LLNL-PRES-XXXXXX This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC AIChE Annual Meeting 2013 November 7, 2013
Ed Jones of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) presents on risk and response management both in general and with regards to nuclear waste.
The NuClean Kick-Off workshop was held on Nov. 7, 2013 at the Handlery Union Square Hotel in San Francisco, CA, co-located with the AIChE 2013 Annual Meeting.
For more information on NuClean, visit: http://www.aiche.org/cei/conferences/nuclean-workshop/2013.
For more information on AIChE's Center for Energy Initiatives (CEI), visit: http://www.aiche.org/cei.
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LLNL-PRES-XXXXXX This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC
AIChE Annual Meeting 2013 November 7, 2013
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Potential Events/Failures
Potential Consequences
Response Management
Security and Protection Emergency Response/ Consequence Management
Risk Reduction: Safety & Security
Reduce Threats &
Vulnerabilities
Mitigate/ Reduce
Consequences
Risk Analysis
Likelihood/Probability
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Critical Asset
Threat
Consequence
Protection/Prevention
Mitigation/
Response
Integrated Approach
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KEY ELEMENTS OF RISK MANAGEMENT Planning and Preparation Response and
Reconstruction Risk
Identification Mitigation Risk Transfer Preparedness Emergency
Response Rehabilitation
and Reconstruction
Hazard assessment (frequency, magnitude and location)
Physical/structural mitigation works
Insurance/ re-insurance of public infrastructure and private assets
Early warning systems. Communication systems
Humanitarian assistance
Rehabilitation/ reconstruction of damaged critical infrastructure
Vulnerability assessment (population and assets exposed)
Contingency planning (utility companies/ public services)
Clean-up, temporary repairs and restoration services
Macroeconomic and budget management (stabilization, protection of social expenditures)
Risk assessment (a function of hazard and vulnerability)
Economic incentives for pro-mitigation behavior
Privatization of public services with safety regulation (energy, water, transportation, etc.)
Networks of emergency responders (local/national)
Damage assessment Revitalization for affected sectors (exports, tourism, agriculture, etc.)
Hazard monitoring and forecasting (GIS, mapping, and scenario building)
Education, training and awareness about risks and prevention
Calamity Funds (national or local level)
Shelter facilities Evacuation plans
Mobilization of recovery resources (public/ multilateral/ insurance)
Incorporation of disaster mitigation components in reconstruction activities
Building and Strengthening National Systems for Disaster Prevention and Response: These systems are an integrated, cross-sectoral network of institutions addressing all the above phases of risk reduction and disaster recovery. Activities that need support are policy and planning, reform of legal and regulatory framework coordination mechanisms, strengthening of participating institutions, national action plans for mitigation policies and institutional development.
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§ Multiple hazards!• Natural disasters!• Technological failures!• Human malevolence!
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RISK ZONE AREAS
Frequency of Fatalities Due to Man-Caused Events
Framework for hazard detection and judgment of evidence
Quantitative dominance of PPV and NPV by low frequency of hazard occurrence
Insensitive to false positive or false negative rates, the number of false positives will overwhelm the false negatives
as the frequency of hazard decreases
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§ For low frequency hazards, a large number of false positives can lead to ʻcomplacencyʼ!
§ For low frequency hazards, false negatives may be rare and difficult to detect, but consequences can be extremely severe!
§ When false positives or negatives are found, structured tests need to be performed to determine their causes!
§ Dominance of false positives over false negatives argues that trying to get to ʻzero riskʼ is destabilizing: rather, risk tradeoffs are inevitable!
§ False positive and false negative rates, and frequency of hazard are initially uncertain: there must be constant iteration and feedback among the data and these factors!
These issues entail the importance of the interplay and feedbacks among data and models to manage