NY ĀYA-VAI ŚEṢṢṢIKA THEORY OF RELATIONshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/64250/13/13_chapter 6.p… · But Dinesh Chandra Guha opines that saṁyoga may be vy āpyav

180

CHAPTER-VI

NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢṢṢṢIKA THEORY OF RELATION

1. REALITY OF RELATION

Relation has an essential role in the systems of Indian philosophy.

Amongst the systems, Navya-Nyāya system gives the most importance to relation.

The Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras are the realist

philosophers who accept the real existence of relation. These philosophers opine that

without the reality of relation, it is not possible to gain knowledge. Relation has the

main role in the process of the generation of knowledge. The conception of the

pramāṇas like pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna śabda, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi

require the understanding the concept of relation.1

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas being realist uphold the separate existences of all

things which are knowable and nameable. Hence, the concept of relation is of utmost

importance to maintain the relation between the substrates (dharmī) and properties

(dharma) which are entirety different entities. Of the seven categories accepted by the

Vaiśeṣikas the sixth category i.e., samavāya is a relation. Some of the qualities are also

relational viz., conjunction, disjunction, number and separateness. Later on the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣikas developed the notion that anything can function as a relation by combining

itself to another thing. “In Navya-Nyāya further useful technical terminology was

____________________________________________________________________

1. cf. Relation in Indian Philosophy, p.69

181

developed to handle relations, as their awareness of the importance of relations for

their system increased.”2

In the Nyāya system, the conception of relation is related to the Nyāya

theory of anyonyābhāva. According to them, relation is fully external. The western

philosophers opine that the relations of the things are external as well as internal. The

internal relations are created in the nature of things. In Indian philosophy, the

Sāṁkhya, Bhāṭṭas and Advaita Vedāntins state that tādātmya relation is an internal

relation. According to some point of view, relation cannot make into one unit but it is

accepted as a relation.3

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, all relations are external. The Naiyāyikas

have used tādātmya, as a relation, but as an external relation. Naiyāyikas opine that, it

cannot be gained from the nature of a thing. It is seen that a dharma is complete

different from a dharmin, an avayavin (a composite whole) is complete separate from

its avayavas (component parts), jāti is totally distinct from vyakti. In all these cases,

there must be some relation to account for their existence in the same locus.4 “Relation

according to Alexander is the vaguest word in the philosophical vocabulary. It is used

as a symbol indicating a connection and is generally left undefined.”5 Relation is

known as contact (sannikarṣaḥ). It is the cause of the notion of qualifier and

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2. Potter, Karl H., Indian Philosophy, p. 80

3. A Primer of Indian Logic, pp. 49-50

4. cf. Ibid., pp. 50-51

5. Vide, Relation in Indian Philosophy, p.11

182

qualificand in different things.6

Jagadīśa Tarkālaṁkāra maintains that a relation is the

object (viṣaya)bof the knowledge of being qualified (viśiṣṭa) as distinct from the

qualifierness (viśeṣaṇatā) and qualificandness (viśeṣyatā)7. Rūpavān ghaṭaḥ is the

qualified knowledge. There are three objects in this. The one object is ghaṭa as

substantive another is rūpa (colour) as attribute and the third object is samavāya

(relation) between ghaṭa and rūpa. There is viṣayatā (objectness) in these objects. The

viṣayatā which remains in the ghaṭa is in the form of substantiveness, the viṣayatā

which remains in rūpa is in the form of attributiveness. The viṣayatā which remains in

samavāya is in the form of saṁsarga that is known as relation.8

According to some Navya-Naiyāyikas, that is known as relation which is

the determining faction of a qualified knowledge (viśiṣṭadhī).9

In the Navya-Nyāya, relation is discussed in detail relation occupied a very

important place in the Navya-Nyāya. Dinesh Chandra Guha also underlines the

importance of relation in Navya-Nyāya Logic thus “The edifice of Navya-Nyāya rests

to a great extent on the conception of ‘sambandha’ or relation. Indeed the conception

of relation is so interesting and all-pervasive that on account of its application the

Navya-Nyāya can safely be called Relational Logic even in the most modern sense of

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6. sambandhaḥ sannikarṣaḥ sa ca vibhinnayovastunorviśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-

bhāvaprayojakaḥ. Navya-Nyāyabhāṣāpradīpaḥ, p.9

7. viśeṣyaviśeṣantvānyaviśiṣṭadhīviṣayatvaṁ eva sambandhatvamiti bhāvah.

