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Ethno-Religious Pluralism

and its Management in

Liberia and Ghana

Lessons for Nigeria

O. J. Para-Mallam, PhD.10/5/2011

Submitted for peer review for the Nigerian Journal of

Policy and StrategyVol. 16 No. 2


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Ethno-Religious Pluralism and its Management in Liberia and Ghana 2011

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Introduction

Since Nigerias return to democratic governance in 1999 the expanded political space opened

up opportunity for voicing grievance and discontent expressed through identity-based

communal conflicts, particularly of ethno-religious coloration. Such conflicts have increasedin quantity and intensity over the last few years with severe costs and alarming implications

for national security and political stability. Are there lessons we can draw from the

management of identity-related crises in neighbouring West African states? This is the central

exploration of this paper. The post-Cold War upsurge of identity politics has transformed

several African states (including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia,

Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and increasingly Jos, Nigeria) into a theatre of violent

conflicts (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007). Such conflicts entail the manipulation and

mobilization of primordial identities, such as ethnicity, religion, occupational gender, sex

orientation, disability etc.) around shared political, economic, social or ideological goals

(Jinadu, 2007). However, such conflicts are not unique to the African continent as seen in

places like Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya and the indigenous peoples of

Latin America, to name a few. Nevertheless, among numerous identity markers ethnicity and

religion, especially the former, constitute the dominant axis around which violent conflicts

have revolved in Africa (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007:12). Indeed, Mary Kaldor (1999) refers

to ethnic identity and difference as the new wars.

Samuel Huntington (1996) famously alluded to the great clash of civilizations depicted in

the new wave of ethno-religious conflicts around the world, most notably as a fall out of the

globalization of western ideology, culture and capital with attendant resistance from other

cultural systems. Ethno-religious conflicts in Africa are a reflection of the rich cultural make-

up that is characteristic of most African states. Yet, ethno-religious pluralism does not

provide a sole explanatory cause for violent conflict as examples of ethnically and religiously

diverse, yet peaceful nations exist. Hagg and Kagwanja (2007) make the point that ethnicity

is not always a cause of violent conflict as homogenous societies may erupt in hostilities (as

in Somalia) while heterogeneous societies abide in peace (Osman, 2007). A complex web of

cultural, religious, social, political and economic factors weaves through most identity-based

conflicts in Africa. This paper demonstrates that for diversity and difference to be an asset

rather than a liability they must be managed through an operative policy and legislativeframework that intentionally promotes nationalism and integration. Without such a

framework violent conflict and state implosion are inevitable.

After a brief review of the changing nature of conflict on the global scene the paper considers

some conceptual road marks for locating ethno-religious conflicts within a broader

understanding of identity-based politics. It then discusses and critiques Jinadus (2007)

cultural theoretical model for the management of ethno-religious, and investigates the merits

of the model in light of examples from Liberia and Ghana. In this regard, the paper explores

the comparative management of ethno-religious conflicts in Ghana and Liberia in order to

draw lessons for Nigeria on possible institutional mechanisms and approaches to peace


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building and fashioning national cohesion. The scope of the paper does not include an in-

depth discussion of the specificities of any given conflict beyond sketching basic elements to

enable a comparative analysis of how they were managed or resolved. The analysis is further

supported by research data collected during the NIPSS Senior Executive Course 33 Study

Group Three Tour of Liberia (2nd

16th

May, 2011). It concludes by applying potentiallessons from Liberia and Ghana to the Nigerian situation, with specific emphasis on the Jos

conflict.

The Changing Nature of Conflict

In Understanding Conflict Resolution Peter Wallensteen (2007) asserts that in the 21st

century global armed conflicts made significant shifts in nature, location and focus. Before

the Second World War armed conflict occurred primarily on large scale between states.

Consequently, they frequently held off-shore in foreign territory and were focused on

national territorial or resource claims. However, Post-World War II conflicts, taking place

within the context of decolonization and emerging independent states, occur increasingly

within states as part of the contradictions and contestations in the state formation process.

Intra-state conflicts tend to be more frequent and more numerous and, as noted earlier, are

rooted in identity-based politics. Identity politics has been at the heart of violent conflicts in

Africa and are rooted in colonial politics (Hagg and Kagwanja, 2007). As newly independent

states in Asia, Africa and Latin America turned towards nation building they were left to deal

with an inherently conflict-ridden legacy of colonial administration.

This is not to suggest that pre-colonial societies were devoid of ethnic or religious conflict orthat the colonial regimes are solely to blame for the current spate of violent conflicts in

Africa. African historians have highlighted several examples of ethno-religious conflicts

brought about by empire building and expansionism characteristic of great pre-colonial

empires such as the Songhai, Mali, Asanti, Fanti, Benin, Oyo, Kanuri and the Islamic Jihad of

Uthman Dan Fodio. Most significantly, violent identity-related conflicts persist despite, and

often as a result of, the resurgence of democratic systems of government in places like West

Africa since 1990 (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). However, the intense and combustive nature of such

conflicts within the context of state formation took on new dimensions as a result of

distortions introduced into the diverse mix of ethnic nationalities during the colonial era.Such distortions are intensified by long years of military rule.

