UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO MEETINGS Nos. 65 - 75 January 1962 to April 1963 ENGLISH CONFIDMTIAL VOL, 8 UNITED NATIONS ARCHIVES
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UNITED NATIONSADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE CONGO
MEETINGS
Nos. 65 - 75
January 1962to April 1963
ENGLISH
CONFIDMTIAL
VOL, 8
UNITED NATIONSARCHIVES
CONFIDENTIAL
I'Mneting No. 659 January 1962ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY CCKMITTL'EGiJ THE COKGO
Meeting at United nations Heerlruarters, Newon Tuesday, ^ January I^b2; at 5 p.m.
In the Chair:
Members:
U THA17T
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
FecVjr&tion of Malaya
CLicM::-
Guinca
Ireland
Liberia
Kail
Morocco
Fakiotan
Conceal
/Sudan . . . - :
Gv/cden ' •
Tunisia . . . - . -
United Arab Republic
Congo, (.Leopoldville).
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL
Mr. riTCHIE
K:r. I'lJEGCONAVJARDENA . -
Mr. CELRE-EGZY
Mr. I<"PJ--1IL .
Mr. PADZIE .. •
Mi-. DIALLO
I'*,-. JIIA
1-^. I APIAN
M r . I.'OLAlNT) • . • •
Mr. BARNES
Mr. TA
Mr. TAZI
Mr. KGILERUMA
S |r 1 '-uhammad. ZAH1ULIA • KHAII
Mr. CIG.GE
KJT. ADEEL . •; •-.:
Mrs.. R03S2L. . . .
Mr./CHIjlIXI . . - - . . .
Mr-. LCL7IFI . . . - . - .
Mr. M!Bbyo-Paul .,
62-00829
HA/b{
The Acting C^RETARY-qi-NFML: Before we proceed, I should like to
welcome the representative of Uicrra Leone, who is here with us. Of course, while
welcoming our colleaeuo from Sierra Leone, I want to take this opportunity of
mentioning that the contribution of contingents to the United liaticnD operations
in the Congo docs not automatically/entitle the contributor to E seat in the
Advisory Committee. As members are aware, there are other countries which are
not rrxn.bers of the Con^o Advisory Ccinniittce but which have contributed very
significantly to the Euececs of tfcc Unite! Ilatior?" operations in the Congo.
Regarding the question of membership of the Advisory Committee, I will wish
to hove the benefit of your advice at a subsequent meeting. In the meantime, of
course, I am very delighted to welcome the representative of Sierra Leone.
I have asV;ocl you to ccme to this meetly; for three main reasons • Firstly,
I wish to consult you about the replies I have receive! to my request to the
Goverr.rr^nts of the United Kingdom aud Portugal thit observers be stationed along
the frontiers of Rhode:,Is and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit
traffic into Kr-tanga, L.bout which, of course, you havo already K<_en so't--thing in
the prose« Secondly, there ere a couple of matters ou which there appears to be
need for some cxplcriation on iry part, since some questions have beer .v.v;ed.
Tliirdly, it is desirable to brin(3 you up to date en developments in the Congo
and particularly in Katanga, inasmuch as we have not mot since 16 December.
You have before you copies of my letters to the United Kingdom and Portugal
about the stationinc of observers and copies of the replies which I have received
from those Governments. There is also before you a copy of a statement concerning
this matter made by Gir Roy Wclcnsky. This latter text, incidentally, has not
been checked against delivery, and I cannot therefore verify its accuracy.
You will note that the replies are negative, although the Government of
the United Kingdom suggests on alternative in the form of.an invitation to me
to go to Salisbury — an invitation which, I have been told informally, would
equally cover a representative of mine. It is not at all clear to me what, if
any, constructive results might bo achieved from such a visit. It certainly dees
not cover what I had in mind in making the approach to the United Kingdom
Government. Here I might say that this approach was rv:n.do because we finally had
some concrete evidence of illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side,
which wo immediately presented to the United Kingdom Government and which
Sir Roy Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be described as
gracious.
EKS/db
(The
Tn this regard, I mipht call to your attention'thnt, although'fVlr Roy Uelchnky
vigorously tried to explain avny the'crossing of the forty-eight' jeeps at Kipushl,
he has never made any public reference to the activities of the Dornier aircraft
"based Qt Ndcla raid piloted by one Mr. Wickstcad, probably becauae toe evidence
we presented vas too convincing for oven Sir Roy to drmy.
I vould appreciate the vicvs of the members, particularly on the British
alternative proposal, since I must reply to it,With regard to the situation in Katanga cince the intense fighting in early
December come to a halt, there have been frequent references to a ceace-fire. I
wish to make it quite clear that cincc the cease-fire of lost October broke down
because of the vauton and repeated viclat-lor.r; of the KntarigeGe, leading finally
to the fighting which began 0:1 tho afternoon of 5 Escember, there has not been
and there is not now my ceaue-fire In effect. There haa been no approach by
United nations ofi'.icials to tlie Katar^esc on this question, although Mr. Teiiombe
end cor ,- of his collen(ri.? s hav-^ frequontly alluded to the cubjoct and Mr. Tchcnibe
tried to make a cease-fire a condliion for hia participation in the Kitcna tallio.
This condition, GO you know, waa reiuced "by OirdC. riL.ere has been vhat micht be '
called the unilateral vJ.tlilioldlr^ 'of fire, or "hold-fire11, if you vioh, by OliUC
cince the achievement of CIWCTs inanudiate military objectives in Elioobetlivlllc, "••which dn fact coincided with the beginning of the Kitcna talkc. This hoe meant
only that OUUC' in Elir.abethville \?ould not initiate fire but vould retui^n fire if
fired upon. • • •* . • . • •
This VQS undertaken for a number of reasons. First'of all, because with the
general collapse of gendarmerie resistance in Elisnbethville and the capture of the
Union Mini ere compound, "which irao the lact stroc^liold of recistance, the oiaic task
in Elicabcthville consisted primarily of "cleaning up", that is to say, eliminating
the last vestiges of cniping from private dwellings and other buildinca, ctoppin^
looting by the Katancese, who alone vere responsible for it and not — let ITG repeat,
not — Cl'IUC trcopn, as vas reckleisnly end malicj.oualy alleged in come quarters,
and generally rectoring order in the city towards reauuption of normal civilian
pursuits. With the necessity of thus consolidating itself in l^lisabethville
requiring retention of major strength in that area, OITLJC, in any case, could not
BHS/<Ib 7-10
(The Acting Secretary-General)
for acne time be ready to undertake a now operation against mercenaries in such
other localities ao Krmina-Vllle, Jadotville, Kolwezi und KIpushi, where, according
to our Information, the remaining mercenaries in Katanga ore to be mainly found.
A bit later on I vill ask Brigadier Rikhye to give you the latest information
about the mercenaries involved and tr.]:en captive and the arms and aiLTiunitlon
captured by OlfJC in the Elicabeihville operation of last December.
Moreover,, it vould have been highly inadvisable for tiie Urr.Vc cl Nations to
initiate fighting which vould have made the United Nations responsible for
preventing the mceiin,^ at Kitona of Llr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, or for the United
Nations nov to undertake any action vhich vould prevent the Kitona declaration
from being implemented,, since, in fact, come of its points are in the process of
being implemented. We are pre^nin^; Mr. T;:bo:nhe on point 3 in this declaration
concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and particularly
that relating to mercor-oriers. It is our hope -chat be vill keep his promise to
facilitate the e 11 mi na tic a of rrerce.ncries in such a way 03 to make it "j.i ce scary
for OriUC to employ furtive:: force tc-.r.irdn that end. I must add, hoT,r:ver; l .at our
plans and preparations lor further operations In areas of Katanga other then
rilisabethville vith a vi:', to achieving the total elimination of mercca-i^ee are
going forward viihoat delay.
I feel the need to Gay a word also in explanation of the question of ONUCT s
relationa with the ANC; that is, an AJiC contingent in OWUG, on the one hand, and
a joint ONUC/ANC military operation in Katanga, on the other. As you knew,
Mr. Adoula, in December, after consulting with Mr, Bunchc, offered a contingent
of the AIIC to the United Nations Force in the Congo to serve on the same basis as
all other contingents, and I accepted that offer.
MW/kb _ 11
(Th Ar11 np; S^cretary~Geriera 1)
Mr. Bunche, in Ms talk vith Mr. Adoula, explained TO him fully, as had been
done by ethers in the past, the difficulties for the United Katicr.s in undertaking
a joint military operation with the AITC. Mr. Bundle is l.oro and can ar.cwc?r any
questions on thin matter and also, if you have any, on the Kitcna talks. I might
add that Mr. George Ivan Smith is also here, having just returned from Katanga,
and will gladly answer any questions which you wish to put to him.
In Gumnviry, Mr. Eunche explained to Mr. Atloula that the basic difficulty
about any joint operation was that the United Kationo Force.in the Congo was
subject fully to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council
and the limitations on the ULJG of force implicit in thcco resolutions. There
are, of course, no such limitations on the AIIC, the Congolese Government being Tree
to employ its force internally towards political ends. Moreover, a joint
operation would raise for 01TUC virtually insoluble prcble-.as of command, and
would involve the United Nations Force in sharing responsibilities Tor military
cbjoctiven, military actions and conduct by troops which could not be creep-table
to or condoned by the Jniced Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations Force is
composed of contingents given by a number of States, end if it should become
involved in fighting for political objectives in the Congo, the Force might
quickly disintegrate through withdrawal of a number of contingents. That is how
I see the situation.
Mr. Adoula vas very understanding of this position and undertook, as an
alternatee; to offer a Congolese contingent to serve under United ITations command,
Mr. Bimohoalso discussed the contingent arrangement vith General Mobutu, vho was
fully agreeable to the idea and discussed with Ilr. Eunche and vith General MncEoin
and other officerj at OIIUC headquarters the actual composition of the contingent
being offered. The only troops which could be spared immediately, General Hobutu
indicated, would be the Third Battalion, which lias been deployed in the vicinity of
Luluabourg, and 300 AHC personnel to man the six armoured vehicles which were being
provided. It is the intention of the OMJC Command to eir.ploy the AIJC contingent
initially in the Kaniina area when it is actually made available.
I shall now aok Brigadier Rikhye to inform you about the latest information
concerning mercenaries, and also on the responses to the appeals which I have
made for additional troops.
MW/kb 12
'-_J:5?\T\' : * shall deal first vith the rr.orcenar:LeD . On 20 November,
the date CM which the ri-htlr^ ;;t;ir, ,cd In Elicul-cthvil lo, it van understood that
.-t least ::70 i;ier 'eriarle., were in ^e rv . iv 'O with Katui.r i ferries; about L5:G v-^ro
! elieved to bo proucm:, in iHisalcidiville itself. r [l course, tho-e f i f ju r - r , arc not
- iocura io , , as I'r. Tahr i . ibO ' :; Ooverniiiont had taken all p o s ^ i i - l e steps to cc;.ceal
; ho presence of 1 hose personnel. /jiichj them were a f . -o^p of aboirt ~:.irty-ei£ht
]"r^r ' ' ) i mr rcenari-1::;,, the uo-callrd "orcnh ^rcup!I w h - < v:^ro tlie ^aircprir^
:: jr :Lrj j . the f] cht'i n^. It i;eeinn thai, this [;rcup va:~. ^r 'aniued c
:..orrc:i::iric3 named Parcn :Mid Hivcr -- ['i-cs-.^iahly rrt.r?:"> d« j - ' T r r i i
,-cnei-.-A LKpervis icn ol' on-.'i callcl CoTcnol l--aulquj_i3 . '.this French croup were
i in 11 lied hy the other m>~rcei;a:r/ ^rcur^ tecnuse, d u r i i j fr the whole of the flr
1 hey vere believe;.! to h^o rf:;r,r-l^'"..;{ jn Ooi.?5:une Aibf^t, vhich ic jun t cut3.'de
hliGahGthvill(?_, e,:id to hrr/e ru)-; i . :hj tattle fr::rr. the J r d-ohc . As a ro-ult of thic;
it oee;;;3 tacit b o i / i re]^ian mercenaries a:;:l. Katari[;,cs*j rj Hilary intolll^.cij^o service
arc rjp*,T nyiinGt t'his f roun of French morccnariciG. Hci-o ol' them aro believed already
to have D c T b h'at :: :}{•_; a I'rov.i.^ce.
It ic al;:o T cport od ': hat a ctmrrtle for pnvcr han dovoloped in IC.ru!Jhi
Miiong i he rc:r,aJ.nr!':C me rcciinrie:! -- ICiy)i i :shi now bcin^ th1^ headquartori; oT such
•-:7:<:-r;.dnt3 oT hatai ;ync [3;;:, ujiuicrio vh;i ii withircw frerr, Ulicabcthvillo -•- c.v d
Cclonel laulques ard Coloi-el Huycho had benn accuse , of rocliGtaoririj;; in cr^n^inc
i. 'Lcrcon'-ir i^J and b..iyin^, aii 'craft. We have received r.ome ii.ioriiiation abci.i1: seine
;.lrii::i >;hioi had :;,ecn nvjlinittcu hy Colonel Faal^ueG lo Mr. T^hniabe. jie had
nif^er/ted that tl'e United Hationj Force ou^ht to bo persuaded to deploy their
trccpc oritjide El i s:\hcthville ; Rinco he vac very cure cT lein^; able to del eat
i hem if they made such an attempt. Ho had hoped tlv,t tho withdrawal of the
r a t a n ^ C G o ^endariieric tovnrda Kipu.ihi vculd per^und' . j the United hacicr.r, to follov
;;n that vithdrawai. in adv-'oicinf, Lcvardj Kipuchi^ or,, arj ar^ alterriative_, that the
Jnited K ^ L L c n G m.i.-'ht undertake operations in the d i rnc t io r ; of Jadotville.
In I'ai.-t, Mr. Tchcir.hc decided to r :-rjain in EliG:d r. Llsville cind; as he vac
^oing to wtay there vith hie Government, pi.irt cf hir. : • .iii'larrnerie alco staged
i ehind to take care ol the Govr.rnmcji t ai:d to rerjain in a;; ir.uch control as possible
.f the city. This resulted in splitting the ^erdamerie an'i, ol' course, the
United Nations, al'ter irivjn^ f . in lGl iod its operation of clearing its ccr.rnur.i eat ions
in Llisabv-'thville, did not folio1;/ uj) the vithdrawinc troops, thereby foiling the
intents and purposes of Colonel Faulques.
1-W/kb 13-15
(nnnorn.1 TUkhye)
The only course opnn to Colonel Faulques and the other mercenaries now
in to harraos United Nations troops as much as possible in the. city of
EliGa"hethville ncelf. .
It is "believed that an aviation mercenary group of about fifty ir.cn
had been organised in December at Klpushi and that now many of them have left,
having been discharged and repatriated. This c^oup Included nine FrencLraen.
Wo are also informed that a hotel called Edinburgh Hotel in Kitve is being
used as a rest hcme Tor the mercenaries. :.
The final figures about the civilian foreign personnel captured or. killed
in Elic-abethvil Le during the December fighting arc as follows: .captured, 28 --
nineteen of them have been rclonsed since then, ai'tor interroraticn; killed in
action, six. • I must make it clear at this starve that all the information, which
• re have teen' able -to [-ather var> only rrcm such areas where our troops are
stationed. -However, it is known that in other places, cuch as Kongolo in
north Katanga; I3o.ulouirrvM.lle iu eastern Katar^a and Krunir.a -Ville, tiio Kn.tar.gese
iorces;-nave mercenaries, although it is difficult to ascertain their excct
nimber. There are recent indications that the Kataneose Government if again
recruiting new raerc^nari^s. In connexion with thin, on 7 January Jjaticasl Radio
of Ldopoldville broadcast an announcement that one Katancese agency is now
recruiting mercenaries in the Gouth of. France. It seemed that the agency was
located in Toulouse. . •
AP/ids 16
(General Rikbyo)
This news was confirmed by a report received from OliUC on 8 January.
One United Nations employee,, travelling from Paris to Brazzaville on the
UAT flight, B&I-/ in the same plane a group of Frenchmen i'rcm the South of
France, numbering between thirty and thirty-five. On arriving at Brazzaville,
the United Ilations employee learned from a reliable reporter that these tr.en
were mercenaries who had "been recruited recently• /.ccording to this reporter,
they were to disembark at Brazzaville where a special plane was waiting to
transport them to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia, and from there they would continue
their journey into Katanga. It was later confirmed that this special plane, a
EC-6, left Brazzaville with thirty-five passengers at 10.lp a.m. on 8 January
for Ndola.
On 8 January, the National Congolese Radio of Leopoldville rebroadcast
a dispatch from Reuters Agency in Paris which confirmed this news, as well as
that the French police had made certain arrests at Toulouse in connexion with
certain recruiting activities for mercenaries for Katangar You rcay have seen
reports in the press about sorr.s arrests made "by the French police in connexion
with thcG2 recruiting activities,
We are now ^formed by our United Nations Information Centre In Paris that
on 6 January the French police broke into a hotel room in Toulouao which was
being used by a certain Paul Robagnol as a recruiting centre for Katanga
mercenaries. Robagnol is a French citizen discharged from the army after
the 1959 insurrection by certain army officers in Algeria. RobGgnol was
accompanied by a secretary and several would-be recruits. He had been inserting
announcements in regional papers for the recruitment of servicemen and young
men free of military service for work in Central Africa. Robagnol and his
secretary are being prosecuted before the French courts next week, charged under
the French law which prohibits recruitment on French territory of persons for
forces for any foreign Power.
This information was brought to the attention of the British authorities
who have informed us this morning that a UAT aircraft requested permission to
land at Ildola. This was refused and the flight instead landed yesterday, that
is, 8 January, at Livingston where already UAT has landing rights. This aircraft
was carrying thirty-six passengers. The nationalities were nine Belgian,
AP/ida 17
(General JUkhye)
one Spanish and twenty-six French. The Spanish and French passengers did not have
proper papers; therefore, they were refused permiccion to land. --The Belgian
passengers had proper papers;'they were allowed to land and continued vith
their journey. The aircraft returned to Brazzaville with the French and
Spanish passengers. •
On 26 December, the Secretary-General asked Mr. George Ivr».n Smith, who
was then in Eli^abethville, to convey his satisfaction on the implementation
of the first part of the Kitona' agreement and that he hoped that Mr. Tshombe
would, without delay, give practical meaning to point 8 of the declaration by
indicating the steps he would take to eliminate the remaining mercenaries in '•
Katanga, which could "be done by public declaration that the services of the
mercenaries are no longer desired "by the Government of the Province of Katanga,
and that the mercenaries will no longer receive pay of any kind from the
Government.
This message could only "be delivered to Mr. Tshorrbe on 33. December, Although
Mr. Urquhart has since met with Mr. Tohombe a number of times, Mr. Tshcmbe has
not offered any views on the future of the mercenaries so far.
I will now describe the arms and ammunition captured by ONUC troops during
recent fighting in Katanga. About 10,000 rounds of various kinds, mostly made
in Belgium; some hand grenades; one anti-aircraft ho millimetre Bofors gun,
made in England; twenty 6.5 millimetre machine gunc; six 8l millimetre mortars,
I understand that a list of captured arms has Juct been distributed to you,
therefore, I will not go into the other details of this document.
The last point I have been asked to speak on is the present position in
regard to the Secretary-General's request for additional troops. In notes verbales
of 8 December 19(jl> the Secretary-General requested twenty-six African States to
provide troops for the United Nations operation in the Congo. Many of these
countries have not yet replied; some have replied negatively. Two countries have
given a positive answer: Tunisia and Sierra Leone. Prior to this request Ghana
had already informed the Secretary-General that it would send a new contingent
to ONUC,
AP/ids 18-20
(General Rikhye)
The Tunisian "battalion was airlifted to the Congo during the period
20 December to k jsnuiry. It consists of 5*4-7 QH ranks, Sierra Leone will provide
one company of four officers and approximately 100 men. It is our latention. to
airlift this company from Freetown to Leopoldville as soon as they have
completed their preparations. The estimated tine of departure is about
20 January, For administrative purposes, this company will be attached to one
of the Nigerian battalions.
The Ghana battalion is now ready for departure. We are working out
transportation arrangements and we hope to airlift the battalion between
17 and 20 January, or coon thereafter.
The total strength of ONUC today is 15,669. After that arrival of Ghana
and Sierra Leone contingents, the strength will increase to l6,420.
21
The Acting ' SECRETARY-GENERAL ; The floor is now open to the membersof the Committee,
Mr, mtLERUMA (Nigeria): First of all I should like to refar to the
instructions I have received from my Government concerning" the v; situation' in which
we find ourselves, The message is very brief, but it iu comprehensive. My"
instructions are that, at the meeting of the Advisory Committee, my stand must •
be as follows: (a) the United He, Ions cannot treat vith the G over rune nt of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which is not sovereign, Therefore the Secretary-General '
should not accept any invitation to discussion's in Salisbury, (b) If the • •
British Government, vhich is' constitutionally responsible for the Rhodesian
Government^ external affairs, dec ires a discussion, it should take place in
Hew York, betv/een the British Foreign Secretary and the Gecretary-General or in
London if the Secretary-General's preoccupations permit, (c) Tho Nigerian
Government insists that the Kitoha Agreement be implemented to the letter.
(d) The Nigerian Governnont fully supports the stand taken by the Acting : •
Secretary-General. ' ' • '•• .
Those are the instructions of the Nigerian Government to me for cnimuni cation
to the Advisory Commit i;ee» •' ' : '
The position of tlr 'Northern Rhode si an Government is very unfriendly, as we
have seen on more than one occasion. Of course, we are here to advise you, and •
in view of the Incidents which happened in Ndolo. and the fate of the late
Secretary -General, Mr8 Eag Haintdrskjold, I feel sure that nobody would advise
the Acting Secretary-General to go to Northern Rhodesia to discuss anything at •
all, even if it was an independent country. Of course, 'Northern Rhodesia is not
an independent country and therefore the"' instruction of the Nigerian Government
is very categorical,
We read in the New York Times that Sir Roy Welensky is preparing a dossier •
of the atrocities and 'illegal actions by United Nations troops, • If that is 'the
attitude of the Government of Northern Rhodesia, if they are compiling a -list"'
of crimes and offences committed — according to' 'them -- by United Nations troops,
what is the purpose of discussing this question with a representative of the
United Nations? I do not know whether they want the Secretary -General or hl's v
representative to be taken before a court or what, I do not know -what 'they mean,
but their attitude is very unfriendly, • : ' ' '
GR/Jpm 22
(Mr, PTgilerumn, Nigeria)
If the British Government feels very strongly that this matter should "be
discussed in the presence of Sir Roy Welensky, if the British Government would
agree Sir Roy helensky could accompany the Minister for Foreign /Vf:Cal-.-o of the
United Kingdom to New York in order to discuss the matter with you; since it is
a matter of International importance, I am sure the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the United Kingdom could come here, i^ necessary accompanied-, by Sir Roy
Welensky, to tell yov. vftat it is all about0 Perhaps Sir Roy VJelensXy?s argument
will be that the "border is very wide and it is difficult for them to control it,
but all the same it is for hin to come and toll you thisj nobody will expect the
Secretary-General to £,0 alon>; the "border tc see whether it is wide or whether it
is narrow0 If you go to Sal.:.Efoury or to London or if they ccme here to New Yorfc,
you will sit in an office a'.iu discuss matters of policy; you are not going to
travel along the border, and I therefore see no necessity for you or your
representatives to go to Salisbury for discussions,
The General AsrjcmhJy adopted a resolution appointing a Corrr.ittee to investigate
the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Dag EcLiucarslcJold, No report has
been produced, this is a very delicate matter and we do not know -what will "be
the conclusions cf the reports Therefore, it is very unwise for aryone to
discuss this matter in any way with Sir Roy Welensky. I must repeat that if
Sir Roy Welenslcy is co-operative, if he wants to discuss the matter with you,
he should come with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is a matter between you
and the Minister for Foreign _'Affairs of the United Kingdom, not between you and
Sir Roy Welensky.In this connexion I should like to raise again a small point to which I
have referred sonic tixie ago, namely the question of information. The Prevident
of Katanga is in a position to have an office here in New York to obtain
information on what is happening in the United Nations arid also to distribute
false propaganda intended to mobilize the opinion of the United States masses
against the United Nations with a view to discouraging the United States Government
from supporting the-United Nations, This being the case, I wonder whether the
United Nations has given some consideration to the possibility of publishing a
daily paper or Lome other kind of publication to educate the masses. If the
masses in the United States of America are unaware of the purpose of the United
Nations Operation in the Congo, I am quite sure that many people in Africa do
not know the genuineness and sincerity of the United Nations. So perhaps the
GR/Jpm 23-25
(Mr. Ngilerumn, Nigeria)
Secretary-General may consider whether the United Nations should not perhaps
publish some daily paper with a view to educating the masses, I know that
there are United Nations patnphlets and documents, and these are ava:ll?Jble to
the public, but I have to admit that I myself cannot find the time to study
them all. But if there were a paper published by the United Nations exclusively
to educate the public here In America an'l all over the world; people might read
It and compare it with the Now York Times, the .Herald Tribune, and other papers.
All this is with a view to giving information to the people.
NR/Jvm . ' 26
( M
Another matter vhich is very interesting in connexion with Cir Roy Welensky
is this. He does not want an observer of the United Nations to go to northern
Rhodesia. We have to ask ourselves whether he has something to hr'.doo If he
has nothing to hide, why should he raise any objection? All the Secretary-
General has asked is to be allowed to send some observers to see if weapons
are sent through Northern Rhodesia to Katanga. That ic the only purpose. If
Sir Roy Welensky has nothing to hide, why should he raise any objection?
Why should he ask tiie Secretary-General to come to discuss it? What are you
going to discuss with him? The purpose is very simple. You want to send some
people to be stationed at strategic points to s?e whether weapons are carried
to Katanga or not. Go, if he has nothing t:> hide, the answer is very simple:
he should agree. But for him to raise inter -national complications, saying
the Secretary-General should be invited or a representative should come --
this all seems very silly to us. These are the observations I wanted to raise j
Mr. Secretary- General.
Mr 4 JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, after the statement by
the representative of Nigeria we do not have to say very much. I hl.vk he
has brought out all the salient points arising from your statement this
afternoon very clearly. I will confine myself briefly to some observations
on the three important points that you have brought before the Committee.
The first was the question of the invitation to you by the Government
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyas aland which has been extended through
the United Kingdom Government. We entirely agree with the representative of
Nigeria that the Secretary-General should not accept this invitation. The
acceptance of this invitation, especially in the context of the statement
made by Sir Roy Welensky, apart from anything else, is not really worthy of
the position of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations. Apart from
that, there are other implications. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
is not an independent State, and we should be very careful, especially in
the context of all that has happened and is happening in that part of the
world, not by anything like a visit of the Secretary- General to give enhanced
political and international status to that Government. It has also to be borne
NR/JviD -•-" 2?
• ' ' -' (r/ir. Jha, India)
in mind that our late Gecretary-Ge"neral died in circumstances which are still
to be cleared-by the investigation-commission. For all these reasons it Is
also cur advice that you should not visit the Federation of F odes!?,)
It is understood that the invitation has also been extended to some
official of the United Nations. Now, that to some extent might stand on
a different footing, because officials might be able to dlecujo matters.with
authorities on a de_f<aqto basin that would not have the same international .
implications as a visit by the Secretary-General himself. But the point, is:
what is this official to discuss? The Federation of Rhodesia has. already
rejected the proposal by the Secretary-General for stationing observers. The
words-in the note of the permanent representative of the United Kingdom
dated 8 January are:
' uThcy therefore invite your Excellency to visit the Federationto diccucs all aspects of traffic across the Northern Rhodesia-Katanga
border with e. vie* to satisfying yourself that arrangements fur the
control of the frontier are fully effective."
I believe that informally and orally the same invitation was extended to
some officiar or the United Nations. So far as this is concerned, IE/ delegation
would be quite content to leave it to you to decide whether you think any
useful purpose would be served by an -official going there and satisfying
himself or, rather, the Federation discussing with hira" arid showing him places ~
to satisfy ~ himself that arrangements have been made. -We' do-'not wish to
express a categorical opinion about this. This could be.left to your- judgement.
It is of course true that the United Nations cannot station observers •- ...
in another territory without the consent of the Government: which, controls its
external affairs, particularly in this case the United Kingdom Government,
and I suppose the United Kingdom Government finds it impossible to persuade
or to dictate to the Federation of Rhodesia. So far as that aspect is
concerned, that is to say, the stationing of observers, the answer has been
a categorical no, and I do not see how we could really insist on the
stationing of United Nations observers without the consent of the authorities
of the State concerned. But, as I said, on the question of sending a
United Nations official, we would be quite content to leave it to you
NR/jvm _ 28-30
provided you think that there could be at least some advantage in the United
Nations official going and seeing places for himself, end I hope that he will
be shown the various arrangements, if any, that they have made. We would be
glad to leave that to your discretion.
There is one other suggestion made in this note, and that is in the last
paragraph, in which the United Kingdom Government says, referring to the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyacalnrid, that they are, however, prepared at once
to extend the existing arrangements whereby Fxed Crocs officials inspect all
the traffic going to Katanga from Ndola to air and road communications
between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, it they are asked to do so. Here it
might be an advantage for the Red Cross to extend this kind of inspection,
but we do not ::..-jcw wliat tiny are doing at present. What sort of inspection
are they extending to rail traffic? What is the objective of that inspection?
Are they authorized, to look into packages and goods traffic and see whether
any arras are being carried? Provided you find from further inquiry of the
International .Red Crosr. what is the exact nature of their inspection, and
if it comes about that that inspection extends to both goods and personnel and
can be fairly meticulously done, this seems to me an aspect which c v.'.<V be
further explored0 I do not say that this is a substitute for having United
Nations observers, but it could be worth exploring by inquiry from the
International Red Crocs, and also inquiries may be addressed to the United
Kingdom Government as to what exactly this means. This again we would leave
to your discretion, if you think any useful purpose would be served' by
pursuing this matter, in the first instance by getting more information,
and BO on. If you consider that as a good step, we shall have no objection
to that.
D.R/wrb —. 51
(Mr, Jha, India)
Then we come to the question of.mercenaries. The position there, in
spite cf the disclosure that some mercenaries have left or have been forced
to leave or thu.t some were not allowed, to proceed, I must confess, seems to
be a very alarming situation, and it is on this question of mercenaries that
the entire bonr fides of Mr. Tshombe anu of others v;ho are behind him rests.
It seenio to UG obvious,_in the light of the latest attempt to send mercenaries
there that ail is not over and that uc may, the United Nations may, get into
positions -where it may find itself embarrassed or where it may have to
take action of the came nature as it was forced to take L. month ago. This
problem seems really very dangerous and, as has been insisted in the Security
Council and elsewhere, the problem of mercenaries still remains the core of
the Katanga problem and ve have to do everything to eliminate and to resolve
it.
We "would suggest very vigorous representations to the Government of France.
It is good to see that they have made some arrests, but that is not enough. I
think that it has to assure the United Nations; it ought to assure the United
Nations that the United Nations has the right to ask them to get all information
as to- the precise measures, anticipatory measures, that have been taker: to
prevent the recruitment of mercenaries, and their forward dispatch to Katanga«
It is not enough,.it does not seem to us enough that some arrests are made,
that some noise, is made and that some action is taken at the moment when .
something is found out somewhere; that is not enough. I think that
safeguards have to be taken and these have to be sincere and honest and as
foolproof as possible. I believe that it is possiuie for every Government j
for the extensive aim of the lav and the polic,e,.to see, that this sort of thing
aoes not happen at all. II^w, for.example, can some Frenchmen recruit and go
en recruiting for months in Toulouse or wherever it is without their having
an office or a place of business, without his contacting various people? It surely
is not beyono. the capacity of the Secret Service arid the police, the normal
police of any government, to find out that these things are happening and to
give sufficient information to its Government to enable it to take measures.
DR/wrb ;>2
(Mr. Jhi, Inaia)
It is also very alarming that ail these mercenaries pass through
Brazzaville, and it certainly grieves us a great deal that there is
an African country which has permitted either knowingly 01- unknowingly --
we do not know yet -- the passage of mercenaries through its territory in
spite of the clear resolution of the Security Council -- and I am referring
to operative paragraph f; of the Security Councille resolution of 2k November
read .with operative paragraphs 7 -nd 11. Thece really amount tc an injunction
to the State not to give any facilities or assistance in the matter of the
transit of mercenaries through their States.We would suggest for your consideration that a communication should be
addressed to the Government of the Congo (Brazzaville). This is a very serious
matter. There have been reports of this nature "before that traffic to Katanga
has been going through Brazzaville. Of course, we did not have much proof of
this, but this particular incidence is something on which the Secretary-General
could base an appropriate communication to that Government. And it is our
hope that that Government,like every other Government, will co-operate in the
implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council.
\ve entirely agree with the suggestion made by our colleague from ijigeria
that it would be a good thing for the United Nations to bring out some kind of
a -weekly bulletin for public consumption not only in the United States, but
also elsewhere too; perhaps this aspect might be examined. It "will have the
advantage not merely cf putting the correct facts before the public, but also
of acquainting world public opinion with the tremenaous work not merely by way
of the action through the United Nations force, but even more important perhaps
the great work in the technical assistance field that is being done by the
United Nations in the Congo. So I "would wholeheartedly support that., and
perhaps you will have this matter examined by your experts to see if something
could be done in that direction.
DR/wrb —-_. '•£>.
(Mr. Jha, India)
V/e see a long list of arms and ammunition which were captured by
United Nations troops during the December operations in Katanga and it
is not clear to us how an anti-aircraft gun with British War Office markings
happens to be in Katanga. One can understand Pelgian arms because these
could have been there from before. But there is quite a lot of arras and
ammunitions of British manufacture and one anti-aircraft gun -with British
War Office markings. This really lends point to what has been said ell
along that there has been traffic of these commodities through the Federation
of -Rhodesia. However, this is something, especially the presence of an
anti-aircraft gun with British War Office markings, which night need further
examination and investigation, and possibly proper contacts with the
United Kingdom authorities.
as regards the question of ANC troops, that is a matter which raises
several questions of principles, the juxtaposition and the relationship
of ANC forces with the United Nations forces. On this point,
Mr. Secretary-General, I am not in position to give you the definitive opinion
of my Government at this stage but it ocean to us — and I am speaking
purely tentatively -- that joint operations in the sense of two separate armies
under two separate disciplines in the Congo would neither be desirable or
feasible. There is the question of command. V/'ho is going to command these
joint forces, who decides upon the tactics, who decides upon the strategy? Is
it not likely that there will be bickerings as to the details of operations?
All that kind of thing comes in. So far I speak only tentatively at this
stage, but I believe that my Government will not view with favour joint
operations in the manner that is indicated or that is suggested by ANC forces.
Of course, it is fully recognized that the ANC forces are the forces of a
sovereign State and there is no detraction from that position. But on the
question of joint operations, that is to say, the two forces acting side by
side in the pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations,that seems to us
an extremely difficult and in many ways a not very desirable process.
DR/urb/gd _._ 3^-35
(Mr, Jha, India)
Then there is the other point about the absorption of a battalion Of AIIC
forces in United Nations forces under United Nations discipline. From the point
of view of discipline that seems less objectionable, but here again it seems to
us that this is in some ways a very radical departure from the principle and
practice followed hitherto. The position of the United Nations force has been
like that of an attached third force and not mixed up with the fractional armies
or even the Central Government„ Co I do not sr.y that that is something which is
likely to be harmful. I cannot make any allegation of that nature at this stage.
But we feel that that also is something about which you might go slow. You have
already accepted that, of course; there the metter roots. But in view of certain
political developments that ire going on, the possibility of an accord being reached,
although the eighth point there, the point about the mercenaries, is likely to prove
very difficult ac far as we can eee. Nevertheless, it seems that perhaps it is
best, having accepted the offer, that there is no qui^k effectuation o,-
implementation of it. I think that it would be wise to t'juie a iitvfcle mo.ve time to
see how things shape up and then perhaps one might be able to decide in the light
of the circumstances thrv'; have arisen; there may be some more radical
considerations of this whole question of the precise relationship between the ANC
forces and the United Nations forces.
HA/rh -,,,. 36
• • (Mr. Jha, India)
I should like to make it clear "that this is not a criticism of what you have
done, Mr. Gecretary-Oeneral. After all, vhat you have done in merely a token
matter, involving only 1,000 men, and they could certainly "be used on garrison
and guard duty at a place rather remcte from the trouble spots in Katanga. I
assume that steps could be taken to ensure that these are a source of strength
and not a liobility, as undisciplined forces are sonetimes likely to "be.
I have ventured sto 'express some General considerations, and I should like
to cay again that these need not be taken as the definitive views of my
Government at this stage. ••
That is all I have to say at this t?.me> Mr. Secretary-General. I vculd
only conclude ly saying that ve fully support, in general, all the actions that
you have taken GO far. We ho'-:e that while there 13 this''temporary lull, the
posssibility of a political rapprochement and that kind of thing, your 'officers
in the field are fully alive to the fact that all the dncgers may not be over
and that the indications of various 1: iritis that we get -- the latest' being these
attempts to smuggle mercenaries into Katanga -- should be duly taken into account,
I hope that the United Nations will not be caught napping if Mr. Tihombe, as
is liis usual habi'!:, should break away from his word and his premises.
Mr. BOTANP '('Ireland')'; I have a number of points that I should lite to• • • : • • , ' > - .
mention briefly.
I should 11 Irs.' to uay,firct, that I fully agree with the case which has been '
argued so cogently by our Nigerian and Indian colleagues against the Secretary-
General's going to Rhodesia to meet £ir Roy Welencky. I agree with the reasons
which were advanced in favour of that"view. I fully agree with my Indian
colleague, however, that the arguments do not apply with the same force to a
United Nations official's going to Rhodesia to explore the possibilities of
getting increased co-operation from the Rhodesian authorities. I quite agree
that there are reasons of principle and protocol against that being done, but
I think we should adopt the pragmatic approach and not stand too much on
punctilio.' ' I think that, if there is any chance at all of getting co-operation,
we should explore it and 'should do everything possible to secure the co-operation
of the Rhodesian authorities. The fact that far Roy Weldnsky's attitude is'
unfriendly, as the representative of Nigeria described it'— and I thought he used
HA/rh •- 37
(Mr. B oland, Ireland)
a very charitable term -- should not, I think, deter ust Nor should we be
deterred by the threat that Sir Roy V/elcnaky has evidence of misdoings on the
part of the United Nations troops. If he has evidence, let us have it, V/e
should not be afraid at all to hear whatever evidence he has and to go into itand establish the facts.
On the vhole, therefore, I agree -with the representative of India that,
whereas it would perhaps be a mistaken course for the Secretary-General himself
to go, I would not S'>2 the spme objections to his designating an official of the
United Nations to go to Rhodesia on his behalf. Like Ambassador Jha, I ain quite
prepared to leave that matter entirely to the judgement of the Secretary-General.
The second matter to which I wish to refer is tiie question of co-operation
between the United Nations Force and the ANC, or the incorporation of any
detachment of the ANC into the United Nations Force» I can only express a
personal view on this, because ny Government has not considered it and I have
no instructions with regard to it. However, my belief is that my Gc"'eminent
would view any propose..! for co-operation between the United lotions Fores and
the ANC, or Qnv proposal to incorpoiate detachments of the ANC into the United
Rations Force, with considerable doubt and apprehension. At an early stage of
the Congo operation, it was made clear, I think, that the United Nations Force
would maintain its independence and would not act in competition or in co-operation
with any local troops, including the troops of the Central Government of the
Congo. I think that is a principle which is worth maintaining* I think that
the proposal to incorporate a unit of the ANC troopc into the United Nations
Force would mark a new departure, which should be avoided so far as possible*
If it is a small detachment, and if it is localized in a particular place, that
might not do so much harm. But I think that the introduction of ANC troops into
the Province of Katanga under United Nations auspices, at- a time when the
future relations between the Province of Katanga and the Central Government of
the Congo have yet to be fully agreed upon and negotiated, would be a mistake,
and one which the United Nations would be well-advised to avoid.
My third point is that I wish to thank Brigadier Rikhye for the account he
gave us of the evidence available that mercenaries are being recruited in France
and flown "to Rhodesia through Brazzaville. I think that is a very serious matter
and that perhaps we have given too much attention to Rhodesia and Angola, and not
sufficient attention to Brazzaville. But what I found disturbing in his account
HA/rh --.
(Mr. Bo.land, Ireland)
was that, when the plane finally landed at Livingstone, a number of the
pQ^r,cnp,erc were refused permiscion to disembark but the Belgians on board
were found to have proper papers and were allowed to proceed. I tbirk it is
a pity that we do not have evidence as to what precise papers they had, /s
we know, the Belgian Government is anxious to prevent that traffic and is doing
its "beet. I think the RhocLesian Government must knew that, and I would wonder
what criterion of judgement the Rhodesiun Government ex.crcisei — and I think
it was the Government of the Fed^r.-aticn that was involved -- in deciding that
these Belgians ' papers verc in crrler and that they should be allowed to
proceed. I must say that I found that a rather disturbing feature of the
account given to us "by Brigadier Rikhye in regard to that flight.
Finally, I should like to raise two specific questions. As you mentioned
in your opening statement, Mr. Secretary-GeLV'ral; there is now a "hold-fire";
there are no active hostilities going on. There are, however, in the hands
of the Katanga forces a number of United Nations personnel -- ma,r'.n.ly, I think,
at Kipuchi. • Thera are a nuirb^r of Swedish troops involved, I think there are
two Norwegians, there ore tv? Irish, and I -Uiink perhaps one or two others.
BH3/bg ~"~" 111
(Mr, Bolanfl, Ireland)
I wonder whether it is possible to negotiate, consistent with the Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions, an agreement with the Katp.ngecse
authorities for the release of those troops, I would be grateful for any
information that you could give me as to the steps which have been .taken towards
that end.
Finally, I wonder whether it would be possible for us to be piven an
account from the map or the principal rcut.es from Iihcdesia into tne province
of Katanga, or perhaps they are so numerous that it is not possible to indicate
them in the course of a brief demonstration. We hear about the passage of
armoured cars, jeeps,, and so en, from Rhodesia into Katanga. Could we have seme
idea of the precise road routes that or^ capable of handling that kind of traffic?
Sir Muhammad. ZATPUr.TA KT.IA.N (Pakistan): Mr, Secretary-General, we are
very grateful to you an.! to Brigadier Rikhye for your statements and for the
information you have glvo-.i us. which is very valuable o I shall not take up too
much time cf the Committee ac the questions we have to discuss are very-
important and I pm cure there must be many other speakers who wish to express
their views on various Expects of those problems, I shall state our view's very
briefly.
I strongly support the suggestion made by my friend on my left with regard
to the weekly bulletin. You will recall that I have been rather strong on the
strengthening of publicity, I think this would help us a great deal..
I am happy that, as you are aware, my Government has been able to comply
with the request made by the United Nations with regard to supplying another
ordnance platoon, which will be ready to be lifted by 15 February,
Wow with regard to one of the major questions which you have posed for our
expression of views this afternoon, tho main problem concerning Northern Rhodesia
is to find a means of achieving our purpose. I agree completely with my
colleagues who have spoken before me that this is not a case where the Secretary -/
General should himself proceed to Northern Rhodesia for nny conversations with
that Government, For reasons stated and for other reasons which could be stated,
this would be inadvisable. On the other hand, you could at your discretion take
advantage of the indications that have been given to you to find means of
BHS/bg
establishing contacts which might .appear, to you to be suitable in order to
explore the possibility of resolving this, positive' threat to the achievement
of United Nations .objectives in the -Congo, I agree in that • respeofc w;Lth .
Ambassador Jha and Ambassador Poland. I shall not attempt to say who or at
what level we chould nominate or in what manner, but we think that the . -:
possibility should be explored. It wculd.be wise to do so. The situation is
such that some: solution must be sought to be found rather thp.n that we chould.
stick too much, to technicalities and so on. . :
•I too feel rather apprehensive with regard to the suggestion that, the
contingents of the ATIC chould bs associated with the United Nations forces* .- -..
On the other hanrl^. I have no rear1. on to triple that you and your advisers are . ,
not fUlly conscious of those difficulties, and I am sure that you will approach
that problem wisely. . • . . •
I-orn greatly perturbed with regard to what has been eaid on the cnestion
of the mercenaries* I. wish very respectfully to endorse what Ambcsse/lc/r Boland
has said. That question is of equal, if not of greater, 'importance than any. of
the other problems that you have raised this afternoon, Again, I fcave_r*o reason
to doubt that you Ere alive to the necessity of terminating, that source of •-.-....,
disturbance in the already disturbed conditions of the .-Congo, .
• • Mrt/GEDRR-EGZY (Ethiopia):. .1 just have a few points ; and soijie of them ,
are in the form of questions. . .With -regard to the .letter from the British . .
Government^ I .was wondering whether the , same thing could be achieved by stationing
observers on the Congo side of the border in. Katangese territory, I do not know ,
what the difficulties or the shortcomings would be if that were done, I would
be very interested to find out precisely whether we can station control posts
on the side of the operation, that is to say on Ccngolece territory.
The second point in 'that connexion is that, quite frankly, I find the
statement from the Federal authorities to be very impolite and very
inconsiderate, if I may say so. I shall have to decline for today to express
the position of my Government, and if you ask for it, I shall then have to
bring it to the attention of my Government and convey it to you,
BHS/bg 43_li5
(Mr. Gobre-Egzy, Ethiopia)
My next point concerns your statement, in which you said -- I did not hear
it very well and I do not want to put words in your mouth -- I believe (, that the
Rhodesian authorities never challenged part of your allegations. I would like
to get further clarification on that matter BO as to understand the exact
situation.
Next, there is something that puzzles us about this question of the
implementation of the Xitona agreemente We are very much cfrs,1'/! that they are
buying time once more, in other words they are building up somewhere else.
Although one m£y say constitutionally this is the affair of the Congolese, we
are very much concerned that they are taking their time purposely in order to
have more time to build up their strength end to attack the United Nations once
again. We are very apprehencive about this and W3 would like the United Nations
to take all the necessary steps to p.void such a build-up.
With respect to tLe question of the mercenaries, there is something that
puzzles me, if I b.eard the statement correctly. I thought I heard
Geneva! Rr.khye Bay that there were twenty-five mercenaries, of which nineteen
were released end six were killed. We know that there are a number of T.Tnited
Nations troops in captivity by the Katangese or by the mercenaries. If that
is so, then there should at least have been an exchange. I would say that
the mercenaries should not be released at all, because if you release them they
only return. This has happened in the past and it will happen again. But what
chould happen is at least that they should be exchanged for the release of
United Nations prisoners. They should certainly not simply be released, if I
have correctly understood the statement.
MW/db U6
QMr« Gebre-ffgzy, Ethiopia)
Then there is the question of the new mercenaries. Thirty-six of thorn are
supposed to have gone "back. Of coii^£;« ? it is "bad that, a "brother African country
should allow this. I think that tbe matter should "be taken up very strongly vith
their Governmeuto In my opinion, passports and visas ere issued "by the Central
Government of the Congo, and the Rhode^isu authorities, onse th^y found that this
w.ifj not co, should not have left the nine Belgians to proceed "but should have sent
ih-?m 'back, 'Ihe issuing of passports, according to my knowledge of the Constitution,
io the pxevince -of the Central Government* Therefore, I think that this should "be
taken up inLiodiatcdy irith the British Government GO that proper action can "be taken,
In connexion with tlie participation of Coagclsnc troops, Recording to ray.
recollection, I V33 the on* tfio first "brought this f;uo£jtion "be.fr,i-o the Cornmittee.
V,Tc still 22ainb".j.n ou1;- poci^x.^n, but- we agree vith you that the United Nations Force
chculd maintain ti';e di3eipl:'.ne« Cf course, it ic all \-ery veil to have 1,000 or
2,000 troops an •; contri"butioji; Juct like ours• or fiat of India, "but I tliinjs it
nay "he goiiig too iar and may disrupt tlie. discipline of the United Nations troops
if the Force has more then it can handle. On that point we should like to have
come information regarding the training of the Congolese troops, I should like to
know exactly what is happening in that ro^or-is We have one of our gs.uorels there
and I oftsii vor.der vhether he is boiuG used properly — if not, he can join the
United Nations troops, . •
Next, thare is the cuestion of Red Crocs irr/olveccnt as re^arcio this traffic
between Katanga <:r_d Phodesia<, This purz:-leB raa0 I did not know that Red Cross
people hod the authority or even the me^rrj of doin^ this sort of Job, On the
second pace of the statement "by the Government of the Federation of.Rhodesia ve
find the following: "*»<» to extend to air and road communications "between •
Ilcrthorn Rhodecia and Katanga the preLicnt Errsngeme.nt whereby Red Cross cfs'icislg
inspect all rail traffic goinr; to Katanga 1'rorr. IiTiola«Tf On wha.t authority does the
P.cd Crooc carry out such work? I am r.lso pus7.1 ed "by a state.Lient on the first page
of this satto- dotJUTont, where mention is made of the trade between Northern Rhodesia
and Katanga, Again, I feel that such traffic trade should be authorized by the
Central Government; otherwise, it should be stopped.
MW/db 1*7
(Mr, Gobre-Egzy, Ethiopia)
, I think that there is a legal question involved here "both as regards
passports and as regards trade "because, under cover of trade, it is obvious to me
at least, one could send whatever one wished,
In connexion with the Red Cross situation I should like to have some
amplification.
Finally, I should like to say that, of course, the United Nation-3 needs
publicity, or at least dissemination of exact information. It will "be recalled
that ve were the victims of, if I may say so, pome rather dirty publicity on
the ptirt cf Katangose authorities and of some other very foolish people who
joined them., I vac glad to hear you say today, sir, that all that vns sheer
fabrication, as ve l:/n?w all along*
I rllP - rl . (:~'ongo (Leopoldvillc)) (interpretation from French): I
•wish to tha'ik yc ., Mr* Secretary-General, for permitting me to speak, and also to
liiank the representatives of tiie countries vho nave spoken "before me. This is
the second time that I have attended a meeting of the Advisory Committee on the
Congo and I have already had the opportunity of expressing our appreciation of the
assistance 'Which the Cosnni uteo has extended to uj., I wicli again to egress my
gratitude to the ncmbero for the efforts which they continue to exert in helping us
to GoJ.ve our present difflcultiese
I have no statement to moke which would be any different from what we have
just heard; nevertheless I hiwe a proposal -which vould supplement the series of
measures which already hr-ive been toks.ru
Day after day a rapprochcm-nt is being observed in the settlement of the
political aspects of the situation in Katnuga, 1-Jliile yesterday ve heard, that the
eicht points of the declaration had not been recognised by -che. Provincial Government
of Katanga, today the I*re3,f3 of IT' w Yci-k reports that there remains only one last
point which must obtain the approval o:? th.e Ann-mo.ly of i:.'.;:a.a. T^QG there are
always evil elements that intervene. Vie are \jell ocquairr'ood with the enemies of
our country. You will see how they are trying to turn aside 'bhe intelligent
proposals which you make. But anything tbey may do will not discourage us,
The Congolese Government conaidsrn that i;h? r fuca]. of Bhodecia and Portugal
to place United Nations observers along the border of Katanga province confirms
MW/db 1*8-50
(Mr » M1 B ay o- Paul , Congo (l-eopoldvlll**. ) )
the suspicion of traffic In veaporis frozi Angela fir.d Kbodusia towards Elicefoethville*
This refusal is a violation of th'j resolutions cf th>; U.'iitad Nations vLrleh its
llornber States are 'obliged to respect. Tne position of the United Klin^a-ora
estGniehes us especially since that country IE a permanent cicmber of the Security
Council r.nd IB thus doubly oblirsd to ccnply Td.th recolutAons. The United Kingdom '
b.35 fi^iirn^d on ri-'-ny occasions that it complied with the obligations incumbent
i:yon Me;;./.::: Stotcia. Tue roouaGt of tao Secretary-Central is fully •wlt'.iJ.n his
validate and the rop2.y from that Government constit'ctes a violation of the Charter.
The sane applies to tlic p:."ohr,bition of United Itations aircraft from flying
over, vliich prohii.bitl.on he .1 "been dee;;<?.?d "by Francs,, Vie can orj.ly express our regret
at the ect.ions or that cou:y'.ry and we hope that the right to fo.Llow the itinerary
will be recovered aii.:1. re;>'ji;.;.'U:d.
The inyltaiion e:;ten'. :d "by tr?5 Unit eel Kingdom Coyerriiient to you,
Mr. Secretary-Ge' rsl, to vicit Salisbury cannot be cccep-bod» It is by such
niethodG that a r-:nid Gad eflicienb solution of the problem before uc is "being
cast aside. I vould request members cf the Ccccnittce to consider whether the
situation an it slancLs now does not cell foi4 tho convening of a meeting of the
Security Council.
AP/kb 51
(Mr. M'Eoyo-Pa-ul, Conp.o (Leopoldvllle))
The United Kingdom must have pracsvre brought upon it. It must not shirk
before the resolutions of the Security Council, It i-3 regrettable if tliat were
to be BO. This could bring about very serious consequences in Africa.
The declaration which I have just made shows the confidence which the
Government of the Con^o (Leopoldville) has placed in you. With respect to the action
you have undertaken vith the Gcverrrncntu of tlie United Kingdom and of Portugal,
I would surest, Mr. Secretary-General, that you consult the Prime Minister of
Tanganyika, Mr. Nyerere, with respect to the possibility of placing United Nations
observers under the same conditions as the other two countries with whom you had
made requests, since •rang-inyika is also a neighbouring country of the Congo. The
acceptance of placing observers in that territory would large!1/ inconvenience the
British Goverrjjient. I cor.r;ldcr that this proposal would m^et with the approval of
the members present bare.
The Congolese Government has noted, not without astonishment, the replies
given to the Secretary-General to his request for assistance which he had made for
the transport of troops to Katanga. Such a position is one that would
justify those who have a lack of confidence in the United Nations; it vould
compromise the spirit of co-operation which we wish to see established between
the Central Government and the United nations. Th3 intention of the Central
Government to have the Congolese troops in the Katanga operation is dictated by
psychological motives, namely to give to our population the assurance that the
Central Government is taking to heart the overcoming of the Katangese secession
and wishes to take part in the activities. The Congolese Government has a sacred
duty: to safeguard by all means the integrity of the territory Or the Congo.
I would wish to say one further word on the convening of the Provincial
Assembly of Katanga. Out of respect for the fundamental freedoms, the
Central Government had decided that the Provisional Assembly.of Katanga should be
convened at Karaina and at Elisabethville a minor Assembly could be convened under
conditions which would be deprived of any guarantees — and this ehows the lack of
United Nations support for the reduction of the KatangeGc secession. It should be
noted that the presence of troops of the National Congolese Army in Katanga can
not in any sense be interpreted as a military operation conducted by it against
Katanga. But the Government has ordered its troops to intervene only in the event
of legitimate self-defence against the attacks of the mercenaries serving in the
ranks of the Katangese gendarmerie.
AP/kb 52
Mr. BARNES (Liberia); I should first wish to be allowed to say
that my delegation is happy to have back with us here at Headquarters
Mr. George Ivan Suith whose experiences in the Congo and particularly in Katanga
pave us all pain and distress. Whilst we deplored the injuries he suffered, we
are thankful to a merciful Providence that he came to no greater harm and injury.
In regard to the invitation extended to you, Mr. Secretary-General, by the
United Kingdom to visit Salisbury, I would say that niy delegation would be among
the first to encourage any efforts which would have the effect of seeing the
implementation of the Security Council resolution with regard to mercenaries,
amis and equipment finding their way back into Katanga. However, it does not
appear to ine that ycur going to Salisbury would in cny shape or form assist
in the implementation of tM-s resolution. I believe that when you addressed the
letter or spo!-;c to t:,r_ repv*,tentative of the United Kingdom on this
question, you vera convinced that arms, mercenaries and other equipment vere
finding their wsy back into Katanga over the borders of Rhodesia. So that,
if you are being requested to go to Rhodesia to inform yourself on the conditions
there, then it implies that the purpose is to have you fulfil the functions of
the observers. Aside from the fact that this would be beneath the dignity and
prestige of the office of the Secretary-General, it would be physically impossible
for you to do so. Therefore, I do not see any usefulness or utility in
accepting the invitation to go to Salisbury if, for the purpose of going there,
you will have to be informed of the situation; and the only way the information
could be gleaned about this matter is by having these observers posted on the
borders between Rhodesia and Katanga.
With regard to the integration, if I may use that word, of some of the
ANC forces into the United Nations forces in the Congo, I would want to be the
lact to object to this arrangement for the reason that you have sought to do so
becaus3 of the insufficiency of United Nations forces in the Congo, My
Government's contribution to the forces hc.ve not been large for the reason that
we do not have a large army ourselves, and so those of us who have not contributed
very materially to the operations in the Congo would not want to insist upon
any arrangements which would deny any effective operation in the Congo by the use
of ANC forces. But I should like to say I believe that the United Nations forces
went to the Congo for the very reason that the ANC forces could not execute their
own responsibilities. The United Nations fox'ces wei-o requested to go there
because the ANC forces were undisciplined and untrained. It was felt that unless
AP/kb ~ " 53.55
( r> P^rnes, Liberia)
there vere forces other than the AIIC forces in the Con~o, chaos would continue
to exist. Now, I am wondering whether by the use of these AIIC forces it implies
that these forces are trained and that there vould be no necessity for the
training of the AKC forces.
The second thing is that there have been many resolutions of the Security
Council to the effect that the United nations operations are not to enforce a,
political solution of the situation in the Congo. If the AIIC forces are being
used, they can only be used for that.purpose -- for a satisfactory result in
the political situation, which means that the United nations would, be brought
under criticism that it is not complying with the resolution c.f the Security
Council, vhich is, to u.-.iiiy'-. in law or to restore lav and order, but it is
trying to effectuate the restoration of the political situation in the Congo.
The third considero.tion is that it seems to me that if you use one faction
of forces in ths country againnt another faction, that implies a civil war.
So that, the United Nations will be lending itself to criticism that it is
participating in a civil war in the Congo by the use of the AIIC forces.
It is for these reasons I believe that th^re should be some
hesitancy in the uce of AKC forces with the United Nations forces in the Congo,
However, I must admit that unless you get sufficient forces from other countries
to assist in these operations, you might find it difficult not to use these AHC
forces. .
<***«-! ef
GR/ids
__ (Ghana): On "behalf of my delegation I should like to make
a -few remarks on the points you have raieod. Lik0- others which have epoken
earlier, my delegation is very strongly opposed to your accepting this invitation
from Gir Roy Welensky. On grounds of protocol and constitutional propriety
alone, it vould hardly "be in keeping with your position to accept such an
invitation. Sir Roy Welensky is Prince Minister of a non-self -roverninc country
who GO foreign arcl international relations are handled "by the United Kingdom.
For thor-:e reasons alone, as I have said, it is unthinkable that you should even
consider accepting such an invitation, "but over and above that, and more
importantly, I think ..ny positive response by you to such an invitation would
give the impression that you were condoning Sir Roy Wclcnksy'c ^liberate
flouting of tbo Geci.'.rl'.-.y Cov-ncil resolution. At the Gam: time;, it vould give the
impression ttut you v-jre t-,\ing seriously the -- if I may say so -- .ir responsible
allegations that he has been making against the United Nations operation. It
would also giv^ \.he appearance that the Security Council resolutions were
in some vay negotiable, which they are not.
On the other hand, ray delegation has no objection to the suggestion
previously put forward that you night send a representative to negotiate not
the principles but the modalities concerning the stationing of observers along
the Rhodesia-Katanga "border. If you were to make a vigorous effort to this end,
and if you wore to base yourself on the willingness of the authorities to provide
similar facilities to Red Cross officials, I have every confidence that you mightsucceed.
In regard to the question of the use of AHC forces, my delegation shares the
objections that have been raised against joint operations. There are various
political, military and administrative- reasons which work against such an
arrangement. However, ths incorporation of selected ANC contingents in ONUG
seems to me to be a different matter. . My delegation has previously suggested
that you might examine the possibility of using such contingents in the Force
in the hope of alleviating the manpower shortage, in the hope of giving them
in-service training, and in the hope of permitting you to disengage other
national contingents for use elsewhere in more responsible and active operations.
GR/ids "" " 57
(Mr. Dadzle, Ghana)
I appreciate the force of the raiGgivi:j£o expressed by previous speakers, but
it seems to my delegation that those misgivings could be met if the contingents
were directly subordinated to ONUC; if they were used exclusively in the
implementation of the Security Council resolutions, if they were used in police
duties in pacified areas where there would be no chance of their indulging
in revenue-ceekin^ activities and reprisals. For these reasons my delegation
does not really share the misgivings expressed by other delegations about the
incorporation of ;>.NC contingents in the United Nations Force, on the same basis
and under the same comiiand as other national contingents. Such an arrangement
must, however, be clearly safeguarded by the imposition of the :--ame conditions
upon those contingentc; as c-.rs imposed on other national contingents in the Force.
Mr, LAFIAN (Indonesia): Although I have not received specific
instructions from my Government concerning the invitation from the Prime Minister
of r\hcdesia; I think I shall not go far wrong if I go along with the position
taken by previous speakers and oppose the idea that the Secretary-General should
ro to Rhodesia, by reason of the same considerations as have already been
mentioned.
The Indonesian delegation can agree with the suggestion of sending observers
to Rhodesia, but if efforts in that direction are not successful I would ask
the Committee, and you Mr. Secretary-General in particular; to consider the
idea put forward by the representative of Ethiopia, namely to investigate the
possibility of sending observers to the Katanga-Rhodesia border but to station
them on the territory of Katanga. If that is possible I think it would avoid
the difficulties of discussing the question with the Rhodecian authorities.
I was a Irctle shocked to hear from General Rikhye that mercenaries are
still being recruited in France and perhaps also in Belgium and the United
Kingdom, because such actions are obviously in contradiction with the
resolutions already adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.
I agree with the representative of India that it is not sufficient for us to hear
from the French authorities that the recruiting agents have already been arrested
in France. We should take a stronger position and think in terms of sending a
GR/ids •"--. 50-uO---'
(Mr. Lapian, Indonesia)
protest to the French Government and to the Belgian Government, and, if it istrue that tha United Kingdom is also involved, to the United Kingdom Government
also. These actu are clearly in contradiction with the resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly.
(Sweden): I shall he very brief. iMy delegation has already
had a previous occasion to inform you that we were not in favour of the
incorporation 'of AI'IC forces into the United Nations Force, so I do not have to
repeat that now. Concerning a joint AftC-ONUC operation, I have instructions from
my Government to sny -uhat we object strongly to that joint operation and in this
connexion I would I.Ike to quote a passage from a statement mad>", "by the late
Cecretary~Genr>r:-;l, Jor/Das 'i'.-immarskjold, on !;> July 19 0 in the Security Council.
I think that wiv:.1; he caid then is ttill valid;
"The authority granted to the United Nations Pores cannot "be exercised
within the Congo either in competition with representatives of the host
Government, or in co-operation with them in any joint operation. This
naturally applies a fortiori to representatives and military units of
oth^r Governments than tha host Covernnar.t» Thuc, ths United Nations
operation nuct "be separate and distinct from activities by any national
authorities." (Security Council Official Records, Fifteenth Year,
SupT)leme:it- for July, Au^ur.t c.nd '
KR/Jpm _._ 6l
Mr, RITCUIE (Canada): Mr, Secretary-General, I think perhaps there
has been s oca thing like a ccn3enous of opinion ; if I nay say co; here today
vith regard to the invitation forwarded "by the United Kingdom authorities in
connexion with your visiting Salisbury for discussions with the Rhodesian
authorities and with the other possibility Of an official of the United Nations
proceeding for exploration of the issues involved^ My Governnent is in agreement
vith iny colleagues here. We feel it would be quite impossibJ-e and quite
inappropriate of course for you to go to any such meeting; "but we also feel that
it is quite in the tradition of the United Nations to pursue any opening for
conciliation and for negotiation which may "be presented, even if it means
departing from the strictly fornvd protocol position;, Thcrei-'-^o wo hope thit
tiiis m^yV} possible., j/^Gi-r-vVarly as the United Kingdom communication in its
first paragraph cpeal-is of o.lscucL'r.ng "all aspects of traffic1' across the border.
We think that this is come thing we shou3_d have another looli at, and we hope that
it m?,y "be possible to explore these possibilities 9Wi>:;n regard to the other issue under discussion, that of a joint operation
in whicl;, AL'C components of the Central Government of the Congo would be involved,
I an afraid we cannot agree that that would "be desirable y for the reasons which
have been very well set forth "by others who have spoken before me. We also have
very considerable misgivings about the wisdom of incorporating in the Force
a unit of representatives of the Central Congolese Governnent AEC, particularly
if they were allowed to proceed to Katanga,, Vie think that would leave the
United Nations operation open to a great deal of criticism — and in saying this
I am in no way derogating from the sovereignty of the Central Governnent of the
Congo, of course, but I am speaking only in connexion vith this operation,
^j(2. (Guinea) (interpretation from French) : Mr0 Secretary -General,
not having previously Lad the opportunity to state publicly the position of my
Government with regard to your policy and attitude in connexion with the
operations in the Congo, I am hr/ppy at this time to express the satisfaction of
tlic Government of the Republic of Guinea at the fact that you arc
determined to respect scrupulously the resolutions of the Security Council and
the General Assembly concerning the Congo,. as has besn apparent since you assumed
the highest poet In the United Nations <> My Governnent and my Head of State
NR/Jpm 62
( Mr« Diallo , Guj nea)
have had the opportunity to inform, you of their eyr.ct fool-ings vj.th regard to
the situation*. Of course your etl/l.tuCe, :ir0 Score cary--Gcne.rcJ., Is not tlie only
decisive elemant in the solution of the Con^o problem, !-%y Government follows
with, attention, with interest and with sympathy your attitude and your efforts
Gill it hopes that, the autior.3 of your c.i 7'':.csc.ries and the adversaries of the
Console* 9 people and of the United Nations policy in the Con^o will not triumph. '
1 aci b'.v-vy to coiTvfirm to you here officially tLrit ny Coverar.cnt; in close
co-cpeiv,ilon with friendly Africa Governments^ is followlnc very closely your
attitude and it hopes that that atbituda will rnake it pofiDi .le to contenplate
a further exojtilr.Tt,loL of their ov;n pollcieQ with respect to vjat has. "been the
United Nations ooerri'Mon in •I'.'oe Con^o up to nov0
With ie;.a::.i tc \:;:,at ^v-u nave sc.id totey, MrP GecretcMy^eneral, I shall
ts very brief c. Firri1!:. of a.'.'.'.'., in. ro .i.:_-0. to the invilatiori fro^a l"ae Federation
of Rhcdec^a and ITyacLi(\ancl; t-he r:a or.ity cf the opiiiioss livvo already ljeV:n expresnec^
and a unanftmous agreement seor;?; to anitirge from the deliberations of this afternoon,
I shall Ginrr.ly add two or three more reasons'* The dcle^auion of Guinea of course
shares t;;.e point of view of ell the cthors -fco the effect that it does not appear
to be appropriate- for ths Soc .-ctary-Cenci-a."!. to reply afllr- a.t1,ve.ly J;o t.U.s
invitation., Howevar, one of the reasons which, it seez.s to us^ has not been
advanced GO far is a reason of principle 0 Indeed it chciu.d "be recalled here
that there is an extremely serious ciiallon , in the United liitiotis, rGcarding
the status of the Federation of Rhodes:! aa Indeed :'i.t will \& recalled that during
the flrct part of the oi::tecr;th session ri'.uifirous cVile^-ibioi\s, inc.lucli.n3 my own,
found thomss.lves in oriposition to the United Kingdo^i Goveriiraant in regard to the
exact ctatus of Rhode c-iao VJhcn VTG cal.l.ed for information on there territory;
the United tCin .om Governnieut expressed. Its opposlt:'.ori0 We "believe that an
affirmative reply by the 3ecrat;ary-0cneral ar> rerar.lr, the riossibility of
accepting the invj.t.;tioa from the Fri-sil/lerit of tl:o rederation Eifj'lit be
interpreted as concurring with the position cf the United Kingdom Government,
Iliis is only a reason of principle, "but my delegation thought it worth vhile to
Factually the rey.cona are numerous 0 The moot eG&ential one appears to us to
be the clear-cut anl unequivocal attitude of the Government of Rhode s.ia which
has already replied negatively to your requejst, Mr. Secretary-Ceneral*
-_... 65-65
(M^» Diallo, Guinea)
For all these reasons, my delegation fully associates Itself with all
those vho have preceded us in. expressing; Jclie "belief that it is not desirable
that an affirmative answer be given to the invitation of the United Kingdom.
In this connexion, ve wlch to say hov apprehensive we are over the attitude
of the United Kingdom, Vie rece.ll that last September It was also the United
Kingdom ovcrnmerit — and in fact a member of the United Kingdom Government —
tJicit acted as intermediary In organizing the fatal rendezvous of tlic Socretary-
Ceueral, Hr0 Eeijjiiar .-jold, In Mo.1a0 These are facts which are too much present
in our minds for us not to bring them out, and the attitude of the United Kingdom,
according to ti:e statements of hirp. officials of the United Nations In the
operations in Katar s,, are efficiently troubling0 Tnereforo -'-.Le nr,ture of the
reply of. the Secret -u'y-G-eu-,rul in this connexion should l>e "beyond any doubt.
With regard to the inci.'cenaries, the role of an African country has been
evoked here. Vo were among the flrut to show how the Brazzaville tu:n~': ,ble
wac playing an j.nportant role In the Katanga secescion. At the tJme ve were
criticised as extrornists^ "but I think it is quite clearly established that
BrazisaviJJLs Is playing an Important and Indeed capital role in the Katanga
secessions
DR/jvm 66 .
(t::r. Diallo, Guinea)
It would be desirable, in the view of the delegation of Guinea, for very
energetic action on the part of the Secretary-General to be undertaken with
the Government of the Congo (Brazzaville)..
I should like very briefly to put three questions. 'The first one is as '
follows: the Acting Secretary-General has told us that Mr. Ralph Dunche being
present, he could answer all our questions. Mr. Bunche took part in the
discussions at Kitona. Very numeroijs and differing commentaries have been made
in the Press concerning those (iincusGicriG. Could Mr. Bunche tell us whether,
yes or no, Tshoinbe has in fact signed the eight-point agreement? Because we
have heard that the contrary is true, one is finally persuade?, that it is so.
I have not had the opportunity of meeting United Nations officials a.nd to put
this question 'to tl",.".a. We know very well how Mr. Tchouibe has specialized in
retractions, and we think trat it would be useful for us to hear from the
primary source j.tself if he freQly signed the eight points of the Kitona
agreen:ent. That is my first question.
The second question is the following: we have learned from the Press and
in fact from this morning* s newspapers that news has come from Leopoldville
concerning the first Vice-President of the Council of Government, Mr. Gifcenga.'
Is the United Nations Secretariat in a position to tell us exactly what is
happening at the present time in Stanleyville? I put this question particularly
since in an article which appeared in Th^ Hew York Times this morning, there
is a portrait of Mr. Gizenga described by the representative of the. United
Nations in Stanleyville, Therefore, I believe that there is a niinimurn of
contacts between Fir. Gizenga and the United Nations authorities. It would be
desirable for UG to know what is the latest in the situation there.
Finally, my p.ast question is as follows. The representative of the Congo
(Leopoldv.illa) referred a few moments ago to a lack of co-operation between the
United Nations executive and the Central Government of the Congo. I did not fully
understand his thought because the exchange of views was made very rapidly.
I should like to have some explanation of this, taking into account the satisfaction
that we feel regarding the manner in which the Acting Gecretary-General seems, in
cur opinion, to have conducted United Nations operations. If the representative
of the Congo (/popolcbr lle) present here thinks that this manner is not
satisfactory, my delegation would like to have information on this.
These are the three questions that my delegation wished to put to the
Secretary-General.
DR/jvm """" 67
Mr* JHA. (India): I am sorry to take the floor again and I ehallbe very brief.
It has struck me as I heard the views of ray colleagues around this
table, practically oil cf whom felt tlwt there ras no hnrm In scndf'jig a UN
official to look into the question of the frontier arrangements for control
through the Federation of Rhodesia, and I was wcnclerirg whether it would not
be a good thine for you to take up diplomatically with the United Kingdom
authorities that the visit of this official and his talks, particularly his
talks with the Rhodesian authorities, should be in the presence of United
Kingdom representatives and he should be associated with these talks.
It seems to me that that would take care of the constitution'';.l position of
the responsibility of t*.-. United Kingdom Government and it might also be
helpful. But I en just leaving this thought with you to consider; I.am not
making any specific proposals. It might perhaps be a ^ood thing because
the Government of the United Kingdom, as has been pointed out "by several
representatives here, is undoubtedly responsible for the external relations
of the y-rderation of Rhodesia, I should plso like to suggest that we should
make it clear that the contacts of the United Nations official, should you
think that comsone should go there, should be strictly within the framework
of the penultimate sentence of paragraph 2 of the United Kingdom Government's
note.
We do not want this official to be regaled with all kinds of allegations
that Sir Roy Welensky has been making and that he should get involved in
controversies concerning that matter. We do not think that any of those
allegations are entertainable; they seem to be very one-sided and rather wild.
I think it should also be made clear in diplomatic contacts with tho Uuited
Kingdom representative that the visit, if you are thinking of sending some
one, should be strictly within the scope of what has bc-en stated in the
United Kingdom1s note, and no notice should be taken of the statement
made by Sir Roy Welcnsky on k January 1962-
Ambassador Boland brought up a very important point, that is to say,
how is it that the Belgians who were in this aircraft were allowed to proceed?
Their papers were said to be in order. Hew can the papers of any mercenary
be In order? In other words, what lies to be looked into is not the mere
paper, the mere formality of passports or visas.
60-70
(Mr. Jha, India)
It is incumbent in the context of United Nations resolutions that Member
States should go further into the matter and satisfy themselves where they
have any doubt or where there might be any doubt that tho persons proceeding
to the Congo ere or are not mercenaries. It seems to me that this matter
could also be taken up with the United Kingdom Government. Certainly some
more information should be secured such as: what sort of papers were there
and in what capacity were they going there, whether they were going as Union
Minicre officials? Sometimes the cloak of Union Miniere employment has been
used for getting mercenaries into the Congo.
The last point that I wish to ir.cke was to support very strongly what
Ambassador Boland said aboiit the fate of United Nations prisoners with the
Katanga authorities? In ivds connexion, I should like to mention here the
great concern felt by my Government and my country over the fate of
Major Ajeet Sir h, and I would hope that every further effort would be made
to get correct information about this officer, whether he is alive or his
whereabouts. I saw something in the papers to the effect that Mr. Tshombe
had told Brigadier Raja that he would make every effort to locate
Major Ajeet Cin^h. I should like to know if there is any truth in that.
In any case, I very much hope that he is alive and that no stone will be
left unturned to find the particulars about him so that we would know whether
he is alive, which of course would give rise to great rejoicing, or we will
know the worst. Adequate action should be taken to see that there is no
recurrence of such incidents.
HA/wrb """""" 71
RJ[~2i' ^: Ber°re I wind UP the discussion; I
feel that tiiere are certain aspects or the United Nations activities in the
Congo vhich could better be dealt vith by come of my colleagues here. I think
that one representative here has asked whether it would be possible for one
of us to indicate on the map the routes leading into Katanga from Northern
Rhodesia . On this matter, I think the beet person to answer vould be
Brigadier Rikhye. I therefore would request him please to indicate on the
aiap the routes leading into Katanga from Northern Rhodesia.
Brigadier RrKTrxrE: The routes leading from Northern Rhodesia into
South Katanga are the following: first, the road link between Mwinilunga and
Kolvezi; second, Kas'ianshi V-.ines to Kolwezi; third, Kipuclii to Elisabethville;
fourth, a road and rail li.:k from Sakania to Elisabethville. There are
various points o.C entry from the east: Kabunda, a road link; Kiniama,
another road link; and lastly, Kasenga, also a road link. These places have
been marked, on: the map vith blue strips of paper, and we will leave the map
there for the inspection of anyone who is interested.
Mr. BOLAND (Ireland) ; May I just ask one question to follow that up.
It has been suggested here that inspectors, instead of being stationed in
Rhodesi- > might be stationed on the Katangese side of the frontier. There are,,
I think, seven or eight roads there. AS I understand it, South Katanga is in
Katangese hands, and it would not be possible to station United Nations road
inspection groups on those roads in oouth Katanga -without a major military
operation, which would mean a move by the United Nations out of Elisabethville
into the whole of South Katanga, including Kipushi and Kolvezi. Am I right
in so thinking? I believe the Secretary-General said that there was evidence
that the French commander in charge of operations hoped that the United Nations
would do precisely that. Or am I wrong about that?
The Acting SECRETARY -GENERAL: Brigadier Rikhye said that.
HA/wrb 72
moment, the only point of entry that wecontrol into South Katanga is the one leading into Elisabethville itself from
Kipuchi — as a matter of fact; from all directions into Elicaoethville itself •
We are, however, not in control of any of the other points, and, as indicated
by the representative of Ireland, it would be possible at present to reach
those points only by carrying out a military operation, unless, of course,
the Kutangese authorities agree to the United Nations' stationing observers
at various points. If such an agreement were arrived at, it would be necessary
that the United Nations inspection teams should be accompanied by sufficiently
large garrisons for th^ir protection — which, again, will have to be related
to the size of the Iv~t anger e gendarmerie vhich is located at different places.
In fact, it would require another operation, which is under examination at
the moment by CiTJC as veil as by the military staff here.
The ActJ1ng_SECRg1AgY-GKrTERj\L: Regarding another point that was
raised, in connexion with the training of the ANC, I think that Dr. Bunche
would be in a better position to make a few observations.
Mr* BTWCHE; This question was raised, as I recall, by therepresentative of Ethiopia. I had several discussions in Leopoldville with
General lyassu, who returned to the Congo, at our request, for the specific
purpose of being in charge of the programme for the training of the ANC.
General lyassu has worked out a detailed plan for that purpose and has had
discussions on it with Congolese authorities. He has not been able to go
forward with the first aspect of the programme, which is to set up an
officers1 training school, because he is lacking the basic core of French-speaking
officers, well-trained officers who are capable of training other officers
for this purpose. He needs immediately fifteen veteran French-speaking
officers, to get started. We have now an urgent request to the Government of
Canada for such officers. We tried in the past to get officers for this
purpose from Switzerland, and we were refused. General lyassu will need
HA/wrb """' 73-75
(Mr. Bundle)
considerably more than fifteen, "but he could get started with an initial
complement of fifteen. We are hoping very much that we vill get a favourable
reply from the Government of Canada to the appeal made directly to the
Prime Minister "by the Secretary-General, If those officers are forthcoming;
General lyassu will be able to get started.
The Acting flECROTaPY -GENERAL : As to an issue raised by the
representative of Guinea, regarding the ICitor.a talks and the agreement, I think
Dr. Bundle "will be in a position to clarify that.
Mr. B'.'lTCrir.-j Firrro of all, I think that, although we constantly do so;
it is probably more accurate not to refer to v/hat transpired at Kitona as an
"agreement1'. IJ; was not a joint agreement -- that ±3f it was not something
signed by Mr. Adoula and Mr, T.Ghcmbc. It was a declaration signed by L'r. Tshombe
alone; although on the understanding that it was acceptable to Mr. Adoula -- and
this \:as ascertained in advance. In the course of the discussions on this
declaration; which took a whole day and night; Mr. Tchonibe at first wanted to
make a conditional declaration; namely, one subject to ratification by the
Assembly of Katnaga. This was objected to strenuously by Mr. Adoula, vho
pointed out that it would be incongruous for the law of the land to be subject
to confirmation by a provincial assembly*
. I:,
BHS/rh " 1C
- • ' (MiyBunche)
Subsequently, Mr. Tshombe, explaining that he had not had time because of
the conditions in Katanga to consult fully with Katanrcce authorities , wished .
to append a footnote to the declaration which was signed. This was after
agreement had been reached on the eight points, which Mr. Tchcrnbe' was willing
to accept and which Mr. Adoula would approve, as he put it, as a minimum
statement by Mr. Tshcmbe. There had been other points which had been requested
by Mr. Adoula which were dropped in the course of the discussions, Mr. Tohoinbe
wished to put this condition of consultation as a footnote on the declaration. .
This was unaccepted ,2 to Mr. Adoula* Finally it was agreed by Mr. Tshombe
that he would sign the declaration without any condition on it, but that in
transmitting it to r.3 ha vould Indicate in a letter that he h^d not had full
opportunity to consult an,"1, .would wish to inform his people vhsn hG returned..
However, he did not claim in this letter that ratification was necessary to
confirm his E.p;. oval of the declaration. I have the signed declaration .here
and also, the signed letter.. If you are interested I can pass them round the
table. They were signed "by Mr. T^licmbe at 2.30 in the morning.
'hc ,J?.et_t-f r__uorQ pa s ned round tij|,e t able . )
You may note that the letter transmitting the declaration addressed to
me was signed by Mr. Tshombe as President of the Government of the Province
of Katanga. His signature appears over this. The declaration was transmitted
to Mr. Adoula -- this was also a part of the package — by me in a letter which
made no reference to the fact that Mr. Tshoate was gcinj to inform 'his people
when he returned. Mr. Tshcmbe in fact approved the text of the letter by which
I transmitted the declaration to Mr. Adoula.
While the letter is being passed round, I might say that you have seen
statements in the Press about what has br^en said by Mr. Tshombe concerning the
Lo i f cr/.l am.en t n. 1 o . I would like to emphasise that in the course of the two
days at Kitona, the one statement which Mr. Tshcmbe reiterated most frequently
and unqualifiedly was his acceptance of the Loi fondsreentqlG. This was the
ctock answer if the question were put to Mr. Tshcmbe, as I myself put it to him,
"Do you give up the claim to secession?11, Mr. Tshciibe replied, "I accept the
Loi fond omen tale" . He made this statement to me on at least three different
occasions. He made it at the meeting across the table to Mr. Adoula. He made it
to anyone who would raise the question. There was never any qualification vith
regard to this.
BE3/rh '"•"- 77
Thank you. Another point raised in
the course of the discussion related to the functions of the Red Cross units in
the examination of foodstuffs end other commodities coring into Katanga. On •
this particular issue I think Mr. George Ivan Smith would be in the best
position to reply.
M J ''-~j : The representative of Ethiopia was quite correct in • -
aseua-ii^g that one could not ask the International Red Cross to exorcise any
general border control. That was not done. The cases in which we sought the
aid of the International Red Cross were strictly related to a number of specific
humanitarian functions. They were short of food in Elisabetr. -."ille and a request
was made to "o.ring r i:d? trains in frcin Rhodesia. The United Nations had no way
of checking thc-na trains c/t tha border and asked the International Rsd Cross
if they would certify that those trains carried cnJy focdstuii's. The same was
done with regard to sonic trains that the authorities wished to bring up to
carry refugees -away from Klisabethville. We wanted to have some assurance
that tL.-,V were in fact empty carriages. These vere the only cases in which
the IntvT rncitional Red Cross vas ua^d.
^ __SECRE?ARY-GEirF!Rf\L! Thank you. The representative of
Guinea raised a point regarding today's nswsrarcr statements about Mr. Gisenga.
Perhaps our colleague from the Congo (Leopoldville) could make seine observation
on this question o
Mr0 M 'BOYO-PAUL (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French):
Vie have no precise information on this subject. Vie got the news from the
newspaper like" everybody else.
Tho, Actl-ncr'ljEC^ETARY-C-ETrjRAL: Thank you. The representative of
Guinea also raised a question sbcuu the statement wade by the representative
of the Congo (Lebpoldville) to the effect that there has been an absence of
co-operation between the United Kations reprcsentc.tivca in Lcopoldville and the
Central Congolese Government. Am I correct in understanding that your impression
is that there has been c-.n absence of co-oporaticu "between the United Nations
representatives in Leopoldvillc and the Central Government?
BHG/rh ' 78-80
Mr. M'DQYO-FAUL (Congo (Leopcldville)) (interpretation from French):
One can only ir.akc a deduction after reading the section of the text which I
have read out. It is a text which I received frcra Leor.oluville. The
representative of Guinea said that I read it out very quickly and that he did
not grasp it, and I shall therefore repeat it. It soys:
"The Congolese Government has registered not without astonishment the
r^ly Civon "by the Secretary-General to its request for assistance intransporting its troops to K:ito.n£p."
There must be a letter from the Central Government addressed to the
Secretary -General. I cm unaware of the text of that letter , but I do see here
that the Central Government requested, the United Nations to ceal with the
transporting of ANC troops to Katanga, and apparently this wr : refused.
The Acting GSC^TA^Y^GECTAL; Thank you.
- Mr. rJ-3TIEP.TjMA . (Nigeria) ; I do not want to raise anything new. I
wish. to support the representative of the Congo (Leopollville) in his
suggestion that. the possibility cf establishing an observer in Tanganyika
should be .explored. Now. that we are agreed that the ceixUcs of
an observer to Northern Rhodesia. is necessary, although we do not think that
tiie Secretary-General should go, I feel very strongly about exploring the
possibility of sending an observer to Tanganyika. I am quite cure an observer
in Tan? r,nyik<v would be in a position to know what was going on in Northern
Rhodesia. . - - . . .
. . - Mr, ADEEL (Gudan) : I find among the documents that you have been
kind enough' to.. circulate to us an obscure tclegrom from Mr. Gir.cnga to the
Prime Minister. I do not knew what it really means. Perhaps it was put here
by accident. . •
The Acting nECRFlTARY-OEKEFiAL; We just present this as a document for
the knowledge of the members cf the Committee. I shall ask Dr. Bunche to give
sane background en this document.
81
Mr. BTTNCHEt It is an interesting letter, "but not a mystery. It was
put in deliberately for your information; we have, in Tact, a pliotostatic copy
of the letter, and it came about in this way. Cn the Sunday night before the
Kitcna talks I was in. the homo of Mr. Adoula, who had just that evening returned
from Eukavu. When at Dukavu he had been handed this letter, written by hand
by Gizerga, who had asked General Lundula to deliver it to Mr. Adoula in Bukavu,
which Cenoral Luiidula did. Mr. Adoula and Mr. Bomboko were discussing the
letter which Mr. Adoula had shown to Mr, Bombo.ko for the first time, and they
passed it to me. I said that it was a rather historic document and that I
would like to have a oopy of it, Mr, Adcula thereupon said that he would
provide me with a photostatic copy. I thought he Loci forgotten it, but after
my return to New York it u.f.s sent by pouch from Leopold ville. We thought that
it would be of interest to Vne neitfoers of the Committee, and so we gave you copies.
Mr, rC'sLLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I do not wish to
press the point, but in view of the events of the last few hours and the fact
that the representative of Congo (Leopoldville) has no adequate information in
this connexion, I would esk whether the Secretariat has any information regarding
the situation of Gizenga in Stanleyville. I do not press the point, but if
such information is available it would be interesting if you would chare It
with us.
The ActJnE SECRE^APY^-GT^TE^AL-s First of all, I wish to bring to the
attention of the Committee the fact that the newspaper reports this morning were
confirmed by my representative In Leopoldville, This report was that
Prime Minister Adoula had told Mr. Gizenga this morning — that is, today —
that Parliament had decided last night — which was Monday night — that he
should return to Leopoldville within the next forty-eight hoars to .appear in
the Chamber and explain his absence and his activities in recent times; otherwise
he would lose his post in the Cabinet, This is the message which we have
received Just now.
MW/bg 82
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Regarding the other points raised in the discussion this afternoon, I have
noted that there -is complete agreement on certain issues. The first unanimous
agreement is that I should not go to Salisbury on the terms set by
Sir Roy Welensky. There is complete unanimity on this point*
Thpre coems to be seme cono^nauc of opinion that the possibility of ay
sending a deputy to Salisbury should be explored in the context of ths United
Kingdom GovernmentTs reply, but not in the context of the statement made by
Jir Roy Welenaky. I shall keep this in mind and I shall give very close
consideration to this recommendation.
There is also a unanimous opinion as to'the imdeoirability of Joint ;.
United Nations-ANC cj-o ei-:..''i:Lon iu Katanga, If I underrA-cod correctly, all the
members of the Coimnj.ttee wbo have participated in the discussion this afternoon
are against the United Nations launching operations in Katanga jointly with
the Central 'Government fs. ANC at this stage* This, it would be cl>r,crvcdj
coincides with ny own vie:;s as stated in my introductory remarks.
In tV_3 context -I wish to reply to the representative of Congo (Leopoldville)
end to stute why the United Nations has refused to n^lp to .transport the Central
Government's ANC troops into Katanga. Since we have not decided to accept the
offer of the Central Government, to launch Joint operations, in Katanga, I think
that the providing of transport facilities for the Central Government's AKC
troops into'Katanga is out of the question^
Tliere seems to be a division of opinion regarding the inclusion of a
battalion of the Central Government's ANC troops in the United Nations Ccmicandj
which I have accepted at the request of Mr, Adoula. This, of course, has been
stated in my introductory remarks. For this, I take the sole responsibility.
Anticipating the approval cf the Corrimittee, and having in mind the observations
made by the members, I will see that their eaploymont and their utilization
under the direct corcmnd of ONUC is guided purely by the suggestions offered by
the Advisory Committee.
MN/bg 83-85
(The Acting Gecretary-Creneral)
. Another point which has been brought to the attention of the Committee is the
need for greater publicity of the activities of the United Nations in the Congo*
I have made it clear on previous occasions that I am very conscious of the need
to employ all available means of publicity in order to put across to the general
public the United Nations point of view. With this in mind we are preparing a
White1 Papc-r -- as it has been termed by several Governments — purely on United
Nations operations in the Congo, and this publication will be ready sometime
riKxt week. It will be ready for the Press in both English and French. It is my
intention to have ten:; of thousands of this text printed for ES wide dissemination
and publicity as possible both in this country and in Western £uropeB
Regarding a r.ur-..-T2J.ticv'. to brine out a weekly paper dovoted solely to
United Na-clone activities in the Congo, I chall keep this in mind and, after the
necessary consultations with my colleagues in the Secretariat regarding certain
aspects concerning editing, financing and distribution^ I hope to be able to
present the arrangements at the next meeting of the Advisory Conanittee,
As v,o the mercenaries who journeyed from France to Brazzaville and from
Brazzaville to Ndola, I have to report that I have launched a protest to the
three Governments already — that is/ the Governments of Francef the United
Kingdom and Congo (Brazzaville). Replies are awaited.
Concerning the need of stationing an observation group in Tanganyikaf my
first reaction is that there seems to be no immediate nesd for the stationing
of United Nations observers in Tanganyika, but I can assure the Committee that I
chall give further thought to the suggestion,
AF/el 06
(The Ac 11nff Sccrctn ry-General)
I hope I have dealt with all the major issues raised in the CcEsmittee.
There ia one further point about the necessity of negotiations for the release
of the United Nations armed forces in Katanga, These negotiations ore going on
and I an hopeful that they will be successful "by resulting in the relecso of the
United Nations prisoners now in the hands of the Katangase authorities*
Mr,_ roiLEPlTMA (Nigeria): I am very sorry to take the floor again, but
I would Just like to raise the point of the bulletin. I em not only talking about
the "bulletin for the Congo and the Katanga activities, but I am thinking of the
United rations activities in gencralc For exampley the Unitej risbions is cioing
a great deal of good ork in the eeoncnic, social and mnr.y other fields. But
"when- tlie question o.f i^niu^ the bonds was raised, even in a country like the
United States, the reaction of the general public was rot favourable. This, tomy mind, is because of lack c£ knowledge and lack of public information passed
on by the United Nations. Thon I began to consider, if this is the situation
in G corntry like the United States vhere the Headquarters itself is established,
what will be the reaction of ether countries in Africa, in Asia and in otherplaces.. This led me to the bringing of this matter to the notice of the Secretary-
General so that either a daily, preferably a daily, or a weekly bulletin, written
in very simple le.nguage -- not in any technical language -- which the General
public can read a?ad can understand, not only in America but also in other parts
of the vorld so that they may know -what th'=j United Nations is doing for them.
I am quite sure that there ia a £reat deal of ignorcnce GOout the activities of the
United liations which are really useful for the interests of marJiind, but people
do not know about them. Many people rely on local n-3vspapcra but they do not
take the trouble to read ths United !\-tions documents, perLicularly about
technical assistance or the other social and educational activities, .
The United Nations should give consideration towards the establishment of a
paper, daily or weekly, depending on the financial ability -of the United Nations,
to educate the public so that it might know the usefulness of.the United Nations.
At tbe moment inuny people think that the United Nations is only useful for the
small nations and that it is not useful for the big nations. We feel strongly that
the United Nations is doing good work for big nations and for small nations but
AP/el __ 87-90
(Mr« TfoilerumB, Nigeria )
the general public does not know It. That Is why tile general public in America
is criticizing its Government c.nd doing many thing B to discourage the Government
in its good support of the United Nations ao in the case of the buying of bonds,
Tliis is what I mean, not only the activities in the Congo and in Katanga "but in
a very wider field so that the United nations may "be able to educate the public*
I krov it is a -very big thing and also th^t it involves a great deal of financial
and physical activity; Perhaps the Secretary-General may give consideration to
it, bearing in mind the usefulness of the bulletin,
The A c t in^ GECr: T.AR'. r rgpt A . Generally I agree with the contention that
the United Nations sliould >.•<; luoro cor>.cerned to get across the United Nations
activities sensibly co the nan in the street not only in this country but in
other countries -coo0 Put I feel that while there is a real need for more
publicity end r/ore information media to be employe;!, ve have to consider the
other aspects of the problem too. For instance, another newspaper or a weekly
journal put, out "by the United Nations which is primarily meant to educate the
public -v.voh respect to the activities of the United Nations will not convert, if
I may say so, millions of diohards in this country as veil as abroad to the United
Nations point of view, To illustrate my point, if ve published a newspaper in
the French language, and we print one million copies and distribute or sell them .
in Franco, this will, not change the French Government from its present attitude
of refusing to buy bends. At the same time, of course, any publication by the
United Nations explaining in very clear terms what the United Katior\3 has been
doing in the Congo, for instance, will not influence a man like Senator Dodd
frcra his rigid opinion regarding Congo- Ifetangese problems.
My point is that there are, of course, tvro schools of thought in this
country generally speaking, r,s in other countries. One school cf thought sees
the United Natiors as a neutral, if I nay say eo> Asian-African loc which should'
not be encouraged; rightly or wrongly this view has been held very widely.
There is another school of thought which sees tue United Nations ao a really
effective machinery for the settlement of dicputes without war. They see the
United Nations e.3 the only hope for the future 0 These people will support United
nations activities whether we have a newspaper or not. The first group which I
mentioned above, who see the United Nations in tb.elr own light, will not be easily
swayed by any publications of the United Nations.
OR/MI ~"~" 91
. . , . (The Ac tin p; Secretary-General)
Of .course, I agree with the Ambassador that scr.tf sort of attempt should
be raade to present to the public, more concisely .and more clearly, the various
activities of the United Nations, but this has already been done through the
medium of our United Nations Review which is published every month. I also
agrse with the Ambassador that a monthly publication is not enough, so I will
Give further thought to the matter. But the printing of a daily newspaper,
involving perhaps scores of editorial assistants and probably millions of
dollars every year, would be a very difficult proposition for us in the
present stage of our development. However, I will give serious thought to
the suggestion and perhaps a weekly or forthnightly publication may hs possible.
On this I will obtain tlia ro'lvioc of the relevant authorities in the Secretariat,
and perhaps I &ay be able to present the developments to the next meeting
of the Committee. - ' .
Mr. GE7il?]j]-5G5Y (Ethiopia): May I return to a questiora I asked about
mercenary s, and their being released. Perhaps I did not hear correctly what
was stated.
General RIKHYB; I said earlier that the final figures of civilian
foreign personnel captured or killed in Elisabethvillc were: 28 captured,
out of whom 19 were released after interrogation. These were civilian
foreign personnel, not mercenaries. After interrogation the 19 who were
released were found to have had no connection in any way with any of the
activities which are banned under the various Security Council resolutions and
the other 9 are still under interrocation. We do not yet know whether any
of them ar2 mercenaries, or at any rate it can only be established after
interrogation.
Mr. GEP.RE>FG'"Y (Ethiopia): Had any of those who were released
fired on United nations people?
General RIKHYE; No Sir.
GR/hh 92
Dr^ JFUNCHE t I could give an exarrple in ansvcr to your question.
While I was in Leopoldville ten Belgian cilivians were brought in from
Elisabethville. They had been taken in the Sabena gucct-house in the course
of the fighting. Their clothes and shoos were muddy and the troops suspected
that they might have been involved in the fighting* When they were brought
to J-.eopoJ.vlvil.le nnd interrogated, it was established beyond r.ny question, and
to the full satisfaction of our people, that they were legitimate Sabeiia
employees — technicians and so on — and that they had not participated in
any way in the hostilities. They were promptly returned to their jobs in
Elisabethville*
The A ''vlJ C'' '!?-''1^1 * w-~h to thank the rcernbers of theAdvisory Committee for tholr very valuable and constructive suggestions find
observations &n'J. I fesl rea3.1y gratified that generally the United Nations
operations in the Congo have been very heartily endorsed by this Committee.
The irsotln^ rose at 60?5
COHFIDKI7TIAL Meeting No. 66?)<• April 1962ENGLISH .
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON THE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Tuesday, 2k April 1962, at 10.JO a.m.
In the Chair:
Members:
U THAM1
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of Malaya
Ghana
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Liberia
Mali
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Genegal
Sudan
Gv;edcn
Tunisia
United Arab Republic
Congo (Leopoldville)
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL
Mr. RITCHIE
Mir. MAIALASEKERA.
Mr. GEBR3-EGZY
Mr. ZAKARIA
Mr. QUM30N-SACKEY
Mr. DIALLQMr. JHA
Mr, WIRJOPRANOTOMr. BOIAND
Mr. BARKES
Mr. EA
Mr. BENIIIMA
Mr. KGILERUMA
Mr. luUIDANI
Mr. CISS
Mr. EL CANOUSI
Mrs. ROGSEL
Mr, Taieb SLIM
Mr. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. MBOYO
62-0927
AE/ids £.5
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have not been together officially
for quite some time. In fact, this is our first meeting since 9 January. I have
not called a meeting earlier because there has been very little to report to
you or to discusG with you regarding the United Nations operations in the Congo.
During recent weeks, the situation in the Con^o has been unusually quiet and
ONUC's attention has been concentrated on bringing together Prime Minister Adoula
and Mr. Tshcmbe, with a view to having them conduct talks in order to effect a
reconciliation of their differences. It had benn my intention to call a meeting
of the Committee as soon as seme important stage in the talks had been reached
but, as you know, although the two leaders have been meeting in Leopoldville for
approximately a month, nothing concrete has as yet emerged.
The meeting today has been called for two purposes: First, the new Commender
of the United Nations force in the Congo, Lieutenant General Kebbede Guebre, is
here in new York, with us for a few days. He has come for consultations before
proceeding to Lecpoldville to assume his command. Seme of us already know
General Kebbede and his distinguished career. May I point, out that this is not
the first time that the General is tincociGted vith en activity of the United Nations.
For fourteen months in 1951 and 1952, he served -- and I might add, with great
distinction — in Korea as a Commander of the Ethiopian Kagnew contingent. After
the Korean campaign, he returned to his country, where he assumed the functions of
Governor of the Province of Ogadan and Commander of the Third Infantry Division
in 1955; Commander in Chief of the Ethiopian Ground Forces in 1958; and since
January 1961, Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces.
I consider it extremely fortunate that ONUC has been able to enrol the services
of such a distinguished soldier in the cause of peace. I am happy to present him
to you.
HA/ek 6
T Acting Secret ary-General)
The second reason for colling the meeting is the presence here — until
tonight -- of the officer in charge of OHUC, Mr. Robert Gardiner, He has come
to Kew York on a very short visit to have some intensive consultations vith me
on the Congo operation: there are some necessary exchanges which can never be
carried on adequately by cable. I thought that this would be a good opportunity
for the Committee to hear first-hand from Mr. Gardiner about the latest developments
in the Congo and particularly the recent talks between Prime Minister Adoula and
Mr. TGhombe, Robert Gardiner, I may add, has boon meeting the challenge
of the Congo vith groat ability and -wisdom.
Before giving the floor to General Kebbede and Mr. Gardiner, let me observe
that, as indicated in the notice to you of this meeting, I shall have to adjourn
ths meeting not later than tvelve -thirty. Both Mr. Gardiner and I have
commitments which would make it very difficult for us to stay beyond that time.
I hope you will not object to this.
General Kebbede, if you have anything that you would wish to eay at this
time, the floor is open to you.
Lieutenant r-Gonoral KSBEEDE CT3BRE t First of all, Your Excellency, I
express my highest appreciation to you for your kind remarks in introducing me
to the Committee.
I know 'that my assignment as the Commander of the United nations Forces in
the Congo is a very serious and trying one. I am not prepared at the moment, of
course, to say anything about what I shall be able to achieve in this most
complicated mission. Eut I do hope that, when I have been able to study the .
problsmc on the spot, I shall be in a position to make a contribution to the
achievement of this Organization's aims.
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; I now call on Mr. Gardiner.
HA/ek
Mr. GARDINER; Mr. Secretary-General, I am grateful for this
opportunity to give an account of some of the recent events In the Congo. The
most important development has been in connexion vith the Adoula-Tahcmbe meeting.
In order to understand or perhaps to appreciate fully the Implications of seme
of the moves ms.de by the participants, we may try to recreate the atmosphere or
the background against which these talks have been taking place,
The meeting steins directly from the resolution passed by the Katanga
Provincial Assembly on 15 February. That resolution, which has already been
published in a document, reads:
"Accepts the draft declaration of Kltona ... as a potential
basis of discussion vith a viev to the settlement of the Congolese
conflict; authorizes the Government of Katanga to establish contact
vith the Central Government with a viev to ensuring a solution in
the spirit of the draft declaration . ..w. (n/5n53/Ac1cU8, Annex I, page l)
Tlie resolution goes on to say:"The Katanga Legislative Assembly reserves its right to ratify
the final agreements which nicy he concluded between the authorities
at Leopoldville and those of Katanga In conformity vith the authority
given to the Government of Katanga." (ibid., pa^ p)
To the people in Leopoldvillc, this vas a disappointment. It had been
expected that the Katanga Provincial Assembly would either reject or accept the
Kitona declarations. But the resolution did neither. In spite of that,
Prime Minister Adoula agreed to a meeting vhich vould consider as a basis of
discussion the Kitona declarations. After an exchange of letters taking nearly
a month, Mr. Tshombe agreed to come to Leopoldville under the protection given
by the United nations and supported by the Prime Minister. Mr. Tshonbe arrived
on 15 March.
However, before ve get to 15 March, ve may recall that, immediately after
the passage of this resolution and after the acceptance of the idea of a meeting
by Prime Minister Adoula, it vas announced that Kongolo had been reoccupied by
the gendarmerie. That set in motion a number of developments. Reinforcements
vere sent to Nyunzu, Albertville and Kabalo by the Central Government. Therefore,
there vas this tension not too far avay from the minds of the people vho vere
getting ready to meet.
