November-December 2015 CERI Commodity Report — Crude Oil Relevant • Independent • Objecve CERI Commodity Report – Crude Oil Editorial Commiee: Paul Kralovic, Dinara Millington, Megan Murphy, Jon Rozhon, Allan Fogwill About CERI The Canadian Energy Research Instute is an independent, not-for-profit research establishment created through a partnership of industry, academia, and government in 1975. Our mission is to provide relevant, independent, objecve economic research in energy and related environmental issues. For more informaon about CERI, please visit our website at www.ceri.ca or contact us at [email protected]. Figure 1: Saudi Arabia Relinquishes Role as Swing Producer Source: EIA, Oak Leaf Energy Training WTI has been sub-$50 since mid-summer 2015, and the world’s other main marker crude, Brent Blend, has been trading at comparable levels. There are no manifest signs of an upward swing anyme soon. Cheap crude oil is now plenful and available to all. Forty years ago, the story was much different. The 1973 Oil Crisis marked the beginning of a keen naonal awareness of oil’s importance in the daily lives of Americans. Arab naons, displeased with US and other naons’ support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, announced an oil embargo on those countries. This energy restricon resulted in immediate, massive increases in oil prices, which in turn had resounding effects throughout the US economy. The US had reached a peak in oil producon three years earlier, and could not unilaterally make up for this sharp reducon in supply. Various domesc policy and diplomac efforts eventually eased the supply crisis, but the 1970s were a me of long line-ups at gasoline staons and persistent economic “stagflaon”. 3 In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed new legislaon to deal with the crisis, The Energy Policy and Conservaon Act. The Act established the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, both of which are sll in place today. It also provided the President with power to control domesc Assessing the US Ban on Crude Oil Exports Jon Rozhon In his 2006 State of the Union address, US President George Bush dramacally announced, “America is addicted to oil”. Those remain perhaps the most memorable words of the enre speech. The next sentence, though, has turned out to be even more telling: “The best way to break this addicon is through technology”. 1 President Bush was certainly correct in stang technology had a role to play, but in the oil and gas industry, a decade of remarkable technological innovaon has so far not cured America of its oil dependency. It may well be argued that technology has only fed the addicon. Two rapidly developing technologies in parcular – horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing – have pried open previously uneconomic shale oil and gas plays throughout North America, flooding markets with domescally-produced hydrocarbons in volumes that would have been unthinkable during the Bush era. The price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil stood at $67.86 on the day of the President’s speech, and there were some fluctuaons over the next few years. Since 2010 however, the oil price stayed uncharacteriscally stable, trading mostly within the $70-$100 range. Finally, in the summer of 2014, the crude oversupply caused global crude oil prices to collapse by more than 50 percent. The situaon was further exacerbated when Saudi Arabia made the decision not to adjust producon to support higher oil prices, thereby abandoning its tradional role as “Swing Producer,” 2 and the world witnessed the unfeered laws of supply and demand taking the price of oil straight down (see Figure 1).
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November-December 2015
CERI Commodity Report — Crude Oil
Relevant • Independent • Objective
CERI Commodity Report – Crude Oil Editorial Committee: Paul Kralovic, Dinara Millington, Megan Murphy, Jon Rozhon, Allan Fogwill About CERI The Canadian Energy Research Institute is an independent, not-for-profit research establishment created through a partnership of industry, academia, and government in 1975. Our mission is to provide relevant, independent, objective economic research in energy and related environmental issues. For more information about CERI, please visit our website at www.ceri.ca or contact us at [email protected].
