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The NOAA says there is only one ocean. The divisions between them are unclear and

continually contested to this day. A multiplicity of “oceans” is simply a variety of

constructs made by humans.

NOAA 13 [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, last revised 7 September 2013,

http://www.oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/howmanyoceans.html]

While there is only one global ocean, the vast body of water that covers 71 percent of the Earth is

geographically divided into distinct named regions. The boundaries between these regions have

evolved over time for a variety of historical, cultural, geographical, and scientific reasons. Historically,

there are four named oceans: the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic. However, most countries—

including the United States—

now recognize the Southern (Antarctic) as the fifth ocean. The Pacific,

Atlantic, and Indian are known as the three major oceans. The Southern Ocean is the 'newest' named

ocean. It is recognized by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as the body of water extending from

the coast of Antarctica to the line of latitude at 60 degrees South. The boundaries of this ocean

were proposed to the International Hydrographic Organization in 2000. However, not all countries

agree on the proposed boundaries, so this has yet to be ratified by members of the IHO. The U.S. is a

member of the IHO, represented by the NOS Office of Coast Survey.

The social constructions of various “oceans” block us from fully interrogating the

ocean in itself and treats the ocean as a nation-state.

Steinberg 2001 (Philip E., Professor of Political Geography @ Durham University’s department of

Geography, The Social Construction of the Ocean, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 18)

Leaving aside for the moment any further critique of the realist conception of either the state or

international relations (both of which are taken up again later in this chapter), it is argued here that the

military history perspective is deficient for much the same reason as the commercial history perspective:

Both perspectives are premised upon a denial of the ocean’s long history as a space that continuously

has been regulated and managed. Even those who stud the history of sea power from an explicitly social

angle-such as Modelski and Thompson (1988), who trace the rise and fall of maritime powers as

indicators of world-systemic long cycles and the shifting fortunes of individual countries – fail to

investigate the ocean itself as a space within which the social contest is played out. Rather than being a

neutral surface across and within which states have vied for power and moved troops, the sea, like the

nation-states themselves, has been socially constructed throughout history. Although in the modern erathe sea has been constructed outside the territory of individual states, it has been constructed as a

space amenable to a degree of governance within the state system. Indeed, as Thomson (1994) has

shown, this construction of the sea has played an important role in the construction of modern norms of

international relations. As was the case with Harlow’s definition of the sea as unregulatable transport

space, the very act of defining the sea as a space of anarchic military competition both reflects and

creates specific social construction of both ocean-space and land-space.

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The resolution‘s focus on relations between nation-states reflects a desire forcoherent, unified national identity. This is impossible because every social bodyis filled with a multitude of perspectives. A focus on interstate relations is a maskfor the violence that allowed the nation-state to exist in the first place. Theinability of the United States to ever become a truly unified identity is translated

into the creation of threats and dangers that we measure ourselves against.Shapiro 97 (Michael, Professor of PoliSci at Hawaii, Violent Cartogrophies, p. 149-150.)The complicity of social sciences, psychology, and psychiatry in the idea that there is a

normal and cohesive American character type served ultimately to help depoliticize issues ofracism, sexism, class, repression, and other forms of antagonism with a discourse on devianceand irrationality. The repression of difference at the level of institutional politics was therefore reinforcedwith a conceptual repression.

Nevertheless, the forces of fragmentation persist, and those that are particularly threateningto representational practices of selfhood and nationhood as coherent and undivided are, among otherthings, ―peripheral sexualities‖ (hence the recent furor over gays in the military, a conflict at the level ofmodels of individuality) and various social antagonisms (hence the recent struggle over entitlements). Adding a dimension to Herman Melville‘s insights about the masks of history, Slavoj Zizek has argued,with a Lacanian frame, that the drive for coherent identity at either individual or collective levels is

necessarily always blocked. As this drive to overcome incompleteness is played out at thecollective level, the imposed story of coherence is a mask that covers a void. The fact of socialantagonism is displaced by a myth of undividedness. And rather than facing the disjuncturebetween fact and aspiration, the dissatisfaction is turned outward, becoming an ―enjoyment‖ inthe form of a disparaging model of enemy-others, dangerous character types, and outlaw nations.

As Zizek notes, it is not an external enemy that prevents one from achieving an identitywith oneself; that coherence is always already impossible. But the nonacceptance of thatimpossibility produces fantasy in the form of ―an imaginary scenario the function of which is to providesupport filling out the subject‘s constitutive void.‖ When this kind of fantasy is elaborated at the level of thesocial, it serves as a counterpart to antagonism. It is an imagination of a unified and coherent societythat supposedly came into being by leaving a disordered condition of struggle behind.

This mythologizing of origin, which constructs the society as a naturally bounded andconsensual community, is a political story that those seeking legitimacy for a national order seek toperpetuate. But the disorder continues to haunt the order. The mythic disorder of the state of

nature, supposedly supplanted by the consensual association as society comes into being, continues tohaunt the polity. It is displaced outside the frontiers and attributed to the Other.

In short, the anarchic state of nature is attributed to relations between states. Thisdisplacement amounts to an active amnesia, a forgetting of the violence that both foundsand maintains the domestic order; it amounts to a denial of the disorder within the order. This tendency to deny domestic disorder in general and to overcome more specifically thedisorder and antagonisms in post-Vietnam War America – stresses between generations,between military and civilian order, between the telling of imperialist tales and the telling of post-colonial ones – has been reflected in the media of post- Gulf War America. The triumphalistsafter the Gulf War have been attempting to write out of the U.S. history the post-Vietnamagonism in which tensions within the order were acknowledged. They seek to banish a politicsof interpretation and self-appraisal that was part of both the official and popular culture during

the post-Vietnam period. This was especially evident in the orchestration of NormanSchwarzkopf‘s career as a media personality.

The politics of borders rely on the instrumental management of populations toestablish national identity. This requires outsiders, who are tortured andexterminated. This violence collapses politics and makes life meaningless.

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Dillon 99 (Michael J.[ Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster]) ―The Scandal ofthe Refugee,". Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Pg 109-110.The scale of the politically instrumental— deliberate, legal, and policy- initiated—manufacture of estrangement in world politics necessarily calls into question, therefore,the very moral and political foundations and accomplishments of the modern age, particularlythose of the state and the international system of states. In such circumstances—and given

the vaunted political and moral claims made on behalf of states and of the international statesystem, as well as of so-called international society—we seem increasingly left not knowingto what symbolic space, to what understanding of the human way of being, we can entrustwhat we variously call freedom and humanity. Modern politics, the politics of modernity,continuously undermines, however, its own most violent, most intense, most totalizing attempts to securely free humanity. And this is not because of some technical deficiencyon its part—the global politics of modernity is the expression of politics as techne. It isbecause it is not realizable. In the process the modern expression of identity politics, while thus disclosing something also about the modern world‘s response to strangeness assuch, provides a powerful intimation that the reception that the modern we accords thestrangeness of the human way of being is what the very (dis)order of political modernity itselfcalls into question. Specifically, modern political subjectification creates its own peculiar

form of political abjection. Originally applied to French Huguenots who fled to Englandafter the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685— and therefore a direct function ofearly modern absolutist understandings of the entailments of stable, legitimate, andauthoritative political order, and their consequences—the refugee is precisely the figurethat identities the political abjection of the modern age. Abject means cast out; abjectionmeans also the act of expelling. It marks the failure of the political subject to be a pure politicalsubject even in the act of trying to realize that ideal. Marking the porosity of limits of that whichseeks to be the self-same, it is the waste that continuously disturbs identity, system, and orderbecause as the outside produced by the inside, it continuously irrupts in a way that erodes thecry parameters by which the inside seeks to be defined. That which the effort to subjectifycreates, its production marks the impossibility, the abject failure, of what modernpolitical subjectification idealizes and aims to realize. For the political practices of

burning, chasing, raping, expelling, degrading, murdering, humiliating, terrorizing,excoriating, removing burying, hiding, suppressing, and devastating invent and re inventthe very waste they name and exorcise in the process of continuously reinagurating aspolitics, a certain imperative of political unity and malleable uniformity. Waste, as Ricoeurnoted, is not waste with out its wasting processes: its protocols of purgative production. Neitheris it undifferentiated since its processes of production are themselves Plural. Abjection—thesystem‘s own self -produced and self-producing perturbation — is neither inside noroutside but the in-between, the boundary or limit that enacts the differentiation.Abjection is (inter)national politics, and as (inter)national politics, it insists on apreoccupation with the inter anterior to the national.