HA/ek 8-10(Mr. Gardiner)
When Tshcmbe arrived on 15 March, he stayed at the Royale. The same day,
Price Minister Adoula had to go to Coquilhatville. There had been in session
at Coquilhatville for nearly tvo weeks a meeting of representatives from all tha
provinces. There vere serious administrative problems in the provinces, and the
provincial representative were trying to develop a coumon approach to the Central
Government in coping vith these problems. The Prime Minister felt it sufficiently
important to intervene in the discussions and to e:xplain both the ppsition of,
end the difficulties being encountered by, the Central Government. That vas
the reacon vhich led to this coincidence, namely, the arrival of Tshombe on the
15th and the departure of Adoula to Coquilhatville on the 15th.
AW/SJt
11
(Mr. Gardiner)
But Adoula returned on the l6th and made contact with Mr. Tshorabe. Here
again, the Ministry responsible for provincial affairs ic the Ministry of the
Interior, and a few days were spent in trying to determine whether Mr. Tshombe
could get in touch directly with the Prime Minister or would go through the
Ministry of the Interior. This caueed some delay. But in the end the difficulties
were resolved and the first meeting took place on the l8th..
It had "been decided even "before the meeting that everything would be in
closed session and that no information had to "be given tg the Press or to the
public in any form by either party. We learned later that the first meeting
considered four points submitted by Prime Minister Adoula. The principal
theme of the conference was to be the end of the secession of Katanga. Then
the meeting was to examine the mandates of the delegations and proceed to examine
the Kitona Declaration on the basis of the loi fondamentale, and also to considermilitary action in North Katanga.
At the beginning of these meetings the Katangeee delegation made it clear
that whatever decisions would be arrived at would have to be ratified by the
Katangese Assembly. This led to a very lengthy and inconclusive discussion.
In tho midst of this, information started getting into the papers and was also
being broadcast. The meeting was not adjourned or suspended, but simply did
not continue, while the exchange of charges and counter-charges vent on about
the breach of the closed-session agreement. This went on for about five days,
and then it was agreed that everybody would respect the closed session and
discussions would start.
Even during this stage we received reports, made by both sides, of troop
movements and accusations of military action, which we investigated. And so
again, there was this tension behind the negotiations. At this stage Mr. Tshombe
decided to submit certain points for consideration. He indicated to Prime
Minister Adoula that he was prepared to renounce absolute sovereignty But in
reply to that he wanted to be given assurance about hia internal sovereignty.
This formula was not rejected out of hand. It provided a basis for a study
AW'sJt•12.15
(Mr. Gardlner)
of possible conclusions which could be arrived at by the meeting. And from
6 April to the l^th, the staff of the Prime Minister's office was "busily engaged
examining the conclusions which might be submitted for consideration to the
Katangese delegation.
Cn 16 April Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe met -- not with their delegations -•
and Mr. Adoula handed over to Mr. Tshombe the text of the conclusions. The
Prime Minister informed me that Mr. Tshombe had undertaken to study these
conclusions and to pass on his comments or suggestions foi- amendments. But
that same evening, that is the 16th, the Prime Minister left for Coq.uilhatville,
hoping that by the time he returned Mr. Tshombe's proposals would be ready.
But when Mr. Tsnombe returned from the meeting with the Prime Minister, he indicated
that he also would like to go home for some time, and in keeping with our
agreement and undertaking we had no option "but to agree to let him have a plane
to return to Elizabethville. The Prime Minister was informed of this just
before he left.
MP/Jpin 16(Mr» Gardiner)
Katanga is a very burning issue in the Congo; and the Prime Minister?s
reaction to the information that Tchorcbe intended to go was: TTCh,no, he cannot leave."
That may have been an expression of disappointment or a decision to try to
intervene, but tliat was the remark he made to me and to seme of his colleagues
who were at the beach with me when I made the announcement to the Prime Minister.
We vent ahead to make arrangements for the departure of Mr. Tshcmbe, and
he declared that he would be ready to leave on the I0th» Arrangements were made
for the plane to leave Leopoldville by midday on the iBth, and the Katangese party
bearded the plane according to our schedule, but later on, a message was received
that fire engines had been put on the runway to prevent the plane from taking off.
This seemed incredible to come of us because of some of .the assurances given,,
not only by us, but also by the Prime Minister* The Prime Minister was out of
town, so I got in touch with the Foreign Minister and the Vice-Prime Minister who
was acting, and we discussed this problem and its implications. We later on met
the Minister of the Interior, under whose supervision, perhaps, such measures had
been taken.
In the course of the discussions, it became clear that it was going to be
difficult to determine who had taken the initiative to delay the departure of theplane. We got in touch, by radio, with the Prime Minister, and he suggested that
a meeting of the cabinet should be convened and a reasonable decision taken, and
that he would be quite prepared to support a decision taken by his cabinet. The
cabinet met at 3,00 and sat until about 9«0°j and "the deliberations were
inconclusive.
I was invited to an informal meeting of the cabinet; I heard the views of the
various ministers who were very concerned about the possible effect of the
departure of Mr. Tshombe on Congolese opinion. They ehowed no hostility; if I may
put it this way, we were, on both sides, equally embarrassed, but decisions had to
be taken. So at about 10,00, I met again the Minister of the. Interior, the
Vice-Prime Minister who was acting for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We argued
in circles, agreeing all the time, but not being able to decide on the action to be
taken.
Meanwhile, Mr. Tshombe and his party had been in this plane since 12.00, and
some of us thought that we could not delay any further, and so we decided to let
the plane leave. We had taken all necessary precautions; fortunately there
was no attempt to prevent or resist, and the plane left at 4.00.
.17«
(Mr. Gardiner)
Looking at the event in retrospect, one might coy that, had the Prime Minister
been in Leopoldville, perhaps the departure would not hove been as eventful as it
turned out to "be. In any case, Congolese self-restraint and a willingness to
explain the grave implications of this situation, although it took a long time, '
made it possible for us to honour our word and to fulfil our obligation. I am
sure that this lias not left any real bitterness between ourselves and the Central
Government. The Prime Minister, in a speech to the Congolese public yesterday,
endorsed'this view, and he has made1 it quite clear that this has not affected in
any way'the' relations between the United Nations and the Central Government.
Running concurrently with these discussions, plans were being made for the
meeting of' the Provincial Assembly in Katanga, An attempt had been made earlier •
for the full Assembly to meet -- that is, with members of the Balubakat ond the
Conakat; but that meeting took place without the Bclubakat representatives1
participation in passing the resolution of 15' February. Some Ealubakat
representatives were in KLizabethville discussing the plans for the arrangements.
when the plane incident took place; and I am happy to report that nothing
happened to them. It appears that the talks are continuing, and one of these
days we may have -the legally elected Assembly of Katanga meeting to express its
views on Kantangese affairs.
'The Acting HECRI^ARY-GMKRAL; I am- sure Mr. Gardiner's statement is
quite helpful. 'The floor is now open for questions from the members of the
Committee.
Mr_» _ BARNES (Liberia): Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary-General, 'I
have two questions here I should like to propound. One is directed to Mr. Gardiner,
the officer in charge, and the other to you, Mr. Secretary-General. But before I
do so, I should like to express a word of congratulations to General Kebbede on
his assignment, and, on behalf of ray delegation, to express the wish for the
success of his mission.I should also wish to commend you, Mr, Secretary-General, for the very prompt
action you took with, regard to the freedom of movement of Mr. Tshombe. It is true
that we are all disturbed over Mr. Tshombe1s machinations; but I think he ic
entitled to freedom of movement so as to ensure the continuation of the talks
between him and Mr. Adoula, the Prime Minister.
MP/Jpm 18-2C(Mr» Barnest Liberia)
I believe that Mr. Gardiner, in giving us the details of the recent talks
between Mr, Tchcrabe and Prime Minister Adcula, said that, during the course of
these talks, information percolated that there were troop movements on both sides;
and this information WQS investigated, I presume, by the United Nations representative
in the Congo,
I should wish to ask Mr. Gardiner what this investigation revealed. This ismy first question.
The second question is directed to you,Mr. Secretary-General: This morning,
at 8.CO, I heard, over station WQXR, the Now York Times broadcast to the effect
that Prime Minister Adoula had announced that he had communicated with come
African and Asian Governments, requesting assistance to bring to an end, once and
for all, the oeccaaicn of Katanga, and that the response of some of these
Governments had boon favourable,
I was wondering whether the Acting Secretary-General had any information
about this news which come out of the broadcast this morning. These are my two
questions, Mr, Secretary-General,
Mr , GARDINFR; If I may deal with the first question, there were reports
about further movements of troops to Kongolo; and vc have been carrying out
reconnaiGGance regularly to check up on movements in the whole of North Katanga,
Sometimes we have been able to 'find traces, and on several occasions there has
been no indication of any movements,at all. We have had^also, movements into
North Katanga from Kaeai>soine of whicli have not led to anything, Gome of the troops
got to Gentery, and returned; and so you have these units either moving to join
troops to which they belong or trying to establish new spearheads. Wherever we
encounter such developments, we worn the parties involved that it might lead to
a clash and also make it difficult for the talks to continue in any calm r.nd
constructive form. We have warned about, drawn attention .to, and have pointed
out the implications of all these movements.
TL/rs 21• • (Mr. Gnrdiner)
With the Secretary-General1 s permission I will say something with referenceto the second question.
We have been having exchanges with the' Prime Minister. In one of them he
recited the events connected with the Katanga secession. Like most Congolese,
he is very worried that the recovery of Katanga does not seem to be in sight. •
He is fully aware of the fact that Congolese resources; especially at this stage,
make it very difficult for him, as Prime Minister, to think of ecting independently.
He, needs help. It is in this spirit that he communicated the substance of some
of the letters exchanged with me, to a number of tho African countries.
; FECRFTARY-GENFRAL : I would just like to add a few words
to supplement what Mr. Gardiner has just said.
, In respect to the broadcast news which Ambassador Enrnes heard this
morning, I think that obviously it was a reference to Prime Minister Adcula'-s
public statement which he made today. We just got The report a few minutes
ago and I have not read it; "but it seems that Prime Minister Adoula
has addressed personal messages to certain Heads of African
States, and only last night I got private information from one of the African
representatives that his Head of Government did receive a message from Prime
Minister Adoula requesting aid and collaboration with the Central Government
to expedite the integration of Katanga into the rest of the Congo. -Of course,
I have not seen the text, and most probably the radio news this morning referred
to Prime Minister Adoula!s public speech that he made this morning.
Mre DTALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): First of all I wish
to welcome amon;$ us today two of the persons most responsible for "both the
civilian and the military operations of the United Nations in the Congo, We
have listened with great interest to the statement of General Kebbede,
TL/rs 23
(Mr. fliallo, Guinea)
I would like to express, on behalf of the Republic of Guinea, our great hope
that to all the laurels the Gcsneral has won for Ethiopia, both nationally and
internationally, he may add, in the course of his duties in the Congo, perhaps
greater laurels which will be those most prominently recorded in history; that
is, it is our hope that he will faithfully and completely carry out the resolutions
of the Security Council and, in so doing, put an end to the secession of Katanga
and bring about the total expulsion of mercenaries from Katanga.
With regard to Mr. Gardiner, we have already at previous sessions had
occasion to express our wishes for the complete success of his mission. However,
1 do wish to point out that though we Africans fesl great joy at seeing these
two eminent Africans at the head of United Nations operations in the Congo and
honouring Africa in the high United Nations positions which they occupy, our
joy is overshadowed, unfortunately, by one aspect of their position* With all
the frankness that we feel entitled to use with regard to these representatives
of Africa, we roust express our concern lest the errors of the past --errors
dating from the time when others occupied their posts — be continued and
perpetuated under the supervision of these Africans who are now in charge of
the operations. This fear and concern we feel we must express to the Committee.
You mentioned, Mr. Secretary-General, that there had been no official
meetings of this Committee since January and, with all due respect, I would
gather from your statement therefore that there had been unofficial meetings
in that period of time. % delegation took part in no meetings, either official
or unofficial, of this Committee since January, May I therefore speak with
the frankness I have always showed in our meetings here, and say that my
delegation can only express regret that this Committee has not been convened
since January. We have not met to hear your views on the situation in the Congo,
which you have described as calm; end from Mr. Gardiner's statement -- and if
I Gin mistaken here I hope Mr. Gardiner or perhaps you yourself will correct rne —
I gather that the United Nations is content to await the result of the
negotiations between the Central Government and Mr, Tshombe, Now, my
delegation believes the United Nations mission in the Congo is very clear; it IB
laid down in a document we ere not discussing here, a Security Council recolution.
TL/P9 2 -251 (Mr, Diflllo, Guinea)
It seems to me we would be fully justified in asking ourselves whether these
negotiations themselves are not to a certain extent in violation of the Security
Council resolution, at least marginally to.its provisions, I believe that
basically the United Nations Mission in the Congo has one purpose, namely to
implement the resolution of the. Security Council, and. with this in mind I am
led to wonder about the significance of certain reports in the Press. We have
not been able to meet and diocuss these matters with you, Mr. Secretary-General,
the better to gauge the state of affairs in the Congo.. On the basis of these
reportc, we gather that certain provisions and amendments that were submitted
to the Security Council but not adopted are being implemented, whereas the
resolutions adopted by the Council are not. I will clarify this.
You will all recall that at the time when the resolution of the Security
Council was adopted, mention was made of negotiations. We are not members of
the Security Council,- but at that time we said we were in favour of negotiations,
of peaceful settlements. .We were among those who formally stated that ve could
not negotiate with Mr. Tshombe; and the statement made by Mr, Gardiner, wherein
he indicated that no effective-results had come from the negotiations, certainly
did not surprise the delegation of Guinea. We know Mr. Tshombe and we know hifl
background.
Thus too/ Mr, Secretary-General, there had been draft amendments aimed
at putting an end to the so-called secession of Oriental Province, and these
amendments likewise wera not adopted.
DH/kb 26
(Mr, Diallo, Guinea)
But when fill Is said and done, what do we see CD a resultf The so-called
secession of Oriental Province has been ended vhereas the pertinent provisions
of the Security Council resolutions which sought to end the Katanga secession
and to expel the mercenaries from there and to stop the inflow of arms and
weapons to Katanga -- what happened there? What happened to those provisions
which did clearly appear in the resolution of the Security Council? Consistent
with this way of thinking; I should like to ask the following question: within
the framework of what we have just described, this so-called secession of
Oriental Province, we know that Mr« Gizenga was arrested, that he was interned
despite the parliamentary immunity which he enjoys.
We believe that one of the obligations of the United Nations in the Congo is
to defend legality in that country, and we see that the head of the secession,
Mr. Tshcmbe, does benefit from official and unofficial protection, and yet
Mr. Gizonga is imprisoned despite his parliamentary immunity.
We were happy to hear Mr. Gardiner say that the United Nations has defended
its honour and that it has assured Mr, Tehoznbe of oil facilities to leave
Leopoldville. These problems are of great concern to us, and we must be frank
in stating this•
I should like to ask one last question. After having made wy statementregarding the situation of Mr. Gizenga, we should like to know exactly where
he stands at the moment. What is the United Nations ready to do to redress
that situation?I have one final question regarding the implementation of the Security
Council resolution. What is the true situation in Katanga itself? Are
mercenaries still present in Katanga? Is it true, as we have read in the Press,
that a certain Colonel was relieved of certain documents whereby it was proved that
this Colonel had bought European arms for Katang- ^nd these arms had been brought
into Katanga?
These are all questions that trouble and worry us, and because of ourdesire for honesty, we felt tliat we had to ask these questions in the Coxnnittee.
DR/kb 27
The Acting SECRKTABY-G TIII AL; First of all, I will ask Mr. Gardiner
to anwer these questions and; if necessary, I will supplement Lis statements.
Mr, GAPDINER; If I may deal with the question of Orientals first,
we may say that the secession in Oriental ended itself. It was the forces
under the ccnmand of General Lundula who put an end to the secession in Orientals.
It vas not found necessary for us to undertake any action. Relating that to
Katanga, we have been forced into a number of engagements which have not succeeded
in putting an end to the secession there, and so OITUC in the field has been
concerned with secession in all places and in all its forms and in some instances
the outcome has been satisfactory; in others we are still confronted with the
problem.
IIow, if I may turn to mercenaries, the elimination of the mercenaries
has become a continuing concern. Not only do-we get thoce who have been
expelled coming back, but also new recruits are reported from time to time.
We spend a great deal of time checking up on information about mercenaries ana
also making arrangements to apprehend quite a few of them. The example cited
by Your Excellency is perhaps a. certificate of our efficiency in coping with
this particular individual. In some cases, and I think in several instances,
we have been fortunate. I say this net to create any atmosphere of complacency
out to give an indication of our continuing exertion in trying to implement
the resolutions mentioned, by Your ivcellency.
..nd then there was the third question; this particular individual who
has been purchasing arms was picked up by us and is under our custody at the moment.
The list which has created GO much of a scare is list which we captured
whan we apprehended Colonel or Mr. -* I do not know what title he confers on
himself -- Julian.
To turn to Mr. Gizenga, I have already referred to the exchange of
correspondence, spreading over a month, with Mr. Tshombe in which we gave
protection, offered protection to Mr. Tsboobe with the approval of the
Congolese Government. In the case cf Mi-. Gizenga, who asked for protection on
arrival in Leopoldville, he insisted -- I should like to emphasize the word
"insisted" -- on being let out of our protection and he went out, and later on was
picked up by the Government and sent to this island. Our offer of protection still
DB/kb 28-30
(Mr. Gardiner)
Stands. If I may try to "be a little practical here, ve have resources in the
Congo, but they are limited resources and we have got to act with caution so
that ve can reach our objectives with the least possible losses* thinking in
terms Of the countries which have co very generously put their men and material
aii our disposal. I do not think that ve do ourselves any credit by offering,
shall I say, more defiance than vre can back up, and in this particular case of
Mr. Tehombe ve could concentrate our resources and cope vith the situation.
Vihen somebody goes into the country, it requires a little more effort to
organize a campaign to retrieve I-Ir. Gizenga. But our offer stands and we have
not abandoned Mr. Gizenga. One of my continuing cares is to find out, almost
daily, what is happening to Mr. Gizenga. Sometimes some of the information ve
Get Gets into the papers, such as the report of the journalists who .visited him
last week. We have a concern, Your Excellency, I agree entirely. We have also
so many other concerns in the Congo but, alas, our resources are such that we
must go not only by priorities but by the practical considerations of vhct can
usefully and effectively be done by the team you have put in the Congo — and I
say "you have put in the Congo" because our strength and our weakness both
depend on you.
AE/db 31
'• • • (Mr» Gardiner)
* I,should like, to add> if I may, that ve have had to refuse to entertain a
request to send troops to South Kasai, for instance. We ore aware that a situation
exists-in South Kasai and are using all means at our disposal to deal vith this
particular prob_le:n. Eut to send "battalions, which ve do not have, into South Kasai
naw -will only be inviting trouble for thG United Nations;
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I wish to thank Mr. Gardiner for his
comprehensive statement, I should like to odd a few words to what he has just
said.;r.eg3rding my uce of the expression "official meetings". It is perhaps
necessary, to make clear that since 9 January we have not had any official meetings '
such-ac, this. From time to time, however, ve have had occasion to exchange views
at cocktails, receptions, lunches, dinners, on the vay to the delegates' lounge,
and ;s.Qi..oru .These cannot, of course, "be regarded as official meetings and
discussions. It was in this context that I said that ve have not had any
"official meetings" since 9 January* . .. ,
. JHic representative from.Guinea has.very rightly pointed out tho resolutions
of the Security, Council in tfre- context o£ the ;activitica of the United Nations in
the Congo. .•; I vant merely to reiterate my understanding of all the Security Council
resolutions that have bc^rt passed with^regard to the operations in the Congo.
The United Nations can employ force only in three situations* The first
situation is in order to prevent civil war. The second situation occurs in a
contingency vberr; it ic> necessary to arrest mercenaries. The third situation is>
of course, to retaliate in self-defence, if attacked; the United Nations may
exercise the right of self-defence. It,is only in these three situations that the
United Nations has been empowered by the Security Council to exercise 'force, The
United Nations.has never been authorised to employ force in order to impose a
political solution in any part of the Congo. I am certain that my interpretation
of the..-Security .Council's resolutions is correct.
Regarding the present phaoe of events, in which the United Nations has been
concentrating :its efforts toward bringing together the dissident Congolese leaders
with a view to arriving at an agreed solution of the various problems, it is my
feeling that our attempts have not been in vain. My interpretation'of the recent
Adoula-Tshombe talks is not one of pessimism. The talks have not broken down
AE/db 32
(The Acting Secretary-General)
and there are definite indications that Mr. Tshombe will come "back to Leopoiaville
in order to resume his talks with Mr. Adoula. With good-vill and patience on
"both sides, I em confident that these talks will "bear fruit. Of course, in the
event that the talks do break down, there are certain concrete steps which we may
take in order to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. In that event,
I will convene this Committee at the appropriate time and it has been my intention
to request the convening of the Security Council if I feel that a fresh mandate is
necessary. In this context I vant to reiterate what I said at one of our meetings
in December, that if the United Nations had only the resources and the manpcver
that it had last year, it vould "be in a position to implement all of the Security
Council's resolutions within two months;.my belief in that respect has not changed,
Taking into consideration all factors which presently exist — financial, political
and psychological -- the United Nations is. now concentrating on the non-military
aspects of the operations.
With regard to Mrf Gizenga, I want to add just a few words to what Mr, Gardiner
has said. Personally, I am BO unhappy as is my good friend, the representative of
Guinea, regarding the situation in which Mr, Gizenga is at the moment. But I
should like to recall that it has been ray constant endeavour to get Mr* Gizenga
back under United Nations protection, When Prime Minister Adoula was here, I
brought this question up with him at all of our meetings and he reiterated hie
assurance that Mr. Gizenga will be sent back under United Nations protection
whenever he wishes. The offer of United Nations protection still stands;
Mr. Gizenga is aware of that, I am rather puzzled as to why he still refuses to
come under the protection of the United Nations, With regard to his health and
general condition, as Mr, Gardiner has Just pointed out, three journalists saw him
last only this pact Thursday, four days ago, and they reported that Mr, Gizenga
was enjoying very good health and was in cheerful spirits. It is worth repeating
that one of the Journalists is from the West, one is from the Socialist bloc,
if I may call it that, representing the Tass agency, and one journalist is from
Yugoslavia, Their unanimous report was that Mr. Qizenga is in perfect health.
He did not indicate to them that he wanted to come under United Nations protection.
AE/db/bg 53-35
(The Acting Secretary-General)
I wish to add that I am taking steps to suggest that Mr, Gizenga be submitted
to parliamentary interrogation, in conformity with the lows of the land, and I
am coranunicating this vish to Prime Minister Adoula. Of.course, whether
Mr. Gizenga should be submitted to parliamentary interrogation or not io a purely
domestic matter, in which we have no say. But I am requesting; that Mr. Adoula
see to it that Mr, Gizenga is brought before Parliament as early as possible,
and, if it is deemed necessary, that he be submitted to interrogation, as was
contemplated.
GR/rh %
Mr, QTTAISON-GACKEY (Ghana): I vish to cay how very pleased my
delegation is that ve have had an.opportunity of welcoming here the new ONUC
Commander, the former Chief of Ecfence Staff of Ethiopia, I am sure his
appointment means a great deal to Africa and that, vith his co-operation with
your representative Mr. Gardiner, there vill be a felicitous combination of
circumstances which will help to ease the situation ve are now discussing. I
vish also to thank Mr« Gardiner for the clear exposition he gave us of the
Adoula-TGhcmbe talks*
I am sure that meetings like this are very useful if only that we may know
what is happening, and for that matter I would like to make a suggestion. I
think it would be a good idea if the Advisory Committee could meet more often
than it has dona. I agree that it is your Committee, Mr* Acting Secretary-General,
and in fact it is your prerogative to call it into "being or not, "but in viev of
the fact that Katanga is still raising difficulties and that there are so many
other problems facing the Congo at the moment, perhaps it would not be a bad
idea if you vero to call a meeting once a month at least. Of course, there could
be more frequent meetings than that if occasion required, but I think ib would be
a good idea to have a meeting once a month so that we may get the picture of what
is happening in the Congo.
In Mr, Gardiner's clear report of what happened in the Adoula-Tshombe talks
he mentioned the occupation of Kongolo and I wanted to ask a question about that.
I thought Kongolo was part of the neutral zone which was declared by the United
Nations in agreement with the Katanga Government. If I am wrong, I can be
corrected, but if that is so I wonder how it happened that Tshombe's gendarmerie
were able to move into Kongolo to occupy it. Perhaps we could have an explanation
of that*
Then Mr. Gardiner mentioned a possible election in Katanga* I am not sure
whether we are talking about the formation of a now Government or the
establishment of a new Assembly. I happen to know that under the loi fondamentale
there should bo provisional elections in all the provinces. What we see here seems
to be the formation of a new Katanga Government with the full participation of
the Balubakat. In that connexion, may I know what Ccndwe is doing at the
moment? Is he still the effective leader of the Balubakat and what is their role
in all these discussions between Tshombe and Adoula?
GR/rh 37
(Mr* Qnaison-Sackey, Ghana)
The third point I want to touch upon is this appeal to African countries, I
remember that a similar appeal was made "by Mr. Lumunba in 1960, when he wanted a
certain, number of African countries to help him take Katanga, There vas a meeting
of African foreign ministers in Lcopoldville to consider this matter in
conjunction with a number of other matters, but Mr* Lumumba chanced his mind and
the Central Government then said that Katanga vas no problem. I would like to
knov the Secretary-General's reaction to this request, because if ve c° into the
question properly it would seem as if the logical solution to the problem of
Katanga vould be for the Central Government to have a free hand to take it over
if it can, I said something like this at one of the meetings of the Security
Council in 19 0, when even the representative of the United States felt that ve
here could not prevent the duly elected Central Government of the Congo from taking
any action, military or otherwise, which vould "bring Katanga back to heel.
Of course., this can be considered within the framework of Security Council
resolutions .regarding unilateral action by Member States; it might mean that if
any African country like mine helped the Central Government directly it vould "be
i:oing against the Security Council resolution, I would like to ask the Acting
Secretary-General whether, in his opinion, the time has not come to consider the
withdrawal of all United Nations troops with a view to allowing the countries which
might wish to help the Central Government to do so with a view to bringing about
the proper integration of all the provinces we have been talking about. This is
icy third question. My country feels very strongly that this problem of Katanga
has dragged on too long and although every effort has been made by you and your
representatives in the Congo to solve this problem, it neems as if in the end
force may possibly be the only resort, I am sorry to use the -word force^ I myself
do not like the use of force, but I feel that the only way the Central Government
can be sure of getting Katanga back with all the apparatus of the Union Mini.ore
intact vill be for them to take stronger action than has been taken in the pact.
The fourth point I want to make is in regard to Mr* Gizenga, We welcome the
assurances that have been given that his position is being watched by the United
Nations and that every effort will be made to cee that nothing untoward happens
to him*
GR/rh 58-1+0
(Mr, Qnaison-Sackey, Ghan<%)
I was not very sure on your point about a parliamentary interrogation.
Are you taking the initiative in asking the Adoula Government to do that, or
is it tho Government itself which wishes to encourage Mr. Gizenga? I would like
to know the possible consequences of this, because Mr, Adoula -- I do not think
I can hide this -- assured me personally that in fact he had agreed that
Mr, Gizenga should go to this small island at his own request and that he
himself is personally responsible for Mr. Gizengars protection. I am therefore
wondering whether a parliamentary interrogation of the land you arc envisaging
may not just fan the ashes of a fire that was dying out. I would like you to
review this question in the framework, of the Congo aG a whole* I think this
problem has dragged on far too long and the more'the United Nations is engaged
in the Congo the more the problems that will arise. I therefore feel that
every effort should be made to settle the question once and for all. That is
why, possibly, other meetings will be useful; every consultation and every
concrete effort should be made to solve the problem, as I see the Katanga question,
and the other problems vhich are at the moment facing the Congo Central
Government.
Mr. GARDINER; The position of. Kbngolo, in relation to the neutral zone,
IB this: Kongolo has never "been the neutral zone; and when we talK about
reoccupation of Kongolo, perhaps VG use terms vhich are not really appropriate.
xhe f^en^nrmeriG moved a few miles away, and camped in the "bush not too far frcm
Kbngolo; ond when the ANC troops got a ."bit tired of campaigning, they withdrew,
and the gendarmerie occupied Kbngolo. That explains, to a certain extent, the
events of 15 or 1.6 February; "but Kongolo.is in Q strategic position now, because
the A1IC troops are in Albertville and Kabalo and Nyunzu, and movements from
Kongolo can be a serious threat to thsm.
Then, in connexion with the Katanga Assembly, the Balubakat members cf the
Assembly withdrew .in I960; they have never participated in the deliberations of the
Assembly. At the request of the Central Government, and in agreement with the
people in Katanga, we are trying to make arrangements Tor the full Assembly to
neet again* We have had several discussions about the possibility of re-chuffling
the cabinet, of. forming a coalition government in.Katanga, so that the Balubakat
msmberc. nay be given peats in the Provincial Cabinet.
Mr. Sendwe is actively associated -with these developments, and he is else
a member of-the Central Government delegation which is, at the moment,
negotiating or having talks with Mr. Tshombe. .
The- Acting r CR TARY-OF.rrSPAT,; I would like to deal vltfc a few other
points raised by the Ambassador of Ghana:
His suggestion that the Congo Advisory Comnittee should meet more regularly
is a very sensible one, and, of course, because of the conditions prevailing in
the last two and a half months, we have not been able to convene any meetings; "but
in the future, I shall see that we meet more regularly — perhaps, if possible,
once a month, as suggested by the Ambassador of Ghana*
Regarding another point raided by the Ambassador, I believe it is .just a
thought, and not presented as a formal suggestion, that the United Nations should
consider withdrawing all the troops from the Congo and give way to the African
States to take the place of the United Nations troops in the Congo, by vay of
rendering help to the Central Government to achieve its political objectives.
In this regard, I just want to make a very brief observation: The Central
Government has never indicated its desire to request the United Nations to
MT/db 1+2
(The Acting. Secretary-General)
withdraw its forces from the Congo; and even in such an unlikely contingency, my
personal feeling is this: if the United ITatioris troops were to be vithdravn from
the Congo, it would create a state of chaos; and, of course, I am conscious of
the fact that several friendly African Governments would immediately go to the aid
of the Central Gove.vnra.entt At the came time, I think we should not lose sight of
the fact that Tchcmbe, also, will no doubt attempt to invite certain other
friendly forces to come to his aid; and I have no doubt that there would be a
repetition of another Korea, Of course, these things have to "be taken into
consideration, "but I om cure the Ambassador was just throwing out an idea, not
in the form of a definite proposal.
Regarding the laat point raised by the Ambassador, about my reference to
parliamentary interrogation, I just want to recall that, when Mr. Gizenga was
taken out of Stanleyville, the Central Government5 s position was that he had
cciEHitted certain breaches of the law in the context of Congolese law, and
must, therefore, be brought before the competent authorities to answer certain
charges. If this is still the intention of the Central Government, I propose
to take immediate steps to request the Central Government to submit Mr. Gii:enga
to parliamentary interrogation by whatever appropriate authority the Central
Government may have in mind; and then, if he is not proved guilty, he should be
released. My intention is that I will take the initiative in encouraging the
Central Government to implement this expressed desire on its own part.
Mr. JHA (India): Mr, Secretary-General, I would like to extend, first
of all, our very warm welcome to General Kebbede. 1 will "be very happy to see him
in over-all command of the United Nations forces in the Congo, a large part of
which is made up of contingents from India. I am cure he will receive, in the
field, nil the co-operation of our troops as, indeed, he will receive here from
our delegation sympathetic understanding of the difficulties with which he is
faced as well as deserved tribute for his achievements.
We are also very happy to see Mr» Gardiner here. I believe this is the first
meeting of the Advisory Committee he has attended as your Special Representative
in the Congo* Of course, we have known him before, and have come to admire his
qualities, and would like to extend to him our very best wishes for the difficult
assignment vith which you have entrusted him.
MP/db 43.115
(Mr. Jha, India)
We now meet after a good fev months during vhich much has happened. But,
fortunately, the period has not teen one of turmoil. The United Nations has not
"been involved in any warfare; and since ve are a body not fretting for war, that
is something for vhich to "be thankful. Negotiations have "been going on betveen
Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, These have had their ups and downs; and although,
for anyone not very closely in touch with the principal actors in these
negotiations, it is something of a mystery, it is good to see and hear from you
that the negotiations have not broken down and that there are prospects of
further talks. It is always good to have these talks going on; and as long as
they are-talking, I suppose they will not fight. I would, therefore, share your
hope, and even your optimism, that something might cone out of these -talks,
something agreeable to the Central Government, and agreeable, also, to the
Katanga Legislature, and that, thereby, the main problem standing in the way of
settlement of the Congolese question, will be solved.
TL/ek U6
(Mr, Jha, Bidla)
I said a moment ago that it is a good thing that these talks are going on,
and we have to be patient. But at the same time one must not permit oneself
to cast into oblivion the purposes of the United Nations in the Congo ac laid
down in the various resolutions of the Security Council. I have particularly in
mind the resolutions of 21 February and 2k November 196l, which not merely
authorize but call upon the Secretary-General to undertake certain tasks in the
Congo. We certainly cannot afford to lose sight of these resolutions. As a
matter of fact, speaking for niy own country, our contribution of a large
contingent of forces is in the context of the 21 February resolution, which has
been more or less supplemented by the 2k November resolution. I am sure too
that you, Mr, Secretary-General, and your officers are fully aware that whatever
the United IJations is doing in the Congo, is done under the umbrella of theoe
two resolutions. They are tfce very ralrjcn c1'Ct::3 of the United Nat iocs
in the Congo.
The talks "between Mr. Adoula and Tshonibe will probably go on for some time.
There is no harm in these talks being protracted, because sometimes by the cheer
process of attrition solutions are reached. But provided — and I would underline
that — provided that this period is not used by Mr, Tshombe to consolidate his
position and increase the number of mercenaries in Katanga, to further the
acquisition of arms and also to increase the unfortunate diplomatic support that
he has been receiving from certain powerful countries and certain bf his
neighbours. This is something that we can never afford to lose sight of. If
it vere a fact that the interval that has passed since the Adoula-Tshombe talks
were started has also seen a weakening of the forces of the mercenaries in
Katanga and a decrease or diBcontinuation of all acquisition of arms by Tshombe,
then we would be completely satisfied with the situation and there would be nothing
there to worry about. But there have been reports in the newspapers, and we have
also had reports from other sources, that possibly this interval is being used
by the Katanga authorities for augmenting their military strength and for forming
liaisons with the Portuguese in Angola and maybe with others in Couth Africa —
and of course Sir Roy Welensky Is always there. I do not know exactly what the
situation is. Perhaps you are in a better position to tell us exactly what is
the strength of all these liaisons which were established by Tshombe with these
TL/ek
various neighbouring territories . There have bo^n reports that the , mercenaries
Iv.va i;cc:i frtrei;;; cloned, trorc h.vo bcc;n reports of the _-,: coipt of aniic cy T^ivoor
of tho construe Uon cf airiiolch acrcna tho border :!n A^.oln, and FO forth. IT
ell that IG aotu'illy hnj rooin-, tb.-n I uu afraid vo hnvo coi^idin-able cau.:;o for
ar.rleiy. UG vculd very ir.uch 11.:;e I'd: -jcu, ,lr, Cccrc^ary-GGiicral, ii" possible,
t^ be ablo to ir.j'.'orm this C:\Er.1, lt;toG 0:1 throe r.r.t! . ic, zir.u r-crir-yo tho n^n:l-::r:; of
U:e Cec'.-rity Cov.ncil c.n veil, by circulating ncir- l;:Ir.d of pr^cr on this euI 'JCTl ,
It, lr» a J. -itter of jrreat Importance, l -^v^nce If th^r:r- rrrortc arc true, tl.on the
I n n h of tha United Nations is ay be vory :r.uch more dliTicu i t if and wiioii thccse t
break cic-,,n.
'Ihc other point vhich io Important in that It van t l^rs hope of tho United
I/rtionri, on the ^ui.'jtlon of tho ^ecnuiLy Council reiolw lonn , that Mr. Tr,hcmbe
^.v i.'LJ. not rocoiv'': the he] p of PC- •:.;.- re, ; roat and r?v :•.].!_, .1 r respect of tbn
Liivn-:/-: .- . in!; of his ullitary forces nr li?.r, i : .-!l l i :- y i -o t ( rrtinl. rjl: ,'•;!; j.n vhy In
i l . . ; i. " : . ' - , ' •vi ' ion., .1 of tVl o I ' i . ' i t c i . ]' i ?.ovin ;in r : ;hr-L o .i ..-, pl^.r. 1 on thrs r:.-^'''y of- ,:• v;; 3
\: ::it c.r. Liv.-it tjic.:o parh..i of t:io ... ,;u jln' •*oi;r<, of \ lie; ; .ocvjr . t . ly Counrtl havo l:^..c
i..;lly v .Of active. IT the pci/iu'.] of n f f ^ c b i c v ^ l r ' h . T -~ tu:.d i;n^otii,lior]3 r,r'- cert
iijovitahio if BCV.IG k'Jnrl of a;- 1:0 -i^ont Is to "bo r;.;:\cl:cd in the u.r.;:.o -- if thio
j , . : i i n d c •; aid be <.3::>ed for ino'l .aL ! ny, l^r. T^hoiuho i ; : v i ] c r :rro;ij the cupport that ho
I;.--- .; rocv ivod frc:i variour. coiurbvios for purpcnrn cor/crr iy to tho^,:; of the
I'nitGd i;..1. bionn, ...hvin v;j \;-oul.d I : \ Y G ^"lirerl uc ; : Udn(;;; bul. if on Liv; other bnncl
li..o -Vv. .£ . i . - jua conl,.ict.G and chMnnai!} of anractancG I 'LIVO bc:;n Gtr::nr;ihenc.t and If
o ;i lor. a I. Lo nuppc/t has bc.on ntron^thoncd^ t:,on of course ue vould Gcaln l^avo
cause for aiixiGt/,
Tn i;hifl cor:::.n:rion J nhonld inquire; vliat 'r,nppc>nod to tho various efforts that
the Unit.i-1 liatic ,£j i/cj i;:--.l:.ln^ w l i l i t;u Govcri:i:,f a IB cf ".irlouB countries :ir. re^-rd
to tho l : ivywn sv>i ,.ly of i : ' v . : , of t ; i r c , . ^ f L and o/ h.illtaiy a3tiictr.ncc to tha Ki.t^rif.i
ijovcx.i:f.:..il"., nad ,;i:ut tho cJtr.vJI'.vii 1- a I; rrc-1:." -,t.
' . ! ! • ' • • -3 nro n:--ti;or:3 ol coniiM-- . valil.e jn^ort ' : . . co. J:"k on thonn pointn wo can "be
G r , t j o i 5 . r - i , t]:-n I vouJ.d i . ny trr, L, i -.01 Jin l;.iicc .In tho c r f ^ i - t u to r-oicu a Vi.i.^otiatcd
i.-cAti -••ir- T.G liotucon Mr. /-.('r'-ul:'. and Mr. Trb^Ls j.s ccTic t i . l i .^ vlu.ch .U; quit;;
lci and tLcue ef fox to uhould be continued; but if on tho other hraid the
TL/ek
Interval Is .bein^ used for prnp.iri.ng Katanga, for putting it into a pociticn or
Creator potential drfl/ineo of the United hationn, then the vhole cituation ha;;
to bo carefully review..,!.
r.c\i} ore I'ir.al pot. .it, vith regard to Mr. Glzenf.T.. Rcferi-in^ to the id^a
that ycu have pui; for-wavd, Mr. nccretnry-General, I do Let l:<icw if it in desirable
on the ] art of Lhe 1-niU'd EalioniJ or your parr,, to nur'-y^t any kind of inter ro^alA
Lviueni ~!.y they are not prepared to Tr-riri-j Kr. Gizc::-;! Lc i ' o rG the nr.propirUTlo
autl^-oritiGG. ]v>;;cil:)ly thc:y lir.vo not u*ot onou li evident-:, or they nn.y conniuor
that it iG not politically viGo, thr.it it iiiirht cc.nrjc convxiloicnD or norao Giich
tiring. Mr. Gizercn, h;uj boon out of public life for a c cr,ci'lrirable time new.
Tiicro iG a ccrSn. lvi amount of concein J.n luany rciniorlco i.bout the vay in vbich he
in L-.-'i?^ dctaii:od tin f- ••••l--o but, [''^ ; inrCjCiirr^-<-3. to bo at liberty,, all of v~.yi.ch
ir> r.^'i; ,';c£Kithii,;~ 'wbi .ch rcdount':.; to Iho c.odit 01' t:io Co. itral Government. Ihia is
;:-nr. ilv:hv-- tliat ;anny of rn tocL. the c ppori/jr.lty cf irr.prcr;cin[i on Mr. Adoula vhoa
Iia \;: ;. Lore, a'' y^' ir inv.Ltalion ? a i ^ \ r L."nti..r; a (-vo.
Vculd it i:ot bo Lcllar to vcrk in the direction of persuading the Central.
Govorn: ont_, pe.:.'nuadin^ I lr . A-.lou.La, (j\if;t to lot jvh'. (J:i. onra 130, to Ic o hi..ii irir.
with the mainstream of life in the Congo, tcinc just IL!LO any otlier politician?
}v\rldoi)\;ly ho hnn loot Around. Ho ic no lonror in O r i n n t a i Province, and rn:;ny of
his Gupportcrc alao, 1 hear, did not quite approve or his coritinuod abnoncc i\-ora
the Government, end all tliat l:lnd of thine. Would jt n^t be better to persuade
them to let h:ua fp, ju;Jt xorp/:t about iiLn and let h:i.n, function ar> a deputy, aa a
ruomber of Parli.aii.Giit and an ordinary member of the poll Llcal party to which lie
bGloi-:fG? Thau mlc^t be a better vay. I chare the feeling of our colloacuc
from Ghana.
51
(Mr. Jhn, Irulla)
Of course, your idea is in the best interests of securing justice for
11:'. G i.:';' r.~a, but on the ether hand it nvi^ht, boomerang in sorsc vayc; it might
cuurc di; f icult.i ,2G of otlnr kir.-ls, GO why should tir: Uni.tcd Nations tak-3 upon
itself the adept jon of a particular procedure by tl:e Central Government? Would
it not Vc better, since they have not preferred any charges against them -- a£
a matter of fact he baa porliorrontary immunity -- to portniade them jur,t to let
him quietly mor^o himself with the people of the Conco and with the political
part ion there?
Thin is all that I wish to say. I would repeat tint we are most interestedin tho cuceeos of the Tshoribe~.Adoula talks. We- think that you, Mr. Secretary-General,
tool: the right .step, if I ray r;iy so, of afford inf: fir. IVhombe the f ull.es b
facilitnoG for t.'o;inC bade to TU-.'r/.absthville. '1'h.Lr- \.\-IG really in accordance wiht
the p"'OM.,c that hnd leen {riven to him by you ar;d by the United Nations • Vie ere
i.-.l;:r> ii L '. to iv.n.r that ha tv,:;.y b.-; coi/rin^ bcick, ii.at lie In lihaly t.:> cot^o back
i o I cop- Idvillc for tal:,u» 'j'!;.':; ci.tou.Ld ceitai;:]y bj cijcoura :;'!. L".& X voaM
£tt 11:2 ...:;. uo tin,, j, as T nr.id cLiMer., like to ctr.^rs t! > roae3city of cc/sijv;: >:hat
this interval in in no vjy uced Uy tl.jcc who uic o;.«]:ori "HwG of the United Il^c IOLUS
in the fonco and clccv/hLro end by Tcl:;o:.ibe for Ltrcnathcnlng thcmsclveo and for
strengthen ine tlic milit;:ry potential of Katanga und ito potential capacity for
defiance of the United Uutionc.
\nt''?1-nrL^i?n-^T^^r'ri'l^U/"1Ei: Jn vicu 01" thc f'^ortnesG of time at ourcbinpoonl oiid iu viov/ o.C Li...: i i r , t thj.L there aro t'i.o ir.o.-o cpcn.l;crc. on my diet,
tho rep"cs'?ntati,ve of I'Ivv--i iti end the ixprcsuv>.ativo oi' Cui^o (f e^polcv/illc),
I will iju,f;t dcaJ. very brieily i.uth ivo of tb.e y-jir.br, iai;,od by ^UTibaccador Jha.rii^: first point re."i:iLci: tu his query roc-.ia.in:, 'J';:};:;inbe 's reported attempts
to ctrr.vd:heu h.i.J3 positi ;u vii.h 1 ho old of fo:,, bn i'ov/.ir,1; or aulihoriliec. Of course,
Iron t''.i : to tJi .; uo 1 '-v •..• b^,cr; r L.\;i\in ; lnic:u'i..;io_o:i ib;\i, l i r » T;;ho!iiLe had attempted
tu JC;G;' o rnd h..d cccin-^L sub./L; tit.i;;.i help - .: ,ii L;_ c'.il.rMo, bvit 01 courcc,
r,,dci'oiJ^:ulab'ly, such pi'^'cn of iuro..: ;Ttioa WO-.L.: v,^/ J. i t ,'i.cult to confiri.i*
\.'i.cjicve^ v;o had LJUU.O ;:j^;'oi.:iat: nl (_". ornd;:. to c-.-^ifir.^ t)vi:j JnToiirritioa, thj
U i - i t L i l h - biono t,,ok npp, prJatc. ncti ,11 >;it;ii th : icicvoid, Govoi r.^ents or authoritioo,
;/'i in cJ I Ctisjc;;, if I j.-^y rn;/ DO, 1)::rc; authoritioa or Governments have been
ve.,y co -operative vith tiio United LT:itions»
DR/Gjt
ooord point, ahr.ut Mr. Gizcnrf;i, tho position is this. The
Central Government believes that Llr. Gir'.enra has c^-.itt.jd certain brcc.cheo
of law in terras of Con^olene l;;v. Oi.' course, on t h i s I nave nothing to
cay. It is not Tor ine to say whether the Central G-j7crir:iGnt in ri^ht or
All I w i G h to cay is that if the Central Governor..! ::;t i.ll i:;nintains that,
i;r.Gir/:::i;:;a has committed certain breaches or Con'.;o].i:;:o law, let him to
"before Lhc appropriate judicial authorities un-1 'b^. cuu.dtted to interrelation or
trial, whatever the c:inc hiay be. ir the Central Govurrji.-ont now reels that io
connot -:,VbGtanliate itfi charges, or that there is nc-t c n s f i c i e n t Around for the
Conti'al (Jovernn ?nt to believe tint Mr. Gir,cr;^:i iiac ccLJ i i . i tied cert a in breaches of
the lav, then bo should be ru leased. So on thin. I air. ' r r l i inr ; ii .mediate action "by way
of requoGtiii^ the Central Government to expedite the due proccco of lc.w.
Mr^nr r^Pn ' i /V (Nlccria): On behalf of ny del-cation I wich to
:::;;r-cd-r'-o i^/^ol , v L L l , thoLO who contra till :•••."! Cr.;if ::al K .;b,'do Cehro.. tilC i;OW
c;'ji^;;un'"" :;l" of the 01110 in the CQJI^O. I cliould alL>o lii'.e to cziprcca i:iy
ivat icfcct ion a1; ceoiris that tbe oPficerin charge of Oi;U(! is an African, that
tile Ccij.i.'andcr c,f CHUG is an African. It is really o i.. u t ter of Gaticfactlon Tor
all .ALr ica i iG "because the prolJeni in the Conco, in afldii/ion to its l-eii'i-;; political,
liiilitai^, and Diplomat ic,iu ul.,:-.o pGycholo^ical, cad it b'o3.pG to know that
Africans are dr:alin^ wi.th the i,. at tor . I om qviite sure t .hat thoy have the competence
and the psychological c. uility to do;::! "with the Con-;olcr,f: becaer.G Africans _,left
alono to thcmrnlves wiLl i r /ui t ar:y outside interference, can settle their problems
in a shorter period of t iuic .
l\,J time iii pressing I will be very brief, and would refer only to one or
two ti; atter :J.
Vlith regard to Mr, Tnhotiibe, I think that the difficulty which took place
in tin r, cose b^cauoe of ]dx r.;fusal to eor.ie to Leorv.->J;lvillc vac, from the
r.oginnirr,, ciuo to tliQ fact that he had bcevi arreeted in Cocpiilhatville ecmc
time o.:o. Jr.;) war> GO in t imida ted anil thus he .;ae a lways undei1 tho impreaGion that
if lie crane to f:cepoldvi lie coiiicthin,;; woi;ld hDL )I. ;Gn 'GO l ' i ' r i « into vac the cource
of all the trouble, and now the incident, which, tool: place at the air
on his way Lack to Katanga thio tiiuo couo to uo Africtuic an a matter of
DR/Gjt
disappointment because thin would, cause another now difficulty.- Ho arc!
his supporters m.'.fjlit u::e it 03 -Q prete;:t, cuyinrj that"!!1 Mr". Tnhcuibe refuses
to cor.e rack to Lfepoldvillc acrnin, here; is a cool CP.GG, he was detained at the •
airport". In any case, ho haa now nana^cd to'fro back to his country. I do
not know if there is uny ^irrranucG ho can "be civ"en ir he refuses to come, if the
Unite:! Notions can do nnythirrj to "brine him back.- G7 courae, I appreciate
vhcit the l.inited i.'ationc io doin:^ in the Con^o, particularly in Katanga, now, but
his detention at the airport is a very, very bad C::QJ-,: le,flho iiueotions we have to ask ou.:".;clves have oJ courno been -mentioned by
the Secretary-General. I.IT thcfic tulka between jVloula end Tshocitc break off,
vji.it will happen? The talks have broken off ard Vic. TLho:nbe rcfucen to come
•bccaucs ho vac i-.iticiidated and he will sa>, "llo, if I £;o uack to Leopoldvill9,
or if I ,vj to mcot the representative of the Central Government, perhaps
come tiling niiclit ijnprca to u\2, to my pcrDon"* Then ha ;.Mvl his supporters would
*:•'?.vo a v:::y >:o,l ca^e ard that uould lead me to one prch'Jem that wan raised
by the r1 preGent':.tive of Ghana when he GUQ^cctcd that African Covcrnmsntc niifjiit
replace OliUC in the Conco.
h'cre a^ain, one would ack the ejection! if African countries or other
countries go to the support of tha Central Governai^rt lu replacing OHUC, I- am
quite sure that fir. Tolioiubc also haa mr.uy fricndo vno \/ill come to hia -support.
As you yourself, Mr. Secretary- General, have pointed out, another Korea would
then be created. We know very wall that Mr. 1'choinoe in a very influential person.
lie 1mG his nupportcrs Uith inside of Africa and outsiue of Africa. if Africans
r;o to the Con^o they mucb GO to support the Central Government, "but not to replace
the ONUC. With due reupcct to my colleague frc;a Guana I think that it vould bo
a very difficult thing for African countries or other Governments to take
different sides.
Irruma , N1 ..yr la)
At the beginning of hio rpcerhj Mr, Gardiner mentioned one thing vbich vao
not quite clear to r.e. He caM that the Accc^ly in K"Ur;r(^a neither accepted
nor rejected the Klhonn ncTce'.i^nlG, Neverthelcso, i'r. Tr.hanbo camo to meet the
representative c.f the Central Government. I would I'Jko 1-lr. Gardiner to clarify
this pciiit Tor me, with regard to wiiat he really iue;;nt,
Ginoe the hour is very late, I chall not c;n £.ny further but will only
mention the qucrtion of Jir. Gizenca. The Acting Lcorotavy-Gencrnl has clearly
elated that he :LJ about to take r a initiative. It ic gratify inc to UG to hecr this.
V,rnat is Important, hcwcvcr, is that lir, Gizcn^n i.e. a political leader and a very
vcll-l:ncwn perociu la it wise merely to leave hli;. in a situation that ic fraught
with anxiety^ V;e do not know vhat in ' Qiu to happon to him. He is second to
Mr, Lurr.iu'.ba and everybody Imcnrs v.hat }iaj:'-pene;l to L.c0 Luim^uba* Now Mr, Gizcn^a ir>
allowed to remain in a very certain situation, l/o do noi, know vhother ho still enjoy
hi:i parl 'amentary iiiinumity and privilejrcc or vhethor he ;LG conc-idered en ordinary
i:/.icea. As Lar> been quito riretly pointed ou-^ ii1 ho j.i concicJcrcd nn ordinary
;.*. i lA^f 1; a ahou3 1 be breu^ht bcTere a ceuvt or p:.v-I:k.:'icnt, end tried. But to lr .ivc
him in c.n anxicty-ridOnn situation vould create ii.Illicu.lty and divide rr.nr,y Afrifiuns
in whose raindc^ of course^ he io a political leader,
Mr. NrPOVO (Conco (Loopcldville) ) (interpretation from French) : Having
heard the report of Mr. Crirdiucr a] id the ctateui-ntr, made oy the speakers wl:o
preceded m>>, 1 sliould like to u;nke a bi'icf ,0 totciiicat arid ank what the intentions
of the United Nations cue with renmxl to the Ka'car^a pruM.eiuo I irir/ist upon this
because the arinfjiiiervt of Katanra v/as Dccomplishcd in the presence of the United Hat ions.
and thus, the United Nations may be considered to be responsible for this state
of affair So
Ihe question of the entry of ormnments into Katan^/i in fundamental because it
is as a result ef reiuforein£ his inilitarj/ potential l.hnt Mr, Tshembe believes that
lie can defy the United Uations and the Republic of the ('cn o. If the United hatioriG
coiiGiderj that ILD mandate is to prevent civil wui , iL I'.n.yt suppress the caucec oi'
.'jiicn Q v.ir; the u.ain eciu;je of cucn a war i;j the ani.a:-:nt cf Katc.nga, which was quito
r.:ccs::iv-j. 'i'iie Uoveririr.r.-nt of ihe Cen^o cannot tr;i.ei:ite t)ie reariMai.-ient of Katan^a^
':hich placer, in jeciparOy the lives of the coldiera cf the United I fa ti one forceo,
as well «-3j 1hocc of thousrAiids r^f Console JG» Thic ic why wo asl: that the United
iiations take immediate ctepa in order to eliminate this potential for armed conflict,
AE/j m
- to the question ncorcs to me to be quite
cinple. I have been cerr;m.!;;GiGi;cd to fulfil tho ir:r nant^c for l«atan^a that vcre
given to UG by the Security Council. We htvc no intention other tiiun that.
Wiv.'h rotprd to the ji.inoruiti.Lii of nrino into I.oLr.:;^n> we have
been i;corchin3 for and trying to apprehend thoac people uho bring arms in and to
confiscate some of thece ari:i;j, I believe that the: Centr;:! Government it/relf would
be the i'iirst to acknowledge; what we. have clone in this rcr.pdet. We have, even
Duccec.u.vij to a certMin oxtcn'o(1 in prevcntir.^ t.he tronGi^i1 of arri1.:; frcm one part
oi1 Katr.;j;-a to another. HUG V£:c not a matter in which wo could of ford to be
.Icisurcv.y; it i:; a vary r^crioiia threat to uc^ to tho Con(:olen^ population ond to the
position of the Governmont. We welcarc the reco^nitica uf the importance of the
work that we ai e doin~ in thi;j field by tho Go7err:r;ient .
1 r-hall ncnr turn to the question rec^rdiii;- tho hatan^a Assembly which was
rniccd by the rcproncntativc of ili^eria, Althourh the A:.Gomb-ly ha;:; been mooting
ciiiCc .A; ;.not cf l.Gct ycr.i it hns not mot wit.ii all of Itr: member o jTeccnt.
/ jprr,:. ''}... ialy 'K1 p:r coht of the r.c:..bc ';;hip ir, rr.aao up oi' I>alvtba rc'prcccvilatives.
'.iho e pce^lc withdrew fi'cm the AcLcnoly in 1>;0, An at LL nipt lo now bein:' i.^nl-j to
IKIVC til-., -e Ealuban return to tho Frovijiennl AasorrbJ.y, no that there may be on
AjL^.nibly which will be truly rcpreccntative of the vholc of Katanga* This, io the
topic to v/hich 1 made reference in rny initial
^rjL-Il '-'•hJ' l (United Arab Republic): I rnnnot becin to put my question
without welccraii,(j both LTr, Gardiner and General Kc-budj Gcbrc to thic mcotine;.
Since I i.ust be oriel , 1 GhaLl cc.nrino myccli' to thcco words of welcome to them.
Wo have hoord that on b April., i'r. Aloula prcc.cntcd certain cc-nclunion^ i'rom
their 1 nl !:G to La', Tnhcnbo, 'a.' he word "concluGiona" C'-^vcys that these were
unucTGtccd to bo agreed upon. VJhat ic the natuj-e of -these cpnoluGions? I vronder
whether ill'. Gardiner would be gotd enouc.h to explain thc^e concluoionc to ust
_ i : Tliccc were draft conclucionn which were submitted b y
Mr. Adculn to Mr, ^i.-.huijibe i'cr hij cciuideraticri and we hope that 1'rcui thcivij if moot
of tho rrovirjioiLj are nc^ccd upon, iruy ccine the final conciuoions of the discuGcionc
that have thus lar been held.
AE/Jpci 50-60( l''r,
I ray add that v;e are not taking part in this dincunnion. This document
hoc been pocncd from one party to the other 0 - We, have no I received an ofiUcInl
t:\xt, sines uc nro not a pnrty to the diccucsion, J l cv /cv^r , the litfcle that vehavo ho'ird with regard to this document given uc. the iinpreccion that it is quite
consistent with the provisions of the 3. oi fund n merru \ 1 2 •
_Mr. ET.-7AYYAT (United Arab Republic): I wlch to thank Mr. Gardiner for
his explanation.
GRR/ek
l ^ lrT 'L (Ethiopia): First I vnnt you to allow r.e to welcome
our own General. I ,-.; i cuvo ;;,<ou. will a^ree that ills presence chovr, the extent
c,: our co';:.;aitcont to the United rations operation In the Coirjc. It vao riot very
cany to release the Cliisf of Staff, but we have don? it and we hope that ho will
bo r.ucccGCi'ul. I am euro you vill ac^ee with ino that ho will ncnd -tho cood vishos
of U3 al 1.
I s:n a little troubled by thin question of the detention of Mr. Oizencn.
I would have thought that the United Uationc was rurbidlen to interfere in the
internal affairs of the Congo, particularly in regard to personalities. Tr.era,
you ar. entitled.to give protection when they ai;k Tor it, but I doubt very rcuoh if
it in.within the power f'ivnn to you by. the various resolutions to aisk.for scr;ie .
]; r3cnr. to he j_ roGGcuted or rot procccuted. I u:r:l2rGland that it is pccsibl?- to
;r;v;ue v.l;at tecr.ut»e he 1u mch a prominent per,"on.uliby y^)U are entitled to uca your
;'j;od c"i ''icon, but ii' iliat irj tlic ca;-o r>y incliruj.l. bon quite froiilily ic to acl: in
a c-U*ii ;,htrorv:;rd miinncr thai llr* Gl^cn^a b3 ,.olr:nncd. In rebelling tint
conclusion I b;:.GG niycclf upon the following facti. ife has been in prljon :fo.i.v...
a Ion;'', >.:liue; no charges h;ive been brought against him; and to 1 :0 tho conclusion
is that he should bo raloaGed. If. however wo pro.^cc 1 the other way around, if
\,z QG!-: that lie be prococutcd, 1 ain afraid it ; ri^ht pub tno Ort-vmization ic a
difficult position. I certainly nhall not bo able to iinderiitand why llr. Gardiner
vill tabe the initiative and nay that llr. Giz^n^i nhoull bo prococated. rarh":po
that is juct a manner of spcakinc, but I would bo inclined to say that since no
charge: has bean raac'io a^uinut lain, ho should ba rolcrr.ad. That is my inclination.
Kn::t I have a munbor of queetlons about the eeriiriby of the troopr., about the
veaponn we havo heard are ccnin- in to rntanc;i and vhotner the question is coinc
to ba settled peacefully, bcvrcver, since iU in aate I am hoping that we shall
have another opportunity ao ;;con au p.ocr-ible to c° in bo thcce matters and I will
reserve niy questions for the next iucetin^.
The ^ctl.n/r r^^^^A^Y-n^F^AL: I just want to brinp; out my point of
view refm-dirc Mr. Gii.cjjua. lor llio record, I think I should inform the Comraittee
that ns early aa 17 Jar-utiry of thic year I addressed a communication to I-lr. Adoula.
I will read tho relevant text;
GRR/ck 62
(Tbn
"I express the laopo that all procedures errployed in dealing with
Hr. Gl-Ciija vill bo entirely :!n accordance vith l.ho lav of your land,
tl:at they will te coiJij:J;; tent vlth the uuo pio>?e:Cij of lav, and that hlo
rights undor the lav will be i'ully rccp^ctcd."1'iiis, of roure.o, Ims been incrrr:orat^d in my report to the Security Co^mcil,
document 3/5055/Add. l/Aiinox (^. In th^ aatter oi' Mr. Glzenr;: of courGe; I am
u^ing my coed orficcs. It is not rny intention to interfere in tin intornal
ra of a Bovcrei£n Governracnt; ar.d I om not tryinr, to pa^s any jucl .-.ment on
thn rijhtness or tho wron^ncns or the Central GrvGrnmcn^c attitude tcvards
Mr. Gi'.:r',r>.£a. All I am trying to do, and all I vill try to do, is just to
C^nerato the processes of the machinery of the law of the land "by offering my
good officoc.
I nn very Grateful to you for all your very useful and positive contributions
to the dali'uorcitionn today and. I can assure you once again that in future tho
CoiEialttee will meet more regularly.
The mentinn ror.n nt IPJ ptin.
V ,,v,p
COlPTDF.irTTAL ng ITo, 67ey Jur:^EKOLIGIl
UNITED HATT-ONr, ADVISORY COMMITTEEOil Tlffi COIIGO
Meeting at United Nations IToadquarters, Newon Friday, 29 June 1962, at 11 a.m.
Tn thn Chair: U TIIAITT
Canada
Ceylon
Tc aeration of Malaya
C ulnca
India.
JnJoncGia
Ireland
Liberia
i;.:.;li
Morocco
rUr^riaFaliic tan
The Acting SECRETARY-GEriERAL
I'v. BARTCH
1-ir. MALAT Af;EIvTJU
Ix. CEPRJ-EGZiT
l!r, ZAICARIA
l»r. AClilCAIi
Hr. JUA
Mr. WinJOPRAITOTO
1-ir. O'CULLIVAII
lli% JOIuIGO'J-
Mr. COULTBALY .
Kr. BLlJTIli-'A
Mr. A3IODU
Mi-. Muharjrad 2AFRULIA ICIIAN
Uiulan
United Arab Republic
Conco
Mr. ADEEL
Mrs. RC'JGEL
i:,i'. Taicb SLIM
Mr. UIAD
Mr.
62-114-370A
FGB/ub
in ordnr to
the n;jml-crs of the C c i P M L L t c e up to date en develop:on to in the Congo,,
v-.?.rticul,?r;Ly w i th record to t':o Adcula-Tshci;;!^ tal!:::3 :hi Lo-.vpoldvlLle, Since
t,h,.-' c':ll. for 11: LG LicetJ.)\3 un,r; iscuod these t aJkn , r.c you knew, or.do-1 early in
•l.-vj r/iv-(.".:\z of .~'u Jun-3 without e^r:!':. fnT.nt, thus ereH.tlnp; a ^.r/^ critical phase
:'ci the 'Jrlted i:-itirn3 operation In the Conri. 1'ou ^-11.1. have seen by new thet;.;b of Mr. Gardiner ra report on the Adcula~T:jhcir.l o tn. !!:R, vhich I have dictributcd
03 a C:cu.vity Council rlooiii'.cnt under the cyr.bt.l 3/i.'^;^/Aad'.10. Tlie annraed;
l;cvcvoi% vhich -".re voUu^in01112, • are ctill "bain,'; prcccrccd and have not yet been
circv..lir,cu. They vi].l '1 ^ cca^letcd ac follow a : the French text, tcmorrov
;]aturu.ay aorniciQj tho KnglLoli text vill "be reaJy en Tuc:.;dc?,y morning
tl'.c Ku3f.i.n,n text will to ready on TaoGday afternoon. lir. Rols-Bennett^ the
CliuG representative in j-Jli'/ii'^jthville, vho cat with I'r. Gardiner in the cecondphase or the trO!^, ina returned and I intend to oall upon him to pive you
firct n^i>i in.frr-i:r.tion cur pin: ntary to tin written rcpcrfc ufcout tl:c tc,'Iii:j.It in, I l i : ink, n Lit ci^riy to Qttc-r.pt t:o Th Vv/ r.v / concilucicua &a to the
cic"iiir:iiicc cf thj i'aliuic cT \'-?ic I,cr^:?TdvilJ«; 1 ,xi; '^ to ciri la C/Ti'£.ciijr;ut« '( icrG is
no invwicion for then to rosier-, but u.3 chall r^"-'^ for them to do GO. Tho
dccicivo qucati^n, of course, ^jill l-c whether llr. T3hc::.l'2 and his lieutenants
in Katc1:!^ will now undertake to resume thoir cecesnionLit efforts. They
ir^.y or i.l'uiy r:ay not. Aa ycu know, Mr. Tshrmhe, a'c I l i t o n x and en other occar,iona
Giucc ti'-'-n, has renounced i;ecc:G::;ion. But what ho viil actually do now remains
to "be S'.i'.n, particularly clrice &<:••:?.<* of hia collca^acc; -- r.ioct notc,bly
Mr* Kiraa — have inereuTl.nrLy evidenced a lr.v!: of cymra'thy with Mr* Tshcmhe's
rarticiyation In tho tallta end with the so-cnlled cc- i ic . i l ia tory Una he war,
puraulr.-r at Leopoldvillo. In-'Iced, there have been ii.d Lc.--,t/iona that cane efforts
vcre l f ; j n s exerted to undermine 1'r. Tchcmbe in Katanga during his absence in
Lecpoldville.
I Lil^ht add that virile ve vcre hoping th-it tho Loopoldvlllo talks rnlcht
end in t.^rccmcnu vo vcro always pi'erared lor thcjir l i l :^ ' j / failure, despite tiie
fact Lhat Mr. Cr:rdinc;r vau cxhi.bitin;- greut skill curl du ln^ everything h
possible to keep them goiiic and to achieve fruitful result3 for them.
FGB/ub 3-5
(Th-
I have cuccested to Mr. Gardiner that he should cnne bore for concultaticns
in the r.c::t feu dn.yc since I wr-ald \7inh to have t!:n V:or>cfit of hi.c anai'-ycic in
rivin;- thouQhl, to the iimrcdtale luturcj You may Lo cuic that our T.ou^le in
the C^.ro h^vc l)cen told to he very much on the alert for any contingency as
a ccnoe^aence of the breakdown of the talks.
(Th? Acting ncerntnry-Gen^
It Is quite possible that, in the light of d^vo.l < >pr;: :ntc in the few
I will, find it necessary to consult you rcrar:ltn[' the cource of action to
be tal-:o;i raid even, perhaps, to invite the Security Council to review the entire
Ccn£o cituatior. and to con cider the advisability of clurj Tying ond ctreiicthening
the ex.'. ?•!-,-; rig irar/iatos end providing certain new ooe:;, i.ou may be cure, of course,
that in the meantime we will ecLtinue the policy oi' extending oil possible
Go^istarr^e under Security Council rcnoluticncj to tl.e OoY^rnircnt in its efforts
to achieve unity and protect the territorial integrity cf the country*
In this respect, I may rcj.d to you the text of tUe inoccnc.G which waa sent
to Lco^oldvillc today in connexion with the occond Qmuvorcary of the independence
of the Congo which will bo celebrated tomorrow, t) nt ic, I'jaturclay, 30 June. The
text of r.v/ inesc-.i^G^ v/hich is of course cent to both President Kus&vubu and
Prime Minictcr .'vloula, roads as follows:
"To r resident ICa^avu'ou^ Prime Minister Aclcula and his Government end
all the po- -pie of the liopnblic of the Ccn-o, 1 cxte:id, on behalf of the
IV.. l.tcd llaticns^ vnvinaot iveelln^c and beet wic-heo en the cccaoion of the
iieivublicrs bee ond Lidcpcj' k:;ice Annivercr.ry.!1I nriy toka tiiis op;;oi tunity to o,i";oure ycu that the United Nation?.
holds Dtea'ifaGtly to its pusiticn in support of the unity arid territorial
jiitcfnrity of the Con^o an it wcs r.n the at:tair/.;onb of its indcpandoijco
two ycrirs r^o» TUo United Uationc therefore wishes to see success attend
the efforts of the Centrr.l Government to dv5cLrste nil dicuniby and to
re-catablljjh l.mi mil order thrcu^hout the land,
"it it; my most honest hcpc uiat, in the interest of the well-being
of the people and the coi-ntiy^ the reconciliation of all differences between
the Ccntra.1 (lovcrni.^nt and Katanga Province or uny other provinces will be
achieved without further report to force end without much more delay, that
thci'.o who would pursue divisive and ccceGGionirjt air- a will cce the folly
of their wi yu nnd will in- re a so tho co-operation, c\'C which tiicre liave been
recent iridleaticnn, town ids fin-.-ling ocreed solutions of difficulties.
"I would wish the Guvorrnnent of tiie lie{iib.l Lc to know that I em even
now giving thou;_art to furtiicr measures which ~ihe Un.itcd Hat- ions m:i['ht tcke
in D;jsictin,i thu Governir^nb in solidifying the; ccuniry, clroncthening the
administration and iuipr ovine the economic v;elJ.-bc;1ntr of all people. Please
bo <••.:.; sured that we in llic United Nations fully uiiderstand your problems and
oppi.uud and support your valiant efforts to encure a bright future for a
united Congo,"
AE/ch 7
(Tli'-i AoM.jv; Hr"-. rotary -0->n? ml )
Thnt in the text of my mocnoca. It vas sent this nomine; it ic to borelcn.:~d tomorrow morning.
I - .ay also infcT-n ^eu that sorr,? time a^o the Kntonr^se authorities informed
cur pcor.le in Llisalethvill .e of their intent ion to celebrate the co-called Katanr^se
1 lid.^roivJ. T^U or: 11 July and to brir. •;;; a thousand CM.- core Katcn^GGC ^cndriru.cn fro;;'.
pluooo o-otaido Zlicabothvillo to p a r t i c i p a t e j n l.^ per^ie on that date. Our people
b.v-'S tr1 : 'n a f i rmly negative position ac^inct b r in ; unr in any additional £erHnnr/:-rie
to Elir r ' tethvi"! lo for this or any otnor purf.ocG n » : d ; inrood, -we hnve infoiuod itio
Ka tnn^c rc nuthciltics ni1 our o t ion / ly negative view or cny no-called iadepoii:)Gnc("
aolGrr^l i .Gn at all by thorn. wo have r.lco cnllc :-ci tho ru^port of some Coverruacata
v?ith rrprooentc-t iveG in Elicobcthvillc to tiio C;C.Q:; c iTcct .
I tli ink it l i i i f - h t now ba advisable to cnll up^n Mr. Rolz-Bonnctt and, following
his Gtatcmcnt, to invite diL»cujL'ion about the situation in general.
1-ir. r^Lj-PFT^1;7.1?^1 (Former OWC reprcccntativo in Ellantotiiville) : It fri
n1.^ £Tcr- pleasure t;c LM here- v i t i i you thin ^orr; in : ; . I rhall try, to the n-axinufn
o;it^ .it pojGil ' l^ ^ to {3ive ^:cu ;;.;;, ,G deta i ls x-ui.ch r --y "bo \i;:ci;vl iu y> ' ) \ i r ^ : ^ ~ > l i i ^ rnd.
interpretation of the report of the OQlcer-in-Ch:!rc~', vhich ia contained in
docunont S/>0^;/Add, 10. 1 vich particularly to i . . fer t^- certain cvorita vhich
transpired in the eourne of the tvo periods oi1 tho air.ci.inaions 'bot^?,:-n Mr. Adoula
end Mr. Tnhcmbc. A3 ,>ou l-:.nov;; during the f i rc t p"\riol of the GO c l iLcucc ionr , , vhich
Ifictcd f rom 18 I larch tu 10 /-.pril, only the Central C o v c i n m o n L :mi K,"at anyone
dolcL;at j.otiG were preGont . Altl ioxich the Off icor- i i i -Chrn IQ of OulJO provided general
ricsistrn^e to laeao mcetincs, he was not present at, the talks Leco.uoe the partieshad c:LvroG3ed a deairc to conduct thceo diccus^io.iG Lctv-cen thcnv-elvon .
A ^reat pait of thic fir:;t period of the d i ccx ins Louu vac d.:voted to an
cxarai.natioa of the re:.:-i ac t ive yowjra of tho dele;.; hi ion r, in order to determine
i,i!.oblier, in fac t , both the Kr- t .n i^ere delegation n i u i tuo delc^Cii.i.on of the Coatral
Govoinrront woic empoT>,:ei\,d to jnake f i r m cor.uni ti,.cnr:: vaich, in turn , could be
iii.plc.n.cnted without refoience to cny other auuioi i ty . 'ihe' applicability of the
] . r - \ f Y ' n d r ' i . - i e n t C ' '1 •/ to Iv/ ' t ; lai^a \ ic^ the other c.aLn euU.ojt . It vac at the end of thic
J. ir;;t i L r i o d 01 the tal l-o tluit a «.locur.ent w..ii: nr. i . r . j t..i,ed by Mr. Atloula to
l\r. Tc.Tii.be. Q a i : j dociuaent van entiticd Draft Ccuc.- !u:riona of the Lobpoldvillc
Talks end contr ined the {.anide lines of a posciblc bricl^in:.: of tlie dlfferoncoa
hctv.'oen the tv<\- parties and an enumeration of certain U< iiatitutional propocala for
i i t e d iGtr ibu t iun of povcro between tiie Central and the Provincial Governments of
tuC COiv O.
MNIfr; j|.!t!
AE/ch 0.10
(nr.joiT rcr u)
I believe that e Krief rzziwl end e, mention of tli3 points contained in this
droft rr:i.<rht be useful to you c-ccuso thoir diecucnioa hr.3 contributed to & cortnin
clarification oi' Uic na.in iuzu'Jo ci. ccatcnt i.cu {sid Uru,, in U:rn; r.ii^ht lead --
if tivo intentions of the Kctorv.cse le^aciG of necking ru agreement crcj ncnuine •-
ihis mi/iit cont.ribatG, I repeat, to finding; r.ol.ut Lc^na to theno differences. The
('lr'CVu]i.:fn-c. conti:inlii5 the di^L't conclar: !.ono -which V-TJ r, nl mi t tod ty Mr. Acioula to
Mr, Ti-lionibe on j.6 Airil included the following meiu puiuts. In the fiiT.t pJ^ce,
a reutr.t.crr.ent of the pilnci.ple of unity and indivisibility of the Republic of
the Ccr. j vithin it& bc-undtu'.Lcs nc 01 ;O Juno l^^O cn-1, at tho came tir;-; a
recognition thr.t unity did not signify that particular conditions prevailing in
the various regions of the count,iy clnuld be ignored.
In the GGt-nnd place, the document mentioned that the Central Government would
under toko to cui^niit to the Lc^Lnl.ative ChamberG, vithin tvo months, a draft of a
i'cdejT.l coiiBtil.ution for Hie C-H^J.In tbe thi.rd place, the dcv'uuiont rrsntioned a dlvicion of povors to be
inoluo ;d in the, couclltuticri, that is to say, a cilviciou of povcro between the
C' ntrr.l Govcrz;' -jnt and llio proviricinl authorities rf the various provinces of
vhat vould beccma the Federal Republic of the
TL/kb 11
It ".-jns proposed thnt the Central authorities -would have arrorig their pavers
those relating to fcrei-u f . f fa in j j armed. forces and c^" iiineric, external and
internal security of tho Gtatc, .Lir-ir/i^ration and enL^r ' i t ion, monetary matters,
tho -r\r;c: ::>1 and rviGtcr.iG f:yat-;;:i^ the [>_ncral economic [o i . I .%y of tnc country,
ooi^uj i ie .tionc Mid sources of morcy o.r national i n t e - r e f j ' u j higher education,
pucts ; j)a cumriunicationc, as well au bror.! clear; tiDr;.
On the oth-r hand, tho p JVCTG i-cco^uized Lo the Provinces vould include the
or^an.i.2.:.tj.on of provincial legislative and executive cr^.^na, the provincial police;
thj o^'c^^isation of provincial services and ad::;ini3tr::tivc cub-division.':,
c rn ica t ion (with the exception of higher cducp.uion), th- 'ranting of agricultural and
mining L-oncccoinns, ana i,hc Rciiiinati^n of pc rm/ r ih r l fez* the provincial Gcrviccs.
Thri provincial J..-OWCI'LJ — a, id this IG irriport-uiL, -- v;ould be -cafr-^uarded ly a
riaiiGo rpcci fy i i .^ that Miy law oiac i id ing the ul ; t r iuuLlou of compctcnccj could not
become • lYcctivc except with the agreement of all .L'TOV. i.ncial Aj::. ..u^iicj .
Another point ineluucd in the docuaeut was thud ti.c aiined i'o'^ccs would be
placed v-vler t h i » control oi1 ti;e Cential C .•vcri.Mc at . Ti . ib tliece nr;:ied fore;.- ,3 vould
r. ' j ' l ; be ... 'dliori?. d to incorvcu.. ir* piovinciaJL c.tTairc or la the u^lriter 'Aa^c ol
pu'nlic order crrepb in t-iie fo.l. loving ccv.es: flrr/l, oa t!iO requcGt of the
pruvincJr'l authari tic:.;; uccondiy , if the provincial ^ovcirunerita proved to be
unable to fulfil their obligations to naintain public orcicr, and this only after
ncn-coiTK linnce cf the provincial authorities with a rciju-:^t by the Ccntr::.l
GovcrrJiicnt to nu-ct their oblif^tions and r.ftor a ctatcux.ht by the Council of
Minintcr j dcclar i i in ; a ^,tate 01' cj.icrQcn-;:y in tlic region or province; &nd finally,
if there VLLS rclusal by the provincial authorities to execute a decision of tho
Court oT ConstiiulJon-'l l ty, a decic.ion which would c l ea r ly e:;tab.lir,h a violation
of the Constitution by the provincial authorities. : ' : i f e ; nardu were also
jnc lu - i c i ' ccnccn-in;^ the riplrt of the Central Uovernr~nt to ta^e mcacurcs towardc
tiie execution cV law:; ar, I ordl i i i inccj in the p . -o> r Jn :c . / . « 'the Central Government,
1ne docv.iiCnt conti. j iuod, would tc empower0 '! to cch" f e cei inln of its
..••'ijjinJ ^"'•i.'.ntive junctions 1o the provincial (_uvcri"i i . .Jivl .-r>. -W'i t l i in the
fi-ai;iv:.\:oi U of tlu. lauj au-i intx.vn .tioaal agrees-! :uts t i i^nrd by the Central Government,
the provincial auol -or i taoG would have chc ri^ho to c,1 . . l L ; e the cervices of loioLcn
technicians whoi.i they iiiicht require, .Finally, the 1'v,;/; ueiininn; tLe TeG[-.ective
i'ia'inciol doinoJLs of the utate and the provinces, and the: organization oi' the
Court of Constitutionality, would be adopted, it was proposed, at the same time os
tiie Constitution..
(Mr. r!ol.7.-Bfmnqtt)
These'vere the General features of the document. r,ut at the end were also
incln-Jed a number of iLcaGures 'which v?ould have to be taken iranedlately, and
tliCcc : ;oo.i:v,i'C j were the follow in?.:;
The first wns that revenue obtained from the exploration and exploitation
of underground resources as veil UG from agricultural or mining conco-jclone; in
any prov ince \.7ould be divided as followo; 7U Pc*' eent for the Central Government
and 30 per cent for the interested province.
The next j immediate measure vould be to r'-cognize that the Loi fondprr^ntrVl^
•would be applied to the vliole of the Con GO; nlco, tir.it 'the so-called Ij.canccce
Constii.r.tion of 5 August ll'':'-0 \;uuld "be vithdravn. Tho jjrovincial govurnr.crib
vould also nbctain from e::crc:i:3inG; powers reserved, to tuc Central Government
by the 1 n.i f n n - : ' " [ i rn f ;0.r^ in ]:ai biculur thoce rcfc rr:i.nf3 to the aiTned forego £ rid
j j ^ n d a i i V i r r i e . Luwev«.a^ the Kotan{7ece cendarnicriC; th" ciacuLaent ccncinucd, having
cliriii^iied all foreign elcmcnta, v;ould l.e ni.-iint:rjncd in its .present orc"nlzi.;tion
•and -vorld be placed under the control of the Central Guvcrrar.euv. It waa aloo
f,ur^-: : r . i . -?d that OluIC fcioes rhould. be authorized to be c.ationed in Kolwoai,
JadvjLvJ. l le and Lipushi, The K.atan;je:-e money would bo v;it};i.li-own and rt-^/1 c.oed
by the national money. Personnel of the kurettj, innicratioii^ taxes, cuoterns
end telecomrnumcation serviceG would be placed under the authority of the
Central ISovernr.avt. a incuber of the Central G'ovcirniiieut designated in
concuLtation with the provincial government v;ouia reGJ.de in Llicabethvllle and
c;:ercir ^ in Katanga the poweru ret»crvcd to the Central Uovernmcnt "by tnc
Lnj i'oi • ' iJjHiont-"i q .
l!iit;il cuch time 03 the lr,v defining the respective financial
competences between tho Central Goveriuacmt and tlic provincial authorities was
pncucd l^y larl;].ajnent, the Central Government vas pr-.:pr:rod to Gi^n a
provisional arrcin^arnonD and to convcrvj, vithln a f . : : i i ' 'd of one i.ionth, a
conference of I i-ovinciul Pretjidenttj \;ith a vit.w of tjctc.rrai.nin3 on equitable
dlctribution QJ" public revcauo between the Ltrrte and the1 provinces.
!fwo furthv:i- point r, coiit'iincsl in the docunic-nt vw>:: tliat, cubject to the :
faithfu'l. application of the i-iuvcmf^t by Lhc i'jitnn:;:,f;e authorities, tlie
Central Goverriii-iit -,/oulrl rcccind. tlie state of e^^.ney in Katr.nca, and that the
boundaries of Katanga Province-would be respected unless .thq.K&tangese
I'rovincial Assembly agreed'to a change by a two-thirds majority.
TL/kb 15-15
This documr-nt wns submitted to Mr. Tshombe a few U.T/S before his departure
for E.linacethvi Lie, and whon lu'^otiritiono berpn a.^ain fur the jvourpticn of the
tDi . - r . -3 the Off ice ; , in Charge of o i ; i JO vmt to El inrb : I hvil j.c to explore vith the
KaLai ' ^c jo authorities; their ro':ct:ioru; to the dje'urent w h i c h Mr. Adoula h-ul
present.'. d to til m. "'./e }nd a ccrion of diccunclon.-; v.i.th tlie K/itan;j;e:;c outhoritiec
in rAic :bothvil.i .o, and at the t .rni of thc;:-e dic^ir^j io^.C' a, id -p r io r to Mr. TciiCifibe' S
return to LeopoLilville tae I .^ t rn- ' je^c cv.binittcd a ( : c c u ; a c n u containing their
couritcr-proposG I ;j, a docuir^nt -which they imde avail-itlo v.o the Ofricer in Chv-r^Q
on 5 May. I vi.L.1 qu ick ly [;o over the roints contoin .d in the counter-proposals,,
because by cont/asti.ii^ them vlth vh;,t i h:,vc r.vui ;r,-.ir is- cd 'rein the Central
Government' G dc- 'UMcrrl , tn^ dlf torcn ' jcc vill clourly cinpear .
In the fi.r::.t olLce, the IC' i lDr-GOse counter-prc,;:oL,M ir; cnviGnged that there
should be a tr-:;:ir3.iticnal pcrio-l. umain^ froi:i the c].,. _:uir ' of the agreement, to the
< j ' i t o of the adoption ana application of the ncv; fc V.rral eonatitution, nr.a a
fj.no .1 pci. iod wh ich vould cci^ui^nco 'with the opp Lie;: t.i on of the ncv/ ccnatitution*
Thv.: doci^icnt ROCJ:; on to enuinorfito r;one of Lir:; fcaLu.- .xjK i;hich the
new constitution, should contain. /uir.'-nc t-hcm \/cro the f <.> ij.owin^;
The; Republic of the Con.^o would be errani::ed w> a t\. dcrrl ctate. The
organ;.} of the federation would be a prccidcnt, a fe icr r . i l . asjcuibly and a federal
(TOVCrnrr.cnt. Tho states rncmberc of the federation would, bo ecua.l.ly represented
in the icderal ^overnaient. Tne federal Gcscmbly vouid bt: conrpoccci of en cciual
nuir.bor of deputies elecrlcd fron each state?. Tho pr-r. 'nidc'it of tho federation
would coii-mand the arn^y^ but c:,eh ctate would have its own endarrnerie . The
budget of the federation would be fixed by the federal assembly. Each state
would contribute an eq.ua! percentage of its own revenues to the federal budget.
Ill
16
( I 'r • .flols-Bc nn?.t> t )
'the fcflerul oubjectn or powers would Tic the following: clr'.plcraatlc
roprcsc ntation, it boiii-' uncle rnt.ood ihat each Ctnta voui.cl be entitled to hove
it. i ova rcpreri'.ntaticn abroad of ur econcir> l.c na ture ; th-; national arr:'/;
liovcv.::r, tin PJ evident of cL?h Gtn.ie would "be ; :o_ , ] . ; r e t.ie niche Gt authority
of the national army contingent stationed in hi:: terr i tory] the exlerrip.l
; j f :ou r l ty of tlu.; Republic; the ^.o-o^dination o" the economic cind social
roli;?y of t.he i ^ t K t c u ; 1:0:3 tr.l so iv icen nnd cc i rmunL^a t iu i i ^ ; I cnLGla t ion on
:i-.i.'::.on:i'L: eniif^r '- . t iun c,a.i Ij'wnic.rc.Uion; cuclon^ c ^ r v i c / G c;r-!ceruln(j import n;
n o t i f y ruil cxcivn^o ]ioliuy ^3 of Uu: rr.omoiit vhi"n a co-oi-i inatca economic policy
v;ould }-\L±VQ por.Mi'.tcd the icunif ic'i'..i en of th j ir.oi.ey cy.v.o;;; vithout clangor
to the i conoiuy of the i'..ilcrat.U)n anU cf rhc ino-Lbcr static; tije f i n n n c c L i of the
f cdcra-'lon, cub j cot to Lin.! ro':c3'1G reserved to the: P T I O V J . . I . C C G in this field.
'.ih'_i:i tlie noc'uraent continued to caiueratc ccr t^ .Jn uub. jocts i/n.Lch
vould :::: oo i i c iU: r^ i i fc pox. oi3 of llic i'odc^T.l n t . - l cLi. .cci evil, ioritico. '.flicks)
•\,'oro t 10 following: i/ublle voriiG of liatioiirj. . in i .o rc^u; hi; h^r ecinoation;judiGi;.! organization Mxl proccuurc^ inron^ntioii ; h - \L i l c Ic ;:! Lilation concerning
oourcc.j of cncr,'"/ and ruincj; u l r , c..a iind Qilira- lacunc of 1 rancportaticn of
nation;.'l intoT'':-:it, n:.\d l.c/'.iclation concerning th(? r-jral police.
j •;L::is'lati( n relating to Ihc Cibovc-incrationed matters could be enacted only
i-rLtli the n^rcc-ii'iont of tiic- interoGt*. cl. _ states.
/i;.:on^; the JVOVGI^J rocervo'l to the eta Leo of tho • rodoration vould be
the following: tiie police oi.cl (juntUaT-ierica .of the eta L O G ; cut/tcii'S cervices
in r^: .;,rd to export i h i U r n ; i".Lrcnl Ic^iclaticn, i xccnt in nab tors rcueivvc:d
to the xcdcral uul.hori i, i.cr. j. Jn tv . r j i n l ncc.urily of the states; liioucy ar.vl exchange
policy up to the time v'.icn tho i . ioiiulnry cyitcn vrould be unified; education,
vith t lK; cxcepiion or h igher cd ieahi.cn; the c:L)po1nl'.".:pnL of ur^iGtratca;
brcadci-atin^;; luinin^ and aci-lcultui-al concec^icno ard, iji fronoral, all other
eoiupct . . . IICOG not exjjrec>.;ly rcrcrvcd to tho i'c;lcral cui'hur-itic:1.,
The- docuu; lib contiriuod to cxpi 'C^o that the lrc;ji loot of each state would be
the femoral a\\- liority \n1!r'n IViat rrt.ato. Tlic of./iclr.ij of the federal services
•would depend auinlriistratlvcly on the authority of the President of each state
in which they would exercise their functions; the latter would be under
17
obligation to report to the federal government on this cubject* Tartoo, duties
and fill ether revenue would bo established and col lec ted by each ctite. Ihc
federal author! ciee vould "be entitled to e-GtaVilch rcileral ta::c3 vliicii should
net exceed a cert: a in percentage of the ta:-:eo es tabl ished for CXjJGrtC, Imports,
or the c:;ploltai I.on of mineral n and forests. Fc>JVr:,l ta::ec vculd to collected
by each state u:;d vould V-c dcr.ocitod by them w.'.tli tlio lo.icrcil authority. Tlic
Tefleral authorities vcul-,1 require the a rr ccir.cn I, of eaca irtata in order to
cl-lain credits vhich VwULd be choree d e.-ainst the :L-^>:rai "budget. It vac also
ct.al.cd that tvo cr rvjrc c tn tcG ve-uld iiuve the r:'-:iit to join in order to
obtain credits \.iieh they vould rci-ay Trcm their cT/n resourcco.
The federal conrt . Ltuticn r-nprovod by the C'hatLber.:.^ the document ^cnt inueo,
voi;ld be Guhnii tied to a referendum of all Ccrgolc::''.- people and approved by
each of the s tates Kembca j, of the federation. If the ooLDtituticn vac rejected
J n the rcfcrcnduin, the text would be submitted o^ain to the Chcjnbors for
eonGidcration.
ri.irjii.3 tlic transition period, the relations between the Central nrvl
KatanyeL .. Gcvcrnsicnto vculd be l.!n:i.tod to a nu;: her cf oubjectc viiicli verc
•ihen indicated; for exor^ple, an e-xclian^c of ir:.uufacturc:d coeds end a^ricaltural
products. Such cojijnereial exciian^c-G v.-^uld be P^M.V r:ned \. :-, r 'bilateral cotupenaalory
cperationo of a .nonetary charge i e r . ' j lr j co-called V " > l o _ I; it'ponnlr: (the railvay
over 1hc hubiluGii Rivor, contl .nr . j j to Tort PrJircqui in. L i'ro:n there by
river to Matadi) , voul.l be re-eol.ablich :d for transport to and
from Katanga, and Kutan^a vould undertake to tran^p^rt the majority of the
products, as vo].l 03 J J I O J L ci' itr, iinporto couLufj; f i e n the /Vtlanbic Occau
:-.y HUG Vr . i . e ^Ta_t. inpn_ln, Tl io export uutiea would coatiiViio to be collected by
h'atarryi iihtil a ..aticractory arraij^c";ont van reached ^n political matters vrith
•.,ho adoption of a const i tut ion, and i v . LI the rucpi..etivc financial domains of
.;he Centi-al Gove,rn3f:ent and Latar;^, \,\/al i be ^.atahj.i. j l ied Ilatan^a vould contribute
i;o the Central Govcmiuoni, a cerLai .n i.e rce. ibc ( \e of eu- jLoms duties as well as of
other revenue deriving from miner u.1 and foi 'usLry exploitation.
MW/ch 10-20
It vng alco curr^eo to a that the ministries of foreign affairs, finance
national defence of tho Central (lovciur^nt should lo OGr:u>ned to representatives
of Kati.;nr.a; that a coj-:nU,lce of Chief c of ritaff chc-.ild be ectabllshod, vith
rcpioGcntativoG of the ;j;c, OlftjC and tho Ketaar;r:, ,'c:i.''.ar: i-.Lv7, IV/r the purpoce of
verifying the imi ort of Lr.ms end L.IG retreat o'.' the- /lij i'rom tiie areas which it
occupies at precc'iit in Katanga.
Concerning .i.Orei n teclraiclnns, it \;a3 pro)-o.r.ed that Guah. technicianc QG may
be needed for the- efficient functioning of the j.-.a; iinictrative scrviccc of Katanga
vculd bo freely recruited by tho Matt ri^a ruthoril ice. rj jo Govornmeat of Katanga
'would coiiMunicate to tho Central Goverr^snt tii2 naj,.2G or occhnicians so
rcoruiced. The ctructuro of tho r.o-cMllod Katan^or.-^ ctato aG it exictc at present
',Tould l)(j ;n?-intaii.ici.l_, as veil as its personnel. Tho borders of Katan^r., as uho^
".T3ro f i:\od oft 3d June 1.9 0, vould not be modified nxocpl, with the a j re or. out cf
tho Kaooip^ese Aor,cn;bly by a tv.o- thirds majority vote; end f. onera'l. political
amnesty vould bo enacbed and nil jiolitical prisoners llr.oratcd i^niodLo.toiy.
Ttro KatanQCi-'O comitGrpropo.-.aln /ere presented to the Central Go vein;. -.oat,
vhich did not find tlnm a Guitabl,? br.ais for disounr.uonv Ar, the talks rosuned in
Lcopoldv ille; tlio deloj^ationt? of tho Central Coven-ir , Jt;t and of tho province of
Katauc'i n^reod on 25 May to UGG as a basis for discusaion a working document
prepared by OHUC.
jvm 21
Tha uorkinc docuir.c-nt contained the following rr.nin llnoc: rrrccmont on a
docv;r.ent v:bich would in e f fec t put ;.\n end to tlr.: I'. L.:vr" :.::>_ oececiiieii; urjd
'.: Gtiibli r.hr.ent of r.nchinory to .i<r:jle:..r>nt -- with Hi: lzz.i:t po::ciblo colcy but,
;.t the or:.:? time, vrith the lenet pccciblo diGnrnticn ^-T cervices end
insti tutlonG -- the inte(- ..... -ation of Kc4:anca into tlie i;c_ rn^bJ.ic of the Con^o in
the liiilitf^ry, mor.jtary, fiscc.1, cconcrLc cjid oth -r ricl^ij .
Tho pi'OviGif iiol f.;p^n;ln T.ropci cl f.vi- this nocjr,.-! r.^unu of tulhc contained
in t'r.e f i ro t plGc;j the d.L:;cuoOicn of v;]mt wuuld be ct^'',,^'. tlic flnnl conuu unique --
"l int ic, til? b n c l c doci:;:;cht of roco;iciliat'Scii, on tli ? b n o i n of which the
rr icl i inory l;o ef li" ct the i;itc^r:vtic-n V/OLU d be ecn.nbii ched. However ; nftr-r a
lone ciiccu.iGion, the ortlcr of tho nr f-v id:i UD:J ci i r jn; ;c ' l , and it vns decided, that
i he fircL it/jni cl'.ou.ld be nn cx-er i.nv.ii"- Lori of tl'ie r;:ur,:!ulc3 of the con^nic'r-ienr- to
ron.-,trUitc tlic Ki elrincry for iu,plcu;'.ntation, r.rui thnt ot the end of the ' tr.lks
1ho delci itiono i, ..uld cure back to the finnl ccj;.rrii.;:Piqi.io, uraftinc it in the
] iijht (Ji1 i ' lair x;;- "vioiio n^rccnr-ncn.
T. ;O I iliLC G! ...:;i"i:ocj in nn aiTuG:.;r>horo of a cortnln fcrrrnlity, and ptirhoT>r. of
tcijcic-ji -• Ijecau::: j, CUTJ--;.; oltu-r K.a, .,>.;, u nvv..^r r ci' p,. e |. i ^ f .navy r.'.r.tt/'iro L?.d
•' o l:-o di; nosed ui : foi: e::r;,.^lo_, the c.L. i-if ientlc n e, ,"• a c. ,A LCi ' . eub u^lcli
';r. Tcl j^i- . . i ;s j liad n,ad e lici'c/re Icr.vi.ii^ liliGnbctHville i-.:vi in v;hich ho n.ado a nirnber
ef ocoucni: Ions afijnct tlr:: Coni r;:l Gcv.:iTj^:::nt, ond f J ,:o Lhe qujcbicn of ^cc^rity
.or the r. embers cf the IUiunuj ; ;oL: .3 del-,;, Lion, r.nJ. cf iLeir freed:"] cf iiiovc::,'jnb.
'./.hose qiicci-ions Led to bo ::o tiled before tlic tr. 'ks on :;i:,')Glunce could b G £ - l n ,
• • nd, P.;: I have suid, thiu d iycueGion contrJbutLd to L certain at r;;o sphere olv
i'orunlity and tension ^t th.o sir .rt of ths tnlkc.
Ilovevor, ai'l^jr a cerl-ain tiiv.e liad jacced, and notwithstanding occacional
flare-ups, the atrnofiplicrc of the tolKi; ir.proved and indeed there were meetings
at which Q relaxed familiarity prevailed.
Jvin 22
(Mr.
I nhould also mnke It quite deer thnt the tnlkr, took plnce in an atmosphereof ccrnr. ..etc freedom. There is no truth whatsoever to c,ny r>uc(~ectionn that either
dele^a^ion was not conrai.otely tree to exprecc its vlcwc; and to Give or rcfuce
orrocr.cat, Thia absolute freedom vac maintained even during the rcoGt tcnco
moments of the talkc.
The delecnvicns of the Central Government and Katanga were composed of five
iraniborc each, 'rh^ roprocGntativc^ c-j: t;:o Control Covcr:],:ont vrcrn: Priro Minis tor
jMonln, Vic3-Fr.jGideut Gondue, and Ministers BoL.boho, i;'i:;:jitatu raid Ilco. :_rho
Katonr^co delegation v'au ccriponcd of; 1'r. Tcli.;n.jc; Mr. jobwc-j hie lllnlcter of
Finonco; f-'j.-. Klhcn^a, h.Lc MiivL:;tor o::1 Public V.'ui'k.i; and liners. Kairbolo find
Ki ' ih iba j v;ho nrj I .a tunf>3c Mcrboru? j-::irticipntin^ In tho -IclibcrntionG of the
UcnGolcr/.j Parli i^ont nirl. who h:<vo been in fact living for a munber of monthc
no'/ -- ", Lnec tl.i;: "toQinninc of j'rnriary --. in Lonpoidvillc .
/\fi:or Ion,-, draTjn-cu« dincunsions, during i;hich f.tt^ntion vac pnicl to every
vjcrd, t ;re mondal;:-1 of the mlli tnry coj'TiiGGicn vac c-j^'rovc J. After that , f i i i cvon
l>:iV;jr -i . i .ccuG3i'ra enrved connejiiin:^ the raonotc-ry c:c.:;:;:i.!:icion. Having failed to
i\\- : h r _ro ."?,;.. "int. en t;:.o i.^iLlaLe <.;f th-^ inf^ctory cor: , !.: .;I.^a; the r;;rr; Lln;3 too1;: up
r.rndat-. of the I'icccl cad ccoucinic eorr/iujion, on .: cltji- it, tlu L'^r/Irtc o.C
1 he trar.nport and cor/.Riurjicr/bicn eon.;.. L^L ion . Py ts;e loiter prrt of June tlio
r::':nrlat'.or; of all Uie cur.i ' i ilGJiion:3 lied been approved, inclii'ling the uionctcry
coiLV.ii.GC ion, and rai effoi-t vaG nnde di;rin^ the lont i..c.cuingG to rcFich G^rcement
on the final c era; rani quc . • You linvo of course beeu iuforiLQd that it was not
poGG.ilile to recoh Gueh ocrccrneat .
i:'i am repcr to which I am Gure you have all seen ; it has been ledrned that
nfter hiu return to EltcabetlwQlG la:b. Tchoiubc r,;arlo certain • ctr.tomcnt::,
jiicludia.^ one to t)ie eil'cct that he did nob consider tin it the talks had been
brckon off and that ho \.cai earaetin^ them to reciu^c. Whether they do in fact
reGUu.e only the i'uturc will tell.
irt".::;;:j:j ,;j-:n(nJ)fMW»[r-
EC/en 23-25
Mr* I'0-1'7*-!'
Thcr.e vcrc soraa of the aspects of the Gitur/fcion vhlch. I thought it would
be uneL\;.L Tor \ ,?u; Mr« Gecretaiy~Gcnoral ; and for the i: .colors of this Corri'ii
to ki.cv;, If llicrc are any point:; on vhich further claiirication is decircd,
I am of course entirely at the Ccipju:l.ttc:c ' s dic,pr,c':il.
Mr. r^ARTOi''! (Canada): I nin not finite clear about these coiranlsBtons
that hc.ve now 1- ••cri appiovod, Are tlic?y lunctioiiiiic^ or arc they suspended
until tiic tallts are resumed?
comraisciona
have been approved; no coicm scion ha.3 a;3 yet been cat up,
Hr^'^irif1!!^: It mlcht bo added en thin point that prior to h-'.c
dr-pci.rtui-e from J^opoldville Mr. 'i^h'-irfbd infon.icd Pr. f!;.ii-dir.ar oi'ally tLat
it WGU his intcnticii to follow thro\irh on tho n f r ^ c i ' - i n b on the mandates which
l';fd 'bcr-i i reachc'lj dccpitG tlitj :Cac'u bli.at tharo wny not n^reernont on the final
communique, Viicthcr that intention will be carried out remains to be seen,
DR/rh
Mr . __ TTT P .Torn A rnTO (Indonesia )t Our delegation is thankful Tor the
information and c::pl?.miition5 r i v e n . We tl'.U'il 1o l:.nJ. cr/--:c information --
perheps ue did not bccaiuo I VUG rot able to ivad everything end liste.i to
every th ing available thub I -wrs r.rt f-illy inio-..nod -- airout the deblock in the
final c'.-., .ijuniquf:. It W:..E; EicntioiicJ. here that one of the primary reasons Tor this
deadlock was dua to the insistence of the ICatan^an allocation that paragraph 6 of
its draft bo maintained,, 1 should lirc.t like to hncv iaore details as to wl;at
precisely is contained :'n thio ^arar/. j.oh 60
Secondly, ve aro rnniclly arriving at the ctar/j v^;oro we vill be in a strong
poniticri. We hr-.vo been pat.i.c-nt in this n.atter. I understand that la^'t n.cnth
United. i;atioriG .ansiGtanco ctaited to flow in0 Ilovevei1, vo are still r/y; able to
bring r.rmt a fiill reconciliation between TchniT/i-jc and th^: Central Covernr.ent, My
ri.;ccnd ',;ue5tion is th.l^r after all t.ai:3 CAplorabion arm propa.votion, coulcl vuu
tell us what the real state of mvind of Tchonibe if.;!' We are patient, b-j-n cur patience
iu runn:l n(5 outt Perhapo .he docs not kno\r vhcre the interests of the x^cople lio or
T/nere tLo interns 1:3 cf the G t^ t e lie. 1 even have the irpression tliat he does nob
^.r.O1/ vh-,:re even hie own Gelf-.li>l,erefjt lica, Oi' coui'^e,, this is a matter of
juclfjei.iei.t. What c:ui ^;e do ^.ith such a n-an ar] 'frhoi-.be? I hope I can be (^i
];oi:e clarification about this point before ve think about rueaourcs or further
steps •which ve should take in this matter.