Figure 1: Saudi Arabia Relinquishes Role as Swing Producer
Source: EIA, Oak Leaf Energy Training
WTI has been sub-$50 since mid-summer 2015, and the world’s other main marker crude, Brent Blend, has been trading at comparable levels. There are no manifest signs of an upward swing anytime soon. Cheap crude oil is now plentiful and available to all. Forty years ago, the story was much different. The 1973 Oil Crisis marked the beginning of a keen national awareness of oil’s importance in the daily lives of Americans. Arab nations, displeased with US and other nations’ support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, announced an oil embargo on those countries. This energy restriction resulted in immediate, massive increases in oil prices, which in turn had resounding effects throughout the US economy. The US had reached a peak in oil production three years earlier, and could not unilaterally make up for this sharp reduction in supply. Various domestic policy and diplomatic efforts eventually eased the supply crisis, but the 1970s were a time of long line-ups at gasoline stations and persistent economic “stagflation”.3 In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed new legislation to deal with the crisis, The Energy Policy and Conservation Act. The Act established the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, both of which are still in place today. It also provided the President with power to control domestic
Assessing the US Ban on Crude Oil Exports Jon Rozhon In his 2006 State of the Union address, US President George Bush dramatically announced, “America is addicted to oil”. Those remain perhaps the most memorable words of the entire speech. The next sentence, though, has turned out to be even more telling: “The best way to break this addiction is through technology”.1 President Bush was certainly correct in stating technology had a role to play, but in the oil and gas industry, a decade of remarkable technological innovation has so far not cured America of its oil dependency. It may well be argued that technology has only fed the addiction. Two rapidly developing technologies in particular – horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing – have pried open previously uneconomic shale oil and gas plays throughout North America, flooding markets with domestically-produced hydrocarbons in volumes that would have been unthinkable during the Bush era. The price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil stood at $67.86 on the day of the President’s speech, and there were some fluctuations over the next few years. Since 2010 however, the oil price stayed uncharacteristically stable, trading mostly within the $70-$100 range. Finally, in the summer of 2014, the crude oversupply caused global crude oil prices to collapse by more than 50 percent. The situation was further exacerbated when Saudi Arabia made the decision not to adjust production to support higher oil prices, thereby abandoning its traditional role as “Swing Producer,”2 and the world witnessed the unfettered laws of supply and demand taking the price of oil straight down (see Figure 1).
CERI Commodity Report - Crude Oil
Page 2
oil and gas production, to regulate energy prices, and to enforce energy rationing in case of another shortage.4 One important provision of the Act authorized the President to restrict exports of coal, crude, natural gas, and petrochemical feedstock, with the exception of exports to important trading partners Mexico and Canada. Much has changed over the years – there are no longer any price controls, for example – but one thing has remained constant, the ban on crude oil exports. Presidents and Congresses since the 1970s have accepted that control of domestic oil is fundamental to the nation’s security. Oil production was on a seemingly inexorable decline; within a generation, production had fallen by more than half (see Figure 2). However, the technological advances mentioned earlier have brought domestic crude production roaring back to the point where 2015 volumes are comparable to those produced before the long decline began 45 years ago. Now oil producers, politicians, and the general public are asking whether or not it is finally time to stop restricting crude exports. Figure 2: US Field Production of Crude Oil, 1970-2015
Sources: EIA, CERI
The resurgence in domestic oil production should not be mistaken for oil self-sufficiency. The US is a net importer, and that is unlikely to end soon. Consuming oil at a rate of 19 million barrels per day (MMBPD), the US requires more of the commodity than does any other country
(China is the second largest consumer at 11 MMBPD); domestic production still falls well short of what America needs.5 The problem, however, is not a matter of oil quantity but quality. Many US crude refineries are presently equipped to handle the sour, heavy crudes imported from Canada (by far the US’ largest crude import source), Mexico and Venezuela. Capacity to refine the increased volumes of domestic crude, which is light and sweet, is therefore at a premium. US production has pushed out much imported light, sweet crude, but even so, the industry appears to be nearing a threshold where no further light oil can be absorbed by the nation’s refineries without yield declines or capacity additions. The number is by-and-large agreed by analysts to be between 10 and 11 MMBPD.6 The most recent data from the EIA (Figure 2) indicates domestic production is now close to those levels – in excess of 9.5 MMBPD. Building new refineries or retooling existing refineries are two expensive and potentially unpopular options: many refiners, especially along the Gulf Coast, have already incurred significant expense configuring their facilities to take heavy oil. In addition, the general public is not usually receptive to new-build refineries – “not in my backyard” being a commonly-held view. Exporting domestic oil, on the other hand, would be a simpler, less costly option. What would be the economic ramifications of opening up crude exports? In recent years, at least partly because domestic crude could not reach alternative destinations, prices have been lower in the US than on global markets. Releasing US oil to the world would have the general effect of putting downward pressure on global oil prices. Any existing gap between WTI and Brent would narrow. Figure 3 shows the historic difference between WTI and Brent prices. Lately the persistent spread between the two crudes has closed. Over the long haul, WTI – a slightly better quality crude than Brent – could be expected to fetch the same price as or a marginally higher price than Brent.