Ifeka (2000) and Matinussen (2002) contend that while industrialized states evolved over a

long period of time naturally from ethnic nationalities into territorially defined political

entities (nation-states) post-colonial countries were artificially contrived states forced into

political union by the agglomeration of diverse ethnic-nationalities. In fact, Ifeka argues

outright that a country like Nigeria is not a nation at all but an amalgamation of ethnic

nationalities forced to struggle to forge a non-existent unified identity. In the words of

Matinussen (2002:321) by the nature of their historical process in state formation post-

colonial states are more appropriately defined as state-nations. This reverse pattern of state


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formation in post-colonial states greatly differentiated the task and challenges in nation

building in post-colonial states from that of those in the Northern Hemisphere, particularly

western democracies. Globalization is another critical determinant in ethno-religious conflict

in which the fluidity of international capital, markets and media is bringing diverse cultures

and people groups into close and contesting relationships that revolve around the competitionfor global resources. This has led to the globalization of ethnicity and the localization of civil

wars over copper, diamonds, land, oil and other incentives for the control of state largesse.

Consequently, the changing nature of global conflict brought about by the peculiar

characteristics of state formation processes in Africa history as well as the effects of

contemporary forces of globalization call for alternative conceptual and theoretical

frameworks than those previously used to analyse armed conflicts.

Some Conceptual Road Marks

Historically, political scientists and conflict resolution analysts tended to apply liberal or

Marxist conflict resolution models to explain or seek solutions to African conflicts. Hagg and

Kagwanja (2007) argue that such models recorded only limited success and provide evidence

that identity-based conflicts, particularly of the ethno-religious type, require re-configured

analytical frameworks. Ethno-religious conflicts are best understood within the broader

context of identity-based conflicts because ethnicity is but one of a variety of markers which

may occur singly or in concert with others (such as religion or class) in a given conflict

situation. Volf (1996:16) makes this point succinctly in Exclusion and Embrace when he

says, the problem of ethnic and cultural conflicts is part of a larger problem of identity and

otherness. This larger problem refers the tendency for people groups to derive a sense of

belonging together from shared cultural, physical symbolisms and rituals and then exclude

others on the basis of that shared identity (Woodard, 1997). This paper adopts a working

definition of ethnicity based on Irobis (2010:2) understanding of an ethnic group as a

community of people who share cultural and linguistic characteristics including history,

tradition, myth, and origin. Tradition often includes sacred beliefs and symbols. These

identity markers are deeply embedded within the psychology of individuals because they are

signifiers of belonging, entitlements and meaning. When challenged or threatened they can

evoke powerful responses. In summary,

When premised on essentialist claims to a shared identity such as a historical

past, cultural heritage, religion or biological traits - difference can lead to conflict,

war and dominance. (Para-Mallam, 2007:34)

Before we review how select countries have effectively managed identity-based conflicts, it

is important to consider some general explanatory frameworks on why they occur and, why

they are so pervasive, combustive and intractable across African states. Hagg and Kagwanja

(2007:12) draw on the analyses of a variety of scholars to explain why ethnic conflicts, in

particular, are so common. In reference to Endalew (2002) they assert that,


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The ubiquity of identity wars is based on the fact that ethnic identity is indeed

particularly strong in traditional societies embodying the deeply-embedded sense

of belonging to a group with unique identity markers, such as myths of common

ancestry, shared memories, cultural values, traditions and symbols, and ownership

of territory.

With specific emphasis on ethnicity, Hagg and (2007) refer to the work of several scholars to

distil the following reasons for the preponderance of identity-based conflicts in Africa:

The legacy of colonial poli tics:The colonial administration set up systems of political

development and artificially contrived territorial agglomerations of ethnic nationalities whose

erstwhile cultural identities became translated into political identities. Thus, through the

political elevation of one or a few ethnic groups and the relegation and marginalization of

others, colonial politics bred political tribalism in emerging states characterised by

patrimonial client networks for the conduct of governance. The most frequently cited case of

this is the implication of Belgian and French colonial policies in the Tutsi-Hutu conflict in

Burundi and Rwanda. Others include British colonial administration that saw the elevation of

the Ashanti in Ghana and the Hausa-Fulani emirate system, first over ethnic minorities in

Northern Nigeria and subsequently over the political system in the newly independent state

(Salawu, 2010). Notwithstanding the inherent animosities bred by colonial divide-and-rule

tactics, it appears the diverse ethno-regional and ethno-religious entities were able to initially

subsume their differences under the banner of nationalist struggles for independence. In this

regard, Bruce Berman (1998 in Hagg, 2007:14) contrasts emancipatory nationalism of anti -

colonial liberation movements with uncivil nationalism characteristic of post-independenceintra-state regional and communal conflicts fought on the basis of identity labels and

sensibilities in the contestation for power.

This ethnicisation of politics owing to the construction of ethnicity as a legal entity by

various colonial administrations, polarized many African societies along settler/migrant and

native/indigene fault-lines (p. 16). Hagg and Kagwanja contend that,

Africa is still struggling to bridge the gap created by these bifurcated spheres

inherited from the colonial society, which has produced two patterns of rights andobligations (p. 15).

