Nishitani presentation oct_13th

Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities

for the New Decade

- The “CHANGE” for the Success -

Koichi NishitaniVisiting Fellow, The Henry L. Stimson Center

Colonel, Japan Air Self-Defense Force

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations

expressed or implied in this presentation are solely

those of the author and do not represent the views of

the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Japan Ministry of

Defense, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or any

other government organization in Japan.

� Mini-Bio

Who is Col. NISHITANI?Who is Col. NISHITANI?

Visiting Fellow, CISAC, Stanford UniversitySep 2006 -

Weapon Systems Programs Div., Air Staff OfficeSep 2005 -

Defense Plans and Programs Div., Air Staff Office� National Defense Program Guidelines 2004 and Mid-Term

Defense Program (Fy2005 – 2009)

Feb 2003 -

Commander, Periodic Maintenance Squadron (Okinawa)Mar 2000 -

Graduated from National Defense Academy1987

Defense Plans and Programs Div., Air Staff OfficeDec 1997 -

Air Command and Staff Course, Air Staff CollegeMar 1999 -

Logistics Planning Div., Air Staff OfficeJul 2007 -

- OthersApr 2001: Joint Forces Staff College and Defense Language InstituteNov 1992: Germany, France, and Belgium (incl. NATO HQ)

“CHANGE” in Japan“CHANGE” in Japan

Japanese TV drama “CHANGE”“Maybe you could change Japan.” DPJ Manifesto

“Change of Government”

ContentsContents

I. Introduction: “CHANGE” in Japan

II. Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities: Rationale, Current Situation, and Challenges

1. Rationale for Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities

2. Current Situation of Air Defense Capabilities in Japan3. Challenges for the Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities

III. Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities: Its Desirable Future1. Preconditions

2. Key Elements in Japan’s Future Air Defense Capabilities

IV. Conclusion: The Steps Forward Breaking from the Past

Japan’s Air Defense CapabilitiesJapan’s Air Defense Capabilities

� Japan’s air defense capabilities mean:

- Similar in content to the air power

- Embody the exclusively defense-oriented policy

- Include all air assets of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)

- Aircrafts, radars, missiles, command and control systems, etc.

- Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) shoulders the core

Rationale of Japan’s Air Defense CapabilitiesRationale of Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities

(a) Critically important capabilities for defense of Japan

- Air superiority has been absolutely critical to win modern warfare;also critical for defending Japan

- Island country: vital to assure the safety of sea lanes of communication

- Lack of strategic depth:

・ NE to SW: 3,800km, NW to SE: 380km

・ High population density

(b) Seamless Mobilization of assets throughout pea cetime to wartime(provide safety of Japanese airspace, which is a common goods)

- Jet fighters on 24-hour alert to prevent/repel violation of airspace

- Crews always watch/listen carefully to provide security information

- Provide air cover for maritime and ground forces in crises/war

380km

380km

380km

3,800km

3,800km

3,800km

Lack of Strategic DepthLack of Strategic Depth

NE-SW: 3,800kmNW-SE: 380kmHigh population density

NE-SW: 3,800kmNW-SE: 380kmHigh population density

Rationale of Japan’s Air Defense CapabilitiesRationale of Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities

(a) Critically important capabilities for defense of Japan

- Air superiority has been absolutely critical to win modern warfare;also critical for defending Japan

- Island country: vital to assure the safety of sea lanes of communication

- Lack of strategic depth:

・ NE to SW: 3,800km, NW to SE: 380km

・ High population density

(b) Seamless Mobilization of assets throughout pea cetime to wartime(provide safety of Japanese airspace, which is a common goods)

- Jet fighters on 24-hour alert to prevent/repel violation of airspace

- Crews always watch/listen carefully to provide security information

- Provide air cover for maritime and ground forces in crises/war

� Current Situation of Air Defense Capabilities in Japan

(a) In the transformation from the legacy capability during the Cold War

(b) Recent developments in the regional security environment

Current SituationCurrent Situation

(a) In the transformation from the legacy capability during the Cold War

- During the Cold War・ Exclusively air-defense-oriented systems that ultimately prepare for large-scale invasion

- After the Cold War・ Cold-War legacy remained in East Asia with Cold-War mentality

- After the 9/11・ Government of Japan revised National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in 2004・ More responsive, flexible, and multi-purpose capability

- Current・ Still in the process of transforming・ Not sufficient to accomplish the concept of 2004 NDPG

Current Situation (1/2)Current Situation (1/2)

Current Situation (2/2)Current Situation (2/2)