In this instrumental society, assuming academics address policy-makers is

anachronistic. Geopolitics is better understood as discourse used to manage thepopulation – the plan speaks to nothing.

Gerard Toal - PhD, Professor, Government and International Affairs at Virginia Polytechnic Institute

and State University - September 1994 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume19, Number 3, pp. 259-272 ―Problematizing geopolitics: survey, statesmanship and strategy‖ [nfb]

First, it is frequently assumed that geopolitics represents a problematic that can bedescribed as ‗advice to the prince‘. Geopolitics involves using geography as an aid to

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statecraft. From the evidence of the usages discussed in this paper, however , this formulainadequately described the performative range of geopolitics. The very concept of adviceto the prince, exemplified by Mackinder (1942, 150) in his famous image of an airy cherubwhispering in the ear of the statesman, is an archaic medieval one, anachronistic not only inthe age of huge foreign policy bureaucracies and postmodern information flows but also in aculture where traditional Cartesian assumptions about the unity of the human subject are

being overturned (Grosz 1990, 1-5). Geopolitics is better understood not as advisors andprinces but as discourses and subjectivities. A more appropriate framework forunderstanding geopolitics as a type of knowledge is perhaps Foucault's (1991) concept of‗governmentality', the ensemble of rationalities concerned with the governing of territoritiesand populations that emerged in the eighteenth century. Perhaps geopolitics marks a particularexpression of governmentality in the twentieth century, a governmentality concerned with thetask of hegemonic management, Hegemonic managerialism produces its own rationalitiesand informational projects. Among them are those we have examined: (i) the survey andsurveillance of objects (regions, minerals, issues like energy) deemed ‗strategic‘; (ii) writings onthe art of conducting statecraft in turbulent times (which includes the art of self-government, howa statesman should conduct himself); and (iii) the divination of the (meta)physics of earth andspace as causal forces in international affairs that enables hegemonic managers to see into the

future and thereby organize their priorities. Such projects are not specific to geopolitics; rathergeopolitics is one gathering point for their expression and operation.

Our advocacy is constant criticism of borders to community – all identity isperformatively created through the stories we tell. Rejecting theirrepresentations of national unity helps break down violent exclusion. Thisprocess is the only ethical approach to international relations

Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg.173-180) To claim membership in a particular tribe, ethnicity, or nation—that is, to belong to a―people‖—one must claim location in a particular genealogical and spatial story. Such

stories precede any particular action aimed at a future result and provoke much of thecontestation over claims to territory and entitlement an to collective recognition. To theextent that they are part of the reigning structure of intelligibility, identity stories tend toescape contentiousness within ongoing political and ethical discourses. To produce anethics responsive to contestations over identity claims and their related spatial stories, it isnecessary to intervene in the dominant practices of intelligibility. Michel Foucault was calling for such intervention when he noted that the purpose of criticalanalysis is to question, not deepen, existing structures of intelligibility. Intelligibilityresults from aggressive, institutionalized practices that, in producing a given intelligibleworld, exclude alternative worlds. ―We must,‖ Foucault said, ―make the intelligible appearagainst a background of emptiness, and deny its necessity. We must think that whatexists is far from filling all possible spaces?‘ Like Foucault, Derrida claimed that a recognition of practices of exclusion is a necessary condition for evoking an ethical sensibility.

His in sights into the instability and contentiousness of the context of an utterance, in his critique of Austin, provides access to whatis effectively the protoethics of ethical discourse, the various contextual commitments that determine the normative implications ofstatements. To heed this observation, it is necessary to analyze two particular kinds of contextual commitments that have beensilent and often unreflective predicates of ethical discourses. And it is important to do so in situations in which contending partieshave something at stake—that is, by focusing on the ethics of encounter. Accordingly, in what f ollows, my approach to ―the ethical‖locates ethics in a respect for an-Other‘s identity performances with special attention to both the temporal or narrative dimension

and the spatial dimension of those performances. Moreover, to produce a critical political approach to theethics of the present, it is necessary to oppose the dominant stories of modernity andthe institutionalized, geopolitical versions of space, which support existing forms of global proprietary

control, for both participate unreflectively in a violence of representation.

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The ethical sensibility offered in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas provides an important contribution to the ethics-as-nonviolent encounter thematizedin my analysis. Levinas regarded war, the ultimate form of violence, as the suspension of morality; ―it renders morality de risory,‖ he said. Moreover,Levinas‘s thought fits fh general anti Clausewitzian/antirationalist approach to war th in prior chapters, for Levinas regarded a strategically orientedpolitics—‖the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by every means‘ which is ―enjoined as the very essence of reason‖—as ―opposed to morality.‖ In order to oppose war and promote peace, Levinas enacted a linguistic war on the governing assumptions of Western philosophy. He argued thatphilosophy from Plato through Heidegger constructed persons and peoples within totalizing conceptions of humanity. The ethical regard, he insisted, isone that resists encompassing the Other as part of the same, that resists recognizing the Other solely within the already spoken codes of auniversalizing vision of humankind. However problematic Levinas‘s notion of infinite respect for an alterity that always evades complete comprehensionmay be (an issue I discuss later), it nevertheless makes possible a concern with the violence of representation, with discursive control over narratives

of space and identity, which is central - to my analysis. Edward Said emphasized the ethicopolitical significance ofsystems of discursive control, locating the violence of imperialism in the control overstories: ―The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, isvery important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connectionsbetween them.‖ Indeed, contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance ofa spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map

of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level . Despite an increasing instability in the geo

political map of states, the more general discourses of ―international affairs‖ and ―international relations‖ continue to dominate both

ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence are most often constructedwithin a statecentric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation ofenmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and on cross-boundary antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume

this same geopolitical cartography.‘° To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we mustchallenge the geopolitical map. Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific

imagination, it is nevertheless the case that ―the cartographer‘s categories‘s J. B. Harley has put it, ―art the basis of the morality ofthe 11 ― here emerges most icantly from the boundary and naming practices that construct the map. The nominations and

territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a ―topographical amnesia.‖ Effacements of older mapsin contemporary namings and configurations amount to a non- recognition of older,often violently displaced practices of identity and space. Among the consequences ofthis neglected dimension of cartography, which include a morality-delegating spatial unconscious and a

historical amnesia with respect to alternatives, has been a radical circumspection of the kinds ofpersons and groups recognized as worthy subjects of moral solicitude. State citizenshiphas tended to remain the primary basis for the identities recognized in discourses suchas the ―ethics of international affairs.‖ The dominance and persistence of this discursive genre, an ―ethics‖ predicated on absolute state sovereignty, is evident in a recentanalysis that has attempted to be both critical of the ethical limitations of the sovereignty system and aware that ―conflict has

increasingly moved away from interstate territorial disputes.‖ Despite these acknowledged sensitivities, the analysis proceeds withina discourse that reinstalls the dominance of geopolitical thinking, for it remains within its cartography and conceptual legacy Arguingfor a humanitarianism that avoids interstate partisanship, the writers go on to reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, whichgrants recognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of ―intervention‖ as a reaffirmation of a sovereigntydiscourse, they refer to the ―Persian Gulf War‖ on the one hand and ―insurgencies‖ on the other.

As I noted in chapter i, Bernard Nietschmann has shown that the map of global warfare changes dramaticallywhen one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and

unmapping the geostrategic cartography of ―international relations;‘ Nietschmann refers to the ―Third World War,‖ which is ―hiddenfrom view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map‖—a war in which ―only one sideof the f ighting has a name.‖ Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann proceeds to map 120 armedstruggles as part of the ―war‘ In his mapping, only 4 of the struggles involved confrontations between states, while 7 involve statesagainst nations.

