Nishida Schema Theory

A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO INTERCULTURALCOMMUNICATION BASED ON SCHEMA THEORY

HIROKO NISHIDA

University of Shizuoka, Japan

ABSTRACT. The purpose of this study was to examine schema theory and itsapplication to intercultural communication, especially to sojourners' cross-cul-tural adaptation. Eight primary types of schemas for social interactions wereextracted, and these schemas' functions for processing information were investi-gated. Furthermore, fundamental functional structures of schemas were analyzedwhen the theory was applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation, and elevenaxioms were formulated in the following domains: the development of schemas,internal organization of schemas, schema-driven versus data-driven functions,and schema modi®cation and change. # 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rightsreserved

INTRODUCTION

Communication between people from di�erent cultures has been

investigated in various research areas: for example, (a) the study of

psychological reactions to unfamiliar environments such as culture

shock (Adler, 1987; Bhatt & Fairchild, 1984; Bock, 1970; Bochner,

1982; Cleveland, Mangone & Adams, 1960; Furnham & Bochner, 1986;

Oberg, 1960), U-curve and W-curve (Church, 1982; Gullahorn &

Gullahorn, 1963; Klineberg & Hull, 1979; Lysgaard, 1955; TorbioÈ rn,

1982), and uncertainty reduction (Berger, 1992; Berger & Calabrese,

1975; Gudykunst, 1983a,b, 1988; Sudweeks, Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey

& Nishida, 1990); (b) cross-cultural adjustment or adaptation (Berry,

1975; Brislin, 1981; Furnham, 1988, 1992; Kim & Ruben, 1992;

Nishida, 1992; Spiro, 1955; Taft, 1966; Ward & Kennedy, 1996), and

immigrants' acculturation (Brower, 1980; Kim, 1978, 1982, 1987;

Int. J. Intercultural Rel. Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 753±777, 1999# 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Printed in Great Britain0147-1767/99 $ - see front matter

PII: S0147-1767(99)00019-X

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijintrel

I want to thank Vernon Jensen, Dan Landis, and two anonymous reviewers for their

comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.

Requests for reprints should be addressed to Hiroko Nishida, Faculty of International

Relations, University of Shizuoka, 52-1 Yada, Shizuoka-shi, Shizuoka-ken, Japan 422-

8526.

753

Padilla, 1980; Yum, 1982); (c) intercultural communication competence(Chen & Starosta, 1996; Dinges, 1983; Hammer, Nishida & Wiseman,1996; Littlejohn & Jabusch, 1982; McCroskey, 1984; Nishida, 1985;Wiseman & Koester, 1993; Wiseman, Hammer & Nishida, 1989); (d)values and value orientations (Caudill & Scarr, 1962; European ValueSystems Study Group, 1982; Hofstede, 1984, 1991; Kluckhohn, 1951;Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Nishida, 1979; Rokeach, 1973); and (e)verbal and nonverbal interactions (Barnlund, 1975; Burgoon, 1985;Giles, 1978; Giles & Johnson, 1981; Giles, Mulac, Bradac & Johnson,1987; Hall, 1959; Mehrabian, 1972; Morris, Collett, Marsh &Oshaughnessy, 1979; O'Keefe & Delia, 1985; Watzlawick, Beavin &Jackson, 1967).

Although we have gained considerable knowledge through these stu-dies, there are few intercultural communication theories underliningthem. Without some form of theorizing, research in intercultural com-munication will not take on speci®c foci or directions. As Berger (1991)notes, `Ìt is not enough for researchers to demonstrate that they canuse certain methodological tools, even when they are used to study cur-rent, highly visible social issues. It is the capacity to sustain theoreticallydriven, programmatic research that produces signi®cant insights aboutcommunication phenomena in the long run'' (p. 110).

In this paper, schema theory is examined in order to explicate thephenomena of intercultural communication, especially of cross-culturaladaptation. The following questions will be discussed: (a) What areschemas? and (b) what axioms can be generated when schema theory isapplied to cross-cultural adaptation?

WHAT ARE SCHEMAS?

