Нобеловата награда за икономика за икономика 2007: Теорията за икономическите механизми (The Nobel Prize for

Eduard Marinov The Nobel Prize for Economics 2007: The Design of Economic Institutions

Original title: Нобеловата награда за икономика за икономика 2007 Теорията за икономическите механизми

In: Science magazine, 3/2008, Sofia ISSN 0861-3362 Paper language: Bulgarian All views and opinions expressed remain solely those of the author. Readers are encouraged to quote and reproduce this material, provided the source is acknowledged. This publication should be cited as: Marinov, E. 2008. The Nobel Prize for Economics 2007: The Design of Economic Institutions. Science magazine, 3/2008, Sofia, pp 19-26, ISSN 0861-3362. (in Bulgarian)

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1 Bxc Samuelson, W. Bargaining under asymmetric information. - Econometrica, 1984, 52, p. 995-1005. 2 B)f(. Harris. M. and A. Raviv. Allocation mechanisms and the design of auctions. - Econometrica. 1981, 49, p. 1477-1499.: Myerson. R. Optimal auction design.- Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981,6, p. 58-73.; Riley, J and W Samuelson. Optimal auctions.- American Economic Review, 1981, 71, p. 381-392. 3 BK Clarke, E. H. Multipart pricing of public goods. - Public Choice, 1971, 11 , p. 17-33.; Groves, T. Incentives in teams. -Econometrica, 1973,41, p. 617-663. Satterthwaite, M. Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and corre­spondence theorems for voting procedures and welfare functions. - Journal of Economic Theory, 1975, I 0. p. 187-217. 4 B)f(. Myerson, R. Optimal auction design.- Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981,6, p. 58-73 .; Maskin , E. and J. Riley. Monopoly with incomplete in.formation.- RAND Journal of Economics, 1984 (b), 15, p. 171-196.

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5 Hanp. B Samuelson, P. The pure theory of public expenditure. - Review of Economics and Statistics, 1954, 36, p. 387-389. 6 3a no-no,11;po6Ho o6~cHeHHe, B)!( . D 'Aspremont, C. and L. A. Gzirard-Varet. Incentives and incomplete information. -Journal of Public Economics, 1979, 11, p. 25-45. 7 Gibbard, A. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. - Econometrica, 1973, 41, p. 587-602. 8 B)!(. Dasgupta, P, P Hammond and E. Maskin . The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility. -Review of Economic Studies, 1979, 46, p. 181-216.; Harris, M. and R. Townsend. Resource allocation under asymmetric information.- Econometrica, 1981, 49, p. 33-64.; Myerson, R. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. - Econometrica, 1979,47, p. 61-73.; Rosenthal, R. Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty. - Review of Economic Studies, 1978, 45, p. 595-604. 9 Hanp. JlaHHHHrep, JlHHxapT 11 Pa,!J;Hep (1989) OTKpHBaT, qe ,!l;BOHHHTe nprose HMaT 6e3Kpai1Ho MHoro (HaHCTHHa 6e3-6poi1) HeJJHHeMHH paBHOBeCH~, nOJJO)I(HTeJJHOCTia Ha KOHTO BapHpa OT HanbJ1HO ecpeKTI1BHI1 110 OTHOWeHHe Ha CTI1MYJ111Te .no HyJJa.

