactured by the practices of the American League’s first president. Ban Johnson was able to

maintain the success of the Red Sox franchise (and other high profile franchises) by organizing

the transfer of prominent players to the team when it became necessary. Johnson went so far as

to organize the sale of the franchise on five separate occasions between 1901 and 1916.

The sixth sale of the franchise to Harry Frazee in 1916 would prove to have the most

dramatic consequences. Organized behind the back of Johnson by then owner Joseph Lannin,

Frazee was unvetted by Johnson and would ultimately prove to a be a staunch opponent of

Johnson. When Frazee’s finances turned, he began to sell players’ contracts-most notably that of

Babe Ruth- to meet his financial obligations. This in turn created an environment in which Harry

Frazee (and by extension the American League) was accused of debasing the integrity of the

game through a practice known as syndicate baseball.

An examination of the newspaper accounts of the sale and its aftermath in 1920 and 1921

make it clear that many attributed the failures of the team in the ensuing years directly to

Frazee’s financial mismanagements. More importantly, there are no mentions of a, “curse,” or

Drolette 34

other supernatural explanation in this period. The collective memory in this period was

concerned with the owner's finances and the consequences of improper practices.

Syndicate Baseball

The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs- informally known as the National

League- was founded in 1876. Over the next twenty five years the National League faced

challenges from several rival leagues, but none were able to establish themselves as legitimate

long term competitors. By the the mid 1890’s the National League was unquestionably the 57

only league that was able to backup it claims to be a, “Major League”. In 1893, a little known

sports journalist named Ban Johnson was elected president of a minor league in the Midwest

known as the Western League. By 1901 Johnson had made the Western League (renamed the 58

American League in 1899) a legitimate competitor to the older National League. Johnson

accomplished this feat largely through direct manipulation of the franchises in his league. Rather

than acting in the mold of a modern sports commissioner who is theoretically supposed to be

independent of the owners, Johnson owned financial stakes in every franchise. Johnson justified

this by arguing that because he was financially involved in every franchise, he had every

franchise’s best interest at heart. Having the option to own a majority in every franchise allowed

Johnson to relocate franchise with much fewer complications. Johnson had taken full advantage 59

of this ability by relocating franchises into cities vacated by the National league in 1899

57 The most notable of these challengers was the American Association (AA) Not to be confused with either of the later iterations, the American Association of the nineteenth century operated from 1882 until 1891. Bill James explains the context of how the AA was founded in chapter 2 of The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. Bill James, The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract (New York: Free Press, 2003), 37 58 Joe Santry and Cindy Thomson, “Ban Johnson,” Society of American Baseball Research, Accessed on 9/25/2017, https://sabr.org/bioproj/person/dabf79f8#sdendnote1sym Stout and Johnson, 6 59 Stout and Johnson, 6

Drolette 35

(Cleveland, Washington, and Baltimore) and even into to cities which already still had National

League franchises (Philadelphia and Chicago (1900), Boston (1901), and New York (1903).

Ironically, Johnson had been able to make his league such a success because National

League owners had engaged in the same type of manipulation which Johnson had perfected.

Unlike in the modern MLB, owners of National League franchises often owned stakes in more

than one franchise. Making profit from more than one team, owners would sometimes transfer

player from team to team with little regard for competitive balance. First place teams could

sometimes find themselves reinforced in the last weeks of the season by the best players from

teams already eliminated from contending for the National League pennant. This practice, known

as, “syndicate baseball,” would create an untenable situation. Glenn Stout describes the practice

the practice in stark terms:

So called ‘syndicate baseball’ allowed one team to serve the interests of another and undermined the integrity of the game. Yet the National League didn’t discourage the practice. Most owners owned shares in the competition. Even the Boston’s president, Arthur Soden, had a piece of the New York team. 60

The National League therefore struggled to present itself as both a profitable enterprise and a fair

competition. After the collapse of the rival American Association after the 1891 season, the

National League consisted of twelve clubs. Between 1893 and 1899, the National League 61

pennant was won only by two clubs: The Boston Beaneaters (1893, 1897, 1898 ) and the

60 Stout and Johnson, 5 61 “1892 NL Team Statistics”, Baseball Reference, Accessed on 9/24/2017, https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/NL/1892.shtml The Teams were: The Boston Beaneaters, The Cleveland Spiders, The Brooklyn Grooms, The Philadelphia Phillies, The Cincinnati Reds, the Pittsburgh Pirates, the Chicago Colts, the New York Giants, the Washington Senators, the St. Louis Browns, and the Baltimore Orioles.

Drolette 36

Baltimore Orioles (1894, 1895, 1896). The resulting top-heavy nature of the National League

gave fans little reason to continue to come to games after the first few months of the season.

Baseball Historian Bill James provides a further explanation on how syndicate baseball

affected the on field product:

If one team had a chance to win, it got all the players -- and it needed them to compete against other superteams. They [the National League owners], in effect, a hybrid major/minor league, with teams competing against their own farm teams. While the top teams each year won 70% of their games, the worst teams lost 75%. 62

The disparity in performance between the pennant winning teams and the rest of the field

eventually had severe impact on profits. In 1899 the National league owners voted to reduce the

size of the league from twelve teams to eight, buying out the owners of the weakest performing

franchises in Washington, Baltimore, Louisville, and Cleveland. As detailed above, each of these

cities (with the exception of Louisville) would receive an American League franchise within the

next few years. 63

Ban Johnson and Red Sox ownership

One of Johnson’s most important early moves in his efforts to strengthen the American

League would be to establish a franchise in Boston. Boston had had a National League Franchise

since the foundation of the league in 1876. The Bostons, as they were usually referred to, had

won twelve pennants between 1876 and 1900, earning the devotion of a dedicated fan base. 64

62 James, 55 63 The history of franchises in the MLB is complicated. The Baltimore Franchise would ultimately relocate to New York in 1903. The current Baltimore Orioles are considered a separate franchise, moving to the city from St. Louis in 1954. The Washington franchise would move to Minnesota in 1961. That franchise would be replaced by a different Washington Senators franchise immediately, only for it to be moved to Texas in 1972. The current Washington Nationals franchise moved to the city from Montreal in 2005. 64 Frederick Lieb, The Boston Red Sox, (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1947). Lieb writes about the heritage of this franchise in chapter one. Stout and Johnson, James, George Vecsey, and many others also relate the history of these early Red Stockings in various forms. The team started in Cincinnati in 1869, moved to Boston in 1871, dropped the Red Stocking name in 1876, and operated as the National

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The troubles of the late 19th century plagued the Bostons as a combination of poor play,

violence, and obvious manipulation had alienated much of the fan base. Johnson exploited this

rift to full effect. At special meeting in January of 1901, Johnson convened the other owners of

the American League to vote to drop previous plans for a franchise in Buffalo in favor of a new

franchise in Boston. 65

Johnson was heavily involved in the operations of the Boston franchise from the very

beginning and would continue to be influential factor in its operation over the next twenty

seasons. Initially, however, Johnson faced a funding problem. Faced with the prospect of

attempting to start a franchise in Boston while also keeping franchises in Chicago and

Philadelphia afloat, Johnson instead turned to one Charles Somers.

Somers was a wealthy Cleveland business man whom Johnson had convinced to finance

the new American league franchise in Cleveland in 1900. Giving him the title of league vice

president, Johnson leveraged his relationship with Somers to fund Chicago White Sox owner

Charles Comiskey and convinced him to become a part owner of the new Philadelphia Athletics

franchise. Johnson then asked Somers to be the primary owner of the new Boston franchise. 66

Somers reluctantly agreed and in early 1901 had a significant interest in four of the American

League’s eight franchises. To avoid charges of practicing syndicate baseball, Somers sold his 67

ownership stakes in both the Cleveland franchise and the Philadelphia franchise later in the year.

League Franchise in Boston until their relocation to Milwaukee for the 1953 season. It was this National League team which had originally worn uniforms with distinctive red stockings. 65 Ibid, 9 66 Lieb, 9 and Stout and Johnson, 8.Both sources claim the amount given to Comiskey as $10,000. Ben Shibe bought out Somers shares in the Athletics almost immediately in 1901. 67 Lieb , 10.

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Johnson, however, had set a precedent on how he would manipulate the American league to

benefit the bottom line.

In order for the American League to survive, Johnson needed the franchises located in

large metropolitan centers to succeed. In practical terms, this meant that the American League, to

borrow Glenn Stout’s term, had to become, “Johnson’s syndicate. ” Exciting pennant races and 68

legitimate competition were secondary to the financial success of the most prominent franchises.

To this end, Johnson organized the sale of the Boston franchise on four occasions

between 1903 and 1916. Targeting wealthy men that he believed he could control, Johnson’s

sales occurred in the following order:

● 1903- Charles Somers to Henry Killilea ● 1904- Henry Killilea to General Charles Taylor for his son John I. Taylor ● 1911-John I Taylor to a group headed by Jim McAleer ● 1913-Jim McAleer to Joseph Lannin 69

After a brief three seasons, Red Sox owner Joseph Lannin decided to sell the team in October

1916. Lannin left behind a team which had won the last two World Series and had on its roster a

talented young pitcher named Babe Ruth.

Lannin, however, had tired of Johnson’s interference in the operation of the team and he

decided to get out on his own terms, selling the team to a theater magnate named Harry Frazee.

The news of the sale to Frazee came as a shock to pretty much everyone. The Boston American

reported the news when it became public on December 4:

The big excitement for the fans of this city was the startling announcement that the

68 Stout and Johnson, 13 69Lieb 116 Stout and Johnson 98. McAleer and company’s reign came to an abrupt end when Johnson engineered the sale of team while McAleer was out of the country promoting baseball on a world tour. Neither Lieb or Stout/Johnson elaborate on how this was legal.