To buttress this point, they refer to the work of Peter Ekeh (1975) who identified a clear

dichotomy between a civic public - amoral and governed by a system of rights - and a

primordial public - moral and governed by custom. In the case of the former, access to state

resources is ideally open to all citizens within a seemingly neutral system of legislative and

policy frameworks. In the latter instance, and in reality, access depends on an intricate array

of kinship networks or other primordial associations. This system of networks and

associations was carried forward into the modern state differentiating citizens in to stratified

aggregations of first-class, second-class and third class citizens and undermining the


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potential for state neutrality in conflict management (Jinadu, 2007:10). Thus, the

compromised character of the state is also a key factor in identity-related based.

The Character of the Af r ican State:Hagg and Kagwanja (2007:18) contend that the majority

of African states remain weak, dysfunctional and predatory and formal institutions andprocesses of governance continue to rely on a neo-patrimonial logic for resource allocation

and upward mobility. Joseph (1999) speaking in reference to Nigeria compounds this

equation with the introduction of personality cult type leadership in the context of a predatory

state that turns on its citizens and uses ethno-religious sensibilities to deepen allegiance

within and rivalry between groups. This rivalry is further intensified by the liberal model of

majoritarian democracy in which the winner in first-past-the-post electoral systems takes all

thereby excluding other contestants and their patron-client networks. Hence, Hagg and

Kagwanja (2007:11) poignantly declare, At the heart of the African crisis is the failure to

bring identities to the centre of democratisation and institution building processes, both

before and after conflict.

The nature of clientelism in a neo-patrimonial state entails that ethnicity or religion, or a

combination of both, constitutes a key eligibility criterion for access to socioeconomic

resources instead of the liberal democratic approach that relies mainly on citizenship. Herein

lays the ambiguity and confusion inherent in the indigeneity/settler conundrum. In this

regard, despite the political posturing of government authorities to draw up national

integration policies, (e.g. the Federal Character principle in Nigeria) the state itself is

conceptualised as a partisan player, rather than a neutral arbiter, in ethno-religious conflict.

Indeed, analysts have long recognized that, in the conduct of its governance functions,allocation of socioeconomic and political resources, the state is strongly involved in the

construction and perpetuation of identity politics and identity-based conflict (Oluksoshi,

1998; Allan and Eade, 2001; Jinadu 2007).

It is also important to acknowledge the complication of identity politics by other intervening

variables such as socioeconomic status, corporate interests and other sectarian interests

including occupational and gender identity. Nevertheless, it is often the case that there is

some congruence between ethno-religious identity, and other identity markers, particularly

class identity, a reality underscored by the effects of globalization, which Hagg andKagwanja highlight as another factor in ethno-religious conflicts.

Globalisation and regional conflict complexes: Citing Appadurai (1998) Hagg and

Kagwanja (2007:14) assert that Ethnic violence is deeply rooted in the uncertainties,

anxieties, disillusions and chaotic environments created by economic globalisation resulting

in what they refer to as regional power conflicts and economies wars in the face of poverty

and underdevelopment. A situation scholars allege is compounded by the preponderance of

longstanding military rule, notably in the West African sub-region (Boafo-Arthur, 2008). It is

within this construct that they locate the instrumentalist conception of ethnicity evident in the

political manipulation of ethnic and religious identity by civilian and military elites struggling


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for power in order to gain access to globalized capital. However, they dispute the greed and

grievance and politics of the belly theses of scholars like Braathen (2000), Elbadawi and

Sambanis (2000) and Collier and Sambanis (2005) that situate identity-based conflicts solely

within the crass struggle for state patronage opting for a more nuanced analysis that takes

cognizance of the role of regional powers in instigating and prolonging local or civilconflicts.

Hagg and Kagwanja do not conclude fatalistically that ethnic identity and diversity is a sure

recipe for violent conflict. Rather, they affirm the standpoint of organizations (AU, 2005) and

individuals (Jinadu, 2007; Tan, 2006; Lonsdale, 1994) who see cultural diversity as important

assets in peace making, national building and social re-engineering. In this regard, they

highlight Lonsdales typology of ethnicity as a useful model in differentiating between moral

ethnicity and political tribalism where cultural identification serves as a basis for tolerance

and mutual peaceful coexistence in the former and unhealthy rivalry in the latter. It is this

cultural theory of ethno-religious conflict, as expounded by Jinadu (2007) that is the subject

matter of the next section.

A Cultural Theoretical Model

Jinadus extrapolation of a cultural theory of democracy begins with the acknowledgement

that ethnic diversity and conflict are fundamental and irreducible components of the social

demography and political tapestry of the African state, and so must be managed

constructively and creatively (p.21). They are the indelible marks of our history and cannot

be simplistically wished away. Jinadu presents statistical evidence to demonstrate thatbetween 1990 and 2002 ethnic-related conflicts constituted a considerable number of the 58

major armed conflicts, and 19 of these occurred on African soil. In terms of their root cause,

Jinadu affirms the analyses of Hagg and Kagwanjas and others to the effect that the neo -

patrimonial State described above engenders ethno-political conflicts which are,

fuelled by a combination of potent identity-based factors with wider

perceptions of economic and social injustice regarding the distribution of or

means of sharing economic, social and political resources within the state (Harris

and Reilly, 1998:9).