_ regarding the nr:plificcv';ion ofparagraph b, which vat; alleged to have- been responsible i:cr the cucpancion of
these trdls, I vill call on Mr. "Kols-Benriett alter :.ry brief ctatefiicnt.P\cr^ardin2 the Ii.r'loiiesian ArabaLGL'-dor1 G referenccc to the. lack of procrcsa, I
entirely agree T/i.th hira. If there ha;; cot- be^n totr-1 lacii of p.r^;;,roGO> there
h:i:.j been veiy slow procross towards the achievement of ti.G United nations
objectives. For thic ro?tson I have aj-cd Hr. Gardiner to cono here to er.ch.r.vi^o
vioys with him cm the m;:t steps vhi".i I have in mind; ho will probably 'oe here
this veciicnd, perhaps toi. orrov/.
It yill no doubt b,- rolcvant for rae to Day that I an leaving Hew York early
next vecli to vir, Lt a few Western European cou.rbricj to huve diticucciona with corue
of the leaders cf thcce o.ouiitrior,, kc.Oiiz the iteir;s to i;o oiucuoucd will be the
itoru of the COL, -p. 1 feel rather strongly that c-orae of the YJejtern European
leaders are in the beet position to exert whatever pressure they can on Mr. Tshombe
DR/rh . 27.30
and bis collcr-^ica. If they m~c co-operative vith United nations activities, I
believe that i-;r. T3boi7:be and hlj coll en rues will 1 o ej/jnablc to re aeon and ccrap3y
with the requests of the Central Govorroent aod the ]-.ivblcra of t] ^ Conpo vill be
solved hei'ore I GO lon^. It in alco vnrth roc, ll:L:?f, tloat rrir_j Minister Adoula
Las publicly offered two scnto in tho Central Cov:erri;;]e:;t to II;1, T~hcn;l:e; that is,
ho has asked Mr. Tshcmbe to nanlnate two rccrr.bers c ° h i t ; Cor/ikab Inrty to j n L n
Mr. A l ju l a ' s cabinet, and his cecon l oii'e-r vas to 1-ir, 'j chon-.bc hirccelf. Prirno
MiniLJ i . r Adoula oiicrcd Mr« T2h.^ral ;; the i:u;rt of Vic^-r j evident in tiic Central
Uover:L:ient. Of courr-e. the oi'ior yn.cs private ana. en.. iid:::}ti;.iL_, but only yesterday
Mr. T.:,..->rnbe rca le thia IniOv/n to tl:e public. If l i r . Tch.viLbe Gi:d his cellea;;uoG wore
roa^T *, . - . ) comply with Hius M i v r L u t c r Adoula's rea:ost l,y ncrrinatin^ two nicnib :rc
cf t:i '2 CoijalLat rari--7 in t.he ( v - n l / r a l f!ab:lnob cuvl y.i1. T;;i ciabc hir.Gelf v.:rc willinr;
to rcc-r^t the on'er o^.1 the V . 'u-o-^rouidGncy in th . j Central Coverrir:cnt; I ain cur a
that you vill a^i'ca T./L'!:h ;;,G b ; iat . ]iu.:ro than half r f the; ; 'onfclc3o pi'^blcmc v.i.1.1 be
solved. If those ofi"cr.j arc nut n.cix.pt'.'d_, I have c:..-rtfun idea;:; in uind and; as
I indicated oa,.'"Licr, 1 vraat to ^oi tl.io b^noxit of c;i.i ...••;.. '.hian^o t.f v l r w : ; with
G o v v J i 1 . : , : -nt lea : ui". 3 in cor bain ll^jtern Europcau cui i / ioi ' ' . • . . , > , On i.iy return from
L'iro;-: '> 'C propose 'to prc i 'ont tho .c'onaltG of thoco ciol^.1';- rationc to you ond obtain
j.;u,r vicars on ; h c m » If i.ccc^ary, a;.; I indicated in 2.1,7 earlier ^tateuieat j 1
\/ould oven convene a fh:curily Council meeting to f.i.vc :;;2 fr;.-i:h inanclaloc or_, in
any rr, ;c; to clarify t i a G j^'oviouij jaundates, Thlo is rjy position u;: present.
C' jncerninf i the Lnbllach bridge, I t-m now in a posit ion to report to the
Coir.ni it i.-oe t'nat the rvp"tr.3 T/ll 1 be f inished bof )i-e th .; <:aid of Aur;.i;rt. Once
this "b-.-i.dco is rcpaLixJ, 1 think tliat tho Uniicd llationj will "bo in a 'p'jfll'fcxon
to provide the nrce^cc i / ' j G c u - ' t for the trancnort of ir. j ocra.lr^ to Hr.tacl.i.. It will
be a V'.uy dcciruule ut .'n tow-h/d the achiovencut cf United HationG objectives f
An regard:] tlie j]oc:ond ni.ioayticn of the In icn..cl,':.n A:;bac3ador on the utabe of
mind o;' Mr. '.r.vlior.ibo^ o.i G J U I O V - ; it in very d l l f i c u i t to cja I /C^G one's vicvs. A^; I
have ladicatc-1 en un earlier ..c,/!-: o;; Kr. aioK.,;/.c ir; a very MiprccUctable man
aad a /ery unstable nrin. iVru.- 'pu ho hae to o p c r . i e in very difficult
r-JreuEiLiUrnccc in view of the :vbatc:;.cutc ef l.V. Klr.ba in the laet lovr weoks while
l-ir» Tohoiube wai; in Leopoldville.
AW/ek
But of ono thin<3 I sm cure: that there are certain Powers, especially
Wrctcrn European revere, which will be in a very ^ocd Tvcition to exert sc:i;e
prccnurc or, Lir . Tshaiibc ana hie collcacuoo to help in the achievement of tho
United Ilatioro objectives,
I will new give the floor to Mr. Ilolz-Bcnnett to amplify the. implicationsof paragraph 6.
Mr. i;nT^-P!Wi?n'_; The reference made at the end of paragraph 53 of
document G/iiO^/Add.10, where il is stated that t rno aj.rcicimnt could Lc reached on
rJ.3 tc.:;t, prii'u:rily on account of the i:atan^-'3:;e cl-.-Jlo^it.'.on'ti insistence that
r-u-acr-:.;}! 6 of itc draf t , be naintaircd", refers to tha draft final coiijr/iuniquo
prc6C!;-;..:d by tho ICal an^csa dclc^abi^n to the L.ootinc. Thiu draf t coi..jauniqne/
in '1'nra; .rapli u, otalT^s that tho Co.:. rnlnnionG crc:iLod chould not .cc:ne into c f iuc t
until cuch tjrao nG tlic L'ollcvJng mcaciireo are ii.ij •. Lcir.cn t'^d, and it GOCJ on to
er;uiE-.>.r.-.Le thc;.u; nir-.a.'jurcr, : to tonnJ i . aLo vhat ti:cy call bhorc the ctat^ of vcr
in K':t:'a:ra "between tro^yiJ of t.io U:. it-id r.;itioy3; tno Al' jJ aad the Ivat::n(TC3e
Ccn'' ;-':" :ric_, 1;;; May of a •procJoTD, L' ion thai; t h > i fit 'its of var vould be fininh^d;
tho i:,,i '.iitcnanoo of the: un,L1y C't i ' ^ l - O T r v i iu Ic.;i i'yo^v ;:icrrj no of ;X) Jun:; if CO; tue
procc ;vation'of the ih^llti'llciial ttructurc^ an -,nll i- .z the oo^irdirtratl^;
i;jL:.uctu] cs of h'atau^a ::jid the Guppi'ooGicn cf tiie p-:at o.C Co^ri-il r:vi i r ^\__°--r ^nordirrJr
for r:io:u)£a; tiiO r.-a I ntci^anco of all perscmel now fvnct Loniiv; lu the iuioCLi uf
order nid in t ;e JuJldal branch of the fatan; -r.a^. Goven^icnt; liborty- for irat-nr-i
in recruitinc directly all t:v; liocec^ary technic Jane which are required for tiie
functioning of iis ciuiulaii;tra.i>iva cei^viccc; to G( r,t;a hojtilo acts and intervention
jn tha intcrml aff-iir^ of L;ilaiv;a,uiKL the cr: aci^a nt of a dccrcjc on general
amnesty. 'fhc^e voro the moaiiuroc which the kati.i.iccice proposed.
Mr. An!l-ry\l^ (Guinea) (ir.te^vctdtion fro-i French): My delegation would
like to e:rore;;j ils B jM. i i j f ac t ion aU tha tvo ct^ 'n.ont^ we heard which five ur. a
co.uplcte pictiu-e of thr: nitr.aLi.on in tho Cv-n^o c:.. a j-ornlt of the ccmvciaatlana
hotvccn the C^.il'-ral Go\orni,; ' :nU and tlyj ;,roup of i.'r. ri£ho;-.-be. But thoic IK one
cspcct of the Coneo cn;o;.;t/j.on which has not been touched upon and my dole cat Ion
vould like to ack a question on it.
AW/ck 32
(Hr. /'cbl:r'r,
r~fa*e do3X'5 so, I chouia like to f;.iy that ye fully n^ree that if the
s i tua t Jcu continues to dovolop cs ct i-rocont, one chouk:. cnv:'.3ar:;o, as you said,
l i r , CJorvatary-Conaral, th->t Ibe Heouricy Council he cc . i rod of the problem a(_;aln.
/is In 3 licen Gti ; icd, 1:1 r^o is of th2 essence oi:d it r>c-":;';s that 3c:::e people arc
banking on that. 1 think that the last statement lirv- "by Mr. Itolz-F'tfrnett
cleo.rly chova tho stato of nvJr.d of Mr. Tshcrr.oe. Uni> rturatoly, l.e bar. not,
c]-<a.nr?'.l; i'or t]\? clal i i i r" centa l j icd i i paragraph 6 ai'c tUijta^ioiLit to tin;: recognition
of a co-called indci.cnoence 01 Lat^rca.
Hr. Gc;cret';ry-Gci!';ra.l; in order to pose the question that is in rvy nlml, I
vould 3il;o to c.3l: the i'ollovJnp,: If 11 July vere to be ccnsiaored in K:itnr.ra
nn ii;d.. o^nt]onc(. cliy, and if tl^oro vrro any fet: Livitio:; on that day, -what vo:ilcl
th-2 atlllude oP the United nations he? You have shown your negative altiti.ac:
tc-vrard;j bhn 'n , tut could you clarity it? If tlioro \:oro cuch fes tivitiof, f cv^n
vithout ocnd:>!\, o.dUit I.oi;'.J.. f u r f - o c to Slisahothvllle, 7;.-;;-:'it vould the altitucie of
the Uii i tcd hat:i,oi.u:; in Katanga be touarOn ouoh an r=v;->nt?
Ti ; Gocond ouci.;li<:a — ; lid this is a malt or v:i.^;.i va,3 not touched upon in
tha cte Loiijents :;o heard thin ;;K;r,nrp conccrhj.r^ t'.o {/..r^ral turn of ovenb^ iu
li :c Co: ^o ~- coi'.corr;;j the id'ca c. f i . , * . GirGn^r, . Vo arc a::ior^j tUo;;e -\?l;o c.i"O gravely
cc.ncarr.od uhoui, tuc Gituation oi' Mr. Cli7.c-n{;;a inac...;uc;i ar> the Frees and v.'irioiin
viir.ourG have provided. jniYji'iiiation that in not very roar;rvu'ii^. I" i iv;.- United
lotions has any inioiiii'ition on the condition of Mr. Gizi ijf;a at preGont, my
(bjlerntion, and. soiuo ol j icrc ; I run cur a, vould l-o ir.oct (;,ateiul if tba information
V^IQ Imparted to the CoL:uiittec. Tiicre is the quectlon of sricesGlon, hut thlo
is n.l:3o a very important question as far as vo aro concerned, and if CCWG riiiaoura
•s;c.re prc-.-ed to oc true, I tliiib; that thic vouid only cc;.,plicate furtner the problem
of trio ('jii[-o.
I tliank you ngnin^ Mr. noorotary-Gonoral, for the ctatomonts that vero made
today. These are, the qu.eijtio.ii3 tlr..i^ r:y deiefatiun vunojd to raise.i
The Arvi-.lrr ,n"r? TA'°Y- "T7:.>'Mi: An re-arfb: the quoction of the no-called
KatanronG iudc^,..nacrco ^liicii i.r. '.uUi'>:.;bo and IIJ.L; cwLL-.;i; UCG i-ropoce to (^Glebr-tc
oil 11 .luly, tbc Uult'-d rr.'.Lior.'3 docc not rccof/Mlae thi... ,.t all. Of court;o vbjn
I say that the Unitud nations haa an absolutely ne c.ti\c attitude towards thiu, it
AW/cls 33-35
jin-mo not only tnat the United IJationc ic not rol.i'irr to participate in ther^e projected
celebrations In tflisabet.'ivill^ but t.l/it the U. : ILni retime h::u" even rcq'iecttid.
thoco i;.:.;:bGr States vhich havo GciiLJular ropr^G^nt.'vti1. c c, in ^HECL' .othvill^ not, to.
particiv'Tite in taiB celebration. Of co:u*r.;e; I do r:ot thlnl; tLevc vTlll. te any
p.jysical invol\v;j:ont if t-h'i I;."tanne:;o autliorltie,^ I) i:ir;t on ccicLratinc In -their
c-,:n vny . Tliorcforo, 1 can in'il-o it ca'bG.'-orioal t l iab ti o United I'ations close not
rcco£!J:t::o the co-called iTatar-r'^ne intic]:<^r.doMco cay cu* L": l^brations .
uc;jnrciinc J i r . GiaGii/^ the latoc-t infcmation *rc h • v'o is tj.at ho in ct1.ll
enjoy:! ny t';God h* alth, Bvit ar; I o:-rrlainod to th-n Cc^mitbeo at nn earlior meeting,
ti/2 Unito.1 ilati -nc is not in a pociLion to inter^nra in this particular cn^c afosr
1. :?.<" re-r-^v.ted ro." action of my oi'i'cr i,o cone under Un.ltcd ilaticnr: protGcticn*
iic'.revorj Lsincc '.he l-arli:uucnt ii '^3 ta;;en certain ant ion ro^ardiLf; li:i.a iiL.iurlty^
I clo :.ot feol t ? iat tho United :Tationn should le^itimatoly interfere in any vay
vith re,-ard to i i r , Gl'/.er-^i's future,
^-^out his personal pocitioii, all available information indicates that ho
is enjoying very ^ood health.
AT/wb
y^^l-^^-^.r^.. (Ghana): T!:io i icetin^ has "been a vary frood one.
Ky delegation vnld lILo to thrTil: y.va very ninoercJy f^r the statasent which
;vcu r - - / l e at the teniuni:^ erd i'cr l-.r, Bennet t 'a a^t?,,. ut, I think both
of th.. :i need }Tcpei* study, l-'y clele ^tion in not in u- petition to (jive eny
ou£-;.;^:-:tic;ns tv, to uhat should Ic the nc::t ctcp, CLisoi'uly ac you, yourself ,
coLtxr.jlate certain G/jtioiJo -which ;you vculd liha to pub before us scrr:o tiir/a in
the lul.uro. I think thii-'o thn Cn.i::lttce ccin only otuOy the pclnto which have
"been 2:-idc by Hr. r.omrjtt, e^ccj.iY.'i.'ly the ccnL2tAii.!.rii:^r> i'rcn "both the Central
Govcr., ^.:nt and frca Katan^^, 1^ r^-ro'ir, feel that ny del coition will require
cci^e t:ir,2 to jtudy this vci/ c^.i.'G'i^illy in order to L-.i In Q p^oi idon to ccr.ir.cnt
en thCi . i and to LCQ 'v?h;jth'-r ^^G ean j!.vo ucofc.l advice to ycu r.3 rec^r^G the
next step. Put there are a i 'c\7 points vhl.ch I Llic-.J.lrl like to r^lce now and
I'crh^^-3 you r.:i.£ht l;o in a p-;ulLl.cn to r;iva nc c r.a cl^riricntian*
' j i i e i'irct cue iu/lir. AloiVla, ai Icr the brrr-l-.Oovn of the t~l!;3, caid that
"How t!:G ball in jn - the .c\ .. r v,ho United la;-lor;;. I havo tl.:-no ail I can,"
There van nlf :o a i^yji't, t.r:d. lo vaLilG to cp: ;:r,;l tcj c^i tain / ^ r i i c a n covntrlc-cj
-io h:\-) him ;:*avo thir, Kal ::•-., pichlciyu I 'io rot I - • ' . / \)ir..tlv::T you ll.',VO Ci/y
civ:.:: ' :-.l;3 to r^l:z t . r i "uiik \,-h. .u ho r ;.vi.d., Th:) 'UtiL 1.; -Li tha ^ual c
I.',.; 2 .C; . . / ' . Ural1. e;.-QCi. !y no '.; ho r::::-ii? I thimc th'lt 1:1 ul'iora coir.
tMiJL Action i ih j - l i t he ic*]nt.r;.,d.
}.y rccr\..i point i.; ti.''.t It Jorfl necm ve have 3f^ored the lol
T th i i l i . tn V-. j * f . j • - , . • ' • • i . : . ^ ( . ^ t ; .:**e era cer ta in r-\ o^lcionn c.r, r-jj^rns th,3
GiitiiG'/iiy c.i ihj '.;,!ti , o.J. (!, /..-.^a..-.* .A'. a;.-d the aataciiLy (I1 Ihc l''rculd:.r:t» X feel
thnb ;!.u the . , . 4 c u c i i J . 1...^. r;,,o ^.^ K • ,j I H . . L li.- 'nrd too ra.rh o.bcat t!:o llojd of J'Jtatc.
Ho ho.i cc i 'Ui iu :-• ... 'i.. '.;,i :v.^ i i t i : » : . J L !• -.Vl" ' " • ' :: • " *"- '• • "• '-"V-^; xti^ t;ruvv.-:ional
C l O V - i i " ' . , , '\ • - v .. .i, J ^ V ' . ' V i U a e n b £i, L UO ( • ! » 1 Tv:; l.'Ji^ ^ . ' i . i , ; ; >h lO ti'.:.,; L' YOU;
llT* h . : C | . . s , • ,. .. . , • - . : . ; f- '-: ' ;. • IV O »'- 5- ' - . / ^it:^ c ' l • • ' l L •' "" ;- "-': ' ^]-
C-i\ i -o 1 " ; i ; j i . ( . : - 3 ^- ' ; - .•• : ;" M t " ' ' ( . ' ; 'l^. « . ' . ' " 1 !C t • • • , 3 * ; . v . . - : . . . . U ! . ' „ ' , < . , . :,.i en
no c i : . : n i i c n . ' . « / ...'•! * . ^ ; J ^ I . L i.•- ' i . i : - a . i ' . f . y ha/c U r v . ' . i < " • • : T ; . ^ ' .-ir • % i .
"by i.hlch sci.;.c actiou c^.n ic iu.Lcu a^-vlnot tho iut'.Lun.;.:ac- Go\
Ic
AT/wb 37
1 r'
l-'y third point is tho surnection that the Provisional AnGcrobly of
convene. I no to frcn i he rop.cr t contained in drvAuncnt S/5?C;?3 thlt theALGC.r 'b ."y did not meet. 01 corner, vhen we arc tacl:linr the riatr.n/^a problem
vc ch-.uld not :T or cot that the Katanga author! by ilcclf is not an authority
an ciivirj^.ji u-drT the ^'5_£.^^i;ri!i);^^. The Asr-cr/lO.y haa- not i.iet., As youll^OW t;ie Balul: '..'cat Party Tcr ^ .In^j tii^e has l;ccn xrovr .v tcd from attending the
A.'i-c-nc.ly. 'Thorei'orG^ 1 cm wondering what steps have hcen talxn to ijec that the
l-'iy fourth point irj uith respect to the position of Beleium in this entire
icGuc. I knew •; :u referred to We G tern Europe an I yoih.1 tour to
^et in touch ^r:v ;;L a certain Lunihor of ccuntric;;. I ; :oji{;:Lor.) id P.el^iurr. hocauce
recrivily \;c h:.vo noted th.ab the Central Gjvcrrjjicnt Lr,'i pcr.Ccnned a vo]To~f:'^e;
they L,I c now ^utLiiir, alon^; very voll with Icl; ' i iua in the way of dlpLjaa^ie
rolaticns and iho iaot th^t a numher of Eclc^no are ijii[^pc:;ed to he 10 turning to
the ( . ^ , i , i i t r y« (i:Vjr';.-.rore, ivy (nu:^ticn ir;: h'hal ic ro l^ ' V - I J I ' G attitude b-:wara,G
*uhl.G j •'•tau^a, t jOco;;sion? It' tl;.:/y i re trer J In;' vl.th Cc.itral GovcriirLont, ti~;::a
arc t i i o y not La a position to ho.Lp the Ccntr;..i i ; ^ v c ; i LJ.. JHG to L,olvc thia pr^hlcm
'by pc,;ijibiy Li ih in ,^ a pronouncement putting the:ir icc^t dovn ar;d in loot
prevailing up^n Tchc.ynVo vjucw they have cnccurai'r' d in the pacit. I thin!; this
ic a 'voiy irap.j.rtnnb point. I r.nov that a nir.iher of UosLcrn Eurcpenn countriea
also fall into uiis category; 'but I think Bel^iura'G rclo in this ia p^rc^.icvint.
I \ronoor what ciTcrtu cun b2 r, :ade by you r:cT>r to cot liclgiun to play a decisive
role in the oolutdcn <".-f tho Katonc"1- problem.
'j.he last pcinb viiici: i uc-uid raico io in roc^rd to the precent situation ortroop movements. Uc h a v o y b yet l"?ard auylhiio; Mx;u., vhnt has haproned to
our i-roopj i;. the Conr.o ; vhoro they c.re and vJ:::theif ]n i'act they axe dolns a
ucc-ful job. Allied -L. j th:L.; probi^i, 01' c o u r n t - , i : i' 3 nance vhich ha.i "been
incurre;! by i ,ji U,nlt , : t iicvi" LO/.-'J • ' . . :h->n one cons Id •" ' • • •a I IG vhcvi e c-omub of tho
citu-ii . ion — t n.; f a < : L t ha t ' t i u r o arc troops ro; -.li.jiin.-1; ia tho country, ths fact
that there i,; not :.-rjy iorc^- cable colution to lh: vh: Le proLicia rnd the fact
that the United Mationu ir; .:t.LU. Iv^avily cn^Z'-d- 1;'1 ^^ tliis — thcjjc r:al;o your point
about the Security Council meeting a ^ood one. But, as I Gaid, I am not in a
AP/vb
(!Tr, Qu/?J ron-Hnckcy, Ohr.rn)
position to C'.'!rjiit:.:t r.ov 03 y;/;r prcyoGGi. But I feel that with the clarification
V'hxoLi you will give rnd u lso the further points which vill cc/tie to Hc'nt later
vhen you do meet with us a^ain, vc nay be in a position to give definitive advice
G3 to what slr'Ulcl be done.
- . , : ^ ^ When Friro Minister Adoula said theother day that t :Tho U.ll is lu il.u hands of the United lut:l or.s", I a^rc.3 v.vtll
him, (:•!' courije, it IG up to tho l.Tirto'1 Nr;tiona to tiiinli'cf the mcccurcr; vaich
shouTl "be tal::;ri to Jji.plcincnt the rcoolutions c.f the -Security -Jouncil c-rfcctlvely
and s- cadily. Ac I lir.ve indicated, first c:f c.il, I vuiit to have th^.- ".).:.r.of Lt
of d i i jCUGaicns -"jith certain leaders cf the Governrnon U; in Uectorn ILir; (_.>':? -H
com:-; ries, Actua.l.ly, I hr.viro presented rour-iily iay vLe^-s, throu^a tl\a i-cpr
of ccrlvixn Cc vnrnncntr? in:;vf. r:;r;.l]y_, vith tlic lui Iiiabior, that I proposed to take
up th'.^e qucrtionc yiicn 1 ; ' , t to Lii'-ir ctipltaJ.:; « T:je:T,forG, ca'tc^
thc:;^ project jd dcli1:orRtic3i3, I l.avc no iiicam of i-rncwln^ ct prei^nt what the
results vill U3. I (Vjrtciii."' . ' / ci)n pr-jscut i;!-ic r;- vUii .f i of tb-— r- acir.^iationc
at tb-.i next i-'ioctrn^ vhich i;.lll - i i i l re place, of O O U X L O , on liiy icturn ir:n I.u/'jpo,
Vlie proulcm IG, to iny ^ / o y ci" th.lrjl:iri^, thr.t t ho .!.*-•» ere cc:voral ccnrji.fl.ci'-rcioiis
vhich chculd p;cvern car activitioo in the Coriip* The rao:rt importonb of tn^o
ccncldcratio.13 is the one cf resources. When I nay ".rccources" I em tiiin'iin^
priir-irily of the financial renoarcos. It vill le of interest to the r.::::-;iboro of
this CcDimittcu tli:»t Lhc r':lovc:.nt coi.-jnittoe of t'ha Ii.--;u3o of P.cprGser.'totiveG of
the United £. later., vhleh c ica ' I .G vith each r.at,ler^; .rerjuiucd. itu deli'ticrationn
ycGtc-rd- iyj c .1 tc.'lo.y ul:;o t^niy r;.re taking v:n this a i n .OGticn of the bond iasue.
I hci'/e hocn infCi^-J. tlic,t pcrlia;',.; li. irr.y lake -l.hrco week:: for tht5 H;/dfie CciiUlittGC
to ccme to a definite position re^rdine Pi evident Keunedy' c proposal.
HF/jpm la(Tne A•".tJ n^ T.r-orotr> r y-Oonornl)
The Senate Dub-Cci.iTiilttee lias pc^ed its o;.uc.:rc;.iont; and the House Committee
shall I.avc to coma to a clcci-icn co^eti^e, ncrhcu::;, in vhc middle cf July*
The proposition, ar, you Kiev, IG this: if tho Iku: ,o approver Precidont
}'•.'.'i::^: dy TG recci.r :,cnegation,the baited Jtatcc will purehaGO 4^ million worth cf
b. i; ' .-7 plus rcatcihirsj; the other pledced subscripts ::ic. 'rnat means., if other
e< v...-•,_'•!C3 .vul c. uhei" courcoa buy cr plod^G a certain Gr-r,iint_, the United Ct'G'oCS IS
//. '.,.J: ,l"^i GO plv.l^C; or purchase thin amount pl^G ^2^ rl Llion vorth. Tliat is on
t>.^ c..:,jr]T,pui.ou that tho Houco Cuma'cbee xOllu;/G t;io JJiio of trie Jenate Ccir.mibtec*
T.IUG, iu effect^ tho United. States r:".y buy :'',;>) million, worth of bonds on tjio basic
ui v-:"1 million already pleclc/'-u. by cUr:r countries ar:l cUicr source a i^o Tar -- that
?.•; , ->o5 vivMlir)- . - - i - t : ; , r '2^ 1'iillioii. .If tho Iloucje CCT. ;i; i.tt'.jc apprc:VG3_, J:L-.= Unibed
vj-'Mtr;"; will bu .:^^ ...llliun \ a r b h of bcndc, ai;d the tctal ai.icur.v: pled.-_,3d vrlll be
v^O :;illlcn p].u[j i|'6'; r;:i.]J.ion; foi •, total of '-fi.y.> million; cr^ in anticipation of
pi'ojoc ocd plcd^or^ pcrhapc ipl^O uiiaJ.icn or vlu^ i./illlcai, CG a.^ainct the expected
total of Y.'ICO ,-J.llion,
If the UiiLtcd Kntions receiver ijilGO million or ^16^ million in pleigoD or in
actual purcha^ ' . j^ . thi3 cam w.ru. bo ruITictcnb icr tho b jitcd I:utioii3 opcr-itionG
to oo.")t.i.r\uo uii,,".:. the end of December l^bi l* p f^ /hnp i : , w.i.di ''bo udcjticn c/x" ccu.o
cconcr. y uioc.euros wo inoy be able to carry on until January or February I.[)6jf but
not beyond that.
Ly primary consideration^ therefore^ ia that wo h5//o to tackle the problem of
the Coi'i^o efi'cotivcly^ speedily nir-". virroroui ly b.:iXr' ; toe yoar io out; tl.iu it, a main
conci'-Krration. I, parnonclly^ fool thab the Uni ted .'ationo GtiCUJ.d. not ccrry en
thece voi'y c:-:pcn;"jive operations v;ith an cn.pty trot:LUi-y in c:-rpuetation of sudden
v/indfaliG. i-'cr thin prj .ncirnl rcacon, I have outlined certain steps; and these
•jtcpr, ;> U3 I ha/e indicate:]; \.-ill bo xlie tcpica cf d.i.;:.c:ucsion;: botwoon r.o and
certain headc of Governments; and I will be able to report to you in detail when
1 roturn.
ior;arc"!.in£; the question about tho President !a position-v::f>-^-yln_ ihe
Lo_i I-' , . ' l o : ' ; { n V i l . o , cu.' omrGc ; ii.y undorGtar.diny, ic th .• t i . - ro s ido - .b hasavubu can take
certain aoticu.,3 a^aln^t- i'.at.-ir,; -i in chc oentoxt cf l ; i o ! <• ' ._2^ 'c .v i ' ' r i ' r . - ;n ta l '. * To cito
c.no inntaiico^ ho can t 'of iij.it: ly in::i;;b on p:.,yuioi:b ( :.' r\ . .v<_auoG by Kata^ra to tho
Central Goverijinont; he can legitimately. But in practical tormc^ tiiat vrould riot
achieve any rcsultu.
jvm
la so fav c i? tlio lo(yit:.r:.u-':c: iV^xi-f-'but.^'-i of revenue:: is concerned^ I have
..l^o outlined this in riy ne:::, ctcp:;^ lx:e^uue in the i - ic t i ivj ; ciLtualion
I - . j _ Li .jut Knntiv^.bu wil L not be in n pnfjition to L'djlcve any pr>cit:. /Q ros^lts intills direction. llenec it is vm -to the United KnLLeMa, with the active co-cieiation
cf th-2 ii^pcrt.'Uit iLJii.bers concerned. It io only vitu their c<j-opc-r^ticn that we
can Goliiova iccvilts.-. ivJj^arcLins the Katan^Gco r^ovlncial Qcaeitbly, I think M>:. RoJ.^-BeEr.ett will
be .in a better position to nn-^j^r this qu-j^tj.on, GO I will Give the flour to
!,r. rola-Eemi^t.t. i ftoi- my fiir'Lhor brief ctatomen'C.Concornir:^ tlic qucjticii or Bol^iran^-. aLtit\v:lc touardn the United '.Tntionr;
my fe::lin^ i:j thrt tho BclQi-uni Covcrnncnt f>hov,rc si^ui of cioi ;.-:•.- C Q - - C . J v.-:'ticn with
the U:iitod K'.tio:i3 nctivitios in the Con^Oj and. I hc^;a to be cble to elaborate
en this at trio no :t ^jetir.^. la connexion \iiUi trcr;p movc:r,jnts, I -will five the
fioCi' to Dr. Bunche ulo^r Kr. Kola-Bonnott to v?h-iji I aou cji^7^ the floor to clarify
Ambassador QuaiGon-Eackey : j point on the Kcitcm^esG provinoitil asDQir.bly.
.-™|T:-":;T (Eejmty Ch?f do Cnbiret, 1'crir.er CNUG repreconin Ej.iGt3het:iV.Llic) : b t rc t ta \; ji e mado er.rlic-r thlu .sear to cc-iiVone tlio provincial
aaG:..ri:bly of Katrai^a with tL-'i full rarticipj-tion oC1 u 1 its E^r.ilerc, including,
natiirally, the ir-iuber^ oi1 i he oi position i-rty, the lialuliak:;t. Indeed, the
Gur1;ection careo in the forva of a letter vhlcli wc,3 cd-.;rc^D.-:d by Minictor ci' the
Int,.ricr Km.iitatu to the cuthoritics in lili^aboLhv Llle, and vhioh w;.;3 aliJOtrnncraitted to u::, tlie Unl'lod ^H^tienj j rcvi 'e 'JoaLutivuj^ in eraer'to proviso
accL./caucG Tor t.io r. jotir-r;. r-ene of th::f:e r.-itLcrci c..^u referred to, as you will
see, in p:.ir<.j£rarh 9 uf autn^out 3/^°q^/Ada-10-The Cc j i i ra l Ouvc-r ivj^caLj LiL' tor its letter to the Katen^eGe authorities, alco
cent tiro re ^ecentai. i'voG i'j'jD Leopoldville in crf'Kji* to hove toli;:5 with tnc
Irc^idcnt of the j-o'e-rlnoi'.-.! uri^.Jjly. IT-.e^c rCi)re:icutativoG crrived by United
rations aiiplauo HI Klicabethviile. r rohoct i 'Ui \ . - ; .u ^iven to them and we put
them in toi^u wi.th the r-rc^adeii t of the provin-,i-:l asspu?jly, with vrfiom they
had tulkc i/ilh t i i j view of convening the ac--.. ij' ! y.
Howevor, before; cinnvcyinj; to .you tiic aA.L i . jT le of the Elisabethvillo
authorities in. rrQ.^:d to ihlc liii-ttci*, I won!'!, i I!;:e ;,o c;ay that the United Nationsir.Ld:..' it very clear thrrt w: \?cro prepared to j'riv.: all the co-operation and
nc;3ictLsnce ncccjcary for the1 convening of the4 aasoiubly, iuoYludinr; the
of ail deputies into Kliuabcthville.
(I r.
lTo wore r.lco reody -- and, Indeed, ctartod preT\'ir:vtion3 - - t o ensure the
security of tho r.e:;:beru of tho. Ircvinjiai j .rcoiijbly arriving in Elisabethville,
to prui'ect the n.cCv, inj itself , nad to Quarontco tnat x-o n-^Gtin^n uculd be hold
in :'.n i/tniosphi/re cC complete freedom I'-.r all participazitG. hwcvor, the tallM
betv;^.m the reprou.mtj^iver Prou I^opoidvilJ.e and thj I rocidcnb 'Of the prcvill
aaserJoiy were not siiccoL^Tul . 'iha Elioabotiivillc uubhcritloc hold to tha vicu
that tlie arcer.bly chcuid be convene a cuter the Li_nciii;:ion or tiic /idouia-Tshcir.bo
tclkc:, because at that tir.io ^\.i2 reccnciliatica \!:..ulr'l bs much oc.fdcr, cni the
rcor c~iiizati- . i of tli^ provincial C.yvGrnm^nt ::hou.'id alro be ono oi1 the ctcps to
ccr.io aj a con:;eciucnco 01 tho meoti.nr; of tlio provincial a^enbly, such
roc.rr- iiizatie •• t.o t'il:c effect vitu the particip'.,ticn c-f B:iluba--o.t i-.-.precentotives
:".xi -Vj'.o proviiu-ial govcrnirrint. i;'or the GO rc-acoan it waa not poccible to hold
ohe niGctinG of tiic provincial a^orubly at that time.
Kr- BUI-If^r71, ( Under- Gccretary): Ac of HO Jnno, the total stroncth of
the force vm^ i/,OCo ofilccrG and men. Thoy were deployed by naticrijl imito
ao f>. i l o v j G :
.in Leopol.iville FrovincG, thoro wore, as of 23 Jvne, 1,C90 officers o.nd innn
Of tli..i;c, l^'i'^;} w^:re in tho city or LcopoldvilJ .j, :Lt:;,:.}.f. 'Iliio vao tho ITl^rian
Fifth Battalion, a Nigerian police miit, and the 37th Irish Eattaliou \aUch ic
in L ;cpoldvi.' lo_, actually la transit. It W.MG held tiioix^ for cecvrity work in
connexion with the AdoulQ-Tiihcirbe talks; and then it \;as to move en to
In Matadi, there is n Nicer! an police detachr.cnt of fifty-five^ and the
Sierra Leone ccmpv-.ny of 110 i:; GLutioned at Kii.onri raccj.
In the rrovirico U^iciitaLe there arc c^O ci f icoir> und men. Thece fic\iroc
are nil as ci :.:o June. lh:j.:o arc all in ^LoijlryvilLo where are located th~
Ethicjian IIccidquortarG Bi-ij-'idj and the Ethiopian L'ir'hth Lattalion, total Line 090
in ICaoai Province, thv:i'c aro 9;;^: the lUu-ri; . ;* ilead^u.Mrtera Bricade and
the 1,'i^crian Firot Battalion, of £'}'{; and a LiU.rian coiiipany in Port Franqui
of L ; ,y ) .
In Kuvu Province, there are 1/931, conr/ictinc oj1 the Malayan IIoaelq\jorterG
Brif^do and Seventh lK:nirr;:i.t, LLatiei.cd at iiul-.;;vu, tctallin^ 7^0, the l-iulayen
Firct Reciment at Goma, tr-tu.Llinp, J;7U; the Ethiopian LGtli Battalion at Kindu,
totalling 577 i and. an Ethiopian company at Kucon^o totallinc
FGD/Jtb
Finally, :. ~A Kat/er^a province, there are e ,O i , - J ; - hi ilayanr: and
hV; of who!!! are at All. o.'tvi.l n.c; 7u.V "t W^nciu -- that ;,oin<-; the 2', ch U-.-hiopian
•-atta.Lion; 5, ' / !>*- at Kiifsr.db-eihvillCj consisting of Jhial^rij Il3lccy3n; Tunisian
;.;^j. bi'Uiiopian troops; and l;;,5v '^t 1'pTirino. bat:e, these hc-inf, the lotn Gwedish
i?.-tta...io;i_, the1 l;tn Ghanaian Ijattalioil and a i3i;;all Indian unit of rifty-six
I n:i{rlit tcd:o thia opportunity to coy ju.rfc n vonl v;ith rer;ird to the
reir.er '.-.bio mv;voe33 that iiao o tten'i"d the eriortc of our people in Elicabethville
to li^uid.ite ,ho referee co:no v;lv'.oh, an the Cer n:i'"tee knc'/r^. hud attained a
been evacuate ,. -- I'7v011 by brain and. J o / ; Y > by air -- eruV.re.y by C ' l / J J ' s cvn
re.'oui'^e^ and cffox't:; and y i l i i vj.i';/,:,r:.].ly no inoioent, vhich indicates remarkable
orcarizaticnel vori: done by Mr. Cai'dincr and hr. Glueing and their as;
L'''li ^!."1. (J'Klia): VJe hP.vc heard a very full and illvj^inatinc; statcincat
by Hr« I^o}.^-j,:.i'.,e1 :;; . .U..L ve h:\vc had r.-.n c.ec^u';.t of th . . - ir:.portL,i>t r a i . 1 ^ that tL-:
Uui".A;i i!at..Lo•:-, iu r 1'-jin^ bc'rvrcl |/o suciic-j viitii a vi. .v; to 1-viji^i:-.3 aboub thn
ncccjjary a^.'-ecny^nLo which wouJ .d ^c_^ib tho UJLJO prohle!;1. to b^ solved hrid tjiC
Uiii.tcd Uatio.iG to ulccil^u^o itGe.l.r from tbo Coi . jT. I believe that it is your
ucjire, Mr. i:nairw^ii ; aui ib ij the deLiiru of the rr/.'r^ora ch this Co,;:ultt9vj »-
and certainly it IL; tho Cooirc oi' niy Govcrir.uc^t -- u^at our cn^^G^^out in the
COUPO ahoulil come to aji end after th-3 compic-ticn of tho inuiiuntc as coon re
y:u;^iblc» V/C are jyirlj .CUlurly iUtcrestc 1; Of rourr-e. because ve have a large
contincent c•[' force- there -^iid, a.-; you arc av/firc, LMr, there have been GCERC
d" : . ] " j i i o in oar public circloi; that we cliculd e.i£:\rre that \;c do not become
indci initely involved in i ho Coir^. Naturally our t~ oops are not there to etay
for ill time. Irh^y vent 'i 1 ;?rc- fer a specific puipo:-^.- under a ^p^cific
icGcJ.uticn uC th-;j United h: t.icns, and \;e : re iv ih . f i / - - ed in ceeine; tho purpocon
of the United Il . i iyio i,; i'ul.j. Illt.u -nd the troopi; L tura hoine. \\e are not at all
kcea on or happy ab._/ut iu:n ntainiih; these foree^ indefinitely in another country,
even though it IG under the United nations flag.
FGB/kb
Lil-.e the representative of Ona, I feel tnr-t th-: :;tatci: nts iriado are CO
it that we should really die;; ;vt than, an--: I cou'M at tnlo stace cay
JV:ythl; definitive vrLiOiit ^'cttinj tiie reactions o. :.<y Government. 1 ut I ml
t^ko tiiis opportunity provicloniJly to not out roir.e oi our thinkino
It ic, of course, <].uite ri;_;ht th'.-t these n>\: -tinti JUG chould take place.
After -'ill, the Con^o pru'ulu;: coa only Le solved i. j Ll .j Congolese and i.y their
loc .lo-r.'j. Therefore?, the talks that arc f.oinc on i;.:tw;jc:i the Central Gover
..-H'l Mr. TGl:cin!,o :,re ouLte av:,)ropri'-tc . The only tiii.iif- ID that tiicy h' vc bcvn
Coin-^ on DO lu,i£ tn'iL i:::iny c C uj d'.;Lj;;:iir Liiat any'tiiir.'i.1; v/ill ccnio cut en' thci;i;
ar.a. bh-.t is vh ,t oaur;c:j :.. cr:K.t do-.il of anxiety ~- tu ;t the United W'l'iions han^
ir. a^i. L 'fomiai "cy^ Locoiiio i;ivolvGa in tnece t.ilK;. .u: 1 ha\c ::;:.id_, tr.o taiha
a:-j ::•-_ illy for the two partio..;, a^. i anything thc: 1. is agreed upon eetwecn th^w --
anything that COCICG atoub aj u result oi' tne tali-.r. ; Vi.k.-Laer it is a i'cocrai
GyctoM or a centralizou cy.ntem, or a cyatcm in v/aich ti.ere ic a particular Kind
of Ginrins oT ^ov/ori; -~ vovlu naturally be acccptal'le xo all of v.o because it is
for \h:ri to acl,iJ.c thc:;e r/vL-tcr c . 'iiiu only tiu.ii[a that ctrihea \\r, ID that,
•ilt.hov j;! it i;. o-jite viopcr l^r the United Hut j oa:> , ;j o LJ'ie rc;avioot of the two
parllcj, to Icna ita i-:::ori.'iaLal (jclvice anl to lu prc-i^nt at tiic talKG a-Ki
cct QG a catalyst, v/e have, I think, to be v^ry t^.re.iul that tiio United Nations
involvement, even iudireetly, in DieGe converBCitionj aces not lend a touch of
le^itiu^cy to t'no K'-t1 i.^a Govc:. nment.rj'hat is vhat vc ere nfr^id. of, becau.se if those trlkc C° o^ a"l o^ in the
preaence of the Unload Ilatior.:; and, in the courr.o of lime, nothinc; happaus^a
kind of £^ttj -MV v;in'l 1 vi.ll l.'ivc icon reached. Tnui. i;; to say that Katanra,
ai'tor all,*7ii"L h.ivo lathed en e'-Lu-nl terni:: v;ith i::e Central Oovr,rnment, and I am
13 lire ".alt Tshcruba will ui:;e thrit po;;itic-n, cr eouLd n:;e that position, to
establish !:cra. • liind of lo:rl tin^ cy . 1 do no c Lay that anythinr like that has
happened, but tnis is a caveat vin.ch must alway:; he rr. icmbei c:l -- that is to say,
the United Nations, although tahii;.; part in ;.:cr,i'': \r.'-y i.i these discusjioris, luuat
not, 'ii.reet.ly or ly inMliea'r/ion, 3-end any statue of 1>: :itiir.^cy to the inicpcmaent
or sn..;i-inde]X:nJent e/iisteiiao c;f the lOvtan^a (lo\ er;:n.ciib. Tnat, in ['act, \;onla be
entire.!. y cont/aiy to the reiser arid the spirit Oi u.e Jecur-Lly Council resolutions
which have, time and M^ain, laid down in eatep.orical ten.is the Council's
adherence to the unity, integrity and political independence of the Congo.
FGB/kb kQ-5Q
(Mr. Jhn
Although I r-.'iltc t ' . i .^o r^'arl 'G I am not si.yln.3 that any cr th^.e tv.r.r,s
h--.s K- '^n clone. as a n..- 'vter m1 iYut, I vould say th'it the United I];.tion;;
ip.'/olv :..;cnt h\c uce:i v-ry ::.li--lful u-,o far, and I ;. ivc no ccirncrits to hialie, but
I _LJ i';JLl tliat I cnonlJ :.v-l:c •- - .Lv , tr our poniti jn v:it,h r, .-vai-d to tiie role of tuo
U^:.-;:ea Cation::. It is tint thrrc niiould not be;, ever, t ;citly; any accvjo^an^e o
a ;;-j:it:v:., calvary to thy IKiited ifations recoluliorrj . I \Vc jd not Uj>' 11 out
ti\ire ;.1oi;olu.u.'.o;i^. 1'ncy arc very .i: :|;or bant -- thoc^ uf .?! Fc'^ruory end. 2^'- I.-oyoir.
1.; ;-ur'oXculr.ir i;ud, oi' L ' O U L ' L J G ; , ti'ic ourlicL1 o n c G t i j i i fc tiiio is r:. point -which l..'-^j
al\/jy3 to be !:;•:. rue in. i:;.u.rl. If •i.h.^.-o L^ll;o ^o volJ., ;Ma if -c:oy rccul ': in come
conclusion, e".. './-oJ.y v.ML be vc.ty l:"-Pi-y i-nd will .,-iu. L the l';:i".f.J. .\'; :. .".ji'.o a iiut
ii they go vrc ,;v, a^vi. t;i';i\j ii3 i 'ur tb .r t rouulf j^ tl.ca t:i-: Ui-.j.ted lotions .aight be
b.lp.:-.::, ,-;.t Gomf luture date. Thorc-rore, v;c have to pi elect ourselves . from any
pOGclblo criticik:i.;i.
TiiGsc nrc the important matters that have to be borne in mind in connexion
vith l,;a :'nvolv'Li:;ort 1hat t: c Uni t i I Tationc i:^c xia b:,ri ru-on .at the request of the
two pr.r Lies'. ' we f e e l - v i i a t t i ; f j pr'-Gence of Hv. Cuv.:iii,.r civi I.T. i;oli;-Icra;ott la
very valuable in. tho cu ia r^e of L!:c:;o. convero-.it-u. n.-. . i. cm euro that they ar:,
trying to ^ct the tallui "br-ck on the rails and to prevent the parties from drifting
apart and ending the discussions.
IIA/bg 51
(Kr. Jhn, TmHa)
The vay vo ceo it in that vhat the United I'atinna could do informally is
to in: a.Gt on the anno stance- cf certain funcS::; ;ont".l principles, unco those are
accented, then, of coerce, the ectsils of tjb:.;3o principles, in the form of trie;
c-Gt-.blidimjnt oT a Liui.ual rt-latior^hip between the ccnlre and the states, could
be vo-xked out, "bcen.us'.; there rr.any different possibilities arise,
l.'v- do not Tccl very sure, even ufoer tliece ^oveia.L montho of talJis, that
thcro ic realty a^ :-er; ;i,.;nt on fiind:;r.iental prlneJ.pl C.G bcLvecn the tvo parties.
For c:.r,iiiple, :i n tih; Id. i.ona ;-('rexi./ r.t of 21 iJcc^i.,.: ^r; :L c. is stated th:;b rvhc
r'/i.-sid.:nt of the Covcrriiicnt c:C the? Prcvinco of Kulan^a accepts the aj.pLication
( . > ' ' '",\\ * Fujidain' .rtnl Lirj, rccor.rrizo:; tiie indiSoolucJ.c \inity of the Rcp.L')1 .ic of
t...j -'jJ.:;o, re .'.j : ' ,nizeG Proc,Ld...nt Ivr.r.a-Vubn. ...". In other wordc, various
impo.''T:''nt and very salutary concliu;io:i3 uerc roachod.
"Cut then v;c Tina, i'.ceordinc if) docui::ent [J/;;J^")/Add.lO, that the Katarica
people D^c;a tf; have ^onc b::oh v.ui that. The b do^-urr.riYi; states:i ;T':,j i;at iri;-:a dol:r;-tion :.-r.^ucd thot the: l ' " ; . Vorr l^TiontnTo could not
"be comi•!•;:• i cd Oj [dicalj.1. ^ In v,'.c".r of ccr.-llt! CT, . I i - l i ab had co radically
•.liarccu :-,..ficc iti; adoption ...". (r>/'"9^1/f-''ir^.\p.j'\:'r-i._.5)ircm a curnory rcadii:;;;, ci.' tho doc-;i;i:cnt, I dv.- -aaL iaiov tiiat that pooltion
of tha Katanra Govern;.^nt lv:r, "bc;;.i chuprod. h v l u r i , ' . , i . y they wc.;:t to c,.o the
vho.lo picture before t ;iey vLII ony vhotlier the J,- ; T'-ivlr^-r-trb^"1.^ i- ^pl^i^-^'lc*
It LCCUG to rnc that tiiat places the Central Go^u, uacn l - in a \vry difl'lcvilL
position, and Idtan^a thereby ^ct.:; a kind of Llacki .aiiin^ pov:.;r.
'ihe IlniLcd I fot ion; ; effort shoiild be in tiio direction of having certain
principles l.i !:c Iho nnity ai.d torriLorial intr^rit./ c.f tiic Coii;;o accepted^
hav i r j the ^r i__Pr^r'i-i - n ' n l . accepted, unlosj and u-ibll, "by due proceed! of
ecu:;litutiOLf L ehan^^ u cl.\r:r;:;j :i.j laadc in that lav and a federal structure,
if ti;at ic iv reed up^n, ici pL'r^mJ.^al e-d,
,.nother fun lemeni al pri]i ' ;Lple ic that there ehnulcl be no parallel pover
capable of dcf j ance of the <J...,n!i :al GOVCIT-TK.. nt. Pre .-cnt diff icultie:.; ari.se
Irciii the fact that Tehemr.e bac too much po\/^r -- hj.tt u\/n independent army,
C;;civJa :.iiieric, etc,, etc. -- ana thercfe/re ho is L:I a position to defy the
Central Government. That brings up the Vaole question of the integration of
"n(1
the batata forces, and the crzostion of depriving them of their power to oa.intain
Ihoco farces, t.vj PCVCT to i'TMi't ' vcapojio or even to r^nivfaeturc weapons. .And,
of COUTJO, thoiM: has to be an i;naor''.itiop_al cr.l to ••>( •jc\-;.-.!:'.ori-r
If the £30 p arc a,:c:.pb ;: d, then It cc-,.rr.:; t "> 'J.3 that the details
the nharin^ of revenues, the par t ic ipa t ion of the roprc.r^.iitativoa of Ihitun^a
and oi1 other Uhi . ts in the CYn^cl Gc-vcr-n^ont, the- ::,.:. r i r . i of the po;roro of
taxaLio:^ the d,..linori.tion o:i: u'v.iictlta-:; of vnrl,.ju,i h i n l j i 'Ct,-rocu the ceatrc and
tiio ct; ' ; ; ,oG^ the }iie3ticn OL vlicre t l io rc'jidu^ry pc:::. .-."^ chuuld rc^t -- ;-.ij all
t.:onc r.. .ttora tliore coiild b-o a ^ood fioal of cc., ;prc ;- L r ; c f t And c.t that ^ ' i r - -^ f
I -'.hinJ^ the Uni ted iJat.lonr; roo.T- (. :.';'j;i1/.it:|'.voo C C ' M La p;.V.:y a very key role, a'linoct
a dccl"iv3 rolc\, v-y -ihcj.!' ptr..i 'a jj.01:. If the: ^iinc":.~' : 'r.nl:al prin^i.plc^ c?\.
accvp co:, then I ^uppuco tiie te^ti-al Goverment, cc'j.i.d ai'.-.'ord to be c 1:'. ;;i.le
f : ' :erou3 in the sharing of thcso various powcro bel./ocii iLio ctatca o^d the
centre,
ilcvover, from vh-at I could ^nth-?r, it ::cr.;'^ ihat th--y have "boon tryir;^ to
<'o th .'.::. .: the ov i;r ^, y ; roj.;.:<i: the .Cjnaai;:_it : .I V.\. , ./:!. a n- o jrct hay; ; :" !.K.:Ca
i i.':o i.ct ijiovr v.h other in t.rab \ ,ry a, ;r enent cculd be e;: ;>cetefl in i.he rear future,
but I " lh ink it i >z a very diff icult i. .,;.u. Aa I ec;bi ; U; : United IlationL bo
pcrforr j ' . j j .^ a vtiy juct rnd CiV/i. 'fopriat ; role in t r y L n c bo nebn thcr:i to rotr.h
i ' .arceiacnL. But there can "he ].o bet-up on thooe f ui;c!...-i, nt al principles "which
•Mwe be .:i rcneateuly C M f l i a o i i e d l;y tlie Uniteiri'itioii'J o'cciiirity Council, f::.Q I
t i i i i ' ik aj 1 the c.i foi 'LS absuid be dire;1. Led toward an unr.oui.:.'.L:lcria.i. acceptance
c,-'C -Lhoa;; prlnclp"Let';; an .urcoir'hLbio] <ab nccepCrmcc ;jf the ]_ rincJ ],lc:"; cf the
^.LtC'in a- ; reLiaenU 1 do Loi; kr.o:r, I l r« G."icrr.ito.ry-Qe::eral, bo -ha t extent your
;'eproi:cnoTlivo;j vhorc are hopr.ful tbrrt in at could bu -.'i:vnca bub that T,.!oubd "be
the vay bn vhich, J f I n~ay aay .:o h,....bli;- and taii'.ii-3 ve .y provisionally/,, I
•,/ould li . ^ t-o cee Ihc Dnll .ed babiona proceed; Lt L• a.":i;'.!/! b>e\vcry hard on those
rrineip.!.'.::; -- buu, one, lao.je prin^ipj.e:; are aceep lc i^ \;c cou.Ld advice c /en tnc
Uentral t iovernine.it to TJO perhaps a livblo more (; ,eneroii3 in the details in order
to ceo that all parts of the Congo arc satisfied.
IIA/bc 51
(I i.r. 3}-ir\} 3"nf'li a)
I mint apologize -- I know it ic very eacy to £ivo advice in thic matter -
and I ? . : . i not ci\ iri/j *uy advice, Lut: I think the pocitio]) of the.United nations
is very Jryporta.it in this whole busirrsG, We want to ho protected -- .and, ^avon
I nay 'Si-j", I IT.-:an tho vholc: of tho United Nation:; -- t;;j.-iinot ar.y kind of '
critici:j:ii later that there v&s aicUi/Lun C.T procure en Uic Central Government,
i.'j l ic-vo to avoid any indi . f ja t . i fn , cv-,n by ir-plication, that tho United I.'aLions
lias in rx'me cay equated the Katar^a 3ovorijr.^nt vit'i -tho (/cntral Govcrnirx at,flh.^ro c. i: be no equation in ih.lo Liattcr. The ntlvice o,'. t, ;c 'United ImtioriG Lhru
be carccted -- c. t tl;c;ir re^ucut.., c\" source -- to tao Ccivirnl Government al^-ays.
As a ir,Tt.ter of i';.\c-; 'ohc Ur i t^ 'd Ii.:t/.'-.-\a, Q'J.tlio'Yjh .uivi^j; infornal Cditacts Vi'tll
'j.'.jh.v.L'.l':"-. haz> tc bo vc-vy onreful . , •.i-.cn it vri ^?u Ictt-:.-!^ to him o^ t.viOorc him
fiuvioc-, tiiat the TCJ chovJLd be no conc^irrence .in that with the pow?r of the • •
Central Guvoririi, nto
On -..attcrs ::f detail, an I said, once the principles are accepted -- vhich
io vh.:;t iwlio^be ic chiiiln^ iro-%i ^1", the tirno -- much .c.^uld be dor/j by-way or
liiccti) 3 i > c , difi ..rent pc' / .uli o C vU.v, . . . .
\/j :i .J.ly DL r o v e , i ' l t ' e oCcrctu^y-Gcncral^- of tv,e of rcrts that 3'ou cro cc:?r'G
to ml a in t::a i-ij^-ii^ ixc:-s In ihc L'.v,-ut^c:-n capita'1 c, Wo ceri-ain.ly j"ecj. t i - . ^
1he Gcvernmcni: 01 i :.el>LiJja haa. a f - rcab capability of ir-ru-oncii-r; Mr, ^chcrrbo -~
and pc-rh:.'^s oomo oihc.- O^-vc-r^.Monio too, V/e havg heaid. it a;.iid for a I.C1.H time
ihat 1'ho (jov«;in\icnt o" ]Vjl.^Lvuii is now veering rounl to ( B o a t e r co-operation,
/ut, cur:i';y, it -is t a ; : ?n ' too J/.'nr; a ti;:n, I thinl: thab if the ]ici"ian Go'/rj/ tj f '.-j »J ' -•• .
ivi ide it v'.lcar to the -'"^'nJJjrvn v;^ _ -- and, after all, ihcy have Lcma control
over tliclv finances, be. ca.u^o thcjo aio ail cleared t.iroi\;U banJiG in liclji\:;'a ---
.ji:J if •(.'.•:.y cavo ^iic r- '(v : i l j auvlce to Tsljuiibe cad told h i j i i that he has to chare .
I!IOSG rc:'r..nucc in a ri.^.nor \ . j . : ; . ! - l i in agreed upoii^ ond l::nt he cniinofc cot any
diplomatic1', support fr.v.i lk'l^.h;i i o:* n i r - i i L i . d cf arL.od r.'.rojoi't -- officlaJ.ly, of
course, tuey tiro not C - ^ ' - ' C al';" i-i-'tied support, Lub f h c v - Ac no doubt thu'c coino
ia f;oinc ^'rcin ili!?.t pai L oi' the \. via to T,;hci.bc -- Uu.n iTK'h couVd be done, and
C hope thut yo\ir ci'fortn, Mr. C-..cretrny-Guueral, vj J I in: fjuccec^ial in that
direction, I think tliat other Governaientc, too, arc in a position to influence
IIA/bg 5^-55
(IT. Jhn, India)
the TGh'^be Govornnicnt. Thene diplomatic efforts, of rouroe, muct n° on, and
lot UG hope Ihn 'o they prod-ice Gcir . j rv.-C'.v.rt, DCMO Jr-pa-t.
The question ia i/]:at Lhc ;.-i fcur.ticu vrlll to iL notliinr happens and Tclior^be
ct.ayc GJ! at Ulir.abcthvi l.lu. I h.jpc- lie vill s° ba,;:!; to Looroldvillo for the
I'.alhr;. EirL, lno]:ln.^ at liio p;.itt-.;rn of tlic-ce tall::", or.c carinot roally fee l very
hor.cful that an /'thin,^ i;ill cc :v^ unt t^r then. fJc;>; L.ir^ IV.nclcijncr.tal ficrr.}o
MirGir:^; from tlVjGC tallic -- un<l that l'ii:iu::xK:ntal thr .^ i:i .'.sincerity, is ^ood
f a i t h _ , <"ni "the i~ :rt of the Katanga G'vveriiii.ont. lie Co no'I o;:actJy knew vhv. r they
are i'olluuirn; I;ICL:C taclico, r.Llicrc have been ru'iievrG that thc.y are "bui
up or th;.t tliey may CccL that, by a u-hcor prcrc;jr, :-;.C QLi/:Ition and by the
] a^ra.'^c c.:i' tiinC, they i;Lll havo c-^i-ablished thanccj.vcs in ccir.e kind of
i.rt'i.poi'! lent position and the uor.Lcl \;.i.ll have to accept them ao a £o1v^.acc
I'aybo those are the tactics behind it.
AE/rap
j]ut the1 point ic that tho United Nations, as you hnvo vary richtly cnicl,
Mr. Secretary-General, cannot fo on indefinitely, if on.iv for financial reacono*
Apart ii era the conr.iucration of financial reasons,, nd iiprru:!!'; in behalf of r.y cvn
delegation, .there is alno the fact that ceveral thuum^l uf our troops are tho/re and
the truth is thau public opinion in India reflects thab nobody vants to COG thcce
traopr, nwny frcra our countiy indefinitely. It io not cur policy to Send forces
outside or our country.
Of course, ".re responded to tho call of the United r>.tiona at a very critical
tirr.e and arc proud that \/e did no an 1 of the "behaviour of our forces in the Con^o
and cf tho accirtannc ur.d cup:;;crt vluch tncy ^avo ic tlic Ibitcu. KationL th^r^.
Gt:ill_, tiiat cannot ^o 011 indoJ.i niv-j'i. -• . It va:: not intciifl^d thot thc^e forccn
Ljhculc. veKiain in th-3 Conro indeCir-Ltuly. I helitvo th;-o serious th;ojr;ht must be
Liv.=a to tho (iiinition of what i-lionld bo done r.t'ccr a rc'tronable intcr^cl of tiuc
if denirnd results are net anhicvod. Uo shall oil I::ive to make thio uocicion
but I tivLik that priii.-vii'.y you, I :.;.•<, nccrctaiy-Ccncral, ulil have to coL:ridcr ^aac
chou.ld ':3 done; it i;i.ll be for you to docido vliGthcr 1 oc Cocurity Council should
be co;.3.:ltca and, j.f :;o, vJ^t rcv.,o;-,.:uo-.dation you \/;.li !':.,i;e«
i"aturnl3.y_, [ ciin not in a pobiiio.i to ^ai,cj eny LI.; L.. :nt on future rolir.y no'r.
!,ro have not ci.vcn tho vutlcr c:^ L.ioh thought GC have yea a 'l your colleceucr; fiv.i
day to day. But I do bolieve that ti;:j Gituatiun ic vo;y unsaticiaclory. I oi.i i.yt
pleaded by the comic r/j--ia th.nt in c°-;-r--d c'nJ tiicy n.ecl.; they p^rt, ti.ey meet ar;aia
rnd part a sain. One c: y tho nowLj is very hopoiiil; i:v:j r.'jxt cL':y it ic very
Such oveiJ'.s cannot be ollovrcd to continuo iadof i nitc-ly.
hcwevor, 1 wlzh i 3 cay l;l:at I asii not j or^iuLatic. i;r. Ga'^diner and
I-'r.Rolz~.!onnett, who are vo.ey dedicated nnd ablo P'-cpV.^ arc dealing with thcce
problca:3 ;.vad have contact with the two parties and J. none thai- they will be
cucccncful. o But let uc not I.OGC- Gifjit of the principle;; and the position of tho
United i.'itionc in tliij .revttor. l/o can only no^o tliat your effort n and those of
your collcacues -./ill ^uccoed in I:ri.:^_n0 a^out the necessary accord in order that
wo may conclude I ho United r.'at.lenG operation in the Con^o successfully and thus
bring credit to our Organization.
• fti« '1'ihlu !•;•AE/inp 57
2£ £:yi!£Jr * vich to thank the representative of
India for hia VCM / valuable observations end to oncuro h>i:n that I shall bear them
in rdrd. I ;:'_ali mho a very brio.: cc^n-^iu on cci:a or tho aaia po:in';a t&tt heraise 1,
V/i th regard to principles, I nra entirely in a. .reorient with him that the
United Nations should adhere to the,,! to the veiy letter. By "principles"; I of
co-jvoo refer to those principles which oicuuntc: ircu tho various resolutions of the
Cccurity Council and the (ieneral .Assembly. It will cc L'.y constant endeavour to
continue to adhere to these principles.
fo-ardinc; the question of eo-.iatiic the Centrn.l Covnrnracnt with Katanra, I also
Gntir-.;ly u;:ree v'.th lii.ui that tho Unitud IJationc r..Ir/i;l,i no I: attc!..pc, to equate th'-
i:o.rltion (..!' the Central Oovorninant vit.h that ol' th*-1 !,at.ii.::ene ai;thontios6 Whil.e it
ij truo that Liy vopr-.:-i-nL.ativoo in the4 Co;:;;o par'..-! j.:: pa tea in tl:C ncrot:! ationr. that
too.: plac'.., they did GO merely in an ad'/iscry capa^dr/; in order ' to expedite the
soliitioii of the variouG probloi::..; by peaceful mcrn in^ r.incc matters of conciliation
arid negotiation are part of tho li.^.iO.^tc of th'j rcr.olbtionc of tii3 [-ecuriiy Council*
1 wiah. t j o t roG3 thrt no j.nfcre^co t:]?.oiild be c!rar,m i ' i< ' i ; i 1 no par LiGJ.];;a1,ic n of i;;y
i 'cp/ 'c l , j : i tati .vnG ..1.11 theGC tL ' .LJx ; in t h - - capacity w. .Lch v h,a;e jiiot outliut:^ wnich
*.;cuid l^jav ' l to th 3 fa].rjo c.jncln(;;ion that Iho Unic^d h ' a L i o i . j has c-nmtcd tho Central
Govern...-jnt of thJ Conpo vi th th3 co-calleu authorities (• .£ Kat-an^;a,ri;o dminarir.o L;y thotjlibs in thu Giivj^.tion, tae p rcb l r j i . . of the Con^o is the
problem ^f the c j c e c r J . o n of i^a i^n^a j t);e prociosa c-f th-,. u'atan;;a t3occf;Gicn io
prLnarily a problem OL' finances; the p.L'oblci.i of f innp.cjn, in turn, in the problem
of Union Plnierej and tho prcb.Leni of >.:nion Liini^r,: ii;, in itc turn,' the prcbieia of
Hcl^ium. That ±z n# intorpraL.?.t , i-;n« !• jr this reason, I nave been taehiih^; 1 he-
root of the problem for GOJIO tJ.L:o. Without revealing oho trend of the diGcnscions,
tl:e ir.dico.tion3 iJ:;. thj la;iw ro;; days aro hopeful a;.d ^rc i;.ay n^Dvma that, if lol^ium
oo-cpcrr,los whc.Tohcartcu'iy with the United ilations, tL.i entire problein will adrnlb
of an eor ly soli u ion a Pnat ia why I . :,!]._, if 1 "u.ay, continue to tac^lo this
problem ab its core.
Consistent uith my thinhinp in this n:attr-r, I liavo Veen in touch with the
r.?l2ian G'TverriLiCnt for r-u:.o H..M and have ezch;.m;p,d vi-^-i ;- ^ith the hc l{ .Un Foreign
iiinistei person..lly on i.ovxral occasion;:. I ri iail cont inue to (-::e}ic.,:i/:>.: vicvrs on
bills subject TJh',. a I vis.it VicsV-rn European countries n .:.t. rioiith, 1'ithout inahin^
any conir.iitruent at this Gta^e, 1 may say that 1 am rather optimistic about the
outcome of these talks.
AE/mp ' 58-60 ' ' fi'ii't
( 11 • ?. _f\ ct 1 T i rfl_[>Mr r tn ry- Or nor n l)
There .is another relevant factor to be consul r» re Ji in ucalirc with tha
financirl problem: .in tha overall p le iv i re of the Ccn~ > oi:o.rc\iimn. The lut
Court of Justice, I an inforir.cclj will co^'j to u ciociicicr^ ^atliin tlic context cT
•cli2 General AGKC!-.hly ] 'CL]oluuio:i of ' rr!i;r::c, in about t i : - j iiilddlc of July. Hits may
i'.ave voiy import. -.at implications re::r.ii'dinLr tlie a t t i tude ox certain Member States
to the l.-ond- is8i:;.^»
1 \ri:-h to t>.an!c the representative of India a-;r,in for Ms very constructive
Giiccp-tions. Gi i i^e I have tT.ro tipoal'.nrG on i^y list and tlr* time is running short,
it might Le well to hear from tnc-m at thio time-,
^'r, JO'lir'^TT (Liberia): My dole-nation wishes to thank you,,
:<;r, Gecrcf ary-Gc:.'-val, n^I lir. liolc-Buiuiett for tho infcrriation contained in the
atf.i.te:..-'jnt.- ?;:ade j:C-rc v-hi:) morniii;;>
jii -.-lew of the line of action which you propoce to take in conducting tallcs
with rcrtalii European Govoi'iTniont:]^ my clc-lcfration consider.:; that it ic Ta-ei.:-r!:ni'e to
co'/'v.cnt lur fchor un the pjor/^riu titute of affairs in the C'jnr.o. V/e thorouj-ily
Mi -pro\ .} <.:.f your j .ropo^ecl J.inc of action. I^y del oration w i.ll continue to watch
viji i lr .TLiy all f^ i r thcr develop^cntc in the Ccr/j':> unl nonn f "a prcpnrod to leopoud to-
your siiia.ions at any tlrro, in the further conr»idoralion of this problem.
TL/en 6l
nr._Mahroi^P,IAT) (United Arab ?iOpublic): /.s you said,
Mr, eV'Cretary-Generalj, t.hej is running on DO I t:;h'.ill kc very brief.
Allow me to arayjcr the question that was put by the /:nbassador or
Indor....si.-i, which I think is a basic question, ccar-emii-^ tlie state of nind of
Ik'. 'I.-kor.ibo, I think that ikr. Tsho-.-r.bc is cornn3'.^ uJy c. £3,1 net the unity of the
Conro and is trying to cicatc an independent state in hatanfp, I cto not
believe he i:ili :rive up this idea unions a certain amov^t or prcncure is put on
kin. Mr, Tchenfoe- is a very clever inan^ or cine hie a'Vvicerc are very clever
and brilliant rien. They l-no.; tliat ti:.:e is in thoir Tavour in this situation
:.,•'/! tl.et they ^ro f/iiniij^ f r c -n i ail the::.c ne^^tiablf > n e , Therefore ; xinieGE
P'- - GiT.v.ro is pi:I; on lir, 'ichor. !:e he will never ri/e up.
;>jch pressure can be arplic-.l in several ric.M';: political pressure,
economic preceurc and i;iilitaiy prcosure, pnliLlcally, we l:i.ov: i:hat certain
Westc in Po\;er:, arc Lacliin^ Mr. Tnhoi.ibe, There i., no -oubt about tiiat. It
is i-i'ue that c-.oi^ c>r i iicjii Gey they ae'o rea^y to eo-opou*te \?el. li the Uiiited Nations
aiiel te iuipleii:.'. n,t the United batkeis larjclviLi^nij. Eac 1 believe thae up
until now they lave been iv/buuiaivt and iiivo not olio.Ju CMOU^II acoei'Uii^atlon to
ir.;pler:ent the:,c i'eijolui:.lori3; neL cnle n3 far aa too IcLLoi: ef t.iiora C!"JG:; but
i.ioi'e especially j.n regard to the r.pirit of tlie resolutions. Thus Totiouit'c
still oontinuej to receive politic;..,! eupporb.
In the- economic ,n.tua;,ion, ve knov/ tko pocition or the Union RLriierc,
ITow, *:}\o owns bhe Union l i i . u i / T c V I believe it ij certain bl;;; Pov/cr^ that
own the Dliares of tlvj Union llinibrc -- B^J^ 'U-m, the United KJnr/ lcm^ the
United otatco rind LSOL;,.' ethers. ibe main bu lk of tiio eliarcc ic in the hands
of these counerl.es, and of course if they ie:;.Lly wi.su ee co-oporato \-;ith the
Unitr. l Ilation;; ui.der j .Ls resolutions^ 1 thi . i k thoy ca i - d o a lot in this matter,
Uho is it th.-at is buying tlv: L i -edu--uien cf tiu Uai^n. iilnlere? Also
certain '.Josborn Powers. 'ihcrei'01 o they have a po\/criul means at their disposal
for iiii.luenci ^ the situation i.n i iat . -Mira.
;.:.; to mi ' t tary pressure , , \ ; ] i i j - j I u.iu not trying to :^ake any military plan
for tno Uiiite i ilntion;; force-s i..h.:re in the Con^j , .1. ^.;ould point out that if the
advisji'3 of Ik'. f.i 'sn'>;,.bo l:.new th;d; ,.ho balance of stre; ' i0Ch was not with then
they would accept the idea of negotiation and would be very mild, and we could
TL/cn 62
brinf, this matter to a conclusion. As I undero! 'iri'l it, tho United Ilntlons
force: 3 iii the Congo arc xaul-v vho dir: \tvant -i^a oi" not. >win^ cut'i'lHent if:ans
oi1 tr:1.; ;vnortat.'.,jn, no the: i;:llit::.iy ;:itintlo:; vLll f.l *..•;;; bo iiivou;-v.t:uv to- j +J *.
I!r. rJ::V.'-i;f.--o. .:Au-t her., lure, no Lji-f ' ai certain fo'- ' - . / irri towers conolnuo to
rviippor^ i-Ir, Tc].jj..bc and a:;c:iL,b hii;i Ly ^l.vin^; }d!,i :i : r: aiid a.llc-win,: r;.-,-rccnariGG
lo ent-.-T ir.atan,';a, he will always l:c in a strong position ana he vin neverCive i^;,
I believe that the approach of tho ^cGrc'oary-^-cnoral to tho problem,
the rvprrroach thron^h cjiitmit'. ' . ' : • • covtcvLn h'cGt-.i 'ii r : . J " i V - _ , Ic a very vise r,:iil
r-oun*l one, 1 hcpe he vi LI i i - . icccccl in Ivi.r; talhn r i v i I rua very f f l a r l to l i^nr
l.r.vt ho is opt_,r.j.Gtic, But if \}i\ .z 'iTr'i'oach i ' ru l i r ; tu urir;r; a re til solution,
then, vu riust bj i'ca-ly to raiso till;; quj:;tLc);i G.,;_faiii. i/i i:.u Urdt-^vl JTaticnr^
olthor in the .^etauily I 'ounc.LL or pOiiiaps in the C " O i v : ' T " . L /.soci-ib.ly. For many
re£ib3Li3 we ILUS ^ thin]: L ' b o u L tiiij al:;^, Whon I r ; : f^ :u . i . n) the Go.i-.ial Acneinbly,
1 Jo , . , ^ j -jo. nt i.-o ceo t.Vti.3 prcl)] ::i:i aicounocd In a f:!:jj .(i-\<ar aLao:; ;-i;:jrcf
la tL':.;3 r ?GC i.j i..;.ve to L-u ^._ p ..•,.. ,-^urc on t.h V'C.i i .o^i PC.' :.; 'CJ±-;; to put prccaure
on Hi'. TGac--:O lo i;cci.; ru an p .._;:;: oc: • ; ;Vt. Au t i J i J M/. . ,. v.c Di;a3..l. vait/ tDl vo
Vic a3.no hopt;, r:nd oi' .uuuisc .w ' .> arc cure, ttrit he Iru h' 1 or \;j.Il 3iavc d
here in the UnLtod Gtai.ec al£-o :. Thcn7 \;hcn \;o ]:ear I.i.cm h.im about the
of his taJ.'.'G, \,e way be c.blr,- \o si'binit our advice concerning the next G
to be tahen. • • . •
Th° Acj^n^nrr^TT-^Y-rir.r^AL: I would lil: to suppleir;?nt vhat theoi' the l;,ji'L.jd ;.i.,i.- M^uuMie said with tli~ liifoiTn" 1 1 on th^t lact
•year., l^Cl^ Ih1. T c l i ' i i . ' i o j tv.M hi-j (Xi-llcaf^UCL; — that IG, the I'.aL^ncocc. authorities —
{jot .'i.>Ol;_,COO,0'JO in the forn oi' revcnuea i'j.'Oin tli.; Union 1'inibrc alone, _ Co it
can be seen tl.o.t thio ic tl,e root-cauoc of the vliolc problei;i»
TL/cn
LL'§J'Z'::(-''A (Corrr;o (Lcr.poldvllle)) (interpretation from French) :The Tollovi-^ is L]:e position of the Government u.-I' the Republic of the Conr>>in respect of the evolution of the Katanga alTai s,
ovo days after blr. Tnh~i : .bc 'G c-purturo from Leoyoldvillc to Elicabethville,
thus i::di".a,tir.^ tho intci ru]/tion; if not the enu., of tne nerotiaticna vhich
the Ccr.bral Govcr imiGnr , had agreed to undertake vith the dissident lenders
of Katrine;0-, the Covorn:n:ont of tho Con^;o vlchoG to inforn tho Advisory Ccinnittee
Y'j Government considers L:at the negotiations it has aluays advocated
for C-. poc.cefuy solution of tho oord'ltet no lonro; r aro oppropriaoe to oho
'.:rcuiortanccs, The Central Government, since tno bcfnnniivj; cl the crisis,
r.-uj ;.i tuayo coiydib a GO'orb ion thir^uyh peace'.'ul L.o.in:: and ha:; aluayG practiced
a policy of r/jii-violenco. It has had recoiu-so eo arja:, only as a last resort,
"jib:: ::;: ,ni concorn Ivoo a3.wc.yc "been to end tho oocejolon of the Province of"
Dui.'._"r, this tin?. Ivr. Tchonoc, vlth the support of certain forclc- cr.pibalict
circles ^'ivj.•:•"..: a.-c (luite veil huoun, has never cc\iscd to am 1'J.niseli, .hcwinf;
in ;:.'o.':i: £•:'':• i^; .1 vorl.;:;.b3c ri i . iy of ir.orcciia.rior; ^:n.Lcu todpy nuucors in exc.or.c
of lu,COO trcopj. lie h^s obrained heavy weapon;, an/.-'-ured cri 's, tanhs^ and
f ino.H ..y even : ichter i)lano3 oo.d ,;ob planec» !'!;; an.:;:, "which ho ha;::
nallieieusly cji .L' j .ed a y;:ndav;ue.:le5 :J n dirocted by _'.lf.-'~c-aff of a?.l 1:1 nds:
by pro'ieccion:.,! Iril.lerj iro;;i bho O/i.,.1, by exbronists fron Algeria and foreign
le£;ices, by ro.cists fron b'outh Africa and Southern hhodosi.cie
!iy Government ir.usb point out 'that a].l thifi has been .brought into being,
that oil thir. ni'':rcojra.:iy r-.rrny hac- Leon created, ^,;it;h -i ]i-.: fu.il kno-ulcdro and
before the very eyes 01 \,Iie Uheted. Idvu.I.ChL, The U n ' t . o . iiatlons operation in the
Con^o i/ao cojio-.rivod in toiur: . " t l ic ouccoL.::rive rc^olnblons of t'he Cccurlty Council
and the Gencivl Asoc^uoly^ in order to i'urnisli mi].i.h.'.iy assistance to the
Govero...ont of the Aopu'jlic i-f id:o C - M y o to t'ae < _ • . : . L o ; ' r;afefjuardin^ itn
indep' j)- idonco -aio t .^r r i . [-..^ial intor./ i ty, Ginco tho nontli of Ju.ly l^rJ, the
L.elto L Ilation, Orrj ' ;r , i : ' . ' ; .bion liao h.. • to deal uith the :;ituatio.r: in tho republic
of tho Uon^o, and In oartlcu.l.ar \;;i th the situation c r>o vbcd bocauce of tho
secc.osion of h.atan;ri, Tho resolutions adopted by th: various United nations
bodies have t.dxn note or tlie fcircri^n influence and decided upon various measures
appropriate to the ending of the accession. But after tv7o years of discussion,
__ / ,,, ^TL/cn 6^-65
(!!r._ 1 VT^I , C'^nrn (Loo
it must be c.c?/J.owledrcd that^ rrart i'ivm the- c^::pul:jioa f-r a lar^c murder of
foreign iiiorcerrries, Uic dissident Ico/lcrs or the ^ r o s i u c Q invjlvccl continueto n-Ti thonsolvju and roinforc'^ their ^ocitiou. It is reprftttablo to have
to ticl.r- "Jl'jd^o tharcrui 'C, tli:,t/ Lhe ra^olvvtioiia hn,vo rvrL been fully applied
with record to thin c\ixa of -L-ho Cou^o. The intc-i^iatioiial Orc-'^ization musttal-i'.j r.c,-l:c of tl;i.G failurec
Li.t in spito of this situation raid in fIntrant contradicition to the
United nations ievolutions, the Central Government ha/; placed itself at
i-Ii1. rj1c}-rir!bets disposition to ntudy with, liim the possibilities Tor a speedy
ruintec;ratio:i without recourse to anus.
Hl7/rh
^pivrt froin the situation in tho nocescioniot r-'ovinc;,^ r.y Cc vern:::ont hlG not
been ubie to succeed bccauce of the d-layin^ tactic:; oi' Mr. Tchoubc. Ilio attitude
rince Tanane.rive is veil hno'.rn. Thin wn:: ono oi the first efforts at rapprochement
v'hir-h vu.3 attested at Coquilhatvil le, and ho has r.ever e^^it'Ccd . himself
irrevocably ana clearly, T;:c "I'jrty dry." of dincuDi-.io3i.-j ceorr.-d to brii\c a tiaie
i^provviiiont in rur I'^lationc; vcrkin^ curjEittucs v j i c :;c'o up \mich were to oe
ci.tj--u3-,.-jl vith tb-3 explor^ticn ci' t;.o \?holo (inoLit !..>n oi' rcuiilf iccition^ but
!ir. T:J.- :nbo had r3fi.i^ed to ciyn a final ccr..--'.1.!;-/!^.. •• > On 16 Jo no ho IcTt Lcopoldville
tn'ter nfusinG ^o :ri.(^u Uic r^fvical aiipnarcd to have bncn ri 'c^cditntG^ . I!'; had
;'.v>OU:i I'or ror'r,y dc;y^ Lhat he vrnilO.. accept ijothirj^;. and J J J . G do^^r -'^re ;-.?-msd to bo
u, . • owj -tactic. In arvecinr; to r.tnp n.^otiationc, he vac tryir.j to r'.'.in time to
c:-rcn:;inon his si tir.it iun rrlliturily and i'in::nciaU.y, cxhauctin^ the national
t.-io:L2r.:iy c,nd. iTicrea;)in;: tho a.i..p;r';i enco oi the United l:':i!:ions.
TJ'io Cover? jucnb of tlie CC;I:P;O hao reach- d the c:;iiciur;io:i that the tine for
norpti.xtir.r.c; is rnst. iho u - j ^osc i c i i lL / f c nv.!;itun -j of the hat^ar^oco continueG. Tho
jj:>l'.'".ed iia.-.. er>J :iiU,ct d c i i n j i ;:.;:. jr;_,...i ;!;.:. to ;;• , ; . . -• ; .•<,• dorr," I/ <'u."-'! d^-t;orr-iine itc ay^rojirifite
iuoanij .:u' ac^:.0: eo eu^ure full and unro.''?rved :h;v_:i.CTJ:.nt:.atioii of itc, rc^oluLionc;,
T.^e people of the Cun.^o ha/e c i i ^ f c i - c d ciiou;^:. 'lie..1/ have i^L-ced t!-.nl:r truat
in the United n?/jionn and e:ax:>-:\.od -Crrj in it thj cr.fen;iLa:nU;i{v; of their independence
and territorial : -itej-rit;/. i'; ^,:yru.T; th:it foreifn ir.uiuencG:; e::c.?ed th'c Kec.rm
and rcrjourc'sr; availahl^ to :,:vj lnt^rnatiorio.1 Organize, tiont Incvitaoly^ the mandate
must te changed and tho Orcani^atioii inuct rive proof of more finuHCSf],
n nn-oria)*. I ^TiG;i to put a rranll cuppler:entary questionafter liGtcnin;';; to the- v^ iy i.-ifon^noive ctatc;i;er.t^ that have been made and the
answer;; to vai IOUG nuostioni'V- lor \ j i i i e l ; we die lu^t ;p.\i,tcluJ-«
j;j ' tcr heerirr^ th : ]e;.;t iiroervi.ntion^ I . -,a net qe l^e sui'e whether my
supplementary (iuustion ve.c aej .r /red^ Ao I Ivjol: ab i_'ai'a;_-raph 3'<- of the report with
which we are at prer;e.ii; t^jri! >/riied ; llier-e app:ar3 to bo a hint of finality in the
stblto!;} f./f tie C e i l i v . L (J . . iv . - : j i:L:onc a3 regard;] ccnLLnu, . i:-icn of the taJ.hf.;. ±b nayc
there 'iUite clearly t^at the i.ata.i .-cco waiibed a i •J'erceice to ctu-jeciuoM b talhs; i,he
Central Gov-ei:.,]jenu re,.;;;:ctcd it ann. would not- have it in the- cejv:.rjni'.!.uo.
ijubuc juontly, the iri...e Minister :L: reported to hiv/o L;aid that the ball wao in the
court of the United liatione. You caid in paccir.rj, Mr, Uecretary-General, that you
agreed with tais.
MU/rh 67
It ic not Cor nrj to av;t Lo^nto tto ::.a::y etc-.." vo ' ch you vili no doubt bo
cons.i i"1-oriiiC^. 'out i v 10 WOP/ .-i' lor if, in I'ac-b, tr.ro I:; a "better definition of
tho Viovo or Inc. Cenlve.l C^v-" uo:;;.. Mb an r^rnrun any nuhoequont tolkc. Th:i « ird.f'i
occur in tho "ncantia^ vliilri ;you ai ? on your tr:i o to Mm-opot I ;^a n-jt ..-111.0 c3.c
rih^M-'o thin, I!;/ fl..-le ration vonld li!:o to Un^.r T.'hoilr.i.1 you havo .a mor-* precis':
-Ld-r.i "3 ~oj v.^ther ; in ::act_r they vo-.rb to bavo rn^ ro t-\lo3. Uo understand their
rcolii lLC^ Of CGUrJC > find tllOCO tl:iir;a up to now liavc been futile, but we chuuld
Ii:u5 to Iinoi;,
D c r o r m a n C ' J ^ u/ cvuj. ~o; it i;..; n:i • >
int of f in:;~._J"y^ a:J you 1\ .".:;•/ e n a i / I
a:i'l I i'ecl 1 :HVG rrij;.;o Mi.n. i . r ;L^r ^'..' '
I!--- — tic.tior;:: vLth i i r a 'iubc ov;oe L ' \ I
JooCJui i r . ed c:: a rc-olt of the clov • •
riAT,: In the lirio or Mr. TciioiEbe's ro-1^
:. j Landr-a.'.Lo t:^t r r l ruo Minister /looula ('"P.VO n
^ ro;'-:vrcl.^:ir \,ho p^or.pect oi" i'uta.vo nc^ot-iationc,
(,, of courrc, liiu • HKil c.iititu'lo TJiJ.l "bo
opi.iont!^ vh toh :J.T%: ;jtili iiuprcdictrinlc;
I . 'ont \/i:.'.a to i.,:\i .j a cori .:r- i.i...-u Loi'o: -; vo -',n j j - ' ivn . I cold a r^oront ayo 11: -it
too iota' . •- vo.>-.!^ po.i.d by rn't'oi ; • • i i x o v - - - to tlio K.'.'.. . i ; ' • , ;oibh':.ol. blon .l:-;:'i y t •--. .- - . • • • . ,
(•(>') }'< . .00 ;C;-JO. Aoti- :? 1 Ly7 tl:iu v^ ;..-.,: ^o, 000 coniitiiv.; l:oi -Lho ioiv: i revoiro;,; i-,j.,o::ivca
L;/ i ' i i O K:r : j i>-- r ja aiUJiOiitioo,. (,'!.' cj i ircc, tljiu (..-- ...... ,. iluccl i'ov-r;\.;:G Tro-i cthcj.*
L.OTI V ' ,OD ; EM>..':. r?.n r'o;irt£onyi '.:•. C".:.'iico :.-.,•: .ionn on'i o t i j . - i ' . : . r:;i'i.: L ;•:;... L i I uv:. 11.13 .'OJ..;! 'by
I T n i . - v ^ . i i . r - ' . ' . M , - . - to El ; i:.u,both / . :,.-.G lo.ct yoar vac; ^V^v • ;^ ; 7. - ' - - ! - T:ho. .v' '-5,f:- '^,00.-
VOG the tot J. rove. iioo, oi1 Oxiicli ti^e revenue paid ly ;?o ' • m j o ni^ro vdLJ tl:;j i'iourG
vhicii I havo ol"-^t oujtod,
Onc-G a.. :?,:.-.], t i ' : -ok yo'i for thin fiuitful discussion and for tiyic very
corr'.kructiV'j c-oucio:^ I oi;:J.L look Tui^aru to luocLinc you ac^in COILG time late
in July on my return i'rora ...uror^r
at l."0
ret,.'..Tif1; T ro. uG
UlttTED IIATin::.-; ADVinrRY CC'IUTTOil TliJ CO.!1 JO
at Unit<-d KaMrns II"rid quartern,on Tuc^la,/^ 2-4- July I>o2, at ;? p
.-nv York
u TiL\:rr
Canada
C'.;-7'1.o.'l
JilUiioj I. a
l/'cdoration of
i.'ihcina
Cu ! nca
he Ac tine uECRtTARY-GEIJERAL
1 :.r , I i: I.A'LACL'KERA
-all
;r . : : i ; . :'. a ; JO- C OGROWARDO JO.^. o \inudVAiJ
iiini.j.i.3,
United Arab Republic
i r. Ai' ;.;JL
i -!."G • ' •- :J»-ji-/J-J
IV. r i \ ;- i .ob -GLIM
Mr.
G2-l6l66
Tho^/\ntirif:J".rn;;r.T/-.rY-rr::irT^M,; K:r:a^:.:c of tlic Conrr.ttt-c, I call upon
you once ore fo..- i-dviee — th i f : i^i..-- in a t:cct dii'Jicult and cliallGi^iiig phase01' Ir:? United Ik:; lonj opcrat1] cnn .in the Ui .^ fo .
Til': Adoula-rj^hciiibe l:il!r.a in .U o~ -\.10.v ilia h'lvo Ir^hon off vlthout, any fruitful
rocul-c. :;?:. Tsh -b^ ct ^ho l-ot i.: !.]•;• :o; ^Tur :d to U:A'O with ar.'.V ci^i the i'lniil
oo- ";ur.:_o;;o: end L;.ince thin we? 3 ':.;i r ^ . ^ o l cui 'cMtLjn -V.^r r ;^btdn: ; ti.c cor.ninr'-ionn to
v-or];^ i : r . _ Adculr. .:cruGC3 to do rnyUi i_n^ in tli^t dir jctio-n until the cor^a
Fo." ".-juinc hlr» return to niinr.bothvillG, Ilr, rrr/.K.inbo has civon more thin
nnov.c'n c\idOi.cc i iiat hie nc{,ot;'.c..t;li;:;i3 in Lcc-poio.vj.llc tcv;arcic; ending I^tan^r1,1 3
,.;ccco.:lo:, u-^ro l".o]'.in;'; in ni i? .^- . . i .Ll . - , "»
Vovy :}iTTiiiiv iitly iu the, Lr.c.:: >our>d is the; i:;ni.v? oT n. now conotitution for tha
'"'oi'C0' Cr'n.y^oc ,, o.J couv::^^ v:ii..t.; lo c..;C In ruiv.::!.:1?. r, cr :i"tj.tut:i;-;n i;lvt ah uoiilt: clv
Ivuu c'.tl 'U. 'it he \ii:;hc:> on bC'h?/li ' oi' K'.itP.ry:, beroj.-:; 3v; i: . • :.; L:.;V I'^r:-. cci icr-3L;; ,cr i
••n f?cc';"... ion. It io r.ooL unll:T:l;"^ in r.(y "yic-';:^ t l i " .; :.0.-a: ;i ut.ll t:u:o a : ; / C o o p to
.\it L...,.'.' y ..... . .hoirD^ :; A thlG ::"e;y.ivU ri:i;C.^.i;,^.'e, t l jui ' -? vonii L.;cm to l;c ucj re;-.! pru^ico
'J...-.J i.,'oyall;I/;:j att'.tiiJ'j ol !J. h : :• ; . . '.::0 'ird lUr. v:. ' l l-.; . : :'^c:' to^:cir-"lG 01FIC IB anyUixnc;
hut iricr - i . ' l y , \;j ;,b c o i f L u hr.vo l;-.,,n n, i.ir^t curious clt...n uctw^cn Gi'iL.U troc^o ',";••!
vuj (_;cnd;;. iii.orie \;,;j oiuy 'njr icvjy c.v«jrv...:l on 11 -j\ 1 • \:i:- n the K-t-uu.-oc Ir.-lc 1^1^ over
'.ai: oji.jvjitioa, on cclobratln' ; tK-ir co-c.?Hod IM' J C.L.'V! -.:nce, nt uMch tir:o aiao
'oii,"3 I'r.,t;.; . OGO cilici'i] L; i ;; < - ? x ; n .\; k ;;i.i ':^.icv: l,l.;.ii, tji...:.r \/c.: ••! ia V7o-. ith!.c;ji3,
F;v:lK2rmorc, u L k o t :.,cilov:,- li .ci ' j jut occur- .;d jn J7 .ruly in Lluiabcthvillr:Ti1ien a. ]•"•. •: viiiOd r.nd v ic i^ : , j y c; '? ; t^oivc:d aoGuult by thuu-xirv o of ICacais^oi:;;:; \7C ;:.::.rt and
. ' i l L d r c i i \;.ic uiadc on Indi.xi truupc ot a I'or.d-bljclu 'ihu.;:.- tr^ov;.;^ ii:Cl',l.ci:U:J ]y^
.;-'.ui»loyo''i :-.-cir:G.rl::.blo r<-oti'ulrt o^id diccipliiiQ under Gxtrcr/.-j provocation, and never
i'iic-J. (Mi tho i:-C}\jt
T.:]K:. ^o ho.G nm? £ono ac far nc to indicate; to Mr. Gnrdincr hifl intention to
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MP/jpm 3-5
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Having just returned from a rather extensive trip which took KG to several
European capitals, during which I had the "benefit of a number of exchanges of
vievs on various aspects of the Congo question, I propose now to inform you about
these disciiGGionc.
Since Mr. Gardiner has come to Headquarters at my request for only a day or
two of irrcenslve consultations; I shall subsequently also call upon him to report
to this Coinnittee on the latest facts about the Congo and on his impressions of
the situation and the road ahead for ONUC.
(At this point the Acting Secretary-General made some off-the-record remarks*)
AW/kb 6
(The Acting Secretary-General)
As you can readily surmise from what you already Know about the Congo,
some vital decisions about ONUC are going to have to be made without men delay,
I very much wish to have your thinking about them. First of all; naturally, is
the question of whether it will be timely and advisable now or in the near future
to go to the Security Council in search of a new mandate for our operation in the
Congo or for clarification and strengthening of the existing mandate set forth
in the Security Council resolutions*
Divided counsels are given on this question. I understand also that the
bis Powers have differing views about the advisability and utility of a Security
Council meeting on the Congo at this time. I an mycelf not unaware that there
may be considerable risk in going to the Council now, for if the meeting should
be held and no conclusive result achieved, the United nations effort in the Congo
would be worse off and I, in its direction, would be more handicapped than now.
Only Tshombe could gain from such a result.
I know that there are some who take the position that no new mandate or even
a clarification and strengthening of existing mandates is needed from the
Security Council, on the grounds that the resolutions of the Council already
afford me enough authority to have the United Nations Force do whatever needs to
be done. I for one — and I believe that there are a number of others -- seriously
question this view. It is clear, certainly, that there is no mandate entitling
Lie to employ force to achieve the political objective of ending secession. It
could lead only to harmful results to try to do this deviously* I entertain
your views on the question of the need and advisability of an early Security
Council meeting on the Congo.
Of even greater importance, from a practical standpoint, will be what I can
learn here about the positions of those Governments — especially those that
provide contingents for OIJUC --on the question of the need for a new or
redefined mandate. It is more vital still to learn what the positions of those
Governments really are with regard to the kinds of situations involving possible
fighting in the use of force in which their contingents can be used vrithout those
Governments calling a halt and saying that their troops cannot be used for this
purpose or even withdrawing their contingents.
AW/Kb . 7-10 ' - ' ' ' * '
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Let me be more specific in this regard. If, let us say, I interpret the
original becurity Council resolution of 12 July 1560 so broadly, under the guise
of assisting the Government of the C01130 in the maintenance of law and order,
OB to esM'.gn detachments of the GITUC Force at the request of the Central
Governr.'.e.nt to protect representatives of that Government in their efforts
to operate a customs regime in Katanga, cr to control exports and imports,
or to protect the installations of the _Union_uinibre and other companies in
Jadotville, Kolwesi and Kipushi, would all of the Governments providing
contingents to the Force accept this interpretation and permit their troops
to be used in its application? In such situations there probably would be
fighting, even heavy fighting.
AP/bmt 11(Acting Secretary-General)
You will readily agree with iue, I am sure, that whatever Interpretation may
be made of the existing resolutions, or whatever the rr.andate defined, "by any new
resolution,effective execution of the mandate will depend on whether there is in
fact a United Nations force in existence on the spot to back up the mandate, should
this be necessary as a result of overt hostility and attack "by the Katangese.
I Ki-ast know, obviously, exactly where we stand with regard to the use that can
be made of each contingent of the Force. I would hope to get from you in this
meeting adequate clarification on this point.
The question of ONUC's relation to the MC is still a difficult one. There is
still no indication of a willingness on the part of Adoula's Government to
implement their agreement of last December to provide a Congolese contingent to
OIIUC. On our part, there is ctill strong objection to enlacing in any military
operation jointly with the ANC. There has been, no doubt, some improvement in the
Congolese Army, but the United Nations cannot afford to commit itself to a joint
military operation in which it would have no effective control over the selection
of military objectives, over tactics or over the conduct of the AHC troops,
although the United Nations would be held fully responsible for everything that
happened.
There is, indeed, even a division of opinion on how far we can or should
go in seeking to apply economic pressures to Tshombe and Katanga in order to bring
an end to the nonsense about secession. I mean mainly by economic pressures, bearing
down on the Union Miniere in order to ensure that the Central Government will
receive its proper share of the revenue from the exploitation by that powerful
company of Katangeoe resources.
I find some ambiguity, if not irreconcilability, between certain passages
in the resolution of 20 and 21 February 1961 on the one hand and that of
2^ November 1961 on the other. With specific reference to numbered paragraph A-l
of the February resolution, no definition is given of what is to be regarded as
"civil war", while paragraph 1 of the November resolution strongly deprecates
secessionist activity. I know that at the time of the adoption of the February
resolution there was no constitutional government with which the United Nations
could deal. Now there is a constitutional government with which the United Nations
AP/bmt 12
(Acting; Secretary-General)
should and does deal, and this apparently with the agreement of everyone "but
Tshombe and company. Surely it would not "be realistic to say that the United Nations,
in ordor to "prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo", should attempt.,
even by "the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort11 to stop any
Central Government efforts, even military, to end secession in Katar.ga. Granted
this, th^ ;j_ueration remains as to how far the United Nations can co and how much it
can do in assisting the Central Government to establish its authority over Katanga/
which today, for all practical purposes, means Southern Katanga, not to mention
what it is entitled to do whan the Katangese undertake military actions against
the ANC in Northern Katanga.
I must say also that the Security Council mandate regarding the elimination
of mercenaries, which in the November resolution went so far as to authorize the
use of force if necessary to eliminate that evil, is no longer very pertinent
in any helpful sense. I do not mean to imply that there are no longer any
mercenaries in Katanga. There may still be a few hundred. But they are no longer
overt and active and out in the open as they once were; they have merged with
the civilian European population, have nominal jobs and cannot any longer be readily
apprehended as in the case of the substantial number who were captured by us last
August. Thus the mercenary provisions of the resolutions no longer afford ONUC
a good basis for effective action, as they formerly did.
Well, here are some issues to consider. There are others, of course, but the
ones I have mentioned are, I think, the basic ones.
I invite your most serious views on them.
With regard to the question of a Security Council meeting, it is my intention
also to consult individually and informally the members of the Security Council.
I now call upon Mr. Gardiner,
Mr. GARDINER: As already described at the end of the last Adoula-Tshombe
talks, the Katangese delegation very carefully avoided the signature of a final
communique'. The last meeting Continued from five in the afternoon until five in the
morning and no agreed text could be produced. Immediately after the departure of
the delegation, Katanga announced a grant or a gift or a contribution -- that was
not made clear -- of one hundred million francs to be paid to the Central
Government, and, a few days afterwards, also the nomination of the Katangese members
AP/bmt 13-15
(Fir. Gardiner)
for the four commissions. But in nominating these members, Katanga described the
commissions as preparatory, advisory, and in no way executive. The original
intention in recommending the idea of commissions was to set up todies which
would take practical measures for the integration of Katanga with the rost of the
Congo- J,,i the absence of a final communique and in view of the very vague terms
in vihich the purposes of the commissions were described, Prime Minister Adoula
hesitated -- in fact insisted on purposes being clearly defined before the
commencement of work by the commissions.
At this stage we, that is, ONUC, cot in touch with President Tshombe and
suggested that perhaps it mi^ht be a good idea to accept and declare that the
work of the commissions is an essential part of the process of integration. When
I last met President Tshombe he pointed out that this formula had appeared
acceptable to him, but the events or the incidents of 12 July and 17 July had
made it impossible for him to act. Ke was not a free agent, he said, and the
presence of ONUC forces and roadblocks in Elisabethville constituted undesirable
duress. In other words, there is no longer any serious interest in continuing
the discussions, in following up the work of the commissions, under present
circumstances.
RH/ds -16-
(Mr« Gardiner)
I think that the question which we have boon asking ouraeJ.ves in ihe Cccgo
is this: are the Katan/gans cerious -when they declare that they wish to discuss
and achieve reconciliation with the rest of the Congo by peaceful means? There
are certain incidents which perhaps may increase or emphasize our doubts.
Buriii;.-, r/ns couvae or the negotiations'in Lccpoldville, the KatonfpriD were at the
saaae tims very busily engaged in preparing for the celebration of their
independence, a separate occasion from the independence of the Congo. .They
have not stopped building up the strength of the gendarmerie; they ptlll '
hold on to. and there is no ind:i.:-i-jion that they intend to give up, the trappings
of independenceo In the Local Pre-3G, through the radio and by general
pronouncements in Kate.nga, the idea of a State, a country, a nation, is being
more and more popularized; in other words, the population is getting more and
more used to th? idea of Katanga as a separate State.
This process, I may repeat, is developing concurrently with the professions
of a desire to end the secession. If we may relate these developments to the
presence of OHUC troops in Katanga, we are faced all the time with this tension.
If the Katangans seriously want to end the secession or to have integration,
then certain measures which we may take— that is, the ONUC forces and the
ONUC civilian staff -- should aim at this and should coincide with their
professions. On the other hand, most of the measures which we take are sometimes
considered hostile by the Kctanganc. This is only one aspect of the tension,
We also find out that most of the stories put out by Katanga^ are
readily accepted or acceptable and we -- that is, OIIUC -- have to go to some
lenglhs to justify every observation we make. Fortunately, recent events seem
to indicate that at least some importance is being attached to some of the
information that we communicate to the world. We no longer accept these
atrocity stories, I hope, without qualification and our version, again ve
hope, will now begin at least to gain seme consideration. But against this
background we have our daily vexations and provocations, wild and unfounded
accusations against United Nations personnel, civilian and military. Not only
that: our supplies sometimes do not get across the border. We run very low in
stocks of our essential materials, and each occasion has to be very carefully
and patiently negotiated.