Drolette 39

World’s Champion Red Sox had been sold to two New York theatrical men, Harry Frazee

and Hugh J.Ward.it cames as a surprise for there had been little talk of a sale although it was well known that Joseph J. Lannin was willing to dispose of his property if he could get the figure he set upon it. 70

If the public was shocked, Johnson was flabbergasted. Johnson released a statement on

December 5 which outlined how he felt about the deal: “As I do not know either of them [Frazee

of Ward] I must withhold judgement [on the deal].” The idea of a person like Frazee owning 71

the team was Johnson’s nightmare. Born in Peoria, Illinois, Frazee was an outsider to both the

city of Boston and business of baseball. Frazee had made his money in theater, producing a

number of financial hits between 1904 and 1916. 72

Harry Frazee’s Finances

Frazee would own the team until 1923, but he took over the Red Sox franchise at an

inopportune moment. In April of 1917, the United States would enter World War I and

professional baseball suddenly found itself under great public pressure to contribute to the war

effort. By May of 1918, Secretary of War Newton Baker and director of the draft General Enoch

Crowder issued a ,” Work or Fight”, order which commanded the season to end and all of the

players to either enlist or find work in a war related industry. Largely through the efforts of

Frazee, the 1918 season was saved by a compromise to end the season by September 1 and the

World Series by September 15. 73

70 As quoted in Lieb, 154 71 As quoted in Stout and Johnson 72 Stout and Johnson, 116. Stout and Johnson provide a history of the particularly successful plays 73 Stout and Johnson, 125 Lieb, 163. These two sources disagree about who is responsible for the extension of the deadline to allow for the World Series. Lieb claims it was was Cincinnati Reds owner Garry Herrmann while Stout/Johnson says it was Frazee.

Drolette 40

Frazee’s Red Sox would end up winning the 1918 World Series, but that victory could

not undo a season’s worth of plunging attendance and lost profits. Looking at Frazee’s tax

returns, it is clear that he was hit hard by the troubles of the 1918 season. In 1917, Frazee had a

taxable income of $15,625.50. In 1918 Frazee had a negative taxable income of $13,363.50, a 74

swing of some $28,000 dollars in a year's time. While part of Frazee’s losses were undoubtedly

related to his theater business, it can be no coincidence that the paid attendance at Red Sox home

games dropped from 387,586 in 1917 to 249,513 in 1918. This financial volatility would 75

persist throughout the remainder of Frazee’s time as owner. His taxable incomes for those years

were:

● 1919: $721.00 ● 1920: $-34,583.54 ● 1921: $362.21 ● 1922: $-13,237.94 ● 1923: -2,324.09

What Frazee lacked in hard cash he had in assets in the form of baseball players. No player was

more in demand at this time than Babe Ruth. After joining the team in 1914, Ruth had

established himself as equal parts bona fide athletic wunderkind and reckless playboy. He was

also quickly becoming a headache for Frazee. Ruth had become dissatisfied with playing

primarily as a pitcher and feuded constantly with manager Ed Barrow. Despite this, Ruth was

74 Daniel R. Levitt, Mark L. Amour, and Matthew Levitt, “History versus Harry Frazee,” The Baseball Research Journal 37 (2008): 31.This figure and the following tax return figures are taken from this article. 75 Ibid, 29-31 “1920 MLB Attendance & Team age,” Baseball Reference, accessed on 9/28/2017, https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/1920-misc.shtml Even during the post war years when baseball began to recover, Frazee was unable to attain financial stability. In 1920 he had negative taxable income of $34,583.54 and the Red Sox turned a profit of only $5,970 despite a resurgent attendance of 402,445. Frazee had incurred a lot of debt in the form of deferred mortgage payments and the like while purchasing the team in 1916. Lieb, Stout and Johnson, and Levitt, Amour, and Levitt offer fuller accounts.

Drolette 41

still the talk of the baseball world, largely for his feat of breaking the record for homeruns in a

season with 29 in 1919.

The Sale of Babe Ruth

On December 26, 1919 Frazee sold Ruth’s contract to the New York Yankees for

$100,00 and a (then undisclosed) loan of $350,000 with Fenway Park as collateral. Over the 76

next 84 years the Yankees would appear in 39 World Series and win 26 of them. In the same

time period the Red Sox would appear in and lose four World Series.

The Boston media’s immediate reaction to the sale was one of shock and confusion.

During his time with the Red Sox, Ruth had been one of the best pitchers in the game and was

well on his way to becoming one of the best hitters in the game. The amount of money involved

in the deal was unprecedented. When the deal was announced to the public in early January,

1920, the Boston Globe ran a front page story entitled, “Red Sox Sell Ruth for $100,00 Cash,”

with the subtitle, “ Demon Slugger of the American League, Who made 29 Home Runs Last

Season Goes to the New York Yankees.” In this article, Red Sox owner Harry Frazee defends 77

the move by arguing that the move was made to improve the ballclub and that he couldn’t have

gotten players in the deal:

I should have preferred to have taken players in exchange for Ruth, but no club could have given me the equivalent in men without wrecking itself, and so the deal had to be made on a cash basis. No other club could afford to give the amount the Yankees have paid for him, and I do not mind saying I think they are taking a gamble. 78

76 The circumstances surrounding the sale of Ruth to the Yankees was largely dictated by an ongoing feud between Johnson and a group of owners made up of Frazee, Charles Comiskey (Chicago White Sox) and Jacob Ruppert (New York Yankees). Lieb (178-181), Stout and Johnson (141-145), and Vecsey (72-73) offer more detailed accounts of the dispute. 77 James C. O’Leary, “ Red Sox Sell Ruth for $100,000 Cash,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), January 6, 1920. 78 Ibid

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Frazee goes on to double down on his logic, arguing that the team could not have succeeded-on

the field or in the account ledgers-by building a team around one player like Ruth. Frazee even

goes so far as to call Ruth’s increasing contract demands selfish:

We have had other stars on the Boston team besides Ruth and have them now. [Stuffy] McInnis, [Everett] Scott, [Wally] Schang, and [Ossie] Vitt, are all great players, and hard, conscientious workers, but last season they were totally eclipsed by Ruth, which made the Red Sox a one-man team that finished near the bottom of the second division. Now the investment of the stockholders cannot be protected by a one-man team, which is not in the race [...] The other players have little incentive or encouragement for great effort when the spectators can see only one man in the game, and so the one man has an upsetting influence on the others. It rarely does, and never should, win a championship. With the money received in exchange for the Ruth, the Boston club can afford to pay $10,000 or $20,000, even more, for another player I think he is really worth, and be ahead, both financially and in playing strength. 79

By putting forth such an aggressive message on day one, Frazee was attempting to control the

narrative. The article makes no mention of any financial trouble experienced by Frazee, nor does

it include any definite numbers. Neither Frazee or the primary owner of the Yankees, Jacob

Rupert, name a specific number for the deal and the author of the article, James. C O’Leary,

makes it clear that the numbers provided are only speculation. 80

Unsurprisingly, it seems that fans were less excited about the trade than Frazee.

Dedicating part of his article to the fan reactions, O’Leary claims that, “the inclination to protest

against it was at first quite general.” Expanding on this thought in an uncited explanation of the

fan mindset, O’Leary writes:

79 ibid. 80 A subsection of the article called, “Rupert Says Johnson Must Accept The Deal,” also sheds some interesting insight to the ongoing legal battles between the Yankees owners and American League president Ban Johnson.

Drolette 43

While there were many who could not indorse [original spelling] Ruth’s attitude with regard to his contractual obligations, every last one of those seen was sorry that he was not going to be with the Red Sox next season. They regarded him as a Boston institution and probably hoped to see him make 29 or more home runs next season as a member of the local team. 81

This reaction represents the counterpoint to Frazee’s enthusiasm. Though likely a creation born

from an amalgamation of general sentiment rather than drawn from a particular fan or set of fans,

the narrative of fans being unsatisfied with the results Ruth trade would continue to grow

throughout the rest of Frazee’s tenure as Red Sox owner. Newspaper coverage of Babe Ruth, the

Ruth trade, and Harry Frazee in the Boston Globe and the Boston Post throughout the rest of

1920 shows how the narratives around the trade began to evolve as the ramifications became

clearer.

In the immediate aftermath of the trade Frazee’s narrative seemed to be winning. Two

days after publishing the initial story of the trade on January 6, the Boston Globe ran another

story which seemed to indicate that Frazee intended to follow through on his promise to spend

the money to improve the club. As a result, the Globe’s James C. O’Leary cheerfully speculated

on the types of players Frazee would acquire in a January 8th article titled simply, “Frazee to

Announce A New Deal Today.” O’Leary going so far as to claim that, “its [the Red Sox 82

“machine”] chances of being a contender for the championship undoubtedly will be better than if

the big fellow [Ruth] remained.” 83

The appearance of action on the part of Frazee and the relative peace of the off season

allowed Frazee to create a fantastical narrative that would soon be challenged by reality. Within

81 ibid. 82 James C. O’Leary, “Frazee To Announce A New Deal Today,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), January 8, 1920 83 Ibid

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a month of the initial reports of Ruth’s sale, fan sentiment began to more clearly turn against

Frazee. On January 18th, the Boston Globe published a story which showed the growing fan

discontent. The Pere Marquette Council of the Knights of Columbus of South Boston published

a formal protest declaring their opposition to the trade. The Boston Globe related excerpts of the

declaration:

[...] It is the consensus of opinion in K. of C. circles that Boston fans were dealt with unfairly in the sale of Brother Ruth, and that it is felt that commercialism is fast gaining control over baseball as a sport [...] [asking that] the resolutions be construed as expressing the opinion of 1500 members of the Pere Marquette Council, K. of C., as terming the sale of Ruth an unfair proposition to him, to Boston fandom, and to the sport-loving city of Boston. 84

While not as stringent as later complaints would be, it is clear that the money was already being

seen as the primary motivator of the trade.