It is said that when a person enters a familiar situation, a stock ofknowledge of appropriate behavior and an appropriate role he/sheshould play in the situation is retrieved. In other words, every interac-tant's social world is usually constituted within a framework of familiarand pre-acquainted knowledge about various situations. This familiarand pre-acquainted knowledge is called schemas (or schemata). Theconcept of schemas is not new, but existed even in the 19th century:German philosopher Immanuel Kant developed the idea that each per-son's experiences are gathered together in memory, forming higherorder concepts (Kant, 1963). And we can ®nd the concept early in the20th century, too: Piaget's work in the 1920s investigated schemas ininfants, and Bartlett's research in the 1930s tested memory for schemas(Matlin, 1989, p. 223). Furthermore, in the last 25 years, the concept of

H. Nishida754

schemas has been used and de®ned by quite a number of scholars(Cohen, Kiss & Le Voi, 1993; Mandler, 1984; Markus, 1977; Matlin,1989; Rumelhart, 1975, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor &Crocker, 1981; Thorndyke, 1984; among others): Cohen et al. (1993) forexample, explain schemas as ``packets of information stored in memoryrepresenting general knowledge about objects, situations, events, oractions'' (p. 28). Moreover, in Taylor and Crocker's words (1981), aschema is:

. . . a cognitive structure that consists in part of a representation of some

de®ned stimulus domain. The schema contains general knowledge about thatdomain, including speci®cation of the relationships among its attributes, aswell as speci®c examples or instances of the stimulus domain . . . . The schema

provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli, which include plans for inter-preting and gathering schema-related information. (p. 91)

Schemas, then, are generalized collections of knowledge of past ex-periences which are organized into related knowledge groups and areused to guide our behaviors in familiar situations.

During the period from the late 1970s to the middle of the 1990s,researchers have obtained massive evidence that shows that people'sbehaviors are deeply related to what they store in their brain. Hudson(1990), for example, clearly demonstrated how schemas are stored inlong-term memory and how they are used in the real world. Contrastingpreschool children's memories of a speci®c event, attending one sessionof a creative movement workshop, with their memories of repeatedworkshop sessions, Hudson found that the children's memories ofdetails were better for the workshop immediately preceding the testtrial, if only one workshop had been attended rather than four work-shops. When four workshops had been attended, the children tended torecall the entire sequence of events during the workshop better thanwhen only one workshop had been attended. However, details fromworkshops 1, 2, and 3 were wrongly remembered as having occurredduring workshop 4. In short, with repeated encounters of the workshop,some general knowledge of relationships between activities during theworkshop (i.e., a ``workshop'' schema) was built up, but once theschema was formed, memory of speci®c details declined. Moreover,Hudson and Nelson (1983) found that even young children could repairnot-quite-consistent stories with their schematic knowledge of theirworld. When misordered acts were reported (e.g., a not-quite-right storyabout a birthday party), children tended to repair them in schematicallycorrect order.

These studies demonstrate that even young children's knowledge isorganized schematically; that is, children's schemas in memory are simi-

A Cognitive Approach to Intercultural Communication 755

lar both structurally and functionally to the schematic representationsof adults.1

Schemas for Social Interactions

Schemas for social interactions are cognitive structures which containknowledge for face-to-face interactions in social environment. An exist-ing literature indicates the formation of schemas for social interactionsas follows (Abelson, 1981; Barsalow & Sewell, 1985; Bower, Black &Turner, 1979; Cantor, Mischel & Schwartz, 1982; Chi, 1981; Fivush,Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1983; Hudson & Shapiro,1991; Mandler, 1984; Minsky, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor &Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994): When we interact with the members ofthe same culture in certain situations for a number of times, or talkabout certain information with them for a number of times, schemasare generated and stored in our brain. As we encounter more of thesesimilar situations or as we talk more often about the information, theschemas become more organized, abstract, and compact. Thus, peopledevelop schemas by their direct experience and also by talking aboutschema-related information. When schemas become tightly organized,the information the schemas contain becomes more usable. They startto be accessed and used as e�cient units of information among themembers of the culture. As the schemas become more abstract, orga-nized, and compact, our communication becomes much easier throughsuch thus-re®ned schemas. Furthermore, these schemas come to charac-terize the behavior of the members of the culture.