CERI Commodity Report - Crude Oil
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Figure 3: Historic WTI and Brent Crude Oil Prices
Source: EIA
US producers would welcome the increase in domestic crude value, but refiners would likely not see similar benefits. For years, refiners have profited by using cheaper domestic crude and blending it with cheap heavy imported crude and then selling the higher-value refined petroleum products (RPPs) – which are under no export restrictions – at global prices. However, with open crude oil markets and lower prices for Brent, global RPP prices would fall, too. In sum, producers would benefit to a degree, the end-users of RPPs would benefit to a degree, but refiners would probably lose out. It should come as no surprise, then, that refiners are leading the way in opposing lifting of the crude ban and producers are in general agreement that the oil should be on offer to foreign buyers. The House voted in favour of lifting the ban in October of 2015, with 26 Democrats joining 235 Republicans.7 But Obama’s Administration feels that "Legislation to remove crude export restrictions is not needed at this time," "Congress should be focusing its efforts on supporting our transition to a low-carbon economy.”8
The President may be right. Worldwide oil and gas prices are low and it will take a great deal more than lifting the export ban to breathe new life into the US industry; perhaps the legislative focus is required elsewhere. US producers and consumers could have benefitted if the ban had been lifted several years ago when the WTI-Brent spread was at its widest. Since then, however, Saudi Arabia’s choice to abdicate its swing producer status has proven to be momentous, shaking the oil industry to its core. Right now, lifting or not lifting the export ban would make little difference in this global landscape of cheap, plentiful oil. If the world returns to a situation where oil is a scarce commodity, releasing US crude could bring some relief to domestic producers and consumers. It remains to be seen if security of supply will continue to trump economic efficiency. Endnotes http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/31/AR2006013101468.html A swing producer, simply put, is capable of manipulating the global price of a commodity by adjusting its own production. Simultaneously increasing employment and inflation with slow, even stagnant, economic growth. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/94/s622/summary BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2015 edition. Bordoff, J. and Trevor Houser. “Navigating the US Oil Export Debate”. Columbia | SIPA. January 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-lift-oil-export-ban-1444411778 http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/07/white-house-threatens-veto-of-bill-lifting-oil-export-ban
Low Price Case 29.33 33.15 27.20 28.90 29.75 31.45 33.15
Relevant • Independent • Objective
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Data Appendix
CERI Commodity Report - Crude Oil
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A1: Historic Light Sweet Crude Futures Prices ($US per barrel)
A2: Historic Crude Product Futures Prices (¢US per gallon)
Notes (Tables A1 and A2): Prices are listed by contract month. Close: final contract close on the last day of trading. Last 3 Day Average Close: simple average con-
tract close on last three days of trading. Average When Near Month: simple average closing price on trading days when contract was near month. 12-Month Strip
Average: simple average of daily near 12-month contract closing prices in a given contract month. Spread: difference between one-month and two-month forward
prices in a given period. Source: New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).
NYMEX Light Sweet Crude
Last 3 Day Avg. When 12-Month Spread
Close Average Near Mo. Strip Avg. (1-2 Mo.)