In order to think beyond the confines of the states orientation, it is therefore necessary toturn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditional moralthinking and thereby grant recognition outside of modernity‘s dominant politicalidentities. - This must necessarily also take us outside the primary approach thatcontemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory. As applied at anylevel of human interaction, the familiar neo-Kantian ethical injunction is to seektranscendent values. Applied to the inter state or sovereignty model of global space more specifically, this approach

seeks to achieve a set of universal moral imperatives based on shared values and regulative norms.

This dominant tradition has not yielded guidance for specific global encounters because itfails to acknowledge the historical depth of the identity claims involved in confrontationsor collisions of difference— difference that includes incommensurate practices of space

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and conflicting narratives of identity. The tradition depends instead on two highly abstract assumptions. The first is

that morality springs from what humanity holds in common, which is thought to yield the possibility of a shared intuition of what isgood. The second is that the values to be apprehended are instantiated in the world and are capable of being grasped by humanconsciousness, wherever it exists. As Hegel pointed out in one of his earliest remarks on Kantian moral reasoning, Kant‘s sys teminvolves ―a conversion of the absoluteness of pure identity. . . into the absoluteness of content.‖ Because, for Kant, the form of aconcept is what determines its rightness, there remains in his perspective no way to treat ―conflicts among specific matters.‖17

A brief account of an encounter between alternative spatial imaginar ies helps to situate the alternative ethical frame to beelaborated later. It is provided by the reflections of the writer Carlos Fuentes after an un anticipated encounter with a Mexican

peasant. Lost driving with friends in the state of Morelos, Mexico, Fuentes stopped in a village and asked an old peasant the nameof the village. ―Well, that depends;‘ an approach that assails such totalizations with the aim of providing an ethics of encounter.Levinas and the Ethics of the Face to FaceFuentes‘s experience and the conclusions he draws from are elaborately prescripted in the ethical writings of Levinas, for whom the

face-to-face encounter and the experience of the Other as a historical trace are crucial dimensions of an ethical responsibility. Toconfront Levinas is to be faced with an ethical tradition quite different from thosetraditionally applied to issues of global encounter. In Levinas‘s ethical thinking andwriting, morality is not an experience of value, as it is for both the Kantian tradition and Alasdair Maclntyre‘s

post-Kantian concern with an anthropology of ethics, but a recognition of and vulnerability to alterity.This conception of vulnerability to alterity is not a moral psychology, as is the case with, for example, Adam

Smith‘s notion of interpersonal sympathy. It is a fundamentally ethical condition attached to humansubjectivity; it is an acceptance of the Other‘s absolute exteriority, a recognition that ―theother is in no way another myself, participating with me in a common existence.‖ According

to Levinas, we are responsible to alterity as absolute alterity, as a difference that cannot besubsumed into the same, into a totalizing conceptual system that comprehends self and Other. For relations with Others to be ethical they must therefore be nontotalizing. Rejecting ontologies thathomogenize humanity, so that self-recognition is sufficient to constitute the significanceof Others, Levinas locates the ethical regard as a recognition of Others as enigmatically andirreducibly other, as prior to any ontological aim of locating oneself at home in the world:―The relations with the other... [ not arise within a totality nor does it establish a totality,integrating me and the other.Ontologies of integration are egoistically aimed at domesticating alterity to a frame ofunderstanding that allows for the violent appropriation of the space of the Other :My being in the world or my ‗place in the sun,‘ my being at home, have not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to theother man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third-world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding,

exiling, stripping, killing? 23 To be regarded ethically, the Other must remain a stranger ―whodisturbs the being at home with oneself.‖ The ethical for Levinas is, in sum, ―a non-violent relationship to the as infinitely other .‖ we recall the problematic presented in chapter 5, it should be

evident within a Levinasian ethical perspective, one would, for example, accept Ward Just‘s perpetually enigmatic Vietnam ratherthan endorse Norman Schwarzkopf‘s domesticated version.

We cannot stand idly by . The resolution must be kritiked in order to generate any

kind of solvency.

Natsu Taylor Saito 06 (prof. of law at Georgia State University College of Law,―CROSSING THE LINE? EXAMINING CURRENT U.S. IMMIGRATION & BORDERPOLICY: Border Constructions: Immigration Enforcement and Territorial Presumptions‖,The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice, Winter 2007 issue, lexis nexis)The fact that borders are sociopolitical constructs means not only that borders areconstructed and capable of being changed, but that fortifying them, or even simplyaccepting the status quo, is a social and political choice that we make, and we remainresponsible for the consequences of so choosing. We bear that responsibility whetherwe vigorously defend and promote enhanced border security or simply live in a state ofdenial, 257 refusing to take options seriously because we prefer to believe that the status quo isright, natural, and inevitable. We can, if we choose, truly have a "government of laws, and not of

http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m=013735d6998507cab96c92b8715f276a&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVzW-zSkVk&_md5=2ff0de900257a1a6ac49939e14c52b79#n257




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men." 258 We might even find that we prefer to live in such a society, but we will only find out ifwe are willing to question the premises that we are continually asked to take for granted.





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A2: FrameworkTheir framework is ethically atrocious, tying debate to the state ignores the vastmajority of violence which occurs at the local level – they write these indigenousstruggles off the map, legitimating their destruction

Shapiro, 99(Michael, J[Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii] ―The Ethics

of Encounter: Unreading, Unmapping the Imperium‖ Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and WorldPolitics Pg 61.

For example, a recent analysis in this discursive genre, one that is both critical of the ethicallimitations of the sovereignty system and aware that ―conflict has increasingly moved away frominterstate territorial disputes,‖ nevertheless has reinstalled the dominance of geopolitical thinking byremaining within its cartography and conceptual legacy. Arguing for a humanitarianism that avoidsinterstate partisanship, the writers reproduce the geopolitical discourse on war, which grantsrecognition only to state subjects. Even as they criticize the language of ―intervention‖ as areaffirmation of a sovereignty discourse, they refer to ―the Persian Gulf War‖ on the one hand and―insurgencies‖ on the other . As Bernard Nietschmann has shown, the map of global warfarechanges dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging thestate-oriented language of war and unmapping geostrategic cartography of ―internationalrelations,‖ Nietschmann refers to ―the Third World War,‖ which is ―hidden from view becausethe fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map,‖ a war inwhich ―only one side of the fighting has a name. ‖ Focusing on struggles involving indigenouspeoples, Nietschmann maps 120 armed struggles as part of the ―war.‖ Only four of his warsinvolve confrontations between states; seventy-seven involve states against nations. In order tothink beyond the moral boundaries constituted by a state sovereignty commitment, it isnecessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditionalmoral thinking and thereby grants recognition outside of modernity‘s dominant politicalidentities. This must necessarily also take us outside the primary approach thatcontemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory.

Their framework is not neutral, it‘s a tool to monopolize perspectives in debate.The state is not the ―natural‖ center of politics, coding it into academic

conversations blocks out the voices of oppressed groups – reject this exclusionwith your ballotShapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii;Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page xviii-xix)

In recent years, challenges to domestic authority structures and instabilities in global jurisdictions have highlighted inadequacies of traditional political discourses of comparativepolitics and international relations. It is less the case, however, that these discourses have beenmade invalid by changes in the political situations to which they referred than it is that theiradequacy was always limited. For a while they were adequate to the legitimation needs of thedominant political forces. They contained political conversations within the problematics thatserved the centralizing authorities of nation-states and the dominance of states in globalexchanges.

Nevertheless, those involved in the productions of these discourses have largely

operated with the illusion that they offer a universal perspective. They have thought ofthemselves as serving disinterested knowledge rather than dominant tendencies. But the officialdiscourses of the state and their complicit academic echoes have effectively overcoded various social and cultural segments – ethnicities, mobilized women‘s groups, indigenouspeoples, and stateless tribal groups – whose interests, affiliations, resistances, and actionshave failed to achieve political articulation. To the extent that these affiliational groupings haveappeared in mainstream political discourses, they have usually been quarantined within theadministration of ―social problems.‖

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What has been attenuated of late is the smugness that has attended the state powerconfiguration. The assumption that bordered state sovereignties are the fulfillment of a historicaldestiny rather than a particular, and in some quarters controversial, form of political containmenthas been challenged. The instabilities in global units to review the partialities of the voicesthat have monopolized the interpretation of political identity and space and to create adiscursive frame that can enunciate alternatives. To appreciate this invitation, however, it isnecessary both to treat more specifically the idea of ―political discourse‖ and to map the sites ofalternative voices whose addresses have not appeared in the directories provided bymainstream political science disciplines. Aspects of this mapping are provided in the essayscollected in this volume. What this introduction provides is a framing for what the alternative voicesimply.