Types of Schemas

Schemas for social interactions are classi®ed into several types.Taylor and Crocker (1981), for example, point out the following ®veschemas: (a) person schemas which contain knowledge about di�erenttypes of people, which includes their personality traits; (b) self schemaswhich contain knowledge about themselves; (c) role schemas which rep-resent knowledge about social roles; (d) event schemas or scripts2 whichare information about the appropriate sequence of events in common

1Although children's schemas in memory are similar to those of adults, developmental

di�erences between them have been found (Crain, 1992; Das Gupta, 1994; Karmilo�-

Smith, 1992; Mandler, 1988; Oates, 1994).2``Script'', a kind of schema, was named by Schank and Abelson (1977). They described

the restaurant script which contains a theme (eating in a restaurant), typical roles (custo-

mer and waiter), entry conditions (hungry customer), and a sequence of scenes and

actions within scenes (ordering, which involves getting a menu, reading a menu, and so

on).

H. Nishida756

situations; and (e) content-free schemas which are information about a

processing rule. Following Taylor and Crocker's classi®cation,

Augoustinos and Walker (1995) claim that person, self, role and eventschemas are primary types of social interaction schemas.

Meanwhile, through experiments on arti®cial intelligence (AI), Turner

(1994) found the following three schemas play important roles when `à

schema-based reasoner'' (i.e., AI) solves problems: (a) procedural sche-mas which contain information about steps to take or hierarchical

plans; (b) contextual schemas which contain information about the situ-

ation or appropriate setting of behavioral parameters; and (c) strategic

schemas which contain knowledge about problem-solving strategies.

Procedural schemas in Turner's classi®cation are similar to Taylor andCrocker's fourth type of schema, event schemas or scripts, and strategic

schemas are similar to their ®fth type, content-free schemas.

Furthermore, Chi (1981) classi®ed knowledge into the following three

types: procedural, declarative, and strategic. According to Chi, pro-cedural knowledge is about procedural information in situations, and

declarative knowledge is our knowledge about facts and concepts. Chi

names procedural and declarative knowledge ``content knowledge''

which is characterized by domain speci®c functions (e.g., their situation-

ally-dependent functions). Chi further explains that the strategic knowl-edge is information about strategies used in various domains (i.e., it is

situationally independent), and it can be acquired only after content

knowledge thoroughly develops. Here again, Chi's classi®cation over-

laps with Taylor and Crocker's and Turner's: Chi's procedural knowl-

edge is similar to Taylor and Crocker's event schemas or scripts and toTurner's procedural schemas; and strategic knowledge is similar to

Taylor and Crocker's content-free schemas, and to Turner's strategic

schemas.

Through the above examination of schemas and other related litera-ture, the following schemas can be extracted as primary types for gener-

ating human behavior for social interactions:

1. Fact-and-concept schemas are pieces of general information about

facts such as ``Tokyo is the capital of Japan'', and concepts such as``Bicycles are those vehicles that have two wheels, a seat, and handle-

bars'' (Barsalow & Sewell, 1985; Chi, 1981; Hampton, 1982; Rosch &

Mervis, 1975).

2. Person schemas contain knowledge about di�erent types of people,

which includes their personality traits; for example, ``John is neuro-tic,'' ``Taro is shy,'' or ``Mary is easy-going.'' Since we have some

representation of what it is to be ``neurotic,'' ``shy,'' or `èasy-going''

(i.e., person schemas), we tend to classify people in terms of their

dominant personality traits (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Cantor &


Mischel, 1979; Shaw & Pittenger, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Insome instances person schemas are linked to stereotypes or prejudice(Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Ruble & Stangor, 1986).