2013 96.82 97.37 97.01 97.45 -0.12
2014 96.53 96.37 96.73 87.56 0.54
2015 49.68 49.80 51.41 53.58 -0.77
4Q 2014 83.30 83.34 86.59 86.30 0.56
1Q 2015 51.08 51.34 54.75 56.95 -0.47
2Q 2015 53.32 53.04 52.84 56.55 -1.51
3Q 2015 50.39 50.63 53.14 54.10 -0.42
4Q 2015 43.92 44.17 44.89 46.71 -0.69
Yr-on-Yr Chg. -47.3% -47.0% -48.2% -45.9%
Jan-15 56.52 55.70 64.33 65.55 -0.19
Feb-15 46.39 47.11 50.64 52.78 -0.45
Mar-15 50.34 51.21 49.29 52.53 -0.78
Apr-15 45.72 44.78 47.98 52.78 -1.84
May-15 55.26 55.79 51.65 55.42 -1.57
Jun-15 58.98 58.56 58.89 61.46 -1.12
Jul-15 59.68 59.91 59.63 61.11 -0.41
Aug-15 50.36 50.47 54.66 53.70 -0.36
Sep-15 41.14 41.52 45.12 47.50 -0.49
Oct-15 45.83 45.73 44.47 46.73 -0.57
Nov-15 45.55 46.23 46.32 48.55 -0.51
Dec-15 40.39 40.56 43.88 44.87 -0.99
Jan-16 34.74 34.81 38.61 41.66 -1.39
Yr-on-Yr Chg. -38.5% -37.5% -40.0% -36.4%
NYMEX Unleaded Gasoline NYMEX Heating Oil
Last 3 Day Avg. When 12-Month Spread Last 3 Day Avg. When 12-Month Spread
Close Average Near Mo. Strip Avg. (1-2 Mo.) Close Average Near Mo. Strip Avg. (1-2 Mo.)
A3: World Crude Oil Contract Prices (FOB, $US per barrel)
A4: North American Posted Crude Prices (FOB, $US per barrel)
Notes: 1. ANS is Delivered price on US West Coast. 2. Edmonton Light Sweet prices are discontinued as of May 1, 2014 and replaced by the Canadian Light Crude
blend which is traded daily on the Net Energy Index. 3. Hardisty Heavy. Posted prices are based on price at the end of each month. Sources: Oil & Gas Journal;
Natural Resources Canada.
Notes: 1. Urals is Delivered price at Mediterranean. Contract prices are based on prices at the end of each month. Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report.
Saudi U.A.E. Oman U.K. Norway Russia Venez. Kuwait Ecuador Mexico Nigeria Indon.
Arab Lgt Dubai Oman Brent Ekofisk Urals1 T.J. Light Blend Oriente Isthmus Bonny Lgt Minas
A5: Crude Oil Quality Differentials (FOB, $US per barrel)
A6: Crude Oil Spot Prices and Differentials (FOB, $US per barrel)
Notes: 1. OPEC-Reference Basket is average price of seven crude streams: Algeria Saharan Blend, Dubai Fateh, Indonesia Minas, Mexico Isthmus, Nigeria Bonny
Light, Saudi Arabia Light and Venezuela Tia Juana Light. Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report.
Notes: 1. Edmonton Light Sweet prices are discontinued as of May 1, 2014 and replaced by the Canadian Light Crude blend which is traded daily on the Net Energy Index. 2. Hardisty Heavy. Based on contract prices at the end of each month. Sources: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report: Oil & Gas Journal; Natural Resources Canada.
A7: World Petroleum Product Spot Prices ($US per barrel)
A8: Product Spot Prices in Selected American Cities (¢US per gallon)
Notes: 1. Reformulated regular unleaded gasoline. Spot prices are based on average daily prices over a specific timeframe. Source: EIA Weekly Petroleum Status
Report.
Notes: 1. Regular unleaded gasoline. 2. Waterborne 3. High Sulfur (3.5-4.0%) Residual Fuel Oil. Spot prices are based on average daily prices over a specific timeframe. Source: IEA Oil Market Report.
US Gulf Coast, Pipeline Rotterdam, Barges Singapore, Cargoes
B1: World Petroleum Supply and Demand Balance (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. Totals for OECD and non-OECD supply include net refining gains; specific regions/groupings within each do not. 2. OPEC demand is an estimate based on
historical annual data. 3. Balance for World equals global stockbuilds (+) and stockdraws (-) for crude oil and petroleum products and miscellaneous gains and loss-
es. Regional surpluses (+) and deficits (-) are balanced through net-imports and stock changes in the short-term, and net-imports in the longer term. Supply includes
crude oil, condensates, NGLs, oil from non-conventional sources and processing gains. Demand is for petroleum products.
Source: IEA Oil Market Report.
OECD Non-OECD OPEC World
N. A. Europe Asia-Pac Total1 Asia Non-Asia FSU Total1 P. Gulf Non-Gulf Total2 Total3
Notes: 1. Production includes crude oil, condensates and NGLs. 2. Reserve-Production ratio is based on latest month production and British Petroleum reserve
estimates. Sources: IEA Oil Market Report and BP Statistical Review of World Energy.