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A2: Cap K

Perm: Do both.

Our advocacy is to radically deconstruct the resolution’s notion of oceanic borders.

Borders have been historically been used as a tool of colonialization which has been a

well-known manifestation of capitalism.Agathangelou & Ling 04 (Anna M.[Lecturer at the University of Houston-Clear Lake andDirector of Global Change Institute], L.H.M.[ Associate Professor Graduate Program inInternational Affairs at The New School]) ―Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons ofViolence and Desire from September 11‖. International Studies Quarterly Volume 48 Issue 3Pg. 520.

Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics.Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but theirsignificance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999).Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the

spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonizationproceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past torationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the "West."George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed againstAmerica but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizationaldiscipline against all "terror." (The Bush administration's semantic shift from "terrorism" to"terror" offers one small indication of this change from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaderstransgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an"international coalition" against terrorism for Bush; "global jihad," for bin Laden; and,

http://popref%28%27b73%27%29/

http://popref%28%27b73%27%29/

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Representations KeyTraditional sources of foreign policy knowledge are insignificant in comparisonto representations – they permeate culture and shape everyday lifeFerguson 1997 (Kennan; Professor of Governmental and International Affairs,

University of South Florida; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities;page 180)

To map is to designate members of social classes ( in the broadest sense of that tem), as wellas national peoples, through an aesthetic discrimination in relation to others. TheseHeigeggerian paradigms enable a different model of the ways in which we understand foreigncultures. The traditional Kantian mentalistic direct representation(e.g., the way people aredescribed in a text book) becomes far less important than the constitution of selves inrelation to incarnations of other cultures in everyday life. The immediate and commonplaceaspects of cultural items—the things valued—augment relations with alterity; the artifactual is farmore important than the intellectual in determining these relations. To determine the Americanunderstanding of Africa, for example, most academics study canonical texts of foreign policy like state department bulletins or administration policy statements. These are not unimportantsources, but they are insignificant and tangential to Americans‘ common lives. More

germane to the U.S. comprehension of other peoples are the aesthetic associations withthem, the everyday relationships between our lives and other cultures : using African clothingstyles, displaying native crafts, wearing handmade jewelry, or viewing imagery of their ways of lifein National Geographic . Through these cartographic creations, ties of the world rather than thesignificant players in issues of international affairs. Paul Simon is thus a far more important American-international diplomat than whoever happens to the American representative to theUnited Nations at a particular time, because he has far more control over representations of―Africanness.‖ It is as important to examine everyday interactions with aesthetic judgmentsof the cultures as to study the ways those cultures are represented by disciplines likeinternational relations.

Boundaries are formed through individual discourse. Imagining new lawsdelineates the proper role for individuals within society – this round is key

Pavalakovich-Kochi & Morehouse & Wastl-Walter, 04 (Vera [Director of the RegionalDevelopment Program @ University of Arizona], Barbara J.[Professor of Geography at theUniversity of Arizona], Doris PhD [Director of the Department of Geography of the University ofBern] (Challenged Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries Pg. 32-33)

As this exploration of boundaries and borderlands has emphasized, the concept of sociallyproduced space is one of the most powerful theories at the disposal of the borderlands scholar, for the process of producing space, as played out in the regimes of knowledge that structureour world, frequently entails the drawing of boundaries . Drawing upon Foucault‘s idea ofregimes of power, the persistent use of boundaries to produce space-and spatializing difference-suggest that the existing, spatially informed structures of power and knowledge are alive and well. Entire systems of law, in fact use boundaries as a foundation for enforcement of public andprivate will. It is not so much the drawing of boundaries, however , that embeds formallydelineated spaces in the political, economic, and social structures of society; rather it is the

reproduction of the boundaries, and the space enclosed within, through institutionalizedprocesses, regimes of power (Keely, 1990) and the everyday actions of individuals. To carry theargument further, and assuming an active role for individual agents, it may then be observedthat boundaries, as (re)produced through discrete discourses and actions, are plastic. Theychange in location, length, function and value depending on who is exerting greatest influenceat that moment. Every decision and action that accepts the rules and functions of a givenboundary reproduces that boundary. Every decision and action that challenges the boundaryrules and functions also challenges the legitimacy of the boundary, for that purpose. An accretion

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of challenges, as happened in former East Germany can result in the erasure of the contestedboundary.

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Language Key to Borders

Boundaries are powerful metaphors which allow the state to secure itself fromoutsiders

Pavalakovich-Kochi & Morehouse & Wastl-Walter, 04 (Vera [Director of the RegionalDevelopment Program @ University of Arizona], Barbara J.[Professor of Geography at theUniversity of Arizona], Doris PhD [Director of the Department of Geography of the University ofBern] (Challenged Borderlands: Transcending Political and Cultural Boundaries Pg. 33)

Boundaries, then, are perhaps best understood as rules and practices, material demarcators ofedges, and barriers to flows; they are also abstract metaphors that are useful for articulating,and spatializing, concepts and perceptions of difference. Boundaries provide the edgesneeded to contain space and its contents, and to protect that space from outsidepenetration. They sever what was formerly a unitary space, regulate and filter flows, and ofgreat importance, they provide legitimation and a material location for engaging insurveillance and enforcement.

Maps are the key entry point to understand cultural representationsCasino Jr. & Hanna ‗06 (Vincent J. Del, Doctor of Liberal Studies and Geography – California State University, StephenP., Dept. of Geography – University of Mary Washington, ―Beyond the Binaries: AMethodological Intervention for Interrogating Maps and Representational Practices‖, ACME E-Journal of International Critical Cartographies, p. online)

When does the moment of map production end? At the time when the printing press stops rolling,or the crayon leaves the page, or when a yahoo map stops loading, or perhaps when the finishedmap is found embedded between columns two and three of the New York Times? Or, maybe,production never stops. Maybe maps are constantly produced and (re)produced as is suggestedthrough the democratization of production in participatory GIS. Such questioning of production,

however, should be accompanied by similar questions about consumption. When is a map firstconsumed? After it leaves the hands of its authors? Do authors not consume their ownrepresentation, see themselves in its images, reconstruct their own desires through this object, ordare we say subject? Still, many critical cartographers (Black, 1997; Harley, 1988; Harley, 1989;Harley, 1990; Wood, 1992) maintain an implicit duality between production and consumption,author and reader, object and subject, design and use, representation and practice. They still focuson how maps are produced in particular social, political, and economic contexts; or, theyconcentrate on the consumption and use of these particular objects in their post-production phase.Yet, maps, to borrow from Gibson (2001)2, are in state of ―becoming.‖ As such, maps stretchbeyond their physical boundaries; they are not limited by the paper on which they areprinted or the wall upon which they might be scrawled. Each crease, fold, and tear producesa new rendering, a new possibility, a new (re)presentation, a new moment of production andconsumption, authoring and reading, objectification and subjectification, representationand practice.Maps are thus not simply representations of particular contexts, places, and times. They are mobilesubjects, infused with meaning through contested, complex, intertextual, and interrelated sets ofsocio-spatial practices. As Deleuze and Guarttari suggest, ―the map has multiple entryways‖ (ibid.,12) and a myriad number of possibilities because it operates at the margin and centersimultaneously. Maps are also not, as some may argue (e.g., Harley, 1989), fixed at the moment ofproduction, a result of the hegemonic authority embedded by the mapmaker in/on therepresentation. Thus, while maps may be infused with power, and thus ripe fordeconstruction, it is not enough to demythologize the map (c.f., Sparke, 1995). Instead,maps ought to be theorized as processes, ―detachable, revers ible, susceptible to constant

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modification.‖ It is therefore appropriate to say that maps, as representations, ―work‖(Wood, 1992). As we contend, representations, such as maps, work because ―they help makeconnections to other representations and to other experienced spaces‖ (Hanna et al., 2004,464) suggesting that maps do, indeed, provide multiple entryways into how they are produced andconsumed as well as how they are used, interpreted, and constituted.