3. Self schemas contain people's knowledge about themselves (i.e., howthey see themselves and how others see them). Markus (1977), forexample, describes self schemas as ``cognitive generalizations aboutthe self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide theprocessing of self-related information contained in the individual'ssocial experiences'' (p. 64). Thus, self schemas are components of theself-concept which are central to identity and self-de®nition (Markus,1977, 1980; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Taylor & Crocker, 1981).According to Turner (1987, p. 45), there are at least three levels ofself-categorization (self schemas) important in the self-concept: (a)the superordinate level of the self as a human being, the common fea-tures shared with other members of the human species in contrast toother forms of life; (b) the intermediate level of ingroup±outgroupcategorizations that de®ne one as a member of certain social groupsand not others (e.g., `Àmerican,'' and ``female''); and, (c) the subor-dinate level of personal categorizations that de®ne one as a speci®cindividual person (e.g., in terms of one's personality or other kinds ofindividual di�erences).

4. Role schemas are knowledge about social roles which denote sets ofbehaviors that are expected of people in particular social positions.These refer to achieved and ascribed roles (Augoustinos & Walker,1995; Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Researchon ascribed roles have been proli®c, especially in the areas of genderand racial stereotypes (Taylor, Fiske, Etco� & Ruderman, 1978;Markus, Crane, Bernstein & Siladi, 1982).

5. Context schemas contain information about the situation and appro-priate setting of behavioral parameters. According to Turner (1994,pp. 37±39), the information contained in context schemas includespredictions about appropriate actions to take in order to achievegoals in the context (i.e., to activate procedure schemas), and sugges-tions for reasonable problem-solving strategies (i.e., to activate strat-egy schemas).

6. Procedure schemas are knowledge about the appropriate sequence ofevents in common situations. They include speci®c steps to take andbehavioral rules for the events. The application of the procedureschemas causes people to take some actions (Bower et al., 1979;Lalljee, Lamb & Abelson, 1992; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor &Crocker, 1981). Turner (1994, p. 22) argues that procedure schemasare distinct systems and are derived from past planning or past actionsequences that worked, or from `èxperience'' embodied in societal orother conventions (Turner calls procedure schemas procedural sche-

H. Nishida758

mas. However, I will call it procedure schemas to emphasize the con-

trast with other social-interaction schemas). Tulving (1985) and Zola-

Morgan and Squire (1990) also insist that distinction between

declarative and procedural knowledge (i.e., knowing what versus

knowing how) is important since, for example, knowing the rules and

traditions of baseball is not the same as being able to play baseball.

7. Strategy schemas are knowledge about problem-solving strategies

(Chi, 1981; Taylor & Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994). There is some

evidence that in humans, one factor impacting the choice of strategy

is the person's expertise. For example, according to Patel, Evans, and

Chawla (1987), doctors who are experts in a given type of problem

tend to use a strategy called predictive reasoning, which is basically

the same as hypothetico-deductive reasoning, but less-experienced

clinicians, or those solving a problem outside their area of expertise,

tend to use another strategy. One factor to associate with strategy

schemas, then, is the experience level of the person with respect to

the kind of problem under consideration. Another factor that should

be included is problem-solving constraints that are context-indepen-

dent. Rather than redundantly storing strategy schemas about these

constraints with each context schema they a�ect, the information is

instead recorded with strategies useful for coping with them (Turner,

1994, p. 47). For example, a constraint on time may be seen in many

di�erent contexts, including an emergency situation in a hospital or a

situation of being late for an appointment.

Recently there has been increasing interest in the a�ective dimension in

schema research. Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O'Conor (1987), for

example, asked subjects to classify 135 a�ective words and to describe

typical emotional states, and then cluster-analyzed the obtained data.

Through the analysis, they found that emotions are schematically stored

in long-term memory. Fischer (1991) also argues that a�ect and evalu-

ation may be accessed via their associative links to other schemas, and

therefore we may experience automatic negative arousal at the sight of a

prototypical politician, or fear and anxiety in the presence of a dentist.

Other studies also indicate that emotion schemas are socially con-

structed concepts, just as any other schemas (Manstead, 1991; Lazarus,

1991; Parkinson & Manstead, 1992). These studies suggest that emotion

schemas play important roles in human social interactions, and there-

fore they should be included:

8. Emotion schemas contain information about a�ect and evaluation

stored in long-term memory which is accessed when other schemas are

activated. These schemas are constructed in social interactions through-

out one's life.