Siddhāntalakṣana Jāgadiśī, p. 252

8. cf. Relation in Indian Philosophy, p.80

9. viśiṣṭadhīniyāmakasyaiva tathātvāt. Siddhāntalakṣana Jāgadiśī, p. 252

183

the term. Anything which has been done so with the help of relations.”10

Moreover,

Navya-Naiyāyikas are called sambandhi. All subject-matters of the Navya-Nyāya

system clarified with the help of the concept relation.

2. DIFFERENT TYPES OF RELATION

Broadly relation can be divided into two types, viz.,–

(a) Vṛttiniyāmaka (occurrence-exacting) and

(b) Vṛttyaniyāmaka (non-occurrence-exacting).

Those relations which have roughly the notion that something occurs in

something else is called Vṛttiniyāmaka relation. Vṛttiniyāmaka is also of three kinds –

(i) Saṁyoga (conjunction), (ii) Samavāya (inherence) and (iii) Viśeṣaṇatā

(attributive). Viśeṣaṇatā is again subdivided into abhāviya-viśeṣaṇatā or relation

pertaining to the non-existence and kālika viśeṣaṇatā or relation of temporal

qualification.11

3. VṚTTINIYĀMAKA SAMBANDHA (OCCURRENT-EXACTING RELATION)

(i) Saṁyoga (Conjunction))

Saṁyoga is the one kind of Vṛttiniyāmaka sambandha. It is a guṇa. The

special cause the usage of two things as conjunct is known as Saṁyoga.12

In the

Dīpikā, Annaṁbhaṭṭa clarifies that when there is the usage in the form that these two

things are conjoined then the special cause of this usage is called saṁyoga.13

In the

Dīpikā, we find that the word ‘special cause’ is added in this definition of saṁyoga to

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10. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p.56

11. Ibid., p. 58

12. saṁyuktavyavahārahetuḥ saṁyogaḥ. Tarkasaṁgraha,p. 18

13. Dīpikā on Ibid.

184

remove the defect of ativyāpti in case of space, time, number etc.14

He mentions two

types of saṁyoga, karmaja and saṁyogaja. The karmaja saṁyoga is arises when a

book comes in contact with the hand because of the activity of the hand in taking a

book. The saṁyogaja saṁyoga arises when as a result of the contact of the book with

the hand, there is contact of the book with the body.15

Karmaja saṁyoga is again

divided into two kinds – anyatara karmaja and ubhayakarmaja. The example of the

anyatarakarmaja is that the conjunction of the bird with mountain. In this example,

only the bird moves but the mountain remains static. The example of the

ubhayakarmaja is that the conjunction of the flying birds. In this example both birds

move.16

Viśvanātha defines saṁyoga as the contact of two things which were first

removed or separated from each other.17

That means conjunction is the relation

between two separable (yutasiddha) things. Hence, there cannot be any conjunction

between two all-pervading things which are never separate from each other. Thus,

conjunction is the relation of two relata which can exist separately when they are not

related. As saṁyoga is a quality, so there can be conjunction between two substances

only and saṁyoga resides in both these substances. According to Viśvanātha,

conjunction is of three types. Actually Viśvanātha has mentioned the two types of

karmaja saṁyoga , discussed above, as two different kinds of saṁyoga itself. In this

view, first type of saṁyoga is due to action in either of the two relata (anyatara

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14. Ibid., pp. 18-19

15. Ibid.

16. cf. Tarkasaṁgraha,p. 165

17. Bhāṣāpariccheda, p. 207

185

karmaja); the second is due to action in both (ubhayakriyājanya) and third is due to

conjunction (saṁyogaja). The example of the first is the contact of a bird with the

mountain. The example of the second kind is the encounter of two fighting birds,

where both move. The conjunction of a jar and a tree because of the conjunction of the

one part of the jar and the tree is the third kind of conjunctin.18

According to

Viśvanātha, karmaja saṁyoga is again of two kinds, viz., Impact (abhighātā) and

contact (nodena). Of these two the first is the case of sound, while the second is not the