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A2: Representations don‘t Matter Our perception of security threats is influenced by cultural forces. Examiningrepresentations is crucial to accurately understanding modern violenceDalby ‗98 (Simon, professor of political science, ―Geopolitics and Global Security: Culture, Identity, andthe ‗pogo‘ syndrome‖, Rethinking Geopolitics, p.295-309)

Most cultural identities include a crucial ethnocentric formulation in their celebrations ofthe value of being a ‗we‘. In their formulations of security problems as caused by Others,what is silenced is that possibility that, the Walt Kelly cartoon character Pogo‘s famousformulation, ‗the enemy is us‘. I irreverently call this the ‗POGO syndrome‘ because itsuggests that the security problematic can eb understodd in geopolitical term as the persistenceof (P)olitical (O)rganizations to (G)enerate (O)thers! A sensitivity to these processes is crucial tothe further understanding of the contradictions in the policies of ‗global security‘ premised on anuncritical adoption of the identities of modernity. The appellation ‗global‘ does not provide anexception to these matters, however, fondly some practitioners of the term might hope that isassigns them the universal more ‗high‘ ground. Modern geopolitical practices of division,administration and rule are intrinsically violent; the popular representations of Others are partthe unsettling answer (Alexander 1996). So too is the implication that intellectual property rights,exerpt knowledge and the finer points of the World Trade Organization‘s practices may be themost important focal point for a consideration of many of the practical causes of ‗global‘insecurity.

None of this is to deny that there are many dangers in the modern world, or thatviolence is an unfortunate fact of political life that cannot be ignored. But it makes a hugedifference how such matters are represented, who is defined as a threat to whatgeopolitical entity and the how the possibilities for political action are defined (Dalby1996a). Getting beyond the current formulations of global security will requirereconsiderations of the modern geopolitical identities whose consumption can besecured by this technical expertise. It requires a recognition that the simplifications of

geopolitical representations are usually an important part of the practices that makeviolence possible.

By asking questions about the production of geopolitical representations thatportray the poor and the marginal as threats to the affluent, critical geopolitics makes thecrucial point that conceptualizing matters in terms of ‗global‘ priorities, as currentdiscourses so frequently do, elides the specific contexts of insecurities and obscures thecausal dimensions of contemporary violence. Which is why this chapter concludes with thePOGO syndrome: It emphasizes the importance of understandig identity as problematic andpotentially self-destructive. It also points to the intellectual necessity of distancing oneself fromone‘s fondest-held fears to look again at one‘s identity in the light of its being rendered strange.

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A2: Borders/Exclusion Non-UQ

Exclusion has always existed but that doesn‘t make it inevitable – the plan‘sattempt to contrive community through totalizing knowledge is part of the

problemDillon 99 (Michael J.[ Professor of Politics, University of Lancaster]) ―The Scandal ofthe Refugee,". Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Pg 106-107.

Because the constitution of any social group or political community is a matter of theexercise of inclusions and exclusions does not mean that one set of inclusions andexclusions is the same as any other. Nor is it true that because there have always beenpeople who have been outcasts we can legitimately concentrate on the native and the home,and thus forget about the stranger and the outside. On the contrary the ―we‖ is integrallyrelated, because formed by, this relationship with the alien. Given the horrors inflicted onthe alien, it is understandable, indeed almost orthodox, to deny difference and urgentlychampion an all-encompassing inclusion so as to mitigate or eradicate the terrors ofexclusion.

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A2: No Alternative

Alternative forms of mapping exist – indigenous peoples of America had dynamicpictures rather than fetishizing imaginary lines

Shapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii;Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 138) As a result of all three essays in this section, we are able to see global space as ambiguous,

contested, and temporally unstable. Modern maps are wholly inadequate to suchcomprehensions. Ironically , the maps of various tribes of indigenous peoples of theAmericas, peoples whom the conquering Europeans failed to recognize as coherent cultures,were dynamic rather than static. They included pictorial narratives that demonstrated thecontested history of spaces rather than fetishizing victories with the fixed jurisdictionallines common to present maps. The essays in this section are functional equivalents of suchindigenous cartographies, for they render mobile, fragile, and contestable what traditionalpolitical discourses tend to naturalize, pacify and dehistoricize.

Mapping is not natural, its an attempt to encode natural human flows and enforce

the domain of states – this can be challenged Ferguson 1997 (Kennan; Professor of Governmental and International Affairs,University of South Florida; Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities;page 170)

Antithetical to codings, argue Deluze and Guattari, are flows. Capital, cultures, identities,human bodies – all flow over the surface of the earth in assorted ways and at various speeds.Each is motile, and each resists the inscriptions that states want and need to force uponthem. Nomads follow and exhaust flows; the socius tries to capture and contain them(148).Society codes imposing meanings to control and delimit these flows (185). Mappings areforms of overcoding cultures, of trying to freeze them to whatever can serve as an anchor.Territorialization, in other words is the attempt to control, limit and affix meaning to flows .

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A2: Advocacy causes Violence

Even if our advocacy still allows political violence, it will always be less extreme-genocide is only possible in the world of the aff

Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 202) In the case of ethnography, we find a practice that is close to a con stituent element inLevinas‘s idea of ethics, the need for a proximity beyond distancing modes ofrepresentation. Investigators who have combined a philosophical and an ethnographic interesthave noted that in contrast to modern industrialized societies, various tribal peoples havepracticed a radically nonrepresentational mode of encounter with alterity. For example,speaking of the Hurons of the seventeenth century as represented in the writings of theFrench Jesuits, Michael Pomedli dis cerned what he calls an excursive rather than adiscursive approach to Others.‘° As I noted in chapter 2, instead of appropriating alterity to apreexisting discursive system, the Hurons closed the distance through practices ofincorporation—adopting, consuming/eating, and so on.

‗While the Hurons certainly practiced extreme violence—cruel tor tures and killings of

enemy/Others—at the same time they resisted a certain violence of representation, therebyperhaps avoiding the more totalizing or genocidal forms of violence that morerepresentationally oriented cultures have practiced on Others whom they have identified,within their cartographic and narrative frames, as less worthy of moral solicitude.

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Advoccy Solves Ethnic Violence

Recognizing a multiplicity of identity within the state opens up politicalassociation and resolves inter-group violenceRygiel ‗98

(Kim, no quals given, ―Stablizing Boarders: Geopolitics of national identity construction inTurkey‖, Rethinking Geopolitics, p.106-124)

I have argued that the twentieth-century geopolitical practices by which states like Turkeyconstruct their national identity and delineate borders have produced a politics hostile todiversity. State building and the reproduction of national identity depend upon silencingdifferences such as ethnicity and gender within the polity. They also depend uponenvisioning space as something that can be homogenized and bounded, and isultimately linked to territory. While homogenizing space is an integral part of definingand reproducing a unified national identity, homogenizing national identity also becomesan important strategy for strengthening territorial jurisdiction. This politics is today,more than ever, a dangerous politics around which to organize, since globalization

brings greater movement and interaction between cultures and peoples. Students of thesocial sciences need to rethink geopolitics to find a more preaceful way to live with difference.