I will call these eight schemas ``primary social interaction schemas(PSI schemas)'' hereafter.

How Do Schemas Function?

Then, how do these schemas actually function when people interactwith each other? Through experiments on AI, Turner (1994, pp. 15±22)suggests a process to generate ``behavior'' (in his study, the behavior ofAI called MEDIC): (a) When one is in a speci®c situation, he/she triesto recognize whether he/she knows the situation by retrieving one ormore context schemas from memory that may represent the current situ-ation; (b) when an appropriate context schema, which represents similarinteraction situations is found, the context schema subsequently suggestsa goal to pursue (through an attention-focusing function of the contextschema); (c) when a goal is selected, the context schema looks for astrategy usually useful in situations of this sort; (d) the context schema,then, suggests a procedure schema with which to achieve the goal usingthe selected strategy schema (i.e., the procedure schema is retrieved fortaking speci®c actions; in other words, the schema speci®es steps totake, hierarchical plans or behavioral rules; and (e) the application ofthe procedure schema causes the one to take some actions such as ask-ing questions of the other interactant, which further causes him/her tospecify the current context more clearly; that is, to ®nd a contextschema that is more speci®c for the situation. When the more speci®ccontext schema is applied, the schema further ®nds appropriate strategyand procedure schemas to apply to the new context. The more speci®cthe current context schema, the better the chance that more speci®cstrategy and procedure schemas will be suggested.

In the above discussion, Turner explained only the functions and re-lations among context, strategy, and procedure schemas. This is becausethe relations between these three and the other schemas have not beenthoroughly investigated. Anderson (1983), however, demonstrated re-lationships between declarative and procedural memory using a compu-ter model called ACT* (which stands for Adaptive Control of Thought,and the asterisk indicates that this version is a modi®cation of the orig-inal ACT model). Declarative memory in Anderson's study correspondsto fact-and-concept, person, self, and role schemas in our classi®cation.Procedural memory, on the other hand, corresponds to procedure sche-mas. According to Anderson, procedural memory stores productionrules and is therefore concerned with actions. Each of the productionrules speci®es the exact condition in which an action should take place.This indicates that procedural memory in Anderson's de®nition containsthe functions of context schemas which were described in our classi®-cation. For example, if one sees ¯ames coming out of a house, this is

H. Nishida760

the condition for the person to take the action of shouting ``Fire.'' Thegeneral notion is that behavior is a response to a current situation. Inother words, the situation is ®rst recognized and then appropriate actionis taken. This is similar to Turner's (1994) fundamental assumptionwhich is that a context schema is ®rst activated when a problem is pre-sented, and then the context schema looks for a procedure schema totake an appropriate action. During the operation of the ACT* system,the following processes take place: (a) encoding processes which laydown information about the current state of the external world in work-ing memory3; (b) retrieval processes which access information indeclarative memory and place it in working memory; (c) a recognition(i.e., matching) process which compares all the data active in workingmemory with the condition parts of all the production rules stored inprocedural memory (e.g., if working memory contains ``your goal is tobuy milk,'' this will match one of the production rules, `Ìf your goal isto buy . . . ''); (d) the action process which deposits the structures pro-duced by the matched production rules into working memory (e.g., ifactivated, the production rule would deposit `à goal of buying milk''into working memory); and (e) performance processes which transformcommands temporarily stored in working memory into behavioralaction (e.g., ``go to the shop'' would be executed as such a behavioralaction).

Thus, through experiments on AI, we come to understand how infor-mation stored in schemas is transformed into behavioral action.

However, a question may be raised as to whether or not AI can simu-late human cognitive functioning. Sanford (1985) has described theappropriate relationship between computer programs of cognition andhuman cognition:

Although the design of . . . programs and the study of the principles behind

intelligent programs is a study in its own right, it has fairly obvious impli-cations for the study of mind. It is di�cult to write programs which mimicessentially human activities without at the same time studying how humans

do things, and it is foolhardy to devise theories of human cognition withoutconsidering the computational implementation of the theory. (p. 6)

Furthermore, since these computer models aimed at the constructionof comprehensive models of cognition in order to produce rather gen-eral theoretical orientations having wide applicability, they use a rela-tively small set of components (Newell, 1989), and therefore

3One of the important features in the ACT* system is working memory. Working mem-

ory is a complex multi-component system. The concept of a short-term store which serves

simply as a temporary repository of information has been replaced with that of an active

working memory system with a functional role in a wide range of cognitive tasks (Cohen

et al., 1993, pp. 71±90).


relationships among various types of schemas have not been thoroughlyexamined yet. It is, however, expected that future studies on AI will pro-vide us with comprehensive understanding of relationships among var-ious types of schemas.