RH/ds -17-
(Ifc, Gardiner)
We ore also now threatened — and it loolis as if we have only had the first
installment of this — with the utilization of women and children to harass our
troops. This has "been premised us as the now taetic to "be used "by the Katangen
authorities. The road blocks, for instance, have ceen criticized in many
plar.er,, perhaps without a full Knowledge of the purposes which these road "blocks
are r-/ocosed to serve. By the way, we have only eight, covering the principal
roads leading into Elisabethville. The Katanojans have produced a map showing
twenty-foi:r of them; that map is not accurate and I think that it is
deliberately intended to mislead* "What we had in mind in instituting these
road "blocks WS3 primarily to .prevent fighting in the city of ElicaLethville.
On two occasions we have had to fight our way, or at least to resist interference,
from the airport right down to the end of the city. Thanks to the very careful
planning ana work of the OKUC personnel in Elisabethville, we can at least now
"be sure that civilians will not be involved in any conflict which way develop .
in Elisabethville and that whatever happens -- and we hope nothing will happen --
will be outside the city of Elisabethville. Surely, if we take the trouble to
prevent fighting in the city, we should not be criticized for doing something
with really good intentions, something which may be at least, from our point
of view, not only humanitarian, but also very reasonable.
In some quarters it has been stated that there is no disorder in Katanga and
that the only source of trouble in Katanga is the presence of United Nations
troops. It is a little strange and.a bit discouraging to us to have such
observations made because in a place like Manono, vhich Is now on the border
between north and south Katanga, we form the only barrier between those
conflicting forces. If you remove our United Nations contingent from Manono --
and I am sure of this -- you may have a very serious conflict and & very heavy
loss of life in north Katanga. Moreover, it looks, if I may describe it in this
way, like the case in which we move into a neighbourhood and then somebody
organizes a gang to come and disturb us,, and then we are told that the new
neighbours .are the cause of the trouble.
RH/ds -18*20.
(Mr. Gardiner)
Most of these activities against the United Nations forces have "been
carefully organized. Not by the United nations. Left tp ourselves, o-ur
presence there will secure law and order, not disturb it« I have found it a
little difficult, and I bring this to your notice, to follow the logic of this
accusation that our presence ic the cause of all the trouble in Katanga, I
should like to submit that the contrary is the case* But whatever the arguments
may "be, I think that we, as your agents, should call attention to the fact that
it is unreasonable to expect our men, civilian and military, to endure these
conditions of provocations, vexations, and false accusations without occasional
incidents. What ve have got to do now is to pay tribute to the self-restraint
and self-control of our men rather than accept very easily seme of the wild and
unfounded accusations of the Katangan authorities.
Why do we have these accusetions? "Why are these attempts being made to
disturb the morale of the United Nations troops? Why is it that the Katangans
want to drag out these discussions indefinitely? In fact, sometimes ve wonder
whether there is any real desire to use these discussions to solve peacefully
the problemsof the Congo. Sometimes we are even urged to do as much as possible
to reconcile the views of Katanga with the rest of the Congo. If we could only
know the views of Katanga, we would know what we are trying to reconcile,
These are some of the problems which we have to face on the spot,
especially when we receive advice «- not always disinterested -. about
what should be done, I feel myself that the Katangans or the people of Katanga
would like to drag on the discussions, would like directly and indirectly to
undermine the Central Government and, with the collapse or downfall of the Central
Government, to reap the full 'benefits frcm the consequent, confusion* This is a
threat of which the Central Government is very much aware, and vhen people
advise that talks should be resumed, that talks should be continued at any
price, they should also take this price into consideration: the creation of
total confusion in the rest of the Congo,
- r|.p"i(ii!ifl|rni" :«t,
(Mr. Gardiner)
Prime Minister Adoula has been telling the people of the Congo that one of
his Government's principal objectives is the integration of Katanga. Almost ayear has now passed since the creation of that Government and there are no
results on that score thus far. That, in itself, is an indication of the lack
of importance which may now be attached to the pronouncements of the present
In addition, drastic economic measures must be taken if the situation in the
rest of the Congo is to be brought under some measure of control. But these
drastic steps cannot be taken by a Government which is weakened by secession on
the one hand and by subversion on the other and which exists in an atmosphere
of general uncertainty and dissension. These are seme of the seeds which the
present situation may help to germinate very quickly; they are seeds which, I am
almost cure, those who are connected with Katanga are quid:, happy, and even
anxious to sow. Such is the point of view of the Congolese Government.
I-should now like to address nyself to the effect of these delays on the
OIJUC, First of all, the unscrupulous criticism which is made of any action which
is taken can have a demoralizing effect on our nen, who are proud of the traditions
of their regiments, armies and countries. Some of these criticisms are so
fantastic as to beggar any kind of explanation.
There is also the matter of the creation of incidents for propaganda purposes.
It can be rather exacting to be forced — not only every day, but practically
every hour — to study, to analyse and to reply to propaganda. Moreover,
criticisms may lead to some degree of over-caution or inaction. And if, as a
result of criticisms, we become over-cautious and do not act, we shall then be
described as useless and completely ineffective.. Such criticism will come not
only from the people who create difficulties for our operations but also from
those who would like us to act. Therefore, we have two arms of criticism
converging on us.
\Ie must.also consider the financial aspects of this question. I think
that llr. Teliombe has been led to believe that if'he can hold out long enough
the United Nations will reach a state of complete bankruptcy. But here.you
have the United Nations side, you have the direct effect of delay, criticism
and provocation on the OMUC men in the field. I emphasize these points in order
to pose a few questions.
(Mr. Gardiner)
On behalf of both our civilian and military personnel, I am pleased to say
that morale is good. But bow lone can we be expected to submit meekly to
ICatangese provocations and insults? Some of our meetings require a great deal of
patience. How far may ve go in interpreting the tasl: vhich you have assigned to
us, not only vith regard to protecting ourselves, but also with regard to
stanC;'.::r> fina? And, as the question vas already put by the acting Secretary-General,
if ve do stand firm, at what price are ve to do so? Furthermore, is this
Connittce prepared to sec incurred the expenditure of that amount of money vhich is
required to do so? I put these questions "because Many people in the Congo often
come to sympathize vith us. The strange thing is that the very people vho employ
us as their agents come to sympathize vith us because their affairs are not going
•well. I wish to remind you that ve are your agents and ve are quite prepared,
in your behalf, to carry out the mission vhich you have entrusted to us.
The Acting 5?.CRET.\P.Y~GE1';1ERAL; The floor is nov open for questions.
Mr. QUAinON-r.ACIfEY (Ghana): It seems appropriate, at this juncture,
to begin by thanking our Acting Secretary-General and, through him, Mr. Gardiner
for his statement to this Committee. My delegation is very pleased to receive
the detailed report vhich he has so courteously given us. There is no doubt that
he has raised some grave issues with regard to a grave situation. My immediate
thought is that perhaps the Committee might vant some time in order to study the
points vhich have been made by the Acting Secretary-General and vhich vere
supplemented by those made by Mr. Gardiner. In that event, ve might perhaps meet
again on Friday afternoon in order to suggest the next step vhich should be taken,
I may say at once that I a^ree that executive action is nov required. The
resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council contain ample
directives on vhich action can be taken. I can say immediately that ve do not
think that the United nations is required to take the initiative in anything.
It seeas to me that the main point vhich should be emphasized here, before ve
meet again, is that the United Nations is in the Congo in order to assist the
Central Government, As vas rightly stated last year, vhen the resolution of
21 February vas being passed, no duly-constituted authority existed; Parliament
vas not in session. In viev of the difficulties vhich existed, the General Assembly
and the Security Council vere unable to advise vith regard to firm action.
AE/yt 33 - 25
(Mr. Quaison-Saclrey, Ghana)
It seems to me, however, that the resolution -which was passed in November of
l$6l — as was rightly pointed out — indicates clearly that the United nations
must help the Central Government of the Congo to achieve the unification of the
country. One of the means by -which the Central Government would like to do this
is "by <~st publishing law and order in Katanga. Therefore, the only initiative which
the united nations should take consists of having OIIUC assist the Central Government.
I wanted to emphasize this because it is necessary that we not lose our perspective.
It is the Central Government, and not the United nations, which must take the
initiative in order to maintain law and order, although the United Nations must
support and assist it in this aim until such time as the Central Government is
itself able to carry out those functions.
I have made these points in a purely preliminary fashion; if the Committee
agrees that ve meet on Friday, I shall then give a full account of our position.
MP/rh 26 •' ' '•******•>"••
(Mr. '•Mai son Sackey, Ghana)
As a member of the Security Council, I should say at once, without even
consulting my Government, that we do not think you need a new mandate, nor do you
need any clarification of a mandate. I think the mandate is very clear, but we
think it would "be a &QO& idea to have a Security Council meeting as saon as
possible for you to give a report, a clear report, as you have done this afternoon/
indies, ci?ig ^he lines of your thinking, and leaving it as part of your executive
function to do this, I do not think it vould be nc-acoGary then to have a debate
on your report, or a resolution as such«
If I may say so, if I were in the Chair, I would definitely appeal to the
Council not to have any debate, but to adjourn after your report has been given,
But again this depends upon the reactions of the other members of the Council.
However, I ressrva my position to speak again on this -whole issue if ve meet on
Friday*
* - y. l_ rP Jr X. (Ethiopia): We wish to express our appreciation for the
detailed infonuation — particularly that part of your statement where you gave
us the informal result of your consultation; and if I may say so, the questions
which you have put to us. Some of these questions, I suspect, have already been
answered in the ex-shnnge of letters and telegrams when the troops were sent. I
suspect -- I am not so sure — since I did not anticipate this kind of question,
and I did not bring them here with me. I will look at them and see whether
clarifications are necessary on our part; and if that is required, I can. assure
you, we will give them GS quickly as possible and as prorapty as possible. So that
I am in complete agreement with my colleague from Ghana, Ambassador' Quaison-Sackey,
that perhaps we should be given some time to study the record* If we can gc\i the
record tomorrow morning I am sure we will devote ourselves to it and then get the
positions clarified,
It goes, of course, without saying that frcm the point of view of the position
of ray Government, we have participated in the debate in the Security Council in
forming the resolutions , and therefore we stand by them; and, although it is not
my desire to hark back to what happened in the past, I believe, generally, you
will recall that a similar question was put to us at one time in regard to a
specific action, and then we said that the operation had to be concluded, because
MP/rh 27
' ' (Mr« Gebre-Rgzy, Ethiopia)
ve foresaw then that matters vould end up as they have now. We never trusted
the desire of some people to negotiate -- not because we did not want them to
negotiate, but because ve knew that as soon as the situation calmed and they felt
stronger, they would create more difficulties; and this is precisely what
happened,
I "believe I said just before, it is a pity that at that tiae people would
not a^ree with us to complete the operation and did not agree with us to do the job c
once and for all. vhen the opportunity presented itself. I tMnk> fundamentally,
it was a mistake. I have said to you personally, and I stand by the statement
today, that we regret it very much, because the picture you have given us today
is really one "which causes us a great deal of anxiety*
Now, as regards the question of the United Nations not "being empowered to
take the initiative, of course it depends on how one looks at it. The
resolution sayc, for example, that we have to take action to remove the
mercenaries. So if there are ten or fifteen mercenaries in some place, it is
ray understanding that you will ask them to leave; and if they do not leave, then
it is your duty to take the necessary, requisite police action to get them out.
In that sort of a situation, therefore, I think the initiative is really given*
By that, I mean that first they are asked to leave; and if they do not leave
then, of course, action has to be taken. From that point of view I think the
initiative is for the United Nations. As you say, it may be difficult, because
they may have mixed with the civilian population, and that may cause difficulty.
But I hope that closer attention would be given to seeing what they are doing,
perhaps making a thorough study, and then trying to apprehend them one by one;
because no matter what is said, we still believe that although they may be
underground -- they may not be in the open — they are the cause of all the
difficulties that exist in Katanga, If you succeed in removing them, we believe
that 90 per cent of your problems will be solved,
I know that nowadays some people say they are not doing -much; but I doubt
that very much, I believe they are still a factor; and I think you should look
at the picture closely, see where they are, what they are ..doing, and take them.
out* The resolution gives you unconditional authority and unconditional power.
Of course, it is not supposed to be done brutally. If you ask one to leave and
he cayo, "All right; I am leaving", then that is the end of the story; but if he
resists, then you have the authority, and you have the power, to use the troops
to get them out, ,
MP/rh 28-30
(Mr. Gebre-Bgayj Ethiopia)
For the moment, these are the brier observations vhich I want to submit,
As I said earlier, you have given us quite detailed information. It is grim and
causes us a great deal of anxiety. But "before we give you a definite commitment
on position, we would like to take a look at it.
Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): On "behalf of the
Republic cf Guinea, I should like to Join my voice to that of our two brethren
who have spoken ahead of me, in thanking you most sincerely for the clear and
ample expose* that you have presented to the Coirmitteo.
I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, not only
for your statement, but also for the action which you had undertaken -- an action
on which we were very impatient to have some news, Co far we had information
only through the Press, but that information itself and what you have just said
confirms our conviction that the Secretariat is doing what it can in spite of
the obstacles that are bein^ raised, in order to cope with the mandate that was
given to it by the Security Council, as well as by the General Assembly.
I would wish our brother, your Special Representative in the Congo, to be
associated with these congratulation s. It is al-ways unfortunate to say that
we were right; but I must note, without any misunderstanding, that the two
statements which we have heard are completely in accord with our position which
we have defended, and for some time now. We are gratified at this.
I do not wish to refer to all of the aspects of the problem that you have
raised, the conclusions to which your analysis has led, I should merely wish
to refer to two points which appear to me to be at the heart of the problem* It
seems to result from your statement that the Secretariat is convinced that the
crisis of ihe Congo is nothing other than the question of Katanga. This has been
our position since July of I960; and we are convinced that any successful
solution to the Congo crisis must take this fact into consideration, must start
from this fact. The crisis of the Congo is not anything other than a question
of Katanga,
31 (Mr» Diallo, Guinea
The second consideration which I should like to bring out — and which has
been dealt with in considerable detail by Mr, Gardiner — io the use which the
authorities in Katanga are making of negotiations* They are utilizing
negotiations only for the purpose of procrastination and to disrupt the legal and
central institutions of the Congo in order to benefit from the chaos vhich vould
result*
Tiiio v£3 the point of view of New Guinea in this Committee on the day
following tha vote on the resolution of 21 February 19 1. But since that vote, it
may be s?,id that the situation in the Congo has been dominated by negotiations —
seme of vaich were predestined to fail and which actually did fail. This, you
have confirmed to us, Mr. Secretary-General.
After the failure of these negotiations, there remains in our opinion, another
form of action, which would be the uce of force. The Secretary-General has told
us that, in his opinion, that would not be the best solution, if only because the
means would not be available. Th^n the Secretary-General proposer: as a solution
certain forms of economic pressure. We believe taat, by the application of
adequate economic pxecsure, a solution could be found. But also on that point,
one must talw into account the actors on the stage. There are puppets, as everyone
can see; there are men of stone who are acting in the Congo scene. But as for
ourselves, wo say that the problem of the Congo is entirely in the hands of a
certain number of Powers, My delegation is very happy to note that the
Secretary-General, in his contacts, hr;s struck at the right door. In fact, it is
Belgium and some of the great Powers that are really responsible for. the
Congolese crisis; it is they which cultivate it, finance it and organize it. VJe
believe ttat, oacc again, it is necessary for those rowers to be faced with their
responsibilities. The United Nations is now at a crossroad; the financial aspect
of the question to which tl:2 Secretary-General has referred no longer makes it
possible for us to continue as we have; if we do, inevitably the result will be
according to the calculations of Tshcmbe, who is banking on a financial crisis,
on chaos, and on the fact that the United Nations will no longer have the
necessary funds to enable it to continue.
This, as the Secretary-General has told us, is a disturbing situation since,
even if the United Nations is able to obtain $175 minion — which the
Secretary-General considers to be a maximum — that would finance the operation
32 for* Dia.llo, Guinea)
only until jjl December 1962. This seems to us to be a grave situation. Even if
it were not necessary to have the mandate of the Secredtary-General. renewed, it
would be absolutely essential to undertake new action. Such action, which the
Secretary-'General has defined as a series of econcraic pressures, should be
undertaken very soon. If the Secretary-General considers that his mandate frcra
the Gsn£";;.l /'.,••?£ onijj.y and the Security Council is adequate to enable him to
undertake this, new action, I do not believe that there should be any delay.
In C'.ny event, I fully share the view of the representative of Ghana that it
would be usorful and appropriate to inform the Security Council of the situation,
if only to inform the Members of the Security Council — who are, in the first
place, responsible in this matter -- of the exact situation so that each one might
eventually e sunrj his responsibilities.
I am in full agreement with the idea that the mandate of theSecretary-Goi-^ral is sufficient ani that there is little chance of getting further
clarifiestdcn frcm the Security Council, "bearing in mind the fact that has been
pointed out by the Secretary-General, namely, that the great Powers are not in
agreement c,s to the measure which have been advocated.
I should now like to ask a question of the Secretary-General. It happens
that the position which he has expressed and which has been set out by his.
Special Representative, coincides with ours* We agree with the objectives. That
is why I should like to have the opinion of the Secretary-General.
It is possible that the Secretary-General will not call for a meeting of the
Security Council. It is possible thac, having called on the Security Council, the
result would "be negative. As ordinary Members of the United Nations, there still
remains the possibility of bringing our debate before the General Assembly at its
next session en<i of taking all the necessary measures for debate to be undertaken
as soon as pr^ible* I should like to know the view of the Secretary-General on
this questiono In any case, we must resolve this question either by liquidating
the operation in the Congo or by taking all measures so that the mandate of the
Secretary-General may be implemented.
Mru BARNES (Liberia); First of all, I should like, on behalf of my
delegation, to welcome you, Mr. Secretary-General, back to Headquarters and to
thank you and Mr, Gardiner for the information which you have given us concerning
the situation in the Congo.
Mtf/rh 53-35
(Mr. Barnes, Liberia)
It ip regrettable that, after two years of intensive effort on the part of
the United Nations, a solution tq the Congo problem has not been reached* I aa
sorry that the talks between Mr. Adoula and.Mr. Tchombe have broken off and that,
as a result, no progress has been made towards reconciliation It is obvious tyjat
the events which took place on 17 July -- the assault by Katangese women and
children on United Nations forces -• was inspired by Mr. Tshombe and his cohorts
in Katanga in an effort to show their hostility to the operations of the United
Nations,
I think that the Secretary-General has.placed his finger on the basic cause
of the situation in the Congo, which is the economic factor. I recall that at a
meeting of the Security Council — when my country was a member of the Council —
I stated that, in our opinion, the Union Minibre was playing an essential role in
supporting the accession of Katanga and that as long as Mr. Tshombe was amenable
to the financing of these operations in Katanga, his position would always be
strengthened, while the United Nations and the Central Government would be at adisadvantage in seeking to bring an end to the secession.
Now we have been told that Katanga received $6§ million in revenue last year,
$38 million of which was paid by the Union Minibre. It is evident that until the
time when ouch props as these are removed from Tshombe, we shall be going around
in a circle in trying to bring an end to the secession of Katanga.
I regret that the countries which have vested interests — the countries
which the Secretary-General has consulted — have not been able to agree with
his point of view regarding the imposition of economic pressures on Tshombe. We,
at this table, are unable to impose such pressures. It is the countries with
these vested interests which must impose them. "Whether or not this can be done
by means of a meeting of the Security Council or by continued negotiations on
the part of the Secretary-General is a matter for very careful consideration.
RSII/rs 56
(Mr. Barnes, Liberia)
I believe that efforts should be continued on your part with Belgium to
bring these pressures to bear on Katanga by paying these revenues from Union,
MinierjD to the Central Government. It is only by bringing an end to these
payui r.ts to Katanga that the situation in Katanga will be solved,
I •tjhinV: tliat going before the Security Council to secure such a mandate
may not be advisable for the present because you have already said you cannot
arrive F.-'S any agreement with those countries which have these vested interests
in tho Coflgo, but I believo that if you vere to continue these negotiations
we might arrive at some solution to this matter. If going to the Security
Council would be for the purpose of reporting on your talks on the situation
prevailing, tlisn I would fully endorse that you should do so, but to go to
the Security Council to receive a new mandate may not be advisable for the
present.
I tki.nl: that the situation in the Congo will be solved only when Union
Miniere and those other concessions operating in Katanga will get to the
point of discontinuing these payments to Mr. Tshombe and to the Katanga
Government and paying them to the Central Government. Those funds are the
props behind Fir. Tshombe, and if they were not available he could not pay
those mercenaries and he could not pay the expenses of his Government. The
Katanga Government would then crumble.
The root cause as I see it for the present is not the mercenaries, it
is the economic situation that is now existing, and that is the question
which has to be probed. If that could be solved, then I believe that the
situation C.G a vhole could be solved. I fully agree with the proposal of
tfce representative of Ghana, Mrc Quaison-Sackey, that we should postpone
our consideration of the matters which were brought to our attention1until
Friday, to enable us to study the record carefully so as to be able to make
a contribution to the discussions here.
Mr. MBOYO (Congo) (Leopoldvilie) (interpretation from French):
Mr. Secretary-General, since the last meeting of the Advisory Committee on
the Congo little has been added to the voluminous record of the situation in
the Congo, On 3 July, the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs made an
RSH/rs 37
(Mr. Mboyo, Congo (Leopoldvllle)
important statement on the negotiations between Elicabethville and Leopoldville
and on the evaluation of the situation in general. Hence, there is no need
to go back" to discuss the question of the negotiations* Everybody can draw the
necesra^y conc.lueions. You yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, have had extensive
consult :-.-.,ions in Europe, and the Orcc.nication can now determine the new methods
needed to carry out the mandate in the Congo, the necessary ways and means,
whether financial, political or legal,
The last incident provoked by the leaders in Elisabethville only confirm
Mr* Tshon.be's ferocious intentionst These provocations prove once again that
in Elisabethville there is not yet any sincere desire to reach agreement with
the Central 'Government and to reintegrate the Congo. Quite to the contrary.
The foreign financial powers and their agents in Katanga do everytiling in their
power to stabilize and strengthen t'neir positions. In the interior, they do
everything to undermine the authority of the Central Government, whose
disintegration and overthrow they are seeking. They seek to discredit certain .
members of the Central Government, including the Prime Minister, Mr* Adoula :
himself. Every method, including money, is used to this end. '
Outside the Congo, the financial powers which are interested in the .
situation in the southern part of Katanga continue to mislead public.opinion
in favour of tiie secessionists and they are acting against the United Nations
and the Congolese Government. This campaign is developing even more rapidly
now that the United Nations seems to give evidence of hesitation and indecision.
At Elisabethviile, they are waiting until the United Nations can no longer
be in a position to face its obligations. In the Congo and outside, as well as
at EliSMbethville, they are hoping there will be a continued series of crises
in the Congo which will only serve to increase the economic difficulties of the
Central Government. Mr. Tshombe's aim is to gain time.
In addition, as my Government stated at the last meeting of the Committee,
the methods which have been used to carry out the provisions of the resolutions
of 21 February and 2k November 1961 have not had the results which were
anticipated. We do not think that the provisions of these resolutions are
adequate to solve the crisis. My Government is convinced that in the present
RSH/rs 38
( Mr^ Mboypi Congo (Leopoldville)
situation the resolutions cannot be applied integrally because certein governments
have not made the necessary efforts either to accept or to apply thran, 'or el&e
because other governments have tolerated actions which are contrary to the
provisions of those resolutions.
A,-:. •-' ojiiioermenco of these gaps, we cannot say that the ICatangese secession
is any nearer to a solution than it was two years ago* I do not want here to
accuse cortain countries in particular, I simply want to state that certain
governments vhich are giving a contribution to the United Nations effort or to
the economic and social development of the Congo tolerate or facilitate the
activities of foreign interests in tha Congo- In fact, the denouement is
arriving. How could the authorities in Elisabethville have been able to
strengthen themselves for so long if there were not all those other factors
outsio.o tho control of the United Nations?
The pa [' guarding and the restoration of the Congolese Republic is our aim,
and for this United Nations requires concrete jyovisions which are adequate to
discourage tlis foreign economic interests which are at the basis of this
secession. The Congolese Government aims to destroy the vestiges of colonialism
in the South of Katanga and to plac-a this under severe and effective control by
the application of the fundamental law of the Congo end the laws of the Congolese
people. This would be done until such time as the rebellion was overthrown and
this would affect the present limits of the province of South Katanga. In
this respect, the Central Goverruaeiiw requests the collaboration of the Member
States of the United Nations.
In regard to this, the Government of the Republic of the Congo ( Leopoldville )
is not opposed to the convening of a new meeting of the Security Council, but
firet and foremost we must be told whether there is any certainty at all of
obtaining a solution which would be better than the earlier ones, because, after
all, it is unnecessary to convene a meeting of the Security Council if one knows
beforehand that there would be no improvement over the existing situation. Is
it therefore necessary to convene a meeting of the Security Council for such a
purpose?
RSH/rs 39-Uo
(Mr. Mboyo, Congo (l-eopoldville)
The Government will take the necessary decisions and will not recoil before
any measures necessary for the defence of its interests. It will utilize, if
necessary, all the means of communications that may be necessary for the purpose
of pr ?/rent,ing the arrival in and departure from this part of the Congo of persons
and oaj.;:.p £-:it which may contribute to the strengthening of the rebellion against
the Centt-al Government vhich would be in violation of the laws and regulations
of the Colgolese people•
T!.:s Government is convinced that these are the only means which would moke
possible tha Implementation of the Security Council resolutions and that this
would not bs in excess of the financial possibilities of the Organisation. In
the prcnent situation this is the only way to succeed. The United Nations must
resort to these measures if it wishes to realize the mandate which was entrusted
to it,
My Government, GS I have affirmed on numerous occasions, is deeply grateful
to the United Nations for the civilian assistance that has been g-'ven to it since
1960* Without that assistance, it would have been difficult for it to survive,
but without the reintegration of the Province of Southern Katanga; this assistance
would be useless and without any future. It certainly would not bear any fruit
except in a unified Congo.
BC/jpm Ul
Mr. PHAD1CAMKAR (India): My delegation thanks you, Mr* Secretary-General,
for the comprehensive statement you have made to us this afternoon. Ue are also
grateful for the explanatory statement made by Mr. Gardiner, We are also appreciative
of the very considerable trouble that you took, Mr. Secretary-General, in ma&ing
this trip to various countries in Western Europe; before you left, you had hoped
during this trip to find a solution, or at least to move on to the road to a
solution, to this problem*
I very clearly remember your words that the problem of the Congo lay
ultimately in the Union Minibro. This afternoon you have informed us of some of
the suggestions that you presented in this connexion to the Government of Belgium
and certain other countries. But I do not clearly recall your having said that
any action on these lines must be regarded at this stage as a failure« I presume
that we have not yet reached that point and that some attempts on these lines are
probably continuing. I assume, too, that if it is a failure we shall be so informed
at a later date. As I say, however, I do not think that we have reached that stage
as of this afternoon. This is important in the context of what I should like to
say later on.
In your statement, Mr. Secretary-General, you have raised some very grave
issues. I, for one, should not like to make any observations on them until my
Government has had an opportunity to see the full verbatim record of this meeting.
I feel that my Government ought to .see the full record and not merely what I would
be able to send in a telegram today.
The important question is this: In the event of a failure of the action that
you, Mr. Secretary-General, have suggested during your trip to Wectern Europe —
that is, in the event of a failure of economic pressure — is any military action,
or any action on those lines, feasible or practicable?
You, Mr, Secretary-General, have also asked our advice in connexion with the
restricted mandate that you feel is implied in the resolutions of February and
November IS/61 -- namely, that OHUC is authorized to uce force under only three
circumstances: to apprehend mercenaries, to prevent civil war, and in self-defence.
In the various debates there have obviously been different opinions on whether or
not the initiative for military action should rest with ONUC. You have rightly,
I suppose, asked our advice on this point, both as a Committee and as countries
with troops committed in the Congo, Not all the delegations represented here have
BC/Jpm 1*2(Mr, Bhadknmkar, India)
troops committed in the Congo, Some form of advice from the Governments concerned
would no doubt be welcome to you, AD I have said, I should like in that respect .
to await the receipt "by my Government of the full verbatim record of this meeting, .
Now, within the present mandatef not much has happened for a fairly long time,
I believe that that is why you, Mr. Secretary-General, have called this meeting
and have v^L^ed the question whether or not a Security Council meeting should be
requested, either to provide you with a new mandate or to strengthen the mandate that
may be supposed to exist in the resolutions previously adopted.In this connexion there is another question which I should like to put to you,
Mr, Secretary-General, I. had hoped that Mr, Gardiner would provide more detailed
information on this point. What is the AKC doing? Has it improved its conditions,
training, state of discipline and military effectiveness to the point where it could
relieve the United Nations troops of a number of duties which are strictly speaking
not military duties but tasks entrusted to ONUC on the baois of-the original
resolution. — that is, to assist the Central Government in a number of ways,
including the maintenance of law and order? Has the AIIC reached a state of training
and discipline in which it could take over some of those duties, thereby relieving
the United Nations troops for auch operational duties as it migjhfc be necessary to
assign to them either now or at a later date? Of course, our hope has always been
that it would not be necessary to utilize ONUC for active military action and that,
in some way and somehow, a solution in a peaceful manner would be found*
But from what you have reported today, Mr. Secretary-General, and from what
seems to have been happening, our hopes would appear to be further away from
realization than ever before. Ue are in the most serious situation about finances.
I believe that on the Congo we have spent more than the total of four or five years
of the United Nations regular budget. This in itself is an extraordinary position,
We are one of the countries which have so far been able to meet our
contribution to these finances, We propose to meet our obligations in the future.
Nevertheless, it is an extremely heavy burden on us. We are .one of the " have -not",
the poorer, countries of the world. It is not a simple-matter for us to bear this
burden — not only in the financial sense but in the sense of our very heavy
comnitmentG.. in .the Congo. But pur attempt will always be not to fail the United
Nations.
BO/*.(Mr. BhacV.iprakar, India)
Ao regards convening the Security Council, it is quite obvious that we can
only advise you, Mr. Secretary-General, on whether or not you should go about
asking for a meeting. Those of us vho are not mongers of the Security Council
obviously cannot take a decision. Such a decision inevitably rests with the
members of the Council* Happily ye have a member of the Security Council here,
and ho :w-; .pressed an opinion. But on this matter^ too. I should like to await
instrucii-n3 from ray Government, it would, of course, "be extremely unfortunate
for the Congo and for the task that we have before us if a Security Council meeting
Were convened with the definite request that you have envisaged -- either to give
a new meurlate or to strengthen the present mandate — and then the Council for some
reason failed to act on those lines, As you yourself have said, this would make
the situation much worse than it io now, I therefore think that this question must
be given very careful thought.
I. have only one other observation to make. This relates to the incident of
17 July« I should like to congratulate the OPI, or whatever section is responsible,
for the very prompt action taken in briefing the Frees, I think that we had in
the past been slightly critical of the delays that occurred in briefing the Press
on behalf of the United Nations on incidents particularly concerning the Congo,
This time, however, we were very happy to note that United Nations action followed
as soon as possible after the information was received heret I repeat, therefore,
that we should like to congratulate the OPI and Mr. Caruthers, who, I believe,
made the briefing.
TL/kb k£
(Mr. Bhadkamkar, India) .
At this stage, Mr. Secretary-General, I do not think I would like to make
any other observations apart from pointing out that, in my opinion, calling a
meeting on Friday -- that is, three days frcm now — might be sonevhat too early,
because I do not believe the verbatim records would be able to reach my
GovGrnr^-ut by that tine; or even if they did reach them by late 'ihursday, at the
earliest; I do not think ray Government would have sufficient time to study them.
So with that reservation, I shall be at your service for any other meeting that
you might call,
The Acting SECRETAKY-GENIML: Before ending the discussion, I shall
give the floor to Kir. Gardiner to take up the point raised by the representative
of India regarding the AKC question.
Mr. GAPPINERt There has been some improvement in the level of
comportment and efficiency of the AKC. In fact, in certain areas, particularly
in Equator , we have no United Nations military presence, and in Leopoldville
we have what may be described as a token United Nations force. But the AIIC
lacks transport, lacks air support and logistics. Ihey are striving very hard
to make up these.deficiencies* I think this much we can say. What their
performance'will be under trial, nobody can, I think, definitely say at this stage,
We can only talk about improvement, and perhaps circumstances will prove what
contribution they can make or what efforts they can make themselves independently.
Mr, BHADKAMKAB (India): If you will permit me, Mr, Secretary-General,
I would liks to read part of a statement of my Prime Minister, purely as an
indication of the state of his thinking at the time. This is a statement he made
to the Upper Kouce of Parliament last month; it was therefore made before the trip
you undertook and, of course, before the report that you have made today will
become available to my Government, I thought that, if you will permit me, purely
for the record I would like to read out a small extract from what the Prime
Minister said about the situation in the Congo. This is primarily so that my
friend the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) should know that our views
have not in any way changed. The Prime Minister, speaking to the Upper House
on 23 June, about a month ago, said:
. ' • ra IIPIII ii 111 ]«j
TL/kb IfJ
(frr» Bhpdkapkar, India)
In the Congo the position is one of stalemate. In December last
a settlement was arrived at between Prime Minister Adoula and i-ir. Tshcmbe
at Kitona. During this settlement a declaration was made by Mr. Tshcrnbe.
It wr^.3 a good declaration, but very soon after he followed his own practice
oi" c->^-nC bcLck on his declaration* And there the matter stands now, in
stalemate, Mr. Tshombe only believes in adequate pressure with some
sanctions behind it. He made that declaration because there was great
pressure on him. The moment the pressure was lessened, he withdrew from it.
It is obvicus that the United Nations can only succeed in making Mr. Tshombe
act up to his declarations by making it clear to him that they will take
action against him, action including the use of force if necessary.
Unfortunately, he has got into the habit of getting some support from
various quarters outside the Congo -- I mean in other countries -- who
piously declare that there must be no force used against him, and thereby
they allow him to carry on in his peculiar ways."
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; By way of winding up the discussion,
I want to make just a very brief statement, I note that our friend the
Ambassador from Ethiopia made reference to the United Nations troop operations in
Katanga last December, and if I remember correctly he remarked that it was a
mistake to end the fighting in December. This, of course, refers to the fighting
in Elisabethville. Now, I have no wish to differ with him on anything, but
by way of clarification I just want to point out that the fighting ceased in
ilisabethville because the United Nations troops achieved the immediate objectives
there, and it ic common knowledge that up to now our people are in full control of
Elisabethville, Of course, the reason why our troops did not move to other
important areas like Jadotville, Kolwezi and Kipuohi was the simple fact that we
had no means of transport at that time. So I do not think that it was a mistake
for the United Nations troops to cease operations in Elisabethville in December.
Regarding the projected Security Council meeting which has been the main
point of our discussion this afternoon, opinions have been expressed, and of
course I share the feeling of the Committee that definitive advice can be offered
only at a later date when most of the representatives here will have the benefit
of instructions from their respective Governments. The representative of Ghana
TL/kb 1*8
• • (The? Acting Secretary-General)
suggested a meeting,on Friday, but the representative of India feels that Friday
might be e little too early for him-, and perhaps for others of his colleagues,to
get instructions.
P.egardrng the mandate, very useful views have been expressed and the
consenv.i-s coems to be that the previous Security Council resolutions have given
me an al^qu^te mandate to carry on the United Nations operations in the Congo
more fruitfully and more positively. Of course, that will be a matter for
further discussions at our next meeting*
Regarding the question posed by the representative of India as to whether
ray projected steps regarding the economic pressures on Katanga have met with
failure, I want to make it clear'that up to now I have not received any official'
reply from Belgium. After iny visit to certain European capitals in the last few
weeks, the impression I had was that there was no agreement regarding the
implementation of the economic steps I had presented to these Governments before
my departure from New York. But so far as the reaction from Belgium is concerned,
up till now I have not received any official reply.
One other point. We are informed'that every effort will be made by the
staff concerned to have the record of this meeting out by noon tomorrow, eo that
it will be in the hands of the members of the Committee by tomorrow afternoon.
How, in view of the remarks and suggestions just made by the representative
of India, I would propose that the next meeting of the Committee should take
place perhaps Tuesday next, instead of Friday. If it is agreeable to the Committee,
we will resume our discussions' at 3 ?•&• on Tuesday, 31 July.
The meeting rose at 5«10 P»nu
V W V • »V"V V f
CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 6931 July 1962ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON THE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Tuesday, 31 July 1962, at 5 p.m.
In the Chair
Members:
U THAIIT
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of Malaya
Ghana
Guinea
India
IndonesiaIreland
LiberiaMali
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
SenegalSudan
Sweden
Tunisia
United Arab Republic
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL
Mr. TREMBLAY •
Mr. WIJEGOONAWARDENA '
Mr. GEBRE-EGZY
Mr. HAMID -
Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY
Mr. DIALLO
Mr..,.CIIAKRAYARTY
Mr. RONODIPURO
Mr. 0«SULLIVAN-
Mr. BARNES
Mr. TEAOR2
Mr. BENIIIM '-
Mr. AGIODU
Mr. Muhammad Zafrulla
Mr. GIGS
Mr. ADEEL
Mrs. ROSSSL
Mr. MESTIRI
14r. RIAD
Congo (Leopoldville) Mr. CARDOSO
62-16889
AT/yt
The Acting S&RETARY-GEHflRAL: At our last meeting we raised certain issues.
It was decided to take up these issues at this meeting since many delegations
expressed their desire to refer to their respective Governments Tor instructions,
Therefore, I do not think it will be necessary for me to make any introductory
remarks and the floor is open to you. I shall be very glad if members of the
Committee can come up with concrete observations on the issues raised at our
last meeting,
Mr. CIS5 (Senegal)(interpretation from French): Mr• Secretary-General,
I think that since our meeting last Tuesday the situation in the Congo has
evolved to a certain extent. You, yourself, have indicated that this evolution
has taken place. I think it vould bo good for the Advisory Ccnmittee on the Congo
to hear your comments on the proposals formulated "by the Prime Minister of the
Congo, and what you yourself think about these proposals. This is the question
I should like to asK you and I would be grateful if you vould answer it.
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; As you probably are aware I received a
communication from the Foreign Minister of the Central Government of the Congo
requesting me to think of giving to the Central Government, in the form of
technical assistance, some three or four constitutional lawyers or Jurists orconstitutional advisors to advise the Central Government on the formulation of
a new constitution for the Congo, which the Central Government has already
drafted. In his request mention was made that the Central Government would be
very happy if an African jurist or a constitutional expert could be included,
I have given very serious thought to this and actually I am in contact with some
Member States with the view to responding to the request of the Central Government.
Only yesterday morning I asked Prime Minister Adoula if he would be agreeable to
receive three constitutional experts: one from Figeria, one from Switzerland and
one from Canada, because in the request of the Central Government there was one
condition to the effect that these constitutional experts should be conversant
with the working of a federal consitution. These three countries which I have
in mind, of course, as you all know, have federal constitutions. I feel that
constitutional experts from these countries will be able to contribute materially
I ' f l l f l l - l i ' J I ' 1 " ' , ! ] ' ! ; i I
AP/yt 5
(Acting Secretary-General)
to the success of the endeavours now being made by the Central Government. Of
course, the procedure Is that these United Nations experts on constitutional lav
will go to Leopoldville. They will examine the drart which has teen prepared-by
the Central Congolese Government. If the recommendation is acceptable to the
Central Government it is my understanding that Prim Minister Adoula will present
this Joo the Parliament for ratification.
That is the latest situation.
Mr. TRAORE (Mali)(interpretation from French); "Mr. Secretary-General,
my delegation hao full confidence in c.11 the initiatives which you took in
applying the resolutions of the United Nations on the Congo. My delegation
maintains this confidence to this day.
The situation in the Congo is changing with extreme rapidity. Hence, it
deoerveo to be followed and studied from day to day. Hence, one is tempted to
get a review of the situation either through a meeting of the Security Council
or through a meeting of the General Assembly, and above all in the light of the
results of your mission to Europe. My delegation deplores the rather unfavourable
results of your mission. But we know how much courage you showed in pushing your
endeavours there. However, in order to make a deeper examination of the present
situation in the Congo, and particularly in Katanga, we do not think it would be
opportune at the present moment to call a meeting of the Security Council in order
to obtain a new mandate, although the contents of this new mandate has to be
indicated quite clearly in order to liquidate the Katanga secession in a radical
way. A meeting of the Security Council perhaps would only exhort you, Mr.
Mr. Secretary-General, to continue to apply the preceding resolutions adopted by
the Security Council and by the General Assembly. Hence, in this light we are
in general in favour of a Security Council meeting, but this does not seem to be
a particular argument in favour of it if the results were less favourable, because
as you said the last time, that would be a victory for Tshombe and for those who
support him, namely, the Union Ilinlere and certain other elements. That we cannot
accept. That is why we do not think we can recommend to you at the present time
to call a meeting of the Security Council. W^ do, however, favour debate on the
Congo, but we prefer this debate to take place in the General Assembly of the
United Nations, perhaps at its seventeenth session.
AP/yt U-5
(Mr. Traore, Mali)
We think that the preceding resolutions, particularly those of 21 February
and of November, should be entirely applied; that would be adequate for you to
continue your vork on the Congo.
As to the sending of jurists to the Congo, this is a rather delicate question
and bar, to be studied in more detail since this is a matter of changing the
Lei •forr>Lrentrlg of the Congo; that is a problem vhich is up to the Congolese
themselves and up to the National Assembly of the Congo,
RbH/vrs • '• 6(tor. Traore, Mali)
This deserves a more careful study> and should be perhaps a bilateral step
rather than a multilateral one, I have some concern as to whether United Nations
participation is merited. You, Mr. Secretary-General, have indicated there was a
further choice of jurists, mainly from Anglo-Saxon countries. You have suggested
Canada, Nigeria and Switzerland/ but perhaps we should add a person v;ho has some
understanding of Latin or Reman law, I do not put this forward as a suggestion, it
is only an idea which I am putting forward.
Mr. QUAISOII-CAGKE Y (Ghana): There is no doubt, Mr. Secretary-General,
that the information which you have just ^iven us regarding the proposals put to
you by for, Adoula regarding the Constitution of the Congo has put a new complexion
on the issue which we discussed last week. Then your main preoccupation was whether
this Committee could advise you on the advisability of a meeting of the Security
Council, at which you could be given either a new mandate or a clarification of
your present mandate. At that time, we gave our preliminary views on the
advifibility of a meeting of the Security Council being convened, and we made it
very clear that so far as the Government of Ghana was concerned, a meeting of the
Security Council would be useful in so far as you could give that Council a report
and also a report on the steps which had been taken to implement the resolutions
passed by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. We also made it clear
that so far as we were 'concerned, there was no clarification that the Security
Council could then give. I could riot then tell you'whether, if it came to the use
of force, my Government would agree to our forces being used. I am now authorized
to say that should you, within the context of your proposals, 'have to use force,
then Ghana troops could be used for the purpose of bringing about the territorial ;
integrity of the Congo and the maintenance of law and order, provided, of course, ;
there was proper logistic support so that the incidents which occurred in Port
Francqui, when about fifty Ghanaians were butchered, would not be repeated. '
It has always been the view of the Government of Ghana that i-ir. Tshcmbe would
never acquiesce in any solution of the problem which subordinated Katanga in its
legal provincial status to the central government, unless he was compelled to do
so. Mr. Adoula's new constitutional proposals, therefore, must be weighed very
carefully. We agre"e they are an earnest of his good faith and sincere willingness
to achieve a solution, but Mr. Tshom.bels bad faith has been so clearly and repeatedly
demonstrated that it would be unthinkable to defer further United Nations efforts
to secure a solution simply because of this new development.
RGH/vr's 7(Mr. Quaison-SacKeyj Ghana)
I am afraid we are not in a position to comment in detail on the steps which
you hove already taken. In fact, you have told us you have already considered
appointing jurists from Nigeria, Canada and Switzerland, Ky delegation is of the
view th.it you ore within ycur rights GO far as the provision of technical assistance
is concerned, to help the Central Government in any way possible for i;he purpose of
bringing about che achievement, of territorial integrity. But we feel that this
matter should be approached very carefully. Technical assistance can be given in
two ways. If we are going to provide the jurists, then I would assume that the
United Nations would pay those jurists. Prom that point, of view, there' is nothing
to which ray delegation could object. We fe^l that technical assistance in this
context is all right. But the implication of the United Nations itself employing
certain jurists to advise the Central Government on the construction cf the
Constitution is what must be weighed very carefully. We feel that it would have
been better if the Secretary-General had indicated to the central Government which
countries could, be approached for such expertise Nigeria, definitely, Canada,
as you mentioned, Switzerland, any other countries. The United Nations could then
pay those jurists. That is to say, the initiative for appointing them would then
rest with the central Government,
I say this because if the Constitution was drawn up with United Nations help,
with United Nations appointed jurists helping in this effort; and Parliament turned
it down or Tshcmbe showed bad faith, the United Nations would be discredited, and we
would be in a very bad position. Matters would be complicated further. Therefore,
if you have not already taken steps, my delegation would prefer that you did not
appoint those experts, but definitely advise the Prime Minister of the Congo to
approach the countries you have in mind to supply the experts concerned. The
United Nations, by means of the Technical Assistance Programme, would pay for it.
This would obviate the great difficulty which would be bound to come one day if
the bad faith which has been shown again and again by Tshcrobe was once more shown.
Lastly, my delegation would fully support the steps you outlined to us last
week with regard to the economic pressures which could be brought to bear upon the
Union Miniere, namely, the possibility of having the funds now paid to Tshcmbe
frozen in Brussels and that imports should be routed through Iviatadi instead of
through Angola arid the Rhodesias, and, thirdly, that the United Nations would
give guarantees of protection to the installations which are now in Katanga,
RSH/vrs - . . . . - . - B-1C(Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)
'These are the views which I would put forward in a preliminary way, but we
G-till insist that the Secretariat should be very careful not to involve the
United Nation's in this constitutional issue which has always bedeviled the situation
in the Congo*
Mrs. ROSCIiL- (Sweden): On behalf of the Swedish. Government, I would like
to express our sincere appreciation Tor the patient work which you, I.rr Secretary-
General, Mr. Gardiner, and the other members of your staff have done in endeavouring
to settle tha political and economic questions of the Congo through negotiation.
It is, of course, to be regretted very much that the talks between
Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshorabe were broken off when sane results seemed to
be under way. .
The information just given by you about the plan which foresees United Nations
assistance in the drafting of a new constitution for the Congo nay give'uo reason
to look upon the situation a little more hopefully than last week. My Government
and the Swedish people, as you well know, take a very great interest in the-Congo
problem and they are anxious to see it solved as soon as possible, but solved in a
constructive and peaceful way, that is, along the lines on which you and your staff
have worked during the past months.
AE/rh 11
(Mrs. Ross^l, Sweden)
At the last meeting of this Committee, you raised some important questions
regarding our opinion as to various actions which you outlined as possible means
of putting pressure on the Tshombe regime in order to bring about the solution of
the Congo problem. Since then I have had time to communicate with my Government
and I am now in a position -to convey my Government's point of view concerning the
Unit?d nations aims in the Congo, as laid down in the various resolutions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly. They have already been presented to
you, Mr. Secretary-General, but with your permission, I should like to repeat them
and thus put them on record in this Committee,
The principal aim of the United Nations operation in the Congo has been,
and continues to be, to contribute, in co-operation with the Congolese
authorities, to the maintenance of law and order and to the establishment of
such political and economic conditions as must prevail if the Congolese people
themselves are to solve their constitutional, administrative and economic problems.
One principle which applies to all United Nations activities in the Congo is
that the World Organization must not become a party to internal conflicts and that
it cannot be the task of the Organization to impose upon the Congolese people
specific solutions of their problems with regard to such things as the nature of
their governmental system or the relationship between the Central Government and
the Provincial Governments, within the framework of the unity of the Congo,
Military forces must not be used for such tasks. Instead, they should rather
perform the duties of a police force and, beyond that, serve the purpose by
their presence of inducing the different groups in the Congo to- reach agreement
"by means of negotiations.
The Swedish Government holds this basic view of the aims of the United
Nations in the Congo and has given practical expression to its positive attitude
by complying with the various requests which were made for Swedish personnel to
be engaged in the service of the United Nations and for materiel of different
kinds to be put at the disposal of the United Nations in the Congo. The Swedish
Government wishes to stress that the continued observance of the principles
indicated above is the basis for Sweden's participation in the United Nations
operation in the Congo.
AE/rh 12
- . • ,- (Mrs. RBsselj Sweden)
With regard to the question as to vhether the Security Council should "be
convened to discucs the Congo situation at this stage, I should lilie to emphasize
that icy Government has strong reservations about the advisability of calling
such a neeting. It is our feeling that a meeting of the Security Council could
easily result in an increased tendency to seek military solutions which would
alter the "basis for the United Nations action in the Congo and deprive ONUC of
•its impartial position. In our judgement, the most acute questions now are the
financing of 'ONUC, the weighing of civilian against military measures and the
economic, rather than the political, integration' of the Congo.
I should like to stress again that the Swedish Government fully supports
the peaceful procedure which you, Mr, Secretary-General, have followed in your
endeavour to "bring about a solution. It is my Government's sincere hope that your
•work and that of your collaborators in solving the complex Congo problem will
meet with success in the near future. -
• Mr. GEBRY-EQ^Y (Ethiopia): Because I have not yet received instructions
from my Government, I have no detailed statement to make at this time* I am,
however, in touch with them and as soon as I can, I shall attempt to answer
every question which was put to us at the last session* If possible^ I shall do
so in this Committee; otherwise, I shall come to your office, Mr. Secretary-General.
and present my views to you there.
Mr. ASIODU (Nigeria): I shall address myself first of all to the
immediate issues which were put before us at our last meeting and to the questions
on which you, Mr. Secretary-General, asked our opinions.
On the question of calling a Security Council session, I am instructed to say
that we do not consider it opportune. If a meeting of the Security Council is
called in order to obtain clearer instructions than we presently have, it might
easily result in acrimonious and inconclusive debate, as was suggested by other
delegations here, which would in no way help in resolving the situation in the
Congo, Furthermore, we believe that the existing mandate' is adequate. On the
other hand, if the purpose of calling a session of the Security Council is to
acquaint the members of the Council with what has transpired so far, we feel that
the latest developments in the Congo provide a sufficient reason for the issuance
of the usual type of report to those members. All of us are well aware that once
AE/rh 15-15
(Mr* Asiudu, Nigeria)
a meeting; of the Council is called, it will not be very easy to limit tfre
or to compel members to listen to a factual report on what has happened thus far
in the Congo.
The second isnue which was raised concerned the measures which the Secretary-
General described for putting economic pressure on Mr* Tshombe and his Government
in order to convince them to work towards the reintogration of Katanga into
the Congo. The Nigerian Government is fully in favour of the measures which were
outlined. We are also aware that such action would involve the protection of the
installations of the Union Miniere from reprisals and acts of cabotage "by those
who might not welcome any change in their present policies. However, we hope
that if international opinion continues to evolve positively in the direction of
pressure on Mr. Tshombc, it will not be necessary to undertake any military
offensive or in any way to involve the United Nations in any provocative military
gestures in order to ensure the security of .those installations. We feel that
the avoidance of such provocative behaviour is very important not only because
of the realities of the situation and the troops which are at our disposal in
Katanga but also because it is traditional for this Organization to resist any
temptation to "become exasperated with Mr, Tshombe's behaviour and to assume
provocative military postures on the part of ONUC troops* The Nigerian
Government has always supported the efforts of ONUC fully and will continue to
do so.
Thus, if we continue in the direction in which we have been working, namely,
seeking support among those of us who are already convinced of the justice of
our action thus far and who have provided initiative in obtaining good resolutions
for the Congo, and also gain the support of those who can exercise decisive
influence, we believe that a more satisfactory solution will be achieved. We
should not like to have the United Nations justly accused of any military
initiative in the matter.
CORRIGENDUM
United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo
Verbatim Record of meeting No. 69, held on Tuesday, :|31 July 1962, at 3 p.m.
Mr. AsiocLu; Nigeria
Pa^e 16
Delete first paragraph and substitute:
"it is very important to end the secession of Katanga, not only becausethe diversion of revenues uhich lecitimately belong to the Central Governmentto the coi'fers of the Central Government would help to reduce the deficit,,but because we also realize that, to some extent, the crippling expendituresof the Central Government in maintaining such large security forces may beexpected to fall or be reduced if the Katanga situation is resolved."
Page l6, third paragraph, second lino
For "It is now fairly clear ..." read "it IB now fairly current ..."
Page 17, third paragraph
Delete third sentence and substitute:
"Vie think that new military measures ore not called for and would be highlyundesirable."
62-17086
MP/rf 16
. • '. ' -- (Mr. Asiodu, Nigeria)
It is very important to end the secession of Katanga, no-b only because of
the diversion of revenues, vhich legitimately "belonged to the Central Government,
or because the coffers of the Central Government would have to reduce the deficit,•
"but because we also realize, to some extent, the crippling expenditures of the
Central Government in maintaining such large security forces may "be expected to
fall, to "be reduced, if the Katanga situation is resolved.
Tills is another reason Why we think.that, despite the elements vhich might
appear now in the situation,, you should.-continue with your efforts, to see that
Mr. Tchcrube and his supporters really see the need to. co-operate in the spirit of
the resolutions we have adopted, so as to ensure the territorial integrity of
the Congo.
Now, however, there is a larger issue to vhich I would like to refer, having
given the answers to the immediate questions. It is not; fairly clear that the
problem of the Congo is really only the question of Katanga. The Nigerian
Government considers that there are other aspects to vhich we -..must begin to '•'•'•
address ourselves with equal attention. In fact, it is pleasing to read of the
new proposals, by the Central Government, ond the apparent willingness of
Mr. Tshombe to accept these proposals in principle; because the mandate, of the
United nations in the,Congo naturally talks about ensuring the territorial
integrity of that Republic, in addition to talking about ensuring,that assistance
be given in sufficient degree to the Central Government, so that as soon as
possible they can take over the proper government of their own affairs.
This involves training of troops, training of personnel, and so .forth* We
do not think that sufficient emphasis or resources are being devoted to this
important aspect, because, if we must be frank, we have heard it said so often •
that even with the maximum we expect from the sale of United Nations bonds, perhaps
the United Nations operations in the Congo on the present scale.cannot last
beyond December 1962. But it is imperative that,when the United Nations withdraws,
it does not leave behind a situation of chaos and confusion. It is because of
this that we think more should be done to ensure that sufficient Congolese will
be left after the United Nations has withdrawn, so that they can carry out the
government of their territory in keeping with the mandate. This is the full
intention of the United Nations presence in the Congo; and we think it is not too
soon to emphasize this aspect.
MP/rf 17
(Mr. -Asiodu, Nigeria)
I listened with great interest to the answer which Mr. Gardiner gave
at the last meeting to the question put by the representative of India, Certainly,
the picture ve got there of the ANC was not reassuring; and this is just one
illustration of what I have been talking about.
We believe also that, although this is perhaps looking ahead, since ve have
not unlimited resources, and since the contributions of many Governments represent
quite a burden on those Governments, the United Nations should begin to think
about working out a practicable time-table for its withdrawal from the Congo.
This involves speeding up these measures we have been talking about to train tne
Congolese to look after their own affairs; because essentially we are there to
assist them precisely to do this.
Finally, I think I muot repeat what I had said about the immediate questions
which were put to us. We think you must pursue energetically the economic
measures which have been proposed. We think that now military initiatives are
called for and would be highly desirable. But of course we acknowledge the right
of self-defence, and everything must be done to protect the Union Miniere
installations against reprisals if, in fact, that company and its supporters are
willing to co-operate with you in order to end the cessation of Katanga*
Lastly, we think the Security Council need not be called, because the results
would be far from useful and might possibly be harmful. If it is to acquaint the
members with the factual report, the normal reports which were circulated to them
should suffice for the moment.
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; Before I give the floor to the
representative of India, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new
colleague, Ambassador Chakravarty, who has been appointed to this post as
Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations. I am sure all my colleagues here
will share these sentiments; and we all wish Ambassador Chakra-varty success
and happiness.
MP/rf 18-20
Mr. CIIAKRAVARTY (India): I must first thank you for the kind vords you
have said in welcoming me to this meeting today. It is indeed, I consider, fi
great privilege to be a member of tills Committee,
Coming now to the subject for our discussion, we have before uo .something ,
vhich ho.£5 been circulated by the Republic of the Congo, Which Contains Q Copy of
the lettor which has been received by you from the Congolese Foreign Minister,
from vhich ye learn that they have already drafted a tentative proposal for the
Constitution that could serve as a basis for diocussiont It is not very Clear
from this first hand-out whether, i;hen the Foreign Minister said that we have
already drafted a tentative proposal, that that proposal has been mads in
consultation with Mr. Tshonjbe, If the chances of such a Constitution being
accepted by Mr. Tshcrnbe are reasonable, I presume that you then will not think
it necessary to take this case back to the Security Council for a debate. There
is also not much point in taking the case to the Security Council unless we can .
think of some acceptable proposal which could be put before that body.
In view of this new development, I venture to suggest that the situation that
was discussed at Tuesday's meeting has changed, let uo hope, very much for .the
better. In that event, we do not think that a further mandate or a reference to
the Security Council is called for immediately. If and when you find that these
tentative proposals have no chance of being accepted by both jparties -- and I em
using the word "parties" in the loose sense -- then only can.,the .question be
further considered. It is only then that we need go into the specific questions
that were put by you at the last occasion, .
I need only say that, in so. far as the Government of.India is concerned,
there should be no difficulty in the United Nations utilizing our contingent for •
the purposes laid down in the Security Council resolutions. . -
IIG/rs 21
Mr* DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): During the last
meeting of the Advisory Committee I had en opportunity to indicate the feelings
of the Guinean delegation after your statement and the statement of your
Special Representative in the Congo. I once again express to you now,
I'jc. Secretary-General, the confidence which my Government has in your ability
to find a happy and successful conclusion to the Congolese crisis.
I speak again today to indicate the Guinean point of view on the precise
question which you raised here in this Committee. As to the meeting of the
Security Council, we said the last time and confirmed today that we have no
objection in principle to a meeting, nevertheless, we feel that the mandate
of the Secretary-General is quite edecuate, whether it is derived from a
Security Council resolution or a resolution of the Genei-al Assembly.
However, J-ir. Secretary-General, we base ourselves on your own statement,
namely, that the great Powers did not agree on the programme which you submitted
to them. As far as its effectiveness is concerned, it seems rather inopportune
to have a meeting of the Security Council now since if the results are negative
it would make the situation worse.
Although we do feel that there are some doubts as to the effectiveness of
a Security Council meeting, we feel, on the other hand, that this question,
whatever the issue may be, should be placed on the agenda of the next session
of the General Assembly. .And on precisely this point I should like to know if
the Secretariat could provide for the inscription of this item. If the
Secretariat cannot do so, I am sure that the African and Asian delegations,
and certainly mine, are willing and ready to ensure that this item be included
on the agenda of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the item
called "The situation in the Congo"«
We do hope, however, that before this session opens the question will be
solved arid it will simply be a matter then of summarizing or indicating that
a happy solution to the Congolese crisis has been found. However, if this is
not the case, and if the Powers which from the beginning agreed to create chaos
in the Congo continue their policies, it will be up to us and every delegation
here to assume its responsibilities and denounce the manoeuvres which have
been taking place in the Congo in opposition to all the interests of the African
countries.
HG/rs . 22
, (Mr. Diallo, Guinea)
I now turn to the next question which you raised, Mr» Secretary-General,
the various ways of exercising economic pressure against Katanga, vhich is the
heart of the Congo crisis. The Government of Guinea entirely approves your
proposals, although we feel that there are forms of pressure vhich are more
effective, Honce, we completely support your proposals in the economic realm,
but ire think that you also have at your-disposal — and no mandate is needed
for this either on the part of the Security -Council or the General Assembly --
the possibility of .exercising military pressure.
I shall explain this. We have numerous military forces in the Congo at
the present time. Everyone recognizes that all of the Congo is quiet except
for Katanga. Why are troops maintained in the other provinces of the Congo?
You mentioned financial difficulties. It is certain that i;e could reduce
contingents as presently placed in the Congo and integrate all of the forces,
including the general staff, in Katanga• There is no reason why the Commander-
in-chief of the troops should be in Leopoldville, There is no reason why the
troops should not move to Elisabethville, thus leaving it up to the Central
Government .of the Congo to maintain order and security in the rest of t h e 1 - - 1
country. . . -. . ' • • - - • • ;
This offers a possibility of exercising pressure without using force.
All of the troops at the disposal of the United Nations should be concentrated
in Katanga, with your Special Representative sitting in Elisabethville. We '
think this would be the most important pressure of all. It vould reduce the
financial effort and also the effort which the United Nations is exercising in
the'form of personnel, and it would yield most satisfactory results.
Mr.'Secretary-General, you ;mentioned the problem of the appointment of
jurists to give technical assistance to the Central Government of the Congo
in the drafting of a new constitution. - Here our position is very clear. We
believe that the drafting of a constitution is so intimately linked with the
sovereignty of the people of a country it is a field in which technical
assistance has to be as discreet as possible, almost to the extent, we would say,
HG/rs 25-25
(Mr. Piallo, Guinea)
of being entirely excluded. However, the situation being what it ±s, we do
support the Central Government of the Congo if it feels that in a field as
delicate as this it is necessary to appeal Tor technical assistance.
If that is the case, we would Bay that the Secretariat of the United Nations
should exj^cise maximum discretion and should ensure that the decisions are not
United Nations decisions and riot decisions of the Secretary-General, t»Ut decisions
of the Government of the Congo itself.
For this reason, I support the thosis advocated by my friend from Ghana
a moment ago. i think that the beet thing the Secretary-General could do
would be to snb'Jiit a list of possible candidates to the Central Government of
the Congo, leaving it up to the latter to choone both the country anft the man.
These are the few points which I wanted to mention in the name of the
Government of the Republic cf Guinea,
Mr. CAKDOSO (Congo, Leopoldville) (interpretation from French): I
listened with great attention to the statements which were made by my colleagues.
It permitted me to acquire a better understanding of the atmosphere here.
In the first place, I must state that there is a new element which has
emerged in the past few days, and that is the proposal concerning a federal
constitution* The situation naturally changes; it has been changing for two
years. But there are constant elements involved.
Paradoxically, and unfortunately, the most constant element in 'the
situation is the instability of Tshombe. We have come to a point where the
Central Government proposes and yet Tshombe disposes. He has the time and
the money, and he is in a position to keep his word or not to keep it. in any
case, he seems to have achieved impunity.
Without a desire to form an indivisible nation, all constitutions will
remain without effect. The desire to have an indivisible nation will not be
found in Tchombe. The mediation of legal experts and functionaries of the United
Nations, such as Mr. Gardiner, will also suffer a defeat. This is quite probable*
because we have had our hopes shattered too often.
AC/pm 26
(Mr« Cardoso, Conp;o (Leoppldville^ )
The Congo crisis can be considered a constitutional crisis, and I think that
the proposal of the Government is an effort in the clirection of crecdvinc a
constitution which will "be acceptable to the Parliament, But we must say that
this crisis is also a crisis of authority. Among the 137 deputies and 84 senators,
the representatives of Tshoribo could vote against the "beet constitution in the world,
and. the situation would remain the same. That ±5 why^ Mr, Secretary-General and
fellow members, I "bring to your attention the statement -which jny Government
instructed mo to,make at this mooting,, This statement consists of six points.
I V7j.ll read them to you»
In the first place, I think that in previous meetings there were proposals
which tended towards mediation on the part of African chiefs of state. My
Government fcals that this attempt at mediation does not yield any new elements
for a solution. Mediation has "been conducted very conscientiously for more than
a year "by officials of the United Nations and by Mr. .Gardiner personally as the
champion of the Congolese Constitution. A new mediation effort would only
postpone a solution. Mediation is impossible when Tshcmbe does not abandon
the idea of independence for the Katanga Province, Mediation on the part of the
United Nations has been conducted, on all fronts, we must stress, with economic
and financial experts, and others. All questions have been discussed. Tshombe
is merely trying to gain time to maintain the state of secession. There is no
sincere desire in Elisabethville to establish the unity of the Congo. The
Advisory Committee must take into consideration that the idea of mediation is
supported only by persons who have for two years been maintaining and supporting
secession. It has also been advanced by conservative Belgian and English
newspapers'that support- foreign influences in Katanga. British circles insist on
mediation in order to gain time and to exhaust the United Nations in the.Congo.
Ahe Government of the Congo cannot make concessions in regard to the
territorial integrity of the Congo. The Government of the Congo knows about •
the influence of foreign Powers which is at the root of the trouble and continues
to sabotage Congolese unity. Therefore the positions are irreconcilable and
mediation between the Central Government and Tshombe cannot bring any results.
The maintenance of the suspension of the•fundamental law is not a question-of
a central government or Of provincial governments. The population and the
Parliament must be heard in this situation. The Central Government supports the :
Parliament in the elaboration of a new constitution of a federal type. For such a
AC/pm 27
(Mr* Cardoso^ Conpo (Leopoldville))
constitution only Parliament has the necessary competence.,
Tho Government of the Congo does not "believe in the effectiveness of mere
economic measures, and calls for the full application of the resolutions of the
Security Council in regard to the Congo, Only the complete and faithful
implementation of the resolub'.lons will "be a guarantee of the territorial integrity
of the country.
This is the statement, Mr, Secretary-General and my fellow members, which
I vas authorized to make at this meeting by the Central Government of the Congo.
I hope that this statement will he taken sufficiently into account "by you to give
direction to the discussion in order to achieve positive results -which will not
postpone the solution of the crisis.
Mr, IXAD (United Arab Republic): I should like to join my colleagues
in thanking you, Mr. Secretary-General, for theinformation that you have
presented to the Committee after your return from Europe. I was hoping that
the Secretary-General would be informed during his visit to certain Western Powers
that these Powers would implement the United Nations resolutions. But we have
"been informed by the Secretary-General that tha Belgian Government did not
officially answer the economic proposals of the Secretary-General, while others
refused these mild and modest proposals. I say "mild and modest proposals11
because I have certain doubts that such proposals will lead to a final settlement
in the Congo. But at any rate it is a forward step in the right direction, and
my delegation fully supports the^e economic proposals,
We are now facing the fact that certain Western Powers, some of them
permanent members of the Security. Council, are refusing to implement the
resolutions of the United Nations, For this reason I believe that any attempt
to strengthen the Secretary-General1s mandate will fail in the Security Council
at this time. But we still have some hope that the Belgian Government and other
Western Powers will reconsider their position, arid that is why my delegation is
not encouraging a Security Council meeting at this stage. . At the moment we feel
that if all other efforts are exhausted without producing any results, then we
must go to the Security Council and maybe to the General AsccmKLy as veil if ve
find that this is suitable.
AC/pm 28-30(Mr. Riad, United Arab Republic)
Tills question of sending legal advisers is a very delicate question.
I hope that these legal advisers will not be described as United Nations
representatives. The reason is that United Nations resolutions are clear enough
in requesting the full unification-of the Congo and respect for the
Loi fon-Iamontale, and any new constitution means major changes to the
Lot fonJamentale. Since the United Nations representatives are supposed to seek
only the implementation of United Nations resolutions, they should not conanit the
United Nations to such action as is highly political and not merely legal.
0+-1 r-ourscj we have no doubt that the Central Government of' the Congo
has a perfect right to make any change in its system of government or in the
fundamental law. Therefore, I hope that these legal advisors who may go to
the Congo will not "be described, as United Nation? representatives.
TL/ids 31
Mr. MFSTIRI (Tunisia) (interpretation frcm French): The Tunisian
delegation was very grateful to you, h'r. Secretary-General, Tor the •vein-Vole
information which you were good enough to ccrnrnuri.icate t; us, £••;. the la&t meeting
of the Advisory Committee, on the evolution of the crisis in the Congo. We are
equally grateful to Mr. Gardiner for the clarifications which he furnished
additionally.
It is not wy intention today to rev5.ew all the matters which you mentioned at
that meeting; I wish rather to concentrate my remarKs o;a certain points which
I wish to clarify, First of all I want to say that the Tunisian Government
feels that the mandate provided in the various Security Council resolutions
is already adequate to enable CNUC to function effectively in the solution of
the problem of the unity of the Congo. To be sure, thin mandate is in come
respects vague and, as you yourself have already emphasized, even self-contradictory
but it is nonetheless true that the margin it allows for manoeuvring should
be adequate, A resolution of the Security Council under the present conditions
would, in the opinion of my Government, probably add nothing to this mandate;
it could, on the contrary, give to certain countries whose interest io clearly
to limit ONUC'G scope of action, the opportunity to interpret this mandate
in a restrictive manner which could only make the task of the Secretary-General
more difficult. Furthermore, a meeting of the Security Council which did not
result in-en extension or expansion of the already-ex! r/kiiig mandate would bo a
disappointment not only to public opinion in the Congo but also to African public
opinion in general, and in any case would serve to encourage Mr. Tohcmbe in his
activities.
For these reasons we are not at the present moment particularly in favour
of a meeting of the Security Council the outccme of which is difficult to
foretell. Only if you have the assurances from the Security Council members,
and particularly from the permanent members, that such a meeting of the Security
Council would result in a strengthening of the mandate recently given you —.
only then would we advocate such a meeting.
While we are discussing the matter of the United Nations mandate, there
can be no doubt that the task laid down by the Security Council for OHUC can
be pursued under that mandate at least in one aspect, the matter of the
mercenaries, especially if we bear in mind the fact that these mercenaries serve
to endanger any final solution of the problem of Congolese unity. The fact that
TL/ids ' 32 • ' "' Wl S
(Mr, Mestiri, Tunisia)
these mercenaries are more or less integrated into the civilian European "
population should not, in any case, prevent tha United nations frcm undertaking
action against them, "because it would be very difficult to continue to allow
hundreds of mercenaries to remain while at the same time wishing to solve the
problem re-ju."1 tin^ ?ro: tlva existence of a. particularly powerful Katangose
gSLiarrc^rio. Mr. Gardiner has, in foct, told us that the Katangesc have not
sto-r^a strengthening their gr.ndar:i3iie, and that OI:UG is continuing to work on
this difficult task. It is certain that the mercenaries ploy an important part
in this veritable army which is at the service of the Government of Katanga
in imposing a solution in accord with the secessionist aims of Mr. Tshcmbe.
With regard to the use of United Nations troops in situations which could
ultimately lead to combat, it is very difficult to believe that the Governments
which have supplied contingents would refuse to allow these contingents to be
used within the terms of the United Nations mandate. I do not believe that
the countries which were willing to send military contingents to the Congo did
so on the condition that these contingents should not be utilized in carrying
out the United Nations mandate.
As to the matter of economic pressures to be applied on Mr. Tshcmbe, my
delegation shares the regret of the Secretary-General over the lack of
co-operation on the part of certain Governments in applying cuch pressures.
Still we do have some doubt as to whether any effective economic pressure could
be exerted if the Governments of the territories surrounding Katanga, are not
working with us — and it is very difficult to imagine the Governments of
Rhcdeaia, South Africa and Portugal, all neighbours and friends of Mr. Tehombe,
not giving him all the assistance they can in order to save him, thereby
proving that Katanga can make a go of it even in spite of an international
blockade which, in the final analysis, can be but a partial blockade.
Finally, as to the latest developments involving modification of the
Constitution of the Congo, let us hope that we are not once more going to see more of
the dilatory tactics of Mr. Tchcmbe, and that this is not simply another effort
on his part to gain valuable time.
TL/ids 33 ' 1:i"'*""
(Mr. Mestiri, Tuninia)
To summarize, it is our opinion, first, that it would not Toe vise to call
a meeting of the Security Council unless assurances hr-v^ been given that such
a meeting vill hn.ve a favourable outcome; second, that all the troops sent to
the Congo were sent within the framework of the resolution of the Security
Council, and that therefore there is no occasion for saying whether or not these
trcops should be used to cav?:;/ out t.-nat nacidate; third, that the fir$ht to
get the mercenaries out should he continuecl; and ifist; that everything liiust
be done in order to k^ep from falling once again into the trap of Mr. Tshoribe's
delaying tactics.
•PL/ids 3 -35
Mr. BARNES (Liberia)*. At our meeting on 2k July a very grim picture
of the situation in the Congo was painted for us here. Talks "between
Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshcmbe had broken off. Uo progress towards reconciliation
was seen. The Katangese authorities and people, as a result of the incident
of 17 July, were shoving continued hostility to the United Nations. The
Secretary-G-J'ier.'vL'G :V.yct,iations with certain Governments to secure economic
Pi'-issurcn nn Katajagt:, h3/( not achieved the desired result« For all these
reason3 the Secretary-Genera.! had sought the advice of this Committee on the
desirability of going to the 3ecux"ity Council to secure a new mandate or to get
clarification on the mandates alro.ady issued by the Security Council in regard
to the Congo.
At that meeting I endeavoured to make clear the position of my' Government
with respect to a meeting of the Security Council. 'I pointed out that in our
view it was not desirable to go to tha Security Council to get a new mandate or
clarification of the already-existing mandates, for such a debate'would merely
be productive of prolixity without any positive action' and the end-result would
be harmful rather than advantageous* We also held the view that if the purpose •
of the Secretary-General's going to the Security Council was to report on the •
situation then prevailing, we caw no objection to that. Our position in that
respect remains unchanged. . . . . .
How, it cannot be denied that a new complexion has been placed upon the
Congo situation as a result of recent developments. You, Mr. Secretary-General •
have reported to us today that the Congolese Government has requested your
assistance, with regard to a now constitution, by recommending experts to elaborate
ouch a constitution* I fully endorse your position In seeking to secure these
experts from Nigeria; Switzerland and Canada and I say that, because cince -
1960 the operations in the Congo, both military and technical, have been under
the auspices of the United Nations, and while I have no objections to the •
Congolese Government itself securing technical assistance, yet if an appeal
or requo-t is made to you by the Congolese Government for this purpose, I
see no roason why you ought not to acquiesce in it.
AW/cn 36
(Mr. "Harnes , Liber:' a )
Now whatever constitution may be elaborated by experts or jurists vill
only "be the constitution of the Congo after it h~s been ratified by the
Parliament; and the ratification "by the Parliament will provide an opportunity
for the people of the Congo to say whether that constitution is to their best
interests. So that if the constitution is elaborated by experts appointed "by
you, Mr. Secretary-General, or by the Congolese Government, it uiakos no
difference. I ther2fore endorse your position and I s-:-o no reason vhy you
should not proceed in seeking to secure these experts in the areas you desire.
At the meeting on the 2?J-th, I think I also said that you had laid your
finger on one of the root causes of the situation in the Congo, namely the
economic situation, and that you should pursue these efforts in your consultations
and negotiations with governments to bring these economic pressures on Katanga*
At that time you said, Mr. Secretary-General, if I am correct, that you had not
received any reaction from Belgium as to your approach in this matter. I am
not aware what the precise situation is with regard to Belgium's reaction. I
would be thankful if you could inform me whether the Belgian Government has made
any response to your request in this connection..
The Acting SECPETARY-GEBsRAL: Before calling on the Ambassador from
Canada, I wish to extend a very warm welcome to our new colleague, Mr. Tremblay,
who is with us today for the first time. I am sure all the members of the
Committee share my sentiments in wishing him success.
Mr. TREMBLAY (Canada): Mr. Secretary-General, it is a very great
honour indeed for me to join this group and participate in its work. My very
first remarks in this Committee are directed at expressing ray Government's
support and appreciation for your current efforts to reach a negotiated settlement
of the Congo problem. We recognize, as you do, the very serious financial
situation faced by the United Nations in the Congo and we believe that TshombeTs
delaying tactics should not be allowed to continue.
With regard to the first point that you raised at the last meeting,
Mr. Secretary-General -- that is, whether a nevj mandate or a clarification of
the present mandate be sought from the Security Council --in our opinion such a
move might become unavoidable at some stage. But we believe that it would be
AW/sd 37
(Mr. Tremblay, Canada)
premature to move in that direction before all possibilities of a negotiated
settlement have been exhausted. No ono con argue, I think, even on the basis of
current press reports, that all possibilities of such a Gettlenent have in fact
been explored* As we ses it, the danger of a premature reference to the Security
Council is 7ntv« it i.-.'•-j t roll result in a stalemate that would.weiken the present
Urited Nations r>ini:vte ori the Congo, thus defeating the very purpose we have in.
min ., or -jbat a public G.ebace in the Security Council et this tims is v?ry likely
to result in weakening public support for the United Nations Congo operation.
You. also raised at our last neeting the possibility of seeking a stronger
mandate that might involve the use of force by the United Nations. On this point
I wish only to say that such a course of action would.place the United 'Nations in
a most undesirable position. I submit that whatever the outcome of a United.
Nations military operation in the Congo might be, it would not serve the best
interests of the United Nations.
No one can be certain of the outcome of the military operation. If it fails,
it would constitute a blow of the first magnitude to the prestige of our
Organization. If it succeeds, we should ask ourselves whether it is iu the long-
term interests of the Central Government that it be known that its authority over
Katanga has been established thanks to an external force and imposed from the
outside instead of stemming from the general consent of the Congolese people.
If it half fails or if it half succeeds, it appears evident to us that the
involvement of United Nations troops in hostilities would seriously damage the
public image of the United Nations as a psace organization.
Our conclusion therefore is that your current efforts to effect a negotiated
settlement of the Congo problem should be encouraged and supported.
Mr. 0'SULLTVAN (Ireland): I would first of all like to express to you,
Mr. Secretary-Crenei-al, my Government's thanks for your efforts in solving the
very serious problem with which we are confronted in the Congo, which is becoming
more and more urger..t_, and I would like to assure you of the full support of our
Government in reaching a settlement of this problem. I think that in facing up
to this question of the Congo and Katanga, onft should have in mind at all times
AW/cn 38-ifO
(Mr. Q'Rvil3.Ivan, Ireland)
the principles of the United Nations operation in the Congo. In this
connexion I feel that I can do no better than endorse fully what has been so
well said at this meeting today by the gracious representative of Sweden,
vhich corresponds exactly with our own view of this matter.
As regards the holding of a Security Council meeting, my Government would
not favour the ho]ding of such a meeting unless a clear concensus had
previously "been reached between the major Powers. Vie reel that, any Security
Council discussion vhich revealed great-Power dissensions or failed to define
the future course of the ONUC operation more clearly than the past
resolutions, could only encourage Tshorabe and confirm him in his recalcitrance.
My Government also believes that all possible means of exerting pressure
on Tshornbe should be patiently explored before any course is adopted which might
result in active hostilities. Therefore, we hope, Mr. Secretary-General —
and indeed we confidently hope -- that you will continue with the negotiations
which are at present being conducted with certain Powers in this connexion.
We welcome the developments of the past few doys and we also welcome and thank
you for the action which you have already taken to encourage and promote these
developments. The danger which we all see in this Committee in, as it were,
adopting a course which might possibly be less firm than some of the measuresvhich have been previously discussed, is that Mr. Tshombe, with his well-known
penchant for tergiversation, might profit by the delay which constitutional
discussions or negotiations would give him.
DR/rl Ifi
(Mr. Of Sullivan, Ireland)
In fact, at the last meeting of this Committee Mr. Gardiner stated, I Relieve,
that Tshcinbe had been led to believe that if he could hold out long encu~h, the
United rations would eventually reach a state of complete "bankruptcy. My
Goverraent fe^ls that it i?i rather important that Tshonbe should be disabused of
any such illusion. For this, rca-jon^ vo would surest to you, sir.,, and to the
other nurbers of this Corociit^^e t/h t the -Members of the united nations should be
pivparsd to consider special fin.?.neif,l nsasures to encore the continuance of the
Cr/JC cparatioxip whatever ths tjacrj.fic.es involved. This is the idea I should like
to leave with. ou.
-'ie Acting vSE EEMY G-EraRAL: As there a::e no further
should like to wind up the proceedings in c, few words.
It seems to me that there is a consensus of opinion in this Cosroittoe that
at the present moment there should bo no. Security Council meeting. I will take
particular note of this.
Seme members of th'3 Committee have expressed the view that the item on the
Congo should be inscribed in the agenda of the seventeenth -session of the General
Assembly. The provisional agenda of the seventeenth session is already out now,
so if an additional item is considered to be necessary for inscription;, I would
request that a Keroher State of the United Nations should take the initiative.
Regarding the query posed by the representative of Liberia on the reply from
Belgium, so- £a:v up. to this moment, I have not received any official reply from .
the Belgian Government. But I have been informed that very -clone consultations ,
have becrn going on between the Belgian Government and a few other Governments
directly involved in the problem of the Congo in- the last three or four days,
and I understand -that discussions are still going on. I. expect to hear further
on this subject in the course of the next day or two.
Regarding the question of constitutional experts, a Parliamentary Committee
of the Congo hlis been working on a draft constitution for seme time, actually as
a result of the Kitona declaration. This Parliamentary Committee of the Congo
DR/rl 1*2
(The Acting Secretary-General)
comprises, to my knowledge, many shades of political opinion in the Congo^
including a representative from the Conaiat Fa::ty of Mr. Tshombe. The Prime
Minister's office, I understand, has also prepared a draft constitution and the
Prime Minister new wants tho assistance of constitutional experts to put
fininhiD'-r touches to it. Therefore, ho has requested me to make available to
him three or four constitutional experts with experience in the working of
federal, constitutions. That is the position.
I want to make it clear that the response to the request of the Prime
Minister does not mean that the United Nations is directly involved in the
framing of the constitution. What the United .Nations will "be involved in is the
rendering of assistance by way of advice and suggestions and recominond.itions to
the Central Government of the Congo in finalising the draft constitution which
has been draim up by the Congolese themselves. So, of course, the participation
of these constitutional experts will not necessarily reflect the views of the
Secretary-General nor the views of the United Nations.
Like all other technical advice in the field cf education^ finance or
agriculture -- and, in passing, I should like to say that we have technical
experts in the Congo in other fields — the advice to be offered by these experts
to the Government of course, does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Secretary-General. So with this understanding of course^ I have decifisci to
respond to the appeal of Prime Minister Adoula and^ as I have indicated earlier,
I have sounded out the views of the Central Government regarding the nationality
of the experts I have in mind. If he has any other proposals or any counter-
proposals, I will be very glad to pay heed to them. Let me'repeat once again
that the provision of these constitutional experts in examining the draft
constitution of the Congo will not reflect the views of the Secretary-General nor
of the United Nations.
Thus, regarding the Security Council, it is now clear that not a single
member of the Advisory Committee is in favour of its convening. So I wish to
inform you that it is my intention to submit a written report to the Security
Council about the middle of August. The report in itself will not require a
meeting of the Security Council, and on the basis of the suggestions just offered
I am not inclined to press for one at this time.
DR/yt 3- 5
(The Acting Secretary-General)
In the course of the discussions this afternoon, opir.iono have "been
caressed that the United nations operations in the Congo should go on §
uninterrupted despite the new development of last weekend regarding the
examination of the draft constitution of the Congo. I a,jree entirely with this
view. Actually cur activities in the Congo have T)een going on uninterrupted,
and in strict conformity with the mandate given to ne by the previous
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions? I have been going ahead
with the measures which I consider to "be legitimate. Only today I have appealed
to all the Ksmber States of the United Nations to co-operats with me in giving
effect to certain important aspects of the previous Security Council resolutions.
AP/vrs h6(The /.ctinp; Secretory-General)
My appeal, I.understand, is on the way out to the Permanent Missions in
New York and, as has been the practice in the past, ve do not release such
ccrimunicntions to tho Press before these communications actually reach the hands of
the addressees. Perhaps, my appeal will be in the hands of the Permanent Missions
either this afternoon _, this evening or tomorrow uorning. It is my intention to
release this appeal publicly tomorrow morning, For the information of the members
of the Committee I shall take the liberty of reading out this appeal:
The situation in the Congo has been, and is now perhaps more than ever, a
very serious problem for the United Nations. It is true, of course, that much
constructive work has been done in the Congo since the disastrous state in which
that country found itself in July 1960. Nevertheless, after more than two years of
intensive effort to assist the Government of the Congo, the stability and territorial
integrity of the country remain fc.r from established, and the purposes of the
United Nations in it, therefore, far from realized. This situation is particularly
crucial in view of the lives, effort and money already expended and currently being
expended by the United Nations and the financial crisis into which this
unprecedented drain on its resources has brought the Organization.
Although there are many contributory causes to this state of affairs, there
can be no doubt that the main cause is the continuing attempt at secession by the
province of Katanga. Until a satisfactory and constructive solution to this issue
is found, it will be very difficult for the Congolese Government to face successfully
its responsibilities and problems, or for the United Nations to assist it very
effectively. I assure you chat no one can be more desirous than I am to see this
solution brought about by peaceful means through processes of conciliation and
consultation, and the United Nations continues to employ its very best endeavours
to this end. Unfortunately, these endeavours so far have not produced fruitful
results, and the situation becomes more and more distressing.
I therefore feel impelled to appeal to all member utates to use all the
influence and exert all the effort which they can bring to bear to achieve a
reasonable and peaceful settlement in the Congo, I do not -claim that the blame for
the abortive talks in the Congo is altogether on one side. But I do assert that
secession of any province is no solution for the Congo's ills, that it would serve
no interests other than, possibly, those of the raining companies and certain
AT/vi's If 7(The Acting Secretary-General)
neighbours, and has neither historical nor ethnic justification. I strongly
believe that only a unified Congo can give hope for peace and prosperity in
Central Africa. In this connexion I note with satisfaction the latest proposals
of Prime Minister Atioula for the drafting of a federal type constitution with the
assistance of international exports.
The situation in the Congo has been aggravated and. confused by an intensive
and skillfully waged propaganda campaign en behalf of Katanga which has never failed
to poi-cray the situation in a false light. This campaign, having both money and
ability behind it, makes it all the mere important to see and portray the Congo-
Katanga problem in its true perspective.
The United Nations is very much concerned with the cultivation of useful
economic activity everywhere. Indeed, much of its effort in the Congo has been
devoted to the protection of the personnel and property of the enterpriscc which
are vital to the Congo's economy. But the situation becomes immensely complicated
when one of these great enterprises is found involved, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, in disruptive political activities which can be carried on only
because of the very large sums of money available. This is a highly undesirable
activity, both for the good of the Congo and of the enterprises themselves.
Moreover, the overriding importance, both for Africa and for the world community,
of the stability of the Congo and the conciliation cf the conflicting parties in
that country cannot be compared with the short-term and short-sighted interests
and ambitions, both economic and political, of a relatively very small group of
people. Moreover I have no doubt that, in the long run, the best safeguard for
the interests of all concerned, including those I have just mentioned, is the
successful establishment of stability and poace in a united Congo.
I appeal, therefore, to all iiicmber Governments to use thair influence to
persuade the principal parties concerned in the Congo that a peaceful solution is
in their own long-terra interest, as well as in the interest cf the Congolese people.
If such persuasion should finally prove ineffective, I would ask them to consider
seriously what further measures may be taken. In chis context, I have in mind
economic pressure upon the Katangese authorities of a kind that will bring home to
them the realities of their situation and the fact that Katanga is not a sovereign
AP/vrs U8-50(The Acting Secretary-Generr.l)
State and is not recognized by any Government in the world as such. In the last
resort and if all other efforts fail, this could Justifiably go to the extent of
barring ell trade end financial relations. I olso cppeel to ell Governments to
do everything in their power to ensure that bed advice, false encouragement, and
every fern, of military and non-military assistance be withheld frcm the authorities
of the Province cf Katanga, £uch efforts should include all possible attempts to
control the entry into Katanga of adventurers who sell their services to the
Katan/rcse Provincial authorities and whose reckless and irresponsible activities
have contributed ranch to the v/orselling of the situation.
In making this appeal I wish to make it clear that the United nations in
the Congo, as in the rest of the -world, is particularly anxious to pi-enerve and
strengthen the economic life of the country. This applies as much to Katanga as
to the rest cf the Congo, I need hardly add that this appeal is in strict conformity
with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly.
rm/rn 51(The Acting decretory-General)
This is the text of the appeal which I am sending out to all the Members
of the United Nations, and this vill TDG released to the Press tonorro-vr morning.
The Central Government of the Congo has already tciken certain steps in this
direction, and I think it vill he of interest to the members of this Committee
if I reveal one of those steps.
As you are no doubt aware, the Katangcse authorities have "been using the
facilities of the Univsrsal Postal Union by taking advantage of their own
printed stomps on the envelopes, vhich is, of course, illegal, and I am sure you
vill a^ree with me that no part of a country, no province of a country, no state
of a country, can print its own postage stamps and use them for universal
transport and postings. Therefore, the Central Government of the Congo has
brought this illegitimate and illegal system, which has been prevailing in
Katanga for the last two years, to the attention of the Universal Postal Union,
with headquarters in Berne, and requested it to put a stop to this practice* I
have also endorsed this request, and I am sure that the U?U will give very
favourable consideration to this request. That is one of the measures which the
Central Government of the Congo has taken.
I am very grateful to tho members of the Committee for the very fruitful
suggestions and observations which have been prepen-tea -co us. Let us only hope
that our united endeavours for t.ho aohiovomcn-t of the Security Council and
General Assembly objectives will be realized at a very early date.
Mr, CARDOSO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): I
would like to say a last word before we end our meeting, and thank you all for the
efforts you have undertaken to find a solution for the Con£o problem. I should
like to thank you most of all for the deep understanding you have shown in regard
to our difficulties and for the tact with which you have approached certain
projected solutions*
With regard to the designation of experts to help the Central Government,
perhaps it might be difficult to find a solution if the Central Government has to
make the final choice of the experts. It is my feeling that despite everything
there is a fundamental disagreement between those who want the unity of the
country and those who desire its bcilkanization, and I think that if the Central
Government chose certain experts, that would be sufficient for the secessionists
immediately to come out against that choice and to raise questions. Therefore,
RU/rh 52
(Mr.. Leopoldville ))
I would like you to keep this possibility in mind in the choice of the experts
who are to help the Central Government.
The Acting r?CRgTApy-GEKERAL; I thank you very much for this useful
advice; I shall certainly keep it in mind.
The meeting rose at 5*5 P«ri.
Meeting Wo. 7012 OctoberENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON THE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Friday, 12 October 1962, at 5 p.m.
In the Chair:
Members:
U TIIANT
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of Malaya
Ghana
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Liberia
Mali
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Senegal
Sudan
Sweden
Tunisia
United Arab Republic
Congo (Leopoldville)
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL
Mr. TREMB1AY
Mr. MAIALASEKERA
Mr. ABEBE
Mr. ISMAIL
Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY
Mr. CHAKRAVARTY
Mr. UIRJOFRANOTO
Mr. AIKEN
Mr. BARNES
Mr. GOULIBALY
Mr. TABITI-
Mir. UACHUKU
Mr, CILEEMA
Mr. CISSE
Mr. ADEEL
Mrs. ROSSEL
Mr. Taieb SLIM
Mr. RIAD
Mr. KA3HALE
62-22 62
TL/nz
Thejteting SECRETARY-GEM^L; I have caned this meeting primarily
for the purpose of reporting with a view to enabling you to t>e up to date on
developments in the Congo. To do this effectively I must speak with full
frankness, and I do eo in the conviction that my confidence will be respected by
everyone here.
Although come time has elapsed since our last meeting^ and during that period
a great cVsal of effort has been expended towards ac/ilGving reconciliation of
differences and unity in the Congo, I am sorry to cay that the facts of the Congo
as of today would not sustain me in making to you a cheery report of progress*
Although the outlook continues cloudy, let me scy at the outset that I still
believe tlicr'i the United Nations can achieve its objectives of territorial unity,
law and order, and stability in the Congo. To do eo, however, some new efforts
in new directions will probably have to be made. I will speak of this later.
You are familiar with the Plan which I submitted some time ago to
Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshoitfoe. This was summarized in the report to the
Security Council in August, contained in document S/5053/Add.H. For your
confidential information, I am distributing copies of this Plan to you now.
It has the status only of a personal proposal from me to Mr. Adoula and
Mr. Tshombe. As you know, both Mr* Adoula and Mr* Tshombe responded to my
presentation favourably, stating that they accepted the Plan, Mr0 Tshombe
typically later referred to his acceptance of the Plan "in principle"• I should
add that in the exercise of the discretion permitted Mm, Mr. Gardiner considered
it more advantageous not to present the "courses of action" part of the Plan Bet
out in Phase I through Phase IV at tlte time of presentation of the Plan in
Elisabethville. Mr. Tshombe in fact was not in the city at the time.
AW/dr 5
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Following this, a rather detailed programme of implementation of the Plan
was worked out in collaboration between Mr. Gardiner and Headquarters, with the
purpose of converting the acceptance of the parties into concrete actions which
would end Katanga's secession, thus reintegrating Katanga effectively with the
rest of the Ccn^o and making it possible before long for the United. Nations to
undertake a substantial reduction in the military force it maintains in the Congo,
Mr. Adoula explicitly indicated acceptance of the programme of implementation,
while Mr. Tshombe, although not replj^ins to Mr0 Gardiner on the specific question^
gave basis for assuming his acceptance "by proceeding to nominate the Katangese
members of the three commissions called for in the programme.
I have asked Mr* Gardiner to prepare a report to the Security Council on
all developments relating to the Plan and the programme for its implementation
and I would expect to submit this report to the Security Council within a week
or so. I need refer here to only a few of the developments in this sphere.
About a week ago Mr, Gardiner returned from Eiicabe'Chville, Where he 'had
gone at my suggestion to ascertain from Mr, Tshomibe once and for all whether he
intended to proceed with the implementation of the Plan. Mr. Tshciabe assured
Mr. Gardiner that he intends to do so. This assurance, Mr. Gardiner pointed out
last week, will very soon be tested, since concrete measures must be taken in the
realms of military integration, revenue accounting and currency.
Mr. Gardiner's visit to Elisabethville last week was necessary because very
soon after Mr. Tshcmbe's implied approval of the programme of implementrtion,
the dilatory tactics with which we have become -too familiar began. For example,
Mr. Gardiner had, some time ago, informed Mr. Tshcmbe that the Central Government
and OKUC members of the three conmisions envisaged by the Plan -- one on military
matters and two on financial matters -- had been designated and would be arriving
in Elisabethville in pursuance of their work at an early date. When these members
of the Commission arrived in Elisabethville, they were welcomed by. Mr* Tshcmbe,
and the Katangese members of the three commissions were designated. The
Commissions then promptly began to meet in order to get on with the work. All
three of them, however, immediately encountered stalling tactics by the Katangese
members. The latter did not want to discuss the progranme for implementation of
the Plan, but rather to debate the provisions of the Plan itself, thus attempting
AW/dr
(The Acting Secretary-General)
to subject to prolonged negotiation provisions of a proposal vhich Mr. Tshombe
himself had already accepted. This, of course, was Intolerable to the Central
Government representatives and the meetings of all three corrmissions were abruptly
suspended. The Plan was submitted to both parties for acceptance or rejection
end i'C vas made entirely clear that it was not subject to negotiation* Ho one Of
the commissions had got dovn to any serious worfc "when Mr. Gardiner vent to
Elisabethvllle on 2 October. In fact, on the very day the Military Commission
vas in its first meeting, a United Nations patrol at the Martini track at the
airport was deliberately booby-trapped and lost two of its members, as related
in the latest report to the Security Council. The ccmnissions have resumed meeting
and Mr. Gardiner has returned to Elisabethville in a further effort to get the
implementation of the Plan effectively under vay.
BC/jpm 6
(The Acting Secretary-General)
The three commissions are now "back at work, and the reports of their
deliberations vary from day to day and from good to bad, if I may Bay so« To
Siva you an idea, I shall ask Dr. Bundle, after I have finished my statement,
to read to you our two latest reports on them and also some excerpts from a
message sent in "by Mr« Gardiner after his return to Elisabethville yesterday
and another talk with Mr. Tshoir.be, in one further effort to obtain sone concrete
st<;ps towards the rointcgration of Katanga.
We are dealing with Mr, Tshombe, and therefore you will understand why
I risk no prediction about tha implementation of the plan. That will come
about, I suspect, only if and when Mr, Tshornbe becomes convinced that this world
body, ths United Nations, really means business and there is no alternative for
him but disaster. Yesterday he me.de a statement In Elisabethv.llle about his
immediate intentions, and I am new having it distributed to you. Whether he
goes through with even this remains to be seen,
I strike this rather bleak note only on the grounds that it becomes
ever more apparent to me that Mr, Tshombe cannot be counted upon to be in earnest
simply because he approves something. He indulges always in nianoeuvre, usually
with the objective of gaining time. His promising words rarely find reflection
in helpful deeds. I think that it is clear enough what he hopes to gain by time,
He thinks, in the first place, that time runs in his favour "because the Adoula
Government will sooner or later fall, with the prospects that this vill throw
Leopoldville and alt of the Congo outside of Katanga back into the chaos and
semi-anarchy of a year and a half ago. In this calculation Mr. Tshombe could
well be right. Secondly, he hopes that as time passes the United Nations will
increasingly feel the heavy burdens of the Congo operation and that,through
financial strain and frustration at its inability to achieve a peaceful settlement,
the United Nations may at last simply throw up its hands and pull out. This,
Mr. Tshombe thinks, would mean a complete victory for him and the interests he
reflects; some think he dreams of becoming President or Prime Minister of all
the Congo, Here, I think, Mr. Tshombe1s calculation on the United Nations goes
wrong. The twin United Nations burdens of financial strain and frustration are
very great, to be cure -- the financial burden being almost unbearable -- but I
doubt that in the present circumstances it would be possible to get a vote in
either the Security Council or the General Assembly supporting outright United
Nations withdrawal from the Congo -- the more especially so since I would suppose
BC/jpm 7-10(The Acting Secretary-General)
that if such an Issue arose Mr. Adoula and- his Government would make an
impassioned appeal to the United Nations not to abandon a country which the
United Nations had set out to save, a cause in vhich so much of money and effort,
and even lives, had already been invested,
All the vniie, furthermore, Mr. Tshombe is collecting his substantialrevenues Tram the Union Mini & re --in the neighbourhood of §ko million annually.This he does illegally, since the Central Government receives no part of this
intake. This, in my view, is the principal source of Mr. Tshoiiibe's power —
he has at his disposal substantial sums of money. With this money he can buy
mercenaries, aircraft and war supplies -- and possibly parliamentarians, for we
hear that his money is at -work in Leopoldville and elsewhere, and not without
effect in some quarters, Tbus, I am bound to incline to the belief that there
are only two effective ways of really, getting at Mr. Tshombe; and removing the
constant threat of civil war from the Congo. One is overt force, which OKUC at
present has no mandate to employ for the specific end of controlling Mrt Tshombe*
The other, and to my thinking the more practical, vay is to cut off the flow of
Union MTnl£rG revenue to Mr* Tsbombe, revenue which is the chief source of his
power. Measures of this latter nature could be undertaken, perhaps, without any
new mandate for OWUC, although the steps which might have to be taken by ONUC to
make them effective might veil lead to ,a severe fighting reaction on the part
of the Katangese. I shall have more to say about this in a moment.
It has been said, I know, that in the Congo we must have enormous patience*
I think that the record of two and one-fourth years of United Nations activity
in the Congo will attest to aicazing patience and restraint on our part, Mr, Adoula
too — largely, no doubt, because of his regard for the United Nations and his
faith in it — has shown remarkable patience. In this regard, I think we must
never lose sight of the fact that excessive patience with Mr. Tshoaibe and his
perpetual delaying tactics is generally at the expense of Mr, Adoula and the
Central Government and could lead to fateful consequences for both him and his
country,
HA/ids 11
(The Acting Secretary-General)
I do not mind saying to you within these vails that my own patience begins
to wear a little thin. For months on end now, the United Nations in the Congo
has been doing everything possible, exerting every reasonable effort, trying
every sensible: course, in the attempt to bring about a peaceful reconciliation
and to avert civil war. There were the Kitona talks in December* There were
the two phases of the talks in Leopoldville frcn March to June of this year.
There is the Plan for reconciliation and the programme for its implementation.
There is the draft constitution just brought to completion with the
contributions of the four constitutional experts recruited by the United Nations
at the request of the Government of the Republic, With regard to this, I
have been urging Mr. Adoula to make that constitution public and to give
Mr. Tshombe and others a chance to study and comment upon it. This would
deprive Mr» Tshombe of an effective propaganda counter. Mr. Adoula has now
indicated an intention to make the draft constitution available to the
provincial Presidents on 15 October.' But no one can cay that there has been
any really appreciable progress toward reconciliation, towards Mr* TsliombeTS
actually discarding the pretense of separation or secession. To the contrary,
as indicated in the report submitted this week to the Security Council,,
Mr. Tohonbe has been indulging in a build-up of Katanga's military strength
and employing more mercenaries. Mr» Tchombe, of course, denies this, but
this time we have positive evidence. It becomes rather obvious that at least
some of Katanga's borders Q.£'d the neighbours across them are not unreceptive
to Mr. Tshombe's military needs and orders* And, all the while, the United
ITafclcas Force in the Congo is being subjected to harassments of one kind or
another, some resulting in armed clashes with casualties.
These are the harsh facts. They require us to take a good hard look at the
future course for ONUC. I feel that we have just about come to the end of the
road so far as the course "we have been following is concerned. I think that
very soon the United Nations in the Congo will have to assume a more vigorous
posture. I do not at all mean by this that we should contemplate any offensive
military action, for we have no right to do so under our existing mandate, and
it seems to me highly unlikely that we could expect to get one for that purpose;
BA/ids 12-15
(The.Acting Secretary-General)
it being by no means certain in. any case that we would have the military strength
for it at the moment. But I mean that, once it is clear that there Is no longer
any hope that Mr. Tshombe -will succumb to reason and persuasion and pursue a
constructive course, then we must consider measures that could be taken as next
eteps under the existing mandate, uhether or not they have Mr. Tshonbe's favour
and may involve the possibility, or even the livelihood, or forceful Katacgese
reaction, thus requiring ONUC to fight in self-defence, Indeed, instituting
certain new actions may be the only -way of ensuring that Mr. Tshombe -will proceed
with the implementation of the PlaneIn a general "way, I might mention some of the steps and measures that could
be taken, vith the expectation that at another meeting in a week or two we
might have some indication of your Governments' reactions to them.
Without abandoning hope for the Plan and for peaceful reconciliation, there
are certain steps we can — indeed, I believe W3 must — take -without delay, for
it would be a dangerous weakness on our part and an unjustifiable drain on our
resources to stand by passively for an indefinite period while waiting for the
outcome of the attempts at reconciliation. The Plan itself, in phases IE, II
and III, envisages certain actions which would apply pressure of one kind or
another on Katanga if the proposal for national reconciliation should fail.