cause of sound.19

Saṁyoga is a quality and it is avyāpyavṛtti (non-pervasive).20

That means

it covers only a part of the things conjoined. But Dinesh Chandra Guha opines that

saṁyoga may be vyāpyavṛtti also. He says, “This relation is generally known as a

relation of incomplete occurrence (avyāpyavṛtti) because when a contact takes place

between two substances (dravyas), it occurs only in a part of them, if of course, the

two substances have got parts. But there may be instances in which a contact may be

of complete occurrence (vyāpyavṛtti) also. As for example, in the case of contact

between two atoms (paramāṇu) or between the mind and the soul or in similar other

cases, the contact cannot be of incomplete occurrence, because, the atoms have got no

parts or the soul also is considered partless. So also the mind in the Nyāya system is

considered as having no part.”21

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18. Ibid., pp. 207-208

19. Ibid.

20. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 18

21. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p.59

186

From the point of Mathematical Logic, relation may be dyadic, triadic, etc.

In Navya-Nyāya, a relation is usually dyadic, although there are other types of relation

also. Saṁyoga is dyadic when it happens between two dravyas. When a dravya

becomes conjunction with two more dravyas, there may be triadic relation. In the

words of Guha “Mathematical Logic conceives relations as triadic etc. When A comes

in contact with C through B. But in the above stated causes A and B simultaneously

come in contact with C or A simultaneously comes in contact with B and C.”22

In

Nyāya- Vaiśeṣika terminology the first case may be described as A and B are saṁyoga

pratiyogī (counter-correlate of saṁyoga) and C anuyogī (subjunctive). For the latter

casse, A is pratiyogī and B and C are anuyogī of saṁyoga. There are two relations

here – direct relation (sākṣāt sambandha) and indirect relation (parāpara sambandha).

That is known as direct relation in which it directly comes in contact with two or more

dravyas. On the other hand, that is called indirect relation in which relation happens

among the component parts.

Vibhāga is the opposite of saṁyoga. Annaṁbhaṭṭa defines it as the

destroyer of the conjunction.23

It has also two kinds- karmaja and vibhāgaja. Karmaja

is the separation of a book from the hand. Vibhāgaja is the separation of the book from

the body because of the disjunction of the book from the hand.24

Moreover karmaja is

divided into two types - anyatarakarmaja and ubhayakarmaja. It is anyatarakarmaja

____________________________________________________________________

22. Ibid., p. 60

23. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 18

24. ādyo hastakriyayā hastapustakavibhāgaḥ. dvitīyo hastapustakavibhāgātkāya-

pustakavibhāgaḥ. Ibid, 19

187

in which disjunction is caused due to the action of one of the two things. For example,

disjunction of a bird from the constant tree, ubhayakarmaja is that in which

disjunction is caused because of the action of the both things e.g., two flying birds.25

(ii) Samavāya

Samavāya is another kind of Vṛrriniyāmaka sambandha. Samavāya is the

most important and the corner stone of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It is regarded as a

separate category by them. Samavāya is regarded as an intimate relation between two

things which are inseparable. This sambandha is found between the part and the

whole (avayava-avayavi), the generic character and the individual manifestation (jāti-

vyakti), the quality and the substance qualified (guṇa and karma) and the eternal

substance and the ultimate difference (nitya-viśeṣa).26

A composite whole remains in

its constituent parts e.g., the cloth exists in the yarns, through which it is composed. A

generic character remains in an individual e.g., manuṣyatva (manness) exists in all

men, ghaṭatva exists in all ghaṭas. A quality exists in substance e.g., colour exists in

the rose, rose is a dravya, colour is a guṇa. An action exists in a dravya, e.g., the horse

is running, horse is dravya and running is action. A particularity (viśeṣa) exists in

eternal substance (nitya-dravya).27

Samavāya can be established by the following inference:

The cognition that a thing is qualified by qualities, actions etc. depends on

three things, viz., viśeṣya (something that is qualified or substantive), viśeṣaṇa (the

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25. Sinha, J., Indian Philosophy, Vl. I., p.433

26. Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 61

27. Bhattachārya, J., Bharatiya Darsan, pp.194-195

188

qualifier or attribute) and a relation between the two, because it is the cognition of a

qualified entity, like the notion of the qualified entity daṇḍi puruṣaḥ (a man holding a

staff).28

Now, this relation cannot be saṁyoga, since saṁyoga happens between two

dravyas which are separable. But here the relation is between substance and colour or

action, i.e., between the jar and its colour or the jar and its action etc. which are

inseparable. It cannot be the relation of svarūpa (self-sameness) where the relation is

denoted by the two relata themselves without reference to a further relation. In that

case infinite numbers of relation will have to be assumed which is cumbrous. Hence,

for the sake of simplicity, inherence, which is one is to be accepted. Samavāya is

eternal relation29

and it is one.30

Samavāya establishes relation among first five categories – dravya, guṇa,

karma, sāmānya and viśeṣa. As a whole, samavāya is a unique device to make the

metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.31

In other works it may be

stated that when two different things inseparably connected like substance and

attribute, substance and karma, substance and sāmānya, cause and effect, atoms and

viśeṣa which appear as one whole or one inseparable entity (ayutasiddha) there is the

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28. guṇakriyādiviśiṣṭabuddhiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhaviṣayā

viśiṣṭabuddhitvāt ḍaṇḍī puruṣaḥ iti viśiṣṭabuddhitvāt ityanumānam.

Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p.47

29. samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvam. Ibid

30. samavāyastveka eva. Tarkasaṁgraha,p. 18

31.The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga

School, p.375.

189

relation of samavāya. S.N. Dasgupta mentions that “This peculiar relation of

inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action and attribute, cause and effect

and jāti in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one

and the same thing.”32

Kaṇāda gives the definition of samavāya as that relation which is the

cause of the notion that something is here (iha) as between cause and effect.33

Praśastapāda defines samavāya as that relation which is found between inseparable

entities, related as the container and the contained and the cause of the latter existing in

the former.34

If that two things are separable then the relation of that two things cannot

be samavāya e.g., a paṭa (cloth) remains in its composite tantus. The paṭa cannot be

separated from tantus. Therefore, this relation between tantus and paṭa is samavāya. It

is also self-subsistent (svātmasatta), it is marked by knowledge, effectless, causeless,

eternal and nameless as objects.35

In his bhāṣya, it is found that samavāya is one and

independent but its substance and contents are different. It exists as container and

contained. The genus of dravya remains in dravya, the genus of guṇa are found in

guṇa, the genus of karma exists in karma.36

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that there is

____________________________________________________________________

32. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 319

33. ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ samavāyaḥ. Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 7.2.26

34. ayuta-siddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṁ yaḥ sambandha iha pratyaya-hetuḥ

sa samavāyaḥ. Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 289

35. sāmānyādīnāṁ trayānām api svātmasattvaṁ buddhilakṣaṇatyam

akāryatvam asāmānyaviśeṣavattvam nityatvam … Ibid., p.9

36. yadyapyekaḥ samavāyaḥ sarvatra svatantraḥ tathāpyādhārā-

dheyaniyamo’sti. dravyeṣu eva dravyatvaṁ, guneṣveva guṇatvaṁ

karmasveva karmatvamiti. Ibid., p.293

190

difference between the parts and the whole or a substance and its qualities etc. but the

difference of the space between these parts and the whole or the substance and its

qualities etc. cannot be accepted. Hence in such cases, relation is accepted which is

called samavāya.37

According to Srīdhara, that relation is called samavāya which exists

between two inseparable entities which are of the nature of container and content.38

This samavāya relation cannot remain between two entities which are able to be

separated and which exist in different substrates. Separable things can exist in different

substrates. A cloth remains in yarns through which it is constituted. Yarns can exist

independently apart from cloth but cloth has no independent existence apart from

them. The yarns are the container and the cloth is its content.39

He also states that

samavāya has existence, nature, it can be expressed by name. In the different states,

its essential nature can be made through the knowability and nameability.40

It is also

found in his work that samavāya is known as self-subsistent, it does not accept

community, does not relate to being. It does not remain in beings through any other

relation.41

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37. pratīti-bhedad bhedo’sti deśa-bhedastu nesyate,

tenātra kalpyate vṛttiḥ samavāyaḥ sa ucyate. Nyāyamañjarī, p.235

38. ayutasiddhayorāśrayāśrsayibhāvaḥ sasamavāyaḥ. Nyāyakandalī, 15

39. Ibid., p. 14

40. astitvaṁ svarūpavattvam.abhidheyatvamapi vastunaḥ svarupam eva.