WHAT AXIOMS CAN BE GENERATED WHEN SCHEMATHEORY IS APPLIED TO CROSS-CULTURAL

ADAPTATION?

The De®nition of Concepts

The term `àdaptation'' has been used along with other similar termssuch as `àcculturation'' (Kim, 1982; Padilla, 1980; Snyder, 1976; Spiro,1955) and `àssimilation'' (Gordon, 1964; Johnston, 1965). According toTeske and Nelson (1974), acculturation is a dynamic process that mayinvolve either groups or individuals in direct contact situations betweencultures. The changes that take place can occur in one or both culturalgroups and changes in values may be involved. Furthermore, they claimthat acculturation does not require a change in the reference group, in-ternal change, or acceptance by the outside group or culture. Thus,acculturation is potentially a bi-directional process and does not requirechanges in values within the acculturating group. On the contrary,assimilation is a uni-directional process toward the dominant host cul-ture, and requires value changes within the assimilating group (Teske &Nelson, 1974). Adaptation, however, refers to ``the process of changeover time that takes place within individuals who have completed theirprimary socialization process in one culture and then come into continu-ous, prolonged ®rst-hand contact with a new and unfamiliar culture''(Kim, 1988, pp. 37±38). The term cross-cultural adaptation, therefore, isused here to refer to the complex process through which an individualacquires an increasing level of communication skills of the host cultureand of relational development with host nationals. In other words,cross-cultural adaptation can be viewed as transformation of one's ownPSI schemas toward those of the host culture and as acquisition of newschemas in the host culture environment.

Besides the de®nition of adaptation, we must specify who adapt to anew (di�erent and unfamiliar) environment. A number of di�erentgroups of people may be subject to cross-cultural adaptation: immi-grants, refugees, business people, diplomats, foreign workers, students,and voluntary workers. Among these, business people, diplomats,foreign workers, students, and voluntary workers may be classi®ed assojourners since they di�er from immigrants and refugees in twoaspects: (a) Their motives are more speci®c and goal-oriented, and (b)their length of stay in a new culture is shorter than immigrants and refu-

H. Nishida762

gees (Furnham, 1988, p. 43). Sojourners usually spend six months to®ve years at a new culture while intending to return to their homecountries (Furnham, 1988, p. 43). Therefore, it is the purpose of thissection to apply schema theory to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation,and to formulate axioms in this research domain.

Before going further, it should be stated that the goal of theory is toprovide an explanation of the phenomenon being studied, and thereforesome theoretical statements (axioms and theorems) can be generated.According to Blalock (1969), axioms are propositions that involve vari-ables that are taken to be directly linked causally; axioms should there-fore be statements that imply direct causal links among variables. Thus,axioms are commonly associated with covering laws theory and causalrelationships. Bailey (1970), however, argues that assuming axiomatictheories must express causal relationships will result in either distortedtheories or the absence of theories about noncausal relationships. Hemaintains that axioms may describe causal, correlational, or teleologicalrelationships. In this paper, following Bailey, axioms will express causal,correlational, or teleological relationships. Once axioms are formulated,theorems are deduced from the axioms (Blalock, 1969). Althoughaxioms are not directly testable, they articulate the basic assumptions ofthe theory. While their validity is assumed, they are also indirectly sup-ported by theorems that are susceptible to empirical veri®cation (theo-rems are not presented here).

In this paper, schema theory is applied to sojourners' cross-culturaladaptation in the following functional domains of schemas: the develop-ment of schemas, internal organization of schemas, schema-driven ver-sus data-driven functions, and schema modi®cation and change.