Notes: 1. Product includes only finished petroleum products. 2. Total stocks include NGLs, refinery feedstocks, additives/oxygenates and other hydrocarbons. All
stocks are closing levels for respective reporting period. Source: IEA Oil Market Report.
OECD Non-OECD OPEC World
N. A. Europe Asia-Pac Total Asia Non-Asia FSU Total P. Gulf Non-Gulf Total Total1
B4: OPEC Crude Oil Production and Targets (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. Does not include NGLs; OPEC production targets apply to crude oil only. 2. Iraq does not have an official OPEC target. 3. OPEC-10 production targets. 4. As
Notes: 1. Based on dated Brent being processed in average US Gulf cracking refinery. 2. Based on dated Brent in average Rotterdam cracking refinery. 3. Based on
spot Dubai in average Singapore hydroskimming refinery. Source: IEA Oil Market Report.
C1: US Petroleum Supply and Demand Balance (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. Does not balance because of unaccounted for crude oil. Regional surpluses (+) and deficits (-) are balanced through net-imports/transfers and stock chang-
es in the short-term, and net-imports/transfers in the longer term. 2. As of most recent month. Supply includes crude oil, condensates, NGLs, oil from non-
conventional sources and processing gains. Demand is for petroleum products. Source: EIA Petroleum Supply Monthly.
C2: US Petroleum Demand by Product (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. Total includes other finished petroleum products. 2. Total petroleum demand includes refinery feedstocks, additives/oxygenates and other hydrocarbons.
Source: EIA Petroleum Supply Monthly.
C3: US Petroleum Stocks (million barrels)
Notes: 1. Petroleum stocks include crude oil, finished products, NGLs, refinery feedstocks, additives/oxygenates and other hydrocarbons. 2. Includes Strategic
Petroleum Reserves. 3. Total includes other finished petroleum products. All stocks are closing levels for respective reporting period. Source: EIA Petroleum Supply
Monthly.
Finished Petroleum Products NGLs Petroleum
Gasoline Jet Fuel Distil. Resid. Total1 Total Total2
C4: US Petroleum Net Imports by Source (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. Total includes net-imports from Russia and Asia-Pacific region. 2. Total OPEC includes the other eight cartel members. 3. As of latest month. Source EIA
Petroleum Supply Monthly.
C5: US Regional Crude Oil Production (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. California includes Federal Offshore crude oil production. 2. Gulf of Mexico includes Federal Offshore production adjacent to Texas and Louisiana. 3. Crude
oil Reserve-Production ratio as of latest production month. Crude oil production does not include NGLs. Source: EIA Petroleum Supply Monthly.
OPEC
Canada Mexico Lat. Am. Europe Africa M.E. Total1 Venez. S. Arabia Nigeria Total2 P. Gulf
C6: US Refinery Activity Crude Input (MMbpd) - Utilization (percent)
Notes: 1) As of most recent month. Source: EIA Petroleum Supply Monthly.
C7: US Refinery Margins ($US per barrel)
Note: Based on specific crude being processed in average cracking refinery in a given area. As of February 2010, NY Harbor Arab Med. is now East Coast Composite.
D1: Canada Petroleum Supply and Demand Balances (million barrels per day)
D2: Canada Demand by Product (million barrels per day)
Notes: 1. As of most recent month. See notes for Table C1 for additional comments. Source: Statistics Canada’s Energy Statistics Handbook.
D3: Canada Petroleum Stocks (million barrels)
Notes: 1. Total includes other finished petroleum products. 2. Total petroleum demand includes refinery feedstocks, additives/oxygenates and other hydrocarbons. Source: Statistics Canada’s Energy Statistics Handbook.
Notes: 1. Total includes other finished petroleum products. 2. Total petroleum stocks include NGLs, refinery feedstocks, additives/oxygenates and other hydrocarbons. All stocks are closing levels. Source: Statistics Canada’s Energy Statistics Handbook.
D4: Canada Crude Oil Production (million barrels per day)
Note: Total includes small amounts of production from Manitoba and Ontario. Source: Statistics Canada’s Energy Statistics Handbook.