By the time the season began, the anti-Frazee narrative began to take a more prominent

form. In the Boston Globe’s coverage of the first game between the Yankees and Red Sox during

the 1920 season on April 19, a veneer of early season optimism is tarnished by an analysis by

frequent mention of the Ruth sale and comparisons of the Red Sox’ attempts to replace Ruth's

production. A May 26th article by James C. O’Leary claiming that Babe Ruth would not be 85

missed, “When Harry Hooper Decides to Settle Game With His Own Bat,” was immediately

undermined when the Boston Globe published an article the next day which indicated that he

very much was missed. In a short blurb published on May 27, the Boston Globe encourages

readers to turn out to Fenway to see Babe Ruth and the Yankees play the Red Sox for the last

time until September with the headline, “Look Who Comes Today, Babe Ruth.” 86

84 “K.C. Protest on the Sale of Babe Ruth,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), January 18, 1920. 85 “Red Sox Ready for Huggins’ Sluggers,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), April 19, 1920. 86 “Look Who Comes Today, Babe Ruth,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), May 27, 1927. Coincidentally, this would be the last day the Red Sox would be in first place during the 1920 season.

Drolette 45

As the Red Sox’ early on field success in the 1920 season gave way to mediocrity, the

reality of the Red Sox came to be more clearly defined by the loss of Ruth. Coverage of the team

in the Boston Globe related almost every occurrence to Ruth. As one might expect, the Boston

Globe, as well as many other papers across the United States, closely tracked Ruth’s

accomplishments as he began demolishing his own home run record. What is probably less 87

expected is the assertion that pitching to Ruth in a close game caused Red Sox pitcher Allen

Russell to suffer, “a slight stroke.” 88

The ultimate sign of the power of Ruth’s absence can be seen in the arrangement of a,

“Babe Ruth Day,” at Fenway Park on September 4, 1920. Organized by the same Knights of 89

Columbus organization which had published its formal protest of his trade in January, the event

represents a manifestation of the popular narrative which had emerged to challenge Frazee’s.

Going into the game the Red Sox had a record of 62 wins and 66 losses while the Yankees had a

record of 80 wins and 52 losses. The Yankees were on their way to best season to date while 90

the Red Sox were second straight finish in the bottom half of the American League. While the

Red Sox would ultimately finish marginally better than the year before, it would be hard to argue

that any Red Sox fans at the time would have seen the selling of Ruth to be worth the prize of

87 Ruth had set the single season record with 29 in 1919. He would hit 54 in 1920 and 59 in 1921. An example of the type of coverage given by the Globe and other can be seen in a Jun 18, 1920 article titled “How Battering Babe Has Made 19 Homers,” which provides an in depth breakdown of the when and how of each of home run. 88 “Russell Suffers a Slight Stroke,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), July 1, 1920. Charles F. Faber, “Allen Russell,” SABR, Published January 22, 2011. http://sabr.org/bioproj/person/9a72a72e#_edn6 Remarkably, Russell would pitch for five more seasons in the major league after recovering from paralysis. As the SABR biography points out, Russell’s hemorrhage was most likely related to being hit in the head earlier in the season and not from pitching to Ruth. 89 “Babe Ruth Day at Fenway Park Today,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA),September 4, 1920. 90 Before starting this series with the Yankees on September 2, the Red Sox had gone 40- 51 since their last game against the Yankees on May 29. The Yankees went 59-37 during the same time frame.

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finishing in fifth place instead of sixth place. This, “Babe Ruth Day,” was not a franchise 91

sanctioned ceremony held for a long beloved player retiring as would come to be the norm for

sports in the modern era. Rather, it was an fan organized outpouring of affection for an

incredibly talented twenty five year old player who had been sold to another team because of

financial concerns. The ownership had promised that the sacrifice of losing a player like Ruth

would be justified by immediate results and long term financial stability. Ultimately, Harry

Frazee was unable to deliver on either account.

The Crippling of Fan Trust

As Frazee’s financial problems became more prominent, he chose to sell more players to

the Yankees. In what would later be termed the, “Rape of the Red Sox,” by journalist Burt

Whitman, Frazee sold the contracts of fourteen other players to the Yankees between 1919 and

1923. Later historian Frederick G. Lieb describes the fallout of Frazee’s practices in his 1947 92

history entitled Boston Red Sox. Pulling no punches when it comes to Frazee’s business practices

in the later years of his ownership. Lieb writes:

What happened in the years after the 1918 pennant has been described as “Boston baseball’s dark ages,” Harry Frazee’s Crime,” and some other niceties that wouldn’t pass Boston’s book censors. Burt Whitman [a reporter for the Boston Herald], who suffered through it all, terms it “the Rape of the Red Sox.” Harry Frazee once told the author the rape wasn’t premeditated. He didn’t plan it that way, it just happened. He needed money, and the Yankee Colonels, [Jacob] Ruppert and [Tillinghast] Huston, hungry for a winner, had plenty of it. 93

It was perhaps easier for Lieb to see that Frazee was focused on financial gain looking back at

the Ruth Sale twenty years later, but he was not the only person to make note of Frazee's

91 The 1919 Red Sox finished at 66-71 in a war truncated season. The 1920 Red Sox finished at 72-81. 92 See appendix A for a full list of the players traded 93 Lieb, 178

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struggles. Lieb also quotes Johnny Drohan of the Boston Traveler as claiming that there was a

clear public perception of Frazee’s profits from the player sales going directly to fund his theater

interest. According to Lieb, Drohan would be heard to say,“Well, another one of Frazee’s road

companies will eat for the next few weeks,” whenever Frazee sold another player’s contract to

the Yankees. 94

Other journalists were less flippant about Frazee’s practices than Drohan. On December

1, 1920, the Boston Post published an article which accused Harry Frazee and New York

Yankees owner Jacob Ruppert of practicing syndicate baseball. Boldly leading with the headline,

“Red Sox Tied Up By Syndicate,” The Posts’ Howard G. Reynolds revealed that the Ruth deal a

year earlier had included a $300,000 loan from Jacob Ruppert to Harry Frazee, a fact that had not

been revealed to the public at the time of the sale. Laying out his argument in no uncertain 95

terms, Reynolds calls for the removal of Frazee as owner:

Harry Frazee, the most unpopular owner of a ball club that Boston ever had, must be forced out in some way. If the league does not do it, the fans will by refusing to patronize his ball yard. Boston fans have stood a lot from Frazee [...] But they will not stands for syndicate baseball. That is what the American league, through the evidence of connection of the New York and Boston clubs, is fostering [..] The constitution of the American league forbids the owners of any club to hold stock in any other club in the same league. Can this also apply to a mortgage? Or was the mortgage just to cover up and allow Ban Johnson to wink at the irregularity existing between Ruppert, et al, and Frazee, as he had winked at other irregularities? 96

Two follow up articles appearing in the Boston Post over the next two days speculate that a local

group of business man were in position to buy the club and even that former Red Sox great Bill

94 Ibid, 178. The full context of this quote is examined in chapter one. 95 Howard G. Reynolds, “Red Sox Tied up By Syndicate,” Boston Post (Boston, MA), December 1, 1920. 96 ibid.

Drolette 48

Carrigan wanted to be involved. On the same day that the Post published the latter claim, 97

Frazee refuted the news in a Boston Globe article. 98

It is ultimately unclear how close Frazee came to selling the team in 1920, but the fact

that the Post published these stories as if they were accomplished facts, taken in conjunction with

Reynolds’ accusations of syndicate baseball, demonstrate clearly that Frazee’s narrative of the

Ruth sale had lost to an emerging popular narrative.

Ownership and Betrayal

Harry Frazee’s time as owner of the Red Sox was characterized by a great loss of fan

faith in the franchise. The collective response to the economically influenced sales of players

demonstrates a deep dissatisfaction and sense of betrayal amongst fans. More importantly, it

demonstrates the lack of supernatural explanation during this period. Fans and the media the time

saw the results of the sale as having a very rational, human explanation. Frazee had sold the best

players to pay his bills, therefore the team could not possibly compete with such an owner. As

evidenced by the accusations of syndicate baseball and of stories of his theater interests thriving ,

many felt that Harry Frazee had betrayed his role as team owner by putting his other financial

obligations above his baseball related duties. Despite Frazee’s attempts to claim otherwise, the

idea that the Ruth sale was a good baseball move was neither accepted at the time or considered

such after later moves.

The selling of the team in 1923 was seen as an end to the troubles brought on by Frazee.

While it's undoubted that the state he left the team in when he sold the team contributed to the

97 “Red Sox Under Hub Ownership,” Boston Post (Boston, MA), December 2, 1920 “Bill Carrigan in Red Sox Deal,” Boston Post (Boston, MA), December 3, 1920 98 James C. O’Leary,” Frazee Denies Deal is Made For Red Sox,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), December 3, 1920.

Drolette 49

struggles of the team throughout the next decade, curses were not thought to be any part of it.

The Boston Globe coverage of the sale from Harry Frazee to Bob Quinn on July 30, 1923 is

sparse and makes no mention of anything but the basic details. At the point where one would 99

most expect it, there is no mention of the Ruth sale or any supernatural malady brought on by

Frazee. Frazee was understood to be perpetrator of a great pain, but a pain that was temporary

and caused by the fickle financial decisions of a human. In the end Frazee had sold the team as

he had bought it, quietly and quickly.

Chapter 3

The Failed Dynasty of 1946-1949

Between 1946 and 1949 the Boston Red Sox were one of the most successful teams in

baseball. In the four seasons following World War II, the Red Sox would have a record of 378

wins against 238 losses ( a .614 winning percentage), the most successful four year period in

franchise history. This on field success would translate to a World Series appearance in 1946, the

first in 28 years. Unfortunately, they would ultimately lose to the St. Louis Cardinals in seven

games. This loss would be followed by two more traumatic losses in the 1948 American League

tie-breaker game (to the Cleveland Indians) and on the last day of the 1949 season (to the New

York Yankees). The Red Sox were thus left on the outside looking in despite their best efforts.