First of all, clearly, in view of our knowledge of the military build-up
taking place in Katanga, ve must "be -well prepared militarily to meet any surprise
attacks, and especially air attacks, which might be launched by the Katangese. We
have to be prepared for the possibility of surprise attacks on Kainina and
Elisabethville airfields, which, if successful, would cripple our troops in Katanga
by cutting their supply lines. In order to meet such a contingency we are having
to reinforce our troops in Katanga by shifting all of the United Nations troops
from Kivu Province. This is.a calculated risk with regard to what may happen in
Kivu, but it has to be takena This move could be avoided, of course, if we
could obtain three or four, additional battalions for the Force from any source, -
if only .for a short period. But, as you know, we have for a long time been
unable to obtain additional troops,, despite my strong appeals. This situation
may be changing. - •
FB/bmt 16
(Acting Secretary-General)
One of the direct results of the action of the Congolese Government in
creating a monber of new provinces has "been an increase in tribal clashes and
comnunal feuds, particularly in Kivu and Kacai. This is a significant and recent
development, with only vigilant action by OMJC troops together with the good
co-operation which they have "been enjoying recently from the local ANC units
serving to prevent large-scale bloodshed and a breakdown of law and order. This
points the way to an increasingly greater use of the AIIG in the first line of
action in patrols and other activities having to do with the maintenance of law
and order in the provinces. It involves, of course, an increasing support of
particular ANC units "by ONUC in the way of transport and logistics. This would
serve the useful purpose of relieving ONUC troops from certain areas so that they
might "be deployed more strategically elsewhere.
In order not to create obstacles for the discussions on the plan, the
United Nations troops in Elisabethville recently have been extremely restrained
in the face of numerous provocations. The time has about come, however, for the
assumption of a more vigorous role by the United Nations Force, governed, of course,
"by its capacity, with respect to such objectives in Katanga as the removal of
gendarmerie roadblocks, elimination of onerous restraints on OIIUC's freedom of
movement and stopping interference with (MJC's flow of supplies.
There are some direct measures which the Congolese Government might consider
taking such as applying pressure on Katanga, which would amount to "blacklisting"
certain business concerns which are operating throughout the Congo Republic,
including Katanga province.
For example, one company has a direct run from Antwerp to West African ports,
calling at Matadi and Lobito, It does a substantial business in freight and
passenger traffic and has extensive interests in the Congo. Any restrictions on
its traffic in the Congo would seriously affect its operations. This company calls
at Lobito to load ore for the Union Miniere and on its northbound schedule completes
its cargo at Matadi. The company could be warned that unless all loading at Lobito
were stopped its vessels would not be allowed to enter the port of Matadi. Parallel
action could be taken to delay or even forbid financial transfers, banking credits
and other local operations as part of the kind of "statutory" practice so widely
applied during the Second World War in neutral countries.
FB/bmt 17
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Another example refers to three banks established in the Congo and In Katanga.
Union Miniere does banking with all three. A warning could be Issued, as a first
step, that 'those banks would not be allowed to operate in the Congo if their ;Katanga
branches continued to deal vith Katangese interests, and their banking licences
could be taken from them.
The major airline serving the Congo would "be vulnerable to similar action
if it continued to engage in operations to and from Katanga.Any actions of this nature, naturally, would need to be most carefully
weighed in order to "be certain that they would not boomerang and in fact adversely
affect Congolese interests.
We have for some time been considering the feasibility and advisability of
assisting the Congolese Government in the collection of customs duties in Katanga,
particularly in Elisabethville, through giving protection to customs personnel
sent by the Central Government and through our ability to control some railroad
traffic and flow of goods. Similarly, assistance could be given to the Government
in the establishment of passport offices in Elisabethville and elsewhere in
Katanga. It ic recognized that such moves might be opposed by Katangese force, .
which OHUC would have to be prepared to meet.
I said earlier that the decisive factor is the flow of Union Miniere revenue
to the Katangese authorities. In this context I have had some ideas about some
courses of action which might be effective in checking the flow of Union Miniere
revenue to Mr. Tshombe. Indeed, I may inform you in confidence that these ideas
have already been presented to Mr. Adoula by Mr. Gardiner on my behalf, have
encountered favourable reaction from him, and have "been carried out by him without
public announcement.
The general lines of the courses of action to which I refer are the following:
1. A letter from Prime Minister Adoula to the President of Union Miniere
reiterating his demand made in his communication of December 1961 that the -
Union Miniere revenue is due and must be paid to the Congolese Government.
I have been informed this week that Union Miniere officials have advised
the Government of Belgium of their readiness to ship minerals through the
port of Matadi as soon as the Lubllash Bridge is available to them (this, -
of course, would mean paying revenue to the Central Government and could be
encouraging).
FB/bmt 18-20
(The Acting Secretary-General)
2. The Congolese Government, on its part, adopts an ordinance prohibiting the
export from the Congo of any minerals -without provision for payment of the
necessary revenues to the Central Government, which could call upon the
United Nations and the Government of Belgium for assistance in implementing
this provision.
5. Prime Minister Adoula sends also a communication to the Government of
Belgium seeking assistance in assuring cessation by the Union Miniere of its
illegal payment of revenues to Katanga.
4. A similar communication, of request for assistance is addressed to me, in
my capacity as Acting Secretary-General.
All of the foregoing could, of course, be usefully reinforced by a resolution
in the Security Council — I repeat: all these steps envisaged in the
foregoing outline could be usefully reinforced by a resolution in the
Security Council — which vould endorse the effort of the Congolese Government
to obtain the revenues due to it; call upon all parties concerned to take
measures to prevent any continuance of the illegal payments by the Union
Miniere; and authorize the Secretary-Gen-eral to take all necessary steps to
implement the Security Council decision, including, if required, the
protection of Union Miniere installations in Katanga. Action along some such
lines vould in effect give to ONUC a better and more flexible mandate than it
now enjoys.
Steps of this nature vould apply to the Union Miniere. They might provide
legal pressures, both national and international, vhich could veil be
decisive in persuading them to "begin to pay to the Central Government the
revenues vhich are its due, vhich, of course, vould be at the expense of
Mr. Tshombe. I think that ve can count on earnest co-operation in ouch a
course of action from the Government of Belgium.
Since I place special stress on these actions aimed at cutting off the illicit
payment of revenues to Mr. Tshombe, and vish your views particularly on Mr. Adoula1s
communication to me, I am distributing to you now, for your strictly confidential
use, a copy of that communication.
DR/pm 21
(The Acting Secretary-General)
There may be other courses of action -which ONUC could follow, but I submit
that actions along the lines I have just indicated could be taken, only after a
most serious review and appraisal of our military capacity to withstand a
possible Katangese reaction in the form of military attack. We cannot risk the
disaster of a military defeat, and before I make any new move I must be
absolutely certain of our strength, of what we can count upon in the way of numbers
of troops, their Governments1 willingness to have them exposed to the risk of
fighting defensively, the adequacy of their weapons, air support, transport and
logistics.
Mr. Christophe Gbenye, formerly Minister of the Interior until dropped from
the Cabinet in last summerTs shuffle, and member of the MIIC-Lumumba party, was
arrested by the Government in Lcopoldville this week on his return from a visit
to the United Gtates under the auspices of a private organization. Mr. Gbenye,
incidentally, to the best of my knowledge, did not visit the United Nations while
he was in the United States* Mr. Adoula has indicated to Mr. Gardiner that
"certain politicians" -- these are his words -- from Kivu and Orientale provinces
had been in touch with Mr. Tshombe through his representative, Mr. Niernbo, and
were plotting a new secession. This is said to be the basis for the arrest of
Mr. Gbenye. Mr. Gizenga continues in detention on Bulabemba Island. I understand
that he was visited by Ambassador Diallo Telli of Guinea during his recent trip
to the Congo.
I apologize for speaking at such unusual length. But since this is in the
nature of a reporting meeting;come length was unavoidable. You will readily
realize that I have said some things here that I would by no means say publicly,
for to do so at this stage could be damaging and even rash. This is no time
for rashness, C<,uite the contrary, the Plan must be given every reasonable
opportunity to succeed, within reasonable time-limits. We must avoid doing
anything which would expose us in the least to a charge of responsibility for the
failure of the Plan. On the other hand, we must look ahead and be prepared for
the new course that must be followed if the Plan effort fails and there is no
reconciliation and unity. Thus, much of what I have said here is looking ahead
in anticipation of a possible need, and I trust that my words and views will be
kept strictly within this context.
DR/pm 22
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Before concluding this report to you, I wish to advise you that, as you
may hnve noted in this morning1s prsss, the so-called American. Committee for
Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters is at it again with another propaganda splurge,
based entirely on untruth and wilful distortion.
Although I know you will wish to report to and ascertain "the vievs of
your Governments on the points I have raised with you today, if you have any
immediate questions, reactions, views or suggestions, I invite you to present them
now.
Mr. BIJNCHE; Ac the Acting Secretary-General pointed out, these are
samples of the most recent reports we have had from Leopoldville and Elisabethville
on the work of the three Commissions having to do with the implementation of the
Plan. I will also include some excerpts from the most recent message we have
had from Mr. Gardiner since his return to Elisabethville yesterday. This was
received late last night.
The first is a cable on the "Preliminary Draft of Measures adopted by the
Revenue Commission11. It reads as follows:
*1. Centralization of the control of customs receipts
"A. The Government of Katanga signifies its agreement to the
centralization of the control of customs receipts.I5B. At the beginning of each month the Customs Directorate of Katanga
will send to the General Customs Directorate of the Central Government a
statement of gross receipts for the preceding month.
"C. The Katangese Government signifies its agreement to the
establishment of a neutral control commission consisting of three technicians
from an international organization, the United Nations for example, to be
placed at the Customs Directorate of Katanga:
one technician attached to the Central Tax Collecting Office;'
one technician attached to the Customs Control Office;
one technician attached to the Customs Inspection Service.
DR/pm 23
(Mr. Bunche)
"2. Restoration of commercial traffic
Commercial traffic will be restored as soon as possible "between
Katanga and the rest of the Congo, and more particularly the Xatanga/Matadi
traffic. Katanga's mining products Will be exported through the port of
1-latadi, to the full extent of transport capacity, GO long as the outflow of
products is regular. The Central Government will endeavour to persuade
carriers to ensure the smooth flow of traffic.
of ftrocs customs receipts
"A. The Customs Directorate of Katanga -will pay to the account of the
Central Government with the Bank of Katanga the share due to it.
"B. It will be obligatory for the paying-in slips of the Bank of
Katanga to mention the numbers of the customs documents referring to each
payment. These clips will be sent regularly at the end of each week to
the Monetary Council at Lcopoldville.
"C. The Bank of Katanga will advise the Monetary Council daily of the
total amount of sums paid in and the balance in the account.
"D. The Government of Katanga will open an account with the Monetary
Council at Leopoldville into which will be £>aid its share of the gross
receipts from all exports of Katangese origin leaving through the port of
Matadi.!!E. It will be obligatory for the paying-in slips of the Monetary
Council to mention the numbers of the customs documents referring to each
payment. These slips will be sent regularly at the end of each week to the
Dank of Katanga."F. The Monetary Council will advise the Bank of Katanga daily of the
total amount of sums paid in and the "balance in the account.
"G. The Central Government's share of Katangese customs duties, both
import and export,will be 2 per cent of gross receipts and 2 per cent
remaining in Katanga.11 • Royalties from mining concessions in Katanga
"A. The Government of Katanga will pay to the account of the Central
Government with the Bank of Katanga x per cent of the royalties from mining
concessions in Katanga as and when these are paid in.
DR/pm 24-25
(Mr. Bunche)
"B. The paying-in slips of the Bank of Katanga yiii be sent regularly
to the Monetary Council.
"C. The accounts vill be audited "by the Monetary Council*which "Will
assign to Elisabethville one or more auditors who will have access to
the documents necessary for the exercise of this control."
MVJ/gws 26
(Mr, Bunche)
The Secretary-General pointed out that we get "both good and "bad reports.
The second one is an example of the latter category. This was a cable received
yesterday giving a sumnary of the meeting of the Military Commission on
10 Octobers
"The Military Commission met on the morning of 10 October. The mee
wMch was scheduled for 9 a0m,, started, only at 9, 5 because the Katangese
delegation was late.
"The delegates first discussed the minutes of the previous meeting.
Mr. Yav -- the principal Katangese representative — made a number of
remarks on minor points and criticized the inaccurate recording of the
minutes. Agreement was finally reached on all points of'dispute after
more than one hour of discussion, and the minutes were retyped accordingly.
"Turning to the discussion on the proposals submitted by the Government
at the previous meeting, Mr. Ncalula, vho is the representative of the
Central Government, asked Mr. lav to state his Views on the proposals.
Mr. Yav did not give his views on the subject, but, instead, went into a
long harangue, arguing that the original conditions as proposed by
Mr. Ngalula and the counter-proposals by the Katangese delegations should
be discussed rather than the new proposals. Mr, Yav further stated that
certain points in the Central Governmentrs proposals of 0 October were
outside the Consul 3 sionls competence. Mr. Ngalula considered his new
proposals as a compromise between his previous proposals and those submitted
by the Katangese delegation. Mr, Yav could not accept this view,
Mr, Ngalula asked whether or not he accepted the counter-proposals, but
Mr. Yav did not give any reply to this question.
"Further heated arguments ecsued, most of which were not in relation to
the conditions for a cease-fire.
"in reply to a question put by Mr. Ngalula as to what was meant by
the return of troops to encampments, Mr. Yav stated that Katangese troops
should return to North Katanga, for example, to Albertville and Kabo.lo.
"Mr. ITgalula ended the meeting by stating that he would never accept
for discussion any conditions for a cease-fire which were in violation of
the U Thant plan,"
MW/gwa 27
(Mr. Bundle)
Today, however, just before coming to this meeting we received a somewhat
more encouraging report on the proposed arrangements for the taking o£ oaths or
allegiance -- this was an agreement reached "between the two parties.!!2hG un.dersigned, Joseph Ngalula, representing the Government of the
CO^GO, and Joseph Yav, representing the Government of Katanga, have agreed
upon the following:
"(l) The Commander-in-chief of the Katanga Gendarmerie,, accompanied
by two full-ranking colonels, will take an oath of allegiance to
President Kasavubu at Leopoldville on 17 October;
"(2) The oath will take the usual form as follows;tlfl swear loyalty and obedience to the President and to the laws of the
Republic of the Congo.'
"(3) Tha Government of the Congo hereby undertakes to guarantee the
safety of the officers and to permit them to return as they wish;
"(4) The United Nations will be responsible for all arrangements
regarding their transport.
"Drawn at naisahothvllle on 12 October 1962."Finally, I have some excerpts from a cable received late last night from
Mr. Gardiner, who was in ElicabcthviilG again,following his talk yesterday
afternoon with Mr. Tshoinbe, which took place immediately after Mr. Tshombe had met
with the Consuls and issued the statement which has been distributed to you.
Mr. Gardiner states:
"I met Tshombe at 1*1.25 hours to 17 hours this afternoon. He and his
colleagues ex-pressed a violent reaction to the Security Council report on
mercenaries and alleged that they were being falsely accused in preparation Tor
a possible United Nations attack on Katanga. I reminded Tshombe that I had
written him on the subject and that he had dismissed the Issue as another
illustration of United Nations bad intentions. I invited him to refute the
MW/gws 20
(Mr, Bunche)
report paragraph "by paragraph if he thought the account I had. given was
inaccurate. Alter a lengthy discussion, he and his colleagues agreed that
they Would prepare their own. report and submit it in a month. I offered
to transmit their comment or rebuttal to Headquarters and; if possible,
cutest its publication as an annex to the report; we had nothing to fear;
cur sole desire was to let the United Nations and the world at large know
the facts about the mercenary situation,
"Ou iay arrival here I met the Consuls, who had been called a few
minutes before by President Tohombe and Given a communique setting out
what Katanga had clone to cxecuts the U Thant plan, Katanga had cLecutled
to pay an advance of $2 million against contributions she will be called
upon to make under administrative arrangements being discussed by the
Revenue and Foreign Exchange Comnis&lo^s. I pointed out that, from the
text of the Ccimunicjue, the payment did not seem to relate to the
requirements of the plan and suggested the following redraft, which is
to be discussed with Tshombe tomorrow11 -« that is today —•:111 Katanga has decided to place at the disposal of the Central Government
immediately a sum in foreign currency equal to $2 million as an advance
payment against the receipts and foreign exchange which Katanga will pay
to the Central Government in accordance with the measures for allocations
of receipts and foreign exchange now being prepared by the Foreign Exchange
and Revenue Commissions. This sum provides backing for the non-workable
documentary credit opened in favour of the Monetary Council.!
"l have been informed that the Revenue Commission had finished its
work and that the Katangese had suggested contributions of 25 per cent of
total revenue, 30 per cent of mining revenue and 30 per cent of earnings
of the portfolio. This question of percentages is the only one on which
agreement had not been reached between the Central Government and Katanga.
"in connexion with foreign exchange earnings the only point accepted
here by the Katangese has been the unification of procedures which, they
suggested, would require some time. I pointed out to Tshombe and his
colleagues that this was unsatisfactory and would have to be re-examined
MW/gws 29
(Mr, Eunche)
before my departure.' Tchombe had already informed the Consuls of the
decision af Katanga to open the Lubilaoh Bridge on 17 October and. to
direct the transport of copper via that route to 1-iatadi. The Katangese
seem anxious to post tcoops on their side of the bridge to prevent the
bridge being used for the invasion of Katanga "by the Central Government*
I observed that this would raice certain difficulties, Which might be solved
if, on the other side, the Central Government also decided to station troops,
or that both Parties refrained from having troops in the.area and entrusted
the protection a^d neutralization of the bridge to ONUC.
"Tshombers communique stated that radio-telephone communications would
be started with LeopoldMlle on Saturday, 13 October, but the Katangese
complained about military aid being given to the Central Government by
Belgium and the United States-" He concluded by saying: "Tomorrow" --
that is today —'will decide'for-me whether the Katangese seriously intend
to go through with the plan."
The Acting gEOR]T,TAP.Y-GH ERAL; As I stated earlier, I presented th£se
new statements with a view to obtaining your reactions. I suppose that most of
you present here would prefer to refer this matter to your respective Governments
for directives. In the meantime, perhaps there is some immediate reaction which
you would like to offer.
Mr. WA(MTHJ (Nigeria): I would like to ask a question about this
oath of allegiance. The Commander-in-Chief and a few others are to come to
Leopoldville to swear an oath of allegiance; the United Nations sees to their
safe passage to and fro, and the Central Government guarantees that they will
return. What happens to the rest of the army? To me, it does not make sense.
Is there anything else besides what has been read out to us? roes the whole
thing depend on whether the army will be incorporated in the oath by the others?
Or does it only apply to the officers while nothing happens to the rest of the army?
MW/gws 30
The Acting SECFJ^ARY-GTOTRAL; Among the three Cofflzsissioris now in
operation there is one dealing exclusively with oilitary lastters. Of course,
this Commission has not concluded its deliberations, but one of the provisions
of the items discussed in the Commission refers to the tailing of the oath of
allegiance to the Central Government by the Katangese Gendarmerie — the
Katan^ese armed forces — and, of Course, as a preliminary to the successful
integration of the two armies, it was suggested "by the Central Government that
the Coisinander-in-Chief of Katanga should first of all take an oath of allegiance
to President Kasavubu in Leopoldville. I think that was the substance of the
news which we received last night«
AP/ch 31
(Thfi Acting Secretary-General)
Mr. Bunche has comething to supplement what I have just said.
Mr. HMCHE: This is following the pattern which was c/lorted with
regard to the Army in Orientale Province under General Lundula. General Lundula
came to Leopoldville at the invitation of the Central Government to swear an
oath of allegiance to the President, Mr. Kasavubu, the President being the
Cciraander-in-Chief of the Congolese Army. Following that, the entire Army come
over, under General Lundula1 s leadership. As a matter of tfac-.t, nothing more was
ever needed. That was supposed to be an initial step, but it proved to be the
only step that was required.
Mr. WAGHUKTJ (Nigeria): But the Katangese situation is not the same —
because in Katanga there are the Belgian military advisers. That was why I said
you need a bigger step than the one in Orientale. It is not enough, to my way of
thinking, that only these officers can swear an oath of allegiance — and then
they go back and swear it was binding only on them and on no one else.
Mr_._JKJNCHE: This is simply a first step taken by the Military
Commission. It is a step that was taken at the request of the Central Government.
The Central Government required this as an initial token of the intentions of
Katanga. It was proposed by the Central Government, not by anyone else, and is
therefore in conformity with the wishes of the Central Government.
Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Will we have an assurance that the United
Nations and the military authorities will assist the Central Government to make
sure that you have the type of oath that will .be binding on the rank and file,
and not only on the officers, because the Katangese situation is not like the one
in Orientale at all, from what I observed in the Congo. With regard to the bridge,
we are told that the Katangese authorities said, "Well, we are going to post our
own troops on our side of the bridge to prevent a possible.invasion by the Central
Government of Katanga." Well, if this oath of allegiance which is being sworn
AP/rh 32
(Mre TTacMru, Nigeria)
Is genuine, what is the necessity of thinking of invasion by the Central
Government? That IB why I feel you should do more* If the assurance is that
once the Commander-in-Chief has sworn, like General Limdula, that night help
the others to come in, naturally. The monent they have sworn, on 17 October, they
should consider the two armies as one. The thought or invasion "by the Central
Government of Katanga should he ruled out. But the mere fact that they even
mentioned that they are going to post their ovn array to prevent invasion, •
suggests that there is something fichy about the swearing of the oath* So^
there is som^ evidence already indicating that something better.should be done. .
The Central Government may be genuine about their intention; but knowing the
type'of persons we are dealing with, I think we should be more discreet than that.
I am not a military man, but I am a simple man in the public life of a country.
The Acting GECI^TARY-GKNRRAL; Mr. Bunche has a few words to say-on
this* . . . . - . . - - .
Mr. BUNCHE: It is not a very simple problem actually, because this
Military Corcraicrjion and the Government will have to reach a decision on the size
of the army that will come into existence. It is not just a matter of simple
integration of what are estimated to be 18,000 Katangese troops into the Central
Army, which itself is already too large, whose size we frankly do not know -- . ;
estimates run from 20,000 to 28,000, The economy of the country cannot-bear an
army of this size. There will be a very serious problem of what the size of the
integrated army, the reorganized army, Is going to be — and that is going to take
very considerable negotiation, obviously.
Mr, TTACHUKU (Nigeria): I only asked the two questions for enlightenment *
As far as my delegation is concerned, I think the proper thing is to have what you.
have told us -- and we expect that the verbatim record of your statement vill be
Out coon. Then, you will give us some time to consider the natter for our respective
Governments. It may be that we will have something to say about the position.
I will support your suggestion that we try to ingest and digest what you said
before we contribute an opinion on the whole matter.
AP/rh 33
v 'rv Wa :huvru, Nigeria)
We are very grateful to you for beinc frank with us. My delegation isgrateful that you have put this to us. There ic only one request I would make
if it is possible. You made reference to the fact that the Constitution is now
ready and that Prime Minister Adoula is sending it to the Provincial ^ovornmcnts.
I wonder whether it will be possible for you to obtain a copy for us,
confidentially, so that when we are mailing a contribution we should "be able to
make a contribution in the light of the Constitution that has been drafted,
because that is very pertinent to whatever comments I am likely to make on behalf
of my Government, I know that an effort is being made to have a Federal
Government. Looking at it like that, the pcvers of the Central Government that
are enumerated, it seems to me, are insufficient. It may be that rcore things
have been added to the Constitution that has been elaborated. If they are there,
there will be no necessity for any comment on those things. That may help me not
to say some things I might say by looking at the plan itself, as it is.
The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; The verbatim record, of course, will
be ready tomorrow.
Regarding the availability of the Constitution itself, as Mr. Adoula has
made known to us, he will distribute the copies to the Provincial governments on
15 October, that is, on Monday. By that time, of course, the Constitution will
be public property. That is my belief. Therefore, I will see that we get a copy
of it and make it available to the members of this Committee,
Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India): Mr. Secretary-General, we are all, I am sure,
grateful to you for making this factual statement and taking us into your
confidence about vhat has been going on in the Congo. This is the "U Thant Plan"
which ve have now seen officially. The first question I should like to ask ie that
there are certain dates mentioned in this plan. How far are these dates being
observed or kept to? That means, are ve very much out of date, or are we keeping
to the time schedule very carefully?The second question I should like to ask is that if the time schedule has
already been broken, then, with respect to the other phases, do they follow
automat!cally1
AP/rh 3^-55
(Mr* Chalrravarty, India)
The third question I should like to ac ; is that you have Eaid, I think
Mr. Eunche hac said, the distribution of Union Miniere profits and taxes will
be handed over to the Central Government by Mr. Tshcmbe'c eoverr.'s./nt. Is that
a very dependable source of revenue for the Central Government, loiowing
Mr. Tshombe's attitude? Or vould it not be true to say that the Central j|
Government would be completely at the mercy of Mr. Tshombe, whether these funds ,|
keep on coming or not?
EGII/nz 36
Your statement has been a very depressing account or what has been going on,
and all that one feels is that during the ti:re tlis United Ilatioiic is considering
those pirns Mr3 Tshombe is coins on Bt^i^hthorrlnc h unsold, o.na +?:.'. :* tmo n~y
well come when the forces that you have at your disposal i:ay be ccripletely
inadequate to meet the objectives you .may have; not to mention taking any active
steps, 'they may be incapable or even defending tiie-TncelvcG*. That, is a very sei-ious
matter, particularly for those who have contributed forces to the Cor,go« I would
like to know something on that.
The Acting _5?;CRgTARY;-GET]ERAL! Regarding the tlrae-table, as you will
no doubt have seen from the Plan of national reconciliation, it vas Prime
Minister Adoula Ts intention to make the constitution available "to the Members of
Parliament by September. Of course, he did not indicate what date it would be in
September, and since ha has now decided to make this available by 1^ October it
is actually two veeks late, I think it follows from this that the other steps
to be taken also have to be considered in the context of this de.lay; which was
unavoidable. Regarding the iioplementation of the other steps, too, there was no
definite deadline, and I have indicated them in terms of weeks, but these are also
now delayed in turn, so, generally speaking, the whole ccheduie is two weeks
behind time*
Regarding your question about the revenues, as I indicated in my statement
this afternoon, Prime Minister Adoula has requested me to take certain steps,
and I would like the benefit of your advice and comments on the steps he has
outlined, particularly those to ensure that the flow of revenue from the mining
companies in Katanga goes to Lcopoldville only.
If I have to comply with the request of the Central Government, perhaps, as
I indicated in my statement, a reference to the Security Council might be necessary
because the implementation of the steps requested by Prime Minister Adoula might
encounter certain forcible resistance by gendarmerie, and in such an eventuality,
of course, our forces have been authorized to exercise the right of self defence.
So all these factors have to be taken into consideration,
RGH/nz • •• 37
(The
One of the major factors, of course, is the adequacy or the lack of adequacy
of our armed forces. On this, also, I would be obliged to get the benefit of
your advice*
Just as a matter of information, I should like to say th'at there is no'./ at
least one Member state which has confidentially assured me of a very substantial
military assistance, if necessary.
Mr, CHAKRA.VAETY (India): We will certainly refer these matters to our
Governments, and come back with such advice as we can. But it occurs to me,
just speaking on the spur of the moment, that the figures you have quoted with
regard to the gendarmerie, and the amount of training that they are getting under
competent mercenary officers, lead to the conclusion that you are probably
already undermined and probably outmanoeuvred. But, as I would cay together with
the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, we are not soldiers, and we do not know. -You
will have to depend on your military advisers. If you are able to get some
contributions of additional troops from some Governments, wou3.d it not be wise
to have them before you are put in an embarrassing position where you cannot
defend yourself? Normally, what happens under nonnal human instinct is that
when the forces against which we stand are overwhelming, then we generally submit,
without any bloodshed, but when we feel we have a sporting chance of victory,
that might lead to a really very sanguinary conflict. That is one aspect I would
request you to consider in consultation with your military advisers. On that,
I am afraid I cannot be of any assistance.
The Acting SECTRETABY^GEllERAL: As to the prospect of getting some
substantial military reinforcements, I think that our decision has to rest on
the advice of this Committee at a second meeting*
Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): 'The report which you, Mr. Secre'tary-General,
have given us" is very clear and very serious, and I agree that it will require
some cogitation on the part of our Governments before we give our clear suggestions
or advice.
RSH/nz 38- 0
( Mr o Qua:l son- 13n ckey, Ghana )
Before I cair.e to this meeting, I received Instructions from my Government
to state a few points, but those, in fact, you have covered in your report.
That is to say, ve agree substantially with a numbar of the points which you
have mad 2 in the report you gave us this afternoons,
I'y Government is very much concerned, first of all, by this federal
Constitution;, not that we are opposed to federalism as such, but ve are always
afraid that a federal constitution in those cases where a territory is being
carved up into a number of provinces might load to certain results* That was
why we were disturbed to hear this afternoon that already there are tribal
conflicts as a result of these divisions, and we would like to have more information
on the extent of these conflicts and as to how far thoy EI-.T effect the body politic
of the Congo nation,* On the basis of that report, we will be able to eay more
about our position*
Secondly, we are concerned by the fact that, as of now, in spite of the
Security Council resolutions, we still have secessionist activities backed by
outside interests relying en mercenaries«continuing in Katanga in defiance of
the Central Government of the Congo,
Vfe are also concerned that for more than two years the Katanga Government
has illegally annexed tfce resources of the Congo and has prevented certain
revenues due to the Central Government from being paid.
Therefore, we feel that there should be consideration by all Powers, including
the great Powers, that this activity in the Congo should be brought to an end,
effectively, permanently end unconditionally* We request you to take immediate
Steps, in collaboration with the Central Government of the Congo, to prevent by
force if necessary the illegal exports from the Congo territory, including
Katanga, of copper and other minerals on which full duty has not been paid to the
Central Government.
BHG/dr Ifl
G c n -Sach e , Ghana )
Then I am to request you, Sir, to maintain the position necessary for the
enforcement of this measure, that ic preventing this illegal export, until such
time as you are in a position to let toe Assembly Know that witJi lae ogreenent
of the Central Government that all secession activities are at an and and that the
Central Government itself is able to collect without hindrance the taxes due
it from Katanga.
I also wish to say that the Secretary-General and the .OrJUC Commanders, in
the event of resistance "by armed force in Katanga to these measures, -which in
fact include those that you have outlined, should take immediate steps to
disband the Katanga forces.
Sir, from the background of what I have just said, you will see
that in fact we agree with you on the steps which you envisage. My Government
is prepared- to support you through thick and thin, and we would appeal to all
Governments, especially those which have troops in the Congo, to consider this
very carefully. But then, as I have said, this is only a preliminary reaction
on the part of the delegation of Ghana. We shall study the report which you have
given us. My Government will, give me full instructions and we shall then be in
a position to give our final views on your report.
.•• . • Mr, WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Mr. Secretary-General, our delegation is
grateful. for your clear statement, which is very serious in character. We are
grateful, because you have given us the real picture of the situation in the Congo,
Our Government is following the developments in the Congo day by day. We are
concerned about .the situation in the Congo. For the time being, our delegation
is not concerned about the revenues or the export of the products of the
Union Mini ere; neither are we concerned about the future structure of the unity
of. the Congo State. But we are concerned about Mr, Tshcmbe. If you remember,
Mr. Secretary-General, at the last meeting I put only one short question to you,
namely, what, in your opinion, was the state of mind of Mr. Tshombe. I did so
because we were dealing with him directly and personally.
Wir.lopranoto, _ Indonesia )
Now, from your clear and comprehensive statement, our delegation comes to
the conclusion that Mr. Tshcirbe is a dangerous man. lie is dangerous "because it is
our impression that he places his personal interest above the interest of Katanga
and the people of Katanga, "but even more than that, he places his personal interest
over the interest or the State and people of the Congo,, including Katanga. For
this roMvon alone, llr. Tshcinbe is dangerous,,
In listening to your statement, Mr. Secretary-General, we came to another
conclusion, which we held at the beginning, namely that Mr, Tshcmbe is an
instrument of the Union Mini ere, That is a powerful organisation -- I do not
know whether it is with or without the backing of the Government -- which ic
playing a role, and a dangerous role, in this matter, one which I can describe
in our vocabulary of this time as neo- colonialism. I cannot say that Katanga
is a colony, because it belongs to the Congo and the Congo is a sovereign State.
But the whole business in Katanga is typical of neo-colonialism. I understand
that trie whole United Nations is condemning colonialism and also neo- colonialism*
For all these reasons, now is the time for the United Nations, and especially
for you, Mr. Secretary-General, because iyou are in charge of the implementation
of the mandate of the Security Council, to act and to act vigorously. I
understand you have your Plan and you have informed many Governments of the problems.
But Mr. Secretary-General, believe me: you may have a good plan, but what is
the backing of your Plan? In my view, it is not $200 million or $100 million a
year -- that is not the backing, The backing is military force. This is clear
because Mr. Tshcinbe himself in all his activities has developed a backing, and
that is the military force of Mr. Tshcmbe. He has not decreased the number of
mercenaries. On the contrary, he has invited mercenaries to return, in addition
to the many who have been there from the beginning.
Therefore, against this background and against the military build up of
Mr. Tshombe, there is only one answer, and that is the build-up of the
United Nations forces. I cannot see any other way. In my view, the matter is
simple.
BHS/dr
(Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)
Mr. Secretary-General, if you accept the line of thinking that force can
only "be met by force, I have to state clearly that it is not our intention to be
Qggreasive. That would be the biggest crime for the United Nations and for those
Members that are sending troops. The United Nations must not 1)6 Stigmatized as
on aggressor. If seme Member States are gains to send troops again, ve do not
vant to take part in any kind of aggression, but rather we shall take part in the
defence of legal rights, in the defence of the unity of the Congo, in the defence
of the integrity of the Congo State and, above all, in the fight against
colonialism and neo-colonialism. That is our only motivation if we are going to
take part again in thio action.
I think that Mr, Tshcinbc will understand this language, especially if you
are going to ask for a new mandate or a "broader mandate from the Security Council.
At the same time, and even before that, you mu&t do something about a build-up,
about strengthening .your military forces; otherwise, the Plan will remain merely
a plan.
TL/jpm MS
(Mr, Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)
I am not authorized, Mr, Secretary-General, to state here to you and to -my
colleagues what my Government is going to do in this connexion; but what I would
like to suggest to you is that, besides this report, which ¥6 shall send
immediately to our Governments with our recommendations, you could/ from your side,
take some initiative in the cense of sending requests to certain Governments
vhich, in your opinion, might be able on short notice to send military forces,
and to get together the details of these natters -- the number, the date, and
perhaps "Whether we can expect transportation -- because that is very important.
I would 11 ka to make another suggestion; namely, that once all this has
begun, you fix a time* If I am not mistaken, it is your intention to take this
matter to the Security Council in perhaps one or two w^eks. I think that within
ten days or two weeks, perhaps you will have more material concerning not your own
problem, your plan, but rather the military problem, the military reinforcements,
This is important, and I think that this information will also be useful in the
debate in the Security Council, and I hope the Security Council will not ha
split, oometimes the Security Council is able to take a unanimous decision, bub
sometimes they are not able to do BO; sometimes they are not strong enough, in
fact impotent. Bat if from your side you can say to the Security Council, "On my
part I a.T. prepared to do this, this and this, VThat is the opinion of the Security
Council?", this will facilitate the decision of the Security Council, and I hope
they will unanimously support you. Furthermore, this language will "be understood
by Tshombe and the Uni.cn Mini ft re.
The Acting BE(T ?APT-GIi?] gAL ; On this I want to make a very brief
estimation. According to the estimates of our military advisors, our existing
ONUC forces in the Congo are adequate to cope with the existing sit^atiou there in the
context of the existing Security Council resolutions. They are, of course,
carefully watching the situation and they are confident of their ability to defend
themselves in case they are attacked. They would need, of course, strengthening
in some directions if new responsibilities aro to be imposed on them.
That Is the main point,, My present thinking is that I do not want to think
of reinforcements at this stage without the clear advice of this Committee and
perhaps, if necessary, a fresh mandate from the Security Council, because any
attempt to reinforce our fighting forces in the Congo might, among other things,
involve a tremendous additional expenditure. As you all know, this has been one
of my obsessions for some time. Certainly I will keep your observations in mind.
TL/jpm
M^M-MS (Liberia): I did not want to say anything today,
Mr, Secretary-General, "because the report that you have itade here will necessarily
require very careful study before anyone, I believe, will be in a position to
make any construct! contributions to the debate in this Advisory Committee.
I have just baen handed this Plan of national reconciliation, I an sure other
members or this body are in the same situation. 1 have noted here in this Plan
that in respect to the question of constitutional arrangements, the establishment
of a federal government for the Congo is envisaged* I would like to ask whether
the other aspects of this, report, dealing with revenues and foreign exchange,
military arrangements, amnesty, and the rest -- -whether the implementation of these
other aspects is dependent upon the establishment of this federal type of
government in the Congo.
Tho Agting_5EGRBTARY^QENBPAL: Ac I said, three commiDsionc are now
functioning to .implement the provisions of this Plan, They are working ,' •. ;
collectively, but one is not dependent on the other. The commissions are proceeding
on the assumption that the Plan has been accepted by both parties, as it is our
understanding that both Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tchombe have accepted the
Plan, In the three commission5, the Central Government> the Katanga provincial
authorities and the United Rations are represented. They are participating
in all those commissions, which are proceeding on the assumption that the Plan
is to be put into operation without waiting for the constitution.
Mr. COT.TLIDALY (Mali) (interpretation from French): My delegation
thanks you, Mr. Secretary-General, for the statement you have just made, which
has given us very interesting information concerning the development of the Plan
which you have proposed for the solution of the Congo problem. Your.statement,
to which we listened with great attention, gives proof that the Congo problem has
not yet been solved, and that, on the contrary, there have been new developmentsI
which require our closest attention.
My Government considers that the Congo is an independent State. Therefore
wo would have preferred not to interfere in anything involving its constitutional
structure,, .But since we had to do so because of the situation which we all regret,
we feel called upon under these circumstances to make certain observations we
deem appropriate.
TL/jpm 1*0-50
We are not yet familiar with the draft constitution which envisages the
creation of a federal form of eovernniGnb* But en the basis of documents which
we have received and which corre from certain pcllticy,!. parties i.^ '•;'"'? CC.U^QJ
we Know that certain people in the Coiigo .v£,ve c:rpr2Psed mny i3scc.7at;.ons
concerning this draft constitution as proposed. Ifoder these circumstances, my
delegation anxiously awaits the circulation ci" ths drai*t const! txit-Ion; which
you have promised will take place.
I recall, Mr. Secretary- General, that at our nest-to-the-last Liaoting you
indicated that, in view of the fact that certain Governments seem to oe openly
giving support, directly or indirectly, to the Katanga Government -- and it is
this fact that has enabled Tshoaibe day "by day to stiffen his position -- you
would communicate with these Governments and asji tt.ein to review in a more
objective fashion the situation in the Congo. I would therefore like to know
whether, within the framework of your Han and in view of the statements which
you have made this afternoon, and also side by side with the measures vhich you
have envisaged within, toe Congo; you are also contemplating some action with
respect to those Governments whose support, direct or indirect, to the Katanga
Government is one of the determining factors that enable Mr. Tshombe to persist
in his will to secede.
AW/IOs 51
(Mr , CovTAbalyj fo? i )
Now "because of the importance of the documents which you have communicated
to us and which should "be "brought to the attention of our Coverr^ant^, I would
like to ask whether you intend to have another meeting of our Cu it' e oefora
the Security Council meets so that at the next meeting wo could voice the
opinions of our Government -with regard to there projects vhich have "been
submitted to us« My Government was one of the African Governments vhich at
the beginning of the Congo crisis sent troops to support the United Uations
action in the Congo, but because of circumstances beyond our control, and
vhich were especially motivated by the orientation and the use of United Nations
troops in the Congo at that time, we' were led to call for the withdrawal of
our troop o from the Congo*
Taking into account this new plan that you have submitted, Mr. Secretary-
General., we will coEJii-micate with our Government and draw its attention to
your deeire to have a further military strengthening in case the situation would
required further action by the United Nations troops , and the opinion of our
Government will be communicated to you shortly.
The L A cting _SECRETARy-OEI7EIiAL; On the first point, of course I have "
been in constant contact with the Governments primarily connected with the
Congo 'and particularly those Governments which in my opinion exert, soma influence
on Mr. Tshombe. These contacts have been continuing without interruption,
and of course I can assure you once again that it shall be my constant endeavour
to continue this practice.
Regarding the holding of the next meeting, as I have indicated earlier,
I am sure the members of this Committee might like to refer this question to their
Governments, and I shall be glad to get the benefit of your advice regarding
when we should meet again. My guess is that it should be at least after a
period of one week. The verbatim records will be made available tomorrow around
lunch time, and I should think that at least a week's notice will be. necessary.
Of course I will be guided by the Committee's advice on this matter.
AW/ids
Regarding the reference to the Security Covnc.il meeting; of course I made
it clear in ay statement that, If the Implementation of Prime Minuter AdoulaT3
request is to be put through, the question of whether a reference to tho Security
Council will "be necessary or not also has to "be decider! at the next meeting •
Therefore, I will be glad if raeiabors of the Committee could indicate to me
what should be the beat time for our next meeting.
There is the suggestion that -we should meet ten flays from now* It has
been suggested that either Monday, 22. October cr Tuesday, 25 October would
be suitable. So let us meet at 3 p0ra0 on Tuesday, 27) October 0
Mr, ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya): Mr, Secretary-General, as I gather
it, the essence of your plan. Is to deny to the Katangece government payment of
revenue by the Union Miniere.. I would like to ask a technical question about
the collection of these taxes. Are they Just handed over by the Union Miniere to
the Katongase government, or collected by the Katanga se government?
If so, at what time are the taxes collected,, because that is the essence of
your plan to deny the revenue to Mr. Tshombe. So we would like to know how
these collections are made, and at what point are they collected?
The Acting; rECTET jRY-GEJjlJlR ; The Union Miniere has been paying its
taxes for the last two years directly to Mr. Tshombe 's government.
Mr. ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya): I am trying to draw a parallel
with our Government where we have a lot revenue from mining and where it is
the duty of the Central Government to collect the revenue, and we levy the taxes
at the point of export. This is quite an important point,
The Acting SECRETARY -GEI1ER\L; The Central Government has no officers
at the point of export because, as you know, Mr. Minister, the point of export
is only in Angola * Now they have of course agreed to divert their export to
Matadi, which is in the Congo.
AW/ids 53-55
Mr. WACHTJKU (Nigeria): There-are two additional questions I would
like to bring up so thfit the information I may require will be fuller. I notice
that in the report we concentrated on the Central Government and Katanga. la
the present position the Congo State is composed of six provincesn Kstens?! is
one of them. There are five other provinces and the assumption is that the
Central Government has control over the other fivec, Nov will the Acting
Secretary-General "be good enough to supply us with information as to the
state of affairs, broadly, in these five provinces so as to enable us to be
able to assess the extent of control vhich the Central Government has in these
five provinces and how effective it is, and this could be related to the problem
of solution of the question of Katanga, particularly vhcn v;e read that Northern
Katanga itself is now under control of the Central Govcrnrjant. If we have a report
about the other side, I think that -will help.us to understand the picture.
My other question is this.. Of. course we have been talking about
reinforcement and military strength, I remember that in the report vhich was
accepted by the General Assembly come time ago, it -was recommended that the
Congolese army should be reorganized and retrained.. We -would also like to
know to what extent the Congolese Army, vhich was supposed to be over 25,000 or
so, has been retrained and regrouped and reorganised. Bsaauce again whatever
we may do, the United Nations forces are not going there to stay. Ultimately
it will be the Congolese Central Government troops that will keep lav and order
in their own country. Therefore, it would be useful to my delegation to understand
how far this question of retraining and reorganizing has gone, and to see
•whether the Central Governmpnt is either strong or weak in tlie ce.se of maintaining
law and order.by itself.
With these two points, in addition to the questions I have asked, and
also as regards the constitution and the various reports, I think that in
ten days' time we should be able to have a fair idea of the situation so as to
express perhaps constructive opinion on the nature of the solution that we may
think will be effective in the Congo, bearing in mind the present situation.
EC/bat %
The Acting CECPEmARY~aElTERAL; Regarding the first question I would
say this: The Central Congolese Parliament has recently voted to have seventeen
new Provinces. As a result of this decision5 there arc now tuar.-vv.-one
ProvinceG, Our information is that, apart from Soubh Katanga, the .latf find order
situation in the Congo is comparatively stable, and there is a general feeling that
the AIJC is in a position to look after this problem. Of course, when -we think of
the Congo ve have to think of the situation in relative terms only. Hence, when
we say that there is law and order in the Congo, apart from South Xatanga, ve mean
that although lav and order has not "been completely restored, in the usual
connotation, there are very good reasons to "believe that the ATIC can very well
handle the situation, even without OHUC.
The second question related to ANC training. It will "be recalled that I made
this offer to Prime Minister Adoula as long ago as January of this year -- nine
months ago. I have even gone ahead with the plan to enlist certain instructors
from certain French-speaking countries. The response has "been very encouraging.
But, for reasons vhich, I think, are more political than anything else, the
Central Government has not "been able to accept iny offer. I think that Mr. Adoula •
and his colleagues in the Government are thinking in terms of African instructors,
if available. Of course, my offer of training the ANC stands. I have made this
known to Mr. Adoula on several occasions, and it is up to the Central Government
to respond to it. This aspect of the problem has never "been lost sight of,
I thank the Foreign Minister of Nigeria for bringing these questions to my
attention.
Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) (interpretation from French): The Acting
Secretary-General in his statement mentioned the arrest of Mr. Gizenga. Now, when
Mr. Gizenga was arrested the United Nations said that it wanted him to enjoy
humane treatment and that it desired the safeguarding of human rights in relation to
him. At the present time is the United Nations concerned about Mr. Gizenga, or is
he being left completely in the hands of the Central Government?
EC/tint 57
The Acting r-ECRETARY-GENEii/VL: I have repeatedly made personal requests
to Prime Minister Adoula to see to it that Mr. Gizenga receives treatment in
accordance with the law of the land. On purely humanitarian grounds I have several
times requested him to see to it that Mr. Gisenga's healtil and security are not
endangered in any way. Only recently, as I have already stated here, our colleatrae,
the representative of Guinea, had an opportunity to vicit the Republic of the Congo
and he saw Mr. Glzenga personally. We have also made repeated requests to the
Central Government to try Mr. Glzenga under the lav of the land immediately orto release him. To the best of our knowledge, Mr. Gizenga is receiving reasonably
good treatment.
Eefore the meeting adjourns, I should like to reiterate the appeal I made. I
want to stress once again the confidential nature of the statements made at this
meeting and of the documents distributed,, I am deeply concerned that we should do
nothing here to upse'I: any applecarts, because we are passing through a very delicate
stage of our operations in the Congo, and I am sure that I reflect the views of allthe members of the Committee vhen I say that we should, all of us, give the Plan
every reasonable opportunity to succeed. . -
We shall meet again on Tuesday, 23 October, at 5 p.m.
The meeting rose at 5*10 p.m.
CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No, 716 NovemberENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEON TIE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New YorK,on Tuesday, 6 November 196?, at 5 p.m.
In the Chair:
Members:
U THANT
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of MalayaGhana
GuineaIndia
IndonesiaIreland
Liberia
MaliMoroccoNigeria
PakistanSenegal
Cudan
Sweden
Tunisia
United Arab Republic
Congo (Leopoldville)
Tne Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL
Mr. TREHBIAY
Mr. MALAIASEKERA
Mr. GE3RE-EGZY
Mr. ONG
Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY
Mr. DIALLO
14r.. CHAICRAVARTY
Mr. SOSROWARDOJO
Mr. AIIffiN
Mr. COE
Mr.. COULIBALY
Mr., BEKIffivL\ •
Mr. ADEBO
Mr, HAI©MI
Mr. DELGADO
Mr. ADEEL
Mrs. ROSSEL
Mr. Taieb SLIM
1-Ir. RIAD
Mr. Bomboko
62-2^58
BC/gws
The Acting SECjRKTAJg-GETJEf^L! Members of the Committee, we last
met on 12 October. Meetings scheduled on two subsequent occasions
postponed -- In the last Instance for unavoidable reasons well known to you,
I regret any inconvenience that you may have experienced "because of these
postponements.
At cur last meeting, as you will recall, I made an extended statement
which included references to a number of possible actions on which the Views of
your Governments were. Invited, Since then, there have been some new developments
in the Congo which your Governments may also wish to take into account in
determining tiicir views.
The most important of these new developments are dealt with in a letter to
Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe which Mr. Gardiner has recently dispatched on my
behalf. I am now circulating this letter to you on a strictly confidential
basia, since it is in the hands of the parties and we are awaiting their replies
before releasing the text of the letter. It is my intention to include this
letter and the replies to it in the report on the Plan to the Security Council
which is still in preparation, Mr. Gardiner will be talking to the parties
about their replies before they are actually formulated and sent to him. He
will be going to Elisabethville again for this purpose, probably this week. We
are giving the Plan every chance; we are sparing no effort to make it work.
But obviously this cannot go on indefinitely. There must be a limit, a time-limit.
It follows that if the replies to Gardiner's letter are not satisfactory;
if Mr. Adoula should be negative, which is not likely, or — and this is much
more likely -- if there is no clear action by Mr. Tshombe to take the necessary
moves to ensure reintegration> then obviously the Plan must be abandoned and
new measures must be adopted. At that point I shall of course want to consult
with you again.
Aa the letter indicates, the time for the implementation of the Plan is
rapidly running out. I am inclined to regard 15 November — that is, nine days
from now — as a reasonable deadline for receipt of the replies.
BC/gws 3-5
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Mr. Gardiner was informed yesterday that Mr« Tshombe is "st^yJug" the
letter. Just now Mr. Adoula is preoccupied with the reopening of Parliament.
Moreover, as you will note from the text which is just being distributed of the
address given by Mr, Tshombe on J November at the "burial ceremony of
two KstdLJi-c-se polioecen killed in an incident on 1 November by Tunisian soldiers,
Mr. Tshonibe still chooses to talk like the head of an independent State. More
information about the incident of the Katangcse police will be given to you
later.
HA/ids 6
(The Acting Secretary-General)
Since our last meeting also, Prime Minister Adoula has presented the
draft Constitution to the Presidents of the Provinces, who vere invited to '
a meeting in Leopoldville for this purpose, although Mr. Tshcmbe decided not
to be represented, reportedly because the invitation to him referred to the
Province or Gouth Katanga. The Congolese Government rao.de available a limited
number of copies of the draft Constitution for distribution to the members of
this Committee on a confidential basis, and you have now had them for sone time.
Incidentally, an informal n lyeia of this Conetitution by our legal experts in
the Secretariat, in terms especially of how it meets the constitutional
requirements of the Plan, indicates that it is entirely adequate in this
respect. It remains for the new Constitution to be brought into effect through
its submission to Parliament by the Prime Minister.
As you know, Dr. Bunche recently made a short visit to the Congo, at
my request, to undertake seme intensive consultations. In a moment, he will
give you some of his impressions.
Knowing that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo came here
more thna a week ago with the primary purpose of addressing the meeting
scheduled for last Tuesday, which unfortunately had to be postponed, I think
it would be the right thing to do to give him the floor for any remarks which
he may wish to make at this time. Before I do so, however, I call on
Dr. Bunche for a brief report.
Mr. EUNCins i I may say at the start that I derived encouragement
from the observations made and the consultations undertaken in the course of
my six-day visit to the Congo. There were certain positive factors in the
picture there which were responsible for this. First of all, the ONUC organization
was stronger in leadership, in planning, and in its contacts and relationships
in both the military and the civilian echelons. Mr. Gardiner, General Kebbede,
General Prem Chand and General Klintberg make a fine team and work together
most effectively.
HA/ids 7-10
(Mr. Bunche)
Secondly, the ONUC operation no longer has to diffuse its personnel and
its energies all over the vast territory of the Congo in trying to get a
government established or Parliament convened and protected* The AIiC is much
improved in discipline, in leadership and in reliability. It is shoving an
ability to take over frcra ONUC., in a number of areas, full responsibility for
security 3 .;. Tor the maintenance of law and order, with ONUC providing only
limited logistic support to the ANC in these areas. This relieves the United
Nations troops for concentration in other areas where they are most needed,
and particularly in Katanga,
I may say in this regard that the ANC conti?;>gent, winch was made available
to the United Ifo-ions Force seme months ago and which is stationed at Kaaina "base,
is working out very well indeed. According to the reports of all our officers,
there has been a steady improvement in the performance of this unit, in the pride
and industry of its personnel.
A third factor is found in the fact that Mr. Tshombe is gradually
being hedged in. In this regard, attention may be called to the situation
in North Katanga, which is now mostly under ANC and OIIUC control, with only
three cr four pockets of Katangese gendarmerie remaining in that area. The
largest concentration is in the Baudouinvil.le area, where some three battalions
of the gendarmerie are deployed. There is a sizable pccket at Koagolo also,
but this is completely surrounded — and has been, for some time now —
by elements of the AUG.
In South Katanga, Elisabethville — as you know — is completely under United
Nationo control,and also Kamina base. What io not known—there have been no public
reports about it -.- is that today, in Elisabethville, the Central Government has
customs and immigration personnel who have come there for the purpose of
setting up, under ONUC protection, customs and immigration offices.
t
FGB/vb 11
(Mr. Eunche )
These personnel have come to Elicabethville With the consent, albeit
perhaps a "bit reluctant, of the Katangose authorities. Indeed, just
yesterday, the Congolese Minister of Defence, with a number of Congolese
military obcervers/ came to Elisabethville, and the KLnister of Defence
hw-i scAfT.dv.lcd a confersnca with Mr.- Tshosfce for yesterday afternoon. The
military observers are to form the Congolese elements of the mixed military
observer teams that arc to be deployed in North Katanga*
In this context I also might make passing reference to a conversation
I hod in Leopoldville wi-uh Mi% Ngtilula, the chief Congolese representative
in Elisabethv.i'i.le for several v^iks when the comjp.Ljsions "were meeting in
connexion with the implementation of the plan. MX-. Ugalula informed me that •
he had a free run of J51:lfa.obebln lle including the African communes, and
that he encountered no hostility on the part of the African inhabitants of
that city, '
There are three strategic points in the south of Katanga vhich have still
not been penetrated by United Nations troops or personnel, though Kolwezi and
JacLotville have on occasion ber-in visited by one cr t\jo United Nations officials;
Kolvesi being most recently visited — juct last veoli in fact -- "by
Mr. Kathu accompanied "by tvo officers. These three strategic points, of
.course, are Jadotville, Koluezi e.nd Kipusiii, and they are the heart and
the nerve centre of the mining industry of Katanga, of the province's export
rout03,-arid therefore are. the main source of Mr, Tchomoe's revenue and,
consequently,of his power. The mercenaries remaining in Katanga are largely
concentrated in these localities, and also the Katangese air force, vhich,
as the Committee knovs from the recent report to the Security Council, has been
built up*
ONUC, the United Nations Force, must gst to all three of these places.
We hope that it can be done -without fighting, and I think I can say that there
is sound basis for that hope. If the United Nations Force is strong and veil
prepared, ready to fif/nt if it must but never to initiate fighting, it is the
belief of all competent observers that I tallied to in the Congo, United Nations
and non-United Nations, that the United Nations Force vill not be challenged by
the Katangese and vill never have to fight again.
FGB/vb 12
(Qfr. Bunche)
ONUC I found to be strong and secure in Katanga > and especially in
Eli ca"bc thville and Kamina base, and I may say it is getting stronger, I
nicy say also that in recent months OMJC has been deliberately quits restrained
in its actions in order not. to hamper efforts under "way towards peaceful
r~,ccr:.'::U ;.c.tic:ic
Thero are also, of course, certain negative factors in the picture.
First and foremost is the prolongation of the Katanga crisiD no-w for
two and a quarter years. This suits Mr. Tsliom^e's purposes admirably. He
constantly plays fcr time, jn f?,ot« Secondly, -chc-rc is the possibility
always of an Internal political crisis which cou'.d threaten to throw the
Congo again into chaos, though I must say that Prime Minister Adoula seemed
to rns to be quite confident and in good spirits -when I last, talked "with him
a •week or so ago*
It must be mentioned on the negative side, of course, that the economy of
the country is in "bad shape. There is a most acute lack of foreign exchange.
There has been considerable breakdown in the distribution system and in
essential services in the provinces*
Before concluding I should mention, I think, two other matters •which have
come to the attention of the members of the Committee in one way or another.
One is the recent incident involving the Tunisian soldiers. This was an
incident involving Tunisian soldiers and Katangese police which took place
during the evening of 1 November in Elisabethville, According to a
preliminary report from the CIj'UC representative in Elisabethville a group
of Tunisan soldiers went to a movie on that evening, and there they were
molested by Katangese police. The Tunisians called their batallion for
protection, and during an ensuing altercation they fired, killing one
Katangese policeman and wounding another who, it appears, later died. The
Tunisians asserted that they acted in self-defence because they were attacked,
The Officer- in- Charge of OIIQC, Mr. Gardiner, has ordered an immediate
investigation into the incident, and that investigation is now in process.
By the terms of the Status of Force Agreement with the Congolese Government
members of ONUC are exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of their own
Governments and not to the jurisdiction of either the Central Government or
the authorities of Katanga. The attempt of the Katangese police to arrest
PGB/vb 13-15
(Mr. Bunche)
the Tunisians -was, therefore, vroug. In the interrogation — ve have just
learned from a cable that carae in shortly before this meeting — the Xatangese
Police Commissioner had acknowledged that he attempted to seize a sub-machine
gun from a v -ji aergeaut immediately before the fatal firing.
IThf, other matter is the reopening of Parliament. The two Chambers of
Parliament met at nine o'clock yesterday morning, 5 November. The Senate, -which
did not have a quorum — only thirty-one members ucre present vhile -the required
quorum is forty-three; -- immediately adjourned until this morning, and at
this morning's meeting it did have a quorum* The C..';uiaber of .Representatives,
the lover Chamber, had a quorum at yesterday's meeting but did not have one
at this morning!s meeting. Yesterday the Chamber elected a temporary President
and appointed a commission of GL^X to check on the credentials of the
alternates vho had come forward to take the places of former representatives
who are now serving in provincial governments and assemblies. On the eve of
the convening of Parliament President Kaca«-Vutu nc.dc a statement over the radio
in v/hich he called for the adoption of a federal constitution and a new
financial lav concerning the division of revenues between the Central Government
and the Provinces, He aloo dismissed the rumour of an Lmtnont dissolution
of Parliament.
RSE/nz 16
Mr.^POMBpKO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French); Before
dealing vith the very specific questions on which I would lite to retire a statement
on behalf of my Government, I should like to thank the Acting Secretary-General
for having E£u:Le this meeting possible during ray brief stay in New York. I realize
that the attention of this Organization is now turned towards the Caribbean
where tlierj is a threat to international peace end security. Although this subject
is not directly concerned with our present meeting, I must say how much my
Government appreciated your rapid action, your indefatigable efforts, your Skill,
intelligence and energy in dealing with this serious problem* We found again
proof of the courage which you shoved during the crib.lr in the Congo.
Indisputably, the situation in the Caribbean should have priority in the United
Nations over the older problem of the Congo, but, nevertheless, I should
like to focus your attention on the particular mission which my Government has
given to me, which is proof of the importance which it attaches to what I am
going to say.
I should like to focus attention on the urgent measures which must be taken
to ensure the fulfilling of the mandate of the United Nations in the Congo. For
the twenty-eight months during which the Organization has been in the Congo, during
which time it has borne burdens which are unprecedented in its history, I never
doubted for one moment that the personnel executing the mandate planned on
accomplishing the task which had been given to it in the shortest possible time.
Nevertheless, there are serious reasons for believing that unjustifiable delays
have been created and that, instead of bringing the Organization nearer to the
accomplishment of its mandate, a certain tolerance or even negligence has kept it
away from it.
In speaking about the present situation, I would not like to dwell on how
far we are from realising the goals set out in the United Nations resolutions.
This Would be too pretentious, because the elements are tremendous and the
situation is still very uncertain. Eut I would like to say, on behalf of my
Government, that the Organization is still far from accomplishing the goals set
forth in the resolutions, and the very basis of the United Nations would be
threatened if that tack were not accomplished*
The Government of the Congo asked for assistance and aid from the
United Nations at a time when its independence and territorial integrity were
threatened. It had confidence in the Organization and accepted its decisions.
RSH/nz 17
(Mr. Fomboko, Conpo (Leopoldville))
Certainly it "benefited from considerable technical assistance, but^ on the essential
rmttern, so far RS t-iie tsrrlfcori'i.! integrity; the exercics of sovereignty on the
entire national territory, and the end of foreign secession in Elisabothvllle are
concerned, no progress lias "been achieved.
I do not intend to deal vita all the "background of t<22 question, since the
members of -' Is CoisDittee know that background, the peaceful attempts by the
Governi'ii nt, -since the conferences at Tananarive, Coquithatville, and Kitcna, and the
negotiations at Leopoldville, The results of these attempts to .reach a peaceful
solution are limited to.premises'which have not been kept and to an attitude
on the pai't of the teL-ji in Elisabethville to try to go,in time and "by all n?eans
to perpetuate tfcs secession. We jave fcund only atfiJ.ling tactics, and these
stalling tactics practiced by Tsho:nbehave finally discouraged all those who believed
that negotiations foraad the only way-to follow, and you yourself, Mr. Secretary-
General? were obliged to adult tea'ti-ivtih of this.
Tsboinbe and his masters or.ly yield when they feel themselves under heavy pressure
and we believe that for this reason ycu have finally worked out a Plan for the
reintegration of Katanga into the Republic of tha Congo. We accepted and supported
this plan because, on the whole, we believed that it was a valid programme to
re-establish national sovereignty over Couth Katanga and control over the foreign
companies in this region. The public statements made in favour of the Plan in
Western capitals have encouraged us, and statements that have been made in public
have also given us hope. However, neither .certain western Powers nor the- great -
mining coc-'panies were ready at that time, and they are still not ready today, '
to put an end to Katangese secession. Neither the British Government nor the- •••
Belgian Government have given us the collaboration which is especially necessary
for .the implementation of the Blan. Their attitude has only encouraged Tshcmbe
to delay the execution of that Plan or simply to refuse to agree to certain * -•-. -
concrete points in that Plan. _ - . • .
So far as the Congolese Government is concerned, it has .done everything
possible to. implement the Plan. In the first place, there was the question of -
the provisions of the Constitution. As the Secretary-General has pointed out,
the Congolese Government has finished the drafting of this Constitution, with
the help of United Nations experts in federal constitutions. The Prime Minister
has ccnoiurilcated that draft to the. Provincial Assemblies, and the draft has also
been submitted to Parliament., . This is what the Plan asked for, and .this is what
we have done.
RSH/nz 18-20
(Mrf Bcmboko, Con^o (Lcopoldvllle))
Tlie second chapter of the Plan concerned financial questions« The Central
Government was asked to work out a financial law containing previsions for the
division of income, A draft has already "been -worked out and submitted for the
approval of the Chambers* In his address on k November, President Kaca-Vubu
recommended that the Chambers should examine this bill urgently. He said: "In
order to give to the Provinces the material possibilities for survival., it is
necessary urgently to enact a financial law providing for a division of the revenue
between the Central Government and the provincial bodies. The law will put an end
to the difficulties between the Central Executive and the Provincial Executives,
it will make it possible, for the Provinces to carry out on a good basis their
budgetary plans for 19t>3«" This is what President Kasa-Vubu stated in his address,
Still in the financial area, iimnpdiate steps — I would stress the word
"immediate" -- have been provided for. Indisputably, the most important aspect
of the problem is the financial one, not because for us it is merely a matter of
money, but because it is the monopolies and the tremendous income derived from
the mining areas of the Congo, which have enabled foreign companies to maintain .
the secession. This is where foreign financial interests are directly concerned.
The authors of the Plan correctly understood that this was the crux of the
problem, and that is why a revenue division commission should be set up
immediately. The Central Government appointed representatives and sent them to
Elisabethville, but Mr. Tshombe's representatives limited themselves to bringing
up again for discussion the validity and the interpretation, and the special
provisions, of the Plan. They declined to discuss the terms of the divisions
which were provided for in the Plan. Tshombe was satisfied to pay
$2 million to the credit of the Government, on an account in London, of course. ,
He tried to show in this way that he was giving a kind of gift to the Government.
This dishonest gesture was described by Tshombe as an indication of good will,
but the Central Government did not recejLve it. The Central Government has
demanded only what is legally due to it. The Plan is, clear on this point, and
it should be applied faithfully and straightforwardly.
GRR/gws 21
( Mr «• B onb oko, C on £Q (Le opol Avi ll.e ) )
In regard to foreign currency, for the unification of reserves and for
the exchange of currency a second ccmmisaicn was to be set up im^-Iiately,
Representatives of the Government were named and information was supplied oy the
.Central Government, but. instead, of co-operating in the implementation of tha
P3.an, Tshonibs gave only evasive answers which wera equivalent to a refusal.
EG stated that he did not have any foreign exchange and ha refused to send the
funds he was ..supposed to. The Acting Secretary-General's plan did not providefor .thase exeepcionc.
•Prime Minister Adoula in accordance vith the application of the Plan
recalled, the legislation on the control of exchange and the obligation to pay
foreign currency to the Central Government. He particularly requested the
collaboration of the Belgian Government with a view to obtaining its support
vis-a-vis the Belgian companies in the settlement of the question of exchange.
• Belgium has not yet even deigned to answer our request, although as you all know
that country had publicly stated that it was in favour of the Plan. Mr. Adoula
also requested he3.p from neighbouring countries in the area, but neither
Portugal in Angola nor Great Britain in Rhodesia have followed up this request.
The third chapter of the Elan stated that the Central Government should
invite the UN to request the IMF to instruct its experts to work out a plan
for currency unification. A few days c-.go I learned that the experts had gone
. to the Congo, but they had not yet arrived when I left.
To consolidate his secession Tshocibe and all those who support him have
set up.a veritable army, although they call it a gendarmerie. This group of
• mercenaries have great power. No durable solution can be found as long as
Tshombe remains at the head of this illegal army. The Acting Secretary-General
understood these dangers, and that is why his Plan attached great importance
to military problems. First of all there was the provision that all military
units, para-military units or gendarmerie should take an oath of allegiance to
the President of the Republic. No officer, either then or later, has ever given
an oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic, no matter what rumours
have been circulated about this. On the contrary, Tshombe wanted to drag the
Central Government into vain and pointless discussions.
GRR/gvs 22
(Mr* Borcboko, Con^o (Leopoldville))
Secondly, a military commission was eet up and the Central Govom-nent, put
its delegates at the disposal of the provincial delegates of South Kat^ca*
Here again there vere no results "because the Katangese negotiators age* in put in
doubt the very principles of the Plan- The Plan provided that the Acting
Secretary-General should appeal to the Prime Minister and to Tshorube to stop any
movement of troops, this in order to facilitate the reintegrating of the
Katangese gendarmerie into the army of the Congo* But Tshombe demanded talks
with a view to concluding a limited cease-fire, thus transforming the very
spirit of the Plan0 There vas no question of discussing this; it was just a
question of acceding to the Acting Secretary-General1? appeal and above all of
stopping the movement of troops even in South Katanga. The United Nations was
to verify compliance by all military units, but it was not able to fulfil its
mission, because Tshombc forbade it to go to Jadotvillc and Kipushi in South
Katanga. The team, in power established bases there as well as refugees for all
mercenary soldiers.
with the assistance of the United Nations experts we were to set up in
thirty days a plan for the integration and unification of all military units,
para-military unite and gendarmerie within the Congolese units. Here again
Tshombe broke his word. In the third and last place, a period of two months
was proposed and was accepted in which the integration and unification would
take place. Not only was this not brought about within the sixty days, it
has not yet even been begun. We are wondering, therefore, what was the use of
insisting on the Plan, on which we placed a great part of our confidence, if
it was not to "be respected.
Fpur points remain to be analysed. The first concerns representation
abroad.. When he accepted the Plan two months ago, Tshorabe agreed to abolish his
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the missions which have been established
abroad. The countries which had received his envoys also publicly agreed to
aboilah the missions, I must tell this Committee that not only do the missions
continue to exist in Brussels, but foreign consulates in Elisabethville continue
to consider Mr. Kimba as Foreign Minister, This remark applies to all the
consulates in Elisabethville as well as to the consulate of Belgium, which is
maintained there in spite of our protests., lhat consulate has never received
the exequatur of the Congolese Government.
GRR/gd 25
(Mr. Eomboko, 'Congo (Leopoldville))
The interference of these Consuls has "been particularly evident daring the
last few months of negotiation in Ulicabethville. They attempted to influence the
parties, including Mr. Adoula's representatives. It is impossible to deny their
complicity in the working out and in the signature of the so-called cease-fire
agreement.
On the other hand, the Central Government has acted in conformity with the
by establishing, on the airport at iillisabethville, immigration services to deliver
passports, to the Congolese living in that part of the country, as the Acting
Secretory-General and Mr, Euiiche have ,just said.
The second point concerns the umnesty. A legislative text is "being drafted,
"but vc must emphasize here that it is only political offences which will be the
subject of the amnesty. It will be impossible to allow to escape unpunished those
who have committed common-law crimes. In any case, the amnesty can only come into
effect if the Elisabethville provincial authorities definitely renounce secession,
In the third place co-operation with the United Ilations was encouraged. I do
not think that anyone can doubt the intention of my Government to collaborate, but
one cannot say the same thing about Kr. Tshombe.
Lastly, the Central Government was to be reconstituted. The offer made by
Mr. Adoula to Mr, Tshombe and his party is still valid, and at any moment we are
ready to ensure the representation of South Katanga in the Central Government,
Here again we must emphasize that there is a precondition: Gouth Katanga must be
integrated into the Republic. We do not wish, as we say in our country, to put the
crocodile in the boat. You know that we had agreed that the Katangese
parliamentarians should core to sit in Parliament, although at that nooent
Mr. Tahcmbe had not yet renounced secession. What did these gentlemen do? They
created in Leopoldville a centre of subversion to bribe the members of Parliament,
destroy the Central Government and even attack the United Nations Mission, That
is an experience which we cannot forget and uy Government cannot agree that
members of the Conakat Party of Mr. Tshcube join the Government unless Mr. Tehocibe
really gives up his idea of secession.
GRR/gd 24-25(Mr. Bomboko, Conp;o (Leopoldville))
I said at the beginning of my statement that the Congolese Government had
accepted the Plan "because it Relieved that Its faithful application would "be
able to settle the Katongeso problem. Furthermore, the Acting Secretary-General's
propocals both explicitXy and implicitly called for finaneCB and honesty in the
epplicetion of the Plan.
QH/rh 26
^ . . .Congo Theopoldvllle))
As far a3 Implementing the Plan is concerned, the author l-tiec. o:?
Elisabethville have "been quite faithless, Apart from certain Dpoetac
measuresy which were really negligible, they have not contributed f,o
CO lilt 5 on of ths problsin, They hcva Bent seme copper for export via. Lcoyoldville
while the other experts are still going through Angola ancl Jthodecia, Since
the first 'two vagonloads were sent, there has not "be3n another which passed
through the national route. This ahows that it is only for purposes of
propaganda that these two vagonloads were originally sent, and as for the
construction of the "bridge, Mr. Tshcmhe was psrmit^ad to mofce a speech on it,
to say that he had "built it. But the "bridge war. "built thanks to the
collaboration of the United Nations and the Central Government;, Mr. Tshombe
took advantages of the opportunity to slander the Central Government and
even the United Nations,
They claim to have opened communications with Leopcldville, "but in fact,
no progress has "been made, Belgium is still maintaining its radio and telegraphic
ccmmiinications directly with Elisahethville, thus ehowiug its contempt for the
Congolese Government, They cay that they are ready to open the airport at
Elisabethville, but when we try to do it they arrest the aircraft crews which
are flown in and the United Nations does nothing, about it.
Mr. Tshcnfbe is only trying to play for time. The dispatch with which,
the Plan should have been applied point by point is the very essence of it. It
is not by chance that the Secretary-General, envisaged immediate sanctions. The
programme often uses the term "immediately". This does not mean in the future,
but immediately; that is to say, ao soon as the indispensable conditions are
realizable. When we say "immediately" we envisage an action to be taken at once.
It should not be held up any longer than necessary except to give the orders
and to take the measures for excluding all discussion on the substance of the
problem.
As far as the military aspect is concerned, delays of a month or more were
envisaged, and accepted, Eut if any delay is not respected, the Plan will be
pointless,
The report of the Cfficer-in-Charge of CMJC, Mr. Gardiner (S/505J/Add,l-2),
and the commentaries and explanations, as well as the information provided by
the Secretary-General, leave no doubt about the exceptional seriousness of the
situation.
M//rh 27
(l-Ir. Bomboko,Con^o (LeopoJ.dville ) )
My Government ic rarticulnrly a\rarc of this seriousness be~o.u\;e of
the fact that, at the moment of the implementation of the Secretary-General1a
Plan Mr. Tshombe and the Elisabethville authorities seemed to reinforce their
position by means of military equipment in a more alarming way than at any time
since 19 0, While the Central Government; in conformity with its desire to
receive the crisis by peaceful means, took upon itself the task of inplementing
one after another the points in the Plan Mr. Tshoinbe has been violating the
promises and commitments which had bean mads, taking advantage of the patience
of the Central Government in order to continue to arm himself.
I have no intention of prophesying the future, but certainly Tshombe's
intentions are resistance and opposition to the unification of the Congo and
refusal of the Plan and of the Federal Constitution. In a word, it will mean
the failure of all our efforts. Indeed the growth of the air force of Mr. Tshonbe
could be of strategic importance. The quantity ond quality of his military
aircraft, as well as his arms and aranunition, give him an apparent superiority
over United Nations forces, if not indeed the power to paralyse all actions of
the United nations. This is an indication of the dangerous possibilities in
the development of the situation.
Not only can the United Rations be attacked or continually harrassed, but
also can be deprived of any means of effective action. It will no longer have
the necessary instruments for the realization of an eventual economic pressure.
I would say then that if effective measures are not taken immediately, the
Organization will experience a grievoue failure in the Congo. An urgent plan
must be drawn up assuring a logistic support of economic pressures.
The Secretary-General can continue his consultations with the Belgian and
British Governments with a view to obtaining supplementary and more positive
efforts than in the past for the implementation of the Plan. The acceptance
or adherence to the Plan will remain a dead letter unless t,hese Governments
forbid and prevent the hostile activities of private companies against the
Congo. The two Governments could exercise effective control over the companies
which are transporting or providing arms and financial resources for the purchase
of such arms. It has always been insisted that the Central Government should
have discussions with Mr. Tshombe. In general, it is not with Mr. Tshoinbe that
we should hold discussions because he is not the one who is really responsible.
Those who are really responsible are behind him. They are the industrial
MW/rh 28
ropoldvllle))
companies operating in our country* It would be a good thing to invite those
companies to "begin discussions frankly with the Central GevernmoTrt. In spite
of all the appeals which we have made to then/ these companies do not wish to
respond to our offers of discussion. They refuse because they know very veil
that they are the foundation of secession itself.
My Government does not. "believe that the Itelgian and Eri'tish Governments
are incapable of doing this. The nations of the Ccmncnwealth could study and
adopt a pressure policy which would be effective QG fnr as the United Kingdom
and Rhodesia are concerned. Their intervention could also make a positive
contribution to the solution of the problem, as vas the case at the time of the
Suez crisis, for example.
The Organization could give clearer and more substantial support than it
has in the past to the Central Government in the military field. The General
Assembly couli decide on measures to be taken with regard to South Africa and
Portugal, which are directly and overtly encouraging Katangese secession, since
up to now Portugal has not replied 'to the demand of the Central Government
regarding the transport of copper. The Security Council and, in its turn, the
General Assembly, could authorize the Secretary-General to use the best possible
means to institute an economic blockade against South Katanga, for if the use
of force is condemned as a means of resolving the Katangese crisis, force could
be shown/and applied, if not utilized, to assure the effectiveness of economic
measures.
The presence of the United Nations Force and its reinforcement would have
an indirect effect in supporting the resolutions of the United Nations,
In conclusion, my Government, although it continues to attach importance
to the Plan which we have accepted, and which we cannot renounce, requests the
United Nations to apply this plan immediately and without delay, no longer
discussing with Mr. Tshonbe, because when the Plan, was presented the question
was simply whether Mr. Tshcinbe would say yes or no, Gince that time, Mr, Tshombe
has been given the chancp of getting cut of it because he was given the opportunity
of discussing it with us. There have been times, as I have indicated in my
speech, when Mr. Tshombe even wished to place in doubt the principles of the
Plan which he had already accepted. What we want is to invite Mr. Tshombe to
carry out, by concrete, positive acts, what the Plan asks of him, which is to
MW/rh 29-30
(LIT* Bc-'pbokOt Congo CLeopoldville))
make his contribution to the Plan, The Central Government has already done
its part, as I have indicated to the members of the Ccmnittee, c.Tcopt 3>or two
or three questions such as questions of the arancsty nr.d reconstit-ution of the
Government. The Central Govcrnjnevit has put into effect "what the Flan has asked
of it, except in these cascp, ML-, Tahombe muat understand that he must put into
effect -what he has promised. It in necessary above all to finish with these
decays and not to go on discussing eternally0 We must fix a date so, that if
Mr, Tchombe goes beyond it, sanctions will go into effect because Mr, Tshornbe
always counts on the fact that, through discussion,. one can continue to the end
of next year without any measures having been taken0This is the only condition on which we arc prepared to support the Plan and
to carry out all that it demands of us. The Central Government Jias confidence
in the United Nations and that is why ve have agreed to the Plan, What we ask
now is the faithful application of the Plan,
BC/ids 31
(1>lr- Bcnboko/ Congo (leopor.dville))
As regards, for example, the stopping of troop move.T.rats the C^rV/ral
Government is prepared to do this. This is demonstrated by the fact that
the Minister of National Defence is now in Elisabcrhvillo, But. these
troop movements should not relate only to North Kaluga 0 Troop ir.ovememts
must be stopped throughout Katanga, including South Kat-?.n#i. Indeed, troop
movements could be stopped in the North but the bases wouD.d be left at
Mr. Tshcmbe's disposal, and he vould continue as always to supply and
reinforce his positions in North Katanga.
Furthermore, it is incredible that the United Nations has not so far
been authorized to penetrate the very bases of the rebellion of Katanga —
that is, tho bases of Kolve?,!, Jadotville and Kipushi. That is where
Mr, Tshcmte has stockpiled his war materiel. That is where, as is known, .
all the mercenaries are hidden. These hotbeds are in the process of being
consolidated, and no action has been taken to destroy them. Go long as
they are not destroyed, it will be possible for Mr. Tshcmbe to "be the stronger
because he will continue to arm and reinforce his military effectives* He will,
therefore, accept no peaceful solution because he will believe that
his force can oppose that of the United Nations and that of the Central
Government. I think that in Katanga we must give a demonstration of force
so that we do not have to use it later.
BC/ids 32
The Acting SECRETARY-GflNBKAL; I thank the Foreign Minister of the
Congo for his very useful statement. At this stage I would make only one cerement*
I agree with the Foreign Minister that ve should not await indefinitely
Mr. Tshcmbe's reply regarding his acceptance or rejection of my r.V>zr* As I
said in my earlier statement today, I have set 15 November — that is, only
nine d^ys frcm now — as the deadline for the receipt of replies. I have
corvt-ysd this information to Mr. Gardiner today, and he will convey it to
Mr. Tsnornbe — most probably this week, perhaps even on Thursday. I am sure
that members of the Congo Advisory Committee will agree with me that a definite
deadline should be set at this stage and that it will serve no useful purpose
to await indefinitely Mr, Tshcmbe's reaction,
Mro CIIAKRA VARTY (India): I have asked to speak only to try to undo
the mischief which has been created by certain speculative reports that have
appeared in the Press. Some of my colleagues here have been asking whether
it is a fact that, as has been stated in the Press, India has demanded the
immediate withdrawal of the Indian contingent of troops in the Congo. I wish
to avoid further speculation by making this short statement. There is no truth
in these Press reports. All that happened was this: I came to see the
Acting Secretary-General yesterday with the specific object of handing over
a certain communication. I naturally took the opportunity to ask him about
the situation in the Congo, particularly because our good friend Mr. Bunche
had returned from there so recently. But I would like to make it clear that
the report that we have asked to withdraw our troops from the Congo area is
not correct.
I must, however, also make it quite clear that India — and I am sure
that this applies equally to the United Nations as a whole — would not like
to keep its troops in the Congo indefinitely. We have made it quite clear on
various occasions, including those on which I have had the privilege of seeing
the Acting Secretary-General, that we would not like to keep the troops in the
Congo a day longer than is absolutely essential* Vfc hope that a settlement in
the Congo will be achieved very soon, enabling us to withdraw our troops. That
is a hope which we have always expressed and which we continue to express.
BC/ids 35
'• • ' (Mr . ChaKravarty, Trivia)
I would also like to use this opportunity to say that it is G very
depressing account that we have heard fr era the Foreign Minicter of the Congo.
I can only repeat what I said on the last occasion -- namely, that the time
which has been laid down must be strictly edhered to and Mr, TshCube should not
be giver. CLM opportunity to delay by interminable negotiations.
Ccrr.:.n b^ck to the Press report, I would repeat that we regret this report,
particularly since it is going to help nobcdy except, perhaps, Mr. Tshcmlie,
who may think that others might withdraw their troops — sane thing which would
be entirely to his advantage.
_ In the first p.lace, I should like to associate
myself with the view expressed "by the representative of India that the account
to which we have just listened is a very depressing one. But J. must say that
it is not a surprising one, because, although we have not had inside knowledge,
we have all "been following the Pi-ess reports on what has seemed to "be going on
in the Congo.
I am not sure, Mr. Secretary -General, just how much discussion you would
like today. You have, just informed us that you have now given a dead-line
to Mr. Tshcm'oe and Mr. Adou.la for the full acceptance of your proposals. I
assume, therefore, that we ought to wait until the expiration of that dead-line,
and th«n meet to give you our advice about what should he done. •
You have, Mr. Secretary-General, also circulated for our information the
draft Constitution which the President of the Congo has submitted to his
Parliament. That draft ic . the . result not only of the efforts of the Congolese
thcirselves, but also of the efforts of certain experts when you have been
pleased to appoint. We have received only the French text of thlc Constitution*
It is a document, of real importance to us all, even though it has been sent to
us for our information only. I therefore took the opportunity a few days ago
of asking you, Mr. Secretary-General, as you are aware, whether you would not
be kind enough to procure for us an English translation of this document so that
we might be able to examine it with intelligent interest. You explained to me
what the difficulties were — that this is a very important legal document and,
while you had good people who could translate it into English, no translation
would carry the authenticity of the French text. I ventured to observe that,
i. <• in,
EC/ids 2 -35
(Mr. Adebo, Nigeria)
vhile I understood the difficulties, I still thought that tho;ia of us vho do
not speak French should be civen an English translation of this dccunant»
I oaid that we would be prepared to accept the translation w:vth the reservation
th3t it is not an authentic text, that the only authentic text is the French-•„ *^^-^^
I vould therefore like to take this opportunity to press that request,
I hope that my non-French-speaking colleagues will associate themselves with
it.
HA/gd 36Nigeria)
I should like to say that I have not proceeded to express concrete views -upon
the happenings in the Congo just now, for the simple reason that I am not cure that
this is the time to express them, Should this meeting decide that this is the
ti:n3, then, if the Secretary-General does not mind, I would have to ask for the
i" cor again.
The Acting SECRSTARY-ll^RAL; Cn this matter of the Constitution, the
original French text, of course, was distributed to the members of the Congo
Advisory Conxiittee at the lest meeting, and I gave much thought to the advisability
of getting some Secretariat members to translate It into English for the "benefit
at least of the members of this Committee. But I felt that it was rather risky for
members of the Secretariat to attempt to translate such a document as the
Constitution of a country. Members of the Committee will no doubt agree with me
that the Constitution of any country has to be drafted in very meticulous language;
not only does it require skilled translators, but only those who know something
about the Constitution will be able to handle that sort of activity adequately.
However, since the Ambassador of Kigeria has suggested that the French text
alone should be treated as authentic and that the English text should be treated
as unauthorized and should be distributed simply for the convenience of the members
of this Committee, I will see to it that English copies of the Constitution are
made available to the members of this Committee as early as possible. V7e will try
to have them available by Friday of this week.
While on this subject, I also wish to thank the Ambassador of India for his
statement before this Committee. I am cure I am voicing the sentiments of all the
mcir.bcrs of this Committee when I say that India's contribution to the United Nations
effort in our search for a peaceful solution of the Congo problem has been
extraordinary. iJvcn in the face of the greatest calamity, if I may say so, facing
India, the Government and people of India have been most magnanimous in assuring
the world that they are prepared to permit their armed forces under the United
Nations to operate in the Congo as long as the United Nations considers their
presence necessary.
ilA/Gd 37(The Acting Secretary-General)
This statement by the representative of India will give assurance not only to
the members of this Committee "but to the general public, which, is much perturbed,
I understand, by the rumours circulating in regard to the Indian Government's
prospective attitude.
I cjn sv-rc that the members or tliis Committee would wish me to convey the
Crav.eful thinks of this Committee to the Government of India for its very
thoughtful and magnanimous attitude regarding the continued operation of the Indian
forces in the Congo under the United. Nations,
Mrt RIA.D (United .rab Republic); I want to thank the Secretary-General
and Dr, Bunehe for the information they have given to the Committee. After hearing
the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Congo, I think it was a wise move for
the Secretary-General to fix the deadline of 15 November for a reply from Mr. Tshombe
If I may be permitted, I would like to propose the adjournment of our meeting today.
Perhaps we can hold another meeting after 15 November, when we will hear the reply
from Mr. Tshombe, I have another reason, also: I know that Mr. Rueggar, of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, is here in New York now and is awaiting
a meeting with the Secretary-General. We are all aware of the importance and
urgency of such a meeting, which I understood was to be held at about four o'clock.
Since it is now half-past four, I propose that our meeting be adjourned,
The Ac-Vj.nft S CRETAP.Y-GEMAL; Thank you very much for that very kind
suggestion. However, I have the Ambassadors of Guinea and Ghana on my list, and I
should like to know whether they are agreeable to the suggestion just made by the
Ambassador of the United Arab Republic. Actually, Mr. Huegger arrived just before
I left my office and urgently wanted to see me. I tentatively arranged to meet him
at five o'clock this afternoon, but it seems that he wanted to see me earlier than
that, if possible. Therefore, if the members of the Committee agree, and
particularly if the representatives of Guinea and Ghana do not object, I should like
to adjourn the meeting now.
HA/ed ; . ;. 38-UO
Mr. DTALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I have no
However, it was said Just a short time ago that the Foreign Minister, of the Congo
has been waiting here for a week. Would it be possible to ask whether the Foreign
Minister of the Con^o will be here when we again take up the discussion on substance?
Exc-j;:t for that consideration, I would have no objection. It simply seems that,
fron the point of.view of courtesy to the Foreign Minister of the Congo, who is
directly concerned in the matter and who has been here for ten days, it might be a
bit indelicate to adjourn the meeting without beginning further discussion.
The Acting LSECRETARY-GEFERAL; I wonder whether the Foreign Minister of
the Congo could give us some indication of his travel schedule —•• how long he
proposes to stay in New York,
Mr. BOI-IBOKQ (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): This
question is very important to my country. Even if I went back to the. Congo, I would
return here if there were a meeting of the Advisory Committee after 15 November.
My presence at that time would be necessary. ' •
The Acting SECHETARY-GENERAL; I should like to remind the members of the
Committee that the Parliament is in session in the Congo, so the Foreign Minister is
very keen to get back there as soon as possible.
FGB/nz Ul
Mr. QUAISCTI-SACKEY (Ghana): Vfe have an habitual courtesy which ve .
show on such occasions, and we shall never oppose any move for en adjournment*
In any case, as has "been indicated by the. representative of Nigeria, nevr documents
have been circulated and. you, Sir, and Dr. Bunche have made stc.teir.cnto vhich need
reflection on our part. Therefore, I also assumed that there was going to be
ar.?J,>ier moot ing to enable us to give our concrete vievs on the statements vhich
1':'. "been undo* I think, however, that I should ask one question, s;Lnce the reply
to it might be very helpful to my Government when I report to Accra,
You, Sir, said that if the replies from Mr, Adoula and Mr. Tshombe were
negative then it was your intention to abandon your plan. My question is as
follows. Since the plan vhich you have put forward -- and ve have already
spoken on this —• provides for various kinds of coercive measures to ensure the
reintcgration to vhich ray Government has already agreed, why is it going to be
abandoned? And, if it is abandoned, what new measures are being envisaged? I
think that these, are pertiment questions the answers to vhich might be helpful
to my Government*
The .Actin/* SECRET/VRY-GrNERAL: Of course, that Tri.ll be the subject, of
our next meeting, and I think I shall be able to go into greater detail then.
If Mr. Tshombe says "No" to the implementation of my Plan, that is, the United
Nations Plan, then I shall give reasons to this Committee why that Plan will have
to be abandoned -- with, of course, the agreement of the Advisory Committee
on the Congo — and J shall present an alternative plan which I believe will
be equally effective. At this stage I do not want to go into details of why I
want to abandon the Plan under certain circumstances because ve are running
into some practical difficulties, but I am sure that the alternative plan which
I have in mind, and vhich I propose to present to this Committee at our next
meeting, will be equally, effective and will, I believe, render the solution of
the Congo problem easier.
Mr. QUATSON-SACKEY (Ghana): Thank you, Sir.
FGB nz
Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria) : I am very glad that our colleague" from Ghana
made that intervention because I think it is very important that 'what is knovn
outside this Conmittee at the conclusion of this meeting should not be such as
to give encouragement to the people in the Congo vho arc not looking for a •
settlement. I-Jhen you opened the discussion, Sir, you said that you vere giving
information to us on a confidential basis. I have never been sure hov much is
tiii.-..y confidential in the United Nations/ "because after every meeting of the
Advisory ^oionittee on the Congo reports have appeared in the Press attributed to
"very reliable sources", 'and whenever there has been any mistake at all in those
report3 it has been of a tendentious character.
Therefore, I vender vhether it will not be necessary for you to devise some
statement -which you will release to the Trees telling it just what has happened,
but telling it so accurately that there will not be distortion. If the thing
is kept confidential it will in fact see the light of day, only it will "be a
garbled account and might do us harm. For example, if it is published that in
the event of your receiving a negative reply that is the end of this Plan that
would be an achievement for people who do not want the Plan to succeed. On the
other hand, if the point was that if they said "No" to it then you were going to
put to us a revised plan of a more effective character, that, in my view, would
be psychologically an advantage.
Therefore, I would very much like to suggest that, instead of publishing
nothing, we should publish something which I am sure we can trust the Secretariat
to produce with great discretion.
The Acting G^CRETARY-GENI^AL: I thank the representative of Nigeria.
Just to allay such speculation and, perhaps, distorted accounts of this meeting,
I have already arranged with OFI to release a short statement. . •
I should like also to request the members of this Committee — although, of
course, I know that such a request is not really necessary — to keep the target
date of 15 November strictly confidential, because Mr. Gardiner is going to convey
it to Mr. Tshombe on Thursday only, at the earliest, and to the Prime Minister too.
Go, before this information gets to them, and particularly to Mr. Tshombe, I do
not want to give the impression that we are leaking it deliberately at this end.
My request to the members of the Committee, therefore, is to keep the proceedings
of this meeting strictly confidential, as before, I thank them for their kind
co-operation.
The meet ins rose at .35 P»*n.
* *•"•'
CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 7213 DecemberENGLISH
In the Chair
Member's:
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITrj..DuON TIIE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, Nev York,on Thursday, 1J December 1962, at 4 p»ra.
TJ THANT
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of Malaya
Ghana
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Liberia
Mali
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Senegal
Sudan
Sweden
Tunisia
United Arab Republic
Congo (Leopoldvllle)
The SECRET/ Y-GEl'E
Mr, TREMBLAY
Mr. ^yLAlASEKT^A
Mr., GiJDRE-EGZY
i-Ir. OIJG
Mr. QUAISON-GACIffiY
l-'t. DIALLO
Mr, CIIAJC^AVARTY
Mr. GOSROWARDOJO
Mr. B01AND
Mir, BARGES
Mr. COULIBALY
Mr. TABITI
Mr, ADEBO
JJT. HA1-1DMI
Mr. CISSE
Mr. ADEEL
Mrs. ROSGEL
Mr. Taieb'SLIM
Mrf RIAD
Mr. IDZUlffiUIR
62-29 67
AW/Jpm
AL: Since our last meeting on 6 November,
I have talked vith all members of tills Committee, individually or in
small groups, about the developments in the Congo, An extensive report
to the Security Council on the Plan has been circulated in document
S/5033/Ad&.12 nnd Add.1, and we have circulated to the Committee in recent
days certain letters pertaining to the developments in the Congo. Others
are being handed to the members here today. By theGO various means the
Committee has been kept informed and given just about all the information
we have.
There was a good deal of Frees coverage, including speculations —
before the 3_ocal papers closed down because of the strike, of which you
arc 0.11 aware — about the various new plans, such as the co-called
Spaa1.: Plan and the KcGhee Plan, and so on. There is in fact only one
plan, and that is the Plan of National Reconciliation which I have
sponsored and which the Conmittee received a long time ago. It was also
reproduced in full in my report to the Security Council.
Mr* Cpuak and Mr. McChee, as you know, have no new plans, but they
did advance some ideas about procedures and implementation. But these
did not prove feasible. Wo are therefore going ahead with the Plan
in loto and we are now in the stage of calling upon States to give effect
to the pressures envisaged in phases I through IV of the Plan. This can
be seen from the letters that have been distributed to the Committee.
Now as regards the letters, it will be noted that they take different
forms, according to the party addressed.
One letter which has.been distributed is the letter of warning which
Mr. Gardiner has already sent to Mr. Tshoitbe. As yet there has been no
response from, and no public comment on, this letter by Mr* Tshombe.
(The Secretary-General)
Another is a letter frcm me to the Government of Belgium, vhich was
delivered on Tuesday afternoon, that is, 11 December, at the sane time, the
letters frcm me to Portugal and the Union of South Africa were delivered.
My letter to the United Kingdom was delivered on Wednesday afternoon, 12 December —
that was only yesterday.
Lnte yesterday afternoon I received from Prime Minister Adoula a communication
informing me of the identical letters vhich he has sent to countries vhich are
importing Katangese copper and co"ba3.t in varying quantities. These have gone
to the Governments indicated in his letter, which, I understand, is already
hefore you.
Also "before you is the letter, -which I an addressing to the aarcc Governments
in response to Mr« Adcula's appeal. The letters, calling upon certain States
to take actions of one kind or another, spring directly frcm the Plan. There ore,
of course, other actions involving pressures vhich the Congolese Government itself
can take; and that Government will, I am sure, take them in due course.
On our part, as you know, there are non-military steps outrside the Plan
as veil as under it, such as I outlined to you in our October meeting vhich
OI'JUC can take and will proceed to take one "by one. In other vords, we are now
in a phase in which all the pressures available to us will "be exerted on the
"basis of careful selection and planning and with every effort made to avoid armed
conflict. If, however, Mr. Tchombe should elect to order his f;endarr.ierie to
attack us, we will defend ourselves fully and hit back to the full extent of our
capacity. The United Nations troops are alerted and are being prepared for any
such eventuality.
Members of the Ccmnittee will be interested to learn that Mr. Tshombe now
has access to what goes on in this rocnu In a letter of 7 December, which
Mr. Tshcuibe addressed to Mr9 Mathu, our representative in Elicabethvillc,
concerning the fighting at Kongolo, he quotes a passage from-the confidential
suirji:c\ry of the seventieth meeting of this Committee, on 12 October, circulated to
Members of the Security Council for their confidential information. Typically,
however, Mr. Tshombe missed the point of the passage*
AP/dr U-5(The Secretary-General)
The Katangeoe £ l2£!ii££; at KongoXo, who had "been surrounded "by the
AKC for a long time, have left the town. With the concurrence of Mr, Adoula,.
a detachment of OIJUC is being placed in the town and a Nigerian xird-fc Is now
enroute to Kbncolo for this purpose.
The aerial activities "by Katanccse planes in North Katanga seem to have
ceased. 3eCQUCe Of the 103S of the Ethiopian jev, fighters and the Indian
Canberra^ -- under the circvcnotances of -which you are yell awe.re -- the CMJC
fifth-cer piano i'orce is now very weak, consisting only at prenen4: of three
Swedish jet fighters — only three. However, four adiir.ionul Svcdinh jet fighters
-- tharJ^ to the very great- oense of co-operation and •jniorstan/.U.n of the
S'jr-'llih G j/'/erniarrrit -- are being added to the :r.'ovee0 The llthiopi an lighter crevs
will orj roon r^^iirmiic to take over J;he F-66 airci af t which the Units! Nations is .
obtaining- VTc r:av just "been infoi-ned -- of course, not officially yc,-t -- that the
rhilippi/:c; Government v.-.ll provide six jet fighters with crews. An£ there is good
re-.-'i-on to hep-"; ror i'avoura'bJ.e action on an urgent reguoat for additional jet
f j.;-r>ic,erG and oro -j. /node to Iran. The indications are that the response from Iran
Abovi; niddv/., just at lunch-time, I received a message fron Mr. Gardiner,
transmitting the text of a letter, dated 12 December, from Mr. Tshombe,
addressed to me, The text cf this letter has been distributed to you.
Ac /Jirct r.Ir'.>'C.'?> ac you will see, it would appear to be an encouraging development.
Y:j';3 '-.;:'. 11 n-.-9*.!.'. ' understand, however, that in view of our experience with
Mr-, TLhomb:;, we 'i<re not jumping to any hacty conclusions. V/e are studying it
very c-arefully. and have asked Mr. Gardiner to get Prime Minister Adoula' s
reac..::'cD to it. It could be that this development is not unrelated to the new
c>t~,v
.,'»„•- :1 5, I "bcl'.yve, will serve to bring you fully up to date. I, now, of
co-uv?--, v-' I ,.onie iiy cocments the members may wish to make.
TL/rh
Mr* MRNES (Liberia): Thank you very rcucb, Mr. Secretary-General;
for "bringing us up to date on the situation prevailing in the Congo, ife are
now about to enter, I think, the third year of the Congo crisis, and prospects
for the settlement of this question do not yet seem to "be encouraging. We seem
to be still Tar from our goal*
On C1, previous occasion I expressed agreement with your position that the
solution to the Congo problem -would be found in the removal of the economic
props from "behind Mr* Tshombe, but that it wac not vl!;hin the competence of
the members of thic advisory £roup to do that "because none of us, no far as I
knew, was exporting from Katanga any of its mineral products; that If Katanga
was to "be brought- to heel; it -would "be necessary to ge.t the cc-oporc.-cion of
countries cuch as the United States, Belgium and the United KinguC.'u in imposing
these economic: sanctions by stopping the exportation of copper and GObait from
Katanga,, I think our views on this situation are unchanged.
What we rrust do is to continue to seek the co-operation or ta-2 support
or the agreement of the United States, Belgium and the United Kingdom to
stop the purchase of these products from Katanga* For as long as the Union
Miniere is permitted to carry on its operations and to pay to Katanga the
proceeds of these operations, so long will this unsatisfactory and unsavoury
condition of Katanga continue, I have seen the letter you have addressed to
Belgium. I just glanced at it here in the document. I do not know what is
the reaction of the Belgian Government as to compliance with your proposals,
I do not know what is the position of the United States in this matter nor that
of the United Kingdom. I was wondering whether you are in possession of any
knowledge of the reaction of these countries to discontinuance of the purchace
of the products of Katanga -- something which in my view would go a long way
towards solving the crisis,
I must say very frankly that ray country has been doing its best to
contribute to the solution of the Congo problem, TJe have made available a
few of our forces and we have made our financial contribution within the limits
of our ability to do so. But this is imposing a great strain and burden upon us,
and I am afraid that if the Congo situation, continues we may not be in a position
to continue this contribution, I would therefore ask you, Mr» Secretary-General,
TL/rh 7-10
(Mr, Burros, Liberia)
whether you are in a position to let us Imov whether the United States, the
United Kingdom and Belgium are prepared to co-operate in the plan of national
reconciliation vhich Mr. Tshombe has, through his usual machinations, tried to
destroy.
T^^ ,nECRETARY-GF.TTER^Li Of course, my letter vas handed over to
Belgium on th? nth, that is the day before yesterday, and I am sure you will
egree with mo that it is too early for the Belgian Government to respond
officially to this request for economic pressure and for taking certain steps
in the implementation of the United Rations reconciliation Plan. Also, I do -
not tbi'il; it vculd be proper for me to reveal to thia Ccr.£nitt-;;<3 t';cs unofficial
an«l informal response vhich has "been indicated to me "by the rtrmdri^iTC . •
Representative of Belgium, I thirj.i it -would "be more advisable for me to
reveal this re ly only vhon. I receive it officially. However, I can say at
this £'!:?.ce •fcha* the Belgian Government has been co-operative with the United
Nations in the Implementation of this Plan, •
As regards the United "Kingdom, I handed over my letter only yesterday
and so far I have not received any reaction from London-, I have not
receive:! any response, or any indication of the nature of a.rerponse,
from Portugal and from the Republic of South Africa, to vhich I handed over
my letters on the llth, the scvie day I sent ray letter to Belgium.
Abcy.?:b tha prospective duration of the United Nations operations in the
Congo,' I T:J Confident that this view is chared by the members of this Committee,
fiat it 13 very difficult to anticipate when the United Nations can start
disengaging from the Congo militarily. The indications, however, are that, the- .
U-,iftcs\ ...TAUions will be at its peal: of strength, militarily, next month, as I
h-"r-j 0-j.i '.ined M-id indicated in my statement earlier, Co I should think that
f-.-i T.Jn:i.-."j. Nations will be in a position to implement the terms of the General
Ar;6errbl;y n,nd Security Council resolutions satisfactorily in the next three
r/i'.'T'/hE • That is my assumption. Of course, it all depends .on the unstinting
Co- \porTf-v,/.'r. of the Povers directly concerned vith the solution of this problem.
PK/en ll
Mr . QU/vISON*SACKKY (Ghana): I want to thank you very much, on
behalf of my delegation, for the progress report you have given. I see in
the letters vhich we have juct received two that are very impcrtaTt. . One IS
from Mr. Adoula, informing you of the embargo which the Central Government of
the Congo has decided to place on copper and cobalt exports from South Katanga,
ana hie appeal to certain countries named in the letter. This was on
il December. Then, on the following day, Mi,-., Tshem'oe made this offer*
Iii view of t./ie s "oeps taken by the central authority .ana the provincial
authority, do you thiril: there is going to be a clash? I nean, do you foresee
any conflict within the next few days? Because, of course, if the embargo
is to be enforced, certain countries riuct co-operate in thio, bub in view of the
decision which v.hc 'Joverr ne-.t ha a made, do you think that Tshombe's offer will be
considered at a.1.!1? Would it i...ean the withdrawal of the decision to carry on
with the e:t,b 3.1- 0?
Y-- NKc;M): Thank you very much for this question.
I do not think GO, because Prime Minister Adoula ls letter to me, dated 11 December,
was received here 3.ast night. It was strictly in line with the Plan.