The Development of Schemas

When people interact with members of the same culture in certainsituations or they talk about certain information for a number of times,schemas are generated and stored in their long-term memory. The morethey engage in similar situations or exchange similar information, themore organized, abstract, and compact the schemas become. As individ-uals behave in ways that a�rm these schemas, the schemas are strength-ened as others respond accordingly in a cyclical fashion (Abelson, 1981;Barsalow & Sewell, 1985; Bower et al., 1979; Cantor et al., 1982; Chi,1981; Fivush et al., 1984; Hudson & Nelson, 1983; Hudson & Shapiro,1991; Mandler, 1984; Minsky, 1977; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Taylor &Crocker, 1981; Turner, 1994). Thus, research on schema developmentimplies:


Axiom 1: The more often a person repeats a schema-based behavior,the more likely the schema will be stored in the person'smemory.

One of the characteristics of schemas, according to Chase and Ericsson(1982), is to guide the encoding of information into meaningful chunks.In other words, the performance of people who have well-organizedschemas is linked to their ability to perceive and think in terms of mean-ingful chunks. A study by Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi and Voss (1979) isan excellent demonstration. The subjects in this study were divided intohigh- and low-knowledge groups on the basis of a 45-item test of base-ball knowledge. A baseball text was then presented to them, and theywrote down as much as they could recall from the passage. The high-knowledge people recalled more statements about actions that were im-portant to the outcome of the game, and they were also likely to recallthe events in the correct order. In contrast, those with less knowledgeabout baseball were more likely to recall details that were peripheral tothe game. This study suggests that the background information (sche-mas) provides a meaningful context for the acquisition of new infor-mation. This suggests the following axioms:

Axiom 2: Sojourners' failure to recognize the actions and behaviorswhich are relevant to meaningful interactions in the hostculture are mainly due to their lack of the PSI schemas ofthe culture.

Axiom 3: Acquisition of the PSI schemas of the host culture is anecessary condition for sojourners' cross-cultural adap-tation to the culture.

Internal Organization of Schemas

According to schema theory, any given behavior can be subdividedinto schemas forming a ``hierarchy'' (Brewer, Dull & Lui, 1981; Cantor& Mischel, 1979). For example, human behavior in a speci®c situationcan be subdivided into such schemas as context, role, strategy and pro-cedure, and these schemas are further subdivided into subschemas. Nearthe top of the hierarchy are very general schemas. These in turn or-ganize more speci®c schemas that can achieve increasingly more speci®cgoals. For example, as cited before, Turner (1987, p. 45) claims that selfschemas have at least three levels such as superordinate level of the selfas a human being, the intermediate level that de®nes one as a member

H. Nishida764

of certain social groups, and the subordinate level that de®nes one as aspeci®c individual person.

Retrieving information from memory involves working through var-ious levels of the network of schemas, that is, activation of schemasspreads from one schema to related schemas. For example, when thecommunication-with-family schema (a context schema) is selected, themost appropriate role, strategy and procedure schemas are activated.Thus, when a person retrieves a schema from his/her memory, it has achunk of related knowledge about the current problem, eliminating theneed to search for each piece of that knowledge separately (Turner,1994, p. 23). An additional bene®t is that, knowledge that might nototherwise have been retrieved may be retrieved as part of a chunk(Turner, 1994, p. 23). Moreover, when every part of the system is re-lated to every other part, a change in a particular part (e.g., a selectionof a speci®c strategy schema) causes changes in all the other parts and®nally in the total system (i.e., in behavior). Research on the internal or-ganization of schemas suggests the following axioms:

Axiom 4: Fact-and-concept, person, self, role, context, procedure,strategy, and emotion schemas (the PSI schemas) are inter-related each other, forming a network of schemas, to gener-ate behavior. A change in one schema causes changes in allthe other schemas and ®nally in the total system (i.e., inbehavior).

Axiom 5: Acquisition of information about interrelationships amongthe PSI schemas of the host culture is a necessary conditionfor sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation.