He views traditional African cultures to be an authentic foundation for re-engineering

autochthonous political systems that draw from indigenous values, methods and styles. One

must hasten to aver that this is not a call to return to a non-existent ideal past. Rather, Jinadu

hypothesizes a home-grown regime, within the contemporary realities of modern democratic

governance, of constitutional and political arrangements aimed at the pragmatic

management[rather] than [] the resolution orremovalof these deep-seated, identity-related

conflicts. He points to the existence of traditional African political systems that promoted

the values of power dispersal with checks and balances to counter the excessive use of power.

Jinadu, like Ake (2003), sees ethnicity as a potentially positive force in the democratisation


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process. Consequently, he (p. 22) contends that there is a need for modern African states to

fashion out a new political architecture and culture of mutuality and reciprocity between

ethnic groups (Emphasis mine). In this model he espouses a political model of handling

ethnic difference and divergence by channelling diversity towards accommodation,

cooperation and healthy competition.

To accomplish this Jinadu abstracts from the dense literature on ethnocentric conflict three

basic principles for constitutional and political engineering: First is the recognition and

accommodation of collective ethnic rights in a manner that is truly representative,

consultative and constitutive of effective mechanisms for redress if such rights are

contravened. Second, is the devolution of power by way of self-government to ethnic and

sub-ethnic groups within their ethnic heartlands giving them considerable control over local

resources; third, is the consociational principle of a power sharing formula that includes

devices such as mutual veto, proportionality and quotas at national and sub-national levels.

At this third principle, Jinadu departs from Hagg and Kagwanja in their criticism of the

majoritarian democracy and recommends a winner-takes-all configuration within the context

of a grand coalition of ethnic groups in national government. Jinadu admits that this principle

is problematic, yet surprisingly attests to its merits over potential deficiencies despite the fact

that it cannot forestall the emergence of ethnic asymmetry and dominance of a single or few

powerful groups, as has often been the case in many African states, including Nigeria. This

highlights the centrality of electoral systems and the appropriate management of electoral

processes to securing legitimacy for political leaders without which African democracies tend

to implode in violent conflict (Boafo-Arthur, 2008).

Another limitation of Jinadus model is that is does not take sufficient cognizance of the

diffuse nature of ethnicity as not being always coterminous with geographical boundaries.

Neither does it adequately address the complicity of religious identity as a mobilizing force

within and across ethnic communities to forge supra-ethnic identities such as the Muslim

Ummah and the Christian Body of Christ. These identities transcend ethnicity and follow

unique trajectories rendering ethno-religious conflicts even more complex and intractable.

However, despite the limitations of Jinadus take on the cultural theory of democracy, the

emphasis on mutuality, reciprocity, effective redress, functional power decentralization in the

form of representative/inclusive government and resource control at all levels reflect currentwisdom in conflict analysis. In addition, one could make a case for two approaches to

counteract the weaknesses in Jinadus model. First, studies have shown that direct

proportional representation; where ethnic groups are guaranteed representation in national

and sub-national governments in direction proportion to their numeric incidence in the

population, tend to mitigate the mutual fear and suspicion that foment identity-related

conflicts. This principle appears closer to Akes notion of participative negotiated

consensus (Ake, 2003:32). Second, there is an urgent need for a critical interrogation of

religious ideologies to the extent that they promote dogmas and behaviour codes at variance

with the democratic principles of tolerance, equality, and respect for the sanctity of life. In

this regard, through consultation and consensus building it should be possible to arrive at


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common values, norms and rules of engagement predicated on obedience to secular authority.

This implies that religion and religious ideology do change in response to social pressure.

This point is made clearly by Harman (1999) who offers a materialist analysis of religious

ideology to demonstrate that the role of religion in history, particularly in conflict, does not

occur in isolation of material reality. Using the example of the Roman Catholic Church, heargues further that,

People have always been capable of giving different interpretations to the religious

ideas they hold, depending on their own material situation, their relations with

other people and the conflicts they get involved in. History is full of examples of

people who profess nearly identical religious beliefs ending up on opposite sides in

great social conflicts (p.6).

By this assertion religion, just like ethnicity, is a readily malleable tool for the pursuit of

underlying social, political and economic interests. This fact is borne out in the first phase of

the Liberian conflict.

A Comparative Review of Conflicts: Liberia and Ghana

The Case of L iber ia

At the start of the first civil war in 1989 Liberia had a population of 2.6 million people. By

1997 one third of the population had been killed or displaced (Kieh, 2007). The modern

Liberian State was established in 1822 by the American Colonial Society and attained formal

independence 1847. Although Liberia was never colonized by a western power, it was

colonized by the freed American slaves, who imposed a system of ethnicized and racialized

politics on the indigenous groups in the country between 1822 and 1926 (Kieh, 2007). With

the influx of foreign capital the dominant axis around which power struggles revolved among

the privileged elite shifted from only ethnicity to include class such that by 1980 national

wealth was controlled by 4% (predominantly Americo-Liberian elite also later referred to as