Mr. Tshcmbe-'s letter, addressed to nie, was dated yesterday but I just received
it. Of course, Mr. Tshombe's letter, if read carefully, has certain "ifs" ond
"buts", if I nay nay so, and at the same tine, Prime Minister Adoula has not
seen it. Of course, I have asked Mr. Gardiner to bring this to the attention
of the Prime Minister.
First, I think it will be necessary for us to get the Government's reaction
to Mr. Tshombe's proposal, the new proposal, which at least on paper is a very
big step forward, in my opinion. However, I do riot see any link between
Mr. Tshcmbe's letter and the need for Prime Minister Adoula to withdraw
his request. I think the Plan must go ahead,
Mr. QLUIfiON-SACKEY (Ghana) : I asked this question because I intended
to follow up with this: It seems to me that it is very important that your Plan
be enforced, thoroughly and completely, yet from the report you have given us,
I do not understand the actual steps that you are taking to enforce the Plan.
Perhaps I was not attending closely enough. However. I want to be quite clear
PK/en 12
(Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)
in my own mind exactly what is going to be done to enforce this plan ana if
you enforce the Plan fully, how fast -we can achieve the objectives of the
United Nations?
The SECRCT; 0^ -GENERAL; On the implementation of the Plan, I have '
suggested certain steps, immediate -steps, concerning the frontiers of
Northern Rhodesia and Angola and, to some extent, tlie Republic of South Africa.
Thecc three countries are primarily concerned -with the embargo of copper
and cobalt from Katanga. Therefore, I have addressee, a request to
the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Republic of South Africa to J;ake the
immediate steps necessary as stipulated in the Plan. On the bac:' c cf
Prime Minister Adovla's request, I am going to make appeals to all the Governments'
concerned, perhaps tonight, or at the latest tomorrow, to comply -with the
wishes of the Central Government of the Congo not to buy the copper
and cobalt. It vill involve, perhaps, a few more countries,, for instance
Went Germany., possibly Switzerland, and a few others. This will be the
PC?.-:: end stage. The letters will be cent tomorrow at the latest. There-fore,
if the countries primarily involved are willing to co-operate with the
United Nations, I have a feeling that we will be able to solve this problem
in a very short time. If not, perhaps a Security Council involvement will be
necessary,
Mr. AT^BL (Sudan): To carry further the point that was raised by -•
the representative of Ghana, according to. the documents we have here,
Priuc !•?.'. v.d?te:r Adoula has addressed identical letters to certain Governments
aoVJng tl-.,;:TQ not to accept copper and cobalt into their countries. Of course,
Pr-/.7ie Mr.l/nier Adoula asked you to -take some supporting action. 'As you have
juct indicated, you are supporting him by having correspondence, also, with
these particular Governments. Is there any way, by means, of the Security
Cc'irai.'i.- physically to support this embargo? For example, by stopping the
f.U-v* out of Katanga of these minerals? I think that would be more effective
than merely addressing these appeals to the Governments concerned.
The SECRETARY-riENERAL: I think this Implies both measures: the
stopping of the flow of minerals out of Katanga province and at the same time
asking the Governments concerned, their traditional customers, not to buy
these minerals. They are, I am sure, in strict conformity with trie provisions
of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.
J__ SEL (Sudan): As I see it, the first step would "be more effective.
If you can stop the flow from the country you might be relieved of the necessityfor taking any other step.
I°r??l/i Cl£ ^AI': Ve have to see how this -— -T1' step is
implemented by the countries directly involved. As I have indicated, the first
step is concerned only vith two countries directly > llorvhorn Rhcu^nr.n, vhich
for that rjvrpccc ic the United Kingdom, and Angola, vhich for that pui-poge is
Portugal, c-nd;-,o some extent indirectly, the Republic of South Africa. We have to
see the response of thene three Govsr:.i.nents .
i>Tr * QUA I r ON - SAC K T^Y (Ghana) : It is very difficult for me to speak
at full length unless I ask questions. That is why I am anxious to do so.
If Prime Minister Adoula has made an embargo on exports, I assume he intends to
take action to enforce this embargo. Supposing he does? He has not indicated
it in this letter. ^Supposing he takes sudden steps to implement his embargo.
It means there will be a clash. Suppose tomorrov there is a clash? In that
case, are you going to support him as you have indicated in your letter? That is
the point.
DB/gw 16
The SECRETE Y-flTSNERAL; It is a rather hypothetical question,
nnd I will not go to the extent of assuming the inevitability of a cl&sh»
To ccme down to the practical measure, if the Prime Minister of the Con-o, in
conformity with the stops new taken, • asked the United Nations to give protection
to the Central Government officials dealing with immigration or custcms or
revenues proposed to be staticiii/1 somewhere near -the borders — for instance, in
KipUGhi -- for the effective irrQlsrcentaticn, cf these steps, if he asks the
United Nations for protection of these officials, I will respond to his request.
(Nigeria): Like my colleagues who spoke before me, I
want to express the appreciation for Nigeria to you and all those associated
with you for tho efforts you are making to solve this unfortunate problem.
It is a (,r<;s.-v pity that, as you have pointed out, what we are doing e.nd
feeling hars is not confidential end shortly after ve have finished here,
certain parties KCV bo aware of then whose -interest is to sabotage your efforts
and cur efforts. For that reason, I would like to refrain from pressing you
further ou the details that you have in, mind.
What ve have already had orally from you and what ve have gotten f ran
the documents that you have circulated . cncng us,, makes .me feel that at this
time ve do mean business. The last time we .were asoeiublcd here, I made
a brief s.'or-och in order to stress the importance of our showing, to all
concerned, Vi -t on these occo.sions we do mean business, I stressed -the
importance of our preparing our plans very well, of making quite sure that
all of the assistance that is necessary would be forthcoming, and having made
certain of that, of going ahead with the implementation of the plan regardless
of the cojr,Equ3Uces. I said, "regardless of the consequences ,
Mr. Seer r. La'ry -General, because I know you are a man of peace, as everybody
Imovs, and tha/G you will do nothing offensive and that you will be deploying
the forces at your disposal only in defense of actions which are essentially
peaceful-. As you have clearly indicated here, only if, in the course of such
action, those officers who are implementing this programme, who will be peace
officers, are attacked, under those circumetances will the fire be returned.
. • ' •,TOWWW:fl"1
DB/gw 2.7
(Mr, A.debo, Nigeria)
I do not see how, upon that "basis, there can be any objection to any
part of the plan that you propose. Nigeria has troops under your ccinsand. Like
every other country which has ever contributed troops or any other form of
assistance, we are very anxious that the situation in the Congo should be
brought to an end as soon as possible but ve are eiually anxious that this
end should "bo a successful one frcm the point or view of the United Nations
and its prestige aril also, more importantly, for the long-term interest of
the people of the Congo as a whole. We hive no doubt that the stage has
been reached when half measures wil.l not do and I am very mucla impressed by
the cc'Lipralienaivfi nature of the measures that you now propose.
At ru i;arli-ir meeting, there was come reference to a poc:;i"blo abandonment
of this plau in such an eventuality. I am glad there is no more t£.l£ of
such a thl;cg because this plan, when you first produced it, was approved by
everybody, w.3 approved by the Government of Adoula and, ve were made to
understand "b~j Tshcnbc himself that he approved this plan, so that if we now
proceed to implement it fully, I do not see hew anybody can object.
Unfortunately, certain Powers,vhose assistance is vital, are not
represented here but you have, I an sure, the support of all of us here, who
are your advisors in this matter, in the appeal that you have addressed to
those Powers, and we are very glad that in one or two cases, at least, the
response is believed likely to favourable.
Nigeria supports you in what you are trying to do and we are prepared to
support you all the way, within the mandate that you possess and we hope that
it will be possible to accomplish the United nations mission without bloodshed.
We have naturally not been able to read, with sufficient care, the
documents that were handed to us only a few minutes ago. The letter of
Prime Minister Adoula is quite easy to fellow but I must confess, perhaps due
to my lack of sophistication, that I have found it a little difficult to follow
the letter frcm Premier Tchombe. Certain parts of it are hardly ccmprehensible
to me. It may be that on a further reading of it 1 shall get to understand
precisely what everything there means, and I would hope, in the interests of
all of us and of the Congo, that Mr. Tshonbo is sincere in the very forthcoming
gesture that his letter here seems to reflect.
DB/gw 18-20
(rrt Adebo, Nigeria)
I apologize for having spoken at greater length than I had Intended
when I started speaking; but, to etna-up, I would like to assure you that in
carrying out this plan in the way that you have proposed, you h?-vo the support
of Nigeria. I will be reporting this vhole matter to my Government and I
have no reason to feel that there is any portion of what you have proposed
that they will take exception to. However, may I stress once more that when
we have put a hand to the plow, we must see bhafc for once ve carry out this
plan to the end. I wish you the "best of
MP/sJt 21
Mr. BIAioLO (Cjuinea) (interpretation from French); Just as the speakers
who preceded ns, I would like most sincerely to thank you for the very fine
Statement which you rrnde about the situation obtaining in the Con£o. I would like
to tell you, particularly, how satisfied, ivy delegation is to learn that you have
taken a firm decision to pursue the implementation of your plan. In that context,
Mr. Secretary-General, cominc back to vhat you, yourself, said about the letter
dated 12 December, addressed by Mr. Tshoiiibe to the Secretary-General, I would liketo irake two or 'cl'ree snail comments:
You, yourself, said that this letter contains Cc.rtain if's and but's; and even
a hasty reading of this letter authorizes ^ delegation to look deeply into
it.
For alrr.oot thrae years vs have had this matter in hat.:!, and we Yj,va seen
that, each tima an important initiative is about tc be t~J:cm, Mr. TsL-oribe
undertakes sons spectacular initiatives, giving the impression that h= was in
favour of lessening tendon* That is why niy delegation Is very happy to hear you
say that wo should not be exacfreratodly optimistic about any initiative from
Mr, Tshombe. If Mr, TsiioEfloe is convinced of your determination tc implement
your plan, then it is cults normal that Mr. Tchombe once again should take some
initiative which would somehow delay your action.
We have read through this document rather hastily, and there is a bit of
irony in the fact that this document, coming from Mr, Tshombe^mentions African
solidarity, that if any point in Africa van threatened; the whole continent
was threatened, and so forth, and all other manifestations of nationalism which
we were not accustomed to hearing from i-Ir- Tshocibe.
But I would especially like to emphasize two points. This is the last
paracraph of the paper: Fir. Tshombe speaks first of all -- and a.l>:ost on the
saire level -- about his Govermcn*,which he calls the Government of Katanga, and
the Government of -- he does not say "Government of Congo": he says "Government
of Lcopoldville; he puts them on the sane level. Secondly, he asks the
Government of Leopoldville to ratify the cease-fire agreement,
I recall that, during previous meetings, it had been indicated -- and, I believe
by the Foreif^n Minister -- that the Central Government of the Conge did not
recognize this cease-fire agreement. Thus, this is a very skilful manoeuvre.
Ke is iriaking us think that he is undertaking soiice friendly overtures, but he
imposes conditions which, obviously, are unacceptable to the Central Government,
MP/sJt 22
(Mr» Diallo, Guinea)
That Is -why he asks the Central Govermr£nt to ratify an agreoirent which the
Central Government has not wished to recognize. But there is even more here:
.He asks the Government of Leopoldville to promulgate a general acuosty law in
conformity with your plan.Here I will stop a moment to put a few questions, if you will allow me.
At the mordent; we are without newspapers and, therefore, do not have the latest
news; tut I thought that President Kasavabu had promulgated an amnesty law and
that certain arrested members of Parliament had le.t't prison. I would like to
ask whether, in the fivst place, it is tr-raci that an amnesty law ha a been either
voted, passed, or promulgated; and whether, on the taois of that amiss ty law,
0.11 the polTtical leaders have "been re Leaded. We have heard many .-co-Tours, in
this regard, in th-?. corridors of tn<-: Unite0. rTduicnn.
I ve^ld j.ik-" to ask a second ruastxon relating to the first: I would like
to ask tli.'r o~eretartat Fh^bh?r it is in a position to tell us whether
Mr, Glcon. a eventually licnefitted from this amnesty lav and whether he is at
liberty or wh^Lher ho is still under detention. Thirdly, we have heard that the
central Parliament of Conco requested the suspension of the execution of your
plan, until such time as they have debated the matter, end that the debate is
just about to be undertaken in the Congolese Parliament --if not already
undertaken.
Since the whole policy of the United Nations is based upon your plan; and
if the Congolese ParliariBnt asks that it be implemented, then my delegation would
like to kr.ov vaat is the exact situation at present. If it is true that the
Parliament is i^iicd of a motion calling for the suspension of the plan until
such time as the Parliament has taken a decision on the matter, what will be
the repercussions of such a position upon the United Nations policy, since this
policy is based entirely upon your plan?
These are the few questions 1 wished to put to you, I believe the replies
will be ox' interest to the whole Committee and will allow us to see the situation
with more clarity.
MP/sJt 23-25
The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Thank you very much for this very useful
intervention.
In connexion with the amnesty lav, as some Members of the Corralttee sre no
doubt avare; President Kasavubu has icsued an amnesty proclamation* This
proclamation calls for an amrecty covering all political offences. That is the
eccence of the proclamation. It appears in our docuirer.t B/5053/Add..l3/Add.l,
dated 28 November 1962, with the caption: Proclamation "by the President of the
Republic of the Ccn~o, dated 26 November 1962.
According to our information, Mr. Gir.erea is still under detention.
Although I c.ra avare of the rumourB' afloat in the corridors and elsev^are, we
have not been able to establish the assvmption, fact or rumour tJi^t Mr, GiBenga
has teen ralaaicti. Our latest infomation ic that he ia still uiJ.d.Dr detention,,
because h? £ parliamentary iirimiinity has been lifted by Farliamfjiit. •
Reg£i--:-.ir.g the next question; on the prospective cistate in Barlicmjnt in
Leopoluvllle, on the United Nations Plan of reconciliation, the so-called "U Thant
rian"^ it vas brought up by a member'of•Parliament approximately a fortnight ago.
But I understand that, due to the•pressures of-other members of Parliament, this
debate vac held in abeyance-, because there was a general feeling in Parliament
that the- generation of such a debate in Lebpoldville at this stage would not be
helpful to the central Government, and would damage the objectives of the
United Kations in the-Congo. That debate, therefore, has beer postponed sine die.
RSH/gws 26
(The Secretary-General)
Therefore, I do not see any early prospect of a resumption of the debate on
tliis Plan in parliament. AS I have told the members of the Committee, I sra going
ahead with the implementation of my Plan from phase I to phase IV vith vigour
and determination.
v_I_rO£7K3UIR (Congo, Lecpoldville) (interpretation from French):
Sefore this UK?. o vine is adjourned, I should like to maKe a statement on "behalf of
ny Government about this meeting. The text of this will be distributed later,
but first of all I should, like to read it out.
The It -'c time you convened a meeting of the Advisory ComirdtteQ on the Congo,
Kr. Secretary -General, you cave us a very complete picture of tna process achieved
in the implementation of your Plan. Today, you have given us an account of the
progress ?r.ade Binco that time.
The position of my Government hoc been set forth in the letter which
Prime Minister /-doula addressed to you on 12 November 1962. Thic letter gave
details of all the actions which hove been taken in the unstinting support which
ray Government has given vith regard to the implementation of your Plan. I would
only like to add a single, recent foct vhich is significant, that is, the
declaration made to our nation on c6 November 1962 by the President of the Republic,
Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu, vho renewed the proclamation of the solemn amnesty vhich he
nade to Parliament at Lovanium in July and August of 1962, vhich affected all the
sucessionicto, whatever their political offences, vho were ready to rejoin the
great Congolese family. The president, in the came spirit of fraternity vhich
he displayed at Lovanium, stated, in particular:
"I proclaim a complete and general amnenty vill be granted to all those
who return to our country, to this great Congo of ours, vhatever the
political offences thoy may have committed. We hope that they will all
return without exception, and we await them with open arms, with peace in our
hearts, so that all the nation's sons may work together, hand in Viand, to
build the country, as the people wish, as the members of our great family
wich, in concord and prosperity."
This is one more proof of the good will of the Central Government.
I chould like, however, to go into further detail on the various points in the
application of the Plan, because, in the view of my Government, what is important
RSH/gwa 27 '
( Mr._ Td7,unu:iulr, Congo tLeopoldvl-lle )
today is to note without any equivocation the violation of the commitments entered
into by tiie Provincial Government of Couth Katanga. Uhat is important Is not to
discuss why such and ouch a provision or the Plan has not "been I'Uplei-ieuted by those
in power in South Katanga, but to take the necessary measures which were provided
in the Plan to ensure its full implexcntation. I said last time that the various
points of tha Plan were to be implemented at a certain time or immediately.
Today, I have to note that not onJy has the Plan been violated and its
implementation hindered at Elisabethville by Mr. Tehombc, but that the Plan does
not any more even receive the indispensable support of those who conceived it.
Since there was a plan,, there was prepared, as a last resort, an vl-:;ircate programme
of measures which this Organization night take in order to ensure respect for the
national Lioverc.o. gnty and the territorial integrity of the Congo.
If today the implementation of this Plan has been delayed,, so as to compromise
the validity of the Pisa, it is only the foreign financial companies which conceived
and support this socer.sion which profit by this delay. This can only give
encouracv-irerrb to Mr. Tshombs. As strii'dng proof of this is the fact that he sent
a so-called "extraordinary plenipotentiary minister" in the person of
Senator Yova, in order to set forth the complaints of Katanga,
Quite recently, in expelling from the Congo, the Italian Consul at Elisabethville,
a measure which is obviously only within the competence of the Central Government,
the South Katangese authorities have given one more proof of their ill will and of
the grave danger constituted by this attitude., .
On the basis of these facts, we can only conclude that there is a complete
absence of any intention to put an end to the secession. The negative attitude of
Mr. Tohombu justifies the position of those who no longer believe in these simple
promises and declarations and who have advocated concrete and energetic measures.
A demonstration of force is indispensable, for so long as Mr. Tshombe maintains
his military superiority over the United Nations forces in South Katanga, he can
afford to mock at the Organization and at the Central Government. He will only
bow to force or to a demonstration of force. At the moment,- he is-convinced that
the United Nations has other preoccupations and that it no longer has any means of
exercising effective pressure upon him, and that.they will be easily forced on the
defensive if they try to station a force to support an economic blockade.
RSH/gws 28
(Mr. Idznrcbuir, Congo, Leopoldville)
Mr. Tshombe openly threatens the United Nations by proclaiming that the
application of sanctions would mean a new war in South Katanga, This war, vhich
is so strongly supported and prepared by all the reactionary causes in Europe and
America, was announced in those same quarters even "before the publication of the
Plan. Since the Plan has "been allegedly accepted, this has been repeated in on
ever more menacing tone vhich has created an atmosphere of intimidation.
As an example, I can quote an article by Mr. raul Struye, President of the
Belgian Senate, in an editorial of the famous L'"."bre_I3_fO !Q' > on •*•? November 19&2,
entitled "Cn the eve of a new offensive against Katanga". Moreover, tho
ElisabethviLle daily :_,; essor^du Xzrte.nfri published, although I do net want to say
that this w.i3 albo written by Mr. ttruye, a series of articles of a similar nature.
\7hat has H.VC;?, rise no.ct of all to iry indignation is that after Belgium had
officially anu. pu.blicly accepted the Flan, official persons of that country are
publish!1: ciu a high le-/ ]. attacks and criticisms of this Plan.
Eowever, ^-j Government is pleased to acknowledge the realistic and courageous
attitude r.dcpted by tho foreign Mini'-tGr of Belgium, Mr. Spc-.ak, but it wonders if
Mi-. £paak v;.3Lll receive the effective cupport of the whole of the Belgian nation.
To g::.ve aome indication of certain reactions in Belgian quarters, I will
quote a letter of protest, which will be found as an annex to this statement, from
L'Anioalo Oaa Arvr.:! OTIS do la Force Publique du Congo Eelpe, which was addressed to
Mr. Spaak. I would like to read this out.
"L;Amlcale dec Ancicns de la Force Publique du Congo Beige, -at a general
assembly on Saturday, 8 December 19 2 at Bnnnels, gave me the honour of
expressing to you the concern it felt when it saw the Belgian Foreign Minister
associating himself with the United Nations and certain other States in an
atteir.pt to deprive Katanga of the right of self-determination.tli.rhe Association believes that the well-understood interest of the
Belgians requires that its Government should also defend Belgian investment's
in Katanga.
"it also believes that the interests of the Congolese demands that
Katanga should not be engulfed in the chaos of the rest of the Congo, but
rather that the only region of the former Belgian Congo where order reigns
should give an example to the other regions and serve as a crystallization for
a regenerated Congo."
RSH/gwa
i'h VfifJlllljj
( M r . I d z \ircbuir. Congo, Leopoldvllle)
Perhaps I should say, degenerated. The letter continues:
The Association, which comprises members vho have fought to save
Katanga and also members whose husbands and fathers have been Icillod for
Katanga, does not understand how a Belgian Minister can at-the present time
assist J.n the destruction of the Katangese State."
BC/Ji Jl
(Mr. I<'zr,
Belgium, moreover, has just replied to the letter of Prime Minister
Adoula concerning the collection of customs duties and the assistance that
P-elgiuin might "be able to furninh-to the Congo in that field. Belgium's reply
came after that of the Union Mj.niero du ITaut-Katanrrn.. That cany-any refuses
to pay customs revenue to the Central Government: it maintains that c!e facto
authorities are at El.'.gatethvillG. It is easy to disdain responsibility
after having created, inctalled and supported these so-called de_ facto authorities.
Kor has the Tkilcian Government go.ie much further in its prcoilced "co-operation"
and in its "spirit" cf good friendship for the Congo. Its reply is full of
contradictions. It agrees that the Customs Office in Belgium siio-u.lu. collect,
In favour of the Congo, taxes on goods destined for anywhere in the Ccn^o.
It promises its support in the implementation of any mec.~-::ren t!v3e-.ld :'. upon by
cotnnon. e.r;-r.-eer,.'.ent:T between the Central Covcrrjj.eut and the men in powor in
South Katanga. And It yuts all this forward while stating that it would
equally apply "legal" decisions. I wonder, then, if the Belgium Government is not
applying o .r laws anil regulations, those which we inherited from Belgium and
those whfeh we have adopted since independence, "because it regards them as
iliesal.
How can anything be clear from the Belgian attitude? In any case, the
"favour" as regards the collections of the Customs Office must not "be overestimated.
That is not the essence of the problem.
This duplicity of policy is also evident in London* At the tine vhen the
Secretary-General consulted London on this subject, the Plan was accepted
as a whole, including the sanctions to be taken in case there was a refusal
to implement. Today, those two Governments do not wish to hear anything about
economic sanctions. Everyone is aware of the importance of the financial
interests at stake. British and Belgian circles ceem to place their financial
interests above those of the African peoples in general and the people of the
Congo in particular.
We are confronted by a new kind of colonialism. The question which arises
for us at this time is the following: Is the international Organization also
to bow before this colonialism, yes or no? Will the Congolese finally be able
to make their own laws, or are their affairs to continue to be managed from
(Mr.Congo" 7 fr:c~p Tiville ) )
London, Brussels or Ihrie? At this time, when the Organization must put into
effect its guiding principles, are injustice and force to take precedence over
right? If after twenty-eight monthG of the United Nations presence in the Congo,,
the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement the United Nations resolutions
con "be sabotaged to this extent "by those very countries which approved the
resolutions, wa might draw the conclusion that colonialism and capitalism are
still the Casters of this world and recognize that "by approving on the one hand
the United Nations intervention in the Congo and by sabotaging on the ether the
efforts of the Secretary-General, certain Powers only wanted to play a comedy at
the expense of fourteen million Congolese, Unfortunately for the Congolese, this
comedy is really a tragedy.
I hope you will forgive me, Mr. Secretary-General, for having us^d those
words. It is not my intention at all to wound you or anyone else in i,his room.
But if I hc.ve used harsh words it is because the problem of Katanga c-m cast
doubt on the usefulness and the very foundation of the United Nations. The United
rations has proclaimed certain principles and has inscribed them in the Charter,
The United Nations has fought, and with success, to defend those principles. It
has made a large contribution to the liberation of the colonized peoples and
countries. Now, at this moment, it is powerless to deal with a handful of
irresponsible men who want to continue to exploit the African. We are watching,
helplessly, the operations of mercenaries of all nationalities and the actions
of international murderers. The people of North Katanga are bombed in broad
daylight, under the very eyes of the United Nations.
Were we, then, wrong to request the assistance of the United Nations?
And are the people who place their confidence in the United Nations wrong, too?
Is the Organization which we know as the protector of the weak and small nations
to become an instrument in the hands of a few powerful nations? Those are the
questions which we ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, since no one can question the
fact that the international Organization assumed the responsibility of intervening
by replying favourably to the appeal of the Congo twenty-eight months ago.
BG/Ji 33
(l lr . Id ?. vimbu i r
For its part, the Congolese Government has Its responsibilities to thepeople of the Congo.
The various resolutions adopted so far "by the Security Council and the
Assembly are sufficiently clear and precise. In my Government's opinion,
the mandate which you have received, Mr. Secretary-General, is complete and
satisfactory. It is up to you to ensure implementation and, to that end, to
use all the means in your paver, It is up to you to put an end to the
equivocal attitude taken by certain Member States, an attitude which is
compromising the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Council.
The Congolese. Government ban sent to seventeen countries a letter in
which it rskn them to place an embargo on copper and cobalt coring .t'rcn
Let the United Nations carry o-.ifc its task in the Congo. The Central
Government remains determined to carry out its tack. Success in Katanga will
demonstrate to all the peoples of the world the usefulness of our Organization.
The SKCROTA3Y-GITORAL; In Implementing the Plan, I shall certainly
keep in mind the very useful observations just made by the representative of
the Congo (Leopolciville) .
Are there any further observations?
Mr . QU.AT.10N -flACKEY (Ghana ) : 'If this is to be our last meeting before
Christmas, Mr. Secretary-General, I want to wish you in advance a Merry
Christmas and to say that we shall tf at ch developments in the operation of your
plan; you have our support and we hope that you succeed.
' Thfr SECPETARY-GflNERAL; Thank you very much for your good wishes. Of
course, they are reciprocal.
As things stand at the moment, it does seem that this will be the last
meeting of the Coraraittee before Christmas. I very Lvach hope that at our next
meeting I chall be in a position to report substantial progress in the
implementation of the Plan.
The meeting rose at 3*20 p.m.
u
CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No, 7320 March 1963EUGLIGH
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEEOK THE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York,on Wednesday, 20 March 1963, at 3.30 p.m.
In the Chair:
Members:
U THAMT
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of Malaya
Ghana
Guinea
India-
IndDnesia . ..-. •
Ireland
•Liberia /
Mali . . :
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Senegal
Gudan
Sweden
Tunisia
United Arab Republic
The
Mr.
1'ir.
Mr,
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
llr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr,
Mr.
1'jT,
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
I'xs
lor.
Mr.
SECRETARY-GENERAL
TREMDIAY
UIJEGCOWEUARDE1IA
GEERE-EGZY
IIAMID
QUAISON-SACKEY
DJALLO
BIIADIOVMICAR
FAIAR
B01ATID
JOin-IuON
COULICALY
BENIIIMA
ADEBO
ADEEL
ROS3EL
Taieb SLIM
RIAD
63-05819
TL/tt 2
The SKGPETagYrGli]NFRAL; I have called this meeting to inform you and
to consult with you about the arrangements that have been proposed to me by
Prisie Minister Adoula with regard to the modernization and training of the
Congolese armed forces, the nKC.
AS you know, the MC, frcm the very beginning of the United Nations
involvement in the Congo, has posed certain serious problems for both the
Congolese Government and the United Nations. Indeed, the condition of the AKG
has been a vital factor in the course of Congo events since the first week of the
country's independence. In the early stage of the United Nations Operation
in the Congo, efforts were made to assist the Congolese Government, on its initiative,
in the training and reorganization of the AITC,so that it could take its place as
an effective and reliable arm of the Government in the maintenance of law and
order and so that it could be organized in such a way as not to be a crippling
burden upon the finances of the Congo. General Kettani of Morocco, who was the
first Deputy Force Coirmander of the United Nations Force in the Congo, was
entrusted with the initial United Nations step in this direction, and he was
followed in this function by General lyassu of Ethiopia. For various reasons
thece early attempts of the United Nations were never very effective.
The general political situation in the Congo until August 1961, when the
present Government come into power, was reflected in the condition of the AKC,
which was to all intents and purposes split into three rival factions. Even
after August 196! the continued secessionist stand of Katanga and the difficulties
in Oriental Province made it extremely difficult to institute an orderly and
effective programme of ANC training and reorganization.
F '•" .
BC/jw
When Prime Minister Adoula visited United Nations Headquarters in
February 10G2 — Juct over a year ago — the reorganization and retraining
of the ANC was one of the most important of the subjects which he and I
discussed. At that time; Mr. Adoula outlined for ir,y benefit the delicate
and difficult nature of the question, from the point of view of supplying
proper cadres of officers,, of reducing the size of the force and of altering
ito state of mind, especially in relation to the civilian population. He
wished the United Nations to give what assistance it could to his Government
in facing these problems. I acted accordingly, and several countries responded
favourably to my request to them to supply French-speaking officers for the
training of the ANC, and particularly in relation to the establishment of an
officers' training school. We found it very difficult to recruit French-cpeaking
officers for this purpose, but succeeded in some degree, although they v/ere
never called upon. In view of the latest developments, it may be noted that
at that time -- over a year ago -- Mr. Adcula strongly emphasized the
desirability that most of these officers should be recruited from African
countries, although some of his colleagues in the Government were understood .
to hold contrary views. " • ' -'"
In addition to these exchanges, other studies outside the framework of the
United Nations have been made of the requirements of the ANC. In particular,
it may be mentioned that some time ago I was informed that the United States
Government had cent a mission to the Congo under Colonel Green to study the
best methoda of helping the Congolese Government in this sphere. The plan
for assistance from various countries outlined in the third letter before you,
that from Mr. Adoula datei 26 February 19 5, is, I surmise, at least to some
extent, based on the findings of Colonel Green1s mission.
Ac you will note from tha copies of the correspondence before you, I have
been in correspondence with the Pritna Minister since 20 December 1962 on the
practical meacuzes to be taken to train and modernize the ANC. This assumes
added significance now that th^ro is a hopeful prospect of the integration
of all soldiers in the Congo into the national army.
BC/jw U
(The Secretary "
I would not have called this meeting if what was involved van simply a
q^r-fition of bilateral assistance by various eovernjjontn to the Government
of the Conro. ir it were juat a question of "bilateral assistance between
the Governments concerned and the Central Government of the Congo, there would
not, I think., be any need for this meeting. However, there is more to it than
that, for there or. 2 obvious implications with regard to selection where the
United Rations is involved. You will note from the FriKe Minister's letters
that he is anxious for this scheme to go forward with the collaboration and
co-ordination of the United Nations. That is, the United Nations is asked to
provide something in the nature of an "umbralla" for the programme. You will
note also that I have asked, and the Prime Minister has agreed, that the
composition of that "umbrella" -- that is, of the co-ordinating group --
should be broadened. The details of the functioning, of this co-ordinating group
remain to be discussed and worked out with Prime Minister Adoula.
In view of these facts, I wica to have the advice of the Committee before
proceeding with the practical implementation of the programme.
As it now stands, then, as you will note from the correspondence, the
Prime I'linister has proposed that the necessary assistance be sought from the
countries he has specified. He has had assurances, I gather, that these
countries will provide the assistance requested. The Government of the Congo
alcrio, therefore, has made the selection cf the countries from which assistance
is caught, This is the prerogative of the government of a sovereign, independent
State. The financial responsibility for the costs of that assistance, you will
also note, rests entirely with each assisting country. For my part, 1 have
asked that the composition of the group to undertake on behalf of the
United Nations the- co-ordination of the programme of assistance should be
broaler Than the group of nations actually giving the assistance. The
Prime Minister accepts this broadening.
In order to get the programme under way — and there is obvious urgency in
providing this assistance to the ANC — it would next be necessary for me to
send letters to the countries from which the Prime Minister seeks assistance,
BC/jw 5
indicating the nature of the Prime Minister's request; the ccir.position and
function of tlie co-ordinating Group, the financial responsibility end otter
necessary details. It will be appreciated that there ic a close relationship
between the training of the ANC and the phasing out of the United Nations Force
in the Con^o.
I would nov seek the advice of members of the Committee on this matter.
DR/rh 6
Mr. GEBnE-FG?.Y (Ethiopia): I just want to know exactly what is
involved. I have read this, but it is not quite clear in ray mind what is
involved* I think that if we are to give advice and if ye are to get in
contact with our governments, I think that some time is needed. I have read
thio now and I read it before in some other connexion but, quite frankly, I
cculd not attempt to convey the views and opinions of my Government before
some time lapses, in order to Gee what is involved on our part,
I see from your statement, Mr, Secretary-General, that you wish to
convey to those countries that have been mentioned in those communications
what the role cf the co-ordinating group will "be, what their functions will
be and what their financial responsibilities will be. Therefore, it seems to
me that before we come out with opinions and advice, we will have to know in
more detail what is involved. If I may say so, we will have to examine the
reraests more thoroughly.
In conclusion, for my part I an in no position today to express views on
this,
The HE CRRT ARY - G'flNERAL : I was also under this impression before
calling this meeting because it involves a very important principle regarding
the United Nations involvement in this particular operation, and I felt
rather strongly that perhaps one meeting would not suffice because you just
received the copies of the correspondence exchanged between me and Prime
Minister Adoula, and you also just heard my statement. Of course, in most
cases I believe that a reference to your Governments yill be necessary.
Perhaps we might be benifited by your initial reactions, and my anticipation, of
course, was that another meeting would be necessary to give you time to refer
this to your Governments.
Mr. ^IIAinON-SACKEY (Ghana): From our point of view this is a very
good meeting. The idea is good because, apart from the responsibility of the
Congolese Government itself, 1 should have thought that there is an over-riding
responsibility which has always rested with the United Nations in regard to the
possibility of the Congolese themselves having an efficient army which can
maintain law and order. So from the aspect alone of the maintenance of law and
DR/rh 7
(Mr j iipon_ Sacfcey, Gtona)
order and the continuing commitment cf the United Nations operation in the Congo,
this problem which you arc now bringing before the Coir.:i]ittee is a very vital one
because on it depends the future of the operation, whether there should be a
complete break from the country; that is to cay, whether there should be a
withdrawal of ti.e United Nations troops from the Con-o or whether there is going
to be a scaling down of the present operation. I thoucht that all these factors
hinge on the problem as to whether the Congoleoe authorities could, with the
backing of Iheir own army, maintain lav and order. That is why I feel that this
is a very important problem.
For a long time, as you yourself, Mr. Secretary-General said, when you made
your introduction, it has been insisted upon that the traininG of the ConGole3e
soldiers and their disciplining and regrouping should take place quickly. I think
that most delegations which have taken part in the Congo debates have all
stressed this, for about two years now. The first point of course is that, "by all
means, there should be a national army; there should be no room for divisive
forces and no region in the Congo should be able to have any group of soldiers behind
that authority and that any array you have should be a national army. So this is a
responsibility which you, Mr. Secretary-General, will have to face, and 1 am very
happy that the Prime Minister is aware of this problem.
The second problem, of course, is the size and standard of training of the
array. But that of course must rest with the Congolese authorities. I want to dwell
largely on the question of the maintenance of the Congolese army because this ic a
problem which my country has been considering. As you know, we still have troops
in the Congo, and my Government has authorized me to say that GO long as you have
need of cur troops they will continue to be there. They have authorized me to say
that on no account should there be a withdrawal if such a withdrawal will mean a
resurgence of conflicts in the country. I am also authorized to say that in cpite
of what we are telling you, we feel that a scaling down rar.y be necessary. But we
want to be assured that if there is a scaling down, then the authorities would have
a sufficient army which can control the country throughout its entirety.
lie feel that the problems wnich are raised in the letters here are of great
portent, and I agree with ray colleague from Ethiopia that of course it will require
time for us to go into them in detail. But I want to say at once that I welcome
DR/rh 8-10
(Mr. '.••nruson-Sackoy, Ghana)
the idea. My Government welcomeG the idea of international technical assistance
as sought by the Congolese Governmentjand in fact ray Government would like to be
associated with this. It GO happens that we have troops in the Congo just as does
Ethiopia, Tunisia and Nigeria, and we feel that there would be no harm if Ghana is
associated with this. I am authorised to say this. I am authorized to cay that
we, like other African otates "which are prepared to help, have facilities -which
are open for use by the Congolese authorities. Of course, ve are doing so
bilaterally also, but we felt that we should bring this to your attention. We
are very anxious that the tack upon which we have enbarked should be successful
because it would be disappointing if after gaining this success in Katanga, there
should be a comeback* There should be no going lack. We feel that you,
Mr. Cjcretary-Gcneral, should continue with your efforts and therefore we support
you on the organization of small international technical assistance.
In a preliminary way I would agree with you that it is of course left to
the Congolese Government if they wr,i'it to seek help from Canada, Israel, Belgium,
Italy and Norway. It is their prerogative to seek whatever help they want from
whatever country. But because of the fact that they want the United. Nations to
be associated with this idea, we think that certain issues are raised which make
it difficult for us to pronounce on this, without prejudice to the sovereign right
of the Congolese Government. They can go ahead and do this. But if they are
going to associate the United Nations with this kind of bilateral assistance, then
of course a caveat must be entered for obvious reasons. To give one example, we
find it very difficult to see why Belgium, for example, should be' brought in at
this time. You know that,after all, this whole problem was created by Belgium;
there is no question at all about it. I am happy to see that the relations between
the Congo and Belgium have been normalized. But even so, it is difficult for an
international body like this, which has had to commit itself in a gigantic way for .
yoars -- nearly two and a half years --in the Congo because of Belgian intervention,
that Belgium should be brought in like this and their support asked for in getting
them involved in a programme like this,
I mentioned Belgium as an exanple, but I am sure other delegations may raise
other countries also. i3o the mttor of bilateral assistance poses a problem.
I am very sure that when we ha,ve had time to think it over against the background
of the sovereign rights of the Congolese themselves, we shall be able to hammer
out something that will be acceptable to all concerned.
HA/rs
Ici: After the intervention of the representative
of Ethiopia, I really have very little to add. I think the problem "before us
is extremely important. It is' connected with many aspects quite difficult of
solution by us now without instructions frcrn our Governments.
I vich only to add this : The Secretary-General has kindly sug^es ted that
the co-ordinating group should be "broadened and that sore Africans chould be
added to it, • Ee mentioned, among others, the name of Tunisia. .While I an
extremely grateful to the Secretary-General for his suggestion, I wish to make
a reservation until I can consult F.y Government and tell the Secretary-General
what possibilities Tunisia can bring to this co-ordinating group*
1 also wish to say that another meeting will perhaps to necessary in order
to allow us to express the views of our Government on all the issues involved
in this project. Naturally, we all support. thic kind of assistance in order
to bring about a unification of the Congolese Army.
(United Arab Republic): I agree with all ray
colleagues who have asked for another meeting in order to give us time to consider
this important subject, but I should like to raise a question for clarification.
The representative of Ghana has given us an exarcple in regard to Belgian
assistance to the Congolese Government. There is no doubt that the .-Congolese
Government has a complete right to sign any bilateral agreement with o.ny
country. But the Secretary-General mentioned that such agreements are supposed
to be under the umbrella of the United Nations. I therefore really wish to
knew what will be the responsibility of the United Nations here. It locks to.
me at first glance as though responsibility will be shared between the Congolese •
Gove.L-rjrent and the United Nations. But here the United Nations hao no choice.
at all in the question of the selection of countries, and. I am wondering what
will happen in the future if mistakes are ccmnltted by the Belgians, for example.
As has been mentioned, there are ro mar.y resolutions that have been adopted, . -
calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops immediately I'rom. Katanga, and so on;
there are so many resolutions asking the withdrawal of the experts and the
military forces and even the irregular forces. Of course; we hope that nothing
HA/rs 12
(llr. Knhmoud Rlad,
will happen in the future, and we hope that relations "between the Congo and
Belgium will be improved. But suppose that seme mistake happens in the future?
Who will "be responsible? Is it only the Congolese Government that will "be
responsible? It is, of course, up to them, when they sign an agreement with
any ether country, tn t£.ke the responsibility. But what is our responsibility,
as the United l.ations, in this case, when we have no choice at all end £re
simply faced with a list of certain countries? I really wish that the Secretary-
General would give us some, clarification about the responsibility of the United
Nations in such a question.
The SECRETARY-GENERAL : Before I give the floor to the Ambassador of
Congo (Lecpcldville), I want to make a very "brief observation* Ihc problem, to
put it in a nutshell, is this; Th::-;a are o-aly tvo possible courses of action.
The first course is for the Central Government of the Congo to enter into purely
bilateral negotiations with the prospective countries — countries which are
likely to provide instructors in certain specific fields of ANC training —
without United Nations involvement. The second course is for the Central
Government of the Congo to make soundings, if necessary, with the prospective
countries, with a view to securing the necessary technical training, and then
to ask for seme port of United Nations umbrella by way of co-ordination,
The Central Government of the Congo has resorted to the second course*
The Central Government of the Congo wants certain countries to provide training
in particular fields for the AIIC, and then the next step is that the Central
Government of the Congo wants the Urited nations to "be involved "by providing
an uiubrclls. — SCCG sort of co-ordinating function. Thereby cur task is
rendered a little more delicate. That is why I have tried to secure advice
because of the delicate implications, as I said in my introductory statement,
since the United Nations is to ba involved..
If you study Prime Minister Adoulars original letter of 20 December
you will find the terms of reference for these instructors,
HA/rs 13-15
(The necretary-Geno?ral)
As I have indicated earlier, I realize that it will "be very difficult for
raost of the members of this Caimittee to offer any definitive advice, I would
therefore propose, if you agroe, that, after we have exhausted the list of
speakers for this afternoon, we should arrange to have another mooting* when
the members of the Committee will be fully "briefed,
Mr« irZUMBUIR (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French):
I have asked for the floor not to give any sensational Information "but rather
to express a point of view here which may make it eacier to understand the
decision of my Government,
Ilia representatives of Ghana and the United Arab Republic have expressed
the point of view — and I think that this is the generally understood view-
that the Congolese Government has tbc» sovereign right to enter into bilateral
agreements providing for assistance in such a question as the re-organization
of the army.
AP/el -16-
(Mr. Idnunhuir, Ccn^o (Lecpoldville))
It 13 obvious that the example given us of aoma difficulties that
follow and that may be due to any specific relationship that may exist "between
Belgium and the Congo might be considered as mailing tlie matter complicated. But
if tnu United Nations were to be willing to set up the umbrella, it might obviate
difficulties not only with Belgium but with other African countries as well. But
may i say that we ou^ht to be more realistic and see this problem as a function
of a certain evolution, as a part of the Goodwill end the efforts that we have all
made in the solution of the Congolese crisis. On this level I think that there
is a certain optimism. Obviously, mistakes may be possible, but if we are always
to be afraid of the possibility of errors, it will be very difficult to get ahead
on anything. I think furthermore that rather than examining the problem now, a
better solution would be for the delegations to become acquainted with the
documents which they have not had the time to study, p.nd as the Secretary -General
caid, these representatives can contact their respective Governments; this will
allow them at eonie subsequent meeting to have more specific and more interesting
views on the subject matter itself.
l?EiJ5™ML (Guinea) (Interpretation from French): First of all,
I should like to associate my delegation with the request made by my colleagues
who have spoken before me about the advisability of having a meeting later, and
the time between today and our forthcoming meeting be used to enable
representatives to have more detailed knowledge of the documents that have been
circulated to us and to consult our Governments.
But I think that forthwith I may suggest that certain questions could be
raised for the consideration not only of the members of the Committee bub also
for tiiG Secretariat, As far as my delegation is concerned, I cannot conceal
from you, Mr. Secretary-General, our embarrassing position. Cur difficulties
arise from the fact that it seems to UG that there is some confusion here and
this confusion deserves to be dispelled. It is true, as all the previous speakers
have asserted, that no African representative would have any notion of disputing
the independence and the full sovereignty of the Conco. It is for the recpect of
this independence and sovereignty that the African Gtates here, and also in the
AP/el -17-
(llv» Diallo, fl.ulttqo.
Security Council and In the General Assembly itself, have always f ought. But
the problem today seems to us to be changing in nature } and this is the specific
point that 1 would like to raise in tiie hope that the Secretariat will clarify
this issue, if not today, at leant at the tine of our next nicotine.
It seeir.s to us that the terms of the equations have been turned upside down.
As a matter of fact, the United Nations -- and you yourself, Mr. Secretary-
General -- can act only within the framework of relevant resolutions, both of
the Security Council and of the General Assembly. Now 'these resolutions have
net at all remitted, but on the contrary, have ruled out any possibility for
bilateral arrangements within the framework of the United Nations. V;e have
from the very outset envisaged only multilateral international action under the
guidance of the United Nations, and all the resolutions have appealed to Member
States and to all other States to refrain from intervening outside the framework
of the United Nations. The question therefore that I am raising is as fellows;
lo ycu not think, Mr. Secretary-General, in the existing circumstances that we
irust either redefine the mandate of the Secretary-General or raise the whole
issue afresh?
The Government of the Congo, in the exercise of its full sovereignty, made
an appeal in I960 to the United Nations, practically against Belgium. Today,
if I have correctly understood the situation, we are going back to the status
£uo of July 1$K:0 in the sense that as a practical thing, — s::d th:Ls would appear as
a result of letter No. 3 which you yourself hive cited, Mr. Secretary-General --
that Belgium is going to deal not only with the question of technicians for the
ANG General Staff and for the various units, but also the question of bases ;
gendarmerie and various military schools.
GartGz'.nly, i"*"- is outs:".de the framework of the United Nations, it Is the
sovereign right of the Congo to appeal to any party that it wishes to. But I
might ask: Can the United Nations provide^ an_un;brel.] nj1 ___ And_I_think_this is
a substa.ntiYc.---i a sue-,-. this is an issue which affects tne mandate of the United
Nations and your own mandate, r'r".~ il-^rotary-Oen^rnl. The question is: Is the
United Nations empowered under existing resolutions to patronize, to act as a
godfather for bilateral action between' the Government of the Congo and some other
government? I think that the Security Council or the General Assembly should
AT/el .10-
(Kr. Dla.llo, -G
speak out on this issue before we go.any further. There are so many resolutions
which already exist which fully empower the Secretary-General to do a certain
amount and authorize us, as the Advisory Body, to deal with international
assistance provided to the Central Congolese Government, end therefore it seems
to my delegation that we have no legal basis to serve as an umbrella for bilateral
\} co-operation between governments, and more particularly between the Government
I of the Congo and another government. I think that it would be a violation ofjjthe resolutions of the Security Council which request all States to refrain from• •ij intervening in the Congo unless they act through the United Nations. I would
I' have been quite pleased to see within the framework of the normal mandate of thet': United Nations, that the United Nations should suggest to the Central Congolese
i Government, on the-basis.of research that it had carried out, that certain
particular countries should help, all of which would fall solely within the
framework of multilateral and not bilateral co-operation; and then the Government
of the Congo, as ic only proper in tlie case of co-oporation, could accept or
refuse sach assistance or could n&ka -suggestions. Tut, I am very much afraid that
here wa are dealing with a question of bilateral co-operation, which I think
is fully possible between the Government of the Congo and with any'of the
Governments mentioned here — Canada, Italy, Norway, Israel, Belgium and even the
United States — but it does not seem possible to me that the United Nations
should be able to provide an umbrella for bilateral action.
What is more, Mr. Secretary-General -- and this is a second point of
inforir-ation with respect to which I should like to be informed, if not today at
least at our next meeting.; we have been told that Prime Minister Adoula, at the
outset of your discussions, hoped to see only African Grates participate in the
reorr'^nization of the Congolese National Amy, and you quickly sketched for us,
Mr. Cocretary-Gcneral, the fact that some members of his Government were not in
agreement with his view. It appears from the document that we have received today
that no African State is provided for here. This, of course, again is fully within
the sovereign right of the Government, of the Congo to make such a choice, but, on
any assumption, African States at the present time are in the Congo with troops.
You have been kind enough to suggest that the basis should be enlarged and that we
should make appeal to African Governments, I must say quite sincerely that I am
AT/el 19-20
(Mr. Dial3o, Guinea)
very much afraid that when the African Governments learn that the Government
of the Con^o has not proposed'a single African Government and that it is on the
suggestion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and not on the "basis
of the clearly-defined will of the Government of the Congo to appeal to certain
African States, I think this will create a psychological atmosphere which will
norrcally not make it possible for African States to intervene. But I shall not
pive my views on this point; yet the fundamental issue I think is as .follows:
Shall we redefine the mandate of our operations? Does this not seem to you to
"be necessary, that it should be carried out "by the competent "bodies, that is to
say, either the Security Council or the General Assembly?
RGH/pia 21
. . (Mr. Dlrillo, Guinea)
To you "believe that the existing resolutions enable the Secretariat, at
least the Spates represented hare, to provide an unbrella for bilateral
co-operation between the Congo Government and another Government?rihese are the two qu3ctlons which I think are very important and which
should not be-passed over in silence. They are prerequisites for any discussion
ve nay have on this question.
The r.ECEETAKY-GENERAL; By way of a preliminary reply to the very
interesting questions posed by the Ambassador frora Guinea, T would just cay this.
Regarding the possibility or the legality or the propriety of purely "bilateral
assistance negotiated between the Central Government of the Conco and any
particular country, there is no bar in any of the Security Council's
resolutions in operation. Therefore, on this particular aspect, I do not think
that a fresh mandate or a clarification of the previous mandates from the
Security Council will be necessary. I have been advised by my competent
colleagues in the Secretariat that JJie Central Government of the
Con op is quite competent to negotiate for any bilateral assistance from any
country.
A question arises when this assistance is to be put under some sort
of United Kations umbrella, as the Central Government of the Congo has requested.
That is why I am seeking your advice, and, of course, I will deal with this much
more fully at our next meeting.
Regarding your second question, of course, for the first time I revealed the
fact that in the course of wy discussions with Prime Minister Adoula last year,
in February 1 62, he indicated his desire to get the African countries involved
in the provision of the military training pregrammes in the Congo. Also
I was in formed un^rcL'icirJLiy at jom'j later stage that there was no general
agreement among the members of the Cabinet. That is why I indicated this in
iny introductory statement. The development I presented before you today,
as you all know, is new and, if I may put it, as you have just indicated, it
surprised rr.e also to some extc.nt, since no African countries wore to be involved,
But, of course, I have no strong vie\7s on this question, and I will be guided
primarily by the advice of this Committee.
••pi'l"'
RGII/pm 22
I may also irention in this context that last winter I tried to get the
assistance of African officers for this particular type of operation,, "but without
much. success. Therefore, I will have to deal with this question much more
fully at our next meeting.
Ch'.ef ATTvro (Nigeria) : I am in the same kind of difficulty as that
facing other members of thic Advisory Committee. I became aware of the nature
of your proposal only a few minutes ago, and I have been trying to divide rr-.y
tine i etween reading this correspondence and listening to the contributions of
my follow members of the Advisory Committee. I would like to appeal to you,
Mr. ^o ere tary- General, that in future we might 'be supplied with these documents
a reasonable time before the meeting is to be held. There may, of course,
be occasions of great urgency when you cannot possibly meet this requirement.
For instance, at the time when the military operations were in progress, had
you required advice on any aspect of them, it would have been unwise to suggest
that vou give us plenty of notice of the facts, but tho time of most urgent
emergency has now passed, and I would like to appeal to you to help US to help
you by letting us have these facts well in advance of the meeting which is
called to discuss them,
'lhat is a very important matter because, as you realize only too well, we
do not represent our individual selves, we represent Governments, and it is
very difficult to make a useful contribution without having had the time to look
at your proposals and also time to comsult with our Governments.'
Pe cause of this difficulty, I find myself unable to make a contribution of
value to today's proceedings, and I must reserve the comments of Nigeria until
a later opportunity.
1 would add only this, Nigeria's position in relation to the Congo is
well known, Iligeria is prepared to give as much assistance as lies within its
power to ensure that the Congo is put in a position to take its honoured place
in this community of nations.
Leaving said that, Mr, Secretary-General, may I ask if you will be good
enougn to say a little more concerning the implications of the United Nations
umbrella for this operation. I ask this in order to be able to properly inform
my Government so that when we return here 1 may be able to make a useful
contribution.
RS!!/pm 23-25
(rhlor Ade"bo . 171 p;eria'
It is indicated here that the cix Governir.ents which are going to supply
assictance in modernizing and training the army vrill ue responsible Tor their
own costs. It is not indicated exactly what the technical assistance micdon,
vhich includes these oix countries with the suggested addition oT three othersy
will LO doin/-;. Also, I do not find any reference nnde to ireeting the coots
involved in their operation. I wonder, Mr. Secretary-General^ whether you
vould fill in these gaps for tr.e GO that I may "be in a position properly to
inform ray Government.
AW/he
The n^C^ETAP.Y-GUI'I^o^L; Regarding the prior circulation or relevant
'documents before the mooting, I agree with the representative of Nigeria that
for the purposes of providing more time to the me inborn or thin Committee to study
the documents I think we should have distributed them earlier. But in this
present case, as the me-.iibers of the Ccmmittee will notice, some of the documents
had been released in a Security Council document; as fin appendix to my report to
the Security Council, and the last one was received only yesterday, after the
request for the meeting went out on Monday. That is the letter dated 19 March
from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Ccngo. In future I will see to it,
if they are important documents which require a thorough study before the
ccrnreneement of the meeting, that the members of the Committee receive them at
least twenty-four hours ahead of the meeting.
Regarding the second issue raided, concerning the nature of the so-called
umbrella, the points are not yet cloar. What the Central Government of the Congo
has been proposing is some sort of a UN directorate asG'uning the co-ordinating
functions. But with regard to this particular character of the United Nations
operations, I have "been in consultation with our representatives in Leopoldville
and it will be of interest to the Committee to know that I have asked
General Kebbede and General Prem Chand and other military leaders of the Congo
to ccLJ3 here during the first week of April for further consultations. By that
time I hope that the nature of this umbrella or co-ordinating function will be
much clearer.
It is also my intention to call a meeting of the Congo Advisory Committee
while they are here, perhaps in the early part of the second week of April. We
have tentatively fixed the date of 3 April at 3«3>0 p.m.
Wich regard to the costs, it is my understanding that the countries which
have premised to provide the instructors for the specific character of the
trainii.g involved will bear all costs for the provision of the services.
Regarding the costs for the maintenance of the co-ordinating conmittee, we have
not coma to any definite conclusion yet.
AW/ht
llLZI!!7?:- (Morocco) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-
General, e.t the beginning of your statement you 'were good enough to sum up the
background of the question of the technical assistance and the military assistance
of the United Nations to the Congo. You mentioned that one of the first plans
of this military assistance had been prepared in co-operation vith General Kettani,
who at the time was the head of the United Nations forces in the Congo.
May I offer ECHO clarification to the effect that at the time vhen
General Kettani contributed to the preparation of that plan, the United Nations
operation in the Congo was in a certain phase and wr>,s going along an orientation
which at that time clearly precluded any possibility of foreign military
assistance, leaving that responsibility exclusively vithin the United Nations
competence. General Kettani then left the cnrmand of the United Nations forces
in the Congo -- for reasons which my Government explained both in the correspondence
with the then Secretary-General and frcm the rootrum of the United Nations — and
the framework vithin which that military assistance is now envisaged has no
link whatever vith the ideas expressed in the original plan of General Ketto.nl.
I feel that it is important to point out to the Ccronittec that the reference
to General Kettani's participation in the original plan has no link or liinchip
with the plan which my Government will examine once all the information is
available and once it has been communicated to it. Ihis will in due course allow
it to ccme to a decision.
Secondly, the representative of Guinea raised certain fundamental aspects
of the problens that arise frcm this plan. Mr. Secretary-General, I have listened
vith satisfaction and gratification to the assurance you have given us, namely
that the competent advice which was given to you sets up no contradiction between
the previous plans and situation, and the possible mandate that the United Nations
may asaume in the new framework, of this plan. I am sure that the communication of
such an interpretation to my Government will be one of the basic elements on which
cur attitude will be linked. I also wish to associate myself with the statement
made by a number of our colleagues regarding the total frcedcm of the Congolese
Government to address itself, for the formation of its amy, to those countries it
considers to be the most adequate and the moot indicated to give it such
assistance.
AW/he 28-30
(Mr . fle
Put at the sano time I vould also like to associate myself vith those vho
have asked questions, specifically whether the list of countries contained in the
letter of the Prime Minister will not give rise to problems — not among those
countries -which have thus far participated in the formation of the United Nations
forces and which Tor psychological and political reasons cannot oppose the niove.
But does this not raiee a moral, .political and psychological problem for the
United Nations if the troops which have participated since the very "beginning of
the crisis in the Congo, in the re-establishment of order there, and which have
carried the United Nations policy to success, are completely excluded? Whereas,
technically, within the fracewcrk of the re -format ion of the Congolese array, it
might "bo able to give some assistance since they have establish a certain
continuity in their relations with the Congolese arny.
ThlG also leads to another question. Why exclude these forces which have
led to the success of the United Nations? Why exclude them frcm the re-
eGtatJliEhncnt of the Congolese army IM peace when they worked there during the
crisis? My Government will doubtless nek a question of that nature. That is vhy
I veul<l like certain clarification "before I can take it upon myself to cosmunicate
a cenerhl impression of this meeting to ray Government.
There is another problem. This matter of the absence of the armies which
have thus far participated will give rise in due course to another problem.
There are many other countries whose national armies are not adequately set up
to maintain order. We must, I think, define the right of sovereign governments
to decide on whether the array is adequate to meet the needs of setting up and
defending order. There are other countries in Africa which, i'or economic reasons,
possess armies that are unable to confront their national security requirements.
Surely these countries cannot turn to the United Nations for help. Obviously they
could not do so unless a previous crisis had occurred. Bc.t then those countries
could turn to the United Nations and, within the framework of the United Nations,
and within the form of a co-ordination body ox1 bilateral assistance, seek
assistance and thereby create or re-fo.rm their1 c;rn rational uinien. 1 think .that
we ought to define the criteria that should be borne in mind in welching cuch
Dppevls and requests. The.'e are certain African countries which, in the light of
the letter of the Prime Minister of the Congo, should not be denied the right to
turn to countries they wish to choose in order to help them set up their armies.
BU3/dr 31
(Mr. Berhima, Morocco)
The United Nations chou].d consider how deeply it is committed in the Congo
to take en this second phase of Its work, a phase which exists in a completely
recognized juridical framework. Is it then going to require Member States to
take a political stand tb.at they might be ready to take Individually vis-a-vis
the Congo within the frcraework of solidarity, and within the framework of
African fraternity in the case of the Congo, in a case that might arise
tomorrow in new political circumstances, although perhaps in identical
juridical circumstances?
These are the general questions that I wanted to raise at this preliminary
stage of our discussions in the desire to obtain clarification and to request
further information that might assist us in taking the most favourable stand
with respect to the future of the Congo, a stand that would be in keeping with
the principles for which we originally committed ourselves as a Member of the
United Nations and under which we stood shoulder to shoulder with you in your
policies in the Congo in an effort to ensure the success of such policies.
The SECRETARy~GE?vERAL; Regarding the political and psychological
issues involved, I think we had better not take those up at this meeting. I
Lhall give further thought to the very interesting observations just made
by the representative of Morocco. With respect to General Kettani's attempts
to train the ANC when he was the Deputy Corunander in the Congo, and other allied
subjects connected with it, I shall call on Dr<, Bunche to make a few observations*
Mr, BUTTCHE : I shall be very brief. I can affirm that as the
representative of Morocco has indicated, there was no relationship in substance
between the plan of General KettanL and the present programme as proposed by
Prime Minister Adoula* The only relationship that might be indicated is that
in each instance the initiative was taken by the Congolese Government in the
exercise of its free and sovereign will. In the case of General Kettarii,
Prime Minister Luv.iurnba, on behalf of his Government, submitted to me when I
was out there as Special Representative of the Secretary-General a formal
request for the services of General Kettani to advise and assist the Government
in retraining and reorganizing the Congolese army. Initially, as a matter of
BHG/dr 32
'•• •— • • (Mr* Eunche)
fact, Trine Minister Lumunbo wished the full services of General Ivettani, that
he be transferred "i'rcj his popition as Deputy Ccimionder of the United Nations
Force to the Government'of the Congo. General Kettani and I thought that
vac inadvisable, and an arrargement was worked out whereby lie would continue
to cerve as Deputy Gc-XLiand-sr of the United Nations Force but, at the same time,
vculd perform thin function for the Congolese Government. He did vork out
a plan which did not call for assistance frcm outside nations "but which,
through the channels of the United Nations itself, would set up a training
pro^rarane. A mere extensive programme was later worked out "by General Jyassu
of Ethiopia. Neither of these plans was acted upon by the Government and
consequently there was no fruit deriving frcm this work.
Mr._TREMRLAY (Cannda): I should like first of all to welcome the
agreement that has been reached to broaden the basic of the participation
to the ANC training scheme. We curcclvos thought that it vac very important
to have as wide participation as possible,, and we are very glad that this has
now been done. As we understand it, the broadening of the participation'to
the scheme means in effect the establishment of a co-ordinating group that
•will be responsible to implement the scheme. This is a new development and it
is a very important one because it means, in effect, that we will have to
define very clearly the role of the United Nations vis-a-vis the scheme when
the time comes to know exactly what will be the status of the co-ordinating
Group. I think that at our next meeting it will be quite important to have
a little more information as to the functions and relationship of the
co-ordinating group with the Unite.! ITatlonG. For instance, it is conceivable
that this co-c.vdinating group would be primarily responsible to the United
nations. I assume that the co-ordinating group would be headed by a
Director. Where will the responsibility lie? Will it be a responsibility
vis-a-vis the United Nations1*' Will there be some responsibility vis-a-vis the
Congolese Government? Will thire be responsibility to both authorities? I
•chink this is a very importont point in order to reach seme conclusion as
to the attitude that we might take with respect to this new development.
BKS/dr 33-35
(Mr* TrcrnhJoy, Canada)
Another aspect of the problem is the relationship "between this co-ordinating
group and its Director vic-a-vis the national training contingents that will
"be provided by some nations. For the success of this scheme I think it will
"be very important to know exactly what will "be the position of the co-ordinating
croup vis-a-vis contingents which will "be provided by national governments and
vhich I suppose would feel primarily responsible to their own governments
and not co much toward the authority superimposed within the scheme itself.
Another point is the fact that although Canada is mentioned in the
correspondence, I want to make it clear that there has not been any bilateral
negotiation "between my Government and the Congolese Government. Indeed, we
have always assumed that any contribution that we would make to the A ICC
training scheme would be under the aegis of the United Nations, At our next
meeting I may be in a position to elaborate on this point , but I want to make
it clear now that ve do not fall under the category of the "Mlaterals". We
still believe that our contribution would serve its best purposes if it is
effected under the aegis of the United Nations,
L: I vant to clarify one point raised "by the
representative of Canada with respect to the functions and responsibilities
of the co-ordinating group, if there is to-te one. It will act solely
under the United Nations, on behalf of the United Nations and be accountable
to tta United Nations* -.
Mr. TPEMPLAY (Canada): And paid by the United Nations?
The SECRET ARY-GKIT^AL: As I have just said, we have not cleared this
with the Central Government.
TL/jw
_ (interpretation from French): The questionthat you liuve just nut before us, Mr. Secretory-General, is a very important
anl delicate one, and you can readily understand th.?t at this juncture it is
not ponsible for us to make any suggestions along the lines that you have
indicated4 I have just loafed very quickly through the correspondence you
have had with ti:-3 Congolese Government and, a P£i° £; I am not In a position
to rive you any opinion on that correspondence. But I should like, nevertheless/
to obtain certain information GO that I can properly inform ray Government,
and I wish elco to make a few observations for your consideration.
It seems to me that the United Nations troops were sent to the Congo with
a very well-defined mandate; in a specified context, for the accomplishment
of a certain number of objectives, having regard also to the situation
obtaining at that time in the Congo. Among these overriding considerations
thore was .-above all the matter of the defence of th2 sovereignty and unity
of the Conrjo, both of which had bcoa jeopardized. It was in this context
tt-.i-ii a godly number of countries, including my own, gave their sanction to
the dispatch of United Nations troop3 to the Congo. - . • .
It voulcl appear that today, in view of tl.a forthcoming withdrawal of
United Nations troops from the Congo, the Congolese Government -would 'like to
proceed to a reorganization of its army, and, within the framework of its
sovereignty, as has been explained, it intends to appeal to a certain number •
of countries, which it has mentioned specifically by name, and request of
them certain assistance which I think is being requested in a purely bilateral
sense.
You will therefore understand, Sir, that, having due regard to'the initial
mandate given to the United nations troops, it is a very delicate matter indeed
to suggest that the United Nations Organization undertake the task of
co-ordinating the activities which a fully Independent Government has
requested within a framework of bilateral arrangements. In order to enable
livy Government to give you suggestions at our forthcoming meeting, I should
like to know what, from your point cf view, might be the competence of this
co-ordinating body. It seems to me that, in the light of the reply you gave
to my friend from Guinea, you have already consulted your experts and have
therefore examined the problem from the various possible angles and with
a view even to the various possible consequences.
TL/jw 37
(Hr. Coulthaly, I-!a?.i)
Now, If this ic 20, Sir, I chould like to know what, in your opinion,
would be tlici nature of this co-ordinating bccly. To you think of it ac being
fully ccmpeteut to intervene in th2 programme of assistance and in the canner
in which thic assistance is provided to the Congo? After all, if there is to
be a co-ordinating bccly of the United Nations and if we are to be called upon
to pronounce ourselves cu the advisability of Getting up such a body and on
its sponsorship by the United Nations, we mur>t be able to know exactly what
will be the powers and functions of this body. Will this co-ordinating body
be rrrponsiblo for preparing a programme? Will it be to a certain extent
responsible for the possible actions of experts coming from various countries,
experts requested directly by the Central Government and coming without even
the approval of the United lotions? After all, if at the preliminary stage
we cu\e our consent to the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo,
it was because these troopc wore all undor the authority of the United nations
and it was the United Nations that was fully responsible for all their actions.
I should like to kno.w whether, at this second stage, the United Nations will
alr;o have full responsibility, as it did earlier when we gave our support to
the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo.
Obviously, I understand full well —• this is the right of the Congolese
Government and no one can deny it -- that the Congolese Government can appeal
to any country whatsoever for technical assistance; but 1 nevertheless believe
that the fact of asking that this technical assistance be co-ordinated by tho
United Nations arid even placed under United Nations responsibility, does give
rise to a very delicate problem.
We should therefore like to know, Fir. Secretary-General, what your ideas
are in this respect, at least with regard to the co-ordinating committee*
It Goem3 to i;.e you have examined this question in detail and, in the lignt
of this exchange of correspondence which I have rapidly glanced through,
it would seem that the possibility of co-ordinating tiirough the United Nation s
this technical assistance has already been tacitly accepted and that you are
in a position to give us come details concerning the role that this
co-orlinating committee would be called upon to play with respect to the
over-all competence of the groups that would be provided from outside and
sent to the Congo for the task of re-organizing its army.
TL/jw 30-1*0
-CT-'NlT-^L-, As I stated earlier, I am still in the process
of discussing and consulting with ny representatives in Leopoldville regarding
the functions and responsibilities of this projected co-ordinating body. First
of all, the question is whether the Congo Advisory Ccrnaittee has any views on
the necessity of the co-orciinr.i;iiig body, Frcm the correspondence you vill see
that I have made certain surest ions in the way of the expansion of the
co-ordinating bcdy, if there is to "be one.
.']o the issues "before this Ccirmttee are, first,'whether the Committee has
any views regarding United ITtiticns involvement in this whole business; and second;
whether the Ccrcmittee feels that the United Nations should be involved by providing
Gems sort of "umbrella" or by constituting this proposed co-ordinating body, and
if so, "what are to be its functions.
On the second question, as I have said, I have been in consultation with my
representatives in the Congo (Leopollville); and ve have not ccne to any definitive
conclusion. IJhen General ICebbcdo and his colleagues come here in the firs I week
of A;.ril, I think we will be able to present a detailed programme and de-tailed
functions to be entrusted to such a body.
?ut before that, the most urgent question is to get the feelings of this
Committee regarding the necessity or the propriety of United Nations involvement
in such an operation. Then the second question ccraes only after the first
question: If the United Nations is to be involved by the provision of an
"umbrella" or by the formation of a co-ordinating body, what are to be its
functions? Go far we have not come to any definitive conclusions regarding both
issuej: the propriety of the co-ordinating body and the functions to be enjoyed
by thr.t body.
I hope I have msde my position clear.
BC/tt ia
£!l'-I1!7'™!1!?! (ConCO; Lcopoldville) (interpretation from French): Ithinl; that two points should be made clear.
Ceveral representatives have referred to the United Nations presence.
But I do not believe that the correspondence between the Secretary-General
and the Government of the Congo relates to the presence of United Nations
troop:: in the Congo. This correspondence relates particularly to instructors
for the army. Kow; in an ar^y; the instructors do not constitute a Force.
In this respect, African countries must recognize that, particularly as
regarus military academies and related fields, they themselves must call on
instructors from other countries — European ana others --to train their
own cadres.
Thus, it is not a question here of forces ac such, but of instructors
of a ni^her rank. If some African countries feel that they have a sufficient
nur.bcr of such instructors, it is perhaps vithin the I'crpeter.cc of tho Government
to enter into contact -with those countries. But,, within the framework of
the objective of the letters exchanged between the IJC'oretary-General and the
Central Government, I do not think that we should ccnfuse the question of
Units 1 Nations forces vith the question of instructors vhich the Central
Government has requested of some European and other countries,
I-'artherriore, the financial aspect of the question must be borne in
mind. The Secretary-General himself has rightly emphasized this in stating
that the countries with which the Government lias entered into contact --
and there have been only contacts; no agreements, properly speaking, have
as yet been signed -- have in principle agreed to assume the costs
connected with the presence of the instructors.
f r
BC/tt
(Mr. Idzur.buj.r, _ Con^o (L opolrlvill.fi)
When one sees the difficulties involved in the agreement of certain
countries to finance the United Nations Operation in the Coneo, it is
natural to wonder ii' a supplementary tack should be imposed on the United
lotions. That is the an pie from which the Central Government views the
problem. Can it really thin): of involving the United Nations in supplementary
expenses involved in the presence of instructors vho will be given the task
of training cadres,especially technical cadres? This will be rather
c:rpensive.
Another point has been raised by some members of the Committee — that
io; the political consequence;! of their attitude towards the Central
Government. I believe that I may say that the Central Government is aware
of that problem. It has no intention of adopting an attitude which could
result in difficulties with other countries. In any case, members of the
Committee may be sure that this ur.vect of the problem will be brought to
the attention of my Government, which will take all the necessary measures.
BC/tt
M_r_._jTnnpj30N (Liberia); The Government of Liberia fcas consistently
supported any loimula that would brine a rapid conclusion to the Con^o stalemate.
I am sure that my Government \;ould velccme a contribution by any government or
group uf governments to relieving the strain on the Organization °^ ^G
eccnonu c burden ,
AT. has be*. n pointed out here, certain economic, political, legal and social
problems are involved in the new plan before us. That is why my delegation
shares the opinion that at this stage it would be premature to state any firm
position on the part of the Government of Liberia. We should have time to
present the matter fully to our Government:; and receive instructions. Hence,
we s;:all be very pleased to make clear at a subsequent meeting our Government's
position on the new proposal.
Mr. r^L\D?{/\RKAR (India): My object in speaking at this time is
primarily to obt'iin clarification of one or two points. Like other representatives
hero, I shall vi;;h to consult my Government; and the clarifications I now seek
will help me to communicate accurate information to my Government.
I take it that the guiding document, as it were, for our meeting. today is
the Security Council resolution of LI February. There can therefore be no
argument about whether the United nations should or should not be involved in
tendering the proposed assistance to the Central Government of the Congo.
raragr.-ph 2 of part D of the resolution is quite clear on this point. We are
well past the stride of arguing about that. The reGo.lution. has nettled the point --
unless the Council would wish to amend it. The United Nations is enjoined in
the resolution to tender the necessary assistance, in consultation with the
Government.
l'ij second comment is this: It seems to me that there is an analogy here —
although not an absolute analogy, since the reorganization of military peisonnel
and forces ic involved -- with projects that nave been accepted for many years
now un_i.er the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund.
Of course, theic is a major difference to the extent that those projects relate
to civilian af lairs arid the present proposal relates to military affairs.
nevertheless, 1 think that the analogy can be drawn. Once a project proposal
is made by a country, the United Nations usually approves it, if it is a worthwhile
uc/tt Mf-i*5
(Mr* BhndKamlrnr,
project, if it nas come chance of success, if the funds are available. After
that, the propr.r United Nations -authority — the Muna^iro Director in. the cac-e
of the L'pecial fund, the CoiTxiiGsloncr of .Technical Assistance in the case of
the E:-:p~nded iro^raErae of Technical Assistance -- procecas, .in consultation with
tue country cor;2e:rncrly to locate vhat arc called the experts . The decision to
cir.pioy experts froii a country or a £roup of countries and the location of the
o::pertc are usually matters of consultation between the country receiving the
assistance and the United- Nations authorities concerned. In that sense I see an
analory with the present case.
Go far as iny delegation is concerned, we are convinced that there can be no
GUCCC33 in this matter if the arrangements are not definitely approved by the
Central Government of the Congo. Obviously; their Irishes must remain paramount.
We are dealing here.- vith the letter of the Prime Minister dated _
20 Deccrr/cer 19 12. In that .letter t!i-» United LlaticnG is requested to acsict in
a ten-poj.rro Dro;Trairjiie. one Tiolnt of vhich relates to the orranization of a snail-L — . l .' J -- ^-J
inter:-vatioj>il technical acciGtance mLsoion and to the provision or securing of
certain experts. Now, I take it thai: there can be no objection on the part of the
Organization to rendering such ascioLence. We have discussed at some length the
composition and the role of the international technical assistance mission. At
this sta^e, before we have had a chance to consult our Government,, my delecation
would have no special views on this matter.
I wish merely to elicit some information on one point. According to the
letter of 19 March 1963 from tiie Prime Minister of the Con£;o, it is the
Ccngcleso Government's hope that "the nations participating in the technical
assistance prD^ranune will agree to defray the costs arising from their contributions
and that the United Katlors will bear the costs connected with the international
technical assistance mission".
E'R/rs 6
(i 'rr "nhfidkoupkar, India)
New I shculd merely like to ash, Mr. Secretary-General, frcm vhat
particular fund would thic cost be borne. Would It DO part of the general GNUC
opcrG.ti.Gn3 expenses programme or vould It "be ra*"t of the expenses of the
Ccn^o Fund, which of course so Tar has "been geared to civilian assistance only?
Or would this cane out of any provision- that you mny wich to employ under
the unforeseen and extraordinary expenses provision,? Ihus, ii' I knew the
answer to that point, It would help my Government in putting the matter in
the proper perspective.
The__SECRET/CT-GENEPAL!On this question of the provision of funds,
cf course It is the hope of the Central Government of the Con^o that the
expenses connected with the provision of instructors will "be borne by the
countries which provide these instructors, and, regarding the costs relating
to the operations of the co-ordinating body, it is the hope of the
Central Congolese Government that the United Nations will bear these expenses.
But on this, 0.3 I have stated ear 11 or, we have not made any decision. Of
course, if the decision has to be made, I think that, logically the funds should
be frcm the GNUC funds, not frcm the civilian operations.
By way of winding up, if I may, I just wont to clarify one point connected
with the principle of the United Nations involvement in this operation. It
will be recalled that in a letter dated 20 December 19 >2 frcm the Prime Minister
of the Republic of the Congo, he made this very clear in paragraph 2 on page 1
of this letter. He stated that:
"the Government of the Republic of the Congo requests'friendly countries
to furnish the requisite advice and technical assistance with the
co-operation and co-ordination, of the United Nations."
This is a very significant sentence. To this I replied, as you will notice in
the second letter dated 27 December 15 2, that I accept this request in principle.
Go the idea of United Nations Involvement in this type of technical assistance
has been accepted by me on behalf of the United Nations because the understanding
was based en iny discussions with Prime Minister Adoulo. last year in February 19 -2,
(The ^Secretary-Genera.!)
as I Lave outlined very briefly in rr.y opening statement. But when I received
the request -from the Acting Trinio Minister on 26 February 15 5; when Prime
Minister Adculn was in Belgium, specifying the countries which the Congolese
Government expected to approach, I hid the feeling that a direct acceptance of
tliis proposition r.i ht have seme implications, as I have already uncle clear in
r.y introductory stG,tc:nent this uftcrnuon. Go tlint is tue reason vhy I have'
called this Advisory Committee Meeting, to offer advice. .
1 -want to make this very clear. Regarding the United Rations involvement
in technical assistance programmes, the United Nations has accepted the request
of the Central Government. But the problem arose only when certain countries
were specified. At this point I decided to seel: the advice of this Committee.
Of course, details have to be worked out later on.
In the abnen.ce of further speakers I would cu^gest that ve meet again
early next week. I understand that the minutes of this meeting will be made
available to the menbers tomorrow. I was wondering whether Monday would not be
too early.
Mr. ADERL (Sudan): Before we rise, I have a very humble suggestion
to make: that in your discretion, if you find the time and opportunity to
widen the basis of your consultations on thcce issues among the Members of
the Organization outside this Corrjnittee, you might do GO. The issues involved
are very important and very delicate. I have in mind especially the members
of the Security Council. May I, with diffidence, suggest that you give further
thought to the point'raised by the representative of Guinea regarding this
aspect of the concept c,f t/ie umbrella, vhelher the concept of the umbrella for
bilateral agree.Mer.i'.s, especially in 'the military field, is envisaged by the
lelevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.
DR/rs
rAL: I very appreciative of the suggestion just
r.kc.0 by the representative cf tlie SuJan, "but I r.n cure that yca-wl.ll agree with
ir.e that the issue is very urgent. We have to find a ccmpromise botvcon this .
urgency and the need to have cans sort of elaborate formulation "before we meet*
Cf course, the Sscrct^lt/t will try its best to ccr.e up with ccrr.e concrete
papers "before the convening of the noxt meeting, in that case; perhaps Tuesday
or Wednesday. I was. wondering whether Tuesday the 26th or Wednesday the 27th
might be convenient.
!ZI15LL I17112 (Nigeria): I era cure that we all want the Congolese
Government to "be able to get oa vlth this or any alternative project as i:.oon
s.s possible. But frankly, I do not see how I can be in a position to give
the views of rr.y Government if the date is as early as the Secretary-General
has in mir.d. You indicated jujt no\j th<?.T> 'the Secretariat^ in addition to
these papz-rs., will endeavour to c-vo us concrete proposals which I hope will
also be in writing Until we kncv the nature of these proposals^ how car. we
really derr.'ind adequate instructions frcm cur Govornmenta? So I do beg that
we chould be given enough time. If we are not given enough time before the
convening of the next meeting, I think that you may find, to the cirbarrac
of all of us, that we have to have an ad. j ourr.ir.cnt of the meeting in order to
get instructions, So I would beg that we should adjourn for at least about
ten days •
^NFTl^L: I think that it will "be difficult for the
Secretariat to prej-^re a detailed plf/a regarding this projected co-ordinating
bc'.:y. It will be difCicu.lt because even with a detailed plan we have to get the
views of the Central Government also and perhaps it raay take seme time. Of
course, we are new in the process of consultation with .LecpolcLville, but I do
not think that we will be able -l-o come up with a specific plan of co-ordination,
if there ±3 co-ordination, in the ncrct fow days. Perhaps we will formulate
BR:/rs U - O
(Thq Secretary-General)
with ccice sort of general principles underlying the operation of this co-ordinating
"body. So without fixing a date, I would propose that vetry to die tribute some
relevant papers on the subject under discussion early next week,
• Mr, OUAjqC[T.-nACICT((Ghana): I do not know whether in fnct the
Congolese Government wants an answer immediately * Otherwise I was c°inC to
say that if we have a meeting en 3 April, we will have ample time to consider
this matter very carefully, and the su.^rostion made "by the representative of
Sudan about wider consultations ia a coed one. Between now and 0 April we
would have time, as it were, to have this matter so soaked completely in the minds
of people "before we have a meeting. But this is left to you, and it depends
on whether the Congolese Government wants an immediate reply or whether we
can have time to consider the mattert
HA/ria
Tho _ Hfl G PK T.A 11 Y - fTT F AL : Of course, the Government of the Conpo has
been pressing me to expedite this ratter o,5 much ac possible. However, in view
of the opinions expressed bore, I will transmit, my o\m personal appeal to Prime
L!ini:;ter Adoula, explaining to him that the Advisory Ccr.mittec wants some time
to £ive thought to the matter,, especially in viow of tlic fact that the Secretariat
r:ay need a few dr.y to prepare the relevant documents. Therefore, if the
members of the Cciunlttee agree, we will leave the date of our next meeting
open, and I will see to it that you are in possession of .the relevant documents
early next week.
Mr. _ GTlBUfl-flnr/y (Ethiopia): Could the information include what is
expected from the countries concerned? That is rnally very general, and I ara
cure that many countries would like to have sonic detailed information on what is
required of them, because that may determine whether they are in a position to
Give what is aslied.
nilL: Ir we Set the noceccary information from the
Congolese Govei'maent Ly the time we meet, I will "be in a position to furnish you
with the information, I do not know, for instance, the number of instructors
from a particular country that the Congolese Government has in mind.
Mr. TP. MPTJ'iY (Canada): I should like to explore further this point
about the nature of the contribution that is expected from certain countries.
Are we to assume, Mr. Secretary-General, that the precise contribution mentioned
in this correspondence between you and the Congolese Government represents the
final word? Or is it perhaps subject to some other digestion from the
Secretariat, so that, by the time it reaches Governments, it may have a different
nature ?
The rililC TARY 'PlNFR/iL: The position is just tentative. The Congolese
Government has expressed the hope that this will be the case. If the Advisory
Committee advises me to rp ahead with this rcquoGt, I will, of course, have to
contact the Governments concerned, I take it that the representative of Canada
is referring to the contributions?
J
HA/rh 52
j j y, (Canada): The contributions requested from individual
countries. l!y question was circply whether the details which are Given here -- for
instance, ''Canada, ccrninunications" -- are final, or whether perhaps the Secretariat
will have some aucgeationn to inake which racy change the nature of the
recommendation made "by the Congolese Government.
The r?:c uETAT Y-Gi'TP.r! /\L; I do not propose to make any counter-
suggestions on this aspect.
Mr. CQIJLIBALY (Mali) (interpretation from French): Since you have
drawn our attention to the urgent nature of this question, Mr. Secretary-General,
1 vac vcndering whether it wr,c your intention to have us make relevant
cufT^nctionG at our next meeting. If that is the case, I think it vrould "be useful
for you to schedule ether meetings. If you give uz cone information at the next
meeting, Gome delegations may not b^ able to speak out immediately on the
appropriateness of this co-ordination -- alco having regard to the relevant
nts made by the representatives of Guinea and Sudan.
Pr°POGe "t° rcakc "tne relevant documentsavailable seme time next week, possibly early next week. By that tine, we will
be in a position to decide when we should meet. Before the meeting, of course,
you will be in possession of all the- relevant documents.
The nootinrx rose at 5*25 p»ns
CONFIDENTIALMeeting No.6 AprilEKGL1SU
In the Chair;
Kenherrs:
UNITSD NATIONS ADYISCI7Y COMMITTEEOil 'IRE CCKGO
at United Nations Headquartern, New York,on Monday, G Ajjril 1963, at 3.30 p.m.
U THA1IT
Canada :
Coy Ion
L'thicr:La
FoJaration of Malaya
Ghana
Guinea
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Liberia
Mali
llorocco
liigcria
Sudan
Tuniciia
United Arab Republic
The GL'CKETAKY-GFi'EML
Llr. TU^-IDLAY
Mr.. W1JEGCOIEUARBEM
llr, V/crAJO
llr. fi
l.r., I'J
Kr., C
Mr, GC :;iX -W/OvTOJO
Kr, HOi'AMD
llr, r;:^la% COULIBALY
Mr. 01 DI BABA
L!r. AfyJO.
Kr. HA'IDANI
Mr, nuo
Mr.. A1XEL
Mr 3. Pv,?JGEL
Mr, Tciieb GLIM
Mr-
63-07814
RSII/tt 2-5
The r?ErRETARY;-GEm?AL: A.-3 you will recall from my announcement at
our lest meeting, the main purpose of today'3 meeting is to take advantage of the
presence at, Headquarterc, at my invitation, of I/t. Gen. Kebbede Gebre, the
Force Commander in the Congo, and hiu senior military colleagues a I Know you
would wish to meet them all. General Kebbcde Gebrc you already know, since
he has met vith this Committee before.
I now introduce to you General Ixbbeder s colleagues: Major-General Prem Chand,
General Officer Cor.vmanding Katanga Area; Major-General C.R. Ksldager, Air
Cciiir.anMer; Brigadier Reginald Norcnha, the Ccn.raander of the Indian Independent
Brigade; Brigadier RoA.O. Ogundipc, Nigerian Contingent Commander;
Colonel NoL.a licdereii, Swedish Contingent Commander; and Lt, Col. A.G. Palmquist,
Ccmmar.der of Swedish Jet Fighter Unit.
It had also been my intention,, on the basis of the consultations I have had
since our last meeting, to convene a Committee meeting before this one for the
exclusive purpose of continuing consideration of the question of the training of
the Congolese armed forces. When, however, it became apparent that many mernbere
would riot be ready to discuss the matter definitively, I dropped the idea of an
earlier meeting and decided to take up the matter at today's meeting. That
accounts for the informal documents we sent to you last week. However, last
Friday, 5 April, I received a message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Congo, reading as follows:
"The Central Government of the Republic of the Congo attaches particular
importance to the question of the training of the Congolese National Army,
Given the difficulties which seem to have arisen during the meeting of the
Advisory Committee on the Congo, the Prime Minister has decided to send his
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Justin Ecinbcko, to participate in the next
meeting of this Committee. It is, therefore, requested urgently that this
meeting be postponed until Tuesday, l6 April. (Signed) Foreign Minister
of the Republic of the Congo."
BH3/ek 6
( Tb c J3e c r n tn,ry-Gener cOL)
I felt,, of course, that since this question of training is one -which
concerns the Government of the Congo so intimately, 1 could only agree to the
Government's request for a postponement of the discussion. We vill net,
therefore, discuss the training of the Congolese craed forces this afternoon,
Tho date of the next niGGtinr- of the Committee, uhlch i;ill bo for the purpose of
takir.c; up this subject, vill depend upon the date of Mr. ramboko's arrival, but
it will probably "be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, 16 April,
This mecns that the meeting today vill new be as I had originally planned
it; namely for discussing matters of mutual interest, exclusive of AIIC training,
with General Kebbeds and his colleagues. As you know, I invited General KabbecLe
and hi3 senior military colleagues in the Congo to COL.G here at this time for
consultation because I believe that <.:e have reached a po:!nt -where a thorough
reappraisal of the military situation -would "be most useful.
I ain very clad to have the opportunity to valcoijjc General Kebbede and hia
senior military colleagues here in llevj York c.nd to express to thorn parsonnlly,
and •through tliem to all menders of tiio Congo force, our. very great. t.ppreciation
for the servicoa they hnve icnderecl so loyally to tha United Nations in tii2
performance of their moet difficult and unique task in the Congo, I -would vioh
then to convoy these uords in turn to all the officers and rucu nov cervin;j or
•who have served the United Nations in 'the Congo* ^cldcm, if ever, in history
has a military force frcm so many countries been concerned uith so cci' p3.ox arid
delicate a responsibility. In spite of all tha diffJ.cultieo and dangers they
have perfcrmed their task vita a skill, delicacy and restraint vhlcli must bo
almost unprecedented in the annals of military opcrationc. 1'V colleagues and
1 in the Secretariat have followed their activitico ulth the greatest adiniration
and gratitude, and I linow tliat our feelings liave bcon chared by almost all of
the clelegaticiiG here in New York. 1 believe that they have showi in the most
striding manner how professional, coldiero from many nations can vork together
in applying the military art to the scouring of peace. • In doing this they have
made an historic contribution to the development of peaceful institutions.
BHS/ek 7-10
(iho Secrrotary-Genoral)
I would now like to call upon the Force ConiT.ancler, General Kebbede^, to
Sive to the C;<mid.ttee his Impressions of the present situation in the Conco.
I would Q!GO line him, if he is willing to do so, to present some of his personal
observations upon the problems which tlie Corunander or such an international force
races in the field., and to tell us very frankly iiov hie job looks frcn the
operational end in the Conco. 1 now have the creat pleasure in calling upon the
Force Commander^ General Kebbede*
Lt.-Gor\c'jr,l K "DTDF! nTDlvvl: Mr. Secretary-General; honourable members,
gentlemen; ny first duty cu:l pri'/ilGCG ia to thnnl: you, Mr. Cecretary-Goneral,
for th-2 honour you have accorded i:.c and the rconLbcra of ray party in inviting UG
to rr.cct you hero in the United Nations Headquarter3, I accept this honour not
alone on a personal bar:ia for rays elf and those vho have acccirpanled ir.o, but also
aa a tribute to the entire United ilations Force in the Conco vhom I have the
honour and privilege to represent.
Throughout the tragic period vhich reached its climax in Pecenter and
January, \JQ l:ad many difficult problcKS, and I should now like to avail myself
of. this occasion to acitnouledce OIL: indebtedness to you, Sir, c.nd also to
Dr, Bunche, for the wonderful way in which you helped us to overcome those
problems by your Great moral support, your wise guidance and with material aid.
(Gnnornl Ifebberle)
The quick reaction and prompt response we received to our nnny queries and
requests will remain one of our happier recollections of a period which -was not
altogether diotincuishcd for gaiety. It was, therefore, this leadership and
support from Headquarters in New York that enabled us to discharge our
responsibilities. v;e in tho Congo have benefit-ted from our experience there.
The scrfpe of our knowledge has "been enlarged and new horizons have "been- opened up
in the international field. . -
Ca behaJ.f of my colleagues and on iry own. behalf, I should also like to
express ray thanks and appreciation to you, Mr. Zecretavy-C-eneral, for introducing
us to the distinguished members of the Congo Advisory Comnilttee. It is a great
pleasure and honour for us to have the opportunity of being, in your nidst. '
I will row try to give my appraisal of the situation, as I have been asked,
Cir, by you to do.
The induction of the ANG into Couth lOitanga is one of the items about which
I would like to speak. As you kno.r, cccn after the ex,fiction of the military
operations in Jouth Katanga, the Government of the Rcjublic of the? Con^o rera;20bed
end very stror;Lly insisted that the Secretary-General arrange an early induction
of the ANC into that area. Cn receiving instructions from the Secretary-Gcnr-ml to
this effect, wo arranged for the immediate n?ove of the ANC battalion which hod
been with OKUC in Kaicina. This AHC battalion is now located in Eakinia and
l''.Oi.iiirrtti'3f on the l;order of Northern lihodesia. As we nee it, the induction of the
AI-JC into South Katanga in considerable strenctn "before the establishment of proper
CGiu-i:anJ and lopistieal support may lead to serious trouble, and from this standpoint
we insisted th :it the induction be carried out on a planned and phased basis,
in the interests of tiie Central Govcra^ent rind of the I cited Notions,
we L_:iintain that the i'.KC in ocuth ICatr;n^a should be under United Nations command
and control in order to avoid any complication during the emergency period.
In keeping with the desire of vie Central Goveinn.ent to continue induction
prof:rcj:;ively on on increasing basis, detailed dice unions have been held by
United Nations authorities with the Congolese nutLoritles. i-inal arrancomenta
were arrived at in Eiisabothville betweca ILLs Excellency Minister Ileo cad
Colonel Boboso, representing the Central Governic-jnc, and Mr. Mathu and my
representative, on behalf of CHUG. The arrangementa which were made are as follows:
1* Four companies of the A.NC which were moved from Albertville to
Elisabethville will ircve by road to Kolwczi and Jadotville respectively„
-* The balance of two infantry battalions frcn Albertville will move by
road alter all their arrangements for transport, regular food supplies, accommodation
and other administrative masters have been i'ina.lised. CiftJC has on its part
indicated its willingness to assies and co-operate in arranging a speedy and smooth
move ci the AXC units into Couth ICatrm^a.
3. The Congolese Government has agreed to ensure sufficiency of transport
and equipment, regularity in issuing food supplies and sufficiency of officers in
Congolese units and sub-units.
k. All ConsoleJG troops in f-outh Katanga will be under CWJC ccrmand, in
accordance with the wishes of the Congolese Government. This will ensure the "best
co-operation between OftUC troops and the AIIC towards achievement of our mutual
objectives.
'lac integration of the Katanga Gendarmerie with the ANC, required under the
U ThnnJ plan, uas been souiouh^t sic-./, ,'i'ho need cf i.inalizin^ this pha^e oi' the
U Ti??.nu plan Is obvious, and towardi] thio end diGCuoslcnj have been held with the
Congolese authorities, who assure us that ir.oasures are in hand to speed this up.
The second item I would like to explain is the 1133 liter of reduction, of
United Nations forces in the Oonco and the consequences thereof.
From 25 February up to the present uomeivt, the Force underwent the fo3.1ovinc
reduction: Sierra Leone Continuant - one company, 121 men; Tunisian Contingent -
1,0 6 LIOU; Indian Brigade Unit - ,000; Malayan Contingent-- 770. The approximate
total is 6,920.
AiMitioiio since last December arc: -one Indonesian infantry brigade
headquarters, uwo battalions, one anti-alrcrai C. l^^tr.lion and one Indonesian
reccrm^isjance batta.l.iun; total 2/'.:iC> men. T<..e acc.\rvL reduction since 2^ February
is jjkt.sO men. In the near fuLure trie Force will be farther reduced during the
rot'.iticn of the Cwedir/u and Irish Ccati^encs and v.Lth liio -repatrintion of two
F/thiopian battalions and part oj.' the i'hjilippinc aj.;l Ir,:-.rdan crews. Those
reductions will take pI'.CQ throu^aout April. Furr.her i'eduction of the Force for
the mere reason of scaling, down should be seriously considered and should be,
related very closely with the training and modernization of the AKC.
TL/gws 13-15
femoral Kebbede)
Now a few words concerning.problems facing the United Nations Force in the
Congo.
The United Nations Force in tlie Congo is a niulti-ncxticnnl force comprising
contingents frum twenty-one different nations, topped by a Headquarters containing
officers from all thoce countries. This fact brings up many problems, mainly due
to' the? difficulty of making difi'erent organizations; with different concepts end
procedures and using different languages, work together at the Game time in the
same t'ick..
lifferent organizations present a problem when units have to be employed
in the field. . Such problems as strength of sub-units, different airimnition,
diff.ere.nt radio equipment, and so on, can be very embarrasGdng .for the Force. It
is poc^lble to solve them as long as there is co-operation from all parties involved.
In order to achieve co-operation there noist. be a cotonon working language, which is
in itself a problem. Another important point to liecp in mind, is the peaceful
Liiscicn assigned to the United Nations Force. It is not a rec^lar military riiesion
in vhi^h you hnve a definite encry and procedures vhicii are standard in almost
every army. Peace-keeping opcrationo place the Force in between conflicting
parties in order to prevent clashes, to maintain law and order, and to avoid war
through being present, rather than through fighting.
IIA/pm 16
( 0 o n r r a 1. KeVo f. d e)
New, es to relations between United Nations Headquarters end field headquarters:
Due to the die Lance involved, ccttiumi cations play a ^'ijcr role in the relations
between New York Headquarters and the field.* Evnn tlrough radio teletype is need,
there ore always delay a due to the necessity of coding cind decoding and time
ali.T3rcncej3« 'lac procedure vrUch in being used is DcnievUat satisfactory despite
the Q^ovo-nontioried drav? jacks. However, a very important point to be taken into
ccnciuoration Is that the Force Cciaz .ndor shculd "be ol2.ov.3d freedcm of decision
un>1er definite directives to avoid -J:h2 delaying time rector "between events
occurring during a crisis and the decision that has to be taken with the
concurrence of United nations Headquarters, In a?iy cillltary operation; it ic
veil known that the opportunity of Q decision is a Enjcr factor for success*
Therefore, GUC!I problems d^rand study and concentration so tliut-; in the future,
acticn can "be taken when nocesnary vi'fchcut delay. T5ii.rj can "be achieved, through
further improvement of ocm-niuivLcations and Gtn.ndii.ic opei-ating proccdures0
The present CNUC deployment it; ac followG;
In Leopcllville, you hove one infantry battalion frcn Nigeria nnd one
rccanr-aiGGance couatlron maiJiied "by lrl.L-U peiLionne].tt
in Stanleyville, there ia one Ethiopian battalion, to be repatriated in
April.
In Luluabourg, you have one battalion from Nigeria with the Brigade
Headquarters, and one company from Liberia«
Now, as to Katanga Province: In Gector A — Albertville, Baudouinville —
there are two Indonesian battalions with the Brigade Hcad-'iuarters, includinc
1-Icnono,
In Gector B, the Elisabethville area, we have the three Ethiopian battalions
(cne of which is to be repatriated in April); one armoured cqr.ivdron; one Indonesian
auti-aircraft battery and one Indonesian reconnaiGunner battalion in Jadotville.
In Kciaina, wo have three battalions -- or.e Swedish, one Ghanaian, and one
Congolese -- rnd one anti-aircraft battalion IraU'.crway.
In IColwe?.i7 we have one Irish battalion,
i/rom this deployment, it is clear that emphasis was given to South Katanga,
'Iho situation in the Gorge can now be considered satisfactory<> Ho major
incidents have taken place during the lest two moi:ths0 Ihe norale of the OIIQC
troopa is high, and the United llatio.ue Force has reached a point at wM.cn it con
look forward to a peaceful situation.
UA/pm 17
(Gp^prel KeKbede)
I should now like, to say a few words "by way of appraisal of the ANC, the
Congolese National -Arny.
The AIJ'C !.ias progressed clowly toward being an organized national force. Both
cadre and troops ore trying hr.rd to improve their ctm._dards. The future of the
AKC can "be rated as optimistic, provided that reorc'jriization and training on a
large scale tike place a^ ccon as possible. Cthorwir>e, the United nations
responsibilities for maintaining law end order vil.l hove to continue for longer
than JotJired, Even though tae AKC leaders are doing their test to train their
officers and reorganize their unite, ouch training and reorganization, should
be assisted a. id co-ordinated in oro.cr to permit mere j ositive and faster results*
In conclusion, inny I be allovod to cay that civilians and military alike-
of the United Nations operations in the Ccn^o are very conscious of the iimen.se
burden of responsibility and worli borne by you_, !>:TO uOcretary-Genoral, ard your
staff in guiding and directing tho efforts of the greatest and most cuccerJBful
international peace organisation known to hlEtory. 1,To wich you a continuance,,
in tbo future, of tho great CUCCCG;; vhich hnrs characterized your elTorts in the
pact. We pro/ Cod, the Alml^lity, to give you His blerLilngj dedicated as you
ore to the ccrrcd cause of humanity., And \ie assure ycu, «ir. that, as leader
of the march ulcng the rugged road to the haven of \;orld peace, you can count
on the unfaltering loyalty, understanding and full support of the United Nations
Force 3 in the Congo «
Long live the United Nations •
Caving neard General Kebbede's statement,
you may perhaps have a few iiuetstlona to put to him and his colleagueD, If you
do, I should like to request you oi.ce again to confine your questions to the
military aopectc of the Uuited Notions operation in the Congo, in keeping vith
the role and responsibilities of the Force Cciunander in the country.
-V : 1 T' T I v I (Tunisia): I "wi b at this stage only to say a few
vordn on behalf of the- Tunisian d^legaticn. After the few w.rdc of velcoii:e with
enrich, Mr, Dc^.Tetary-ilen-jral, you presented the Force Ccinaaiidcr arid his senior
offi.c.;r, I wir;h only to add the uclecr.c of my own delegation and to associate iny
delegation with the homage and the tribute you have paid to our forces in the Congo
., , j
HA/pm 18-20
(Krc___rqim, Eunlsta)
and vhat thsy have done for the United Nations. Thin historic peaceful miEsion
•io certainly something of which we are all extremely proud?
Cn behalf of rcy delec^tion, I wish to than!-, oil the representatives of the
United rlationa Force vho are pro sent here Tor their devotion cni their effort,o
in earring the United Nations mission in the Co.n o to complete PucceGS4 I think
that ell of TJS around this tabla vrill a^ree that the coal of the United N&M.CUG
operation in the Cca^o, \fnicli vac priisorily alined at freeing that African State
from a ivy foreign interference nnd at strengthening the Ccr^o "by" safeguarding its
independence aM-1 itc full territorial integrity, han now been achieved.,
Those are the l^vr vor^o that I \7i5>i to Lay at this tiiae, and ocain/ onbehalf of Tunisia, I vtsh ^c thank the members of the Force here present.
Mr. I'HZir.CT p. (Congo Lcopoldville) (interpretation from French): On
other oocatiou;:, I have thanked the United Nations for its efforts to restore
P2QC;e to our country and to nairvbain itc territorial integrity, and i thinlt
this i^ Q very solar.! cccaalo:\ .in cr.rl oi* itcelf 3 I c?jcultL 113:e to addrcoG myself to
the Ccnjuander of the United llationa Forcea cni his of.1 Jeers end to tell them thutI am nut inse.u^itive to the' actiona tiiah 'they have carried out. Ihey have
been the artiaAua of peace-In my-country, and they may bo sure that the
population thab they have saved frci:; "both material and moral difficulties is
deeply grateful to them and will never forcet the effort that they have made to
bring this about. That population idll for a lcr£ tine treasure the xinderctandlng
of vhat peace ic; pGrticularly cincc they vere. deprived of it, they vd.ll perhaps
bo better able to underctancl the importance of peace and to make their
contribution to the fiual objectives that all of us are tryir.g to attain*
Cnce again, my thanks to you, General Kebbede, and to your staff as veil*
EC /he 21
-L_ J 9ii-JiArMI (Ghana): I should think that, having hoard the
brilliant and. clear exposition of the Ccir-rander or OIUJC, all of us here ffiust
feel optimistic about what is happening in the Congo GO far as the military
aspect is concerned. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to thank
General Kebbecle Tor this opportunity to hear at first hand an account of the
iLilitary aspect of the operation as it nov stands.
It is not ray purpose to indulge in mutual congratulations. All of us here
have troops in the Cor. go, and if we were to start congratulating ourselves
vo should merely "be log-rolling. My purpose is to rei'f.-r to a point which
Ge-n<-ra.l Kebbede made in regard to the sensitive area ol.1 South Katanga. When the
General referred to deployment, I sensed an absence of any OI1UC coirnitment in
Kivu and Equator. In ny opinion, this means that those areas are free from
difficulty. I should therefore like to ask General Kebbede these questions.