(b) Recent developments in the regional security env ironment

North Korea- Development of nuclear capability- Nodong missile can reach almost all parts of Japan

China- High-paced military modernization- Lack of transparency of defense budget- Increasing offensive capability in airpower

Fourth-generation fighter, air refueling tanker, AWACS, large cargo- Fifth-generation fighter in 10 to 12 years

Russia- Progress in the modernization- Fifth-generation fighter much earlier than China- Recovering operational proficiency level in activities

ROK- Modernizing Navy and Air Force (e.g. F-15K)- Around 10% increase of defense budget in recent years

� Challenges for the Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities

(a) Deterrence and response

(b) Information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and network

(c) Joint operation capabilities

(d) Interoperability under the US-Japan Alliance

(e) International peace cooperation activities

(f) Defense infrastructures for equipments and manpower

ChallengesChallenges

(a) Deterrence and response

(1) Considerable delay in modernization- Reducing defense budget under serious financial difficulties- Focused on building up ballistic missile defense (BMD)- F-X and C-X: behind original schedule- Can not afford any further delay in weapons modernization

(2) Dependence on the US nuclear umbrella and offe nsive strike capability- Nuclear deterrence is likely to be settled in the balance of the US nuclear umbrella and BMD capability

- Possible for Japan to depend on the US for the offensive strike capability, but Japan also needs to shoulder the burden to defend Japan

(3) Absence of dynamic deterrence- Dynamic deterrence: demonstrate defense capabilities throughdisplay of exercise, forward deployment of units, etc.

- Static deterrence: build-up and maintenance of defense capabilities- Dynamic deterrence may lead to the escalation of tension, but it can be sometimes more effective in preventing conflicts

Challenges (1/6)Challenges (1/6)

(b) Information, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and network

(1) Warning and surveillance-centric sensors that suffer gap- Sensor system (fixed ground radars and airborne radars)suffers serious gap in coverage as well as vulnerability

- Need of multi-layered sensor system including satellite and UAV

(2) Insufficient capability for the network-centri c warfare- Highly sophisticated C2 system, but not optimized platform- Time-consuming and labor-intensive process of information gathering, analyses, and distribution

- Enhance NCW capability asap to share information among platform instantly and to provide properly to decision makers

(3) Dependence on US capabilities outside Japanese territory- Inevitable for Japan to depend on the US capabilities- Necessary to continue efforts to enhance information capability for overseas operations (i.e., PKO, humanitarian assistance)

Challenges (2/6)Challenges (2/6)

(c) Joint operation capabilities

(1) Trend to strengthen joint operation capability

- Joint Staff has taken the initiative fully in operation since 2006- Joint Staff would become more functional by merging the Bureau of Operational Policy (2008 report of JMOD reform)

- Room for improvement especially in the field of ISR

(2) Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces’ independently operated systems

- JGSDF/JMSDF/JASDF independently own assets and systems- Potential jointness・ Helicopter (CH-47, UH-60), SAM・ Logistics

- Need to be tailored for each service’s needs

Challenges (3/6)Challenges (3/6)

(d) Interoperability under the US-Japan Alliance

(1) Insufficient capabilities for bilateral operat ion with the US forces

- US forces are the most modern/sophisticated forces in the world- JSDF might become a drag on US forces in an operation, particularly in the air

- Good communication capability is mandatory requirement for successful bilateral operations

(2) Appropriate division of roles between the US a nd Japan

- Important for implementation of the alliance- More specific allocation of roles should be further examined- Question: whether JASDF should focus on more autonomous defense capabilities, or should focus more on the capabilities that will allow much deeper operational cooperation with USAF?

- More cooperative capabilities for USAF could be a significant option from the affordability standpoint

Challenges (4/6)Challenges (4/6)

(e) International peace cooperation activities

(1) Insufficient transportation capability

- Lack of capability (range and payload) for international use

- KC-767 is good for passenger transportation

- Strong expectation for Domestically-developing C-X fortransportation of equipments/supplies

(2) Overworked C-130 Wing

- 1st Tactical Airlift Wing has been bearing the overwhelming burden ・ The only one airlift wing holding the only one C-130 squadron

- Overburden should be removed

Challenges (5/6)Challenges (5/6)

(f) Defense infrastructures for equipments and man power

(1) Weakened defense industrial base- Continuously support JMOD/JSDF for build-up of defense capabilities

and sustainment of systems/equipments- Structural difficulties・ Clients are limited almost exclusively to JMOD・ Defense business accounts only 3% of total company-wide sales・ International competitiveness has been relatively deteriorating- Dependence on foreign companies for parts and licenses to build up equipments