An examination of the newspaper coverage primarily in the Boston Globe, but also in the

Boston Herald, and Boston Traveler will show that the media coverage of the Red Sox in this

time period is characterized by a shift from optimism to pessimism. Buoyed by the general

environment of post-war optimism, the excitement of players returning from the war, and the

99 James C. O’Leary, “Quinn and Frazee to Confer on Sale Today,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), July 30, 1923.

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appearance of baseball returning to its pre-war quality, the coverage of the 1946 World Series

initially brimmed with optimism. As the series went on and it became clear that the Red Sox

might not fulfill expectations, the coverage became more critical and, ultimately, fatalistic. A

similar pattern is also seen in the coverage of the 1948 and 1949 teams. Tempered by recent

failures, the coverage begins optimistically before dramatically devolving to bitterness and

frustration.

The assignment of blame for these failures is clear. In each instance there is a moment, a

player, or a manager singled out as the definitive reason why the Red Sox didn’t succeed. These

symbols of failure, however, were not connected to the previous failures associated with Harry

Frazee or the sale of Babe Ruth. The collective memory in this period was focused on the

present. The past failures were seen as unfortunate and there was an awareness of how long it

had been since the Red Sox had won, but the collective response was not focused on past failures

nearly as much as the later curse ideology. There was no suggestion of supernatural explanations

for the present failures. Humanity, not an abstract curse was seen as the cause of failure.

The Red Sox under Thomas Yawkey

After Frazee sold the team in 1923, the Red Sox entered their worst performing decade.

Quinn attempted to build a competitive team, but was crippled by the death of his chief financial

backer Palmer Winslow in 1927. Quinn held on until just before the start of the 1933 when he

sold the team to Thomas Yawkey. The nephew and foster son of former Detroit Tigers owner

Bill Yawkey, Thomas Yawkey had recently come into his inheritance as age 30 and was

enthusiastic about creating a winning team. Yawkey would own the team until his death in 1976,

whereupon his wife Jean Yawkey would own the team until her death in 1992.

Drolette 51

Yawkey was much more financially stable than either Quinn or Frazee. Almost

immediately, he started to spend like Yankees owner Col. Jacob Ruppert, acquiring a series of

high profile players to bolster the roster. During the later half of the 1930’s, Yawkey’s Red 100

Sox also started to sign players who would be stars of the game in the coming decades including

Bobby Doerr (1935), Ted Williams (1937), Dom Dimaggio (1939), and Johnny Pesky (1940). 101

Largely as a result of Yawkey’s spending, the Red Sox began to steadily improve in the

first ten years of Yawkey’s ownership. Between 1933 and 1943, the Red Sox would finish

second in the American league four times (1938-1939, 1941-1942) and finish in the top half of

the American League another three times (1934-1935, 1940). Although still hopelessly

outclassed by the New York Yankees, the Red Sox were beginning to creep back into

respectability after a decade of futility.

The Effect of WWII

World War Two had a dramatic impact on professional baseball. While the MLB would

continue to operate throughout the duration of the war, over five hundred active players served in

the military. This caused the quality of baseball played during the war to dip noticeably. 102

Historian Bill James offers this description of the game during the war:

With most good players in the service, a collection of old men and children and men with one arm and seven dependents gathered around a dull spheroid, and this was called “major league baseball” for three years. This baseball was characterized by low batting

100 His acquisitions included future included pitcher Lefty Grove (1933), catcher Rick Ferrell (1933), pitcher Wes Ferrell (1934), shortstop-manager Joe Cronin (1934), and outfielder Jimmie Foxx (1935).The dates for these acquisitions are drawn from each player's respective baseballreference.com page. Cronin would manage the team from 1935 until 1947, setting the franchise record for wins by a manager with 1071. 101 Grove, Foxx, Cronin, Rick Ferrell, Williams, and Doerr would all eventually be elected to the Hall of Fame. 102 Gary Bedingfield, “Baseball in World War II,” Baseball in Wartime, published in 2014, accessed 12/5/2017, http://www.baseballinwartime.com/baseball_in_wwii/baseball_in_wwii.htm

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averages, low home run totals, and an unusual number of bases being stolen by anyone thirty-seven or younger. 103

While every team was affected, the Red Sox lost the services of many of their most high profile

players:

● Drafted in 1942 -Ted Williams, Dom DiMaggio, Johnny Pesky, Frankie Pytlak, Tom Carey, Eddie Pellagrini, Joe Dobson, Charley Wagner, Bill Butland, and Earl Johnson

● Drafted in 1944- Tex Hughson and Bobby Doerr 104

Ultimately, thirty Red Sox players served in World War Two. 105

The 1946 World Series

The prospect of a season with all the Red Sox regulars back on the field was beyond

exciting for many Red Sox fans. Even in a cautious article by Boston Globe columnist Gerry

Moore called, “Sox Not So Good as Their Clippings,” published on April 16th, 1946, the author

cannot help but get caught up in general feeling of optimism. After chastising fans and fellow

journalists for giving the pennant to the Red Sox before the season began, Moore still takes a

positive tone:

Wait a minute! That doesn’t mean that the familiar cry of “wait until next year!” has to be raised this early. It may be only within a couple of weeks, or again it may take a couple of months, before the Sox take the form of a cohesive unit capable of challenging on even terms the Yankees, Tigers, and the rest of the field for baseball’s blue’ ribbon award so long and patiently awaited hereabouts. 106

Moore goes on to elaborate on the role of returning veterans in the Sox success. Providing brief

profiles of several returning players,Moore then offers this assertion:

103 James, 197. 104 Lieb 231, 233 105 Gary Bedingfield, “Those Who Served,” Baseball in Wartime, published in 2008, accessed on 12/5/2017, http://www.baseballinwartime.com/those_who_served/those_who_served_al.htm . This webpage contains a full list of the players drafted. 106 Gerry Moore, “Sox Not So Good as Their Clippings,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), April 16, 1946.

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On, if and when, these aforementioned athletes, or a few dark horse , members of the cast, start clicking again, depends the day on which the Sox can present a pennant painting on paper. 107

The results of the regular season made Moore seem like a confused prophet. His cautiousness

proved to be unnecessary, but he could not have been more right about the role of returning

players.

The Red Sox were by far the most dominant team in the American League in 1946.

Reinforced by the play of returning veterans such as Ted Williams, Bobby Doerr, and Tex

Hughson, the Red Sox spent only one day out of first place all season long, won 104 games

overall, and easily glided to the pennant with a twelve game lead. To the fans, the Red Sox 108

seemed to be finally returning to the dominance of the early twentieth century. The matchup with

the St. Louis Cardinals was highly anticipated.

The coverage of the World Series would be intentionally framed against the history of the

franchise. On September 29, 1946 the Boston Herald published a front page story by John

Fenton titled, “Red Sox Prepare to Prolong Traditional Series Mastery.” With the Red Sox

having officially finished the regular season as American League champions earlier that day,

Fenton opens his article with a demand to the Red Sox live up to their history:

When the Red Sox charge out of their dugout for the first game of the 1946 world series this week on foreign soil they will be carrying a mandate far more important than satisfying a pennant hunger that has been growing for 28 years. That mandate of their Boston fans will be that they also bring home the world championship as five Red Sox teams before them have done without fail, for no Boston team has lost a World Series. 109

107 ibid. 108 “1946 Boston Red Sox Schedule,” Baseball Reference, 11/02/ 2017, https://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/BOS/1946-schedule-scores.shtml 109 John Fenton, “Red Sox Prepare to Prolong Traditional Series Mastery,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), September 29, 1946. It should be noted that the list of “Boston Teams” should include the 1914 Boston Braves.

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Fenton spends the rest of his article providing a summary of each previous championships,

exhorting his readers to remember the victories of the past. Fenton ends with a sober reminder of

what came after with the simple line, “Then began the long, long wait.” Unfortunately for Fenton

and his readers, the wait was really just beginning.

The 1946 World Series lasted from October 6 until October 15 and ended with the St.

Louis Cardinals claiming victory in the seventh game. As the series went on, the general tone of

the coverage shifted from the optimism seen in Fenton’s September 29th article to more

pessimistic forms of analysis. Two days before the series began, the Boston Traveler’s Gordon

Campbell wrote, “Red Sox See Series Over in 4 or 5.” Campbell claims that unnamed sources 110

on the team looked forward to relatively easy victory and that the extra rest they had between the

end of the regular season and the beginning of the World Series only helped them. Ted Williams

went on the record the next day with the Boston Globe to claim much of the same thing. 111

After an extra innings victory in game one the Red Sox seemed to be backing up

Campbell and Williams’ claims, but already the idea of easy victory was coming under attack.

After the first game an exasperated Ted Williams claimed to George C. Carens of the Boston

Traveler that he thought he would be traded after the series citing disagreements with owner

Tom Yawkey. Expressing some bewilderment in an article called, “Williams Sure He’s Been

Sold,” Carens writes, “What about this World Series, which has three or more games left games

110 Gordon Campbell, “Red Sox See Series Over in 4 or 5 Games,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 4, 1946. 111 Ted Williams, “Ted Williams Says: Cards Better than Odds but Sox Will Cop Series,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 5, 1946.

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left? What's the sense of worrying about next year when great thrills are at hand?” Williams 112

sense of frustration set a tone adopted by many of the other writers covering the series.