In saying that the troops have been deployed to be centred round the area, of
South Katanga, does General Kebbede mean that he is afraid of a resurgence of
vhat happened in January? Ices he think that there is a danger of coir.e armed
iriEurrection in South Katanga, and is that why he thinks that 01IUC chould be in
that urea, at least for come time?
Secondly, is General Kebbede certain that areas like Kivu and Equator,
where there are no troops, will remain tranquil and that no upstart politician
will try to organize armed resistance to OKUC?
Those are two questions on which 1 should be grateful for some clarification.
Dp : In answer to the first question, I would cay the
following. It is not because we believe that there is an organized force to oppose
that \;e have concentrated much of cur forces in Couth Katanga. However,
although the mercenaries who were operating in that are- a very actively have
aiean v/ared a-ci- VG know that they have vanished on the other side of the boundary,
we ,-:uv not sure whether they are not still on the fence -- that is, waiting to
see what will happen, with the hope of coming back later if the United Nations
force pulls out quickly. That is one factor which we cannot overlook.
DC/he 22
(General
Furthermore., although the gendarmerie -- which, of course, are the arzr.ed force
In that secessionist country -- have vanished and disappeared with their weapons,
we do not know whether they have hidden their weapons cr t;:.vo\m xl-.«--ra into the
tush. Therefore; until we have collected their arir.s a:rl i.itscrat'jcl them into the
AliC, we must consider that they ccnstitute a threat -- not as an armed opposition,
but as bandits operative for their personal benefit. The-/ nai h't use their
weapons in disturbing the law and order and security of the area. Moreover, the
people in the area are hostile, because, as the representative of Ghana knows,
they have been Vjid be :r;iiiy ' in s for at least two years which have crystalized
in their ninds . ' It -v.111 ta'-o them a little time to adapt themselves to the
channel situation.- Furthermore, they may still have seme doubts about their
Icyality; in other words, for a while they may have a dual loyalty.
In addition, this is a very highly developed area, widely celled and
industrialized; it is a sensitive area.
i.vvt is \,;rj we will "be able to take the decision to reduce our force very
considerably tUere on'j.y waen we are i Lilly satisfied that the situation ic no
longer dangerous- and that the gend^.rrccrie have been integrated in the ANC and can
no longer become trouble -inn hers.
I turn new to the second question of the representative of Ghana. The
United Nations denuded the 'equator area long ago, because the situation there is
favourable. As regards the Kivu area, we have recently withdrawn from Kindu,
and since then nothing has happened; we hope that nothing will happen in the
future,, either. We are withdrawing the Kalnyans from Kivu without replacing them.
There is strong opposition from the administrative personnel. They would like
us to keep a United Nations ' force there, even if only a token force, because they
do not feel that the time is ripe for withdrawinc completely from that area.
However, our resource's 'do -not xjeimit us to keep such a force there. We are
therefore obliged to withdraw and denude that area. 'Jliero are two reasons for
this. 1'irst, uf course, wo Lave to try to pass the responsibility to the local
authorities and to the Central Government security force, so that they may learn
to be responsible for keeping law r;,r.d order. Also, the people livlnc in the
area rauct become accustomed to having confidence in the A1IC. The second reason
is the following. If an emergency arises, we have prepared a unit which can be
BC/he 23-25
(r.cneral Ketfoede)
ized on short notice to intervene. Of course, v;e shall follow the
terrfernture of the situation and, if need "be, we shall be able to intervene and
stabilize matters.
Mr, QUAinON-nACKEY Ghans: I want to thank General Kebbede for those
very useful answers.
AF/rh
. J a™ sure General Kebbede will agree withr.y assumption that General Prcn Chand may have a few vcrds to supplement vhat
the Force Commander has just said, since General Prem Chand has teen in direct
tciv.h with the area in cur diccuccion. I give the floor to General
General .. FT^MjFJIAND; I can speak only about the Katanga part of the
operations. There, as the Force Commander has said, we shall certainly have
"I'D deploy our forces, as they have been today, for come little time, becau.ee
the ex-gen-'arraerie, although thoy have been dicnorced, are ctill around in
their villages, During the lar G two rcontho, although ve have not had any
r:ajor inci^i.ents to deal with, there have been a i'e;: crr.?.ll incidents alone the
:"a,jor hi^h-ijayc and in Dor.o outlying parts of Katanga Province of a few people
l:ei:i{T shot up, a few people "being held up and cone banditry-type raido.
The ex-^enrlarmerie were paid off for three rncnthc and that money will eoon be
(;pne, They will have spent the amounts that they lrj,ve soir.ctirne about the end
of y\pril and at that tin-j there ic the possibility of a few core of these
incidents urisino That is what we have to vatch. Ue have to patrol these
areas. We have to look at the so highways. rlhat is why it has been necessary
to deploy these units in the centres of communication so that they can go out
in company groups and pltitoonc to patrol these vast areas. It is only when
it is possible for the Central Government of the Congo to integrate the
e;*~ gendarmerie into the AKC, and once the men who now do not have very much
to do have either been tahcn into the armed forces or have been given some
other alternative employment, that one will really -De j_n a position to reduce
our strength and to take away the units that we have in centres like
Jadotville, Kolwezi, Kilpushi ar,d 'around .ITli
AP/rJi 27
!_'!'_•_I)IALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should li"ke very
briefly to associate niycelf with the words of thanhc and congratulations which
you, yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, and, after you, our t'.ro colleagues, the
Aab a reader c f Tunisia and the Ambassador of Ghana, have paid to the hirhor
officers and their leader, who have "borne a heavy responsibility, in tcfcolf Of
o\;r organization, of co-operating with the vurot challenge over to face tho
United Nations,
Tho Members of the Ccnvnittco will certainly recall that at the time of the
first contact', -which this Committee had with General Kebbedo, before he tool: over
hi:: post in the Congo, in behalf of icy Government 1 said how deeply our feeling::,
wre divided and how much we were dislurbed. to f'~e that in the highest posts of
responsibility in the Congo representatives of Africa and Asia should be appointed
to fill thes3 posts, v'no, of courr^e, had won their ranks in their national
Covc-iY-Sents and Who, in accurainc these responsibilities in the Conro, rai^ht
create a considerable challenge for us, I then had the opportunity to wirui
General Kebbede, as Head of the Uil Forces in the Con^/i, and. also the Cpecial
il:-!-!'' -sentati\'e of th'.2 secretary-General, a::> head of !';he entire operation, who is
an African brother; to wisii also, through these two high personalities, to
all >,ur Afriean and Asian brothers who were assuming responsibility in the Congo,
that they would find a new consecration, infinitely ra^re difficult on the
Congolese teiritory, of the values and merits which they have brilliantly
displayed in their own countries. 1 said that we would not feel .at all
embarrassed if their tasks v;ere too heavy, to speak out very clearly, as brothers,
on their behaviour on the peliticai plane*
1 am all the mure at ir.y ease today when I find nryself in a position to
convey to these brothers of nine, and through them to all who, like them, have
borne this heavy responsibility of conducting the operations in the Congo, our
thanks and our congratulations for having been able to discharge their duties
with nonour and dignity and in a period of time which even the nost optimistic
of us could never have eirpected, and they have been ebie to bring the situation
in the Congo to a point where the leader of the military operation can tell us
today that this situation may be described as peaceful.
AP/rh 28-30
(Mr,
I will certainly have a good irony questions to put, "but I shall refrain
from putting c.ny today, having recard to obligation.!: that I cannot divest myself
of, ccr.aaitmenta that I have outside this room today. It is for that reason that
today I shall content myself with putting only two questions,
First, nay I ask the United Nations Ccrnmandci1 or the Special Representative
of 01IVC in Katanga, 'whether they are in a position to tell us vhat proportion of
the rebel ceadarjierie arc to be found in Katancaj scattered about in ti-.-jt area —
I think that this information "would. "be very useful indeed — and I chculd also
lire to know 10 what decree this rebel Gendarmerie arc atill organized, or are
their units car.plotoly scattered end "broken up?
!//• second question is as follows: General Kebbede has told us that the
situation in the Con^o may be dosciibed as peaceful. On the basis of this very
ii!iport;?.nt stale-Lieut, "which we will h:;ve to c--:anino when we ccn;o to aUcuaa at cur
iio::t i:.x..Gtin2 tha subject r:ir/i..T,cr that you, Mr« Scjcretary-Goneral, have anked U3 not
to touch, upon today, c.:m General Labbcdo — on the ta:;iD of the- ccicc iruportant
end., "or us, very encrjurajjiii^ atatc:i.ciit, having rorard to all the circumatoncos
and thG situaiJ.on in Katanca and having re^ara to all 'tiic factors pi: tiie
situation, co;.iplicated as they are and sojr.ot.imes fluid — tell us ii1 the
United Nations Cotinicmder now is in a position to state what pro^ranime lias been
worked out for the vithdraual of iiiilitary forces frcir: the Con^o?
A related question to tiiio: Joes General Kebbcae thini: that this new
situation, vhich has been doscribed as peaceful, vculd make it necessary that
the existing terms of refer onco, i:u the basis of which the armed forces in the
Congo have be on operating u.jder the control of the Secretary-General, should be
reviewed, or does, he think on the contrary that this nandate as it stands is
sufficient to cope with any situation that may arise, despite the fresh facets
of the situation,
3i• " - - , f • *
(Mr. r-iallo, flu'lnn-i)
Those are the fov questions I should like to pu5 today. In the
in tn.Jb-.inc the floor, I van tod to congratulate General KeKbedc and the high
Staff Officers who aro with us today and_, through thorn, al^o to congratulate
all the forces which, on "behalf of the United Nation L;, have "been atle, vlth
honour and dignity and in a relatively short time, to fulfil the tremendous
hcj:ej VG had placed in them,
Before I give. the floor to General JCebtede,
I v.?nt to intervene urlofl/ on the very important qucrA'ions vhich have just
bron raised by the Au-.basca'lor of Guinea. L'ts firct qucation relates to the
r^t iy-,ilng of inforrnabion 2'cra.rdin tiie Katanc'ece f^T-arrrn^-^1 ^^ courre;
on tris I vlll request Gencril Kubbede to anowor. liJ LJ ,'joconrl and third
o'.iOGtions deal vibh the pha^lnc-out proc^anuro of the United ITo/Lon from the
Corr; •> and to the necessity of revioving the Uocu-J.ty Council and General
A-j.o:r1nly rnnlates. On thoco coc'-sr.d ana. third ite;i:.n, I voi^Ld rcqncct the '
A:.: "•.if. aclor f co i Guinea not to OVLc:Lt"i'CplIorj at tLld ;riietiu(i "because I am
si HI in the prococs of die cussing thorn \.rlth the roi"cy/Cor r;?.nc!c?:. aud othei* oenior
officers fro":i the Con^o and., of courco, vltii my other relevant colleagues
from the Geoi-etariat. I vi.H deal with thei;e two aspocts, tho j.Lanhuy-out
pro;:~'-i.nirije of the Uiiited Nations froir. the Congo and tl;j need to review the
mridules of the Security Council and General Asccnibly resolutions at a later
, not at this inoeting.
(Guinea) (interpretation from. French) : I entirely ac^ee
VTlth your prc^ojal; 1'ic. Geci:etary-Jv ..;cral vliicli is a better one, and 1 vould
wish to transfer tho GO questions which 1 addro:;Ged to Force Coiarander to you.
1 have no objection to the aeply being deferred.
1 I i11 Cive tho floor 'to General Kebbede,
to cive information regarding the cxiatinc status and strength of the Katangese
USH/ec 32-35
Concrn.1. KFpr^rj^: As I initially explained about the situation vltb
regard to the GX-KitanG^ne rnn^rr.orlo, there is no such force in existence
that ve i:nav of as a flfrhtiirj i'orc.i. However ; the strength of the KataMfjrjpe
{v^-v-i^rle, according to our information, was supposed to be lG,CCC. Thia
does not mean that this is correct, hut ve hive taken this as the figure, and
va baaed it on cone inforiration vo received, locally au:l from COK.G of the
docuri-iuts vhi-h, of course, f;,ir.not ho fnJly reliable. .Upvevor, W2 tanaci
the strength of the e.x-Katan£ese rcjn.jrUiT'jncirijp at rouc'aly lO,OCO. So far, vo
have .Lisanr.ed ahout 7,000 fv^v-i.r^-!-,. This i:.canL> thnt, 10,CCO to-ll^OCO rnnrtriri
ha\^ 1. ceu dislanderl and { 0110 bacJc to their 'coionini tic G and to their tribes and
have i.linappearad, boca-aco they cannot live ''without any aclLilnistratiVQ support
in tho huch for a lon^ tlir.R. Therefore, I cannot (jive a poriciv-j answer as
to "/nether or not this i'icure of 30,000 is ccn-cct. Hovrevor, this' is the
fieuro upon vhicn vc have bacecl our C::^lculationD. Wo' Know also of now
recruits vho have not received itucli trainins and vho er.miot "be considered ao
u fJ.GhtinG; unit oecuuso the otaivu.ril of trciinirnr. ^nd their fithtinc capability
is very poor. It ia true that vlrr/ In,ve been dicbandca, and tlicy arc no Lx>ro
to he concidcrod ac a fi^htin^ elo..;/int,
However, if they found the occaolon to do so and if the situation vas
favourable, th^y rdbht pocsibly ra.Ll.y, but whether or not they will corrc back
with their weapons, as I said initially, is also not certain. As ve know that
iiout of their -.reaponB have been thrown away and that r,oir.o have 'been collected.
even during the fiira of the operations, VG can cay that roughly there any be
about Y,OCO to 0,CCO p^nt^.rrQis vho have vanished into the bush, Therafoi'Qj ve
now have the situation fully in hanu, V.Te control all the cencitive and
important places. There lias heon 1,0 harjperin^ of freedom of ir-ovement since we
secured it, LO that we can say for sure that if the Integration programme is
put :1nto practico, vlien the r^ndavros will havro rct'3ict.;.u-cd voluntarily to join
tjie ;uIU -- uo j'ar the figure ia not very inrprusBi'/o, it io cnly cloco to ^,^00
it would encourage others to follow tiioir excuri>le and this also could very nxich
reduce and minimize tJio ey."iT°n:i;t\rn:^r.:'.e situation with regard to those staying
behind on a wait-and-see basis.
GER/nz 36
iiLi- Ji Jj? (Guinea) (interpretation from French): 1'ay I, through
the Gecretary-'Jeneral, very sincerely thanlc General Ket-bede end cay that his
reply Is fully satisfactory to DIG. If I may be ollowec; a final word in order
to dispel any possible misunderstanding, I vlsh to reaffirm that the congratulations
and gratitude which 1 addressed earlier to the hifhor officers from Asia and
Africa I wish to address also to the entire Force, aJ.l the officers and. soldiers
i'rcn every continent end every region who fought in the Congo under the
United Nations banner 0
l (India): I had really wanted to ask two questions
but one has already been answered by General Kebbede and the other, according
to the Secretary-General, should be put off until the next meeting, I have
therefore no rjeotiono to anli tut I would like to take this opportunity of
welocrir<;3 General Kebhcdc and hia ccr.ior colleagues and thanking thera for the
information they have given to this Coicnittee.
Kr ir.o (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I would like to
associate myself with the vclecr.:e extended to General Kebbed.e and hie collcagueG,
1 particularly uelcoir.e the spirit of co-operation that hns prevailed ar;.ong
the superior officers, because I know that without a spirit of co -operation it
would not have been possible for then to discharge the functions entrusted to
thorn by the United Nations.
'me question 1 wir.h to put has perhaps been super ceded or iray have become
obsolete, but for sonic time we tallied about nothing but, eonclarmoG and, especially
during the crisis in ijntanga about mercenaries, a^cl I voulCi IJ.ke to know whether
thir, problem has now disappear^! altogether. VJe have heard that the gendarmes
have1 been dispersed, 1 ut that it is i eared that they might' renew their attack.
A slrr.i]ar situation mi (Jit be created by the n.erceirirics, and this would be
a situation with which the United lotions would have to deal. Rumours are
beiii(j circulated that the mercenarios have not entirely abandoned their aims,
and 1 would be grateful if the Cocucander-in-Chief could give us some information
on this point.
GRR/nz
. : 'The Question of the Ecrccnaries has been and ctill
seems to be notorious to everybody. However, as far GO we know the mercenaries
ctill inside Kutnnca are not what, they used to be before. Previously they
Were organized into a fi^htin^ element end formed a irobile force equipped vith
automatic and h.;avy wer.pciiG, and vith explosive mines to destroy
so on. They have done their job; I think they have irade their money
and as their purpose of course was that, I do not think they would lilce .to
coutinuo to expo a c themselves to dai:(.;;nr. If they do GO it means that they are
not lilting business. Therefore1 we assume that the mercenaries have disappeared.
Perhaps come fcr.ve disguised themselves as civilians and are trying to make ends
uiect by working in a £ a race or in r.n office or doinc ccmethin-3 to use their
professional chill. Wo do not thirh that those who havo left the country have
any possibility of coining back a^,ain. \Te control all the air bases and all the
tovn-0 t-i.d villaccs, I L.oan ii^jjortant plocec. I.Vke Ko.lwo:;i; Jndotvil.le and T'lpuchi
L-:.:ccpt the Pil''-lo. VJe centre! all tho ipirortant hideou^G cf the irsrceruiricc no
I cca i.GGure y; -u thcc tijc^-o arc no r.c-rccnr.rio.; i:o\r op-i^tin^ in K.utaun;a evt.u In
•:.he Lu..;-; btcai.Ge c^rcLiiarieG carmot L.tay in the* buch; their motive is not r.ti-tins
to force thorn l.o rral:,G the cacrifico of ctaying in tlrj jur^lc ,w.".Li.:Out cuppllo e
and without prc per care. I can therefore acsuro you tUit in ^outh Katanc- they
are not os they were before; LI I caid, they have dica:^. eared, ec.no out of the
country, maybe they are han£in;j; around or. are in the country dicguised as civilians,
1 hope this answers the queation.
If no other member wishes, to take the floorI want to Gay \\ZM ^.ratiiyin^ iu is to uote the c::t.i'oord I nary \raiuicJi oi' tlie
1'celinc^ e;:pre:;jcd by Ike lumbers 01* tliic Coiiijittoe to the Force Comiiiandcr and
his ccmor eollou^uec of CilUC. This fooling 01 appreciation and gratitude is
riiared r;ot oaly by the neiuberG of thia CoriiiiitLec but a.l^o,I'aia sure by other
l-.'ciiibcrG of the United. lotions in cenercl. A a I xrado It clear in iry opening
Gtatcu:,;nt, the nc^t i^Getinj will ta.:o place on Tui^day, Io April at 3.30 p.m.
to dJ .ucuja exclusively tiio training of the /U.G. l;c ht:nc that me I'oreicn Minister
of the C.>;iEoles^ Coverr.j'.^nt, l(r. i^ru.oko, will be tblc TO participate! in it. the
uute is tentative and depends upon the arrival of IV. Brifiboko. Kci^bora will be
notified in tino, and I thank ,you once ac;ain for this very useful meeting.
Trn n:-iet.]7:, rose at 'iJir) p,m,
In thr; Chair
Mombors i
on
o. 751963
UNITED 1IATTOU3 ADVISORY COI/MITTEECU TIB CUiGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, N'SW York,22 April 1^6 ; at ^oy p.i^*
The GECRr/j^\HY-GENERALU TIIANT
Canada
Ceylon
Ethiopia
Federation of
Ghana
Guinea
Mr.. Ti^-in
Mr, 1
l-lr. V;OPAJOMi-. ZAT11
Mr, QUMGGN-GACICBY
lir. DIALLO
1-fili
l!orocco
ccr la
I'r. rOLAIIJ
1-Ir. L(J£Mr. I>lCi:o
IT. jjEiinnl-Ir. AJJLLO
In'.. IIAHrYi
Sudan
Guedcn
Tunl. •:',.!. a
Uidtcd Arab Republic
Conco (LGopoldville)
TV" Pf^'^PTi'J.t 0 • lvU^..">io.l
Mi-. HEAD
1 . BCMBOKO
our
IIA/ek
Before proceeding-; vith our main item of
business for this ir.c tint:, I \;i.Jh to present to you A^fbancador Wax rorcinville,
•wko Ls to ta!:e over froia Mr, Uarc'.irer as Oi'ricer-in-Cviarc" in the Ccn.jjo "when,
at the end o,' the r.onth, Mr. Gardiner finally leave .1 to assume his duties as
Incentive r>e.^retary of the 1'conrmic Coranicclon for Africa. As you knoT.i,
Mr, Gardiner 'a departure from the Ccn,;o has been pending Tor scir.c time "but has
Lad to bo delayed "because of developments and circumstances there.
Mr. ")orsinvillo_, I am sure, ia krown to all of yen. 'Ike announcement of hie
ar;.ointn:ent uas made last vneli, lie can "be vith us for only a fev minutes this
afternoon,, c:'.nce IIG is Icavlnr: for the Clon^o 0:1 a ni:: o'clock ilic'ht this evening.
I Ini'jw you all yil.1 join r:o in wir.;lrLn,r; him well and in au expression of confidence
th.at lie \; ill discharge, the heavy responsibilities of i.he Conc'o acni^nn.ent vitli
distinction, Kr, F,T, Liu; vho c;nly a few days oco coi.ie tacli from tar: Con£O;Tjill be returning to Leopoldville i;ith Mr. Torsinvillo on his fourth tour of
duty vi i tii OI;;-0,
^ince, t':z I have said, Mr. Dcrsinville hnn only a few minutes to spend with
us this afternoon, I will cive IrJu the floor before vo proceed vith our other
busiiiess, so that he i..ay iii\Le vhatevcr remarks he visues.
Mr. ropnTNVILT.n (interpretation from French): I en extremely moved
at the very .i.ind ^i/ord.s 'chat you have expressed, Mr. ;Jccre4'.M-y-C!^n:>r:tl_? arid that
you 'jcre lilnl enough to use in introducing IT.Q to the ralvis-oj-y '^OT^.i Ltee. I l^avo
jio uoabt re;v-.irdinL; the trust you have placed in ire, a, A! I think that the best
\;ay of answer iiiij you ^/ould be to sr.y tht;t I have had an example, that cf iry
predecessor •-» of any future predecessor, I mlchb s°-y, since I am not yet in the
field — o,nd that I sliall er idouvv-ur to carry out the task that you have entrusted
to me in the same way in "which it has been ctuiled out by Mr. Gardiner, a "way
that has earned for nlm the ^rentes 1: praise lrc;:.i all.
1 \;ould have lii'.cd to be prcsr-nt at thiu cntij'o vaeetinr;, but that is
impossible "because of my iri.vlncnt donarture. iiO'- ' jvvo:*, I L^ov that I T.-;ill be
kept up to d;^ce recardin^ the results of your discussions this afternoon, and I
ma/ say that the d.ir.;otive..: thai/ I receive i'ror.i you u.:.ll be carried out to the
letter. I vish to l i iar ik the Advisory Corn.raitt.ee and to say that 1 shall endeavour
to fulfil ih'j trust tjiat has been placed in rr:c. I think that will be the best
;;ay to reply to you,
i > . T:CIT. " nv.ViJ n id.thd o'.j .
HA/ek 3-r
rZ:Ii: VJc now reauine our discussion of the questionof tho retroLninc r..nd modernization of the Con^olcc^ armed forces, and in
particular the role of the United Nations iu this pro^ramn-.c* Ac you lmc\if I
postponed tlii3 meeting for one vcc-K in order to alloy tlmo for jrore informal
di^cufiSiona r.n thia important subject, and. enpocially co that the mecbers of the
Ccw;nittee voald have tho opportxirilty for informal cxcUouc03 c'f views uith
Miniiitcr Do:::l)olvo, I "b^licr/c th:rc these iniorr.al diacussiona have at least
nerved to clnar up some mi sunder utandinG's. It vca my hope, of course, that they
\jould find a solution to this problem, vhicli is on urgent one "both for the
Ccn/jolGGe Government and people and for the United Nations,-•which still has
continuing responsibilities in the Congo.
C/jw
Kerrfbers of the Committee have received the letter of 16 April addressed
to ir.e by Fritte Minister Adouia, which seeks concurrence in an interpretation
cf the relevant provisions oi' the resolution of the General AsEe.tr.bly --
paragraph 6 of resolution l 'f'f of the fourth emergency session, adopted in
f.>?pt ember 19 0 — as not imposing, in the present and very much changed
circumstances; a limitation of his Government's freedom to seel: the assistance
it way need where it may deem advicab.le.The real practical senso cf this interpretation, of course, would be in
its application to States providing the assistance requested. Even under the
resolution, the Government of the Congo is free to approach any Government for
assistance* The restrictive burden of the resolution really falls on the
[States thus approached, for the resolution requires such requests to be made
to them only through the United Nations "during the temporary period of
ralitary assistance"; that is to nay, GO long as the United Rations Force is
in the Congo. Granting Mr. Adouia !s request presumably would make it easier
for States to respond.
The view is strongly held by some that only the General Assembly could
make an authoritative interpretation of its resolution. It, follows that 1
cannot in my reply to the Prime Minister's letter give him the satisfaction
he seeks.
Ear,ed on my talks with l-'r. Bcmboko in the past few days, I can say that
it is correct to interpret the Prime Minister' s letter as not insist;' vig upon
a United Nations "umbrella" or co-ordinating machinery for th«. modernization
and training programme. Nor would the Secretary-General be called upon to make
the requests for assistance, In other words, if the Congo Government decided
TO co ahead, as is it.3 sovereign right to ao, with the training programme as
previously outlined, the United Nations would not be held responsible for
that training programme or for any implications of it.
It emerges frcin the informal discr.snions thai: no one questions the right
of the Government cf the Con. 7,0 to perform all the functions and have all the
prerogatives of a sovereign utate, end no one wishes to limit those prerogatives,
On the other hand, if the United Nations is called upon to play a co-ordinating
function in a programme of this importance, or to make the requests, it
7.10
clearly is within the discretion of the United Nations to decide whether such
n role is suitable or not, rcore especially in the light both of the cpirlt ur:l
or the letter of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions governing
ir,8 presence in tha Congo.
it ±3 also true, cf cource; ' thet the problem of the resolution does, in fact,
have the 'effect of limiting tho freedom of choice of the Congolese Government
by imposing a restraint on Grates willing rn«l able to provide the aid.
It n.u3t be borne in uin.I that it is essential that the Congolese armed
forces 'be luOdernizcd ai:d tiaincd without delay, more especial!) y in view of the
U kelihocd oi* the departure from the Congo of the United Ikiticns Force by the
e::-l of l>o;}. Indcad, thcco t',;o events have a practical interrelation. We have
: Iso to consider the inevitable political, iraplicationo f. loving frcin the
relection cf particular countries to carry out tii.i.3 procrerrir:.G. As I underctand
it, the Covornii'enL, cf the Cor. 30 ic anxioua that vld^e CI'lUC is Gtill in tli2 COUGO
ulL BJ£Tnl.i.'if:ai;t ^id to the Cov/c3nY-:cnt of th-j Cjr;;:o should be requested through
United K:'Li-:na cl.cair.els, :alli;o-. :,;;!* in tiris CUL:G it Is prepared to renounce tv;u
i. ja of th^ aid buiijg uOninioto.cd uyiucr a ihiitcl Kations co-prdirutir:;; Lsc:V'':u1.pm.
Ine probl:r;i_, therefore, ic to duvica, if poi.;cible, a foraiula by which tl.o r^cas
of the Co.i^olcce Government; aj stated by IriL.e Kin Inter AdouLij can bo
reconciled both with the tertrr?, or the intent, of the recolutioris Governing the
United Kations presence in the Congo and with the views of the members of this
Corrmittee.
In the cource of the informal consultatiohn, the sugrjection vac often rcade
that as a Ghort-tern ncii^uro — that is, while the United Nations Fore? remalnc
i.j.i the Congo — tho .nalitcry r.i'aining assistance rormired might he sought
exclusively from thoje ccu.itritju olreaciy providing military aid through having
contingents in the United Mi-u^ono i'orce.
I should now Ij.kij to h:\ar tlie views of the members on the question before us,
In that eunuvixion, I ueei: 'il:.e advice of tha Coir:r.itwC<i on how I am to ti newer
Priiuo MLnicter Adonla'c .letter, taking into accouiiU the urgency of the problem
and the iii.co«aily of inakirg LX'iue practical progrc^i.
At tV;-2 outlet, it will be useful, I think, xo aclc Mr, Fomboko to cummarize
his interpretation of the Prime Minister's letter and of the situation as it
now stands, as he sees it.
AP/ec 11
I>. rnj^pnKO (Conco (Brazzaville)) (interpretation from French) :
l-'r. Gecretary-Gcnerul, I thank you I'or fivlnc r:o till LI opportunity oi' iraking
iincvn the points of view of my Government on this ir::.iter. As you know, rr.y
Government attaches particular importance to the solution oi" the problem, of
the training oi' the National Conrolese Arny and you runt understand why we
attach such Great importance to this point. You knov that a .11 rr.odem States,
without well-trained police forcer, ; ladling an cf foe Live arny capable or
protecting both jorcons and their roodo, T,,rouJ.d he unable adequately to fulfil
tiieir dutietJ. You l^riow as well as I do that the difficulties confronted by the
Con-o began by the dissolution caused hy the hrealvclo\;n in ths services cf
protection O.C order. This vas due to the mutiny vhica tool: rlaco in c>ur army,
the army that vc inherited from the rclgians^ arid that at that time,, as you
also Imow d.I.l not fulfil the conditions whereby as an indOFondent State vs
vould be ab3.3 to UGO tho AUG.
I do not intend to giv.j you an account of all the event E which I know
you will roi: imlier. But if 1 have mentioned this at the outset ; it was in
order to shou you ve cannot ui-Klerta.rG anythinc if the ConcoLoce Gov.ernrr.cnt
decs not havo adequately d Lscipli'r.c.I forces of or dor and effectively end
coi..ilctely trained personnel. After so muca efi'ort rr/xdc "by the United Nations
in the Congo with tiio assistance and collaboration oi" tae Congolese Government
it is not possible for us at present to consider a procranne of development, a
pro;j-ai?j;:e of economic growth, unless vo have services and forces capable, of
replneing the United flaT-ions; bncaus(2<; the United Nations forces are not
expected to remain indefinitely in the Congo.
J.Vut in the course of ny ccnvercaticns and 5n the course of discussions
that have tal'.cn j)lace, two objections have been raised to the procraiur.e that
the Console se Government submitted to the Geeretary-Cencral. 1:he first of these
objections has a le£ai aspect; tills is what the. riecre/i: ary-General has just
pointed out to you, p.r'.ragraih 6 cf that General Ansembly resolution of 19eO, io
the one that is adduced, liut when this resolution is interpreted, the
circiuastances surrounding its adoption seem to "be forgotten. I/hy did the
General Asseii'ibly adopt that resolution in the first place?
AP/ec . . . 12
(Brazzaville))
According-to the Interpretationo given'it would appear that tfco
Congolese Government la not granted the i'leodorn or tho richt to organize a&
it ivaes fit either an arisy or a police force, obviously vith the assistance of
any country it uiay desire to turn to. But uhat were, thoce surrounding
circumstances? I know that all of us vero witnesses to the cvon.tr>, .and far "he
it for me to want to give you afain the utory underlying all this.. However>
I (1,; have to stresc certain facts of which I laiov you arc veil avr.re, First
of all, thr; I'Ganons whereby the ".Gcurity-Council and then, uftar the veto
by the Soviet Union, the General Assembly vaa i'orcc'i to ir.oet and ultinntely ..
rif'.rv/ted this resolution; you know that at that r;r);r.'.n-.t r,ho clrcumctancGO
obiainin^ ±u tha Con^o vcre chamcteriLcd by the aeccsuica of IQ;tac i,..
Thai; "beinc tho case, there vas a rccicnation of the Contral Covernn:::nt in . •
Lec^oldville and there vao a very confuted situation in the country. This
cc: fusion taroatGncd tho collobora'; i.on botvccn. tho United Nations and..tho
Co^crol Govc-rnmont Itcolf • A:ro::j otnara; there vcrc unllat^ial interventioaa
on x..:3 part of certoin States i\irallcl -with tho Uni lod Hut ion a operation 1^
the Con^o, nainGly, the Soviet Union that £ up-plied ]/J ar-.es o,r:d certniu military
rit-1'l.t'l, o.ad the Ecleiano vho t>cnfc voapons to Knni.. 5ic- ci:id to Couth f^sni.
If we consider the intervention of Statea that participated in that
General A^Ectibly at that t:noj, \;,.i CGR that stress ,'aa pla:od on the lack of
collaboration betveen the Congolese authoiitiea and tho United -Nations
Secretariat at that nioir.ent. jAirtharnioro, it vas vary dancorous at that
rnGr.-:nt to allow States to arm the political factions, parallel with the
United Nations operation in the ("onc° and thuu further complicate the work
of the United Katicns in the Con^o. This, ti:oreform,.was the reason for that
resolution. And at that time it v.tis folt that In iho licht of the specifically
and. acutely dangerouij L>ituation that obtained; it cf;vild'not he allowed to
States to cairy out unilateral action tliat nl^ht hn,; : or, hinder or ciairac^ the
United Nations operation in the Conco. That resolution was precisely intended
to atop the situation bein^ aggravated by such unilateral action.
AP/GG 13-15
(Mr. Bcn^olroj rcnpp (Brazzaville) )
Therefore, it Is quite justified to ask the following question: To these
circumstances still obtain today? I do not believe ti:e circumstances do
prevail now. Furthermore, are wo afraid now that the Centra.! Government of
the Republic of the Con^o might undertake parallel activities vith the
Unite! Nations? I do not think tnis applies either, and for a nunber of
months now it is obvious to us that between our own Government arid the IViited
lotions there is a very fruitful and close collaoorat ton; there is a,
collaboration that I could describe to you here primrily by stressing the
fact that the Central Government has implemented the ijoeretary-General' s plan.
I shall save you from hnaring all the i'r.cts involved, but you must
realize that the Central Government has, as far as it was possible for it, tried
to abide by the terms of the plan. You know that even on the strength of the
request that wo sent the Secretary-General, we did nob want to act separately,
for such action on our part rdight place the Secretary-General in an invidious
position ro^ .rdinrs the fulfilment of his mandate in the Congo. On the
contrary, v/hut voro the aimo sought by the Cccfcolcse Oovernicont? Well, the aims
were the following:
16(Mr. "P. T-iVi i'oj Conpo (Loopoldvl 1 oj))
'As I said at the beginning of my statement, you are ell cvore of the fact
that the United Notions troops will not he 3 la tinned indefinitely in ti-u Ccnco.
The iiouicnt will ultimately arri\e v:ioii thece troop:, will have to withdraw,
Therofore, it-is inJicponjable that we Mhould, as from this moirent, bonin. to
anticipate t-h<?.t tires. There will havo to be a period of transition which we
will Lave to bridge, and -wo are planning to overcome that transitional period.
Wo have to prepare our forces,and in this matter ve have always tried to cbide
by the deeic-iciis and the re solutions of the Security Council and of the
General AGsoir.bly.
The Co.r.:iittoe knows these rccolutions full veil. The Security Council'
resolution '/V';6y expressly stdtea:
"j:er>lflon to authori;:e the oCcretary-Genercl to take the necessary
steps, ih. consultation with the Government of the republic of the Congo,
to provide the Governi-oat \.\ith such culitary aujiotoncc, as may "be
uccosj:;r.y, vnitil, throL^h the eiYorta of the Con^oleGe Govornnifcnt with
tlio' tov^hoical a^jjib'taiice or tbo United IlaticriG, the national security
forces may ue able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully
their tables.11 • •
-Therefore, the Concolese Govei-nrEont is the only one recponnible for the
setting up of these sec'.uiity forces. V,re certainly do not v/iiih to pass the "Lack
co i\ji- as this -responsibility iro concerned. \vo went to be the ones to do this,
end this re. oluticu reco^nLzes that it is our responsibility and that we will
have to deploy our cj.ToriJ, with the technical assistance of United nations.
l.e are not a siring the United Nations to replace the Console cc Goveim:ent in that
respect, so that the United. Katic.ns, instead of the C'on olesc Government, would
be i..:0 one t-ntrustod vilth th) organization of the :jcourity forcco.
VJliut wo havo sought ii1. not to ask the United Ka^ion-s to replace the
Concolese G^'Vernuieri't:, not to a^k tiic United Nations uo take the };olitical
rcopcnsibility on it..j ov/n ;iiioulOcrs, but-rather to n,;k'thc United Nations to £ive
us LiJ.3 teclriical assistance, and only that. But we have noticed that there have
been those viio have said that our request implies a political responsibility
17
feeing loft to the Secretary-General. Well, ir.y Government, through Its Prime
Llnister, has tried to solve tui3 problem, and I shall explain how in a few
ECU:... nt 3. But let me now ^o back to the objections vhich have been, raised.
The second of the objections raised to the programme suggested by icy
Friir.0 Minister rests on the choice r.ade by my Government of certain States.
I icol that v;e should rot Lave been Judged on this i.::<tter, because the choice
L.aGL by rcy GnveriPJieno certainly implies no political action. Me have not a r keel
certain countries to give us military assistance, that is, to base trocpc or
war ^.ateriel on our coil. What we have tried to do is to avoid forio.nc part of
a li'ijitary "bloc. What v;e have ashed for is pu.rely and simply technical
QG^in Lcnco, material asGictance. But that certainly cannot be taken as rcenninc
that we have given up our jxolicy of non-alicnment, v/liich has' been our guiding
policy.
Obvioucly, in this choice there are certain elements that had to be weighed.
They iiay e3C"ipe n certain political viewpoint very o. ten bec.iuco of technical
e:i;cf,iency o-id becauce of lao ci^octivencLis of tho uLscipline of certain
cr.vi. tries. ,7o have tried to concili.-.jte the points .-.;j.' view of military technolo^ry
and c;ur own policy itsc-lf. An ai.ay is not a Kachine; it is composed of
in-:liv.tdualG, and these individuals have a certain behaviour and obey a certain
philosophy. In the case before u.i, we are not star Line from zero. In the Congo
today there is a beginning, an embryo of an army, and it is on that basis that
we uish to build.
It is not possible, as sorr.e have said, that in six months we would be able
to form an ormy. It is not possiule to imagine thic, and I think you will agree
vjitli me that if we had stated tine in six month a we would have created an ars-y
th'jL would not be a i eal ai-ny, because the formation and training of a cadre,
the very disciplining and training of troops, the setting up of nateriel and
logistic suipltes obviously will tahe longrr. In thi.c case, we have to sturt
wii.l: what we have so that in six or seven ironths frcn now we will be able to
improve upon what we possess. We know that we have something now. It is an
imperfect group, but it can be improved.
RTI/ah 18-po
(l!r. r^irnn^o, Conffo (Lnopo.ldvll.Ie))
Those are the principles on which our choice of count ri en has rested. There
are other imperatives and reasons for this ci:cice, and you Lncw them all. I do
net think thut I or, here to explain the rennc-na which led ny Government to make
T/'.O choice it has, bub I mat reassure especially ny brothers of Africa that
tr!.G choice made by iry Covcr.:rr-rvt-. do CD net cu'fect el.tl.cr our fG2l.i.r>£n or duties
wii;.>i regard to African soJ.i-.lai.Uy, nor does the choice in any v^iy imply a
rc'itioal stand or trend hy iha Congolese Govcrnr.cnt.. Per example, • we would have
lihod to have; concentrated cur choicG only en our .u'rican "brother rerub.lic3.
'ic ; know perTectly Wv2.ll t-iat alter the tra^cJy which v/e unacrvont African
solidarity has l:oen active and 1 hat solidarity itac Lf hac allowed us tr achieve
cur naoional unity. Cu uohalf of uy Goverr.u. nt,, may I reiterate our thanks to
c::r brother republics who hastened to respond to the appeal i'or help made by
Ey Government.
Bur -1,,1.-: also know that, all in oil, wo are in the came boat. We have all
to renfrom; the-GriiLe dii..;..,.culcles. The needs of the Con^o are. trenonctc.i.ii, in
vi'-w of the L.LZQ of the i/m'ito? y th^t we po^oC3S; .-ind really we comict try
i'u- dier to exploit cur brctiier iopuulico when v/e know perfectly well tint they
also are underline ."lmil;.ir dif aleuLtiec.
This is the r 'auui wiuch led i.y Governarjnt to ir.nlie it-n clicice, and it was
no"o only hocau:3e cf tiie dif ficu3.ticj cf which we know, bub alao the fact that
we ourselvuo are f croud to act now_, hecaune if we do not; then it would l;e
the Congolese 3tate that \;ould tnrnlO.e, eince if we do not have 'the security
fo.-cea it will not stand. Wo are ruled by that pre^Gin^ need at the uionent,
and ve iiave to reacli n r.-ipid solution. T..'e have tiu^ea to countries thai, could
L,ivo us spc.'cdy und cfj-'octive auu-lGtarice in order lint we ii.uy ac oreedily eiucr^e
fi\;:i our difficulties. ",.e have, together with t-ho oecretary-Generol, outlined
a i^rocrarcLic for the v/ithdraval of tl.e United Ivaticn.i forces from the Ccn^o, and
their presence in the Conco ia au extremely expensive matter for the United Nations,
DR/he
Having clarified this point, my Government wrote a letter to the
Gscretary-Gc'Tieral, nr.d in thai: 1-tter the I'r.!ux: Kir:.i;,\ter of the Repj'blic of the
Genre, Loopcldvllle stated that in view of the dli?f:kultion that hud arisen
ccncjr-ruing The nature of the aid that the United T::rt:r.cns could give; uc --
w;;e,t has been called here "the umbrella" — that in view or the necessity
and urgency in order i'or un to V.i ablo to act — bonauce ue do not
h'.'licve that this particular case oi 1;he oir^Gnir.atiG;, of il:c forces by
the Console3,1 Govcri.nGiit ca,n be placed within the IrLir.eworL: of tiie
resolution xnat has t'Ccn cited h-}i\\; l:ecauc;e: vo con:;ider thab the aim of
that resolution var: not to prevei.o the Confjc-lene (iovc.rmnent/t which
collaborates effectively with the United nations Secretariat, from setting
up t:; nnccDcary forces of order T,;li:Lch would pciir.it it, to carry out its
ohli'.ations .13 the Government oi' the LState — ve renounced tiiat umbrella
in hi at lett'-r_, tut ve alc:,o anlied tiiat we be alJowed to organize and
tiCflcmizG eu;:1 ariry and that we receive as ouickly ;.,L; poociblo aGnictatice
frcrn .;ountrl ;c villii.^ to rive ciioh a^aijtance to us GO that we will ba
able Lo full11 cur obllcationa.
1'hat ic the last request of iny Governr:.ent because we do not believe,
in fr;.i;t, that the resolution can prevent us from or^anizin^ our forces
ourselves, a L.I the more so .jince the EG forces are nol intended to o.ppose
the action o_ the United Kationc in the Conso. That io the point of view
of my Government. 1 reserve my right to speak later if it becomes necessary.
DR/he
C l m n p . : Mr. Secretary-toneral, nay I pay at oncethat n:y dele,r itlori ie very na ipy th-vt at Icr.G Ir.f-t it h:i3 been possible for vcu
to r- -place Mr. Cardiner and Uat you have nc v/ c:-:r.:t AubasGador EersiriviJle, a man
of (7re^t quality/ a L:rai of G'.lid vor'fch vhr.-m we havo er :Lo to knci; In the? United
IT;Lt.!.c.-:j for a irrm"ber of yenrs. T.-7o ore very certain that he vill continue where
Kr. G .rdiner loi't oil'. I eu cure Ihrvt lie will 'be at To to co-operate vith the
Ccnccl-ce authorities and that he vill he able to hrin3 to fruition the ei^.r.bic
tu:-k *.;hich ti:': United Rationj cLilnrlied \ipon thi'ee yc-iu a ar,0*
' : .o 'are ir.^etlr.;:; this Qf'cernooii to dtccuca a very ^ericus nnd delicate problr-mj
I l:rv:.; that a ni-jiibor of concaltciblr.aia have already tr.lien place and Lhac ycu; 'Jir;
know ihe vievrs which uy deler^clon hol'.is on L'JII : : Inc j i io vhieli we are discuGainc
ti'iis -ifternoo.i. lat i:.ay I vnint out o,l: once tlv.xt my delegation, together ^d.tli
all ry colleanes; oci.:jclally Iroi.. Africa, have r,evc:r on any occasicn Cppccecl the
idea of tho tjalning of tlio ^cn^clo^o arny. In fa^t, *;e h:..ve insisted that this
is voiy vital, thai; in fact U;c vcay training of t i iv j Ccncolccc army \;ould enable
tin ::.;ited lla;:icru; to dl;:en^:i;yG ir..^';lf fro:..i tho Cor;;;o. I Ky-;- l f , if I m^y ca/ i?o,
;-. : , \c on many uecusion::; uuhed ^lo;.;!.] -. nj ai) i-o \;het r::.r tho Con^Lese iui.iy vc.0 telnj,
trt;in-?dj I hive douo tliu t.irc-'.i^hnut the Ifict t:;c yani.\j . ' 1 i::-vo been asking
the^3 ^uentioriu: Uhat. the i;t;j;-u3 of the Con^oleLe ci'i.y vaf;, v;ere they bein^;
traiiic.i and v:.\at about their discipline? rihiG has ah;.-iyc been our preoccupation
for a very lo :^ time, ar.<l it is rather unfortunate t l i ^ - o this training; did not
td':e place ipUckly so that the present irp/n,CuC could hj.vo been avoided. Ee that
ac it may,' tnj n;ain point 'i;: that the African Gtate^ - -a t least JLV country,
Gnai:a, • has -never beon o ipo^f -d to the t^aiivinj; of the Congolese army. We think
it ic very ii,v ortaul thcio cueh training Ghmld val:e pi ice.
In tiie c .ccnd pla^.o, there 113 vord coin^ arr.ut the corridors'and in New York
generally thai, African LJtal/u:- are rppo:.,ed to Cci-^oie^e Goverc-ify.ity and that ve
are In fact divided, chat one ^eeti.Lii ic; supporcino a protr/r;.ULiLe which the '
Congolese Gov .rniiient t.ao put fi:)i-\/;ird and'another ii> or . ^ O G i n j ' , it. I vant to cay
very clearly here thac 1 ai:i not, ev^re of tnj .a ccan:i tu :c.i\ ly the African Gtateu.
Ac le-u,t, Gha..'a ID not in any collusion vith any other'otates in opposing vhuc
we think cliculd In fact i-ako p.Uteo, Uiat is, the training of the Con^oleac aiL.y.
Wnat i'j more, we have oeen told th?'.t ve aie opposed to tho eovereicn rights of
the Coucoleee. Here it scenic to nc that it vould be pertinent for me to refer my
DR/he 2}
(Mr. Cuglnon-Sack^y, Ghana)
Colleagues in this Coinnittee to the ctatencr.t which I nacle in the General Assembly
Mr.'••:! luckily, the privilege was riven to :::.o '::>y the /ifro-Acian nroup cf
:L:u voduclnr, reGoluti.cn lV;"'i- r.r.d I there e-:plc.i,lnecL i:i -v-tail this very pn.ra{T.roph
vh- '-h he. a I c o n invoked by Ira'me Minister Adruba cf r;hc Conc'/V If I nay he
permitted, I cheilld. like to quote briefly vhat; I rbi i. say en that occar/ion bee-rune
it T.;ill h^.lp a lot in clcn.rirj i''.:o r/Lr ci/ocut this npontion of "without prejudice
to the sovereign rights ol trio Iw:pri'.U.c ci the ( v O n t / j " :!II th.Ink tliero iri^nt 1-j rriiic1 n l^ f ivmr •:.!,- ut tho phrase, 'Without
pre.ju'-'ieo to t'iie sovcr^i^n rifhto 01' tlic ;\opi:L ic of the Cor./TO1 . T'r.e spencers
Cave !:unh thought to tvi.G p ;ir: !f,!_, irhich ij (lcr,:i.(_T;ed merely to reco^nis*-
•t:he e:'it;teiiC'3 cf the tjeverei t-;n rifht:; of the ";•:• public. V/ t : feel thcit there
chcula V.3 r.o doubt r.t all n.^ 'CO ^ne rovr rceL/^n rir ;ht^ of the IL.r.utlic of the
Ccn^o, c;:pccially ac il hn.r, n'-t yet l,..;cc;.:e a !v L.tcr f?t/.ite v/ithin our
Or^riniza'oicn. 1 thin!: ti:;;!: in a i:}r,rlui.::.on nieh ac tlris it is not ^^ronc for
the General Ancenibly i;o nt.-ite clrai'3y vhr^t it: its intei;t:ior:.
V. ' j t!,o on TO cay that chero clieull L,: no provision of ^LTIIG, whether
directly or inJirootly} or .u' oth-r r.:..itci'ia.lr: e-j" var and iclli'cary _[ ci"oOnn^l,
or otK:r aLGiclMnc'j r.:?r wilitai jy puriocc;; , during the teirpor-:.ry I'erlc'•. -f
L:il.itL: .y auc i i jbunco t i irou^ii ti:e Unli^-l ib:.tion.;. Of cci.rci _> 1 thiiji1. i.7-c c, ...1
a^ree 'J'.at the help uir'.ch ve arc ^iviny to t j ;o Coi-fo ILL; or Ly tciLjowry ai. 'i. Is
not a :-oi.tiniiJ rijj ccn:.:.rtnx-nt. ^r';ry L.:COQ 'i i.e hepi.iblic ci' tiie Cc>n-jo nuct b;i: able
to stand on its C'.zn f'?ct and mi:;b be Ll:d^. to nr.in tain lav and order, nnd the
United h'o.Lions rai.:t tJ:on v.'ith'.'Ji'irv/ itc i'cuceo -- I mi ciiro v.Lth the appre
of the people to who; - ; iielp the forces i.ero nent." . (A;;'_: • o^O^pp.rin._ !'''. -.
IhiL; intciprotation wac a conjcncuG reai-h^d in i;he AL;G( :.:^.i ••- b c c u u r j o thor.
vas no disG' 'r i t inL* voue becr-uno ;-,r on c^f tor rhe intix.'^ac; uicn of t::e draft rer>c laci%..' Lth this e:, vilanuticv:, ^;e \/e;:o 'bio Lo appeal to the Jo vie t Union to vitl.nl raw its
ora f t rGcolu. ;;Lcn, vhleli va:1 very o t r^nc and vhLch \ } [ - . ^ no't in co^foriiiity vith tiie
tni:.' ii:/^ th; .1 of thr Afro-J^i,1:!! f rcnp. L'o th...j IE e.i.e^r evn.'lenee tiiat even before
Lhe .b'.publio or the force b,,.>:1..^o a l-''.j;iber ru fbe 0;r\; ..ni::ation wo wr.ro in; l:;cii;o
On t:,cce [;o~verei(ai rl{;:J;ts. ,..i.) i.:ov7 iuiL^h uoro caa vo op a~ainnt ;:overol/';n1.y now
that the Con^o :u; a iiciiiber 3Late of the Organisation:'1 '.Ihic iu ihe fact vhlch 1
feel 1 must point out L;O that there should "be no misunderstanding as regurdG cur
stand.
DK/hc 24-25
^ he ck . to the trn.irir.c rio~rccr.rce, you hive jvnt mnd^ a state/Trent which
ir.u<;t i. ,2, taken note ra'. You said U-Mi; i.-he Ccr^ol^uQ (.!';vor7'.:r.c.int*o c.3olrO is to f.o
aiv'-i'.-. wit]icut the United IT-itl* ••:;:; i:i..i;i-c Ma. it4 thut in so, thenvrcro, then thoro
is no rcGpoiiribllil./ un your rart awl tl.urolorQ v-j h;, '-o no responsibility an your
udvicors if \.hcj aro prcr(ircd to ro choad i/j.'thcut, th^ umbrella of the United
L'ltlens. Put even there t lu-re nri" Oi::;_:::rn. I h,->.vo J.l.ctcned to n:y v^ry c^od
frior-'l Mini n tor Prmbolro vhrm J a;l;;:i'rc frreat.ly. lie Ju ' i f . ; knfv;ri my vievs i?nd I''.y
ccv iu t ry ' c vievs for 3- oars becaunc i^ have been ?.n clc^.? co-operation and
collaboration for yearc and therefore he knows where wo stand in natters like this
(i'r. Quglnon Hncl^y, Glnng)
All ve vxnt to avoid is hrivirir-; the Unitod Katioi.D blamed that even in their
presence tl. i COUCP hc,3 turned :un..G a NATO 'tr-an cr a Warcav bloc* . It ic true that
IVj 'icalatnnce \.'ilch is bo inn; nrvv-ht is only technical,, b;rb there ;vro poliiionl
<i?---;:_;oi-G. 1 he Concoieoe I arlic^aeno is bounl to di:.:cp33 the matter, and it vill
pluc.2 the United Nations in a wry difficn.lt citualoon even if they co ahead
;..':, :d conduct bilatci •::! Gsrccir.ont.r, v;hilG tlvj United K^.tionn is there. We c-r.y
1:nlG not V.?:canntj U'e waat to ol^.r;tract their cov":rei(;V: ri£';iti3 or to prOjCriCC
or proocrii.j tbcir sovcrci/'Ti rirriiLc, but \;e ao GO l>?cau:.:o of the future.
To sun ..-'arize exactly '»;liat orrr positicn i:: ran.y I cay that vc fc\Lt ctj-cn^ly
that a multilateral a. op roach to Lliiu problem vrr.s vital, rurinr; the ci:ort terra,
the cix or ,:,eVGii months th;.it the United UatioriG vlil be ther: it :Ls pcsniblc
to }j.-wc the cfficerr, of tno Coii^olosc An:;y trained. 1 clo not thin": it is a
q,,io:;r,ion of training the vholc ai ny., because al'-fccr all the i\rmy hau been in
e;ii..3tence all this time. i;at ;LJ important^ a3 far as I have ucnn able to
gather from the military export::; in the Ccn^o,, ic that there should be
;;u.Violently trained oxfie jrj vl:o cari coniand the ii:;,i in':.i:ion and have the
('.-•-.iJideucG of their o^rn people. If 1 rn.r.y tD^-ov In ci rorcl -- after n'f 1^ the
Ccii , al 01 A/nc Conc^t^-^ --''i-'iv/, Cci^-rul Ilobuuu, va.o trained by the United
i.at.lons. I aiii cure thau ho has been able to carry out ML; functioi.tj "co the
catiafaction of the Central Government of the Conr.o. My Govcrniiicnt foci::,
tiiul; it would be possible for thic- multilateral r.ynroach to be undertaken.
A lot of e-"pcrience has already been gained by tho;:,o hicli-rankinc officorn
vho o.re on vhe spot, and therefore 'cheir opinion, L.-b/ice and counsel should
bo culicited, within the purview of the United liationo,.in getting the Concolece
Army in chape and trained uo that they id 11 be able ~o maintain law and
order. From the pru^rc^ic which the Government hao put forward^ ve Lave the
ir.picssion that tlioy mnt a hichly developed an^y with' paratroopers, and co
cn_, uhich t., u_i is a lon^-tcua aifair. If the Unit/^u Nations in £oinc to
rcniaiii in the ConcP indefinitely, it is certainly (,.)in to be a drain on our
resources and it ia rpinc to ai'fecb the Con^olcoe tlirnselveo in the exercice
of their Go\ereif.nty. AG lone a3 the United Nations is there, people vill
talk about the Conrp.
(i ' r . Onn.).non-.r 'ir:]'r;y r Ch^rn.)
Therefore, ray Cover orient thought it vorAd bo ..loscibXc to firnl a solution
vithin tlh_ froiacuorlL of cur Or; p::a.:ation. Ue surfT.t that oven LGV they khc':!/'!
roecnrri.de':'' their position end icn.i a co-ord: ;.:in.ii.;j<: body c.f non-aliened countries.
M'. th a iY.v coir.vbrieG li:.:c- C'an-U/o._, vhich r.v>j al.n j - in the Ccn QO helping vi/! h
L'. ,( iials and GO on, it chf.'U'Ul r ? pos::;il.'lo iv;r 'i PJ o:"rc'!:::i]c tc l?e Let up wiiicli
V..11 h.avo noii-r/Li:\ned couriti :L< 3 .:"> i'u.r.i b ' lcn^ ' i - i ] i . L i would nyt put the C!ni-,fo
in any di-'Ticultiorj, It -.joule.'1, holp "Lhoco c-±' ur; :.-v.j are oi' the opinion tlir.-L the
C' 'n^olecc have GUiTcred too lone only to 'be cnr'uiH'cci in another rcourconce of
ch'J.OS.
Them fore, our jiropcsal in that the Congolese Government should reconsider
itc posit:1'on. Of ecurce T;O ai;c, -.ivin;;; you f/'lvico, 1'Jir, c.nd tbc-roforo it Lp'".nuld
r/;b "be tai on as intnrrcrcvi :c in rh rLr sovcroi:-n ?i;-ht:;, VJ^ lir.ve no intenLion
01' doing \iiat. Uo are ri^in^; ndvic.-e becau^o you v.,\nt advice. He think it
should "be possible for i.r.^u to t;o aher.d under the United Ikiticns ui.Jjrella. This
r ' j ' i ld "bo f ^ n o if you had a na:i-ali;';iod coi'^r; of He ;ber Ctates helping.tLei:i to
"by :in the. r ari:\y» Un tncroroi'o Lamport t:hG i'loa o •,' a chart-terra ci[i]_Tcach to
i.;io pivoblc-D, ii period c.i ' L,i:: cr o^/cn n:oyj^h c>, I.'.-icn there ia no .['car of o.
i-...::urcener: of the ;:,ii:ucuJ.Gii \rhich occurred in Kat:: :^u and Couth Kacax,, t/-:en 're
;:,:•;; cure that there Trill be GI ability in the Con f; >_, then the United nations
troops can withdraw and the ('onfrLese /Inuy CT;; t.^-.e over.
May I conclude by cryirr- t;:at 1 an hopeful xh'it it is possible for this
to be done. I cm sui'o that it ij possible to nave_, for e:-:.aivjple, vnat is
place in K.Tban^a; that in, the Joint patrols, uhich I understand are
vr-ry ijell. 1 an cure it is possible t.; ha :e this -while the training
Ojs the officers foes ahr-ad. Therefore, I vould fj ,p ')( :al arain that in spite uf
the letter which the Pri^e Minister of the Conro h -s \/ritben and concerning
vhich an interj rci/Ltion lias, be en {j;iveu l.-y the nini;.ter frcra the Ccngo, it
•\;oiild be possible for the United Katicns uinbre! lri to be f;iven and for a
i^iiltilate, al approach t•:• be fcllo^-cd vi bh respect i.o training vithin the six
or seven ir:onths during vhich the operation will continue.
1!^__JTW^T.AY (Canada): K:\y I say at the cutset that Canada has been
r.ost satiro.'i'-'d by :ho pi1,, "res::-: made Ly (T7JO this year in the Cen^o, Ccccccicn
h.oo b-en ».- .ried and lav and order have PO' - .VI restored to the point vhore it bao
Kom po:jG'ihl;: to beyln a ni ' j i i l ' icrint ccalln.; down of OhTO. However, these
ruihic'.'OTCents remain dependent <_ n the ccnbinued pr-ronce of an OI'TCJC force.
Ui. . 'or pre.;cut condition:;.; if CL'UC vero to 'be vitho. 'awn lav and order nrl^lit.
cr..?:-il: down and the dancer of cecoGcion :::L^-])i; ro-cn./i^c. Thir; ic a dcvolopraent
vbich -\:e ,::I1 wich to prevent. Cnrrida. nhareLJ tbc V L C V expressed by tlie
r- ;;-roscnt<.;bive of (]].\ana at our la:.rb iiieotlnr; but one thai OiHJC rbould not be
';i'lhdraT,rn until thore ic no fi::.rtbcr dan;y;r of a brcalido^m of law and order
in tbe Coiop*
It L[•.;.; been recocni-ed tbat tbe key to tbe final -withdrawal of OITUC ic
the retraining uf t J i < ; /\1<C to toe point where It co;i ialic ovc-r I'rcm Ollljr1,
/oorcin^-O:Toobj a;*o needed which ,:..re oiTioiont a.id. G^oeely c.rd do not iinpeoo anr '' ' li 'biona1 . buruen on the a.l.roo/.:y ctr<:.iii-.:d rcGOur(.:-.;; of th,; United Nations.
'i1'.; :• orirh.nb propooal of the (.^"-^^'LCCQ Govern:1: en is for a bilal '-eraL traininf;
r,.•'.;• "raiu^o eo-oroin oled by u Ur. 1.tod JJaoic..^ (T^-'^^'P -1:-:-^ raided p-olitical
difficulties. My Cover;::.:ent cenoicereo. 1-he idea to }]ave been roundly conceived
in a tech?:ioal ::;en:jo in t]iut it v;)ula have era};; ban toed tlie ccv^icxicn bet;r..en
tr;e vithdrrrj:1.! of 01IUC aiol i:hc. retrains n;^ of the h o o « It would aloo have ensured
-ch:vt training u.T ira.i;oMiie; lo3 vould be earr.i.e 1 out ci''ic.icr.it3y ur.d adapted, to
pr:.icotinc a np^edy \.-ithdi-aval of CiiUC, iicwe'/er, t;iis scheme has been
jjhown to l;e oolitlcc.;lly l i i^yract iral»
In tiij snoanti . io^ a raijluer of alternative cur.^ections have been made for
retraining tlie Abo' vhirh I shr.ll briefly review.
Firs'v, there na:j been a Lui^co'cion -i hat a G-ibotantial ninnber of Gonrolcse
officers i.:i^'"jt be u^nt alro:-d for training. While cueh training i^ uceful,
especially tor teehn.leal ofi icers -- ind'jed_, 1 understand that several hundred
Ceo:rplece ofi'icerL; IJM.VC received or are in the proee^ of receiving such
trainii;^ -- the enront laL nee.d fc;r Ccnr;olcr.e fcrco^ now i:j for the training
of officers in funetlen:: ef coi..^.and and adr^iniu. bracion. This requires that they
chould be trained wltii t]:eir unitu,
Gecondly, there hn,vi; been ^u^festionc tiiat ONIIC itself raicht carr-y out the
training, Uith all due o.eiei-ence to the cci;.;ncntc of the representative of
Ch-..na^ whose opinions I highly value., it. tjec:;..: t^ tu; that GriUC is a carefully
balanced force not adapted for this particular wor^:.
AU/tt 51
(?'r. Trrr-blny,
Moreover, the roir.ninlr^ trooprc will be required for the nnintennrne of
lav o:v! or dor and tlu. voi'crc- cc ^:u:c^. ..rated in cuui- r r-.:; 01' potential dlctu rbance,
ah-re it voul/1 be iL.dcnlrnMi; to i - c .vc untr:Jir:f.:cl AliC ui;itc, I "believe there? are
ali:o i^ipa'/taviG ouei'lioua of principle vhich make thic approach, in our opinion,
"beta h-practi^al a.vl Yiridorirab Ic.
'.y.irdly, it haa lven ryopoacd that countries contrltnitinp; to QI3UC slioultl
provi ;io o:fiico.;r3 ff;r tL'ai'.nir.;. .1 i::'.:lo}-at'..iid th::'o i'.i c ; Tee civ a irainviD^; rr< -/'.ramp
"\.")u"!..l i 'Onuire ^ore L h ; i , i u !. '>,; : Ired Iv •. :":ci.i-rrr:i:i'i-. l i ; ; - , c.;.pc .'leno^: 1 o.rj.'j.cer in^ truc'Loro.
My .ii.O.^atir'ri ::CG :i-;.it , )Ccni ; • ; : ; • ju.v-V; 1 that 'it ,;:-uLd b;; . . iOf:: : iL5].c to i'ir/1 thi.'J
i .urnocr cT t rn 'nod l;'ror. •r i i -r .p .- L: LI ^ c. J. Tl^'crs I'-r^n t/ic co:.?':\:i''Lcc conti ' l i^utix'ifj to
i . :u / 'o Withouii L juc i i a -;voup rT c-i'; i .e . crG tl'.ij ?i[ ;^c'j.cli /oiill iioo pi'oviao the
ci'i i>'::U.ntj co-Oiclino cc. ,\ <.nd > : a i o : : 1 . - . , : . inir^ c1!;. :L,.; i cn - j .L i 'C i l in ti.o Crir-;o now.
i - : . ,urthly; it ha:: i^c^n nri.^^Cotr'd tliut r?':j\.,ii^o::;cjj a; ini^ht Lc :i:acic.! bilaterally
by rh 3 CorjyoJA'^ ^ Govei'un^nnt j c -.- i /^Inl . :''> Tiv.G prc^ :).:al XG rcco^aizsd {.-.r,
I '--rov:l.-Mn^ the "boot to:!lui:i.f.'.al GoluLiou of tbj iiyo^.u.ji or no .coat to t^e Uiuted
: • • : • ' ; . • . . . - _ , vh ic jL it; rv"; cov.rc^ p. ^,- ; •..- ...:-.porti.., G o ' J ( . - i j L « ]Ic',:cve.r; It L-J;-. bcrcri
>u\ - i. That " i ! i G Co?v rr ' . : .c£jo G^vc,/! r.j-r •: v, " . u l f t r*rj 1.} entitled under G&LCia l AiJaenflj ly
iXo^lolion lV/4 (]J.;.')-I7) to : / : ; • . , - 5 i . U T ; ; U1T' T^ ' .L J n L "«
r.i.'h ±3 pro". l.c.n iG ^;d;:;ed L,vj;>l;i.,...i. LJ.y in F^jr .c HLnia tcr Adoula1 o letter., to the
r>ccrcv....;ry-Gcr- ral tji1 L.> /.j.r11. 1 -la ink That iiK:iLOv:r;j; o..' this t 'rTanitt ':^ tl'O'ula (_;lve
''•arc^-:! ^oi:ciruration to the implicr.i .,i.c no c.J (jvir ^otniv'^ objections -co the
Co]:;"o.U:ce Govt rnaici/ii n::.i:iij^ :i. u- :-"'j.^. r l^nt arravj;;:: v.o.its i.\..r trainlr:^ the Al'I^.
(]er.c:-=\L y\nsci.iid.y roGoluticn l^V-:- (l "-1V) \;\s nuo;. :.cd <ru a tlii.o vhcn Katnnra VOG
j.ii ccuv.Gci.cn Mid -when .111 addi t ion t'-Jo fcctiona t nc/i claimed to represent tl^e
C e n t r a l Goveri,,aci:t,. The p:i.'..o concern of the United l!..itIor:.G at tliat t.iMe v:.n to
try to preveLt, t.ie co;u'liotii ;; [•rci; ;:; lu tho Ooi ; % _; :> i.rc;.i tiirniri/; to lovers outside
cf the Con^o and ucv-kli.^ ti.-olr ^up;: ;.;'t« It vu::. r^cc ^ ; i . ; . zed .then that this would
int',.i..;iiy ihe <..'.:: ir.li .; .^ divi;:;j.o:"j li; the Congo and it aj .GO threatened to carry
the coj.d var p.y^ical . iy into '\ . ' . ' ' \v f.',-r:;pj.
1'ortunatcly, \:1. th tho ent:n;]. L.ai,. ;out of the Hentrnl .Government nr.d more
recently vith tho enulrp; of Guco^cion i:i Katanpa_, L^O r ItiurcLoxi in the Cor^o has
chaijjc-d ccmpleLejly, 'i'Lere is now a sickle Central Government recognized
AU/tt 32(Mr. Tr r mb 1 . r y ^ _C r< n .
the Con^o. There is no toiler of the cold war beinc "brought into
the Cor.^o thrown appeals from cei'.fliotiijc Cor.^olcr.o p/roup:::,, In other vords,
the equation ';hich General Ass early resolution lV^ ( f'j-lV) was intended to prevent
no Icn-cr e;;iats.
fn the co chanced circumstancer,, for th:i.r> Crrrrritttoe to object to tlie
Gccret;3ry-Gen<-ral rec^m^iii;; that the Uooo;) Lone uove.njic.nt 1C Iree to make its
u'wii orran.^ciiici.tj for uiliiaiy HL^iGiance vcu Ld a^ojab »;o rlaaln.^ a limitation on
Coi : -*c .i.^3e covi..roigiTi;y. I-Iy Covcrnw.-jDt noniuid', rn tnat the United Nations should
bo c.::t rciaely carerui -co avoid putting itself in tlie position of liirdtir/3 the
Dcvoro.ir;nty of nny ^tato to vhor.e a T - ? j c : ; J . it ronponds. Ihe result of such a
restriction on the oovoreif'nly of t..j Coracle so Govcrnr^.ert ni-,;at bo the
cicvolc i'laont of a feelii:^ of i er,c:i t-^:. it on the part of 1 he CorKplece people and
Gov'*:r].i,:oiio, It in relevont that in all our j icaco-kccpl i^ or.crationr, in ^hiui the
Uni.v: .v i elation.:, haj "bc^i involved {'ror:t caro ha::i been i.' ken to avoid ony limitation
of \ i:o aovcreir^jLity of the hocr, u t a c u 'j'lio naaic c-OL^eri'i accounted for the
rt.ir.v'ic-ticn ii. parrj^rr; ,a 6 c.j- Gene. •:•! Ar;;j.-::;bJ / r r^uiut lon l^Y^ (i'-S-Iv) that the
C i p . j a l v/ao raauo vil];oiu; prejudice co Ccij^cleL:^ uovt:rLlc;aty. .For the [\c od of
cur Organization new* and in the fiu,nre, it ic iraixa'-cant that the Cecretory-Ccnernl
Li iou ld feel hit;;,'jel.l to DC in a pnj i tLon to recoo,uiZG the fact tLn t the Co::golcjc-
CenLral Goverr: .nont roircinr; free to make viiat arrangements it docma neeescary i'or
the retraining of ito icrceG.
Mr. Secret .nry-J one rcl, I think it is importnnt at this meeting that ve
should also cci.Gidcr the corMOvjuencea if you nhould decide that you ere not in a
position, to reply affa . i i ' iat lvoLy to J'rlnie Uini:stu:* Aclcula's letter, More valuable
time w'juld be i.oGta E, oil m o ; i L h T « acfiy in ^ctti/ •-?. up a trainii:-:* ccherr.o an the
Coj"~o ii.cans tb.ut Oir'JC \;Lil ha/e to r emain one month more. It ii; desirable, vc
thinJ:, in the nroadcr LiJ intevesx^ that CIJUC should Le \;ithdraT,m ac acc>n as
thio can be dcuc aaL'ely, ri;;:oi.-e is ;;!GO_, hovevor, a .LO.; j;or problem vhioh the
t\iY->rini/..ition f^eos ao ct rcoult oi' the heavy expenditure on C N L ' J _ , a p-j-jblem yhich
liaa vide and C J ' a v ° .political iTrplictitiunc, fj.na.l.ly, if ve fail in taic Coniiittoc
-LO reaeh come ^.:oncli.i3ion, it oo-ciiio to my delegation that this rni^ht lead to the
problciu beinc raiced in another forur,,
W'" I-••'•"
AW/tt 3>25
("r. Tr^mhl ny, Crnn'1 n)
Apart from the further delay vhich this vould. entail, ny delegation vonhd
greatly re^vci, a debate vhlc;i could only result :in tiio re-opening of old \roundc.
..'.! 1 01? XIG in i.hin Ccraaitt,:^ are c.,vnre of ho:;- nucu en,i* Gr^anination c\ifxjc-rcd
<hu'i;:j the fir:>t year of the Ccnjolenc oper'itien* Ve hope very much ttatt in1:hir> concluding rha: a 01* the Ccr ;ol^?:e cperaticn Q r-;v public debate can bo
L.VG I -"-jd and nri'ar^r./.a-nts can be nrxlc \:h'I.ch iri 11 pen:.11; the 1'inal end saLiclactory
. conjlii'jicn ol' Hie C I U O operf!;icn in the C'cr ;o« • .
!"r. Secretary-','ciicral, I b v v c nnoiinn al; nonnil clcrably CTGB^IC length tho.n
IIQG boon my practice ia liic .Aflvlsnry Ccr'ir.ittC'-, > bccc 1:^0 I believe a oiti:.ati r-t:
ha.:, arlcen vh'.eh may do hai r \ io c:ur Ov-';ani;-.'it L^ n4 be arc raced \rLih a c i tua l . ion
.•hirM callc, I thini'L, for Uie exorciLio cl' rc3t.u.int by all 01 U3. Ac I rioirU.oncd
.•-•..• • : . v }_, ;.i;y Hjvc>ri:uient i'uvou:.r.d CM arruii^^iiicrrb 1'or lroini!!C v?i.i.ch voul'l have
r r c - v Ldcd fc,.' L':or.,o ('^-CT.b'"..'.rlin:; rolo J:^T • ; ' : ; ' • i .^ . i i t - : ' 1 Uat inncB Uc t u j v e Lcceptrd
t h n ' : nnlor tho eirci^.jtnncc,-. ,:hi- is nob i vacyl J .cah i.c6 In thic citurtion, pciliQpo
1.',,. C;i'7.y OT"''o;)^c:;:'jnt:j po^oible crc urr--i:'2.^c:.~oijbJ "wliiL'ii are not cc^pbctcly
I. ' ; , • . ; i.: J.'.. i I (.1'-,, c i"^ ' j '* . • -> L i >y O i. 111 / n
Canada :, oho no special role in the Cor^o. Ir,( ^od, in vic\r c?:f my co\mtryT c
limited r . i ' . J L l . i i ' y rcr.;oi;rc:i3 and. it.s o^lctli ..-^ o- ' r^ii -i. nbrlo ( -XCC, it'ls not clear
'hurt Canada could ]_vovide the no^saary ri jcj.abisc:! p:^ ^cnr;-:i. 1/o f :..vc
cc.\u3iiications troiniiv^; to 'iiic /hC. Our ru id l i ;^ int.crect J^ to f lyia that collision
vaio'i -'Jill be moot helpful tu t l^n Orrruizution. bo ijliarc t:ii.i conccr^ i.-Lta till
Me:lor Status. Canada in concerned also 1.13 a contributor, both finaiiciol'ly and
rr.i.'l itari3.y, to OliUC. The ^. on.).e:-i cf training v 'o^- 'o : 1 c i je i'orccc is only one ac^cct
of iho Coi-obese problem^ in vh i>? i i (.'nnada ha::; a direct interest through its
^arbiGii^ilcii in Oh^O, ci:id jh.-uLd r.ot, •:,::c!c-?:d be cor.:'idcred in ioclr.vtion.
Abb^-i, ' e::Luii ).d.n^ abb j/rnpo.-jai:;, ;\/ Goveri.i .LOU'^ l i < - G eui. o. to ihc CGUcXui3ion thnt our
er^nisatic a could bu3t be U 2 u v : ; d by the Con.^i'J.e3o C-cvernir.ent i;,::l;.i.ri<j its ovn
ar ra i jcmcnts through tue lull exercise 01' its
TL/jp
__ (United Arab Republic): Mr. Co^rotary-Goneral, in your
opening c i ' i t c in^n t . ou the .v.Glh of 1: ;:t I-'arch, v:hilc you uc-ro ^ivi:^ uc f.;n account
ci' the virus of the ('.'overcoat of the; Coh^o vith regard to t].c Koderriih'aolch :»r I
the trail::; tr^ of the Congolese nrnoa fore ' / a , you Gu.-pht the advice of the i:.n .bers
of the Cc:.T.:i.vtee on the imv-lvcr.'-iit nf the U n L t r - d 1'. clone in such a pro^;rnnr.;o
v..:reby Ih.e Ornani::riLion »;ouic provide an !'u;::';rclla" to co-orairnte the- fiinctionc
ol the inrtrucbor Lcnnis ci:oL;cn by the Consolejc Governmeni: on a bilateial l^\zi?.
\;ith certain o'thcr Crsvcri'.-r.cntc,. Tc',/araj i..]ic end ct the rr.cctinn you inalcat'.. .1
t::,;C tiiC i .oat r.r^on't qucr/tion \. [CG Lo (;c.L the J.'eoli:if"G of thin Ccir.niittea r(-'nn-^d.inE
t: o neaenrlty or propriety oi1 United. lotion; involvcr;:r:nt in Luch an cnerai,ion.
hii.ce tnat moer,ir!(;:; thi:; iiii^oitant question r: in Leon under constant consideration
iu ];.any vaya and i'roiii dii'lt-'rent an^Lei:. On tae 17-h of thi;; n:onth ve rc^t:ived
a copy of a letter addressee, to you^ fi'oni PrJ!".o Minister vvaoula^ vitii rvr.':.r-i to
vlufi i you e::proGoed your deGii'e to concutt viish th;.: Advicory Ccrr.nii'btce en your
initial reaction^ -irjd vJiich you r<;?raidcu ac lij^ritii:^ more ccriouu attention,
la iact_, t i io contents of the letter culnihathd a uholo scries of discu;;cionj
ru.'-l a^jpro^'diGS to this i^oot c.cd.icatc question. Tho x'rirae Minictcr^ in Ida letter,
"Reportc reaching nic concerning the delil-erationc of the Advisory
Ccrrmittoe indicate That the chief objection unieji hac f.iven rise to the
rcluftancc oi' the ci-eatcr rart of the African mcmberc of the Advisory
Coirmittae flows frei:: the fne t that the procedure under which the assistance
of the Europoari countries listed has bc^n rcciuested and/or offered in not
in h> eping wi'^ii resolution 1^-7^ (KG-IV) aclopto-d by the General Assembly
in Ch:p, , :mi-er I'X^O and is nore psi'Licularly at variance with paragraph u of
the said ruGo.ut ion" .
Prime Minist->r Adoula ei,rcludod by saying:
"But I also appeal to you to confirm the validity of my interpretation
of the Jonerai As:jci,:bJ.y !s resolution mentioned aaovo LO the effect that
it WL ul 1 i>e .ijithei- Just r.or in accord 'w^th t i ^ e ' t r u e intent of the General
;,ssei:bly to intororct i'cs par:v;iapn C> as now h:iposinc a limitation on i.^y
Goverin.,ent! s i/reeu T. t" se^h t-..ie assistance it may need wherever it may
deem advisable. Indeed^ it is notevi tha t paragraph u begins with xhe vords:
'V/itliout prejudice to tne sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo ....'"
TL/Jpm yi' L'Tv IU-d; 1Talt
Consequently., the rcaJn issue before the Advisory Ccnmittec is vhether the
Unit'.vi Hatirr;:^ in arciotin^ the Gov^r j i i r . cn! , oi tiie L. 'NT^O in the modernisation and
•u-ninLnf , of in.- Con^aeca i^iivjd -r,r 'ccj <.a;ccrc.iiny to ^::e -prccrarnne that tint
Ihncriuiiont h ..s cvnuittcd, will or ".ill r.of be in.eom. oiir.ity v?ith tlio provicionn
oT ' L U 3 rcGOlationL: auoated b^ tl.o i'caority Council ^ - - a the Goncral Assembly „
T. wish <.A.v:a chc outset to ^ uixc ;uhax, n.y Grv. crr.iii'nt Iiac always uupporcr.cl the
nece^Jity ol rcndei'in,^ all ):iiids oi a-oi^tanoo to tin. Goverrrr.:-!;! of tho COMS/D;
in L • rb^ my dciec^tioii ic o.^.c cj±' -Llic.^c v;:ic:i; cdncu July l-S'-'"^ have: ui\r.-ec.; -Uvj
Ci /;.. .i::ation to iciM ltr> a::jj.Gtor.: '.(j i;i aj.l f io l .c i J , a.oi th:_t any a.cc.Lctor^c Eiiould
'c.v 'L.i'OU^li t j ie Ui:itc:l LLitio.'i::. Cur i" '^"lil^a'tion. hoj oert':. :.i.riy; either ir. it:;
;i, :• 1 riuirtcrj or ia ~i!:e XiLci • • . , ho. .^j r/: : i - . oco ;LrTOi'U::';i; Du:u.{.n .in rcilizrlr;1; rnd
:;r:' ,i.;'.irdin;; tl'ic ind'..-o en douce ai^ l '(.c-ri'ltori'vl t;il;c^;rit,y ci1 ti;e Concc^ vi l i i in ico
i.c'.r?.,' uiid l i i i i id^te un-Jcr t l>~) dii ,t rt .nu rcr.olu'C.i' i > n . .it.irtncrnco'-c, 1 vich t;:- i,:"!:^.:
it ci . f .a i1 th-i i; no one, either durli:^ our :;:•:-:. i> i.::.^ en i; i larch or later in the coerce
oi' t::..i pr iv^aG cohverGa'Cio.'!: l;ao (.:Tr^-cKGca any •,\L-l!;!.on "which vould dcro^rite fj.-c:u
• r l ' . c j ] ) ; . V ) . .i.cn i l c ' i l j A;| i . i : rn :;" ; ;c.. v.. r>nt ac .;-.:.;!:, C J J Y •. ihj future of our Orc-ni'-rt ' .nn,
n :•;;•; o 1 ;; : in .: uir.il.Linj a p'.Klioy, v:oaLa a pr :-/lc^.;j i . . . . ; -ilut:! c -/. 1 :.- :: {>j:~-r.;-d o«- ; • . ' : : . .
c;\.'iiy wi thV j. iiero.'.'crj tiic i>ui:'ier. io L:oro c,:.' xhc U,.i. c:d h.iCJ.oi;:; tn.'ra of t;.c i.,,/c°«
It in a prolti.c-in in which •w.:; c':x':a,c- a i^'cr-oJont^ cu..:.I j...;eo;.l a i .j;:c x.Li.,ntal ;;ii,.:,;
V/e bcliv.-vo tii-ru .;;.; lonr; aj \hc United I.'-itlOi.j o^-.iratioriG ia t.h-j f:on^j have
not c.v;viG to MI enu, the rc;;(;laLion3 of the ; ' • . JCU. .M, ly Council c.inci tlie General
, i^:;r,...i'ly r<-rr;.in vaiiu. i':ur i .ha i iLui 'O , uy uelL(_a\,iu,i: Cf^ . j ldcrc it inipciative that
Uhti-. the til ,3 coV'.OJ 'uiicn tiio o.j,^.: auioiiG OL' "bh'-j uaitc- l iatir .r jc }];.:ve coacca, rl.l.
ac'\:,ir.:r.c, eit] or by tai.;; Crc . '. nizai L ^ I L a: Irj nnuivldual Go/eii:.. ^ .ntG ; should coi.ip.<;y
•u;i^ii "ihc cxi^tin^ re. oiuti'M,a . !«..iour:il.l.y; ho^c ui tiicLiC acLioL:; should lead to
any i'ln/ure io oI)Lf: ';:o L . ' ) j ao- tiic i J n L L c d iJ.iti.. i.^.
aj j. h:.\e iiK^iti-. 'acd uari'.or ; t..u GOVL.I . :.':nt of the Conco vishcfl you,
Mr. L •.cretary-G'jiicraJ.j, to concilia ^aat a ccitain re3O.;.utloh i;a^ Uccomo invalid.
j y cl. Legation cannot onaori^c i;uch u r i -cpaeut^j i'or no cj . , ; .a-n cnn invalidate or
nuliliy any re^oluticn or i^:ciaicn c,.cc.jt in tho can.; \/hero It is the one that
dcciai .I uyon it — • aj:^ ia Y U J . G ^a;:;^ io ia t . f j C U u n u i ' a L A3.a.:.:biy,
iiavinc caid t)-nv 1 wj.nii to refer very briefly to that resolution -which was
adopted on 20 Hiupt ember I!A/J. It is evident that the pur^oce of tliat recolutioii
\;ac to channel all military asrviGt-inco through the United Nations in order to
ulJ.rv tno LJra.t;ai. 1,'ati.ony CciEi.ana, ao long en it coy;iJ.:.nues to e::ist, to hLove fell
corP rol in 1 no field. It iu e^rally evident luat t ho intent of this resrlvjt-ion
VUG^ and CGI tainly ;;till IG, to unbare tnat the ILIC of any assistance Should 1 e
in ronrorrnity \;ith t^.e provicianG of the Unite.! Ilatic'iiG rocolutiona vith respect
to i.i.o Coii£(-. Mcrcfjvor, in our ord nion^ tliic j.)ropo3'.-i Dclicr^e or "umbrella11 ^ive
r-.!c-c to a very doiicate prcblcn:; ior aucii an action vouid be lacking a lira ai..U
ereiore, after careful ntr.dy c:C the Icrpl implications of the United
Naticns invclvenrnt in th,, Conrp* ith record LO a purely bilateral operation,
to v- Lch 1 c Lroady rei'crre:!, au \:ell ac the political repercussion;; of cuoh
<asr,istance, i;y delegation feels hi duly ccn-nd ic adv.ise the iJoeretury-Ccneral
1 hat the United, nations cannot undo.-'. ;i;e tc^ j_-erforii ~ ho taoh atic'loned to t.lic--
novvinmont of -he Conro under its prG^rarr-ine, and to assume the responsibilities
dorivlri^ freii it.
hr, ;::r,Ci'c:;ary-Gcncral, reali::inrr that the Uir.Ltcf"! Nations foroos vill not
stay .Lndefii;i1 (;ly in tiie L'OTI:"O, , :d furthr-r re nil. ah';; tlaih the ConcoleoG Ar. -.y
n.iu tj be j-•. :a pnlaed and .:', brain \i, icy deloe^Uun l-i.lievcs that it vnivl.cl It,
;.,dvi:,able fc ; 'i-:ie Unitv-d Ilulions ho dra~w up; i:. o:.:;.v l.t.alic-n vith th:; Coi'.r-' -i.eco
Gov:::',.]nent, a plan for tlna, i!urpn,;o to be effected ur ler tlie full su,'ervi.L,ien
of t:.e United natlona Ceii.i;.-i::d* 1'' delegation earnejtiy appeain to tho Government
of tae Con^o to eensider ail the proeiemn taat 1 ave bc^n raised -in "ui^e course
ef l..e discus J..: ons, an-d tlie serioua repercur»:;iozirj un tne future of the United
l^ati'Mis if s;/.cl:i a j_)retJL'ao..e \;ere to be irpl'-aueuLed.
hiiese are the vie'us ef n.y Govcrraient en this question, and -we- earnestly
hope ahat th--- Cen^oli.-je people, nr.w 'that ti;:: i^iited. h itiono liao successfully
restored, the independence and secured the unity of tho Con^o, vill live in
harrr-ony and prosperity.
IIA/j
_/-T!T7r>0 ( Niger ia ) : The cnbjoct tint we ore diconscing now in co
important ti at I iava to crol<\;ize for o^ni^G thc:;o remarks with a rclerer..ce
t .; Mr. Gardiner ci:d Uic cervices in the C::i);,r. JIr..;;over, I cio 30 bccp.use I a'.;i
i:i a position to appreciate the eminent nuaiiti.crj OL' Mr. Caruiiicr, who I'ii-c. L.
curved 'th.;; United r.aticii3 a IO^T; ti.v.:a a^o ar d thcu went £rci:i there to nerve
I:L ,eria, *;L',Te i:e i^i^eiv.a-favvire of a oi;a'ilty tint we still rc^rrbcr. rrom
» ' :I'G ; }\Q vent i ac!l to iii o cv;n country tro r • r..k>r ciunlly ctoriirc cervl.cea^ t.ii
v,.: n nnrr.-? br.el: to LJOTVO xhe Unltr-l Katio 17, a^aiu. I'i;c.u-t to put on record IT-'
u_ reciation of th;i i;ervlcon t l . L U l.r. Garcli, ;._•;: V;us rondoj od in the Cor.^'.o &t i-
-, :\.G of really ^rcut peril to the I:,ii.t.L'i ],'a-;/'onr^ and I alco want to }/.;.aco on
r.j ;ord our ^luhc:-) xi iat l i .Ls service.; to ;;ho ;>?.nnomi:: ConirriLccion fcT /ifrico. may
r> .njlt in t:,at rocloiinl c rGL ii . i • .ticrJ c 1:^cci..lr:/';; n re:1.!, force i'or (jocd on tl o
/r"rican coivLj.ncnt. I alr.o vic i i . oo pcy );.,,' iO - r juc tn i i i .d ex^recc my L;o^^ wichcs
to IJr. Carainer1 £j Giiccc;;;:^r^ i,i.c Arr^r+r-r^Aa? ci !I'..iti.
Uhoii t;cu liro'1/ biai.v;hl, to QI.-V Mti.cm.lon,, Ir. :.;;)crGt.Qry-Genora.l, the
p.'cpor:"ln of tl:o (" )n::ol...LC Covrv:ir:?o.Vii> IO.L- I,};-; t.rj.i.i.'ii: ; Gi : . l n:"-:k:r;: iii.ti-- a of
i-i - ior:.;e:v 1 ujT.. .'iiic.'i :! 'i'ou t very i.:\:-"b c. .r:". nt; be ..;iL.e t r iOGG w c r j obv.'Oii.^!,/
I'i'i pcoalo of nu i i^x ' iLant choractc:.' cuH it v-.ar; e n - . ^ . u L i a l -co corcul.t on:.;1 a
Ct.'.'-.-a.-.riiiient l.-oi'oro '.^.prcjcin^ ua t j in iui i t -At LjUl;::c..-.:ucrit private r^Gt ln /c vhlch
cr.rtain of u.3 hud \ ith ycu_, I •',.'.13 n.- i . - iulo to ncld v . - : , y n:uch to o;:e y-roil:, Inary
cc . ,i.cnts I i.ad i:.-.id'i i.iitil I iiad received J . i !C, , ; 'uct .^ur ; from L.y CoverniLCnt. 'i-
ii..] tructioric IIQVG nov^ co;:.o_, r.ii 1 trny are to '1,110 i'G.'1 lowing oi'fcct:
'.L'ho f '- :r /ci-nr: . :n-i , of -cM Fou- r;;l ion of Idr^jriri i i?c j^u:i.i:cs, us ao the other
Covornuiont o rcrrc^cnted hore, t-Lc uvero: ::iu,./ uf x i - .o Ccnro. ID EfLso i'oelu
trit it is ro:;t .u2. t .cat tr.:rt th;.: /:KC L^ouil 1 b,- 1'atr: incd Qi.d me 'lea'nizcd. It
fools that tiiut projoat irjst be I\-:!:G:I in i;a.. i nii r^u «-G poncfole. II feols
ti..vt roco^.nitiori of tne .icvorc • .^r^y v.-f the C. nyo ir.v.xt be acLuu.^d to carr,y vith it
a iv^co^ii i ' t ioi i that the Coayole,:.'j CovcJ.'iiii.cnt I.:,G tiic ri^ht to decide i/ho
eh.: 11 i'^lyy it.
V/o I: ix^o lictencd to 'the e::^lcmtion of the A^biGScdor of Ghana ar. to the
boc!:Qround 01 t:.o r.,oOiution ui.ucr Vi i icn uo t. re i : i v Ci.-5rat.inj. if OLO did rut
Icr^w that baokcround, one; would wonder how the roco.lution was phraccd as it was.
I have been in tne United rations only a short tir/j, hut I nm no longer surprised
th.it our r,:rDlutic iaj aro diif j^alt LJ centime. I.i fact, I alwu.yr; fool that
ti:a:c who • n\ i't tiaau are to to ' . ' ••airraLulnccd lor haiuy ahle to produce aryiihir^
taut recei'. OG a ^ayerify of i:l;e \vtec in thir, cyr:.d;. Organisation. The tc-::t <;f
o u _ ' rczo3.utic.>ns is uco.'.yn''el to r . r - - f t the o :.ca ..a.oM vdLch has called for thci/;.
d:. a-efore, vhen t;lr.ea c^.aaya, we l / ivc to rcodr.sidur the poniticn. It i;; clear
to ';;he hi(yvrjan (iovaanninav that ta:j ::ir;v;n }:a.c ri'a-^od since -chic recolution
van -racno 1 ry the ; J^vv^rad Aj^cr.My ai,d that :" tru.c I, •jor.plicncc v.!.th the aea/us
ci' i.Ui reGoiution, u i i / h o u b a c; drit od accoi;.j; .- ' :riat--^o.i oa bciai sidcr, wouJ.d
result in -:; iijijoca Lolo t-Ltaat. . ' .on both for tr.e C c ' r . v aluno Covernricut end. for
Id dnited .datioac. hor r 'v j .L j'i a ;:•.:: I f ind i ; y _ , c a L in cuyycrt of the appeal
va.y a was "o elu^uont '-y ]::a/.h: by —::• : a^j ra .^ca 'ua Live of Canada; that, tiuuL;
d.av.uif1; cl'iaayrd, we -..Arao cdaaya viaa th-r.:a.
ihat ..art of t.,/.i acf;'oa of rd:j dd,::^o'j.oco Ccvcr^Hont that invited criticism
waa fa; j ;.;r: .a: i-i^u v.f tiie cc- in t r ie j w h : ; - a \XTO in J ' V . d ' i i t . J G u b n i i t thai. V;j
•:• .a::-.;t r/'.y 'Cr.'Vu WG '•'^ecv^vaaj X ' . 1 - . - ;:,o :."'a:'c;d. :y, .-^.y d c -w. ' taj C 'Dr r -doc ' . ; Gave . r..; rd;
. . . . . . > u u a.?.aj convey. . : : ,_• 1 //o lu . "a \ ra r'.j.^ i..; y . - ^ . a.;, c thd~- .dK/.t a::, ic o d ' r as,
/ ' , ' . 1 cell; /o, droi.1 «.•• ' . I IT. ; ' id;n whi.ca ; . C J - G h . - d ; la p ; . . . - . , . lous Ta^a.vi-dc cc^..:ulda ;a.c, ;;
.:.•.:.a co:ixicus.L; >rhich havo uc.oa L.;V.^O i'.cre, cant cve i jL j^uy is yicyareM ta c^, i . i . ;uU-j
"Lh_i t»
Cn the other hsnd, 1d:e Cov-"%rr:ment of PlLC'eria fooln that the V?r" cod rations
rai r.ot abdacase it; rouptaiijili].:! iy in tuj ( , ' • . ) • . . , . ; u n i . 1 \;e nave witl'diraun ou.:.-
iV ] •••-0.1 f rci. T::.a i.'onyo* j. -'c a ii...;'i, r o / . o ; ) . , ld.y«..a...a •-•..;• hi/yiny that -;;dc und'-roj l.a
\:vu ad not i o.rcp ' .ovr.vl altoy^taca: hue that , a;; a ira;:a.t uf dincu.jsic^o b t lwccn you,
1;-.% i'coi'otaiy-Gc.':X'a.l, aral id'ic •d>oi:^;olci.:r: dovoij.n.^aa^ u ra:hc.....: would he vrv,'i'hc:.i cut
wnicn would, c«;iid.La\ia to a:a:uciai,.: T : i : - d/ilicd havi^na With i.atu cporatiou. L ;o
have been ; Lvlny ti.oii_.ht to the •y\,; ibj l.;d y cf auua a aehc'.^, raid I would nou
lihu to pui, for^.L.!^ w.:at a re ay ...'.:.: .a'icaa,
d'i:e rcru^ut ie i i i c\. ;..0 dL-puei : ' : ' . - r r .!•;•..r; rcoac:
' 'd iahL, i iC r rc judia^ to ;;,..e ::uv\..,rciyn riyrifcn of the r.epubj.ic of the Conrjo,
cello L.^^.i;i v,.i.l ;'JtaL.c."'> to i 'c.d.aia f..^;,i ia-a v.. . . . . ;.a t and inairuci , proviGl.cn •;•;
a:'j::3 o:.- othar laateriai,... cd •.. r anu ]:dlit;..ry y-:.a ,;oa.K'dl MI-J. othar i.jr.:i;.a..a'v .,
fur m l ' i i . a r y pui ± .^v .;; in id : : Co, yo ui.:ria_; t,.a . •'::y;;:a_ry i e r j c . d of .iidu.it.. . y
ca^oiut ..aac thiauyii t.:': Uni\':v?. h.;tiora;_, oaccpt i ax; taa rcquect of tao i . . . . . . ~\:c.(.
i.afion,; i ,hrou. 'h 'the dacr , jLaiy-C^ .iovn'1 —1 J- (< V ' i r - i " l a ••^rr-\-^-\ of -i : - i - . r
IIA/Jw ItfJis
( fh! ^ f __A -1 c b o, III r c r I a )
If vre rcc'cgnizc the. novcreirn rights of the Cor:r;oler,e Government; and if
vo vn'.ch to -help, I surest that help can be given under the terms of thisresolution.
DC/clL
/yVvjo, Hirer la)
The rc:.;clutlon provides th-vo requests for ancietancc to the Cors^o must to
channelled '.-hrouji lha 3cc.rotar;r-G:j-.v:rnlo At; tec cutset, the Congolese Governmentv:aj ,:.rorarc \ ^o to r-hanaet tMe r-vr.ic..;tr;.
hut t..j secretary -Genera:. "H. .UJ j_:-Lr.cod in a eMhhhicult position, "because ho
vas .i-.jaro teat the nature of the rcn/ !,-jatr; \;a3 cue-,, a.; to attract erj.ticitjia irr^t.:e ',.cr.;berc; oh Li.:i jvlvLsor/ Oor-:.-! b uc^ :^ r^.;in.-j to the: uolitier.l. iinp'j.lcatic^a . "...
1^ T., :-rc po^.il'l)le Tci' the /• :"/ijr ••/• u, /.i:p.L-i.c •.:• t;, au.v.l:i:j the rcnre':/iiy-C!oi::f rr.l tii;:;ii
•;.... c request; « : i . ' tlio Co-i^ol •-:; .1 ( . ' ^ / cv .v^nnv , , :'r-"r:.':-d jj- accf.-rciai^c1 v.'lih its st'veroi^n
'.•i . .v. .L'L not Vi :•.:! t)i:i ..-. f . lL l ' i i . . - i i i . t y« :...' I1
•,;:.:! CM the I- .il'^od iiatlcao v., . ' \ \ i . . . i !jr: able \:o [;^. ->vj ('•:.; ti j co-crli.iir:. tic n lor i'hi ;j
;..:::";'. .jtauce, l,':.rc.rj.a \/ui:Id i^c In a :"o:;ition t° 2 nocih., . . ' H - ' L tha;; the i'oquc;>t':; oi' the
•C'o. ^lc^:5 i. ov\-;rn:::o:-t j a L ' ^ L h t C ' l ; . h . r o u : : i tao i . ' cx -^ - ' j t a i - ' J eu i^ .va l , nnoul ' . i "be so
1 thci ;forc ihirh th; •., ta:
Cj.'C en n'e.'r(- ; . , . a ; G .';c:::ei.r-2 ".elc: i
•".Tr.i ct: -e i.h.yht l v . . - : i In atteritio?i to t'vj nature
.;; ee'jry \ : ie "1:1 -.: : .i.ih: of iiiO Adviccu'V Ch!i..h. oh :G
;KiLt, I "bolj jv« .> to l.c: a i/haci.icM1. c::/1 an.O'i.. 1 mh-::.;.,u it i'c;/; tlh-i c:onr;luc:r<.iu.ui of
the Cor.jci.f. ,;c Cove; • ruiicnt_, \;...o r.joc:.v/La:;ay-ot..rjcr^l ..'..hi the other uioiuV'cr^ or cL,i
. ,,a;:.t it ia very inv^rtant that the Ur/.i/vcd ITationn chouLcl not "ho
invnl'/ed iii taij Oi-hrahicii in a ;;j.y. w i i i < ' h \ io^ (A. ; i : a - - ; . it accci^: .rcapoiiail-dlity for
;.:•.: i'.. j: riling i^.at it e.'..iuld i.ot cout"v.\L, h" h.c - : i ^ -.. o ,, h ru-o the C'c.n^c^uoe Cc^crnn^eirt
I I L . ; the uiuc-otcivjd jl^ut to u> j l . - : . j ' o tho C L I O L L I . . . ! . . ^ , i; a it vj.oiiCL. to nooiat itv IMC
:; , . . tM--G oi' i ; : e ; y.;< I Li?.._.( '. vimb^'c J.ia c .^a i . ".•.'c i^'oav . : . . r::i.. •>. bo n i u - . i a;"i to leave i\> floaV
th;;.'., tiie ri .v.-ico 01 the i'U">t 'j. ' _ j r . ' :> l \Jitii t i iC C!;;;iy.« : . . , . o. uovci;:r!t.iit» i Gia:nit u:at
•!! ' j . a pc/i.nt w u a L d co i, ... yt : '.L \,r: \. _. ,e tv: treat i i : . =•. . ee-^Ta I'rc; : tne Con^oicae.
le, y>.J..!;;eni. Liu ti.c i.;.r:.e v,:.y a.; ., aic..:xs I ui* tr ehr; Lc: . . i j. aa^i^ v.ri ice are troa l".; .d» In
a..;ji;;t iu "t hu cu-o.. aiaatic ;>. of th«.: aid L ' J i - ^ h L Ly \.h . C'jn_olc:.c (Jover;u;;civt : i ' r ; - the
uiio.erent euuntriea, ihcac exi-crtj would 'be selected by tae Cecretary-Gene-ial
I3C/ cic i[7(n - i . f t f ArVho, IT1 >rU
in consul tr,t ion \:ith tho Hor^ol o::o G over indent. Since ell, hunrin "beiri^s "belcr:;;
t.i jjartici/'.ur nations, they yr -:l,d l-n rTtlca-L;:; of ..articular nations. Avid,
wlLCe tlio Gocr;>tary--GonGVQ.L hue \',3 that it :!.:, HIT \i-.\i i:t;-jo thirL tlvn Ccvicolc ;o
Co.orn.'...eiy'i-, should be U;.J.J:>.G a.;d in iii.'.c ro..To«:t I 7 jy^yle vhcia the African countries
o - . . i trust to hnvc no active othj^ tiirm tac ' i -L-U to clvo ^ciaianca to lae ..