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10 3a o6o6~eHHe Ha pe3yJJTaTHTe Ha MacKHH npH HrpH c Henb.JIHa HH¢opMal\H» BJK. Postlewaite, A. and D. Schmeidler. Implementation in differential information economies. -Journal of Economic Theory, 1986, 39, p. 14-33.; Palfrey, T. and S. Srivastava. Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication.- Journal of Economic Theory, 1991, 55, p. 17-40.; Jackson, M. Bayesian implementation. - Econometrica, 1991 , 59, p. 461-477. 3a ,1\pyrH o6JJaCTH Ha npHJJOJKeHHe, BJK. Matsushima, H. A new approach to the implementation problem. - Journal of Economic Theory, 1988, 45 , p. 128-144.; Abreu, D., and A. Sen. Virtual implementation in Nash equilibria. - Econometrica, 1991 , 59, p. 997-1022.; Moore, J. and R. Repullo. Subgame perfect implementation. - Econometrica, 1988, 56, p. 1191-1220.; Moulin , H . Social Choice. - In: R. Aumann and S. Hart (eds.). Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 2. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1994. 11 HanpHMep, aKO THnOBeTe Ha HaMaBa~HTe ca H3Ba,!\eHH He3aBHCHMO OT e,!\HOTHnHO pa3npe,!\eJJeHHe B HHTepBaJJa OT HyJJa ,1\0 CTO XHJIAAH, TOraBa OnTHMaJJHaTa pe3epBHa 1.\eHa e 50, He3aBHCHMO OT 6po» HaMaBa~H. Ta3H pe3epBHa 1.\eHa npHHYJK­,1\aBa HaMaBa~Te, qH»TO 01.\eHKa H~BHIIIaBa 50, ,1\a npe,!\JIOJKaT noaeqe, OTKOJIKOTO 6Hxa HanpaBHJIH HHaqe, KOeTO OT CBO» CTpaHa yaeJJHqaaa oqaKBaHH» npHXO,!\. 0T ,1\pyra crpaHa, aKO CTaHe TaKa, qe HaMaBa~»T CH MHCJIH , qe o6eKTbT CTpyaa 50, TOraaa o6eKTbT He ce npO,!\aBa, ,1\0pH KOraTO HMa nOJJOJKHTeJJHa CTOHHOCT 3a H»KOH KYnyaaq H HHKaKBa CTOHHOCT 3a npo,!\a­aaqa. BbnpeKH qe T03H pe3yJITaT e »BHO Hee¢eKTHBeH no IIapeTo B KJiacHqecKH CMHCb.JI, Te3H ¢opMH Ha Thpr ca e¢eKTHBHH TIO OTHOIIIeHHe Ha CTHMYJJHTe B ,!\e¢HHHpaHH» no-rope CMHCbJI.

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. TipH TaKMBa cJia6o o6oc­HOBaHM paMKM e TPY.LJ:HO .LJ:a ce B3eMaT sepHH HOpMa­TMBHM perneHIDI 3a peryJiaTOpHMTe npoQeCM. ToBa no­JIO)I(eHMe ce npoMellil p»3KO c M3CJie.LJ:BaHero Ha Ea­pbH " Mai1bpCbH or 1982 r. B rosa M3CJie.LJ:BaHe pe­ryJiaropHIDI npoQec ce MO.LJ:eJIHpa KaTO Hrpa c HenbJI­Ha MHcjlopMaQIDI. PeryJiaTOpbT IDIMa .LJ:HpeKTeH .LJ:OC­Tbn .[{0 MHcjlOpMaQIDI 3a MCTMHCKMTe npOM3BO.L{CTBe­HM pa3XO.L{M Ha MOHOnOJIMCTa. J.f3nOJI3BaMKM npHH­QMna Ha orsapnHero, EapbH" Mai1bpCbH (1982) no­Jiy•msaTonTMMaJIHa peryJiaropHa cxeMa, 6e3 ,LJ;a npH-6~J:rBaT .a:o .a;onycKaHIDI ad hoc. B OnTMMaJIHIDI Mexa­HM3bM, peryJiaTOpbT (06MKHOBeHO npaBMTeJICTBeHa areHQIDI) CbnOCTaBH QeJITa .a:a non.yqasa peHTa or MO­HOnOJ:mCTa ( npHXO.L{ 3a npaBMTeJICTBOTO) CnpHMO QeJI­Ta .a;a HaCbp'faBa ecjleKTMBHO HMBO Ha npOH3BO.L{CTBO­TO. OcseH rosa, Ha MOHOnOJIMCTa rpn6sa .a:a 6b.a;e .a;a­.a;eH .a;ocTaTb'feH CTMMYJI, 3a .a;a yqacTBa (T.e . .a:a oc­TaHe Ha na3apa). 1-bcJie.a;saHero Ha EapbH-Mai1bp­CbH e nocJie.a;saHo or 6yM s JIHrepazypaTa no pery­JiaropHa MKOHOMMKa. T» .a;asa COJIM.a;Ha reopeTM'iHa 6a3a 3a oQeHKa Ha pa3JIM'fHM peryJiaTOpHM MexaHM3-MM, KaTO HanpHMep 3aKpMTM QeHM cpeuzy CXeMM 3a no.a;eAAHe Ha npHXO.L{MTe M pa3XO.L{MTe. 11KOHOMMCTM­Te M3nOJI3BaT Mo.a;eJia EapbH-Mai1bpCbH, 3a .a;a ycTa­HOB»r eMnHJJM'fHO ecjleKTa Ha peryJIHpaHero Ha cP"P­MeHoro nose.a;eHMe 14