Two articles from the October 8th edition of the Boston Globe show a growing sense of

dread about the Red Sox after the Cardinals won game two. First Harold Kaese voiced his doubts

about the Red Sox chances in an article called, “What’s the Matter with the Red Sox?” Citing a

lack of experience and an unaccustomed amount of pressure, Kaese writes:

On top of all this, the Red Sox have the jitters. They are not fielding cleanly or with confidence. Johnny Pesky, a high-strung kid, has not been relaxed [..] The Red Sox have a minimum of World Series experience. Compared to the Cardinals, who won the closest of all pennant races, they don’t know what pressure is. 113

Red Smith echoes Kaese in an article published on the same day called, “Pressure Cards’ Dish,

It’s New to the Bosox Menu.” Smith argues that the pre-series optimism was ridiculous by

putting it within the context of the series’ first two games:

They were saying before today’s game that this unseasonal round of pitch-catch could easily end on Thursday because the Cardinals stumbled just one put-out short of victory in the first game their daubers might be so low an oil rigger couldn’t dredge them up in time to win a ball game [...] To the Sox the Summer was as pleasant as a bird, a bottle

and a blonde. They ran off by themselves at the start of the season and what followed was one long, sweet song at even tide. Not once did their lodge brothers of the American League make them rise to a challenge. The Cardinals had their heads in the ringer from April on, had to fight to last breath for the fight to get into this postseason brawl. Perhaps it was fancy, but the difference seemed apparent on the sunny pastures of Sportsman’s park today. 114

As the series evolved to be a back-and-forth brawl, coverage continued much in this same vein.

On October 12 the Globe published a story by Elizabeth Watts about the nervousness of the Red

112 George C. Carens, “Williams Sure He Has Been Sold,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 07, 1946. 113 Harold Kaese, “What’s the Matter With the Red Sox?,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA) October 08, 1946. Kaese’s note on Pesky would prove oddly prescient. 114 Red Smith, “Pressure Cards’ Dish, It’s New to the Bosox Menu,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 8, 1946

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Sox players’ wives over the results of the series, followed by another Harold Kaese article on

the 14th that claimed, “St. Louis Not that Good! Black Eye for A.L. If Cards Win Series.” In 115

this latter piece, Kaease again harps on the Red Sox failings and particularly those of Ted

Williams:

If the Red Sox lose the deciding game of the World Series here tomorrow, if their crown be the thorny garlands of the defeat by the Cardinals, then-- It will be a helluva long train ride back to Boston.[...] A Boston team will have been beaten in a World Series for the first time in history. [...] and Ted Williams will be filed away among the greatest of World Series flops. [...] The Red Sox were also using psychology tonight, but on themselves instead of the Cardinals. They are trying to get steamed up for tomorrow’s crisis. But the Red Sox, who won the pennant easily, are weary, while the Cardinals, who battled through 162 games since April, are not a bit tired.

When the Red Sox failed to win the seventh game of the series, Kaese’s fears came true. The

narrative that Kaese and Smith put forth would ultimately come to characterize the collective

memory surrounding the 1946 Red Sox. A team that could triumph in the regular season with

little apparent effort, but could not succeed in the postseason due a lack of psychological

fortitude. An analysis of the reaction to one particular play in the game seven bears out much of

the same idea.

Johnny Pesky and Enos Slaughter’s “Mad Dash”

Tied at three runs each in the bottom of the eighth inning of game 7 , Cardinals left

fielder Harry Walker came to bat with notoriously slow Cardinals outfielder Enos Slaughter on

first base. Walker hit a ball to Red Sox centerfielder Leon Culberson, who was filling in for an

injured Dom DiMaggio. Culberson had trouble fielding before throwing it to Red Sox shortstop

Johnny Pesky. Slaughter ran at full speed base and scored on the play. Pesky was surprised by

115 Elizabeth Watts, “Faces of Wives Reflect Series Fortunes,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 12, 1946 Harold Kaese, “St. Louis Not that Good! Black Eye for A.L. If Cards Win Series,” Boston Globe, (Boston, MA), October 14, 1946

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Slaughter trying to score, reportedly hesitated, and made his throw late. The Red Sox would fail

to score in the top of the ninth and lose the game by a score of four to three. 116

This play is one of the events that makes up the cannon of the, “Curse of the Bambino,”

ideology. Shaughnessy discusses the play at length in chapter four of his Curse of the Bambino

and it features prominently in the HBO documentary of the same name. It is important to note

that while papers at the time didn’t ascribe the incident the same supernatural significance as

later authors, it was recognized as the defining moment of the World Series. The first edition of

the Boston Traveler published after the game on October 15 makes mention of the play, but it

was not until the next day that Boston Herald called the play the, “Mad Dash”. In that same 117

edition, Will Cloney wrote an article called, “ ‘I Gave Him About Six Steps,’ Admits Pesky.”

Explaining what happened, Pesky said:

Ordinarily the third baseman or somebody would yell that the man was trying to score, but there was so much noise that I didn’t hear anything. By the time I saw Slaughter it was too late to get him. I gave him about six steps while I was holding the ball. I’m the goat alright, I just should have been alert for anything. 118

Gracious as it might have been for Pesky to take the blame for the play, it unfortunately

cemented Pesky’s place as one of the perpetrators of failure in the collective memory of the 1946

World Series. Pesky became the goat that he claimed and his name quickly became associated

with hesitation or stupidity. The same day as this Pesky quote was published in the Herald, the

Boston Globe ran two stories related to the play. One written by Whiteney Martin compared

116 A full play by play account of game seven can be found on page forty six of the October 15th evening edition of the Boston Traveler. 117 Gordon Campbell, “Card Champions Beat Red Sox in Final 4-3,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 15, 1946 “Cards Topple Sox 4-3, Capture Title,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 16, 1946 118 Will Cloney, “‘I Gave Him About Six Steps,’ Admits Pesky,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 16, 1946

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Slaughters run to Paul Revere’s ride, casting Pesky in the unfortunate role of a stooge. The 119

other was written by Jerome Sullivan and dramatically called, “Sox Meet Doom, Hopes Go

Boom, Hub in Gloom.” Opening his article with a parody of Ernest L. Thayer’s, “Casey at the

Bat,” that casts Boston as the proverbial Mudville, Sullivan goes on to lament the many what ifs

and missed opportunities of the series. In a hypothetical musing, Sullivan writes, “If only Pesky

had whirled and thrown automatically--with Slaughter on the sacks, what did he expect?” 120

Continuing his analysis of the city after the Red Sox lost , Sullivan writes:

‘If, If, If’ -- those were the sad syllables that rolled from the tongues of a sorry Boston last night as the game was replayed and second-guessed throughout the city in every restaurant, tavern, club and many private homes [...] ‘They lost it.’one man gasped to himself as if he were about to breathe his last. ‘They lost it,’ he repeated. 121

Red Sox fans were devastated, but even in this moment of despair the failure of the team was

seen in human terms. There was no mention of Babe Ruth, positive or negative, in the coverage

of the series and there was certainly no mention of a curse. Instead the failings of the team were

picked apart by writers like Kaese and blame was doled out to the players seen to be the most

responsible, with particular focus on Johnny Pesky because of the events of game 7. A similar

pattern would occur in both 1948 and 1949.

119 Whiteney Martin, “Slaughter Run Like Paul Revere’s Ride,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 16, 1946. 120 Jerome Sullivan, “Sox Meet Doom, Hopes Go Boom, Hub in Gloom,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 16, 1946 121 ibid.

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The 1948 American League Playoff Game

The Red Sox failed to repeat the success of their 1946 season in 1947, winning twenty

four less games and placing fourteen games out of first place. After the season manager Joe

Cronin replaced Eddie Collins as the general manager and Tom Yawkey hired former Yankees’

manager Joe McCarthy as a replacement. Under McCarthy's leadership the Red Sox rebounded

during the 1948 season, but it would ultimately only be good enough for a tie. In what would be

prove to be a dramatic pennant race, the Red Sox, Yankees, and Cleveland Indians had identical

records through 147 games. Over the last seven games of the season first place shifted between

the three teams until the Red Sox beat the Yankees to eliminate them from postseason on the

second to last game of the season on October 2nd. The Red Sox would add another victory the 122

next day to bring their final record to 96 wins and 58 losses. After the Indians lost to the Detroit

Tigers on the last day of the season, the Red Sox and Indians were tied for the American League

pennant.

For the first time in the history of the American League, there would have to be a playoff

game with the winner representing the American League in the World Series against the Boston

Braves. Initially, the Red Sox and their fans were initially full of optimism. The morning of the 123

game, the Boston Globe ran a pair of glowing articles about the team titled, “Hose Confident,

Hold Celebration in Locker Room,” and, “McCarthy Full of High Praise for Sox Players.” The 124

Boston Herald and Boston Traveler followed suit, with Bill Cunningham of the Herald

122 “Red Sox Knock Yanks Out of Race,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 3, 1948 This edition of the Herald offers a full account of the game as well as a humorous cartoon summary. 123 The Braves won five less games than both the Red Sox and Indians, but had won the NL by 6.5 games due to a down year in competition. The Braves clinched with six games to go on September 26. 124 “Hose Confident, Hold Celebration in Locker Room,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 4, 1948 “McCarthy Full of High Praise for Sox Players,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 4, 1948

Drolette 60

describing the enthusiasm of the fans in, “Series Fever Grips Fans,” and George C. Carens of the

Traveler comparing the thrill of the playoff game to the chariot races of ancient Rome in,

“Fenway Drama Miracle of Communication.” 125

Optimism, however, was not the sole message of the day. Harold Kaese of the Boston

Globe, noted critic of the Red Sox during the 1946 World Series, took a more cautious approach

in his front page article titled, “ Sox, Indians Battle for Flag at Fenway.” Leading with the

subtitle, “No World Series Can Quite Match the Flag Race Thrills,” Kaese focuses on the

nervousness leading up to the game and the potential fallout of a loss. After encouraging his

readers to try the drug propylthiouracil for nerves, Kaese writes:

No World Series-whether it be between the Braves and Red Sox or (Boo! The Braves and Indians [ ) ], can equal the thrills of a close pennant race, such as the one which will be decided by today’s playoff between the Red Sox and Indians at Fenway park. When today’s game is played, the town figures to be flat on its back from nervous exhaustion. Before the patient recovers enough to take sports nourishment, the entire football season is likely to have passed [...]. 126

Kaese goes on to stress the historical importance of the game, ending with an allusion to

Shakespeare’s Henry V which compares the participants in the game to the English soldiers at

the battle of Agincourt by suggesting that, “he which hath no stomach to this fight, Let him

depart.” 127

The Red Sox would fail to live up to the lofty expectations set for them by Kaese and

others. In the lead up to the game manager Joe McCarthy attempted to gain an advantage over

the Indians by refusing to name his starting pitcher for as long as possible, ultimately deciding to

125 Bill Cunningham, “Series Fever Grips Fans,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 4, 1948 George C. Carens, “Fenway Drame Miracle of Communication,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 4, 1948 126 Harold Kaese, “Sox, Indians Battle for Flag at Fenway,” Boston Globe, (Boston, MA), October 4, 1948 127 Ibid.