C- " ^.Golc^G (^ovonin:o ib, In 111 ea;ni: -.•..-,, in coi.jaLt:J:.Lcn -jitii tho Gov-erii^cux. of. the
Cc: _o; t -x,- . t ih(j liui, oi-' c-:^r.:rt.v. ccal:.;:5.r.j 'ilu: n,?.:^u:' >.-r ^eOj^c vho not C'lly <_..-C
e."..^crt3 "but are selected i_\.:;i tho r.vii.j'cpria^a cci,iV:iie:.i fraj cur point of vieu
a:;d ircra '-.lie point cr view cu t;:a (': i y-l ;::o CovcriL Tat.
i.ow^ I.owjvcr c-'-rouilly t]'.c:.;o c,'.'::r'i !••;:; -^J'o cr : .e- : t ' jd , it uill "bo ceccnsary to
i::r.'"G it clear that they Co i:c I cur-:;-,- ti fi niic::.,^ or .he United I,;;.t.Lcnr; a'- G U C . J ^
tl ..:•.;•& tliey a::j ncnt tl:cre an c^r::^;'!,:^ and tlif ;.o ti.e ; i ;uGon i;,:y "wo -eel t:.3l/ "ihla
a e r o Ci" oriT/iyr^cnt io r.ooc3^atv i^ "t^— conilirjcd prcjenco of the United ITa^.t.ons
I''v..-,co in 1 lu Coij v ( . i «
r'ii^c. j.a jl'olo vnry firrly th;.,t tho TiVrltod !Tat;-cn3. cannot vanli its hynrlc o.C
t] ,•; (.. ' . .i '^u : :> JA. ii;j cu: tr.o Ij.;..-. L./1 l..^/'.^,);.; --,,:'; o : > . : > "; ; •. ..rjt le: pl^;;" thad. \;j , . . , . / 'L j
L-. . ; -3 '1.0 C ^ v o i.i^Ljij.vi anco ci a J . M . .. ; • • : „ . . - ;jt^n.'le to t"-v.- Cjiircler.'o Uovrciu;,.::'ii, \ : i ; . : c . i"
•' . ; :! . .• I oiia'blo Ti . lG ; :'a:.,.;i.t ioLj.'i. y :r:',cd 'i'O 1.^ cci .pl.LX. d.\.'i..Lii the .rjru:io oudcoc:, i.^ lias
foi'tunaxcl y ;.itiono,:d cu:.' c..- -^r .j lit th:: ri l l . • ; , ' . . y - /.^ h c i X ' »
tir.i'j.3 roqulr.i a cL; ; :y* :d .. ;;t ^-' a r ra :..:/' r. out. fj :i or the Coii;;o«
Gcc;,.i.'.l;r; \;o .i . 'vc-]. t!:..t tan ^r.vorci;:,! ri^Lt or ti:c CcL^olcGe Govemicent to
docioj wiio L-iiall h-, . i .p i~i, .;jur.'«. 'DC i:y.::\.yi1 rc'i,
'.LhirOLir, ^o i c - . l thr;:, ihi,; rc,',r;-l't'i; ' .1 carrier1, vith it tho rcco^nitiion o:!.'
thd rJ.-';dt ,";i tho Cr-nyo .Lc ' ' o ,'^jv. ,:ii:,.>.. :.T; i;o t:l c, ^c ti:.: ; i t ^b c.i' those v.'iio i;ill a-^
ita Wo il:ol^ Jio\;,/v -:.'_, (,::au "i...i 11,... i,od Ka'Li , ;:3 i:.u:.;t !.a iLvolvod in 13ij ;J
i-: : ration -- ri:.3t^ b^cc.^-.! vs urc -11.1. ni: •: -:.u.::.i to r ;c.ict i.:-.r; Cc^^x-'lonu ^ovor^-
L^d; uoeonJly, oecaujo ex trio c^A.ti^uud baited itati^raL. presence in the Cl::.,_;o,
Fourthly, ve feel that vo should h-3 able to find a formula vhich yill enable
the (.'unc^lc'ij; Government Ln the selection of thour; vho \;iil aLro.at it* For that
ro^non, vc n i f^c^ t tuat an I'r.bro'Lia oi; ,-j. G I Pf : ru:.t 1; i.nd i^-cn the cno crl;^inr\l.i..y
L;U;;J;OG ccd u:L:;ht be provided in tv.o Torn ol1 the Goloctlcn by the Secretary-General^
in ,';-n3ultaoion \:itli tho C!r-.n.^ol.2.]e Coverrrant^ o\ '.: eo-orclinntion cci:ii:iittco o.s?
(.:•'. r-^' ut3 to 'i^.'sint the Corv lc.3o Ccvorn.r:jj.:.':. r'.ri r>c--ordina"tln{; 'the holp.it rorolvo3 ;
jv:;'l uo proviac a lii :: Dc tVi .cn -l:!':^ coiitiiiucd oT;..sa;C:.: 01 the United nations :!n the
Ccr"- j and t;:c anxiety ox the Co,j-jolc;:c v.o bc^;.n to cxcrci^o their full co
I -would appeal to tho other nonpars cf tho Advisory Ccmnittco not to dvoll
on ihLiTicult.icJ 01" i.nterpiobl:!^: t]in rejoin lion . \\:. inujt be constructive r.nd
prc-u.ice oOi: 'jtiiin^ vhicii vo 11 holn I h ' i CrnL,ulc::e Cover indent; -\7ltiiou fc putting tlic
Lni1.3d Nation:: in ?:.;i inipo^r-ibLc; po::i tic.:io
I have r.o doub'b tiit/i: vi. at 1 h;,,v.;: GU^r^jDt'.id hH.n its ov/n cnn^s^ but, vith
C.T'. Tit rG3.i\..ct., I v/ould i;t:b;;ji.t t ' i ' irih it !.;:» a pi ..optical fiU^^e.-cticn, and, if any cue
i;l: i .e3 to Criticize it^ ~.i ^;oi;l'i L,\J i:j.u tc pri.;uiicri s - c i ^o l ' / d r i ! - ; £,'i:3e. To bo
a. CM ptable ou.^ rolirtic:-!! I T . I J . J W L '--v '-' ac;ji:, banr/.: "LO trio CoM^olcoC (.ioveruir.ont without
plc.'-in.^ any jJcttc^n on its Govo;;vd rn ri;jhi,-, \;!.iic.u vc ;vJ.l a-ckiK/.'-'lorl^c. It I L L I C O
at 1 ne sarix; tiae aaf cjcuard. tho united I-Iations ;'rc;-.i involvement In i,uch a \;ay that
it \jill have recpcnaihi^lity for mattera over -which, ac the United Hati one, it has
no control*
AI'/Qh 51
I-?r. "^'J.A0. (Trulonoria ;; T vlbl be brleC, but before cp calcine on the
matter vo are a* hsidorLn;; now, I r l i < ~ i Li like to av~.~-.::!.?.;. '. nysclf with the
previous speakers who have expressed choir h\(>i ay ; r: ei.••.-.ion for the work done
by I'r. Cardinor, and to associate r,:yo?lf with those "who have expressed the
eonvi;rtb"n 'ih.at i-lr. rcrsLnvii.k; will do n ftcd job there.
hr. i:'ccreo.'iry-r,c-Lier:il, I rervut that I have to eyer - . r s dirGp-roirit:r.ent.
tecauee of the intei ereu rtion t.iat l:r;:3 b< ; r .n [:iven t~o the letter cf ri'iii-e Minister
CyrilLo ..doula. I ; : i i ia;;her oistre.srid that IT; in no:, an official
iu7-.TOT-_v.^-.it::.ori, and in iVct I v;ou].d 1 Lhe to o^-rosi tae hci' that this
i.iLei ; - r t ;L j t ion u.'iy be enahred. Of cc arse, t i .Ls is uhe f ' .rst letter in which
IVi-c h'.nistcr -.yrille h^lc^la oxplniLvd his plan to cone.Lv.de -- not yet
c-;r.e] v.lv 1 -- b i .L . iUcra l ayieeuicrts -- this request taat L . . e United ITatl :/ir> should
of v/i..e Cj.e^o ha:; subihUvtcd a i;e^.oi'a.:uU;". from W i v L c h I ,Jho.;ld lil"c to menticn
c-..rtain salio.'it points ti'iat in iry opinior. can "be used iy us. ir. ti:o first
place, f:.;r .li::s!.i.;ico, .1 should lihc to ( p i ) t c T./hat is ::a.,d ih para^iaph •'•>;
"it r r -s t n" so re Clare.' el.ear l^hot. the C'or.cofe-jc (Jovci'it'.x-nt has not imde
a :;hlnal '-.' . res ^;:Icv;i.ve chc^.ee, '!
This re.'.'.:.-rs to ".ho si:: eoiuitric:s that have been ch-r'on. The choice is not yet
final ai..d is nou restrictive. This is in the r-eitor tndum of the Foreign Minister.
Ihe seccij.1 saj.ient point is that the Foreign i-ILr.ister made it quite clear
that:
"Any other offers with the same characteristics will be studied with
That is, that ai.y offer coming frcn otlier countries will be -studied with
in Lores ; by th'.; f']Iovce"'i:.-ii^1it oi' feu Ce.e,;e.rJl:.?p., and f,ais u very inr:ortaht, spcaliln^ of what I -would call the Adoula
plan, t:..e Gover..:;. eit says;
"it is pre- are! to discuss the rcfalltles of its replication and to include
in its j.: :."e any are.o.ienLS the ,' '.•ere ::'ary--n..--iier".l ;-'- .'it wi : : - i to suryesl:."
I r c r - ' - j u , "a:ie/'. ;,n^nts t.io Jeeeetary-feneral :.:!.,-fit w L ; . h f . su^;yj : ; t : i . I thick this
is very imrortaut and tlilo isay be the basis of Action that the Cecretary-Ccneral
iwiy carr/ out.
i-r. Pnlnr,
In that ornr.rx- 'on, I should li!:e to read pr.vrn/=;ru':.h 6, the vhole cf the
- ']. h, not only t ha t par1: that bar; 'beer: quoted in the letter of Priina
t.4:1 JitL.-ul?. . Thi- oara r - rav i i - rra^ , as I'clLo:.;:
tbe Cc -.!;•'«•>; calls uyon all bah:
!•• 'i.-'virji on of- cr'/M or oti 'or r - ^ - L ^ r
o.'.-ior Q..J:; '. .: r ,an--o i'or );.;' '.'.:L t Try j - v ; . .
T- '-rlci ni ii;;r.: ' .v.?..rv li.'j^l^'/jn1-.: til
•ci i ; roq-if-:::^ of the IV.ltca I:'i'i,:--;T(: ::•.:./ in^ 'HU tUo purjor.^,; of ' l ^ .
to r ' ji .rij .n ire.. ;;l?c dir
ln; oJ i,-.''jr avid i.:L Litany :
:-: .',^:.^ in. I:]IG Or / ; : , ~ ' j dv.vln,
'jcnnc:l and
'.ii te:..'jNr .vary
rc::o.br:ic;i, r:ai;:; paragraph '> .::. .y c i . b y re. er .0 t::-3 :.L.] •. h.:ry a ^ ^ i ^ L a L C e thaa 1;
now 1;::--•.!•>£ car:,-11 e.O oat eedor C'bbU. / . n y h ' w _ . th , 1: inter;-.i'.rcai Ic : c^/a be c'.veii to
It. bib ti:o;i '.':.:; r<:.ool'.b_:;n f..i' Ib J'ulv .l;-.0j \ - - \ ( / [-r- , ;..L /o T:ara(jr(?.yh 2 E t a t ea ;
7^^ • . - • " to .::Uo:;.< \:1 :,e Lhc C'je fet",ry--\b?vieral '„ j v.,.:c h.:; v.Dcc.-G'inrv
n a;er:;;ary?" — t I . J H ; co)ic ..iii.; , ^.. L cc»u- j j ; ;.:';i)': — "i^A.Ll; thr-^-urii the
> . . \ ' ' : r - \ - ^ o "" the Cor^;ol°ae CVve ;•:•;•,..:• at \.ith the techrv.o.ei. a . ' r : x c L c n C f : of tho
U.-,:.tod- II,. heu.:, !I — ti;..it la .,- . .Lue c.l.j.ir h-.'-e -- " c h ^ . i-^.b/-,a^ c.-n-.irity
: ' \ j " '3C3 in.: be abl?, jn the opinion of tiio Gcvoiui? .;u; to i:ct fully their
I .;'..'.-.-v.ld like to interpret t'i'.!.;i part o:p the rei/ol-xt-ioii an f'ivinr! the United
Nation- ia.ot CD .y thv- dv:-,.;/ biio in j.'^.:.t t: .o i'-C'--- to u . J :ivc.lvo! In ti-aj.nln^ and
rc>orc;a:i:L:.iia^ the Co.iC-1-^o iv.r-y, T l v L f v lo V i-^j ! i i / i ' .ni 'o 'v- .o .iu ccnnexion with T.;:iat
a-13 bc;u p?;opo.:^d v..:i\y ab.'Ly ,;.y the :'-rir ::,;e:iir, tvlvL. ri Iv; ;.::•;.".a. I u^oe in GGUC; ;
ro .>p- jc . . 3 v^bh ;:iK; p.for.o:::!.'! r.-idc 'by 1.1;^ ;; •_•r^Lriy-.^t j .vc o- K.rr,erlu. But c>n the
L.;.;r,iJ ) L' tl\eje •i>..ro rt;L^: i . - i s L i n f . i . j mid . :\ t!;^ bar . ; . , ; , . ->i ' V.IG /C'rd'..:.. tr» thai: havo been
e Ive-j.c ^ I by th-'? j.1;::'.-:;.' ; I.;.:L;:I..^' •.;::.' "c. .e Oinr.-;, 1 tl. i r j ; ; 1::-t t:j: United IJaLioiiJ
'"Oiil.i ;-o able uo provide an u:jbrell'i lor \,'uicli t.i? liriltei Kot.L_oc TJ.i.ll l ave a
reopenJibility, if the United Ilatiuiic \/ould be ^Lveu a aay in the selection •
53-55( f i r . TnInr ,
of ti;c ccdimtrles that have to provide asc.tGtonoo: J.n this case, Instruction.
In T i . i t c a L ' C j I thirl: vc vill i.: ^L'::.:;oiit bct.ii t iu : ro:v<luhion o.i1 .1.6 G^ptci^l-cr (•£
l.-iG '~ : . -nc rQl :.c:ir.:!!.bly arv.l tho r:.jcu»'.lty Coi-v/il r.,-cc:Uv'.icn ci1 1-'.- July IjCO. Of
crur. .;_, tlic jolc :J;icn -- If tho IMtecl IIat:;,o::i3 is c^in^ to mice that and if the
U;vu/.-1 l ja t i r . ;3 can have the a.;-r? j::ont cf th^ Govorna:. nt of tho Con^n — should
uj a .i" in t'ie ;:•].;i.r.it; nn:l I ;j •..r,.:jo these words "iu the Lipi.rit:t o.C the
ruscluticns that have been adopted,
RSH/ ec
K-._]"-:*:;;•'A (horncco)
will alloy a.; to ray tribute to
o ta rUv and th-j clo iuino-3 with •
a.it'."..- 'iyv..L :yy.'u:ycl.y~i^ y .• i." I?./. •", CO1".-
C y'1 i"] P ; jO C " " r v : u he l'a"i L1? -r"1 '1
. - . y - c a - i r y ; v . ^ y r ^ y
:.;h i: ha:' ct:pc;;::c:: utyj qic.
:; aJ at .2 a.* hr; in t;j ; at
"LJ •*.! :!..:> C. :: r..L CT:. j _, ICOL'/
am euro you
; 1'o.r iho
n of the
r; ;>:yp~ct of the
r. re 'Iho
on
Tor:
LO.VI.J or. '.'ii-v :''v:. a aiy," i^cjy.ny;^ OL' .j,y:l^ he my lv\ve h.iro«vurod.
I:l:i:.:yt., :r ;.o;;^:^--o J.i jou:" ::l'Li. T,,vil tJ:.:.ib rluoo tlo t''.r .•: ^"L tl:.~ Ccnrro3.cco
crirl:; :••!/ i'/..lc y,iioi haj DJ.. ; I.I l-y/cj,j ^in^:^,: yL a c jni]t:ir.i: cmnirn npocir.ica.Uy
' v n o ^ c ^ j j
iiroil ci' tl.o Ccnro,
nc cc •,;-• . . , r . \rov-u
at Io'i3t, tr ./i; va:j i;i.>i a3 clc-.j.r.
iioc-d to pToyo.ru-1 -ch'-/o cove_y l ; a ' f -y
n j , o<y i . -'ic-ll;. ;:acr,i to have o""oyj.:.i ;.
i '..:.:i, ;a:,li'ili. •' . ;>' , and I j;iu:t :;yy t1
laard r j j
;rG^/hat chadovy, or
l i:a;al;ioa iLalo 01' the
y' ' .oD.i . ; . ' . i i of t..:o so vnT'ji, i ity oi' i . ; ' ' j
ci:adl';ii[/,ed or doubtod by any Maul
t [a.,' pri-acl to ::,^\ that thorn
;-V;'a \;e arc ci.ually f;nacoraL.d
a t . . : on r« ..y.tli >:-,.;. oi' it. laa
v"> :r a auc.yL.i'./a tiiao Is
zaoion. I do nob holicve,
RSII/eo
oi.th.or, that, it in doubted "by anv country ovrtoido our Organisation. It ir, l:no\.Ti
that v : ic roooiut ion to \h i ieh r^ rur 'n :ce har3 1'Oey nad-.: f ^c;j not eonoiot raerely oi'
on-': p ' : r t that ial-:ec into a o o o n r . i I ho oyre3t:v 'le1.>:h : . a t v i ' o of the Congolese
." "ivoj. -.- hynty , lo it t"o'r a t'0.".p^ r,i: y ->r ;• jo:'i: O.GO.;: p-«.: iod . ",'h-ri o v/oroif nty
i . : : : . . - . L \ , , no pclitli.a.1 j i t u a t i . ; : , v, yy. c*;or it iLr.y ; .e , e^n ler'uly hrirn it anl fromJ- ? lJ 7 4... ^i^
.'ot the- M;her i":.:.'t oi' I 'v, L'c r: VLul . • .on o r i -c i t ; :n oL:l:: r;ati ^ru v/hio'i arc
iiv>r:::;,;..nt ca tho 1:nit•;.•:! lia.t'1 o v . n , ; .. I \ : ! ;0_i tc:'j.."j ,. po:: 'j.:r].G qai;:o ju...; tiriably, vrc
invol:". iho c.y.'io l;ci:oo ul' ci *:c ,7 o:Lt:;;i.'ti<"i:i in •; . ^ r - Cnn;^, -,/o r-'/rhap;.: rorjnt tu dr^w
1.?yj i •-^c.jsary f>-)uc:liuy ;.on^; :i;yl t'j :..;•:. v;1 ;o th-n: tlri.y yyv.r :;itu-itioii that iyvy L:ivo
::.trc-L'..;'jd the nc r /o rc rL /^ i ty ol' th ' j C.'::;";o h:u in :.:';;• v/,.. y to restrict or c:.:panci the
rospr !..3ioili1 y of tho united I at :v ' 'U;i . Tho \.v;o y;i.:'c:;: cf the rosolution arc1
•::lo;jf .. ; linl.', I, and i-'' t .oduy v;o t::y to o;i,ro. one ncv/ i..tcrprctciti.cn to the
prov:h l.ciu tl i.t - i] :pniv nt ly have croato;i c : n d i J . i o M L ; for i.hio r oriifontation of tho
UOYLT; ;-,cri^y -!i "i - - - - 1 - Oc io /o , it .1.3 u b r i o r j t n:L tlv.; rcuronjibility of th-': Tjnitod
ilatir ; . i . j j; :u;3t I.IP oyn-nino:I fi'oin t.,c :.•:.•.::.i. a l r n d n c i i i i t .
• .7 all t . ' .L .Lo, 3. LA yn. thct vrs iy.ivc to ohoooo 1 c/uv;ccn tvro C'lternativco. Either
V:G ac-j ' ioualy ocoinidor that 1 he jtat^ oi tho h : ; U at p resen t \7.\J.1 cJ.lc^v; ccciu'o.ly
;:.nd. c".lor to bo niaintnlncd In too country vithiri tho : o r thocr / i in f ; 01:: nionti.::,
tlyit '.3, \ in t i .L th.c oiid cf tho ro:;nonc 1 bility of tly-: "h . i tod liations operation in
tho f!,.;yo;o, anl in that cano, a i rony 0::-poa.i fcjr i'oroi:: n I'orcoo anl tho intensive
•i.raining that wald. to carried out iy ;ii:: ] '0 \ - ( ' rn \; .y.L.iA. bccor.io a prerequisite „
•:'.vr ii' luring thouo s^x n.oniho too reopoi:sil'ii..i/[ • cC i; o o'nitol I,o.ciorio that has
'(;ccn (O'^rriod -;o, c v/itii GDCOO;. ; . ; conlh \--o C3nt:i.nucd L a i n factoriiy liutil tlio :i!o::.cnt
v / j u n tiio \ ; L t V .•.li'T-val c;f Iho "hii.toJ ..ationo t j - j o ? . ; .vo^ ; t' tlio r- ; ; l i tary invo].yc::::'nl
..;i the : Jn i tod ii itioni'j iy. tho C o r y j . i ^ L i c ;;ituai±on C^-v"c" "^-0 Con;;o.Lcu'C CJovernr.om-
'?iitij'o [VuodC'Hi to turn to \ .o .a i ,ovur iovo^ro ^,t i.i.r:y cho- 'C and to have whatever
;::ili'tary roi j .ey it iii.cj. V,o i i uv^ : no oh.jo^tioi: in p; incipie bo tnis and no
objection ovon ii it i3 made in i_-o fojLi of a r o M u c o t .
50-60
I -,-ould like to acl: those coil -y;ur:T> of ours v;ho havo t?:i-jcl to strops tiiti
::rrnrcr.;, .contra iiotiau bctr/oon th ' j a . : ; v p - I iiaiior:"' j.nt'-ia -n+ioa and iiic-
; - . v , T ' : r H n.iy ci ' ' iv Coiirc -\.iot nor n ~ < ^ ' v i^ly V<r.-liovc t :v i t vr-.ilo ihc Uni ted llations
.1 j :•..:. i - ^ oor. • .ir.v:o, cvc:i f.^r a L:. i>. , , . i^Ci prricl, to a r ' ;::r'ic rccr^r.L'ildlitio.s, ar:d
:'-::":^ . : ; . . ; i ; iliti;;.:. oJ:' a :;.ilitr-::-y i;-\tu:;:o, i t o rin 'bo aG"ooi:i ted \v.Lt]i iho (.••:•_ or ci::o of
. ' i i .1 ::. :c-r^ i . .ynt ' :.u a - v t r v f l o ' . i ^ r . L c ; -vr,c.!;io r;r.d can i^i .d Itoclf thTOii^l.. co:;:c
i;:.rro-U ratio :; Lti..LLtion,.!:jl;coQ i 1 ] ' ) in ;"G;.; :e v/n^- in a ncrj situation v.iiich in:plicn
^ z-::rt ;" ' .}- ] . riilii:;,:';}- j;,;uj..ncc in f:n jJ.'':- ' :>:";i c\)iir ; i;ry.
' . ' . " . ' --.ro not ii. a, . ;T viy ^T'^t; ' L l > rr ; ; i;:;V:-c ^ !-' : ;0 f'-^-..rc; trrirlr: of the military
o r n ^ a i - L ;j.:-, cf a-.y At:iC':!i cci;:.ir.i/. I ;...:: try:_Lp ; : 'bo t !•::!:.!': a l ibtlo 'vi.rhcr end
-: , T r .; v ,--..., ^£ . \-faQ . ,itu:J cior1. fii.'d: .' i^:it : r i ' O ::.H a f c .7 -:;:-!:;; in t]y C c r ; ; o \vlicn th in
':.-• )lic;;/ ihat v:il.:. cre.'it.p an ii::'!:'1.!.':; c;;. in iho hc--.rt r/f :.j'r i.c.-.r: . !i! r:;r. sum tiio;"on;;o J.^= .3 not v^ut tidy iiiibaicUice, rut it io ono v.'iiich i-Iio African otatca have •
to prcv-.mt. • . ' . .
IP-
PR/he
I-*:*. Sroretriry-uereral., I <?•" not talievr< that l.VLtnd ;/itionn respond polity
vouid f:crir J.IA:O r?id/ ' .v ii:c.; j ret:;.:, rf :;. iv-cv r^ar7 coru'il'.-tinn, that lc tu ^' ; • / _ ,
: :> cono.!. li-i t r - Cv. ; ; , ->. . : i . o i ' u r^v. r - . " / - - t -y vt i . • • : ' • • -<- c..,..v i'o:::al re:; I"ri'.. 1.lor.s vich th •••
'J: ::-.:! I.Vtvi.un.: C O - C M . r ra "ica v];l,.!h ;; ;ut '. bo ] nitoci tu br!r.£ a ryldile^JUi l.r, :;:•--.: n
- ii'- :v <;;.:••:;•!• 3 r'- tho Ccr.j-. ] ^ r . o C . - . / • . rr.3 . "nh , \:i-! t entire frced-:ni tc chcoce, and ino
o^urtr i . . . ' j '. ..a\- - i ' i io Corr-•>!,-•• ::• 't. ; .-• i- :r ._ :: ]--.^ " ; . o . j ^n .
j". t,:iii •: •chL. i ; tr.o Unil^i.:. ; . ' - . r . i . - ; : 4 j :.:;;ou '/.i. 1 : . ' i.;or- L'idcly aware or its I'^rltion.
It ::ncnld ] In../ c, '3r> ;j.lc::,' role t ...,;i tlir.I, "i a. ;:.:TO !::t::d IA::: : / ;TI. i .h r>^o ' shru"1.:- 1-
-'- '"• J' - ' - " - C j . :.c < IrMr, 0:1 -i.hO' cov:rci( ,w,/ •. t it'-: C< r ;<;. , 1:\-, tl-- lT::itcd ta t jona ;:v-s/;r::e
i1!:}.".. lc:i a L'..-ricui3 IK :::i:ri. Li:. ' .:;vi'. j. jorr-j..-; ir -i .-j rntr:.::. ol' ry c ) ' ' J . e ; v;:vl. or. tv.(.re ir:
.:0 :'oelinc ' . d v i U L uevcr oT h r^ in - - to r-.vji; r'.ct r-^ ].:'.::::'..'. Cf . . ; . ("::• . ' .ere sov - . i -o i^ r i t y .
'.;.j .'."O :r,-.uuh,/r.3 c i? i M i c Cc...- ;.t:;. :G ;\r.^ \ . : . . _ . LV f n i - > 'b",:,a ci; v- ::^~. hero \/e l^-.v-'.- tc fLv
T-:;r .j.,Ivlcc 'cl.rvt is a^Ved c r' u:1.; fur ^ hs \r;:\ ^ rc^ -,;c ar'.- fiv.':!^ t:i:i.L; ;..dvice in a j:'.^;; L
.•..:r/Lr-j.'o.':.'2 ^ray. rovc1;^!^ tiilr i'or ^:.: ii:;- t') :;iir:'-"ii:-vi Iho t'.ilt-l liationc pr.:f:'..rco
.i:^ t . i - , 1 Oor.s;''j wi-i ;i i\..^tlci! l-.i:.' vl - j . l^n'ro .-.rnd r.t . r.'oi'--.. hceo.ur:c the -v\.;ry nr:t:i;rc-
o/ t . . u j ,...;,Ji tJt:::ic,: t1 ' it ±:: I V Q ' J . -i, o;.1 th'.: Ur.i ,/..! I.'a-; icn;., I'al].:; int j a very Gp-^
, .;d .','jr.LOUi;. j ' l o ld iio'fc C : i i y I :\ 1. ; cl:r,*o L- M rr .' -t >. j? ~::n<; C^:i r": ' ' ; tut. a l^ 'O in U.o "v-ry
•.Vv,lu\:l>3n or r.r.^cd llatin.-r, r^::t.>L:.,iyo i.a 1:1:o : i a b u i « j :;ince "by its dorinitic.n
the Ur . i t^d .ici";ioi"!!3 in u ci\ril j. , ;t;jt ^no--.1 0;- .'n::j.;;;j.(.'.:!.rn.
IT ;;j:e C..'J.L h: :iu t lh; - ; T ; ; ~ > h;iG i.;;.dod u!/d t iv/e:''. :ynty roturno to the Co-n^o, then
the rr-oeptior.'iL enti ?:o 01' uh- j U:.. i . ti .d HVclcrii: T, j.i.L'L. a y 'pr,:r;rr.c^ in the Conr-o 1'allc
,,:, 1 ^ .<:cm-3- : U::Llcj;i; aad ^nru.-rj.-;!:.; ,:.y. 1 Jo i:C", uele icv^ tL^t ' tLr--? ic a Gtnylc
dolc/;:;.tion -ori) which, a L L a c u y h ,^....tir;:y t.c> ^.Lvc1 i..^ i ' . ' jr-._p i.li t.'K; u ^ G e G ^ : u y
:;ix,.:i U-'^t it lia.3 no do:ru\j -i ;> rj'i^.ict; y;.,c ::;,vor-.;if i.t;',. vjon.td ii^hl'Jy givo advice
tiiat vc.utd "ivj -ur, oeri:-iiri . r^rr . k ; _ , _ L il.rcicn a;..,;. \.'hio:': ;.:l:;;it loo. 1 £;r:rr.c p ' -v . j_ lc
' . ;ho:.-j rai:iil j . c < « :,i^u:) vu e;...i i'cre ..:.:c. , T r , . ; i ;.c i; referr-ir;;; to o::e cc.unti-y or
/..;.•:'-i.hor. 1 rr::t,ht i^o i'urtiior cui-i Jay thab tl.c ± olit.i.crj.1 colour oT the ciiojcc- lo
loi'L to the U C \ ! L ^.
AJ :i.i African country vo do not by nry !r.'.-c:r.r. ir-.tcnd tn iinpoce a choice- upon
it YlUiOurh OIL:.' couiit.^/'j lt:-ll.r;;:, aro y-..ll i .oov/n ru i. :./e 'Lviiev^ it is rai/unr
- i L i r l c i i l t to h;wo. a ^c!.o..i:L.,li.:i-. v.ov.iJv-y roLn. . c,od t I:? C. po.,ixdor; in th^ Coti-^o;
t:, C'vuntry aotli!^ n,G a r ' : -nu i.a1 co.i viJ ;..ti jiu uu k;!1 tne- L uc '^ io^Li oi' "che United liatieno
then at the same time "becomes an arent of tlie Unitoa i!alions.
DR/h<
TTo are forced to iralzc a reservation, tut the C:jnp~> t lpfirately hac the entire''roe;! -i ct' choi :G anl t:x?n alco cho cc-uuccrxjart of aG^uxxnc the recpcncibilitioG.:•...oront "in tha1.", cholco .
t;^_r' 'T\ (Liberia): Cino.e this cv.bjo^t vrr, first brought to cur attention
•y c'iolo-.^ti^;: ., .j f;tV'->ri It f^or i . .j.-j c<T :-L^-^•-:;..t l.ou "./: 4-h i-cc^-'oet !•.-. itc r^-y
:•:-.<•-:'•:.•:-•:; in 'h^ A-lvj.^or.y C-- .xLtti . .- .-• vliica " ;cv- 1-Id c-:. thic cuhj^ct, 1 had
.. > 2 c , . u :,!' th, : i . f t i l l : .v . t!:••: ' ; '. TO V. •.. oo u.; .
>.-?: v. •.-..__. \r:ticrc. '1^ r : - . : , .L ^ 'r-1 ::;^v\
_.:!. u".. I / . - : to ..u "Irj J a t e ^ . i L or
t • • • ':•':. - ~ > ^ . I'p/'. 'inj; ii'.i!..!. r.!i:.L:::?
"t1 . > . V ' j .uh 1 . -" . ' . ;a -u tl1,; ? . ; ' • .
' l / . c C - ' ' ' -- c...-i vca 'y iii o; •'.'. ration \;^ : ' L :> ot - • cv .':-.*..' :u;;' i ./ c:i.v nc ; \ i ^ : [-^
;.;, ;.i .!. . L l . , 2 licur, cT L C . , i ' . : " ' , i i ! rr r , ti. .u.b r; ;, ; it r-> :rn to ; 1:1, ouly the Iriii.c.jiir.^ tenches
to it? • id t '^ib ii'j ^ . ' lu l ; r , .r ;f ^:^ to -, . • ro^vj^t v!u.ch ij -uhc UnLtca. li 'atjonc
ui.br,- L1 :... ovor t ' u i i j ti 'a.I.ninf; v^ ' - 'C - - 1 ^-"" • '•
':.M, thca, it hcii: :.. i:.;;;c.'. i. vu ,:.:.. :ct, r\rd th:it ]/- '~"tJve ar.rcct van the
o;-p.ln-L.. . i , . i . -- . ' ! . i thr.i; V'i \.c • . . ' • . : I . . . -OM., . ; L,. •. .d t •.->_, t. ., to v ; r . :,3 tn L . ..:.r tlic c ;xper.Go
i... tin.,; .;l.LU,i f. :al ] o.:; one: oj . !.:;.i,y w: : . L ;. in to t:e ^ ry^o ; . . .L ' • • • • c cilice \ e c r i
: , ; ;yc :M\V. '< •/ ::,, u;;I. :.....!.<. :d vita the c.^-la::.--. . i - = n . i tjiav- t l . : .-o. • : < . . ; ~n L : L n : . . , t ^ r o-.v v,ho Uonco
c i ^ - j j L . ' C h u i i . . ' ( . . ( ; i C^°'lti/ contc\::i,.:j a:vi tii:j i/idiviua:;! i ju i . iuc to 'i>;iat GCLIC oi' u;:
,.;AO iv : utth l . i , . i .
t. ;: . tvjvcr i l K - 3 my Govornr.cnt ii'ay "roroco by \,'r\'r nl' rylvico t f ~> you,
l-:r. il-:. ..^u.iry-i . ...i:--'r;.J., J. 1 r.ve ctr.^ i1^ i-'ll° I^-'ii t vnj rc I rc'^'i-t c-huvi there is hardly
laiy T>c.:.:it en vhlou advloe ID to le : \Lv( . n.
DR/he
' . ""• • • •» only other tiling irv/n i:)i.1.ch vf nn.^it le authorize;! to alvlsc you voulc!
"bo vh- ..hor th'.ro-i;.; a _VMVU •• : ; : • .{• , of t:o C;.;vrii.i::.?:nt of thu C'on.-'O, vhich Is to lo (_'i von
h/,c ?. . .:. Dr.ciry .'•;lirr:ort ;.iir-;o i ::-.;; V'^cr. :. COMO;: . t .-I. I- hT.L'_ -,;':•;,!; I cin G f :^- ; t^at iv.qv.cr;!:
..^.j t ri * 7 . 1 t ] : f ' .\.i.-;i. T "L T;iT, ;.-.:!'cT;:?.i ;;; 'i.t.j :'.i. 10 ^.;;i':i ;.».'. - j an i - i " ? coi'or^l.1'^! riylirc of
't ': : C! ••. ovr'.rwi. .. oT t.h.e co]'{"o lo c'io i,hn'!".^ vl':''ch . i f -bv^e ; ; , " <._;•;"• civic n or Clonicr.1:; .
' .•:/\t 1 • I r i j b :^ ' GaC(".: t.i.cre it; o:;.i c^o t i i in" ' 3e.it 1 ?.v :.. Govc'rr:nc:v'- to advic^ or:
cr:'?! .'..uv-'JM.rrjJ., Jilt in to nr o G•>. ' ! ' ' I:;; .• .vr.-i .^j •'.?]! Lc... 1.-. li.'^ only l:;i .-u<.; t/i:i ;; \.T: r : L , ; v . ' . Lc cc. -ef.. rn';cl x , i t h h". r-^, y' ' i i j
;.?. '.' ,r-; vary ' /-ne^al woul'L,, in y c i , r wlcc.A.r:; l;h^n lc-.,v • it iu the Govc.-;.r: oj /c of
;y.: ' . ;• . •. !-;o L.O ' o.Lii,': \;il . iiri iun L'ove:'ei'":i :.'j' r - ' - i tG '; j cnr r / C'ut itc nrorr:.j:..:o c." it
. . - ion a^'.n, there hriri peon a ro:-orv:vrien vMch the Coverrrr.cnt of tho C'oi^o
h-i3 ir. >•.-.•:-; ai-d v iicli ch ? Foroi;;a Mir . . ' cc - r oi'1 Ihio C - : > ; » ; o ]:,-r; Loon ihllc t: conf i im,
.::i".•'!. t .,t i.:; th ' tc ',]](: Coi,;:o 1 : :>: : . j;. :: r.cor-, 'al/Lcn to coc •: 1 .•;i.hnic^.l ^sristai ice i'rcin
on vhlr'h c
ii ib ' .y or to "i ;io -r: [iropri.v^cj body. Then 2!cu n^;::1:
1\ - over^ r.t tho mc'nciit, there is no other point
i,\i. to cui.viL;e ou.
*!?< I*
Mr* Gins (Senegal) (interpretation from French): The delegation of
Senegal, on instructions from its Government and within the framework of the
customary consultations, wishes to state the following. It is for the
Gcveriansnt cf the Congo, exercising the' rights conferred on it "by its international
sovereignty, to appeal to any country of its choice with respect to obtaining
military assistance. The delegation of Senegal desires that the Corgolese army
should be in a position to ensure law and order* Thic must be achieved without
delay, and in any event before the complete withdrawal of the United Nations Forces/
It is perfectly true that such a result cannot be achieved without external
assistance and internal effort,
In order tc assist in ensuring J,he maintenance of law and order in ~::he Congo
and in order to make it possible for this friendly country to emerge from the
present condition of uncertainty, Senegal is prepared -bo support United ifetions
action in the Congo by contributing whatever amounts may be needed in view of the
situation.
The first question that was put to us at our meeting on 20 March was to
ascertain whether the United Nations could cover "bilateral military assistance,
in which ths sole choice of the contributing countries voulcl be' left to the
Government of th-s Congo* My Government took a clear-cut stand on this question*
My delegation has very serious doubts regarding the possibility of the United•"• • • • ' - • • • : - - • - . . » ' • . . : " • . • • - • - . • • • . , ; ' . . • . . - . - •
Nations to authorize a request for preferential assistance addressed to certain
countries designated by name. The confidence which the United Nations should
inspire among the people of the world, and in particular in this troubled area
of the world, requires that our Organization muct be prepared at all times to
prove that it deserves this confidence by avoiding the adoption of any measures
that might jeopardize this confidence.
The question now is whether the United Nations can authorize the Government
of the Congo to implement the programme that it has submitted to us. The
Government of Senegal has already stated that the Government of the Congo is
sovereign and that, within the framework of its sovereignty, it may appeal to
any country. However, any authorization given by the United Nations would
at the same time mean United Nations responsibility, a responsibility which my
Government does not wish to assume.
(Mr. Ciss, Senegal)
The United Nations authorization would also "be tantamount to jeopardizing
the sovereign rights of the Congo* My Government, as we have already stated,
wishes our Organization to assist the Government of the Congo in the necessary
end urgent training of the Congolese army. We "believe that the United Nations
does have the means to do this, since its presence in the Congo is a reality.
The time "between today and the complete withdrawal of United Nations Forces
offers an opportunity that should be used "by the Government of the Congo to
request our Organization to render the necessary assistance.
Mr« DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): First I should like
to associate myself with those who have spoken "before me to express to
Mr. Gardiner the gratitude which his action deserves as Head of the United Nations
Operation in the Congo. Mr, Secretary-General, you were good enough to tell us
at one of our previous meetings that "before taking up his new duties in
Addis Ababa, Mr. Gardiner would come to New York* I therefore await with pleasure
the opportunity ~LO meet Mr. Gardiner at one of our future meetings and to
express to him our warm wishes for his success as Head of the Economic Commission
for Africa0
At the same time, I wish to Join those who have spoken "before me in, requesting
you, Mr. Secretary-General, to transmit to Ambassador Dorsinville our friendly
wishes for his complete success as Head of the United Nations Operations in the
Congo.
With respect to the question "before us, my delegation deems it essential to
express our "bitterness and regret at the campaign not only of the corridor rumours,
which were mentioned "by the representative of Ghana, "but also at.the Press articles
about whatever we may do or may fail to do, or may say or may not say. This can
only lead to creating divisions among the African representatives on the problem
that concerns us. It is no longer possible to go through United Nations corridors
without having various officials and newspapermen speak to you to ask you where
the crisis lies. These people are so insistent that in come cases they have
persuaded some Africans that there is indeed a crisis* I think it is our duty
to protest most energetically against these tendentious rumours, the political
purpose of which is clear to any impartial political observer.
(Mr* Dlallo, Guinea)
What is more> shortly "before entering this conference room, the question. , ...
vas put .to me. whether I was one of those who absolutely wished the Congo to
"^ placed under United Nations tutelage. I believe that, in a certain maanar of
speEkin?. ,«ao»r>^ languacc. use I *TI. this CcBEaitt^s, consciously or jio-c, has cca-Lr
to the cor«fu.iioiDi
r .AM/rh 71
{" • r • TV: 'il 'i n, (]ni
T;o spealc of n author! zinr," the Government of the C.. 'nyo, 1?o spcal: of
rero'Tjizinc; th? sovereignty of tho Co.n y. Ue urn happy that frcrj tho firs
day vo have re ianincd laithful to the att i tude t l .ab wo vero ar/orr; those- vho
for i:ho indepc ..denoe and severe 1 ~y.iy of the uor.ru, For us lo 1:3 not c, c^uc
,'•'? ' 'T'lco^niti: ;i" c»f t; u Govcroi ; :r!icy o." ti:o Co?i;y_, I:CCM ;..CC cmycuc vho
i'-jniK. iizon o*" thr> c i t cnG tho :;<: -, rc_oi Tit^ of -Glv: C':^i. .o i.liorcty throatonr, the
:;ovor^i._nty 01' Oait:oau /nd thio ir; j:ot culy t/iin i'-.; z i.t :.on of Cuincaj it IG
thj ]\.:^it.ion :;hic:i h,i:i teen corr . - iL 1 .^Mbly jjtntoLi, •.•npoo.LLd c.nd rcai'firmod "by
-'-.i'rir^n ropror .-i iv.vtlv.--;: :1 n tho Lr i l i : . - ! Jiat.lo1!:, 0
Kro L)Ccrc'ta:y-G^ii-.. 'r^l^ t.irou;; i y:ni T,;C ]I:,TC "been c^izcd for nore tJicn a
month vltli a ;. .i!>3tion: ti'.at oi1 cr;;; tyinr; t'riron;-;h TJii Ui.ited IJ-it ionr, aa iu::brella
i'or m.ilito.ry V L'i atcral orcrauiohG ^j c?:;tc:.;platcd hy t":e Gu\rc:."VJ:::cnt of the
'.Icr.rr'. It ic ''ly ii;tenti.on to be v----;y brief _or \J^e c;_...jle re.'icon th..1., not
L.nly in the cc-j-rsc of oui' pe.::t i xo i . ^ : iy ; ; T/.ii ; ih v e-j fo.:-orly li..Id here ; but
alGu iji the C C V . T G O of nuuieroun n'cc l:i:.•••:; in ^rivc'-e con:, altnbienc,, tho pocition
>..•! ?vy ue'Tervjo, v; hciLi I juei: ri.r;,'>"'. .^ very elca,r_, r.hd i n d e e d v v.;u. ;/purue!Lf^
lir . He;-.rotary-Ccnoi'alj, lih^ our b'voth;::r.; tho ro];^ i;..:Jenbe,uivoc of the Con^o^ r..ra
pcrf;..i' ;ly a\ ;a, .:: of our vci.-y r-ic?,r ;":• •':.,.vJ:.,
!•"•./]..lci;i::_ on all th.ico '.;.isou:::,!:-':::, tho I ' inif ' ter e>f the Conro m:iee ]:novn --
first j . r ivuucly^ and then hore, ^ . . / i . c i j u ' . y c..i.l ofi ieiiiDy -- thai his G j'/ei'iiiuciJt
•would ronounc? •• tho UGO oi' the irriib^" L i , ; i u flv;2-o:.;,..:c.f on thin ylano v:i "./Mild bo
oni;i'i;lod to ce.y that i,hoi'e i^ no ivi ;:.r a orooicr.^ and C.G tho representative of
LiboiMo caid o -while r . / o _ , the ] . ro l l_e ; : : arirjoiir viuit o.rs wo in iY?.au cl iLioucoinr?
(,n this level my dclec.r.tion ^r . i id lll:e to r:;r r un:n, yo seriounly fear that,
this i.'omrnittce i:; c;oiny be;, ond its toros of jeforcneo, , liany substantive
ututci .'/iibs h<^ve been i.:. :dc and 1 feel sure Lhat bna C^1'..:.iittcc has ylvea fall
iioteht-a.on to -i ho vc-j.-y cor.ip.LeLe and cx^aast Lve st'.,;x:-: ;•• n., Lado Ly tne representative
of Cae.idu, The prc.hloi.i vhieh he has raised -- ;\ad h: :.G not t'lo only one that
has raised it -- is one uhLch ve ralrvtain is not. u iLnia the ca-rpctcnee of this
Advicoay Coonittee. ,'!ucli a probleoi ic indeed in.thin the competence of the
Uniteri Ilation;,_, bivu at 'other levels.
1 vould i.u uiiee vish to say that in so far as Guinea is concerned at
these other levels Guinea vill not for a sin, le inct^a', hesitate in ascuininn;
its full recponsibilitics if the problem were to be raised by anyone vho wishes
to do so.
'iliiiiisii 'i.!-ATJ/rh 72
(hi', ri.r>,llo, Guinea)
Thus...the Congo huvinr; renounced the use of the- u..-;;r lla, vO.vb rci-ain^?
Practioal.lv, wo arc :;ul;od to interpret tho Gcir>rdL A.- . r i ,mbly recolution* In.your
:• :;id-;:;ont, l!r. nocroLary-Con^ial, you started by cay r>c that ^ou did not i^l
^V'"'.':. fcj. do £ : j « I wi:;h to i.tc:t:i m./ "cii^t yo-ar poGitl '- .n iu fu.Lly in accord
',;Ltl: vhc position vhlc l i the r jprocont ' i t ivoLj uf Gur.io;.! have always advocated,
Tf t'.rio re^ diioion :LG to be int.^ri^rcted, tlien •vre .FAIGL aodrecs ourselves to
Ecivinc; nald ohi : i , .Mrr oecrcta:ry-Gc??icral; it cocuc to ny clo3.ccatlon that
t;ie '• on::o ] ' ' L ' - '/jc; vor:o :J'-_jou th^ :i!::biv'lba, and you. yourc^lf having slate', that
you ave r.ot in a po3-l.tj.on v-o interpret thi x'oi-olutio:^ the A'dvir/^ry Comitbcc
•? ?. ^T.': .;oT7"l of a quoc/tion 01. - j \Leh normally, und-^1 its toirjc of reference,
it cm ^ive a valid '"jpini^n,
AG regard" iho laany detonation:: liore \rhioh hav re raised tho proVi.^rp. of
the choice '. ? counbrioc^ and ctrip.^ ]^i•;/; ;] .cnr. , I thinl: ti:ai. Ihoco clelcjationc
vou]/! do bc-!toi: tj v lit u:ioil u, i o rolevrint orpins, nuch ac th3 General
A U G O . \ iy or i / i^ f'ccur-ity Cowicil, havo :, co i 1 - ct. L'/.cd o..' the natter.; i : ' ;oie 13 still one* t : :1t iy 11•.:•;!'- I hc.T:o \o ;oy, '!>'• :ai''^:: f'C:":in.fj.ion ban boon
cifc:',"i':c'.:>. pe" • ' "> r i ' r ;3 delitorat1:• !.y; en t- i io pro';-1.o'. ia T l...lie/e Jhcu; The Goverrjrienb
ci* T! > Con.O'. :-il:e rny oyn and li re ;''.! ("ovov^i ioat: r- ' i '^-jnontr-a hero is
jov. 'Voi^.i aii.d that tho proMeui ;L,i no'u at uj.J- c ^ n . j of \.iic ucvcrv;i;r.ty oT tiic
Con t ; v . c Uh?.- T73 n,re. .'Li.[.'.cuc£.;in[j; hero is the United Ihi^iona cpcration only.
Iha i'1onr;o an a sovereign t3tai:e ••- and this ha:; alvay:; "been our volition --
r;:"y do c.3 it Tr ia l ieD. 15ut if tho C:-n[_p ca:ir.^t do vono it viu-bjc1 for the
inainLenance of the United I.ratio::3 opo^ati'M:, ii1 tlie ijon^o tai'.ers an attitude
\;hio:i the United Kations doomu incoiupritiblu ^j l tht l i r - contiriur.'cion of the United
Nationr. ope:;.ition, then it io u^> to the United Nations to take the appropriate
Ltti '^lOo
Therefore;, the problem docc not arise in respect of the sovereignty of ,
the Coiujj. The ]-ro"blen aricoc in respect 01 th^ continuation of the United
ITationc; operation.in the Conyo. And onco ayain thU; problen ia not within the
competence i'f this Committeej it is vithin tv:.: ccinpeooiice of other United
Nations organ.? - -where ve \;ill take our full i'ecpGr.r^'d.u^itieG as ye do here.
AW/rh ' 72- 75
rrt-ArT"_Tl (rjUC— 0: You, r : r » ^ccrcta:ry-'li:oe;:c,l, anci the mergers of
the Crrmitteo •vr.il.1 no doubt appreciate the cpeciai i-olciticnchip the Sudan has to
the Ccr.(.*o. Eocrmso of tho clooo tlr.s between the C . j i - j - j oLcno and the GueV^eoe
~ ; - o < " p l e . j end b ^caune of our ccr:n -n frontiers vith the Cone/j^ \-. 3 alvuyu rcjuid
I'-.. j .c ' j^"l 'Jy and tho c t^ i lLty o •[' 11. o f! ):i o £.3 nn ij-'.c'.irr.iicf? c:? cur own [;oc^."ity
Mna '3t-xl:,ility . And T.;. hdv^ an o::^a:;'.^^cl ;.;vl ^joll-0. '.. cclplirecl an:.Y ic orio ci'
•i'!:c chief i.r:c;bruiaei:tD of cecuri ty r.r.d rtaMlity in ;: country « V/e therefore
have every c^r.^tLthy for the C c n f o ' c ccn^orn vith oho cpccdy and effoctivG
rot^ainin^; o.n ! :.;od.:-rrn.L:«a\:irn of their a::::.:;-c
A-^cordiiv'lyj vo have nlvayG cnds.TGO'..!. and r,r.ppo."tod the plea that the
Conr-vlijf.e Cjvornr.eni: cliould be '!;•;:' I:: hod 'by the U;-\it'.--d Hat ion 3 in rror^anininr
its ariiiy and brinr'.Lue; it iriCe;: ':: ;1;(:er ui^cirline. hut in our view The it'ieal
vey in vhirh ::uch ^ . /Giu tanoo shv i id re r-jr:.'!' - : iod vov.'l.d be; throurh i.:u'L-Lilatr.ral
Unit-vl ilcvb/oris e.rrciii^e^onbD. [.'.,i^ii c:-rar\;c/:r'nLLi c^ould iidve- Leon inibir.tcd long
:iic_, but for ::oire rcacon or a ro t i i ^ r this (..id not G C X I & to h:r/o Loon niado-
r :crr : ib lG, 'lov vo aicc coined ;;;i' 'Lhe ;pro^.o::a'l. cvf tho Cciiroiooo Govurr^rucnt ,
'\;ivi;:n ia the :.-uV;ject of our d icn icsi^n oo-.'e t:.'iiny. -Lhcrc cannot, of ccurce,
L'O •:. ;y chaootr of a doubt n; io t-:- Can ;;;:•. !.o ^e v>. vornT-.,,-;-it ' o i all ri^ht to uccl:
c;c.si::tQnc3 L..,^J any country or i/oup of oo;riby.Ic^ ",i..Lc.i ar:: pijou^vci to ho^o.;.
i'hi.; anooct of the matter is neoor in >oieoia.oii and t:i2 loco ve talk about it
the hotter*
Eut tlj-3 difficulty hero 0000:0 to no to rooiac :• n how to reconcile the
Con^olooe Crvurnraeut 'G proposal vith tno u/iitod ]]ation'> pccition ac prescribed
by i. Me United ITritionc. rocolut ion.., oop ^ciciliy Gen,;rr,l Aoo^Oubly -roofjlution
( K o - I V ) o The arrui-ent is bolri , ; ; advau.vod that the i'c:.^oiirahlo change in
oirooiaotancoG cinco 1'joO should JucLi . fy a libei'til ir .L ji-protntion of that
re solution o My delo;/alio:i i-7i.ll rofrain fro, a participating in each ar^uoentG
ciraply becauce wo do not feel that vo aro competent to do co. You yourself;
Mr« GGcretaiy-Goneral, have dealt adoquatoi.y with thio point.
TL/jw 76
'' ir
Afi I have just cald,' tho boi.it vay out of thin diiTLculty of rec'oncllinc
the Con.;30*0 needs vith the United lotions position vouLl be to resort to th .>
.ccncc;;^ of multilateral Unitc-i I'atior.i nrr<-nvj:;7.:c:nts on Lh«j responsibility ' ci'
tho fo :;'^tcr>r-;"j.:erti.' If thjre piovG to be any difiiCij.ltios .vn the way of
v.ri_-."le:L-:i]tin^ this, thon \"o foci that tha prooo:;:-! sub:.. L o tod by Ghana, that ir>
to say o'f cc-T^t^ing the celccoion to the riori-?il:'.^n^d coiuitrteG; may be £iven
cor*ai«L.:ration 'as a GGoond-ber/i: cholr-e. Altorjiativcly, ^rid by vcy of oortprociise —
ar.d thin i:iay be a in:vlificution of Lhe nu;;f;ectj.ori ir.rj'.ca r.y r>y colloague, the
ix_.-- ^ ' . . - . "tative of Ni^aria ••- ;.lu ir.uttcr of co.i.cotii.^ in.^ructorG iron ciroitj all
the countries that are prftpan.d to liel]^ should, in the first place, be lefc to
"c'i''3 d.'i 'ci'C'tioii ox tiic »?oc'.''io"tcij.'y-'L'.~.^'.c-rril• iJG j.nov t ..ao in e.xercini,n(j ijfiat
diocreLion the Secretary-Gen:::, ul can to fully relied up^n to take r.ll ::^levc:nt
foe tor j -- political; poyeholujic'-1 L aiu'. othevs -- into eonaiderutioru .Tiie
•'J3cj.'s-'c?vy..GenGrQlIs selection will of course have to be subject to the approval
of t'-i.c Con^cTo,: i Govern ;.ant. Luch r,n arrar.^cvicnt, orio vnuld hcpc; would satisfy
t)ie Coi:-..olc.••'••» ^•r;Gi'Jwnnt ta dsi:xrG3 Lnd would nob be at variance vith
f.rj.r: is :. -:cJ.y on idea -I am 'tl.rowjng cut for your consicloraticn, fiir, and
that c:1 the C. i. 'lttoc. ' t a;-.: (^mbol.ilen^d ^o do u-3 b;/ tho :;taton2nt cl1 the
foreign ii.Lnister of the Con^o, i.iade a :.;hort tii.:0 n^o, thiit tho list proposed
i:ac neither fj"..•>:.! nor restrictive. 1 t.u;, of cource, contributing the.::) rc;..arko--;
on the lijsinriptlon that ait, L^ito^ :\atioiu u o n i d still be as::ocic:t3d vith the
jnlO tiv.lining. But if, as you have jointed out in j-our opening statement, the •'
Con'£clu;je Government no longer insists on sucii association, then these points
may not even arise.
TL/jw 77
:-r..rJf'O^ylii (Tunis ia) (interpretation froei French): Jn the course of
the last rfy-Gtii30 oP this advisory Cr:.i:iitee, 0:1 20 ihrch, you fiiprecsed,
Pr. Goorcrtery-oVneral, a de:;ire to knov our vif .wc ref.r.rdinf, thn e>: char; rye or*
correspondence betvreori the United rations and the h yveuiiiint, op tee Cc;]ryo on
<:-h .- r r o L l c i : . of the r^trainirp of the Oryolesp; h'ati-,r-il r\rey. Fror: the
sted cry.eirb /hat you i;.nde at t ha i , lest rjicctlry vo fyrtrorcd t;e it, the Priir.e Minicter
of lire Con^o, LPr. Atoula, a f t e r having written to you in February of lyip of
hin desire to see the instructors of the Gonyolesc ^ircy recruited from mong
Ail lean Si:atoc_, ha;; nci. aecPied to C'niii3;:u i l : L o tan!:, to ci:: countrlo.u and on a
eilat.jiT.l i usis. i ' -^vcvei ' j IL ;e;yr>ars tna t tho CoiyelcsG Gevc::i:eiit, in
ce::...ultatic i with tLio tiPOC' scrvi H.:.; in 1.e'-'p^'b.ivlllo, ire; conceived of a
par^iciT.at.,on by thr Ujyltod i.ati.ons in ihls t LJ.LIU:IM.I r-lcn of iiilitr.ry assistance.It is on this role of tir. Pnited hat Ler.s -- e-nich y . -u GO \/ieoly terui c.n
^Lnie.'cila" -- that you ar.h.ed us te foe.us e:ur of ten : ; . Lon ana thai- o..1 our
re::yecirive GovernrcGnts. j.t is tnere.i'oie co feet role of the United nations
tin, ve v/'lrh i'o sp^id^ for our con,pr U. nee r'-r-is t'hcr • en id cnu.la not pcrihio us
to ;_ ass jUv 'fc-,:..Mil ci.- the choj.eo t!"'.t \}:.o r;>re\j].(.:ce ('.'ovfrrrneni: his d,,:.cid';d io irake.
it '.s only in r,-..> far as the plan f>;.r reor[ e:.i.:eti^n of the AlIC concerns the
univ .^d h a b i o " - thac ve c-'ei I ' -ass j ' ' .K !f,^ ;-- ;-^t on inao j, . ' .un.
•j'ho TeyiiGian Governio..!n, nes ti. ...^fv re; :n the ej.^lit of the resolutions
defLniny tie role of the Um.tud Ihit ior-Sj ;:d/vi, i.ed tii-, p.! an for rcorrynii irivu.-n
of the AiIC arl Sdie role vhi.cn \ ;oure rail 1 o c-ur Cryenization in suciya T.r':>yra!Tme.
I vise. 13 state at cnee tha o tl'ie 'lunisiai Govorni":.ont has aluro/s velcoLicd
with satis-; ac-irion all e f iorus n. . ; io to nain aid re^. yanise the-Congolese
haiional /.iii/ and i;nl:c ci1 it a sL i :onp and dise en Lln.ii body. Puoii lei aii..y is
a ne<'et:r.ity for the naintenareo uf c-rdei1 iii a ouun;, 'y s.o vast as the Coryoj
am the i::a.i.ni_nance of o.voor is cert'.iinly one uf ir . c^serniial principles that
have inspired the operation ci the bailed nations i i the Gori/jo.
in.jrej.ure ve hive ooi;,;iderei the plan for the reorganization of the X11C
vit,}i i'uil ; yu-aihy; but af ter a. losi oereiul stvxly^ 'idr.! Tun Is Lan Govern:,^ent can
e:i ress un y in attitude <. .>i yreai reserve vitn rcp.urd to ihis plan, and
parfieu.l.uii y vitli rey r;i 10 ih.j role that the Unii,-,. ;. I!.\ti(jns ia asiied to pioy.
first of ail, we rust very idiihily say that u have serious doubt;; concerning
the compatibility of this plan viih rhe relevant reso.Luuicus of both the
oeeurity C^.uncil and the General hiSv.^uly,, We have in mind particularly
resolution 1'V l- (Eu-IV) of the General Assembly adopted at its special
TL/Jw 78-80
( i r r » a^olrl, Tun In In)
orirt TV:O resolution of 21 February l^u-l of the f'oni:riiy Council. Generally
cpoal.inC; bb.: p l .a i i ruaa 'coairc 'ry to tbo principl^a tL".t incplrod the
o l^v *. i.ationc in itLi act! .a: in th,3 Con/po. Tli;; twn; >;.'.'•d uJL'^ or thot operation"
•?f t\j baited i ' l i tionn in fa (Vn^ v,a] to prevent cha^c, in th,..t country internally,
^nd oat email y, to d'tc ^ipa^o the rpeeti-o of the call ^ar. • •
- .; da >•.: i; vich to £O ^-^to a 1 .)ii0 jtatcF.cnt ;ioo.rt tiiiG ncv; but it ic '
' •^•-r^ ;.v cl*'..riv t.1'"' (.1)3 b-i..la j;orl'-. L uncirlaa'::: G i : r , ' o ; ; i c i Wo.a net cletermin^d by
!.;i.-- Lirirp.o' or it .•;-;•'-; pk p. .^ '-boi;o ': Via w i • .-r;\:.rv_d th-j Url 'LoCL ... i i l o n - i o At id th'j choice of
G h < 3 :.:':•: ^ont:':"L' ,iwir:0 r^,_.:iorico }..<;;, CJ:.'':/ L'.if1-"! tj ci:;' !.!;.'.'i'icultie:rju ihcco i;:!.:;
co i int;:le3 all bolor.£, to CD? particular croup 01 n^L. ' .c ' :^ , or,p?cia.l ly powcriul 'oripn
•rilil:\r:ily G; a1::!]! , natiour. v ho ••. interc-Gt;;, r:-t Icaci, for ir^::t of t'-'-'r., ("O
beyond thc3 f iO' : i /u , rc oi' thf;ir o;,rn cour:;. .'icz , di t'alt> r:;j-i.m: vc n u r t re ' 11 that
tr.3 .. ..:e:v.tai;; -aoncr-il^ vl.ou ut 1\:° >/c:".i'"lv: : . M f ; oi t,l: ~. l-'.ltcd Ira'-ior:.;: a., .ion in Ui>
Co:-yM )'•:; h. .1 -:;o ^pp^al to 'othc^- ooiJi'/oric^j tnc>n tli'ji:c- oi' Africa and Asia to
rarLici.oc.te vi ilie opcixition, IUIT^.L! in ills c-1-. . . . . i .co t':> cor.nt.',1^;'::; of \Joctcrn l.'uropo
",/r.o^o .uTiQj.'f.i'-^j Ler.': n.uch 1.'i,:j " ' • • . .^0.-,;._,, r j v t : ; L .-i^c r:uch r..j .Ti'^laivri end Cwc:;en.
' "' uo not 'v..}inl>: it r.cccr^.".^y i/.» rcon':vi:. L' , \- j \,Vi: i 'i,,h .• Cc--:.;, :-'l-oG novorn* jiit
id ^ T ' o l r c l y i. .:'; tc L . - 1 ' J u! a l o v d r c'.:v•;_.-, j it/ r !•'••-•;..iv, ' .-;-,, . [ . L r l ; 'tl-.o Ii,.it^:l I'ati'...-•,'•! dc.:o
i....;t r: joy tht. rir: Iv/tiU::''? •-.: d . V: U.nlr^."! 1 jx,.'.,a:;, ; ii;f, i,• Pe^.r In i..Lnd cuca Li.c i.e.
conoi .... ration- !j.-- r.csr.ror^hJ o- ia L-. j i'cnry o.locrj. Vfn'">.;;• -:'':r t) o clioice of cci i i t r i^ '^T..o e. '.ot iice l.-y\T th^: Uniu;;d . ,L.ii: .,; could [v:'-'L\iy ca.i L\: ..br.:.!/;..'•t; to ci Vil'i:..ci'al aid
obvi'',i,.jly conceived and piv;.:v./-_\l : : rLnl" ;o it cell L.nd. V: ra itt; lolu would bo
noitl. •"• to in,;>ly the : Ian non c;'f'...^i vo j . y 1,0 conta/ol jt; but Licrcly to co-ordinate
itc ii/alaliticc and ohx^ aSM::.ic a d ' . j ^ .:> oi:n r«-:r:o;i;';iLi.l i. l'.y»
a rcadir * oi' the dooui: :at jr.:: "arc I by ta'-; ;.;•. cr _..:'. :.'iat en the role of that
co-oi.Vi.natinc, body uhieh j;.u; bf:on cialod iho "n ..1 ••o.._.l; u Lad vhleh vould be
orrio/i ,;J..'iy c,_ Lie I Ua.a'-C'^1 .'.'oavos r:o • . " iouot -w. .£ : tcov : vcr ro:.;Tirdir\-; c '^Lo point. The •
fact iaat the eapeaaca, v^ould uu aLrcct l .y boi/ao by thj ccintr.i.butu,^ counlrioj
iai.l.D '.oijpletoJy to i > : a a G P i a u; j , i....r it on ly in-.--oa^ :G tbo uoof /adcnco of t:a./
o_'orc.t m — dopOi.\dc..-.o \;n:/::Ii ;iou... = - thur; b;.,coi..o lco...i -•- on \}:..c LLX Covorr-;.:ntc '
ooLCC; ^. d« To j.y li'U:: that i c •-> a'd i.na't iv.n oj,' tno oix r r \ - a i a t o bij.,.icc;.ial. op :.a aclafiG
of a;:;:•.stance vcaild bo necor.;::aj /, t / V i o I..L..J U i l ^ : ' ' i , ^v- l ( . :::; choiJ.d no't no;_iU;!;.; en :h a
xolc ; o^honrico it would joo :ai .ii^e thj pr: rir.:.jVU.ojj i ; a i , ch taa at tiio vory b:a:..i:;
of it" oi .-ciro vfil icy in the C,^. ;../. '1--..J d;il,.:.i i . , .Moaj ;.;la./i:l.d not include in its
.!:er:po.,':Jhi.iatica tachi.a.cal and ua'Ujrial a , . ; j j ; ; t , j - . i f . c of a i;:ilitary natuivj, tcvdin
t.iiV.i i in, a^iiah'y cleponaent on tho authority -of six countries all belon^inc to a
oiij^la i.uoolO(jical bloc.
v/o have already o:rlni:ic-d to you, I l r . Ld-cret--:ry--0 — oral, outride this hall,
our doubts an l i j . i aL i i s s . Buc ; :;inco v^ut tir.e a new e.i<:..,;iont has been brought
to i. • T; and vld/t is the lcd;to.r Od.' td.3 rriir.c Minister of the Conco, aated
i-O -l/.'iL I.d<d3» 'i'h-i in, erpic cation vo r . L v c that letter io aharod by Ilr. ronihoko,
u::d -d.Tc iritoopre-tatiou vuj .-.loo :d,}OG..,cd by you in your letter to Kr. Auouia,
udino.l ;; th:rt ^n.L- Con^IcriO le .Lcr ;!.:.: n-o'G cecl-iin^ an u. tbi-olla yrr-rn tlie United ration:
ai.d .1.: not a a l : L n r ; dor ;;:iy co-ordiiKtt l.n-- 1 cdy i'rc:;-, ih:; United i l^t ioncj Gcccrvli/ ;
t.:ut d; is nou a nu.:ctic/i c~C tuo ( ' ' ^d .dLZCi t ion , tiiroii'.1,!! vour^eiT, dorilactin^ the
jix G >'/eri>meiioG coi.':cer:ir:(l tm.it voulc. unuoriaLc •,,110 tj.'a i.nin^; ci.' the AI.'C ar.d it_;
:i. ' .vinf; r.viid tiiin, the rmat ccr:i.p.lcto rcar>rxuraa?e."i niuot lie f^iven to the
Con~0' .cGe Gowri'ment th;i.b none of i;.::j - ~ - i any '^.'a^ r;mi !.C.!.°;CG the Goverc:fr;^''d/ o^
the c;.,.:do. I cjy "idiij i:^ca\;::o cei duin r'-^La:;(..^ o >.'' i.:;... lettci' ci' the Ir.u::: liir.iir.tcj
• < > . r u l ' l ' ' .<•: ad oil': to believe il.r.t iie j.c net cnciroly cor i - " au: 'G<l tru.t iho rcctrictioiia
•„;.,„., V. • has ;..•• en fid. d n vo he • : ; - o_i td:: di :^c '.c::i od ac die of the Conf'.ole:^
•^•,:.d. ,.; . <..;, the- ^ cjtr Lot j . --nn v.ir i: l.ho I j ^ . t : ' Iddd.^.:; \ . c ; ; ! . - i . pJ.Mc;.; iv;oi- i.L.c.ll' vouM,
I ci:i -.;,.nviiiccv_, be nc'.idior uh justified ru.-r ^ iL 'U) l r . ruLj . : . . y ar.; the l-r'.Srne .hLiccod
i:ru; c N . i . i c d th .n. Fuj. i,;;, .•/iV.o;::. .•, It .1 c nou n ni :c^^i^: . : o/. the United I . ' a t j ' - . i i s * b . ' i r i - - ;
riblc 'i.u refu.:.vj the Covoi '^iucnh od ti.e Conr o ' ' t /ho rii.lu to judr;:e by it^cii1 as ';.o
the \r-.j in wh.;.cii it vould doi'cnd ti..e nation* Li inicroot1'^ as ota-ccd in the letter
iroin l -.'ime Mii:i.)ter h.' .u/u..a.
di, by cc laiou r. /:..-•.; orient, the idea of th^ urrbrclln wan created and thenettii 0 u_;_-; oi' b.L'l.atoraX ;; j;:; i.:.a.,.u.,;c \ . - - L ; i'ir::..L.i.y out . .u. '!0 t one: L/yiiu
xno v: :.'i.h wou It".. Lo ,)j o>i I/..) i r i i i i i u i C . . ( ' ; ; ; U ^ _ ; U L ; of v.d'd.d ;.'utr;cL.n tho
Uover,...i'-,nt of tho (.'-../;'; ,o and ^^ur . ; , 1^'^ I : ; 1 . .d:^i\..t '. ;.y-C;o :ci':il, tc.- i'ind a forrrula
i^;r xh'j rooi/L'^i L'-'ia'biu,; of ' L n > . . ,,;.d ; a i-,. ji-;;/.i:.-z«t. i .« ;n , . - , .r;:.i.n t . iG Uai.ted hdtJoj.:i;.,
!:i;u].(f . :3G\, . i ;C . •. i'Olo i^or-..; ill .hc^ .j.n." vi. i,h I ho .' .......oa ...L-di i.-L/ic-;J i"o iia^ •. i : jGUii . . i . .u ,.
' fhio : v j i i u i i l a i . i r j b , of >...uuroo;, LM. : L; ro: -;oll.
c 01 the Gcuoral .^L^t u.uly c.i.c. cl;o !_:•<_•..• wity CoiuiiMl. uo be l i eve ti/.U" cunh
a fo^... ilo c:au bo foiuvi , and i . h - : uuvo : ; ' / . cnb o_, 'fitru.. i.a . ..v ready "lo L.M};O concrete
c.;nd co:-;3tructivG Guo;;>.;otiouL; aioij;;, choco lin.'f^ U c i c h o.i the i.;odu.Liti'; -j end on the
financing of the reorganisation of the AKC under the z^vc, of the United Nations.
HA/jpm 82
If, however, the Congolese Gov^ri^ent prefers, in the free exercise of its ,
full and complete sovereignty/ to turn to bilateral assistance from six countries/
as foreseen.in the plan, then ve should speed up as far as possible the process
of divorce of the United Nations from the Congo, divorcing ourselves of our
responsibilities and withdrawing the military apparatus existing in the Congo* .....
We -wish to velcome all the efforts made to bring the United Nations . ...-
participation to bear .in the plan of reorganization of the AKC. But w.e are.
forced to note that it is not possible to cover by an international responsibility
a prograimne of a military nature and of a bilateral character.
We vish to express to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and to the Congolese
Government the gratitude of the Tunisian Government that it was thought to include
Tunisia as a participant in the co-ordinating body that at one time vas envisioned.
MrvpTCKO (Mali) (interpretation from French): A few weeks ago, within
this same room, v/e were seized of a request from the Government of the Congo,
which wished the United Nations to provide an umbrella for military assistance
to be received frcra certain countries. It will be recalled that on that day our
Ambassador, Mr. Coulibaly, who is now at the head of a special mission of the
Conanittee of Twenty-four in connexion with discussions with the Government of the
United Kingdom on the question of Southern Rhodesia, defined our stand on the
question. This initial request of the Government of the Congo has been followed
by a letter from Prime Minister Adoula of 16 April 1963* and your interpretation
of that letter has been confirmed by the. very clear statement of Mr. Bomboko.
We would now like to state our vie\c on two specific points. First of all,
the Republic of Mali, when recognizing the Republic of the Congo as a sovereign
State, recognised its right to request assistance, in any form .or manner, from
any source that it pleased. Inasmuch as we consider this to be valid, we also
consider it inappropriate to ask the United Nations to provide an umbrella. We
believe it would be better for the Government of the Congo to appeal directly to
the erperts it wishes to co-ordinate this assistance, since it has already
decided to ask for military assistance without the intermediary of the United
Nations. If the United Nations were to assume the responsibility of an umbrella,
it would also have to decide on the countries which are to supply military
assistance, that is to say, follow the same procedure used at the time of the
crisis in 1960 in the choice of countries to supply the military assistance.
IlA/jpm 03(Mr* Dicko, Mali)
So much on the first aspect. W-; would like our position to be clearly
understood. It is explained, on the one hand, by our respect for the sovereignty
of the Congo, which is and must remain the master of its own affairs, and, on
the other hand,, by the fact that if this request is satisfied it would represent
an embarrassing precedent for the prsrjtige of the Organization, -which, as ve
all know, is undevgoi.ag a financial crisis •
Secondly, y.v;/a your interpretation of the letter of the Prime Minister of
the Congo dated l6 April, and with the official statement of the Foreign Minister,
my delegation believes that the problem takes on another aspect. In "brief, ve
must now consider that the Congolese Government withdraws its original request
for assistance from the United Nations for retraining of the Congolese army.
If that is the situation, my delegation believes that our Committee is not in a
position to take a decision. We nevertheless, believe that it is the duty of this
Committee, given the United Nations presence in the Congo for the maintenance
of law and order — and the forces would be retained until.the end of 1965 —
my delegation believes that during this period it is no less important for the
United Nations forces, with the authorization of the higher bodies of the United
Nations, to assist the Congolese Government in the retraining of its v:T<y. Apart
from this, the Government of the Congo, in the exercise of its full sovereignty,
like any other Government, and bearing in mind its policy to request technical
assistance to continue the programme of military assistance, as it has done in
requesting assistance for retraining its civilian cadres. We believe that the
Government of the Congo should have a wider choice, so as not to have a single
group, and have a broader representation, and thus avoid any embarrassing resolutions
The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 1^ July 1960 in order to
solve the chaos and prevent any foreign military interference is unequivocal. It
in no way jeopardizes the sovereignty of the Congo and does not authorize the
Congo to make a formal request at this time to the United Nations.. The resolution
remains valid until it is abrogated by another resolution.
Before yielding the floor, my delegation would like.to avail itself of this
opportunity to express to Mr. Gardiner, now that he ic leaving the United Nations
operation in the Congo for another important post, its warmest congratulations
HA/jpm 04-85(Mr. Dicko, Mali)
on the delicate task htj has accoia^li^lied vith intelligence and in a rvay that
is an honour to the United Nations. We congratulate Ambassador Dorsinville,
who, I am sure, will dcacrve our complete confidence in completing the mission.
At the same time, I should like to launch an appeal ,to the Government of
the Congo that it re-examine its request, and I welcome the Foreign Minister and
thank hisi for his explanations. At the same time, I should like to express to
his Government the sympathy and effective solidarity of the Government of Mali;,
which will spare no efforts in. everything it does to strengthen the unity of
the Congo and of Africa. . . . . . • . • '
Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): The Gove^anont of Sweden considers the training
of the AKG to be one of the most important and urgent tasks in today's Congo.
As a cousequen.cc?, my Government is o.f the opinion that we should make use of the
most expedient ways ar*c!. means at o .c clcpocal. Discussions on principles should
thus not be allr,v:ed to dslr.y limited measures that can "be handled by the present
OHUC personnel?
The main task facing us seems to be to create a well-disciplined cadre of
officers whose principal object chculd be directed towards maintaining order and
security. In line with this reaconing, my Government believes that the planning
for the training of higher units and special branches of military units should
not "be considered at the moment. We believe that the training should be
concentrated on providing lightly armed compasy units, such as "battalion units
and necessary transportation and signal units. We feel it desirable that the
training should be co-ordinated under United Nations auspices, in close
co-operation with the Congolese Government. 'CIius, the instructors ought to have
United Nations status, possibly as technical assistance agents.
The participation of countries should, we feel, be on as broad «-. basis as
possible, but at the same time — and this goes without saying — with all due
consideration for the wishes of the Central Congolese Government. We do not
want to suggest any rigid geographical distribution, and we definitely do not
want to make suggestions that might lead to a controversy.
A procedure of the kind I have just mentioned requires that so long as ONUC
remains in the Congo the United Nations should hold a firm hand over the ANC
training, and that training ought not to have the mark of any nation in
particular. The financing of the ANC training should, as a principle, take place
under the auspices of the United Nations, possibly as a project of technical
assistance,in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960.
Within the framework of such technical assistance, the Central Congolese
Government could, we feel, make its contributions in the .form of emoluments in
kind, or some similar arrangement.
BC/ah(Mrs. Roagel, Sweden)
My Government has deemed, it appropriate to call to the attention of the
Congo Advisory Committee the resolution adopted by the Security Council on
1.h July 1960, regarding the request for military assistance addresced to the . • .
Secretary-General by the President snd the Prime Minister of the Republic of
the Congo'o • Paragraph 2 of tho -operative part of that resolution states that
the Security Council: -
"D:?cidej3 to authorise the Secretary-General to take the necessary •
steps, in consultation wr.th the Government of the Republic1, of the Congo,
- to provide'the Government with such military assistance as may be ,. .
necessary, until, through.the efforts of.the Congolese Government,with_
the technical assistance of the.United Nations, xhe.national security
forces may be able, in the.opinion of the Government, to meet fully
their tasks." . •
Aa regards the States that should render military'assistance within.the
framework of United Nations technical• aosieuance, ay Government is .of the. . . ••-.
opinion that, in so far ao the ANC training is conducted under the auspices of.
the United Nations, or with tho United Nations as a co-ordinating tody, a number
of quite relevant and realistic considerations have to be taken into account. I
am referring to the fact that this matter, ao well a£ all others relating to
United'Nations assistance to-the Congo, must not appear to have arisen out of -
consideration for a large Power or a group of large Powers; It is indeed
necessary to make a point of avoiding political complications.that might render
difficult the constructive tasks facing the United Nations.in the Congo.
The planning of the structure of the military assistance to the Congo, in the
form of technical assistance, must not lead to a situation in which these basic
conditions regarding the over-all United Nations activities in the Congo are put
aside.
The Central Congolese Government seems at present, if I interpret correctly
the Prime Minister's letter of 1.6 April 1963 to the Secretary-General, to
indicate that military assistance for the training of the ANC is sought on a
bilateral basis. For reasons of principle we find that procedure doubtful.
90(Mrs. Rossel, Sweden)
Bilateral assistance of a military character, with OIJUC still present in the
Congo, signifies a questionable nlxture of military assistance under the United
Nations, on the one hand, and military assistance from individual States, on the
other. There might "be certain risks of a negative political effect if such a
procedure vere to be applied.
As has been the case before, all that has been said here today and all the
suggestions that have been made will be carefully studied by my Government.
Mro_CHAKBAVARTY (India): First, I should like to join in the
expression by other speakers today of appreciation for the excellent manner and
great success with which Mr.Gardiner has performed his difficult task. ONUC's
loss will no doubt be a gain for the Economic Commission for Africa. We also
wish every success to Mr. Dorsinville, whom we have known here as a valued
colleague. His past experience makes him. eminently suited for this delicate and
difficult task.
To revert to the matter under discussion, and especially to the question of
Prime Minister Adoula's letter of 16 April, I believe that no one c^n contest the
fact that the situation in which General Assembly resolution iVfV was adopted,
on 2C September 19 0 — that is, nearly three years ago — has changed,
fortunately for the better. The representative of Nigeria has explained this
with very great eloquence, and I do not wish to repeat his arguments.
The important fact is that there has been a material change in the situation,
and the resolution which called upon all States to refrain from the direct
furnishing of military-type assistance to a Congo then on the verge of civil
war, and without an effective Central Government, cannot possibly have the same
meaning today, when there is an effective Central Government, with which most of
us have diplomatic relations, and when the territorial integrity of the country
has been restored. If that were not so, then the opening phrase of paragraph 6
of the resolution — namely, "Without prejudice to the 'sovereign rights of the
Republic of the Congo" — would have had no meaning, and the phrase need not have
been included at all in the resolution.
AP/ec . °1
(Kf..Chakravarty, JncUa)
Looking'at It from another point of-view, unless there had been a change
in the circumstances', no scaling down of the Unitad Nations forcao vould have
beon possible, This then is the-clearest evidence that circumstances have -
changed since, tha resolution vas p?.3ssd in September 19 0. While we have-no
difficulty in recognizing this pa^ont fact, we find considerable difficulty
in- advising you as to uliat follows therefrom. -I do not think I am called
upon to advise you as to the Intrepretation of resolution lij-7 -- In. fact,'my
delegation would like to reserve its position on this questiono We feel,
however, that for our purpose, it is sufficient to recognize the fact that
circumstances have changed, that we recognize the sovereignty of the Congo,
that we recognize that they are entitled to'ask and obtain any aid through
bilatcrial negotiations. Since the aid is bilateral, there can be no question
of United Nations participation. In fact, as- you have said yourself, Mr.
Secretary-General, Prime Minister Adoula1 s lottor can bo interpreted to .-: ••• -
rccan that he does not press for any United ]rations participation* Again, the
resolution is either still applicable* or it Is not, The Governments who my be
wining to extend such aid are the -best judges of that fact and as ?;•.•• ve:celga
Governn-ents they are entitled to take whatever action they may consider
appropriate. All I can say is that ray Government does not want In any way to
stand against the wishes of the Congolese Government -as a sovereign Government
to obtain bilateral aid«
We seek no role 'In the Congo and are happy that we were able to make our
contribution to the United Nations effort with both n:-3a and money. We recognize
the sovereignty of the Congo with which we have been maintaining diplomatic
relations from the very beginning. Wo fully appreciate also that the phased
withdrawal of OUUC must inevitably coincide with the organised training of the
A1TC, as tho latter cannot be in a position to take over the responsibility of
maintaining law and order without having been sufficiently trained before
complete withdrawal of ONUC. We have therefore always been In favour of proper
training of the AHC,
TT
AF/ec
(Mr. , India)
In theoe circumstances my delegation, I repeat,, does not propose to raise
any objection to the Congolese plan on the technical ground that the resolution
may perhaps only be revised in the changed circumstances "by the appropriate
body.
While speaking on this subject, we would like to know whether you,
Mr. Secretary-General, and your advisers have evolved any compromise plan
safeguarding ONUC's position and have been capable of attracting some measurei
of general acceptability, I think this is also the time when ve might give
consideration to the wider question of the imperative necessity for advance
planning here at Headquarters to ensure that dioongaGomsnt from its
raoponoibtlities in the Congo follows an orderly pattern. Now that the
United Nations disengageicent can be said to have commenced with the repatriation
of a substantial portion of the United Nations forces from the Congo, thereby
marking the beginning of the end of the period of temporary United Nations
IE-illtary presence in the Congo, advance planning is very necessary with a vietf
to decide when and in what phases the disengage riBnt should ba carried on*
With the phased reduction of the strength of ONUC, there must be a simultaneous
reduction in its responsibilities for maintenance of law and order. ri'he area
in its charge must therefore be reduced correopoadingly. Integration of the
Katangese gendarmerie with the AKC in accordance with the U Thant plan must
proceed par! pasou with the reorganization of the ANC. There will' be a law
and order problem if the gendarmerie- which has been paid up to April, I understand,
is not given some oxnployi&art* The United Nations should not permit itself
to be faced with an embarrassing position and must now ensure that the
initiative at all times remains in United Kations hands. •
Mr. BQLAND (Ireland); In view of the late hour, I shall be extremely
brief, but I would like in a sentence to associate myself with the tributes
paid to Mr. Gardiner. He rendered most distinguished services to the United
Nations in the Congo. I should also like to associate myself with the good wishes
and the expressions of confidence in Ambassador Max Doroinville. His wisdom
and his long experience are an assurance to us that he will discharge his new
mission with the utinoat success.
• Boland, Ireland)
Like my colleague of India, I would like to return'to Mr. Adoula's-letter
to.you of.16 April* In that'letter Prime Minister Adoula put forward two
points. First, he asked, you to agree with him that in the changed circumstances,
General Assembly resolution 1 7 was now unrealistic. Secondly, he asked for
soica form of United Nations Involvement in the arrangements he has in mind for
the training and organization of the ANC. I think it is clear now that the
second point need no longer concern the Advisory Conmittee.' We therefore come
back to.the first point, and that is the relevance in the circumstances of
today of Assembly'resolution iVflj.. I quite agree with my colleague of Canada,
and other members of the Committee who have expressed the same view, that it
is not for this Committee to interpret an Assembly resolution. • That is a
matter for the Assembly itself, and pending any determination by the Assembly
itself, it is a matter for the interpretation of the individual members of
the United Nations. It is for them to interpret it.
.. I would like to recall that Assembly resolution l.k"k was adopted at
a very early stage of the Congo -operation, and the United Nations Jurisprudence
in regard to the Congo operation did not cease with resolution iV^i-, Ac' my
colleague of India pointed out, the concluding words of paragraph 6 of
resolution lVf4 limit the operation of that paragraph to the carrying out of
the purposes of three previous Security Council's resolutions, none of which
referred at all to the reorganization or training of-the AN'C. Go paragraph 6
of 147 (ES-IV) has a rather limited relevance to what we are talking about
here. But, as I say, the United Nations jurisprudence in connexion with the
Congo did not come to an end with Assembly resolution iVf (EG-IV)*' It canB
up again. The question was rather further extended in connexion with the
Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961, which GO far as I know, and
I hope I am not wrong on the point, was the first resolution that.referred to
the reorganization and training of the ANC.
That resolution, as members of the Committee may remember, is in two
parts. The first part contained a paragraph, A 2, which provided for the
withdrawal of foreign military .personnel and mercenaries. And in B 2, that
resolution:"Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized
and brought under discipline and control ..." (Security Council Official Records,
l6th Year, 9 2nd meeting, page 19 document
BSII/tt
(Mr. Boland, Ireland)
That resolution was the subject of an agreement with regard to its
implementation "between the then Secretary-General and President Kas
and I do think that the members of the Ccumittee vould "be well advised, if
they have to interpret for themselves resolution 1 7 (ES-IV), to read
the text of that agreement on g3.neral principles which was reached between
President Kasa-v\ibu and the then Secretary-General. This was the first time
a resolution had been passed dealing with the reorganization of the ANC.
I have the text of the agreement before me, and I would like to read out
the opening words. They are as follows:
"The Republic of the Congo accepts the resolution of 21 February
taking into account that the United Nations affirms its respect for the
sovereignty of the-Republic of the Congo in the implementation of that
resolution."
That was the first resolution that referred to the reorganisation of the
ANC« It goes on in paragraph 2 to say that the aim of the resolution of
21 February — which, by the way, reaffirmed resolution ikfk (ES-IV) — that
the aim of paragraphs A.2 and EU2 — and B02 is the one which referred to the
organization and training of ANC — is to eliminate all deleterious foreign
influence.
I think that some member of the Committee said earlier that the aim of
resolution 1 7 (ES-IV) was to make sure that everything in connexion with the
training and organization of the AKC should be channelled through the United
Nations. According to this agreement, that was not its main purpose. Its main
purpose was to eliminate all deleterious foreign influence. I will not read
further in the text of the agreement except to read the penultimate paragraph,
which is as follows:
"The Republic of the Congo recognizes the need to reorganize the
National Army, it being understood that this reorganization is to be
carried out" — not channelled through the United Nations -- "under the
authority of the President of the Republic with United Nations assistance
and on the basis of proposals made by the Chief of State in his letter of
5 March 1961 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,"
RSH/tt 97
(Mr, Boland, Ireland)
I do not think that we are entitled in.this Committee, in examining
this question of -what arrangements the Government of the Congo is entitled '••••
to make on a "bilateral "basis, to confine ourselves simply to General Assembly
resolution ikjk (ES-JV)0 "We must go on to the Security .Council resolution of
21 February and to the specific agreement.concluded "between President Kasa-vubu
and the Secretary-General as to the sense.in which that resolution was to "be
interpreted, .
I do not want to delay the Committee, but the conclusion that I 'draw from
all this is the following. Mr. Secretary-General, I think our duty here is to
give you the most helpful advice that we can. In regard to Prime Minister Adoula's
contention that circumstances have.changed since General Assembly
resolution 1 7 (ES-IV) was adopted, I do not think there can be any doubt as
to the answer. It has changed completely. That resolution must be read in
the light of later resolutions and also of 'the change in circumstances and,
in particular, this agreement on general principles which was made between the
then Secretary-General and President Kasa-vubu.
I do not know whether, in replying to this letter, you need go ±>.n*ther than
to say simply.that, .but I would think that you would be in danger of going .'
beyond the decisions which have been reached and the agreement reached by your
predecessor with President Kasa-vubu if you were to go so far as to ^say that
either General Assembly resolution ik k (ES-IV) or any later resolution limited
the sovereignty of the Congolese Government to the extent of depriving it of the
freedom to make such arrangements as. it may think fit for the. training and -
organization of .the AUG.
Mr. WODAJO (Ethiopia): First of all I should like to associate my
delegation with the words of thanks and appreciation which have been extended
to Mr, Robert Gardiner for the.highly valuable services he has rendered to the
United Nations and to everyone of us. May I also extend the.good wishes of my
delegation and my Government to his successor, Ambassador Dorsinville.
(Mr. Wodajo, Ethiopia)
RSH/tt
May I seise this first opportunity to Indicate the vievs or my Government
on the question on "which you, Mr. Secretary-General,have sought our advice.
Firstly, my Government is of the opinion that the Kind of assistance Tor which
the Congolese Government has asked In within the scope of tre present mandate
of the United Nations presence in th.3 Congo, Secondly, my Government agrees
with the Govev-iniDut of the Republic of the Congo that United Nations association,
United Nations participation in the training of the Congolese army is preferable
to any other kind of bilateral or multilateral arrangement outside the framework
of the United Nations. Thirdly, in our estimation the crux of the problem is
how should this United Nations association or this United Nations participation,
which we all desire to see, should be evolved and elaborated,, I think that the
more we address ourselves 'concretely to this proposition, the better the progress
ve will make»
We believe that the United Nations association should be based on
established United Nations principles and procedures, and in this respect ve
believe that we can learn a lot from the various United Nations technical
assistance programmes. There are certain fundamental procedures an - principles
which give to the various United Nations technical assistance progr&flanes the
international character which they all have today. We feel that this Committee
should keep addressing itself to the question of how we should elaborate a
United Nations programme or United Nations participation in the training of the
Congolese army, with all the procedures which would safeguard the international
character that a programme of this sort should assume*
DR/rh 101
•' ' • (Mr. Wodgjo, Ethiopia)
The question of the request of the Government of the Congo "being
incompatible with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1 7 bas been
put forward. In the view of my delegation, we do not feel that it is the
better part of wisdom to address ourselves at this juncture to the
continuing validity of this resolution under the present circumstances, if
we can elaborate a programme of United Nations participation which could
safeguard, as I have suggested, established United Nations procedures.. So we
feel that there is scope., that there is opportunity still remaining for you,
Mr. Secretary-General, with the advice of the officers of the United Nations, .
concerned with the Technical Assistance Programme and.in conjunction with
the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to work out a. programme of
United Nations participation in the training of the Congolese Army.
We feel that such a programme could be made compatible with the .
resolution of the General Assembly and with established procedures of the :
United Nations. I must confess that my delegation.has been hampered by
discussions that revolve around two abstract concepts^ the concepts of
co-ordination and the umbrella. Unless we give meat and substance to this. ,.
concept, I do not see how we can discuss.,in .great detail, as we did, the ..
compatibility of these concepts with the United Nations resolution.
The SECRETARY-GENERAJ.; At the commencement of this meeting
Mr. Bomboko indicated his desire to raalie a statement to clarify-some of the
points raised in the course of the discussion, and I give him the floor.
Mr* BOMBOKD (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): I
must say very sincerely that my delegation is disappointed with the way in
which the debates on the very important problem for us has been carried out.
From certain declarations that were made, it appears that many representatives
are basing themselves on feelings and CD nsiderations that are quite alien to
the interests of the people and the Government of the Congo. To hear some
delegations .ppeak here, one might believe that this problem, which is vital
and which they know to be vital in their own countries, is a game. In fact,
I have seen proposals made here which do not take acount of the existing
realities, realities that we are all aware of and which we have felt very
DR/rh 102
(Mr• Eoroboko. _*-. Leopoldville ) )
closely. There have even been cone delegations which have talked about "the
balance of forces" in Africa as if our Republic had the purpose of setting up
an army to conquer the rest of Africao I do not think that that is our aim
since from the very beginning we have very clearly defined our position,
pointing out. that if ve asked for an array it is not an army of conquest, it
is merely a ssiiirity force that ve need to maintain the integrity of tiis
territory and also to protect persons and their possessions.
Many people here linow full veil, because of Press reports, of the
degree of the tragedy that besets us, and many people knov full veil that
without the sacrifices of the United Nations, the sacrifices that many
countries have been willing to make so that the Congo would be reunited would
have been in vain and useless because we would have fallen back to where we
were* Despite that, I Gee that solutions are proposed hastily without bearing
in mind that this is a basic problem that bears on the lives of about 15 million
inhabitants. Thus I shall not go into a cLLscussicn of feelings and emotions;
I shall merely refer to facts and I shall say that the solution by which
officers would be sent to Europe or elsewhere to be trained is a so.i.ut.ion that
does not bear in mind the fact that an entire army needs to be trained, an
army that must be a useful tool* You knov that we have done this already?
In fact, we have already sent 330 young Congolese to train in Europe; this
training took from six to eighteen months. Even at the present moment we have
300 Congolese who are still overseas undertaking military training. We have
ninety young Congolese at cadet schools and forty-five young Congolese who
are about to leave to attend that same cadet school. On the other hand,
there are thirty Congolese who are being trained in European military academies
so that they can become officers. We have already made an effort but we are
certain that this effort, despite the 3^0 young men we have trained for three
years in Europe, is not sufficient, that it is necessary that these 3^0 young
men, plus the cadres that, we can receive from abroad will then have to train
our soldiers in the Congo„ It is not because an officer is trained that you
can say that you have an army. If we ourselves have succeeded in training
only 380 yoUng men in three years, how can the United Nations manage to prepare
and train an entire array in six or seven months because some delegations have
said that the date of 31 December 1963 would probably be the target date for
the United Nations presence in the Congo.
(Mr. Borcboko, Congo (Leopoldville))
Such proposals do not "bear in clnci. the facts, They not only set aside the
facts because.General Kebbede Guebre himself pointed out the difficulties
that he has had regarding the command of the United Nations forces in the
Congo. I could read out certain declarations that were made by General Kebbede:
"This factorings up many problems, mainly due to the difficulty of making
different organisations^ with clifferent concepts and procedures and using
different languages, working together at the same time in the came task.
"'Different organizations present a problem when units have to be
employed in the field* Guch problems as strength of sub-units, different
ammunition, different radio equipment, and so on, can be very embarrassing
for the Force,", (T th meeting;, UN Advisory Committee on the Congo, p. 13-15)
We know that the United Nations has had a difficult time in co-ordinating
military activities in the Congo because of. the diversity of the countries
that are represented. How do you expect the same United Nations to undertake
the training in record time of an entire army and in that same record
time to give it the entire structure that c<:\ army needs in order to replace
effectively the United Nations forces when those forces leave our territory?
I think that this is also ,an unrealistic attitude, all the more so since
our requests to the United Nations for the reorganization of the National
Congolese Army is not a new one. The representative of Ireland, for example,
stressed the agreement -with President Kasavubu. But there is a letter from
President Kasavubu dated, I think, 6 March 1961 in which we had already asked
the United Nations to take up, together ith us, the solution of these
problems.
106
(Mr. Boiuboko, Congo (Leopoldville))
You know full well that the Organization has encountered many difficulties,
of which we all know. The United Nations was to come to the Congo only to help us
to keep order and request the Belgian troops to leave. But it had to wage war,
although there had "been no question, of fighting when it went to the Congo. It had
to wage war, and we know that any war, however small it may "be, involves enormous
expenses. Hence the United Nations has had to spend a fortune there to carry on
that war.
This complicated the situation and "because of these difficulties -- and ve
should like to pay a tribute to the United Nations for its action -- the
Organization was not able to help us to reorganize the army. It 'is only now that
we see that the United Nations could do so. But in the final count it is the
fifteen million inhabitants of the Congo who must foot the bill.
Today some people are saying: "The United Nations should try to reorganize
the Congolese army", but they do not even think about who is to pay the bill. That
too is a problem which should be borne in mind when the subject is discussed. ' I
can tell you here and now that my country, who.33 economy is in a critical situation,
will in no circumstances be able to bear the expense of modernizing the r^my.
Furthermore, as the representative of Ireland pointed out — I >•*.£•
President Kasavubu' s agreement in my possession, but I did not want to quote it
because I had no intention of starting a pointless argument — nevertheless, since
the reorganization of the army is being discussed there is one question, and it
is the question which was raised by the representative of Ireland: can anyone
tell me where this resolution which is being so much talked about refers to the
reorganization of the army? It is not even mentioned. What is mentioned is
military assistance. What does military assistance mean? We must first agree on
the meaning of the words. Can the fact that we have military instructors be
described as military assistance which is a danger to the United Nations? I do
not think so; if that were so then the teachers we have in our schools and who
come from countries which -- as some have -.said--- belong, to a certain bloc, would
have to leave the Congo because they might teach imperialism and colonialism to
Congolese children1.
I do not believe that this can be regarded as an obstacle. Since teachers
come here from certain countries, who not also teachers who could provide military
training for young Congolese? Where is the difference? I wonder.
r BHS/ah 107(Mr. Bomboko, Congo (Leopoldville))
It is the resolution of 21 February that referred to the reorganization of
the array. I am a co-signer of the agreement concluded between the President of
the Republic of the Congo end the Secretary-General at that time. It was
Mr, Gardiner's'mission and tho.f:e vho came to the Congo and tried to reconcile
the sovereignty of the Congo with that resolution and with the obligations of the
United Nations. As a result of this effort at conciliation; we finally arrived
at what 1 stated at the beginning, namely that the reorganization of the army
falls completely Within the competence of the Coagolso-a Government, and that the
reorganization of the army; since it has an institutional character, must be
carried out under the authority of those nominated by our fundamental lav. We
cannot abdicate by saying, "We have aeked for the assistance of the United Nations
and therefore it is others who are going to take our place in reorganizing our
army". We agreed with the Secretary-General that this would be done under the
authority of President Kacavubu.
For the moment, we are asking for technical assistance and, in due course,
for materiel. But we do not intend to undertake military operations^ It- Is only
to organize our security forces. Perhaps I have not expressed EyselC correctly,
for French is not my mother tongue. I understand that when one speaks of military
assistance it means logistic sup rt, the "building of military bases within the
framework of a military offensive,, We are not asking for military assistance.
We have not asked countries to give us logistic support; we have not asked for
military equipment to undertake military operations. All we have requested is
technical assistance for the training of Congolese youth so as to improve the
cadres that already exist with a view to maintaining public order and protecting
the people. This is what we seek. We do not have, as some of our colleagues have
indicated, any hidden desire to upset the military balance of Africa, if such a
balance exists. I do not believe that there is a military balance in Africa.
Nobody has created armies for conquest. If such military dreams did exist in
Africa, the Congo would have the right to create an army for its defence. But I
do not believe that such armies of conquest exist in Africa . I think this is an
erroneous interpretation of the desires of my Government.
BHS/ah 108-110
(Mr. Eomboko, Congo (Leopoldville))
If we really wish to turn to juridical considerations, then we must bear
in mind the agreement signed -with the Secretary-General which gives UGj in
recognition of our sovereignty, the right to reorganize our army.
I unj.'r.t stress the contradiction -that exists in some of the statements that
were made, Cone have said that they recognize the sovereignty of the Republic
of the Congo, while someone else has said, "While recognizing that sovereignty,
we state that the Republic of the Congo nevertheless has no right to choose the
countries to which it will turn for assistance in training its army". Then we
were told, "We wish to save the Republic of the Congo, because it is going to
fall under some type of NATO trusteeship".
I must say that all of the African countries represented here who have
struggled to achieve their independence have one common phenomenon, and a rather
curious one, namely that during the period when we struggled for our independence
we were thrown into prison and we fought against the colonizers: yet once
independence was acquired, we collaborated u.lt-h our former colonizers. Even
those who were imprisoned, either by the French, by the English or by the
Belgians, finally collaborated with them. In the armies of today, there are
officers, western and others, who are there as technicians* Why should there
not be confidence in the Republic of the Congo? Why should our behaviour be
taken as some shirking of our obligations and duties as a member of the African
community? Why should we be accused of creating a danger in the- heart of Africa?
Mr. Secretary-General, I beg your forgiveness for having raised my voice.
But my people and my Government consider — and I must stress this point again —
this problem to be basic and vital. We must press our views when we say that
the sacrifice in human lives made by those countries that have assisted us to
recover our national unity will have been made in vain if we do not now undertake
the modernization of our army so as to discipline it. and make It: effective
in order that once the United Nations has withdrawn its troops from the Congo,
we may then1 truly consolidate the work that it has done* This is all that the
Congolese Government wishes to achieve. I must state that the Congolese
Government vail not go back on its position. If obstacles are put in our path
for the training of our army, we shall shoulder our responsibilities on this
level and on the African level too, .
AW/he 111
Mr_._SIDT-EATA (Morocco) (irv'-errrctation frcm French): First of all,
I vish it to "be recorded in the records of this meeting that the delegation of
Morocco associates itself in full with the expressions of congratulations and
gratitude vhich have been addressed "by all those who have spoken here to
Mr. Gardiner, who has "brilliantly represented the United Nations in the Congo.
We al^»o associate ourselves with the congratulations and tribute paid to
Ambassador Dorsinville on his recent appointment as United Nations Representative
to the Congo.
Having said this, may I "make it clear that the Minister 1'or Foreign Affairs
of the Congo has'just referred to a sentence in the course of the statement made
by the delegation of Morocco; that is to say, our concern to maintain a balance
of forces. To the extent that this reference was addressed to our statement, I
vish it to 'be made clear here that what we said a while ago should "be understood
as follows: that the presence of a group of nations having a specific and
defined policy, placed within a large African territory such as that of the
Congo, may have implications which could jeopardize not only balance in Africa,
but balance throughout the world. '
I wish it to be placed on record that that is the way in which tile
statement made by the delegation of Morocco should be interpreted. As for saying
that we have any concern for the existing balance of power in'Africa, this is'
hardly relevant in the case of a country such as ours, which has always desired
to see all the...principles of co-operation, friendship and understanding prevail
among all African States in a spirit cf ipeace and brotherhood.
112
^n .?I ™ I']J:{:::?iLr Du-G to the lateness of the hour, .1 will
confine myself to a very brief remark by way of winding up this cUscucaion.
First of all, I want to thank all the members of the Committee for the
very useful, helpful and comprehensive statements made in the course of the
discussion. Of course, it would be very difficult, if riot impossible, to
surjuarize or eci&lytfa the sense of the discussion. It could even, perhaps, be
dangerous for me to attempt to analyse the feeling of this Committee. The
expressions have been varied and far-reaching; but if there is no consensus
of view in this Committee to guide my thinking in response to Prime Minister Adoula1
letter, I can assure you that my reply to Mr. Adoula's letter will be elided.
primarily by the mood of this Committee. Of course, it will take some time
to study very carefully and very closely the records of this meeting, which I
consider to be very important because the matter under discussion is very
important and, if I may say so, very crucial, not only with regard to the
Republic of the Congo but also with regard to the very character of the United
Nations involvement in the Congo.
At the risk of oversimplification, I may say that two points emerge out
of this discussion. The first one is that there is a general recognition of
the fact that the Government of the Republic of the Congo is sovereign, that
the Congolese Government has sovereign prerogatives in the discharge of its
duties and obligations. The second point also emerges clearly: that there is
also general recognition in this Committee that the United Nations has certain
definite functions to perform in the Congo. Therefore, to solve this problem
satisfactorily, we have to endeavour to find a formula which does not damage these
two concepts, these two points.
I wish to thank you once again for this very useful- discussion. The
meeting is adjourned*
The meeting rose at 7«25 p.m.
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