bhāvasvarupam avasthābhedena jñeyatvamabhidheyatvaṁ cocyate. Ibid., p.16

41. teṣāṁ sattvaṁ na sattāyogaḥ. Ibid., p.19

191

Śivāditya42

and Keśava Miśra43

give similar definition. In the

Bhāṣāpariccheda, Viśvanātha states that samavāya is the relation of a jar etc. With its

two parts etc., the relation of the substance with quality and action and relation of the

generic attribute with these three i.e., substance, quality and action.44

He also defines

in his Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, that samavāya is an eternal relation.45

The relation

which exists between the parts and the whole, genus and the individual, quality and

qualified, action and moving thing, particular and eternal substance is known as

samavāya.46

He also mentions that samavāya can be inferred from the substance,

quality and relation between them. The svarūpasambandha between the cause (part)

and the effect (whole) undermine the doctrine of asatkāryavāda. According to this

doctrine the effect is a new beginning (arambha), it is different from its cause. The

whole exists in its parts from which it is different. Hence, samavāya is not

svarupasambandha.47

Annaṁbhaṭṭa gives the definition of samavāya as an eternal relation.48

Samavāya has no production and destruction, so, it is eternal. He also states that

samavāya exists in inseparable pairs (ayutasiddha). He then proceeds to explain the

term ayutasiddha. Two things are said to be ayutasiddha (inseparable) if one of them

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42. nityasambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Saptapadārthī, p. 51

43. ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Tarkabhāṣā, p.513

44. ghatādīnāṁ kapālādau dravyeṣu guṇakarmanoḥ/

teṣu jāteśca saṁbandhaḥ samavāyaḥ prakirtitaḥ// Bhāṣāpariccheda p. 13

45. samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvam. Nyayasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 47

46. Ibid

47. na ca svarūpasambandhena siddhasādhanamarthāntaraṁ vā. Ibid., p. 48

48. nityasaṁbandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Tarkasaṁgraha, p.61

192

exists as contained in other so long as it is not destroyed. This means that the things,

which are in the relation of inherence, cannot be separated without one of them being

destroyed49

, e.g., threads and a piece of cloth. Here, threads are the parts; the cloth is

the whole. Threads are independent of the cloth, but the cloth is not independent of

threads as the cloth exists only in the threads till it is not destroyed. These two things

are called ayutasiddha and the relation between these two ayutasiddha things is

samavāya. Similarly, the relation between the quality and the qualified, like the red

colour which is a quality existing in a substance like a flower is inherence. Though a

substance can exist independently, quality cannot exist apart from the substance. So,

they are ayutasiddha in as much as a quality, as long as it lasts, has to subsist in a

substance. Similar is the relation between action and substance of which it is an action.

The ayutasiddha relation between jāti and vyakti is the fourth one. Individual cows

cannot exist independent of the universal cowness which can exist independent of

particular cows. Therefore, they are ayutasiddha. Lastly, the relation between viśeṣa

and eternal substance is inherence.50

In his Dīpikā, Annaṁbhaṭṭa points out that the

word nitya is added in the definition to avoid over-pervasion to conjunction. Because

conjunction is also a relation, but it being non-eternal, then is no over-pervasion. The

word sambandha is given here to avoid over-pervasion to ākāśa etc. Ākāśa etc. are

eternal substances, but ākāśa is not a saṁbandha.51

Annaṁbhaṭṭa also forwards the

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49. yayordvayormadhye ekamavinasyadapara’śritamevavatiṣṭhate

tāvayutasiddhou. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 62

193

same argument as given by Viśvanātha to prove the existence of samavāya. In his

view, the cognition in the form of ‘blue jar’ which is a qualified cognition is based on

the qualifier, the thing qualified and the relation of the two, as it is a qualified

cognition like the cognition of ‘the man with a staff’. From this inference the existence

of samavāya can be proved.52

According to Naiyāyikas, samavāya is perceptible but Vaiśeṣikas state that

samavāya is not perceptible, it is atīndriya and anumeya.53

If the dravyas are

perceptible then the samavāya sambandha between those dravyas can be perceived.