Drolette 61

have thirty-six year old Denny Galehouse start the game. This decision backfired spectacularly.

Galehouse was out of the game after three innings, but not before allowing four earned runs. The

Indians would score another four runs off of Galehouse’s replacement, Ellis Kinder, while

Indians’ starter Gene Bearden would pitch a complete game and hold the Red Sox to three runs.

The result of the game sapped all optimism from the coverage of the team. What had

previously been seen as a fantastic accomplishment was now seen as nullified by the end result.

Starting the day after the game on October 5th, Boston papers began to lament how silly it had

been to expect victory from the Red Sox. Burt Whitman of the Boston Herald summed up how

the Indians had burst , “pretty bubble that was the dream of an all-Boston World Series.” 128

Elsewhere in the Herald, an unnamed journalist declared that, “The pitcher-starved Red Sox lost

the pennant in one game as the shortests baseball season on Record for Boston and the American

League opened and closed here yesterday.” Bill Cunningham of the Herald took a slightly 129

more forgiving tack, praising the Red Sox for making it as far as they did in an article called,

“Indians Rise to Occasion,”, but he still criticizes Joe McCarthy’s pitching decisions and

bemoans the Red Sox lack of , “money players.” John Drohan of the Boston Traveler was 130

perhaps less cutting in his criticism in his article simply titled, “Sox Lose out,”, but his

description of the the Indians having, “splattered the Hose hopes all over the premises,” leaves

little to the imagination as to how well the game actually went. 131

The Boston Globe provides some of the most dramatic reactions to the loss. Almost

repeating the title of an article he wrote during the 1946 World Series, Harold Kaese once again

128 Burt Whitman, “5000 Tickets for Standees at 7 Tonight,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 5, 1948 129 “Back to the Indians,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 5, 1948 130 Bill Cunningham, “Indians Rise to the Occasion,” Boston Herald (Boston, MA), October 5, 1948 131 Jack Drohan, “Sox Lose Out,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 5, 1948

Drolette 62

came down hard on the Red Sox in an article called, “What WAS Matter With Our Red Sox?” In

a diatribe that seems like it should be aimed at an owner like Frazee, Kaese first targets Tom

Yawkey:

The best catcher on the Red Sox is not Birdie Tebbetts, but Tom Yawkey. Only Tom catches ‘em on the whiskers. In his 16 years as Red Sox owner Yawkey had spent around $2,000,000 for players alone. What has he got, beside a lot of thrills and laughs? One Pennant. The Red Sox must have muffed on in ‘46, when they finished first.[..] The Red Sox never sit still. They are not content to lose the pennant the same way two years in a row. Last Fall they hire a new manager in Joe McCarthy. This Fall they have already fired Phil Troy and George Toporcer. It’s a cinch Troy and Toporcer did not lose the pennant. 132

Kaese then goes on turn his attention against the pitching staff and management, providing

detailed breakdowns of the what and why of the, “downfall,” of the season. 133

Surprisingly, Kaese does not single out McCarthy’s decision to start Galehouse in the

playoff game in this article. Instead he takes the entire pitching staff to task and even praises

McCarthy for doing what he could. That would not be the case later in the month. By the the

time he wrote the article, “McCarthy Babied Ace, So Kramer got Long Rest and No Relief

Chores,” on October 27, it is clear that Kaese had changed his mind about McCarthy’s managing

prowess. Kaese opens his article with the sarcastic claim that a sampling from, “Ignatz the

Galloping Pole,” showed that the most popular claim among males in the age group from 8-98

was, “Why did Joe McCarthy start Denny Galehouse in the American League pennant playoff

against the Cleveland Indians here over three weeks ago?” Annoyed at McCarthy for not 134

explaining his reasoning , Kaese again adopts an acidic tone:

132 Harold Kaese, “What WAS Matter with our Red Sox,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 5, 1948 133 Ibid. 134 McCarthy Babied Ace, So Kramer Got Long Rest and No Relief Chores,” Boston Globe, October 27, 1948

Drolette 63

Since the Red Sox manager has issued no communiques on the subject in the past 24 hours, or even the past 24 days (nor will he in the next 24 years), we can only surmise the answer, hoping to come as close as the character who said the gubernatorial race would be won by peanuts. 135

Kaese then cites several particular incidences of mismanagement and argues that McCarthy

should have used pitcher Jack Kramer.

More important than the individual criticism mentioned by Kaese is the impact of his

sentiments. Much as Johnny Pesky had become the goat for the 1946 World Series, McCarthy

would be thrown under the proverbial bus for the 1948 playoff game. Kaese’s October 27th

article was one of several published by the Globe in the weeks after the game which tried to

assign blame for the game, most of which blamed McCarthy and Galehouse in some capacity.

Overall, the public perception had turned against the Red Sox. Aside from the Kaese’s hit pieces

and formal criticisms launched by other journalists, fans themselves were fed up by what they

saw as a lack of effort and copious attempts to shift blame. Predating the famous, “25 players, 25

cabs,” line used to describe the Red Sox of the 1980’s, albeit with a milder tone, Tom Monahan

of the Boston Traveler wrote about the dispersal of the team after the loss on October 5. Two 136

days later a letter to the editor of the Boston Globe from one Philip K. Pehda of Roxbury shows

a sense of intense frustration. Describing the Red Sox reaction to a Braves player named Jeff

Heath wishing the Cleveland Indians luck in the playoff game, Pehda writes with clear anger:

If the Red Sox think that the Braves’ comment hoping Cleveland would win the American League pennant “jinxed” them, let them be assure that the larger segment of baseball fans realizes Cleveland won, not because of that well wishing, but because the largest group of prima donna ever assembled on one ball club just didn’t have it in the clutch. Baltimore’s looking for a franchise. Let’s give em the Sox. 137

135 ibid. 136 Tom Monahan, “Red Sox Start Exodus from Hub,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA). October 5, 1948. 137 Philip K. Pehda, “Wants to Give Baltimore the Red Sox Franchise,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 7, 1948.

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This frustration was brought to the fore by the failure of the 1948 playoff game, but the

combination of this failure with the previous failure of the 1946 World Series severely damaged

how the team perceived throughout the remainder of this period.

Here again it is important to note that the failures of the 1948 team were seen as a human

problem. The only mention of Babe Ruth in the weeks surrounding the 1948 American League

tiebreaker is a short Boston Globe article from October 26th describing Ruth’s funeral in New

York. The article makes no mention of his time with the Red Sox, Harry Frazee, or any curse

that he put on the team. None of the coverage of the Red Sox or of that years World Series 138

makes a connection between Ruth’s funeral and the Red Sox franchise in any way. Instead,

McCarthy and Galehouse were seen as the primary agents of the Red Sox failures. The failure of

the next season would another round of targeted blame, again focused on Joe McCarthy.

1949 and the Missed Pennant

With much of the team intact from the season before it seemed that the Red Sox would be

in a strong position to contend for the 1949 American League Pennant. Ultimately, the team

would once again come to the precipice of success only to fail at the last possible moment. After

a rather pedestrian first two and a half months of the season, the Red Sox found themselves in

fifth place and twelve games behind the first place Yankees on July 4th. Then the Red Sox

caught fire. Over the next eighty one games the Red Sox recorded 61 wins against 20 losses,

giving the team a one game lead over the Yankees on September 30th. With a two game series at

Yankee Stadium left to play, the Red Sox would have to win one game to clinch the pennant.

138 “Few Present at Final Rites for Babe Ruth,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 26, 1948. Ruth had passed away from cancer in August.

Drolette 65

Despite the failures of the last few seasons, there was still a moderated sense of optimism

amongst Red Sox fans. The team had surmounted a seemingly impossible gap to catch the

Yankees and it seemed that the Red Sox were finally fulfilling their potential. Taking no

chances, manager Joe McCarthy was planning on starting ace Mel Parnell in the first game of the

series. McCarthy seemed to have learned his lesson from the previous year, clearly trying to

avoid another Denny Galehouse moment. An article praising McCarthy’s decision called,

“Parnell Tries for Pennant Clincher,” appeared in the Boston Traveler the morning of the first

game on October 1st. The article both anticipates the excitement of the game and argues that the

New York team has, “jangled Yankee nerves.” The same day the Traveler announced the 139

pre-sale of World Series tickets, dependent on the result of the game. 140

The October 1 edition of the Boston Globe also praised McCarthy for his

accomplishments. “McCarthy One Game Nearer Possibly Greatest Triumph,” featured a profile

on the manager and describes why a victory in 1949 would mean so much to McCarthy:

He [McCarthy] had won eight big league pennants-- one with the Chicago Cubs and seven with the Yankees. Never had he won a close scramble for the pennant. Twice with the Yankees--in 1940 and ‘44-- he saw his club lose out for the flag during the final week of the race. Last year in his Boston Debut, McCarthy’s first Red Sox team was beaten out of the pennant in the first playoff game in American League history. Three tight races and three McCarthy setbacks. 141

Even as the article goes on to praise McCarthy and hope that he is able to beat his ,”close race,”

jinx, it is clear that recent history prevented the type of enthusiastic optimism seen in the run up

139 “Parnell Tries for Pennant Clincher,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 1, 1949 140 Arthur Siegel, “Red Sox Announce Series Ticket Sale Plans,” Boston Traveler (Boston, MA), October 1, 1949 141 “McCarthy One Game Nearer Possibly Greatest Triumph,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 1, 1949

Drolette 66

to the 1946 World Series. The author’s analysis of McCarthy’s managerial struggles would seem

prescient within the next few days.

