Nuisance

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. L-8191.February 27, 1956.]DIOSDADO A. SITCHON, ET AL.,Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of Manila,Respondent-Appellee.[G.R. No. L-8397.February 27, 1956]RICARDO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL.,Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of Manila,Respondent-Appellee.[G.R. No. L-8500. February 27, 1956]FELINO PEA, ET AL.,Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of Manila,Respondent-Appellee.[G.R. No. L-8513. February 27, 1956]SANTIAGO BROTAMONTE, ET AL.,Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of Manila,Respondent-Appellee.[G.R. No. L-8516. February 27, 1956]ERNESTO NAVARRO, ET AL.,Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as the City Engineer of the City of Manila,Respondent-Appellee.[G.R. No. L-8620. February 27, 1956]AMADO SAYO, ET AL.,Petitioners-Appellants, vs. ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of Manila,Respondent-Appellee.D E C I S I O NCONCEPCION,J.:These are six (6) class suits against the City Engineer of Manila to enjoin him from carrying out his threat to demolish the houses ofPetitionersherein, upon the ground that said houses constitute public nuisances. In due course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered separate, but substantially identical, decisions adverse to thePetitioners, who have appealed therefrom directly to this Court. Inasmuch as the fact are not disputed and the same issues have been raised in all these cases, which were jointly heard before this Court, we deem it fit to dispose of the appeals in one decision.1.Case No. L-8191 (Case No. 21530 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) was instituted by Diosdado A. Sitchon, Luis Gavino and Ponciano Adoremos, in their own behalf and in representation of twenty-two (22) persons, named in an annex to the petition. In 1947 and 1948, saidPetitionersoccupied portions of the public street known as Calabash Road, City of Manila, and constructed houses thereon, without the consent of the authorities. Later on, some of them paid concession fees or damages, for the use of said portions of the street, to a collector of the city treasurer, who issued receipts with an annotation reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarywithout prejudice to the order to vacate. On or about July 5, 1952,RespondentCity Engineer advised and ordered them to vacate the place and remove their houses therefrom before August 5, 1952, with the warning that otherwise he would effect the demolition of said houses at their expense. This notice having been unheeded, a demolition team of the office of the City Engineer informed thePetitionersin December, 1953, that their houses would be removed, whereupon the case was instituted for the purpose already stated. At the instance ofPetitionersherein, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction.2.Case No. L-8397 (Case No. 21755 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) was brought by Ricardo de la Cruz, Isidro Perez and Fernando Figuerroa, in their behalf and in representation of two hundred sixty-seven (267) persons, who, sometime after the liberation of Manila, occupied portions of Antipolo and Algeciras Streets, of said city, and constructed houses thereon, without any authority therefor. SeveralPetitionerslater paid concession fees or damages to a collector of the city treasurer, and were given receipts with the annotation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarywithout prejudice to the order to vacate. The constructions were such that the roads and drainage on both sides thereof were obstructed. In some places, the ditches used for drainage purposes were completely obliterated. What is more, said ditches cannot be opened, repaired or placed in proper condition because of said houses. On or about May 15, 1952,RespondentCity Engineer advised them to vacate the place and remove their houses within a stated period, with the warning already referred to. Hence, the institution of the case, upon the filing of which a writ of preliminary injunction was issued.3.Felino Pea, Francisco Morales and Jose Villanueva filed case No. L-8500 (Case No. 21535 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), on their own behalf and in representation of about thirty (30) persons, who, without the aforementioned authority, occupied portions of the street area of R. Papa Extension, City of Manila, sometime after its liberation. As in the preceding cases, severalPetitionerspaid concession fees or damages to a collector of the city treasurer, without prejudice to the order to vacate, which was given on May 10, 1952, with the warning that should they fail to remove said houses,Respondentwould do so, at their expense. Upon being advised, later on, of the intention ofRespondents agents to carry out said threat, the corresponding petition was filed and a writ of preliminary injunction secured.4.Santiago Brotamonte, Godofredo Blanquiso and Salvador Justiniano commenced case No. L-8513 (Case No. 21531 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), on their behalf and in representation of forty-two (42) other persons, who, without any authority, occupied portions of the bed of a branch of the Estero de San Miguel, City of Manila, and constructed houses thereon, sometime in 1947 and 1948. As in the cases already mentioned, some of them paid concession fees or damages, without prejudice to the order to vacate, which was given, with the usual warning, in December, 1953. The institution of the case and a writ of preliminary injunction soon followed.5.In case No. L-8516 (Case No. 21580 of the Court of First Instance of Manila), Ernesto Navarro, Pablo Salas and Herminigildo Digap arePetitioners, on their own behalf and in that of fifteen (15) persons, who, sometime after the liberation of Manila, occupied portions of the bed of the Pasig River, at about the end of Rio Vista Street, San Miguel, Manila, which are covered and uncovered by the tide, and erected houses there on without any authority therefor. Concession fees or damages were paid by some of them, without prejudice to the order to vacate. After giving, on or about June 20, 1952, the corresponding notice and warning, which were not heeded,Respondentthreatened to demolish said houses atPetitioners expense, whereupon the case was instituted and a writ of preliminary injunction secured.6.Case No. L-8620 (Case No. 22143 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) was filed by Amado Sayo, Marciano Lamco and Victor Bernardo, on their behalf and in that of twenty-two (22) other persons, who, in 1946 and 1947, occupied portions of Torres Bugallon, Cavite, Misericordia and Antipolo Streets, in the City of Manila, and constructed houses thereon, without any authority therefor. Some paid monthly rentals and/or damages, and/or concession fees from 1946 to 1951, without prejudice to the order to vacate, which was given on May 1, 1952, with the usual warning, followed, about two (2) years later, by a threat to demolish said houses. Hence, the case, upon the filing of which writ of preliminary injunction was issued.After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered separate decisions, the dispositive part of which, except