But all dravyas are not perceptible. Then their sambandha is also not perceptible.

Samavāya does not possess a jāti as there is jātibādhaka called asambandha in case of

samavāya. According to the Vedāntins and Sāṁkhya philosophers, samavāya is not

acceptable as a padārtha, because they believe in svarūpasambandha or tādātmya-

sambandha but do ot believe in the five pairs of ayutasiddha things.54

Prābhākaras state about samavāya, in which two separateless dravyas

(yutasiddha) are intimately connected with each other, that is samavāya.Its eternality

depends upon the dravyas, if the dravyas are eternal, it is also eternal and when the

dravyas are non-eternal, it is also non-eternal. Naiyāyikas opinion that samavāya is

nitya and one. The Bhāṭṭas and Advaitins accept the samavāya as tādātmya-

____________________________________________________________________

52. nīlo ghaṭa iti viśiṣṭapratītiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasaṁbandhaviṣayā viśiṣṭapratyayatvādaṇ-

ḍīti pratyayavaditi samavāyasiddhiḥ. Ibid

53. samavāyasya pratyakṣa-varṇanaṁ nyāya-matena, vaiśeṣikamate tu samavāyo’

tīndriyaḥ. Tarka-kaumudī, p. 8.

54. Vide., Gajendragadkar, A.B. and Karmakar, R.D., Tarkasaṁgraha, p.33.

194

sambandha.55

Samavāya and Causation

The reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is dependent upon their

theoryof causation which is called the asatkāryavāda. According to this theory, the

effect does not exist in the cause, the cause and the effect are two separate substances,

e.g., threads and cloth are two different things. These two separate substances exists in

the same place by this samavāya relation.56

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the

material cause is known as samavāyi-kāraṇa that means the cause remains in its effect

by samavāya relation. Therefore, samavāya relation is the basis of the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. It is to be noted here that the theory of samavāya has at

first, been postulated as a relation of cause and effect. Kaṇāda tries to explain the

subsistence of an effect in its cause with the help of samavāya. In fact the problem for

the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas is to explain how two things, viz., cause and effect, which has

separate realities, can remain occupying the same space. Kaṇāda takes resort to the

concept of samavāya in order to explain the subsistence of one substance in another in

such a way that both of them occupy the same space. However, Kaṇāda has not

mentioned about qualities, actions and universals residing in substances in the relation

of samavāya. Later on the scope of this samavāya relation spreads to the existence of

qualities, movement or universals in their substances. The viśeṣa also exists in atoms

or eternal substance through this relation.57

____________________________________________________________________

55. A Primer of Indian Logic, p. 33

56. The Philosophy of Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga

School, pp. 376-378

57. Ibid.

195

Athalye and Bodas mention that “The conception of samavāya is in fact a

key to the whole theory of causation as viewed from the Nyāya standpoint and

consequently the doctrine has been strongly animadverted by writers of the Sāṁkhya

and Vedāntic schools who hold different views”.58

The cause and the effect are

connected together inseparably, this union is called samavāya.59

Saṁyoga and Samavāya

There are some distinction between saṁyoga and samavāya –

(a) Saṁyoga exists between two substances. But samavāya exists between two

substances which remain as cause and effect, between one substance and one other

non-substance like quality, movement etc. between two non-substances like qualities

and universals as also movement and its universal.

(b) Saṁyoga is relation between two things which can be separated. Samavāya exists

between those things which cannot be separated. For example, the saṁyoga between a

man and a stick can be separated, but in case of the samavāya relation between the

effect and the cause, the effect cannot be separated from the cause.

(c) Samavāya relation exists between two things as container and contained (ādhāra –

ādheya bhāva). Saṁyoga relation also abides between two substances. But in this

relation, the container and the contained (ādhāra – ādheya bhāva) sambandha is not

necessary. “That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained

(ādheya), and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the

substratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in

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58. Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 98

59. cf. Ibid.

196

which they reside is the container or the substratum.”60

In case of saṁyoga, the

substance are not necessarily connected in the relation of container and contained. That

means there may be the relation of container and contained, but this is not the

necessary condition, as in the case of samavāya.

(d) Samavāya is one but the saṁyoga is many.