In the introduction, two ways of envisioning the nation were presented. The alternativevision of society described by Yasar Kemal, in which multiple identities share space, needsto be given careful consideration. Implementing this alternative vision requires resistingnotions of homogeneous identity and space so integral to present forms of stategovernance. Rethinking space, for example, might begin with Michael Shapiro‘sobservation that ‗states, and many nations within states have residual aspects of culturalalterity within them. Such aspects of difference cannot be resummoned by redrawinggeographical boundaries; they exist as invisible forms of internal otherness. Everypractice which strengthens boundaries produces new modes of marginalized difference‘(1994: 496). Living more peacefully with difference therefore ‗requires relaxing the spatial

imperatives of the order‘ (ibid: 499).Rethinking identity, on the other hand, might begin by accepting Kemal‘s vision of the

state as a place where a thousand cultures grow. Rather than viewing the state as boundedterritory that contains an unproblematic, fixed, homogeneous identity, we mightrecognize that identities are always unfixed, contested, multiple and hybrid. By hybrid, Irefer to the fluid and historically and discursively constructed nature of identity, theobservation made by Edward Said, who wrote ‗Partly because of empire, all cultures areinvolved in one another, none is single and pure, all are hybrid, heterogeneous,extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic‘ (1993: xxv). In other words, rather thanpitting identities against one another, we might regard identities as mutually constitutive,the national state identity defined in relation to a range of other ethnic, cultural andgender identities. For Turkey, this means acknowledging that multiple identities do exist

and the Kurds may identify themselves as both Turkish citizens and as Kurdish. Moreover, it means seeing Kurdish not as something different and antithetical to Turkish identitybut rather as an identity that, while different, is deeply connected to the history of the peoplesliving in the region and to the history of Turkey. The histories and cultures of the carious ethnicgroups are too intertwined with ine another to be separated by simple notions of distinctbounded communities or policies that try to purify the group, whether on part of the state or bythe PKK.

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A2: Realism Good[1/2]

Realism is not neutral, it‘s an intellectual construct maintained by the U.S. to

close off other alternatives – acting as if we‘re a unified nation-state causesuncritical foreign policy based on us-them dichotomies that recreate violence.George 1997 (Jim; International Relations Lecturer, Australian National University;Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 65)

In this way the sovereign state (the U.S.A.) can be understood to have constructed itsglobal identity in terms of the discourse of anarchy and danger ―external‖ to it. Its foreignpolicy, consequently, is accorded an irreducible logic that privileges the theory and practice ofpower politics in its efforts to respond to the anarchical world it must control for the sake ofsystemic order. Similarly, a hierarchy of meaning and relevance is established that expunges from the legitimate analytical task questions concerning the ―internal‖ self and all matters ofinterpretive ambiguity concerning the self/Other, identity/difference theme. But, Campbellinsists, these are questions that must be explored if we are not to further close off thepossibilities for sensitive and more appropriate foreign policy in the future. Most importantly,

the United States must begin to critically reflect upon itself , to reflect that is identity, framed inrelation to danger between states in an anarchical world, is part of a much larger regime ofdiscursive framing concerned with the disciplining of dangers with in the state.

Understood in these terms, of course, the Cold War can be understood not as the only―realistic‖ response to anarchical necessity but as a ―disciplinary strategy that was global in scopebut national in design.‖ More precisely the Cold War and orthodox readings of it can be understoodas another site at which the anarchy problematique was invoked to provide a sovereign,foundational presence from which the threat of (internal) ―difference‖ and Otherness couldbe rendered unified and controllable.

Realism is out of date, ideas and people circulate through national borders,reasserting the state causes violent reactionary movements

Connolly 1997 (William E.; Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University;Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 144)

This series of correspondences between people, territory, state, unity, freedom, andlegitimacy has been fractured in recent centuries through the international commerce ofpeople, things, and ideas, but it has yet to be reconfigured significantly in either the dominanttheories of politics circulating through western states or in the political cultures prevailing in them.In fact, the accelerated circulation of people, communications, cultural dispositions, things, andcurrencies across state boundaries often fosters reactive movements of nationalism andfundamentalism that are extremely violent toward heterogeneity inside and outside theirregimes.

Evidence of the violence in these inscriptions keeps returning, even in the etymology ofterritory. ―Territory,‖ the Oxford English Dictionary says, is presumed by most moderns to derivefrom terra. Terra means land, earth, nourishment, sustenance; it conveys the sense of a sustaining

medium, solid, fading off into indefiniteness. But the form of the word, the OED says, suggests thatit derives from terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize. And territorium is a ―a place from whichpeople are warned.‖ Perhaps these two occupy a territory is to receive sustenance and toexercise violence. Territory is land occupied by violence.

[2/2]Even if realism is good the plan is still bad – intervention assumes the U.S. knowsthe will of other people better than themselves, this results in state failures

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Brickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch in ‘07 (Ed. Christopher J. Brikerton, Philip Cunliffe and

Alexander Gourevitch. Politics without sovereignty: A Critique of Contemporary International Relations.University College London Press(UCLP). 2007 pg. 100)

The fact, therefore, that sovereignty is something abstracted from society does not mean that itcan be mechanically severed from society by an external agency, and then grafted back on. Toreconstitute sovereignty in this way is to vitiate the entire process by which political will is formed within

society. With the intervention of external forces and agencies into the process of shaping stateinstitutions, politics and sovereignty become ever more mediated, more abstract and more distantfrom the immediate concerns of the members of the society in question. The institution ofsovereignty is replaced by an alternative network of internationalized relations in which the liberties andinterests of citizens are no longer the essential foundation of political order . One of the mostexplicit examples of this is the ‗Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self -Government‘ in Kosovo, adocument that outlined political arrangements in the province after the 2001 elections. What isremarkable about the ‗Framework‘ is that it is among the first constitutional documents (though tellingly initself, not a constitution) in modern political history, whose preamble explicitly relegates the ‗will o f thepeople‘ to only one among a number of factors that will be taken into consideration by the UN officialsadministering the province. To relativize the will of the people in such a way denudes the endproducts of state-building of their political content ; namely, the people as sovereign. It is thisexternal mediation of the process of political creation that gives state-building its fragile andcontingent character. State-building is erecting institutions with few social or political foundations. It isunsurprising therefore, that state-building constantly recreates politically dependent administrations, inneed of international support to survive. This is the meaning of ‗state-building as state failure‘.

Having outlined the internal contradictions of contemporary state-building, we must now turn tothe historical process through which external support came to be seen as a vital prop to domestic order.A critical examination of the concept of ‗state failure‘ will act as the bridge to cross from the logicalanalysis of the contradictions of state-building to grasping the historical emergence of state-building ininternational politics. State-building has emerged as a specific response to a concrete historicalphenomenon, namely the exhaustion of post-colonial independence in many developing countries – anissue addressed in the theory of ‗state failure‘.

States are constantly contested, but this is never shown on the geopolitical map – a state-centric vision is maintained through constant violenceShapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii;Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page xx)

The political consolidations represented by the state territorial map – the internationalimaginary -- were achieved through violent confrontations. Moreover, although spaceappears innocent, ―the epitome of rational abstraction . . . because it has already been occupiedand used, and haas already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not alwys evidentin the land scape,‖ it remains contested. The violence continues as states attempt, physicallyand discursively, to marginalize or destroy various aspects of centrifugal otherness: ethnicsolidarities, reasserted nationalisms, indigenous movements, and draft resistances, all dissonantelements proclaiming the tenuous hold of states over territories and identities.

Although these affronts to the state system do not appear on standard territorial maps

or within the conceptual spaces of modernity‘s dominant political discourses, the challenges theypose have become increasingly registered as the former stabilities of the bordered worldbecome more fragile and states react to reassert control.

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A2: Borders GoodBorders are used to impose a euro-centric vision of the nation-state – theiruncritical acceptance causes them to be applied where they don‘t work Xenos 1997 (Nicholas; Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts;

Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page 238-239)The political upheavals that generated the movement of peoples at the beginning of this century were phenomenaassociated with the consolidation not of states but of nation-states. That is, the modern state, with a few importantexceptions, is an association that claims not only territorial integrity but also a specific national identity. In this claim, theFrench nation state has been the archetype. The notion of sovereignty had been applied since at least the sixteenth centuryin debates over the power of the emerging state and its relation ship to multiple competing sources of power withinEuropean societies, debates that were bound up with among other things, questions of religious toleration. It was in CatholicFrance, however, that a sea change occurred in June 1789 when the representatives of the Third Estate, in what amountedto a coup d‘etat, declared themselves the National Assembly. The full import of this move became apparent two monthslater when, in the Third Article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, it was asserted that ―the source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation.‖ In one stroke, the National Assembly had shifted the battle lines for the control

of state power to the terrain of national identity: henceforward, those who were able to impose their versionof who the nation was could claim to represent the national will and to direct the state. Aristocrats, the clergy, the monarchy, and anyone deemed in opposition to the revolution,including virtually the entire population of the Vendee, were among those who were at one time oranother written off the roles of national membership.