in case No. L-8620, is of the following tenor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryPor tanto, el Juzgado sobresee esta causa por falta de meritos y ordena al ingeniero de la ciudad de Maniia que haga la demolicion o la remocion de las citadas casas, dentro de quince dias despues de haber avisado al efecto a los aqui recurrentes, y a costa de los mismos.In said case No. L-8620, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn view of the foregoing considerations the Court hereby declares:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(a)that the houses of allPetitionersin this case erected on the land which forms part of Torres Bugallon, Cavite, Misericordia and Antipolo Streets constitute public nuisance as defined by section 1112 of Ordinance No. 1600 of the City of Manila and by Article 694 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Civil Code and(b)that the City Engineer of the City of Manila is the official authorized by Article 1112 of Ordinance No. 1600 of the City of Manila and Article 699, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code to abate said public nuisance and charge the expenses thereof toPetitioners.Petitionerscontend that said decisions should be reversed upon the ground that, in trying to demolish their respective houses without notice and hearing, the city engineer sought to deprive them of their property without due process of law, apart from the fact that, under Articles 701 and 702 of the new Civil Code, the power to remove public nuisances is vested in the district health officer, not inRespondentcity engineer. It should be noted, however, that, before expressing his intent to demolish the houses in question,Respondenthad advised and ordered thePetitionersto remove said houses, within the periods stated in the corresponding notices;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythatPetitionersdo not question, and have not questioned, the reasonableness or sufficiency of said periods;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that they have never askedRespondentherein to give them an opportunity to show that their houses do not constitute public nuisances. Besides, it is not disputed that said houses are standing on public streets, with the exception of the houses involved in cases Nos. 8513 and 8516, which are built on portions of river beds. It is clear, therefore, that said houses are public nuisances, pursuant to Articles 694 and 695 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is Republic Act No. 386, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary(1)Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor(2)Annoys or offends the senses;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor(3)Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor(4)Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryor(5)Hinders or impairs the use of property.ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition. (Italics supplied.)It is true that Articles 700 and 702 of the same Code provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryART. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are availed of.ART. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.However, section 31 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, specifically places upon the city engineer the duty, among others, to have charge of thecralawcare ofcralawstreets, canals and esteroscralaw;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto prevent the encroachment of private buildingscralawon the streets and public placescralaw;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto have supervisioncralawof all private docks, wharves, pierscralawand other property bordering on the harbor, rivers, esteros and waterwayscralawandcralawissue permits for the construction, repair and removal of the same and enforce all ordinances relating to the same;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto have the care and custody of all sources of water supplycralaw;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto cause buildings dangerous to the public to becralaw;chan roblesvirtualawlibrarytorn down;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to order the removal of buildings and structures erected in violation of the ordinancescralaw. Obviously, articles 700 and 702 of Republic Act No. 386, should yield to said section 31 of Republic Act No. 409, not only because the former preceded the latter, but, also, because said section 31 of Republic Act No. 409 is a special provision specifically designed for the City of Manila, whereas said Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code are general provisions applicable throughout the Philippines. Moreover, section 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila (No. 1600) explicitly authorizes the action sought to be taken byRespondentherein, by providing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryWhenever the owner or person responsible for any unauthorized obstruction shall, after official notice from the proper department, refuse or neglect to remove the same within a reasonable time, such obstruction shall be deemed a public nuisance, and the city engineer is authorized to remove the same at the owners expense.Again, houses constructed, without governmental authority, on public streets and waterways, obstruct at all times the free use by the public of said streets and waterways, and, accordingly, constitute nuisances per se, aside from public nuisances. As such, the summary removal thereof, without judicial process or proceedings may be authorized by the statute or municipal ordinance, despite the due process clause. (66C.J.S. 733-734.)The police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance;chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the legislature may authorize the summary abatement of a nuisance without judicial process or proceeding.cralawThe remedy of summary abatement for violation of a municipal ordinance may be used against a public nuisance. (66C.J.S. 855, 856.)When necessary to insure the public safety, the legislature may under its police power authorize municipal authorities summarily to destroy property without legal process or previous notice to the owner.cralawIt is not an objection to the validity of a police regulation that it does not provide for a hearing or for notice to the owner before his property is subjected to restraint or destruction. (12 Am. Jur. 356, 357.)In the exercise of the police power the state may authorize its officers summarily to abate public nuisances without resort to legal proceedings and without notice or a hearing.Municipal Corporations generally have power to cause the abatement of public nuisances summarily without resort to legal proceedings. (39 Am. Jur. 455, 456, 457.)Being in conformity with the facts and the law, the decisions appealed from are hereby affirmed in toto, and the writs of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court dissolved, with costs againstPetitioners-Appellants. It isSO ORDERED.Paras,C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia.,JJ.