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. no reopeMaTa Ha MaCKMH OT M3CJie,LJ;BaHero MY or 1977 r. HHMa MexaHM3bM 3a B3eMaHe Ha perne­HIDI, KOMro .a;a npMJiara no Haw npaBMJIOTO Ha MH0-3MHCTBOTO. I13CJie.a;saHero Ha .a;pyrM npasMJia 3a o6-meCTBeH M360p nOKa3Ba, 'fe HMKOe e.a;HOBaJieHTHO Ta­KOBa He MO)I(e .a:a e MOHOTOHHO no MacKMH18 . Tosa 3Ha'fM, ~1e crparerM'feCKOTO nose.a;eHMe Ha M36Hpare­JIMTe BO.L{M BCeKM Bb3MO)I(eH M36HpareJieH MeXaHMThM .a;o Cb3.a;asaHero Ha pasHosecMe Ha Ham, Koero e no.a:­omMMaJIHO Cnp»MO .a;a.a;eHOTO npaBMJIO 3a 06I.QeCTBeH M36op. E.a;MH M3XO.a; or Ta3H .a;MJieMa e .a:a ce M30CTaBM M3MCKBaHero npasMJioro 3a o6mecTBeH m6op .a;a e e.a:­HOBaJieHTHO. MHO)I(eCTBo MHorosaneHTHM npasMJia (Hanp. Koraro BMHarM ce M36HpaT ecjleKTMBHM no Tia­pero anrepHaTMBH) ca MOHOTOHHM no MacKMH " MO­raT .a:a 6b.a;aT npMJio)l(eHM no Haw. He.a;oCTaThKbT e, qe rpH6sa .a:a ce npHeMe e.L{Ha cjlyH.a;aMeHTaJIHa Heon­pe.a;eJieHOCT, KOHTO e HeM36e)l(eH acneKT Ha He.L{MKTa­ropcKHre CMCTeMM: npH HRKOM OT npOcjlMJIMTe Ha npe.a;nO'fMTaHM»TanoseqeoTe.a;HaanrepHaTMBarpn6-sa .a;a e npHel\mMBa 3a o6meCTBOTO " 3arosa Cbmec­Tsysa noseqe or e.a;Ho pasHosecMe no Haw. KpaH:HM­»T pe3YJITaT rorasa MO)I(e .a:a 3aBMCM or nperosopH 11

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12 3a pa3JII1'lHJ.I npHJIO)f(eHJ.IJI Ha TeopHJITa 3a HKOHOMH'leCKJ.ITe MexaHH3MI1, B)f(. Hanp. Mussa and Rosen. Monopoly and product quality.- Journal of Economic Theory, 1978, 18, p. 301-317.; Stole. L. Nonlinear pricing and oligopoly. - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995, 4, p. 529-562; Armstrong, M. Multiproduct nonlinear pricing. - Econometrica, 1996, 64, p. 51 - 75.; Jehiel, P. and B. Moldovanu. Efficient design with interdependent valuations.- Econometrica, 2001, 69, p. 1237-1259.; Cramton. P., R. Gibbons and P. Klemperer. Dissolving a partnership e?ciently. - Econometrica, 1987, 55, r· 615-632. 3 Laffont. J.-J. The new economics of regulation ten years after. -Econometrica, 1994, 62, p. 507-537.

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(3a rro-rro,ll;po6uo 3arr03uasaue c reopiDITa ua HKO­HOMH'IeCKHTe MexaHH3MH, mK. Scientific background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel2007, rrpese,ll;eH ua 6'bJI­rapcKH e3HK B ,H06eJIOBa Harpa,ll;a 3a IIOCTH)I(eHIDI B o6Jiacrra ua HKOHOMH'IecKHTe uayKH 3a 2007 r. ",err. lfKOHOMH'IeCI<a MHC'bJI, 6/2007, C. 90-115- 6eJI. aBT.).

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