Kongos) of the populace. In 1980 Samuel Doe, a Christian of Krahn extract, staged a coup

dtat against the Americo-Liberian hegemonic administration of William Tolbert. This saw

the reintroduction of ethno-centric politics as a means of mobilizing ethno-religious affinitiesin order to counteract opposition to his refusal to institute democratic reforms. Kieh, (2007:4)

argues that although a majority Christian state, with influential presence of the Church clergy

in state politics, Doe cultivated an opportunistic relationship with Islamic clergy which

served as a countervailing religious force. Kieh asserts further that,

pro-status quo Islamic clerics served as a bulwark for the Doe regime against the

criticisms emanating from the progressive Christian leaders, and as a vehicle for

legitimating the regime. (p.4)


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Oritsejafor (2009) explains further that Doe incurred the allegiance of the Mandingo settler

community who were also Muslims and largely regarded as migrant aliens by most of the

population. He appointed the Mandingo to important executive positions. In spite of this

religious dimension, however, E.K. Bensah (2001:URL) contends that the first wave of

violent conflict in Liberia erupted on the platform of ethnic rather than religious sentiments.He summarises the Liberia Conflict and its ethnic ramifications thus:

On Christmas Eve 1989, "a full scale guerrilla war erupted as rebels known as the

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor, a former

minister in the administration of President Samuel Doe, invaded Liberia from its

border with Ivory Coast. According to Comfort Ero "it degenerated into ethnic

carnage that threatened to engulf the whole country." Taylor went on to terrorize

the country with his campaign in Nimba county, home of the Gio and Mano ethnic

groups, which greatly suffered under Doe". Allegations of genocide soon followed

as the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) slaughtered those tribes; consequently,

reprisals by the NPFL brought even greater suffering.

The conflict cost Liberia 200,000 citizens and displaced almost a third of the population. On

the other hand, Bensah demonstrates that ethnicity was not an important mobilizing force in

the two subsequent Liberian wars as it was in the first. Young (2008) agrees with this

assertion. According to him,

The Liberian civil war of 1989 to 1990 was characterized by brutal, ethnic conflict.

However, the subsequent civil wars of 1992 to 1993 and 1994 to 1996 weredefined by factional affiliation that was increasingly independent of ethnic identity.

In the first violent outbreak, all the key warlords, Samuel Doe and his Armed Forces of

Liberia (AFL), Thomas Quiwonkpa, his defecting war general and a Gio, Charles Taylor also

a Gio of the National Patriotic Liberian Front (NPLF), and Prince Yormie Johnson (a Gio)

and his NPLF splinter group, effectively manipulated ethnic sensibilities to stoke conflict and

perpetuate civil war. However, after Taylor had managed to control 90% of Liberian territory

he abandoned ethnic politics in favour of other factional affinities to secure allegiance to his

administration, a situation that continued after he became President in 1997. Nevertheless, thecivil wars led to the near total collapse of the state, which lacked the capacity and legitimacy

to forge peace and deal with the serious humanitarian crises, and the internal and cross-border

displacement of up to 1 million Liberians. The Liberian population suffered immeasurable

social and material upheaval and dehumanization in the form of child soldiers, sexual slavery

of women and girls, cannibalism and extreme brutality.

Eventually, these wars were only brought to a close through the bottom-up initiatives of the

womens peace movement in Liberia on the one hand (Berkley Case Study Series, 2008), and

an arduous externally-driven process of fitful peace keeping missions and peace accords in

Abuja and Accra spearheaded by ECOMOG and the Nigerian government on the other. The


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wider international community initially wanted no part of the peace keeping responsibility,

owing ostensibly to more pressing commitments in Somalia and Bosnia. Thus, much of the

credit for the successful resolution of the war goes to home-grown and sub-regional

initiatives.

The role of Liberian womens activist groups, notably the Women in Peace Building Network

(WIPNET) and to a lesser extent the Mano River Womens Peace Network (MARWOPNET)

has been hailed worldwide as an exemplary bottom-up, indigenous peace initiative.

Ultimately, it was the ability of women to mobilize across ethnic, religious and political

divides that compelled political actors, including warring factions to take the necessary

decisions that would end the war. Indeed, it was the dogged and concerted peace activism of

Christian and Muslim Liberian women of diverse ethno-political backgrounds that finally

drove Charles Taylor from years of misrule in 2003 and forced the establishment of the post-

war Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Monrovia in 2006. Their efforts were well

rewarded as the process led to an expansion of the political space for women. In February,

2006 Liberia elected Africas first female President, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf who has continued

Taylors practice of running an ethnically inclusive government to encourage a nationalistic

outlook in national development policy and planning. Interactive sessions held during the

SEC 33 Study Tour highlighted certain strategies employed by various arms of the

administration to do this include the following:

1. Merit-based Public Sector Recruitment: Employment into the Liberian Civil Serviceand Armed Forces is conducted through a transparent process with pre-set

recruitment criteria that are strictly adhered to and internally and externallymonitored. For example, according to the Liberian Minister of Defence (09/05/2011),

in recognizing that cultural diversity is part of the composite identity of Liberia the

MOD is committed to equality, equity and inclusiveness across all sectors of the

economy to ensure no group feels disenfranchised on account of minority status or

social category such as ethnicity, religion or gender. Consequently, the New Defence

Act (2008) provides a legal basis for recruitment and career progression in the Army

based on merit and performance. Through the Act the MOD initiated a broad post-

war recruitment process across the 16 Counties based on a non-political, non-quota

system ratified and certified by the Joint Personnel Board. The Board consists of anMOD staff, international partners (Donor group and the UN), and civil society

represented by the Dean of the law society.