THIRD DIVISIONPEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 169364Petitioner,Present:Ynares-Santiago,J.(Chairperson),- versus -Chico-Nazario,Velasco, Jr.,Peralta, andBersamin*,JJ.EVANGELINE SITON y SACILandKRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO yPromulgated:MEFANIA,Respondents.September 18, 2009x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry.He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well. Martin Luther King, Jr.Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order[1]of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondentsPetition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,DavaoCity.The Informations, read:That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.[2]Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 202.Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty.The following are vagrants:1.Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;2.Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;3.Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;4.Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;5.Prostitutes.For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished byarresto menoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, byarresto mayorin its medium period toprision correccionalin its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash[3]on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.In an Order[4]dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits.The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States police power and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State.An authority on police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. (Citations omitted).In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police power of the state.The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex (the god of the people is the Supreme Law).This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex A lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer.Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case.Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in the indictment cant be categorized as a crime.[5]The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,[6]directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts.They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Courts ruling inEstrada v. Sandiganbayan,[7]the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes.It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitionersMotion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.SO ORDERED.[8]In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause.It held that thevoid for vaguenessdoctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes.CitingPapachristou v. City of Jacksonville,[9]where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of theUnited States, the trial court ruled:The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession when there are many who are without visible means of support not by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entire country.To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.[10]On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the trial court declared:The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those covered by the law and those who are not.Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.[11]Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE[12]Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citingRomualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[13]the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines.They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.The Court finds for petitioner.The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power.The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged.[14]However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid.[15]This requirement has come to be known as thevoid-for-vagueness doctrinewhich states thata statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.[16]InSpouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,[17]the Court recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases.The Court therein held:At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitionerscase would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[18]The first statute punishing vagrancyAct No. 519was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902.The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy.[19]While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:ART. 202.Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty.The following are vagrants:1.Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;2.Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;3.Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually associate with prostitutes;4.Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;5.Prostitutes.For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished byarresto menoror a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, byarresto mayorin its medium period toprision correccionalin its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support.This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which definedvagrantasevery person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support.The second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general termspublic or semi-public places.The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme Courts opinion in thePapachristou v. City of Jacksonville[20]case, which in essence declares:Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that [all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids. Lanzetta v.New Jersey, 306U. S.451, 306U. S.453.Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v.United States, 325U. S.91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v.United States, supra.TheJacksonvilleordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally innocent. Nightwalking is one.Floridaconstrues the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the habitual wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, common night walkers. We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that loafing was a national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime inJacksonville.x x x xPersons wandering or strolling from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification without any lawful purpose or object may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be casing a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.x x x xWhere the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate solution. Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.x x x xAnother aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of theJacksonvillepolice. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering punishment by analogy. Such crimes, though long common inRussia, are not compatible with our constitutional system.x x x xA presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of theJacksonvilletype teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.[21]The underlying principles inPapachristouare that: 1) the assailedJacksonvilleordinance fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.The said underlying principle inPapachristouthat the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.[22]This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction.Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions.[23]Moreover, theJacksonvilleordinance was declared unconstitutional on account ofspecific provisions thereof, which arenotfound in Article 202 (2).The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court inJacksonvilledeclared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits asnightwalking,wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object,habitual loafing,habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, andliving upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal.But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object.But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by without visible means of support while theJacksonvilleordinance prohibits wandering or strolling without any lawful purpose or object, which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitutea trap for innocent acts.Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.[24]Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement ofprobable causeprovides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2).The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoingJacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.[25]Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse.The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.[26]The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects.The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures.It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.[27]As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest.On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case.Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing watch-your-car boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity.The streets and parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred criminals.Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled if not killed by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over.All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or night.The streets must be protected.Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters.We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.This is exactly why we havepublic order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs.These laws were crafted tomaintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society.These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.[28]Civilly, they are covered by the abuse of rights doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, thatany person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary tomorals,good customsorpublic policyshall compensate the latter for the damage.[29]This provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.[30]In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.[31]Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.[32]Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public indecencies and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct.The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society.For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated.[33]As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.[34]Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed.Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community.Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive.It is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties.Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets.Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections.Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants.Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens.Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for their next hit.The streets must be made safe once more.Though a mans house is his castle,[35]outside on the streets, the king is fair game.The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional.When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[36]The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of thePhilippines, a law has been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[37]It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.Ithas been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.[38]As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED.The Decision ofBranch 11 of theRegional Trial Court of Davao City inSpecial Civil Case No. 30-500-2004declaringArticle 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONALisREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.No costs.SO ORDERED.Nuisance per se - G.R. No. 177807G.R. No. 177807

"x x x.

The wing walls of the building are notnuisancesper se.The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisanceper se.We disagree.The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisancesper se.The wing walls do notper seimmediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may beper seorper accidens.A nuisanceperse is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29]Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.InAC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30]we held:We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, theSangguniang Panglungsodis empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that theSangguniang Bayancannot declare a particular thing as a nuisanceper seand order its condemnation.It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisanceper se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of theSangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)x x x."EMILIO GANCAYCO,Petitioner,- versus -CITY GOVERNMENT OFQUEZON CITYAND METROMANILADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,Respondents.x-----------------------------------------------xMETROMANILADEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,Petitioner,-versus-JUSTICE EMILIO A. GANCAYCO (Retired),Respondent,x-----------------------------------------xG.R. No. 177807G.R. No.177933Present:CORONA,C.J.,CARPIO,VELASCO, JR.,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,*DELCASTILLO,*ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ,MENDOZA,SERENO,REYES,andPERLAS-BERNABE,JJ.Promulgated:October 11, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONSERENO,J.:Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]promulgated on18 July 2006and the Resolution[2]dated10 May 2007of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648.The FactsIn the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifaniodelos Santos Avenue(EDSA),[3]Quezon Citywith an area of 375 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT114558.On27 March 1956, theQuezon CityCouncil issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof.[4]An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun.[5]Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side ofSantolan Roadto one lot afterLiberty Avenue, and from one lot beforeCentral Boulevardto the Botocan transmission line.At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units.Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line.Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.The ordinance was amended several times. On8 August 1960, properties located at the Quezon City-San Juan boundary were exempted by Ordinance No. 60-4477 from the construction of arcades. This ordinance was further amended by Ordinance No. 60-4513, extending the exemption to commercial buildings fromBalete StreettoSeattle Street. Ordinance No. 6603 dated1 March 1966meanwhile reduced the width of the arcades to three meters for buildings alongV. Luna Road, Central District,Quezon City.The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.On 2 February 1966, the City Council actedfavorablyon Justice Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66, subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so demands.[6]Decades after, in March 2003, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Councils (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002.[7]The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions.[8]On28 April 2003, the MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of thePhilippines(Building Code)[9]in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen (15) days to clear the portion of the building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA.[10]Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the wing walls, of the ground floor structure. The records of the present case are not entirely clear on the extent of the demolition; nevertheless, the fact of demolition was not disputed. At the time of the demolition, the affected portion of the building was being used as a restaurant.On29 May 2003, Justice Gancayco filed a Petition[11]with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofQuezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-49693, seeking to prohibit the MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City from demolishing his property. In his Petition,[12]he alleged that the ordinance authorized the taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation, because the construction of an arcade will require 67.5 square meters from the 375 square meter property. In addition, he claimed that the ordinance was selective and discriminatory in its scope and application when it allowed the owners of the buildings located in the Quezon City-San Juan boundary to Cubao Rotonda, and Balete to Seattle Streets to construct arcades at their option. He thus sought the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 2904 and the payment of damages. Alternately, he prayed for the payment of just compensation should the court hold the ordinance valid.The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. In addition, it pointed out that Justice Gancayco was already barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.Similarly, the MMDA alleged that Justice Gancayco could not seek the nullification of an ordinance that he had already violated, and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. It further stated that the questioned property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904.[13]The RTC rendered its Decision on30 September 2003in favor of Justice Gancayco.[14]It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were being taken without compensation for the publics benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that the ordinance violated owners right to equal protection of laws. The dispositive portion thus states:WHEREFORE,the petition is hereby granted and the Court hereby declares Quezon City Ordinance No. 2094,[15]Series of 1956 to be unconstitutional, invalid and voidab initio. The respondents are hereby permanently enjoined from enforcing and implementing the said ordinance, and the respondent MMDA is hereby directed to immediately restore the portion of the party wall or wing wall of the building of the petitioner it destroyed to its original condition.IT IS SO ORDERED.The MMDA thereafter appealed from the Decision of the trial court. On18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) partly granted the appeal.[16]The CA upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 2904 and lifted the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance. In so doing, it held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. The CA also ruled that the ordinance established a valid classification of property owners with regard to the construction of arcades in their respective properties depending on the location. The CA further stated that there was no taking of private property, since the owner still enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the property,to wit:Even with the requirement of the construction of arcaded sidewalks within his commercial lot, appellee still retains the beneficial ownership of the said property. Thus, there is no taking for public use which must be subject to just compensation. While the arcaded sidewalks contribute to the public good, for providing safety and comfort to passersby, the ultimate benefit from the same still redounds to appellee, his commercial establishment being at the forefront of a busy thoroughfare like EDSA. The arcaded sidewalks, by their nature, assure clients of the commercial establishments thereat some kind of protection from accidents and other hazards. Without doubt, this sense of protection can be a boon to the business activity therein engaged.[17]Nevertheless, the CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances. Thus, the dispositive portion stated:WHEREFORE, the appeals arePARTLY GRANTED. TheDecisiondatedSeptember 30, 2003of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 224,Quezon City, isMODIFIED, as follows:1)The validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 2094,[18]Series of 1956, issued by the City Council of Quezon City, isUPHELD; and2)The injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the said Ordinance isLIFTED.SO ORDERED.This ruling prompted the MMDA and Justice Gancayco to file their respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration.[19]On10 May 2007, the CA denied the motions stating that the parties did not present new issues nor offer grounds that would merit the reconsideration of the Court.[20]Dissatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Justice Gancayco and the MMDA filed their respective Petitions for Review before this Court. The issues raised by the parties are summarized as follows:I.WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 2904.II.WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.III.WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.IV.WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.The Courts RulingEstoppelThe MMDA and the City Government of Quezon City both claim that Justice Gancayco was estopped from challenging the ordinance, because, in 1965, he asked for an exemption from the application of the ordinance.According to them, Justice Gancayco thereby recognized the power of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings.To recall, Justice Gancayco questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance on two grounds: (1) whether the ordinance takes private property without due process of law and just compensation; and (2) whether the ordinance violates the equal protection of rights because it allowed exemptions from its application.On the first ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not the ordinance constitutes a taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003 