D5: Canada Petroleum Imports by Source (thousand barrels per day)
Notes: 1. Includes all non-OPEC production. 2. Includes production by the other seven OPEC members. 3. As of most recent month. Sources: Statistics Canada’s
1. The World: OECD is comprised of countries from three regions: North America (Canada, Mexico, US); Europe (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republ ic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK); and Asia-Pacific (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea). OPEC is comprised of Persian Gulf (Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) and non-Persian Gulf countries (Algeria, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela). Non-OECD is
comprised of countries from three regions: Former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan); Asia (including non-OECD
Oceania); and non-Asia (Africa, Middle East, Latin America, and non-
OECD Europe). 2. United States: East (PADD I) – New England
(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont); Central Atlantic (Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia) and Lower Atlantic (Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia). Mid
3. Canada: East is comprised of Ontario, Manitoba, Quebec and the
Maritime provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island). West is comprised of Alberta, British
Columbia, Saskatchewan and the northern territories (NorthWest
Territories, Nunavuut, and Yukon).
Additional Notes
1. Petroleum and oil refer to crude oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs),
whereas crude oil refers to its namesake and field condensates.
Condensates derived from natural gas processing plants are classified as
NGLs. 2. The spot price is for immediate delivery of crude oil or refined
products at a specific location. Spot transactions are generally on a cargo
by cargo basis. In contrast, a futures price is for delivery of a specified
quantity of a commodity at a specified time and place in the future. 3.
Crude oil sold Free-On-Board (FOB) is made available to the buyer at the
loading port at a particular time, with transportation and insurance the
responsibility of the buyer. Crude oil sold Cost-Insurance-Freight (CIF) is
priced at a major destination point, with the seller responsible for the
transportation and insurance to that point. A “Delivered” transaction is
similar to a CIF transaction, except the buyer in the former pays based on the quantity and quality ascertained at the unloading port, whereas in a CIF
transaction, the buyer accepts the quantity and quality as determined at the loading port. 4. Processing gain is the volume of which refinery output is
greater than crude oil inputs. The difference is due to the processing of crude oil products, which in total have a lower specific gravity than crude oil. 5.
Unaccounted for crude oil reconciles the difference between crude input to refineries and the sum of domestic production, net imports/exports, stock
changes and documented losses (in the U.S.). 6. Totals may not equal the sum of their parts in the statistical tables due to rounding.
Crude Stream
Producing
Country or
Region
API
Gravity
(@60° F)
Sulfur
Content
(%)
BBLs/Metric
Tonne
Tapis Blend Malaysia 44 0.1 7.910
Ekofisk Blend Norway 43 0.2 7.773
WTI Texas 40 0.3 7.640
GCS Gulf of Mexico 40 0.3 7.640
Oklahoma Sweet Oklahoma 40 0.3 7.640
Kansas Sweet Kansas 40 0.4 7.640
Wyoming Sweet Wyoming 40 0.2 7.640
ELS Alberta 40 0.5 7.640
Brent Blend United kingdom 38 0.8 7.551
Bonny Light Nigeria 37 0.1 7.506
Oman Blend Oman 36 0.8 7.462
Arabian Light Saudi Arabia 34 1.8 7.373
Minas Indonesia 34 0.1 7.373
Isthmus Mexico 34 1.5 7.373
Michigan Sour Michigan 34 1.7 7.373
WTS Texas 33 1.7 7.328
Urals Russia 32 1.7 7.284
Tia Juana Light Venezuela 32 1.2 7.284
Dubai U.A.E. 31 1.7 7.239
Lost Hills California 30 0.6 7.194
Cano Limon Colombia 28 0.6 7.105
Arabian Heavy Saudi Arabia 27 2.8 7.061
ANS Alaska 27 1.1 7.061
Oriente Ecuador 25 1.4 6.971
Hardisty Heavy Alberta 25 2.1 6.971
Maya Mexico 22 3.3 6.838
Kern River California 13 1.0 6.436
Crude Oil Qualities
For more information, please contact Dinara Millington at [email protected]. Canadian Energy Research Institute 150, 3512 – 33 Street NW Calgary, AB T2L 2A6