Needing one win, the Red Sox lost game on by a score of five to four and the second

game by a score of five to three. As had been the case for nearly the last 30 years, the Red Sox

were forced to watch as the Yankees won the pennant and, eventually, the World Series.

Joe McCarthy and the Memory of Failure

Summing up what must have been the feelings of fans everywhere, Red Sox second

baseman Bobby Doerr was quoted in an October 3rd Boston Globe article as saying, “I’m kind of

tired of being second fiddle again [...] The papers and averages all show we have a great ball

club, but you’ve got to prove it on the field.” Another article where Hy Hurwitz describes the 142

Red Sox as a, “sad batch of second fiddlers,” is accompanied by a Tom Yawkey quote as the

headline, “If We Can’t Win One Out of Two, We Don’t Deserve It.” Fans responded in just as 143

dramatic fashion, with fans in Lawrence staging a mock funeral procession for the team after the

result of the second game. 144

Throughout the remainder of October the Boston Globe featured a series of post-mortem

articles on the Red Sox, with many of them focusing on Joe McCarthy. On October 4th, the

author of , “Sox Had Ingredients, Why Didn’t they Mix?, “ pondered:

The Ingredients were there, but it is possible that McCarthy did not mix his batch properly. Maybe he used one ounce of substitution when the recipe called for for ounces. Maybe he also left out the yeast of inspiration, the salt of determination. How strange for McCarthy, a man famed for putting nine men on the field and letting them do the job, to be exonerated now through the weakness of his bench! 145

142 Hy Hurwitz, “Red Sox Lost Pennant Race ‘On the Road’,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 3, 1949 143 Hy Hurwitz, “ Tom Yawkey says: ‘If We Can’t Win One out of Two, We Don’t Deserve It,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 3, 1949. 144 “Fans Lug Casket in Lawrence as Red Sox Bow, “ Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 3, 1949 145 “Sox Had Ingredients, Why Didn’t They Mix?” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 4, 1949

Drolette 67

This article was published the same day as Red Sox announced that McCarthy would be back as

manager for the 1950 season.

On October 9th, Globe writer Jack Barry attempted to understand why in an article

called, “Globe Sports Writers Answers the Question: “What Kind of Manager is Red Sox’ Joe

McCarthy?”. Criticizing his lack of aggressiveness and, somewhat reluctantly, his almost

too-patient approach with players, Barry does hit on a salient quote from McCarthy that may

provides an intriguing perspective. Describing his motto as a manager, McCarthy says, “If we

win, you guys (the players) take the credit. If We Lose, I’ll take it. That’s the way I want it.”

Much as Johnny Pesky took the blame for Red Sox losing game 7 of the 1946 World Series, Joe

McCarthy used his role as manager to be the punching bag for the collective memory of the

period.

McCarthy’s actions undoubtedly contributed to the failures of the 1948 and 1949 season,

but it now seems foolish to argue that he was solely responsible. In the aftermath of 1949

however, it seems that McCarthy’s pro-player approach exposed him to an disproportionate

amount of criticism. After the Yankees defeated Brooklyn Dodgers in the World Series in five

games, the Globe published a somewhat bitter article called, “Red Sox Better than Brooklyns.”

The unnamed author finishes his article with one last quick jab at McCarthy, writing. “But the

Yankees are champions of the world tonight because they were the come-through club with the

come-through manager.” 146

146 “Red Sox Better than Brooklyns,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), October 10, 1949.

Drolette 68

Destiny Unfulfilled

A period which started so much optimism in the aftermath of world war two would end

with nothing but failure. After a competitive 1950, the Red Sox would slide back to ineptitude.

While the following decade would not be nearly as bad as the 1920’s had been, the 1950’s were

not kind to the Red Sox. The Red Sox would place in the top half of the league seven times

between 1951 and 1966, but they would never some closer than eleven games to first place.

None of the players who returned to the Red Sox after the war would play another World Series

in a Red Sox uniform.

The failures of 1946 to 1949 cemented the Red Sox as a team of failure in the collective

memory of the period. What's more, these failures could only be attributed to the team and its

staff. Whereas an inept figure like Frazee or Quinn could be at least partially be blamed for the

failures of the 1920’s and early 1930’s, the Red Sox teams of the 1940’s had no such buffer. The

team had an owner willing to spend money, some of the best players in the league, and the

coaches and managers to match. This in turn created a hopeful environment which quickly

turned to despair when expectations were not met. Shaughnessy exploits this environment to

shore up a narrative largely based on the experiences of a later generation. Journalists and fans

between 1946 and 1949 paid little attention to factors which the curse ideology stresses. Instead

of seeing the team’s failures as caused by a curse, they saw the failures for what they were.

Human failures caused by human players and managers. Blame was assigned, names were

recorded, and frustration grew.

Drolette 69

Conclusion

For a certain generation of Red Sox fans born after 1986, the, “Curse of the Bambino,”

was reality. It was accepted that the Red Sox couldn’t win because of something a previous

owner had done some seventy-five years earlier. Even if one didn’t believe in the curse’s power,

there was no escaping its pull. Thanks in no small part to Shaughnessy's continued promotion,

the curse saturated the coverage of the team. Yet while it seems that the curse has little

foundation in the pre-1986 period, its value and importance cannot be discounted. Even more

than a decade after the curse supposedly came to an end, the phrase, “Curse of the Bambino,”

can still arouse strong reactions.

The desire to create a satisfying explanation, to lend meaning to fans’ suffering drove the

formation of the franchise wide collective memory in the post 1986 period. The narrative power

of the curse overrode factual accounts of historical events in the name of allowing fans to

connect to the history of the team and the history of its fandom. The fact remains, however, that

the, “Curse of the Bambino,” was an artificial created collective memory device which was then

retroactively applied to previous periods of history.

The collective memory framework produced by the curse ideology, though flawed, had a

significant cultural impact and created a way for fans to deal with their grief. Some fans bought

whole heartedly into the curse’s message, welcoming the chance to blame the team's’ failures

and their own agony on something larger. Others rejected the curse, instead diving into a study of

franchise history. After just such an examination it is clear that collective memories of failures in

the earlier periods of 1920-1921 and 1946-1949 contained no references to a ,“curse,” or any

supernatural explanation. Instead, the struggles of the team in those periods was understood to be

Drolette 70

the result of the historical realities then affecting the game of baseball. In 1920-1921, the

collective response focused on the economic effects of Harry Frazee’s mismanagement on the

team’s ability to compete. In 1946-1949, the blame was assigned to individuals seen as being

responsible for the team not being able to live up to goals created in the optimism of the post-war

environment. In neither period was Babe Ruth seen as a guilty party.

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Appendix A-Brief Overview of Baseball History This appendix contains an overview timeline of the history of professional in the United States between 1876 and 2004. Important events in the history of Boston Red Sox franchise are highlighted. 1876- The National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (hereafter referred to as the National

League) founded. One of the initial franchises is located in Boston. 1893- Ban Johnson made the president of the Western League, a minor league operating in the

mid west 1900- Ban Johnson changed the name of the Western League to the American League of

Professional Baseball Clubs (hereafter referred to as the American League) 1901- Ban Johnson claims Major League status for the American League, American League

begins to operate in direct opposition to the National League. American League franchise installed in Boston.

1903- American League and National League come to an operating arrangement, “war” between the leagues ends.

● Charles Somers sells the American League Franchise in Boston to Henry Killilea ● The first World Series is played, American League franchise from Boston defeats the

National League franchise from Pittsburgh, five games to three

The Reserve Clause As part of the settlement between the American League and the National League, Johnson agreed to respect the contracts of National League players. Part of those contracts was the “Reserve Clause”. Under this clause each team “reserved” the services of every on the player on the team for the next season for a salary to be determined by the team. The American League adopted the same practice. If a player was not willing to sign a contract under these terms, they were not welcome in either league. This system persisted until the 1970’s.

1904- The American League Boston franchise wins the American league pennant, but no World

Series is played after New York Giants owner John T. Brush refuses to let his team play

● Henry Killilea sells the American League Boston franchise to John I. Taylor.

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1907- John I. Taylor formally adopts the name “Red Sox” for the American League Franchise in Boston

1911- Taylor sells the controlling interests of the Red Sox to a group headed by former

Washington Senators manager Jimmy McAleer. Taylor remains as minority owner in charge of the team’s facilities.

● With the help of his father General Charles Taylor (owner of the Boston Globe), John I. Taylor secures land in the Fenway area of Boston for a new ballpark. Construction of Fenway park begins.

1912- Fenway Park opens. Red Sox defeat New York Giants in the World Series, four games to

three 1913- Ban Johnson forces Jimmy McAleer to sell his interests in the Red Sox, Joseph Lannin

becomes new principal owner. John I. Taylor remains part of the ownership group. 1914- Joseph Lannin buys out all of his partners and becomes sole owner of the Boston Red Sox

● Red Sox acquire the contract of left handed pitcher Babe Ruth from the minor league Baltimore Orioles

1915- Red Sox defeat the Philadelphia Phillies in the World Series, four games to one. 1916-Red Sox defeat Brooklyn Dodgers in the World Series, four games to one.

● After the World Series, Joseph Lannin sells the Red Sox to theater magnate Harry Frazee 1918- Major League season forced to end by Labor day due to World War I.