The development of the nation-state in accord with the French model came to beall about borders. These demarcations were inscribed both on maps and in the soulsof citizens. The nation-state had to have its territorial identity marked off against othernation-states without as well as against the others within, those whose physical presencewithin the mapped borders belied an alien identity. The French Revolution thus had to fightwars on two fronts. Along the internal borders, first the Reign of Terror and then the levee enmasse helped to create an ―us‖—le people—doing battle with ―them‖—the aristos and theirbrethren. State-directed festivals and, later, educational uniformity also contributed to thepurposive construction of a national identity. Preservation of the nation‘s spatial territorymeant an aggressive war against real or imagined threats beyond geographicalcontingencies that began to take on a new significance—the Pyrenees, the Alps, The Rhine,or the Channel. The Sometimes paradoxical result of these wars to defend the

sovereign nation and its state was the stimulation of newly discovered nationalidentities elsewhere in Europe (and, to the horror of the metropolitan French nation, inHaiti). Out of the French revolutionary experience was born the nineteenth-centurypattern of nations looking for their states (Italy, Greece, Germany, Hungary). This patternreached its apogee in the aftermath of World War I, when the idea of the sovereign nation-state was codified in the peace treaties, only the old pattern was asked to solve problemsfor which it had not been cut.

Borders are a recent creation of European colonialism which now underpin globalviolence

Agathangelou & Ling 04 (Anna M.[Lecturer at the University of Houston-Clear Lake andDirector of Global Change Institute], L.H.M.[ Associate Professor Graduate Program inInternational Affairs at The New School]) ―Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons ofViolence and Desire from September 11‖. International Studies Quarterly Volume 48 Issue 3Pg. 520.

Borders of our minds secure violence to satiate elite desires for hegemonic politics.Sovereignty and borders may correlate with objective, geographical markers but theirsignificance operates primarily in the mind (cf. Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, and Duvall, 1999).Peoples and societies did not express legalistic notions of borders or sovereignty until the

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http://popref%28%27b73%27%29/

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spread of the Westphalian state-system in the 17th century. Indeed, European colonizationproceeded precisely on this lack. Osama bin Laden revitalizes this colonial past torationalize his hegemonic politics: that is, a religious sovereignty against the "West."George W. Bush seeks not just national retribution for heinous crimes committed againstAmerica but a return to old-fashioned colonialism: that is, (Western, Christian) civilizationaldiscipline against all "terror." (The Bush administration's semantic shift from "terrorism" to"terror" offers one small indication of this change from a political to cultural agenda.) Both leaderstransgress national, physical boundaries to reinforce their borders of the mind: that is, an"international coalition" against terrorism for Bush; "global jihad," for bin Laden; and,

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A2: Hegemony Good[1/2]

U.S. hegemony relies on ever-increasing speed and destructiveness in combat,

its endpoint is the state as imperial killing machineTuathail ‘98 (Gearoid O. professor of political science, ―Post Modern Geopolitics?: TheModern geopolitical imagination and beyond‖, Rethinking Geopolitics, p.16-34)

Responding to threats which are potentially everywhere, the US military is now organized aroundtwo central strategic concepts: overseas presence and power projection. Overseas presence is thestationing of US military forces throughout the globe as well as the development of alliances withloval and regional forces, the pre-positioning of equipment in certain sites, and the maintenance ofa routine program of air, ground, and naval deployments across the surface of the planet. Powerprojections is the ability of the US military to organize the various elements of its overseaspresence into coherent, C412ized, multi-option, fighting force. It involves strategic mobilization andmobility with information coordination, speed, and flexibility fundamental to its operation. Swift,flexible, power projection as a fast geopolitics buys time for liberal politics (Luke and O Tuathail

1998): ‗the ability to project tailored forces through rapid, strategic mobility gives nationalleaders additional time for consultation and increased options in response to potentialcrises and conflicts (Joint Chiefs of Staff1995: 7). The logic of this strategy is the annihilationof space by military speed-machines in order to create flexible decision time indromological crisis situations. Its institutional consequence is the restructuring of the USmilitary as a globe-spanning collective of networks manned by cyborgs dedicated to space-destroying speed. This is described in the US military doctrine as ‗strategic mobilityenhancement‘, its four components and imperatives being ‗increased airlift capability,additional pre-positioning of heavy equipment afloat and ashore, increased surge capacityof our sealift, and improved readiness and responsiveness of the Ready Reserve Force‘(ibid: 7). Liberalism gives us our cyborgian way of life for the ‗our‘ here is thoroughlycyborgian.

With collectives and cyborgs so obviously a part of the theorization and practice of geopoliticsat the end of the twentieth century, the contrast foregrounded by question 5 is an unacknowledgedand under theorized one (see Delanda 1991). Critical geopoliticians need to begin to recognize thepervasive yet unproblematized presence and anonymous functioning of collectives of humans andnonhumans in world politics (Luke 1997). Contemporary geopolitics obviously gives life andsustenance to military collectives and their networks, but do the networks of everydaycollectives have secret geopolitical lives? Follow, Latour-style, our automobile network for just ashort connection and we quickly encounter the very military nets we have just described and manyother geopolitical quasi-objects and quasi-subjects: oil tankers, the House of Saud, autocyborgs,Fordism, petrol pump politics, George Bush, the Nigerian military, dromomechanics, Exxon, aircraftcarriers, polluted beaches, and dying forests. What strange forms of life are revealed by Japanesetransplants, strategic chokepoints, and ‗what‘s good for GM or Exxon is good for America‘?Proceed further into the network and one encounters the transcendent cyborg creature,Hydrocarbon Man and his megamachine dromocracy, the Occidental Petroleum WorshippingCollective, a developed, voracious, and accelerating form of life that reacts primitively and violently

to any threat, real or imagined, to its speedscapes and lifelines (Virilio 1995). Track the automobileactor-network and the Gulf War and many other wars soon reveal themselves (Yergin 1991). TheNetwork collective lives and expands as it kills and depletes. Some conscientious cyborgswithin the collective can protest about its poisonous effects on what they still imagine is‗nature‘ and ‗the human habitat,‘ but none will ever be powerful enough to control ordismantle the collective (Luke 1996a). It has us rather than us having it. It gives us itsgeopolitics.

[2/2]

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U.S. hegemony is based on an imperial delusion that our dominance ishistorically ordained – avoiding global conflict becomes an excuse to oppressminoritiesShapiro 1997 (Michael J.; Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii;Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities; page xv-xvi)

Jim George‘s essay also is addressed to a current situation in which discursive control iscontentious. He notes that the distribution of discursive assets has been shifting, for ―the traditionalhierarchical rituals of global power relations‖ are no longer controlling the agenda. To develop theimplications of this idea at the level of discourse, he summons a remark by Czech President VaclavHavel, who has noted that the U.S. strategic elite is now deluded in thinking that it has the―capacity to explain and control everything that exists.‖ This elite has been used to hearingnothing but its own voice, articulation its own problematics. Because the United States hadoperated from a relatively uncontested frame of reference, it, along with the powerful politicalunits that shaped first the colonial world and then the postcolonial, Cold War world, functionedwithin a delusional political narrative. It imagined itself as a part of a story in which itsdominance in the world order is a historic destiny and a utopian end to global politicalforms.

This political imaginary has been nowhere more apparent than in two very well entrencheddomains of political science analysis in the West. One is political psychology and the other

comparative politics. Both subdisciplines, which took shape in the aftermath of World War II,selected as their constituting frame the avoidance of another Adolf Hitler . In the case ofpolitical psychology what was enjoined was a search for the fascist personality, understood to be adeviant type susceptible to authoritarian impulses or appeals. This search resulted in, among othercanons in political psychology, the authoritarian personality studies of Thodor W. Adorno and hisassociates, Milton Rokeach‘s work on open versus closed minds, and H.G. Eysencks addition of atender-minded versus tough-minded axis of opinion to the study of political ideology.