2. Educational Sector Reform: In order to address the heavy urban-rural (particularlycentred in Monrovia) imbalance in the educational the post-war administration

initiated a 10-year education plan and established primary and secondary schools,

with standardized educational curriculum delivery, in the hinterland where most of

the non-Kongo indigenous groups reside. Certain public secondary schools include

boarding facilities to stem rural-urban drift. The Minister of Education (09/05/2011)

confirmed that exam results are fairly standard across the country. In addition,


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tertiary education has become increasingly de-centralized by opening up satellite

campuses of some of the major universities, such as the University of Liberia. Merit-

based recruitment policies entail a competitive employment procedure across all

administrative Counties to ensure that all indigenous groups have equal opportunity

to gain employment.

3. Increased Administrative Decentralization for Enhancing Resource Control: Liberiaruns a unitary system of government such that resource allocation is centralized from

the Government in Liberia to the 16 Counties. As a result of historical oppression and

over-centralization socioeconomic development is concentrated in Monrovia. Recent

government policy initiatives have increased the Counties access to and control over

resources, including those locally generated. Oversight for ensuring the transparent

management of funds includes the democratic election of local chiefs who work in

collaboration with County officials appointed by the central government.

4. Psychological Profiling of Army and Police Force Personnel: The Minister ofDefence and the Inspector General of Policy, during separate interactive sessions,

provided information on an identified need to conduct psychological profiling of all

force personnel as a means of addressing underlying post-war traumas and ascertain

mental fitness to serve the Liberian people dispassionately.

5. Political Access: In order to broaden the political space and make political processesmore accessible to the grassroots the Liberian Constitution allows for independent

candidacy as well as the election of local chiefs. Independent candidacy is still in an

experimental phase and not all the political elite are in favour of it. However, it has

given local communities wider choice and enabled them bypass unpopular candidates

put forward by the party system. Moreover, the voting system adopted in Liberia

promotes inclusive democracy through broader representation of geopolitical and

gender-based minorities than the First-Past-the-Post system adopted in Nigeria,

which was strongly criticized in the Justice Uwais Electoral Reform Committee

Report for not making the vote of every Nigerian count.

6. Professionalism in the Political System: In interactive sessions with civil societygroups (10/05/2011)political parties (13/05/2011), both activists and opposition

groups attested to the fact that the ruling Unity party had demonstrated

professionalism in handling the rule and function of the political parties. In addition,

the National Electoral Commission was allowed to function as truly independent.

The central government makes a clear distinction between the administration of

government and the management of political parties. Most of the 2006 bye elections

were won by other parties than the ruling party. The multiparty system is widely

adjudged open, free and fair and not muzzled. According to a member of the National

Patriotic Party (which emerged from Charles Taylors National Patriotic Front ofLiberia), this helped to diminish political conflict and violence.


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However, despite these strategies and the largely positive outward picture of peaceful ethno-

religious coexistence, post-war Liberia exhibits underlying signs of potential conflict that

could reverse some of the gains of the current administration. Latent signs of discontent

became apparent during the SEC 33 study tour and are summarized below:

1. Census Data: The official census figures depicting Christians (85%), Muslims (12%)and African Traditional Religion (0.5%) is strongly contested by Muslims,

particularly the Mandingos. According to Sheikh A. Konne, of the National Muslim

Council of Liberia (Interactive Session 06/05/2011), ATR practitioners constitute the

majority of the population at no less than 40%, followed by Muslims and then

Christians (though he did not provided estimates for the latter two religions. The

Sheikh also cited documents that provide evidence of a long history of prejudice

against the Mandingo ethnic group, who are predominantly Muslims and who

migrated to Liberia in the 10th Century as traders. Despite their long history in Liberia

they are still perceived as foreigners and marginalized in political appointments.

Various reasons were given for this by people from diverse ethno-religious

backgrounds including jealousy of Mandingo business acumen and their refusal to

integrate with the indigenous population in terms of religious conversion and

marriage (of their girls to non-Muslims) etc.

2. Constitutional Issues: The Liberian Constitution does not allow for citizenship ornaturalization of people of non-negro descent. According to a top-level executive

(Interactive Session 09/05/2011) of the Liberian Chamber of Commerce (LCC) thislimits the chances of long-term investments by those who would want to stay in

Liberia permanently, thereby undermining the business environment. On the other

hand, a senior executive member of the Liberia Business Association (LIBA)

countered that the LCC represented the economic interests of foreigners and their

Americo-Liberian affiliates to the detriment of indigenous entrepreneurs and traders.

3. Incidents of Ethno-Religious Violence: The Study Group was informed of a fewoutbreaks of ethno-religious violence since 2010 in Nimba, Lofa and Bong Counties

between Muslims and Christians. The conflicts had underlying economic causes, suchas land or property boundaries, as well as ideological contestations that revolved

around historical animosities.