● Red Sox defeat Chicago Cubs in the World Series, four games to two. 1919- The Black Sox scandal Eight Chicago White Sox players work with Gamblers to throw

the 1919 World Series. The controversy would lead to Kenesaw Mountain Landis being made the first commissioner of Baseball in 1920. Landis would ban all eight players from ever playing in the Major Leagues again.

1919-1923- Frazee sells the contracts of fifteen players to the Yankees to fulfill his outstanding

financial obligations: pitcher Ernie Shore (1919), pitcher Dutch Leonard (1919), outfielder Duffy Lewis (1919), pitcher Carl Mays (1919), pitcher/outfielder Babe Ruth (1920), catcher Wally Schang (1921), pitcher Waite Hoyt (1921), pitcher Harry Harper (1921), infielder Mike McNally (1921), pitcher Joe Bush (1922),

Drolette 73

pitcher Sam Jones (1922), shortstop Everett Scott (1922), shortstop Joe Dugan (1922), pitcher Herb Pennock (1923), and pitcher George Pipgras (1923).

-Red Sox pitcher Carl Mays leaves the team without permission after a bad outing on July 13, 1919. Frazee trades Mays to the Yankees in direct violation of an order from Ban Johnson telling him to suspend Mays. Frazee and Johnson would feud for the remained of his time as owner (Stout-Johnson 142) Sale of Babe Ruth:Frazee sells the contract of Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees for $100,000 and a $300,000 loan with Fenway Park as collateral. This sale is later said to be the origin point of the “Curse of the Bambino”. The Yankees would appear in 39 World Series between 1920 and 2003, winning 26 of them. The Red Sox would appear in four and lose four in the same time period

1923-1932-Frazee sells the Red Sox to a group headed by Bob Quinn and Palmer Winslow. Quinn would be president while Winslow was meant to be the primary source of money. Winslow would die suddenly in 1927, leaving Quinn without any stable source of funds to run the club. The Red Sox would record a record of 544-988 (.355 winning percentage) during Quinn’s ownership.

1933- Bob Quinn sells the Red Sox to Tom Yawkey. Yawkey would own the team until his death

in 1976 1941-1945- America enters World War II after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. President Roosevelt

issues the “Green Light Letter” on January 15, 1942. The letter allowed professional baseball to continue throughout the remainder of the war. Hundreds of baseball players, including Red Sox outfielder Ted Williams and Yankees outfielder Joe DiMaggio, would serve in the military during the war.

1946- The Red Sox win their first American League pennant since the 1918 season. The Red Sox would be defeated by the St.Louis Cardinals four games to three in the World Series. Enos Slaughter’s “Mad Dash” and Johnny Pesky’s hesitation Tied 3 to 3 in the eighth inning of game 7, notoriously slow-footed outfielder Enos Slaughter would score from first base on hit to center field. After receiving the throw from the outfield, Red Sox shortstop Johnny Pesky was reportedly surprised by Slaughter

Drolette 74

trying to score.Pesky supposedly hesitated, making his throw late. The Red Sox would lose the game (and the series) by a score of four to three.

1947- Jackie Robinson of the Brooklyn Dodgers becomes the first African American to play in the Major Leagues in the twentieth century.

1948- Red Sox lose one game playoff to the Cleveland Indians for the American League pennant. The Indians would go to win the 1948 series over the Boston Braves of the National league.

1949- Red Sox come in second in the American League to the Yankees by one game after losing

their last two games of the seasons to the Yankees.. The Yankee would go on to defeat the

Brooklyn Dodgers in the World Series.

1953- The Boston Braves of the National League relocated to Milwaukee, becoming the first Major League franchise to relocate since 1903.

1958- The New York Giants relocate to San Francisco while the Brooklyn Dodgers relocate to Los Angeles, becoming the the first two Major League franchises west of St. Louis

1961- Both the American League and the National League agree to expand the amount of each games played each year from 154 to 162.

Era of Expansion Between 1961 and 1998, Major League Baseball would expand from 16 franchises (eight each in the American League (A.L) and National league (N.L)) to thirty. The following is a list of the franchises added during that time period.

1961- Los Angeles Angels and Washington Senators (A.L) 1962- New York Mets and Houston Colt .45s (N.L) 1969- Kansas City Royals and Seattle Pilots (A.L). The Pilots would become the

Milwaukee Brewers in 1970. Montreal Expos and San Diego Padres (N.L)

1977- Toronto Blue Jays and Seattle Mariners (A.L) 1993- Colorado Rockies and Florida Marlins (N.L) 1998- Tampa Bay Devil Rays (A.L) and Arizona Diamondbacks (N.L.)

1966- The MLB players association is founded under the leadership of Marvin Miller. It is the first successful attempt by MLB players to unionize.

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1967- “The Impossible Dream” -The Red Sox unexpectedly win the American League pennant

after finishing last the previous season. The Red Sox would be defeated by the St. Louis Cardinals in the World Series, four games to three.

1969- Both the American League and the National League adopt the division structure. Each

league now adopts a second round of playoff known as the League Championship series in which the winners of East and West divisions within each league play each other with the winner advancing to the World Series.

1972 - MLB players strike from April 1 to April 13 over a refusal by the owners to make

adjustments to the pension policy. The owner gave into the player’s demands. It was the first time that MLB players had ever held an organized strike. As a result of the schedule imbalances created by the strike, the Red Sox would lose the AL East by ½ a game despite playing one less game than the AL East champion Detroit Tigers.

1973- The American League adopts the Designated Hitter (DH) rule. The DH would only hit and not field, taking the place of the pitcher in the batting order. The National League did not adopt the DH, creating a rule discrepancy between the American and National leagues.

Advent of Free Agency Flood vs. Kuhn. The St. Louis Cardinals attempted to trade outfielder Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies after the 1969 season. Flood refused to report, declaring himself a “free agent” on the grounds of his ten years of playing time with the St. Louis Cardinals. Major league refused to acknowledge Flood’s declaration. Flood sued commissioner Bowie Kuhn, arguing that “Reserve Clause” violated his right to negotiate the terms of his employment. The case eventually made it to the Supreme Court. The court sided with the commissioner with a 5-3 decision, citing an earlier decision from the 1920’s which had declared that Baseball was not interstate commerce. Messersmith and McNally

Drolette 76

In 1974, Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of the Baltimore Orioles play the season without contracts. After the season Messersmith and McNally went to arbitration with the MLB, arguing that they should be Free Agents. In December of 1975, arbitrator Peter Seitz agreed with the players and the reserve clause was officially eliminated from Major League Baseball. 147

Free Agency In 1976 the MLB players association and the MLB agreed on terms which allowed all players with six years of experience to become free agents and sign contracts with whatever team they desired. Although Seitz’ decision had technically made it so that all players would become free agents after one season without a contract, Marvin Miller advocated the six year term to avoid flooding the market with players each year.

1975- The Red Sox win the American League pennant, but are defeated by the Cincinnati Reds

in the World Series four games to three. The series is most well known for Carlton Fisk’s walk-off homerun in the bottom of the twelfth inning of game 6. Video of the home run: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_m6GHOPrGcs

1978- After leading the American League East for the majority of the season, the Red Sox blow a fourteen game lead over the Yankees and are forced to play a one game playoff. The Red Sox would lose the game 5-4. The game is most well remembered for a three run home run hit in the seventh inning by Bucky Dent, a player who would hit 40 home runs over his twelve year career. In Boston, this earned Dent the nickname Bucky “Fucking” Dent. Video of the home run: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lvbi8vzg1io

1981- MLB players strike between June 12 and July 31 over issues related to free agency. The first division series (LDS) are played as a result of the split season, marking the first time the playoff would feature three rounds. The LDS would be not be formally adopted until the 1995 season.

1986- The Red Sox win the American League pennant, but are defeated by the New York Mets

in the World Series four games to three.

147 James, 284-285. James offers a full account of the thinking behind the decision.

Drolette 77

A ball through Buckner’s Legs Leading the series three game to two, the Red Sox had taken a five to three lead in the top of the tenth inning. After two quick outs, the Mets managed to string together a number of hits and tie the game. With a man on second, Mets outfield Mookie Wilson hit a slow rolling ground ball up the first baseline. Red Sox first baseman Bill Buckner rushed while attempting to make the play and the ball rolled through his legs. The runner at second scored and the Mets won the game. The Mets won game seven two days later.

Bill Buckner was blamed by fans for the loss-despite the fact that there was still one game to play- and became a byword for incompetence for many years. Video of the play: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=18caPNisP2U

1994-1995- MLB players strike from August 12, 1994 until April 2, 1995 over MLB owner’s attempts to make adjustments to the structure of free agency and impose a salary cap. The strike cancels the 1994 postseason including the World Series, only the second time since 1903 where there no World Series; there was no World Series played in 1904.

2003- Red Sox lose to the New York Yankees in the ALCS in seven games after Yankees third

baseman hit a walk off homer in the bottom of the eleventh inning of the deciding game. The game was also noted for Red Sox manager Grady Little leaving pitcher Pedro Martinez in the game in the eighth inning with a three run lead despite information that indicated Martinez would be much less effective at that point. Little would be fired after the loss. Boone earned the nickname Aaron “Fucking” Boone in Boston. Video of the home run: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLY16wmHdUk

2004- The Red Sox win the World Series for the first time since 1918 in a four game sweep of the St. Louis Cardinals 2004 ALCS The Red Sox had been down three games to none in the ALCS against the Yankees. The Red Sox would become the first team in MLB history to overcome a three game deficit in a seven game series, winning the next four games with a series of unlikely and dramatic moments. ESPN later made a documentary about the series called “Four Days in October.” Trailer for “Four Days in October”: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jVyobFoH0-E

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Bibliography

A note on newspapers:

This thesis contains many references to newspaper articles. The four newspapers that were

consulted most often were: The Boston Globe, The Boston Herald, The Boston Traveler, and The

Boston Post. The paper and article consulted are listed in the body of the thesis and the

individual citations are provided via footnote where necessary. Any additional article from

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