(e) In saṁyoga, the two related objects are distinctly perceived as two, but in

samavāya, although the relata are two, they appear as one

(f) Samavāya is eternal because it has no production and destruction, but saṁyoga is

non-eternal.61

(g) Samavāya relation is internal but saṁyoga relation is external.

(h) Samavāya is a separate category. But saṁyoga is not a separate category; it is a

division of guṇa.

Samavāya is One and Eternal

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas generally accept samavāya as one. Though the

substrates where samavāya resides are different, samavāya is the same in all cases. It

is Praśastapāda who first established refuting the opponents view that samavāya is one

only. The opponents argue that if samavāya is one, then there will be cross-division

(saṁkara) among the categories of substance, quality, action etc. the relation of

dravya, guṇa and karma with dravyatva, guṇatva and karmatva being one and the

____________________________________________________________________

60. The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga

School, p. 379

61. Sinha, Jadunatha, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 372

197

same.62

He refutes this view by the argument that though dravyatva and guṇatva have

the same samavāya, yet there is the different potentiality of manifestation (vyaṅgya –

vyañjaka – śakti) on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the

container (ādhāra) and the contained (ādheya).63

Though samavāya is one, yet there is

some restriction for the different ādhāra and ādheya. The genus of substance exists in

substance. The genus of guṇa exists in guṇa. The genus of karma exists in karma.64

Viśvanātha also refers to the view of the opponents and says that it can be contended

that since inherence is one, so it will give rise to the notion that air has colour. But this

argument is not tenable, for although there is the inherence of colour in air, yet there is

no colour in it.65

The reason is that in the notion of a qualified thing, the knowledge of

the relation as well as of the qualifier is necessary. This relation is, therefore, not mere

inherence, but the inherence of colour. The inherence of colour is absent in air and as

such there is no inconsistence in accepting samavāya as one.

(iii) Viśeṣaṇatā Sambandha (Attributive Relation)

Viśeṣaṇatā sambandha is a kind of vṛttiniyāmaka relation. It has two

kinds - abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha and kālika- viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-

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62. nanu yadyekaḥ samavāyo dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ dravyatva-guṇatva-

karmatvādi-viśeṣaṇaiḥ saha saṁbandhaikatvātpadārthasaṁkaraprasaṅga.

Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 293

63. dravyatvādīnāmapi samavāyaikatvepi vyaṅgyavyañjakaśaktibhedādādhā-

rādheyaniyama. Ibid., 294

64. yadyapyekaḥ samavāyaḥ … ādhārādheyaniyamo’sti … dravyeṣveva dravyatvaṁ,

guṇeṣveva guṇatvaṁkarmasvev karmatvamiti.

Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 293

65. tatra rūpasamavāyasattve’pi rūpa’bhāvāt. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p.49

198

sambandha. The abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha is found in the case of the

event of an abhāva. The kālika- viśeṣaṇatā-viśeṣa-sambandha is found in the case of

the event of objects in a part of time (khanda-kāla) or universal time (mahākāla).66

Abhāviyaviśeṣṣṣṣaṇṇṇṇatā-viśeṣṣṣṣa-sambandha (Relation Pertaining to the Non-existence)

It is known as abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā because it is the same as the abhāva of

a viśeṣaṇa (qualifier) as in the cognition bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti. In this, ghaṭābhāva

(absence of jar) is the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) of the ground and bhūtala is the object

qualified (viśeṣya).67

This sambandha (relation) is called to be abhāviyaviśeṣaṇatā-

sambandha as viśeṣaṇata is established through abhāva, it is also called viśeṣa

(particular) as there is some special feature for which this sambandha (relation) differs

from other sambandhas (relation).68

Kālika- viśeṣṣṣṣaṇṇṇṇatā – sambandha (Temporal Relation)