In the case of comparative politics, the study of political parties has been dominated by afear of instability and, accordingly, a disparagement of those multiparty systems that allowfor the aggregation of extreme or marginalized voices and interests. Those visible eruptions ofdiscontent that do not operate through party politics have become ―social movements,‖ the analysisof which has tended to operate within psychologizing rather than politicizing frames. A safe ―civicculture,‖ one that would never allow a Hitler to emerge, must have structural impediments to

the articulation of extreme appeals in the political process. Such was the anxiety of theimperial center as it produced many of the conceptual commitments of post war political science.

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Impacts

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Wars! Impact

The affirmation of a collectivized identity is the basis for antagonism andviolence.

Shapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 173) The second insight derives from Maclntyre‘s various demonstrations that the intelligibility of actionis dependent on its location within a nar rative with historical depth. Using the metaphor of thetheatrical char acter, he argues that as individual agents we are at best only coauthors of ournar ratives: ―We enter upon a stage which we did not design... [ we find ourselves part of an actionthat was not of our making?‘ Mac- - Intyre‘s recognition of the centrality of narrative goes a longway toward avoiding the empty abstractions that analytic philosophy‘s model of the self produces inits commitment to universal, contextless bases for judg ment. However, he fails to recognize thedepth and contentiousness of the narrative aspect of identity. And his spatial imaginary is toonarrow, for it is focused on the immediate location of the speech act rather than the complex set ofboundaries and divisions—whether consensual or contentious—that constitute the order as awhole. Seeking to restore an Aristotelian basis for virtue, Maclntyre treats narratives in terms oftheir forward aims, their projections toward a future world. This teleological frame obscures what is

at once more basic and more contestable in the narrative context of the actor. While it is the casethat, at the level of im mediate public intelligibility, people‘s actions take on much of their significance through the temporal extension of stories, which help justify the goals of the actions, it isalso the case that actions participate in other kinds of stories; they belong to people in thesense that they reaffirm who they are, where they are, and how it is that they have becomepart of an assemblage or a ―people‖ in a collective sense. The identity stories that constructactors as one or another type of person (e.g., Jew versus Arab, native versus immigrant)and that te-rritorialize identities (e.g., resident versus nomad, citizen versus foreigner) are thefoundations for histori cal and contemporary forms of antagonism, violence, andinterpretive contention over the meaning of actions.

Boundaries of identity pit groups against each other leading to violence andterritorial struggles.

Shapiro, 99 (Michael, J[Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii] ―The Ethicsof Encounter: Unreading, Unmapping the Imperium‖ Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and WorldPolitics Pg 59.

The identity stories that construct actors as one or another type of person-man versuswoman, national citizen versus nomad, one versus another ethnicity, and so on-provide thefoundations for historical and contemporary forms of antagonism, violence and interpretivecontention over the meaning of actions. For example, to be a member of a particular tribe,ethnicity, or nation, a person must be located in a particular genealogical and spatial story.Such stories precede any particular action aimed at a future and provoke much of thecontestation over claims to territory and entitlement to collective recognition. They are partof the reigning structure of intelligibility and tend to escape explicit contentiousness withinongoing political and ethical discourses. To produce an ethics responsive to contestations over

identity and the spatial stories upon which structures of recognition rest, it is necessary to disruptthe dominant practices of intelligibility.

We have to reject borders to ethnically address others and prevent violenceShapiro 97 (Michael, Prof. of PoliSci @ Hawaii, Violent Cartographies, Pg. 34)

What is involved in reopening the book? The most important step is to get out of the historicallyand ethically impoverished. As the geopolitical map was formed out of violent confrontations,state boundaries developed and cultural ones were effaced. As a result, states ai nations withinstates have residual aspects of cultural alterity witl Such aspects of difference cannot be

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resummoned by redrawing geographical bound aries, for they exist as invisible forms ofinternal, otherness. Every boundary-firming practice will simply produce new modes of marginalized difference. It is therefore necessary, as Homi Bhabha states it, to change ―the treatment of‗difference‘. . . from the boundary ‗outside‘ to its finitude ―10k The production of ageography within which marginalized peoples can be recognized and accorded politicalstatus and moral solicitude requires both a resistance to state system maps that denyotherness within and narrative recoveries that add temporal depth to the global map.

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Imperialism! Impact

Western Cartography is used to control knowledge and suppress minoritiesJohnson, Louis, & Pramono ‗06

(Jay, Dept of Geography – U of Hawaii, Renee Pualani, Dept of Geography – U of Hawaii, Albertus Hadi,Dept of Geography – U of Hawaii. ―Facing the Future: Encouraging Critical Cartographic Literacies inIndigenous Communities‖, ACME E-Journal of International Critical Cartographies, p. online)

Encouraging critical cartographic literacy will entail, as Freire‘s critical consciousness work hasdemonstrated, the development of an awareness of cartography‘s role in dispossessing Indigenouscommunities of land and resources. Harley observes that ―maps were the first step in theappropriation of territory. Such visualizations from a distance became critical inchoreographing the Colonial expansion of early modern Europe‖ (1992b: 532). Westerncartography served European imperialism through acts of ―geographic violence,‖ by renaming, reframing and controlling the space of the colony (Turnbull, 1998: 17; Mitchell,1988). The maps produced in the colonial expansion of North America described a bounded land,controlled by coordinates of latitude and longitude, whose ‗silences‘ described ―a land without the

encumbrance of the Indians‖ (Harley and Laxton, 2001: 187). The colonial map asserted theexternal centralized power of the state to dominate ‗its‘ territory and expanded the judicial controlout toward the ‗blank spaces‘ of the Indigenous nations (Harley and Laxton, 2001).The power that Western cartography asserts is not only though the power of the external judicial control of the metropole over the colony, it is also the internal power asserted by thecartographer ―over the knowledge of the world made available to people in general ‖ (Harleyand Laxton, 2001: 112). The conventional signs, rules and specifications of Westerncartography serve not only to dominate the landscape, they also serve to control the way inwhich we envision and represent the landscape. As surely as the lands of Indigenouscommunities have been appropriated through the labor of the surveyor and cartographer, so theway in which Indigenous peoples view the world has been influenced by the standardization anduniversalizing nature of Western cartographic knowledge. It is this colonization of the processesof making the world known through the standardized knowledge system of Westerncartography which has colonized the cartographic traditions of non-Western peoples (seeTurnbull, 1998).

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Patriarchy! Impact

The image of borders forecloses the consideration of underrepresented groups.This upholds a system of politics that favors white, western males and cannot

resolve global problems Anne Orford, 1996. (Lecturer, Faculty of Law, The Australian National University. ASYMPOSIUM ON REENVISIONING THE SECURITY COUNCIL: ARTICLE: THE POLITICS OFCOLLECTIVE SECURITY. Winter, 1996 University of Michigan Law School. Ln)

A related assumption is that state borders exist to protect citizens from the disorderedand chaotic world which exists outside those borders. Ann Tickner suggests thathistorically, the identity of states has been closely tied to their role as national security providers.Given the assumption that threats are in the external realm, a sound national securitypolicy demands that states try to increase their capabilities and enhance their power, themost important component of which is military power. 99

Today, the image of strong impermeable borders is presented in a nostalgic way inmainstream international relations and international law texts, where commentators talkof the new and frightening interdependence of global communities and the fact that weare all less secure because borders are now perceived as incapable of protecting us fromunregulated flows of refugees, environmental degradation, or nuclear devastation. 100

Yet for many individuals, the model of safety and unity inside strong state borders, andanarchy and difference outside, has never represented reality. The dominant modeldistracts attention from the conditions of insecurity which define existence for manygroups within Western states, including women, indigenous peoples, the mentally ill, gaymen, lesbians, and ethnic, racial, or religious minorities. For the members of those groups, theexistence of strong state borders simply does not come close to guaranteeing security,

or even survival. In that sense, it could be said that many subjects of Western democracieshave always been "beyond the sovereign state."

More importantly for my analysis, the model itself is implicated in the form of creation ofconditions of insecurity for women and other marginalized groups, both concretely andideologically. The focus on creating a strong state, with increased military and economicpower, contributes to the conditions which create women's insecurity in Westerncultures, and masks the material and ideological conditions which should be addressedto guarantee women's security. 102 [*398]

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