4. Land Disputes: The issue of land is a ticking time bomb throughout Liberia. One ofthe Senior Bureaucrats in the Liberian Civil Service (Interactive Session, 12/05/2011)

made bold to say that if there is a future war in Liberia it is likely to be because of

unresolved land disputes. In fact, the Minister of Interior estimated that there were

over three million on-going court cases over land in a country with an estimate

population of 14 million people? A good number of the claims to land are based on

un-regulated kinship ties among the various communities.


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The Case of Ghana

According to Boafo-Arthur (ibid.) Ghanas ethnic composition is made up of seven main

groupings (some sources say four e.g. Langer, 2007) and some smaller ones administered

under 10 regional units. The three largest ethnic groupings in Ghana are the Akan (49.1% -consisting of the Asanti and Fanti 15% and 10% of total population respectively), the Mole

Dagbani (16.5% - a loose grouping of 10 sub-ethnic groups) and the Ewe (12.7%). Many of

these ethnic nationalities have distinct political histories, languages, dialects and customs

although the bigger groups (i.e. the Akan and Ewe) tend to share strong cultural trajectories

and symbols. Ghana is a predominantly Christian country; it has a religious profile of

approximately 70% Christians, 16% Muslims and 14% other religions (Ghana Housing and

Population Census, 2000 in Langer, 2007:6). Muslims comprise 42% of the three Northern

regions (Upper East, Upper West and Northern), and 56% of the latter. Conflicts around

religious identity per se have not been discretely articulated in contrast to ethnic identity.

Among the ethnic groups, the Akan constitute a demographic majority in five of the

countrys 10 regions and have dominated political life with sizeable representation of the

Ewe in the military and the civil service (Boafo-Arthur, 2008:61).

Consequently, power struggles between the Akan and the Ewe since the 1969 elections were

evidence in a series of coups in which the latter played a leading role. In this wise, Boafo-

Arthur acknowledges the potential for the Ghanaian military to be polarized along ethnic

lines and draws attention to the dire implications of an ethnically compromised military.

Furthermore, voting patterns in the 1969, 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections reflected

ethnic cleavages. But the most severe ethnic conflicts occurred among the Mole Dagbani inthe Northern region as a result of the marginalization of ethnic sub-groups and, according to

Langer (2007:2) their relegation as second-class citizens. The most serious violent outbreak

occurred in 1994 between the Nanumba and Kokomba leading to almost 2000 deaths and

mass migration out of the area. However, these conflicts were largely localized with no

serious fall outs or reverberations at the national level. According to Langer, for the most

part, identity-based discontent in Ghana is articulated around a shared sense ethno-regional

socio-economic deprivation among Christians, Muslims and traditionalists of the less

privileged Northern regions.

Yet, unlike Liberia and Nigeria, Ghana has enjoyed comparative political stability and

relatively contained ethno-religious violent conflicts and tense ethnocentric dichotomies

between regions or between the predominantly Muslim North and Christian South have not

emerged. Boafo-Arthur (2008:9) accounts for this on the basis of three factors: the

incremental and qualitative growth in democratic norms through effective and consensual

management of the electoral process (particularly after extensive electoral reforms in 1992

and 1996) in a comparatively transparent mode and the ability to arrive at a consensus

regarding the rules governing the contestation for political power. He alludes to Max Webers

rational-legal conceptualization of state legitimacy to explain how adherence to the rule of

law by political actors in the conduct of free and fair elections built the confidence of the


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citizenry in the political system institutions and leaders. The second factor relates to Ghanas

ability to effectively manage conflicting and competing interests. The third factor is the

durability of the political system over time owing to the standardisation of consensual politics

and the efficient mechanisms for redress in the conflict resolution process. In addition,

Langer (2007:12) underscores a fourth factor, namely attempts by the Kufuor Administrationin 2004 to implement economic policies aimed at benefitting the North disproportionately

in order to address poverty and inequality in the region. From the foregoing, there is a strong

alignment between the factors outlined by Boafo-Arthur and Langer and the three principles

underlying Jinadus cultural theory of democracy.

Besides these four factors, it is possible to look to two features of Ghanas historical

development and traditional make-up that lend themselves to relative political cohesion and

stability. One is the visionary nation-building skills of its first premier, Nkwame Nkrumah,

who resolved the national identity question by promoting a de-tribalized perspective of one

Ghana that persists in the psyche of the average Ghanaian today. Nkrumah refused to be

identified on the basis of his ethnic origin or to form political alliances on that platform; this

is in contrast to the ethno-regional politics that prevailed in Nigerias First Republic. The

second feature concerns Ghanas strong traditional institutions which wield significant

influence in providing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, they cannot

be said to have been high jacked by the elite as is the case in Nigeria, but remain largely

apolitical.

However, Boafo-Arthur (2008) warns of the growing danger of ethnic conflict below the

faade of peaceful coexistence. In his words, it appears the nation is sitting on a time bomblikely to explode if the socioeconomic gap between the north and the south, which is still

substantial, persists or widens. The congruence ethno-regional and socioeconomic identity

markers provide ready fodder for the fire of violent communal conflict.