Kālika- viśeṣaṇatā-sambandha has a important role in the Navya-Nyāya

system. Because this sambandha is establish in the Navya-Nyāya system. According to

the Naiyāyikas all things are produced in relation to kāla. Hence, kāla is considered to

an efficient cause of things which are produced. It is also considered as the substratum

of all. Kāla brings about the relation between all things with the motion of the sun as is

perceived by all. The notion that eternal substances like ether etc. exist always, is

possible only because of their relation with kāla only because of their relation with

kāla. At the time of dissolution, all eternal categories remain in Mahākāla by the

kālika relation.69

____________________________________________________________________

66. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p. 64

67. Virupakshananda, Swami, (ed.), Tarkasaṁgraha, p. 195

68. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, pp. 64-65

69. cf. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 6

199

4. VṚṚṚṚTTYANIYĀMAKA-SAMBANDHA (NON-OCCURRENT-EXACTING

RELATION)

Vṛttyaniyāmaka-sambandhas are countless. Through the viśiṣṭa-jñāna

(qualified knowledge), this sambandha is known.

Abheda-sambandha or tādātmya sambandha

In the Navya-Nyāya, the relation of tādātmya and abheda are used in the

same sense. Tādātmya relation is that relation by which something remains in the

thing determined by itself or by its asādhāraṇa dharma (uncommon property). For

example the subsistence of a jar in what is determined by ghaṭatva is called tādātmya.

Hence, the relation of something with that thing itself.70

Vyabhicāritatva-sambandha

Literally vyabhicāritatva-sambandha means deviated-ness relation. When

one object becomes deviated from another, the relation between these is known a

vyabhicāritatva-sambandha. For example, vahni (fire) deviates from dhuma (smoke).

It may also be stated that vahni remains in the adhikaraṇa of the atyantābhāva of

smoka.71

Vyabhicāritatva is also known as svābhāvavadvṛttitva sambandha. This

sambandha is seen in the adhikaraṇa of the atyantābhāva of the self. In this

sambandha generally the pronoun sva (self) is used in the beginning of the name of the

sambandha. This vyabhicāritatva is also known as avyāpyatva. When an object is not

pervaded by another thing, it is known as avyāpya.72

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70. Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, pp. 74-78

71. Ibid., p. 80

72. Ibid., p. 81

200

Vyāpakatva-sambandha and Vyāpyatva-sambandha

The term vyāpaka means pervader and vyāpya means pervaded. Hence,

vyāpakatva means pervaderness and vyāpyatva is the state or condition of being

pervaded, when one entity is pervaded by another. The pervaded one is called vyāpya

and one which pervade is called vyāpaka. A vyāpaka is that which is not the counter

correlate of the absolute negation remaining in that thing. In simple term that is called

vyāpaka whose non-existant is never found in each substratum e.g., the fire is the

vyāpaka of smoka. The relation which connects fire with smoke is called vyāpakatā

relation. Again smoka is pervaded by fire. Hence, the smoke is connected with fire in

the relation of vyāpyatva.73

Pratiyogitā-sambandha

In the case of non-existence the thing which is non-existent in its

substratum is called pratiyogī (counter co-relate) e.g, the ghaṭa is the counter co-relate

of the absence in the form of ghato nāsti. The relation which connects the jar with its

absence is called pratiyogitā sambandha or pratiyogikatva sambandha.74

Anuyogitā-sambandha

Anuyogi is the locus of absence. As for example, in case of

ghāṭābhāvavad bhūtalam or bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti (there is no jar on the tract of land),

the tract of land is anuyogi. The relation which connects this tract of land with the

negation is called anuyogitā-sambandha.75

_____________________________________________________________________

73. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 2

74. Ibid., p.2;

Navya-Nyāya System of Logic, p. 85

75. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 2

201

Svarūpa sambandha

When, a thing is related by itself with another thing without having any

other relation for being related, that relation is called svarūpa-sambandha. The

svarūpa-sambandha is sometimes of the nature of its pratiyogī and sometimes of the

nature of anuyogī, e.g., in gagane rūpābhāva (there is no colour in ether), the relation

is the relation of ether with rūpābhāva is svarūpa-sambandha and is of the nature of

the ether itself which is the anuyogī here. In case of samavāya also the relation

between samavāya and its relata is regarded as svarūpa-sambandha. Here no other

relation is accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas since that will lead to infinite regrace.76

Other Vṛttyaniyāmaka Relations

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept many other Vṛttyaniyāmaka relations. These

relations are: viṣayatva, viṣayitva, prakāratā, prakārita, avayavatva, svāmitva,

kāryatva, kāraṇatva etc.

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76. Ibid., p. 5