when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was granted an exemption in 1966, there was no taking yet to speak of.Moreover, inAcebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[21]we held:It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which isultra viresor beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor.Ultra viresacts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null and void and cannot be given any effect.The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and void orultra vires. (Emphasis supplied.)Recently, inBritish American Tobacco v. Camacho,[22]we likewise held:We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act. Indeed, petitioner cannot be faulted for initially undertaking to comply with, and subjecting itself to the operation of Section 145(C), and only later on filing the subject case praying for the declaration of its unconstitutionality when the circumstances change and the law results in what it perceives to be unlawful discrimination.The mere fact that a law has been relied upon in the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional is not a ground for considering petitioner estopped from assailing its validity.For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when presented before it inbona fidecases for determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. (Emphasis supplied.)Anent the second ground, we find that Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.Zoning and the regulation of theconstruction of buildings are validexercises of police power.InMMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,[23]we discussed the nature of police powers exercised by local government units,to wit:Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation.It is clear that Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of Quezon City,[24]which states:To make such further ordinances and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.[25]With regard meanwhile to the power of the local government units to issue zoning ordinances, we applySocial Justice Society v. Atienza.[26]In that case, theSangguniang PanlungsodofManilaCityenacted an ordinance on28 November 2001reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies contended that they stood to lose billions of pesos, this Court upheld the power of the city government to pass the assailed ordinance, stating:In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated,the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.The means adopted by theSanggunianwas the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial.A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted.The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of theSangguniang Panlungsodof the City ofManilaand any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust... (Emphasis supplied)InCarlos Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,[27]we also held:For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its favor.(Emphasis supplied.)In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents ofQuezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA.Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code,[28]which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. The Building Code states:Section 102. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design quality of materials, construction, occupancy, and maintenance.Section 1004 likewise requires the construction of arcades whenever existing or zoning ordinances require it. Apparently, the law allows the local government units to determine whether arcades are necessary within their respective jurisdictions.Justice Gancayco argues that there is a three-meter sidewalk in front of his property line, and the arcade should be constructed above that sidewalk rather than within his property line. We do not need to address this argument inasmuch as it raises the issue of the wisdom of the city ordinance, a matter we will not and need not delve into.To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.The wing walls of the building are notnuisancesper se.The MMDA claims that the portion of the building in question is a nuisanceper se.We disagree.The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisancesper se.The wing walls do notper seimmediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance.Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may beper seorper accidens.A nuisanceperse is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.[29]Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.Neither does the MMDA have the power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.InAC Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp.,[30]we held:We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, theSangguniang Panglungsodis empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that theSangguniang Bayancannot declare a particular thing as a nuisanceper seand order its condemnation.It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisanceper se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of theSangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis supplied.)MMDA illegally demolishedthe property of Justice Gancayco.MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended.However, the Building Code clearly provides the process by which a building may be demolished.The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official. The pertinent provisions of the Building Code provide:SECTION 205.Building Officials. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Building Official shall be responsible for carrying out the provisions of this Code in the field as well as the enforcement of orders and decisions made pursuant thereto.Due to the exigencies of the service, the Secretary may designate incumbent Public Works District Engineers, City Engineers and Municipal Engineers act as Building Officials in their respective areas of jurisdiction.The designation made by the Secretary under this Section shall continue until regular positions of Building Official are provided or unless sooner terminated for causes provided by law or decree.xxxxxxxxxSECTION 207.Duties of a Building Official. In his respective territorial jurisdiction, the Building Official shall be primarily responsible for the enforcement of the provisions of this Code as well as of the implementing rules and regulations issued therefor. He is the official charged with the duties of issuing building permits.In the performance of his duties, a Building Official may enter any building or its premises at all reasonable times to inspect and determine compliance with the requirements of this Code, and the terms and conditions provided for in the building permit as issued.When any building work is found to be contrary to the provisions of this Code, the Building Official may order the work stopped and prescribe the terms and/or conditions when the work will be allowed to resume. Likewise, the Building Official is authorized to order the discontinuance of the occupancy or use of any building or structure or portion thereof found to be occupied or used contrary to the provisions of this Code.xxxxxxxxxSECTION 215.Abatement of Dangerous Buildings. When any building or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines.(Emphasis supplied.)MMDA v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.[31]is applicable to the case at bar. In that case, MMDA, invoking its charter and the Building Code, summarily dismantled the advertising media installed on the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) 3.This Court held:It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. InMetropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc.,Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., andMetropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.Clarifying the real nature of MMDA, the Court held:...The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.All its functions are administrative in natureand these are actually summed up in the charter itself,viz:

Sec.2.Creation of the MetropolitanManilaDevelopment Authority.- xxx.The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely local matters.The Court also agrees with the CA's ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3,being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.Moreover, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks' billboards, signages and other advertising media in MRT3, because it did not specifically cover MRT3, and because it was issued a year prior to the construction of MRT3 on the center island of EDSA. Clearly, MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 could not have included MRT3 in its prohibition.MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code)and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive.The power to enforce the provisions of theBuilding Codewas lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA, considering the law's following provision, thus:Sec. 201. Responsibilityfor Administration and Enforcement. -The administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Code including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof is hereby vested in the Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary."There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement theBuilding Code.(Emphasis supplied.)Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by imprisonment of not more than thirty (30) days, or by both such fine and imprisonmentat the discretion of the Court, Provided, that if the violation is committed by a corporation, partnership, or any juridical entity, the Manager, managing partner, or any person charged with the management thereof shall be held responsible therefor. The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.As pointed out inTrackworks,the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of the structure, simply because thenQuezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmontesigned MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA.The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a nuisance[32]and tofurther impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner.[33]MMDAs argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its Answer,[34]the city government stated that the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation and/or consent ofQuezon City. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancaycos building.WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84648 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-18390 August 6, 1971PEDRO J. VELASCO,plaintiff-appellant,vs.MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER, its President; JOHN COTTON and HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its Vice-Presidents; and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City Engineer of Quezon City,defendants-appellees.Q. Paredes, B. Evangelista and R. T. Durian for plaintiff-appellant.Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for defendants-appellees Manila Electric Co., etc., et al.Asst. City Fiscal Jaime R. Agloro for defendant-appellee Anastacio A. Agan, etc.REYES, J.B.L.,J.:The present case is direct appeal (prior to Republic Act 5440) by the herein plaintiff-appellant, Pedro J. Velasco (petitioner in L-14035; respondent in L-13992)*from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in its Civil Case No. 1355, absolving the defendants from a complaint for the abatement of the sub-station as a nuisance and for damages to his health and business in the amount of P487,600.00.In 1948, appellant Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation three (3) adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City. These lots are within an area zoned out as a "first residence" district by the City Council of Quezon City. Subsequently, the appellant sold two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot, which was farthest from the street-corner, whereon he built his house.In September, 1953, the appellee company started the construction of the sub-station in question and finished it the following November, without prior building permit or authority from the Public Service Commission (Meralco vs. Public Service Commission, 109 Phil. 603). The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the company's consumers, numbering not less than 8,500 residential homes, over 300 commercial establishments and about 30 industries (T.s.n., 19 October 1959, page 1765). The substation has a rated capacity of "2 transformers at 5000 Kva each or a total of 10,000 Kva without fan cooling; or 6250 Kva each or a total of 12,500 Kva with fan cooling" (Exhibit "A-3"). It was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from the appellant's house (T.s.n., 16 July 1956, page 62; 19 December 1956, page 343; 1 June 1959, page 29). The company built a stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire fence.It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation. Whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue in this case.Plaintiff-appellant Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, reading as follows:A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business condition of property or anything else which:(1) Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or(2) Annoys or offends the senses;xxx xxx xxxbecause subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the concentration and sleep of said appellant, and impaired his health and lowered the value of his property. Wherefore, he sought a judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be declared entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages under Article 2202 of the Civil Code.ART. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.After trial, as already observed, the court below dismissed the claim of the plaintiff, finding that the sound of substation was unavoidable and did not constitute nuisance; that it could not have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis, pyelonephritis, ureteritis, lumbago and anemia; and that the items of damage claimed by plaintiff were not adequate proved. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage,1being guilty of causing nuisance.While no previous adjudications on the specific issue have been made in the Philippines, our law of nuisances is of American origin, and a review of authorities clearly indicates the rule to be that the causing or maintenance of disturbing noise or sound may constitut