Lessons for Nigeria

By sheer population (over 140 million) and size Nigeria is easily Africas most ethnically

diverse nation with over 400 ethno-linguistics groups. Our own painful experience of the

1960-1966 war and bitter experience of protracted civil strife in other African countries suchas Liberia warrants that all necessary measures are taken to avoid the escalation of ethno-

religious conflict. The central challenge facing Nigeria concerns how to reconfigure the

political system in such a manner as to make appeal to identity markers for political purposes

unnecessary or unprofitable (Jinadu, 2001).

Since 1994, especially 2001, the perennial Jos crisis has progressed into an all-out ethno-

religious confrontation between indigenous and non-indigenous Christians on the one hand

and the non-indigenous Hausa-Fulani on the other. The most recent causes of the conflict

date back to the creation of the Jos North Local Government by the Babangida

Administration in response to the significant Hausa-Fulani population but in defiance of the


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wishes of the indigenous population. Contestations over ownership, however, date back to the

era just prior to the close of colonial administration (Best 2004; PIDA, 2010). The Jos

conflict, like communal conflicts in other parts of Nigeria (e.g. Ife/Modakeke,

Jukun/Tiv/Fulani), revolve around the quest for political and economic control. On the

surface, it seems to be a straightforward contest between the predominantly Muslim Hausatown dwellers and Fulani pastoralists on the one side and the predominantly Christian

indigenous populace on the other, with the non-indigenous migrant population thrown into

the fray relevant to their religious affiliation. In addition to the strong ideological undertones

to the mobilization of ethno-religious sensibilities, analysts pinpoint underlying

manipulations of the gullible grassroots by the political elite for self-centred material interests

as well as the pervading failure of the state to provide effective governance and thereby

create the conditions for ethno-religious harmony (Best, 2001, 2007; Adetula, 2005;

Gwamna, 2006; Egwu, 2009; Ostien, 2009; Adam, 2010).

Jos, and by extension Plateau State, is now seriously polarized along ethno-religious lines,

particularly with regard to residential areas, social interaction and political mobilization.

People reside in religiously defined communities and limit or eliminate movements to

potentially dangerous locations. In the wake of the 2010 violence new safe markets sprung

up in Gyel, Rukuba Road and Bauchi Ring Road to further minimize socioeconomic contact

between Christians and Muslims etc. Political polarization throughout the state was quite

evident during the 2011 Presidential elections, as in other parts of Nigeria. Plateau State

election results showed a clear voting pattern where predominantly Christian LGAs voted for

President Goodluck Jonathan and largely Muslim LGAs voted General Muhammadu Buhari.

The Jos conflict has raised national and international concern because of the likely spill overeffects if left unchecked. Amidst widespread allegations and evidence of the complicity of

political actors and an ethno-regionally and religiously compromised military, the Jos crisis,

as in Ghana, also threatens to be a ticking time bomb. Once it is detonated there is no telling

who it may blow to pieces or where the shrapnel will fall.

Consequently, the foregoing discussion on Liberia and Ghana highlights some critical

learning points:

1.

The use of alternative cultural mechanisms for political re-engineering and conflictmanagement needs to be explored in order to address feelings of alienation and

marginalization in the polity. The Federal Character commission should be

empowered with legally backed requisite compliance powers to provide effective

redress for citizens, with free access to Legal AID services from federal to local

levels.

2. The functional devolution of power away from the centre giving more autonomy andresource control to ethnic nationalities in a proportional power sharing arrangement,

such as in Ghana, is crucial for confidence building in the political system. In Ghana

monies designated for redressing patterns of disadvantage in development in the


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Northern regions were to be managed directly by local communities based on self-

defined needs and priorities.

3. The Liberian crises is a clear warning to those fanning the flames of ethno-religioussentiments in Nigeria, particularly in the Jos conflict that the resultant violence is

beyond the prediction of those who stoke the embers of identity-based hatred.

4. From the successes of WIPNET in Liberia we also learn the value of including allconstituencies in peace building and post-war reconstruction.

5. Political professionalism towards broad-based and inclusive democracy will serve todefuse political tension. A credible, transparent, free and fair electoral system lies at

the heart of promoting nationalist sentiments over primordial cleavages as the systems

in Liberia and Ghana clearly demonstrate.

Conclusion

This paper drew on conflict research and practical lessons from Liberia and Ghana to argue

that identity-based conflicts are here to stay and cannot be wished or even legislated away.

Conversely, they must be effectively managed and their positive elements channelled towards

accommodation, consensus and healthy competition. This calls for a consultative process of

constitutional and political re-engineering, as argued by Jinadu (2007) within a framework of

African traditional values and institutional mechanisms in a manner compatible with

inclusive democratic principles. For further study, it would be useful to investigate the exact

nature and effectiveness of formal mechanisms (laws, policies, organisations and schemes)

put in place for national integration in Liberia, Ghana and similar cultural contexts in other

developing countries. This would serve to highlight good practices employed to maximize the

potentials and minimize the pitfalls of cultural diversity as a viable stepping stone to

accelerated national development.


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