- Withdrawal of small/medium-sized enterprises from defense business under decreasing defense budget

- Need to stop weakening and maintain vitality(especially in the area of jet fighter (over 1,000 companies))

(2) Pilot recruitment and retention difficulty- Trend toward fewer children per family- Pilot: required intelligence, mental strength, physical fitness- Military jet pilot is too dangerous a career path for children- Hard to recruit and retain qualified pilots

Challenges (6/6)Challenges (6/6)

� Japan’s Air Defense Capabilities: Its Desirable Future

1. Preconditions(a) Severe fiscal constraints(b) Aging population(c) Expectations from international community

2. Key Elements in Japan’s Future Air Defense Capabilities(a) Effective deterrence and response(b) Information superiority(c) Better joint operation capabilities(d) Enhancement of the capability for international peace

cooperation activities(e) Strengthening defense infrastructures(f ) Structural reform for affordability

Desirable FutureDesirable Future

(a) Severe fiscal constraints- Balance of Japanese government debt has reached around 180% of GDP (2007)

- Japanese severe fiscal condition will continue

(b) Aging population- Population is going to decrease, particularly in younger age・ Child population likely decrease: 17 (2008) to 13 (2020) million・ Working population likely decrease: 82 to 74 million・ Older population likely increase: 28 to 36 million

(c) Expectations from international community- Expected Japan to fulfill responsibility and burdens appropriately for

its place in the world- Case for international assistance could become more complex/difficult- Expectation for JSDF’s participation in overseas activities will only

increase

PreconditionsPreconditions

(a) Effective deterrence and response

- Weapons modernization・ F-X program is the most important

Jet fighter: main asset to ensure air superiorityrepresent strength of air defense to deter adversaries

- Dynamic deterrence・ Need of contemplate utilization of dynamic deterrence

International multilateral exercise could be more effective

- Division of roles・ Need to consult with US more deeply

Examine the concept: more cooperative capability to USAF

Key Elements (1/6)Key Elements (1/6)

The Best for F-XThe Best for F-X

Key Elements (2/6)Key Elements (2/6)

(b) Information superiority- Enhance cooperation with US・ Need to develop own ISR capability

Unique and useful by using geographical advantage

- Improve quality/timeliness/security・ Multi-layered sensor system (incl. satellite/UAV/fighter)・ Efficient information flow (incl. data-link)・ Better information assurance

Strengthen NCW capability at the same time

- One idea for information cooperation・ US-Japan bilateral operation of ISR assets

Need to examine carefully according to Japanese law and basic policies, and to obtain confidence of US for information security

Key Elements (3/6)Key Elements (3/6)

(c) Better joint operation capabilities

- Common air vehicle

・ Efforts to consult in the concept/build-up phase

For a long-term, concentration of air defense assets into JASDF

- Logistics support

・ Treat deliberately whether should be jointed or not

JASDF logistics system could be a role-model

> Logistics specialist in officers

> Centralized logistics support system

Key Elements (4/6)Key Elements (4/6)

(d) Enhancement of the capability for internationa l peace cooperation activities

- Air transportation capability

・ All efforts for development of C-X

Incl. preparation of logistics support for international operations

- International operation other than airlift

・ E-767/E-2C for surveillance and control of air traffic・ KC-767 for aerial refueling

Mitigate the burden on C-130 Wing

Key Elements (5/6)Key Elements (5/6)

(e) Strengthening defense infrastructures

- Maintain defense industrial base

・ Creative ideas under severe fiscal condition

> Multi-year contract> Performance based logistics (PBL)> Multi-national development> Priority for domestically-developed/produce equipment

- Recruit talented personnel / retain well-trained s oldiers

・ Especially for pilots

> Review/improve curriculum> Improvement of status/image/payment (incl. danger allowance)

Key Elements (6/6)Key Elements (6/6)

(f) Structural reform for affordability

- Concentrated investment to air defense capabilitie s

・ Eligible for investment in current security environment

Concentrated investment can reduce cost by mass production

- Drastic scrap of low-effective assets

・ Examine assets and programs and dare to scrap low-effective ones

Sustainment/modernization needs considerable budget

Possible strong resistance against above two ideas

� Always going back to the basics, this spirit of self-sacrifice and the attitude of people-oriented seems the key to successful result for the next decade for the JMOD/JSDF.

� I hope, putting the past behind us, the Japan can positively change its mind-set to the bold new ideas.

To establish the new Japan’s air defense capabilities, it must be the most important “CHANGE” to success.

Conclusion: The Steps Forward Breaking from the PastConclusion: The Steps Forward Breaking from the Past

Any comments & questions ?