Schema-Driven versus Data-Driven Functions

One of the most important assumptions of schema theory is thatschemas are built up through many encounters with similar events or in-formation. Once a schema is developed, information tends to be pro-cessed through the schema. These are referred to as top-down orschema-driven processes. On the contrary, if people are in¯uenced bythe nature of the information itself, their schemas are not applied.These are referred to as bottom-up or data driven processes (Brewer,1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Forgas, 1985).Through research on person prototypes (person schemas), Forgas(1985) found that the more culturally salient and consensual the stimu-lus, the more likely schematic processing was to be activated, whereas


information with low cultural salience was more likely to be data-dri-ven. Other ®ndings (Bower et al., 1979; Fiske & Taylor, 1984), however,indicate that ambiguous information can either be data-driven orschema-driven; that is, ambiguous information directs a search for therelevant data to complete the stimulus more fully (i.e., data-driven), orit can be ®lled in with ``default options'' or ``best guesses'' of the schemawhich is activated (i.e., schema-driven). Bower et al. (1979), however,argue that people have a tendency to reorganize what they have heardor seen to ®t with their schema-based expectations; that is, they insistthat humans tend to use schema-driven processing more often thandata-driven processing. This is because schema-based processing con-sumes less time and e�ort than data-based processing (Fiske &Neuberg, 1990).

Regarding data-driven and schema-driven processing, Fiske andNeuberg's (1990) ®nding may provide us with an answer: schema-basedprocessing is used when the data are unambiguous and relatively unim-portant to the person, whereas data-driven processing is used whenthe data are less clear and are of considerable importance to theperson. What is important here is that data-driven processing isindividuating and piecemeal processing, and therefore requires atten-tion and e�ort, whereas schema-based processing is e�ortless andsometimes unconscious. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) emphasize that mostperson impressions are initially schema-based. If, however, one is motiv-ated to pay detailed attention to the target person, then informationabout the person is processed in a piecemeal fashion. This aspect is alsosuggested by Taylor and Altman (1987). They insist that as relationshipsdevelop, communication moves from relatively shallow, non-intimatelevels to deeper, more personal ones; that is, individuating piecemealprocessings. The following axioms are suggested in this domain ofresearch:

Axiom 6: People use both schema-driven and data-driven processingto perceive new information, depending on the situationand their motivations.

Axiom 7: If one has well-organized schemas, schematically salient in-formation is more likely to be processed through the sche-mas, whereas ambiguous information will either direct asearch for the relevant data to complete the stimulus morefully, or it will be ®lled in with default options of theschemas.

H. Nishida766

Axiom 8: Sojourners who lack the PSI schemas of the host culture aremore likely to employ data-driven processing which requirese�ort and attention.

One important aspect in this line of reasoning is that data-driven pro-cessing is linked to self-schemas. As Fiske and Neuberg (1990) claim,data-driven processing is used when the data are of considerable import-ance to the person, and when he/she is motivated to pay detailed atten-tion to the target person. This implies:

Axiom 9: When information is data-driven, a self schema plays an im-portant role.

Schema Modi®cation and Change

In schema theory, an environmental change elicits a change in a con-text schema, and this further changes role, strategy, and procedure sche-mas. In other words, schemas regulate themselves. This self-regulationis related to ``homeostasis'' which means the self-righting adjustments ofschemas in order to prevent a rapid disintegration of their parts whenthey are subjected to stress (Cannon, 1968, p. 258). When peopleencounter unfamiliar situations in the host culture where they lackappropriate schemas, they are subject to stress because of the disinte-gration of context and other related schemas. What they usually do isthat they selectively direct their attention, through the attention-focus-ing function of their context schemas (Turner, 1994, pp. 53, 57), tryingto provide integration of information using their native-culture schemas.This is an example of homeostasis or self-regulation. However, peopleare subject not only to self-regulation or homeostasis, but also to self-direction to a changing environment, so that they may change or elab-orate their internal structures (i.e., pre-existing schemas which are theirnative-culture schemas) as a condition of survival.

These aspects have been explained by Rumelhart and Norman (1978)as tuning, accretion and restructuring. Tuning refers to slight adjust-ments in schemas that are made on a temporary basis to meet a transi-ent problem. The schemas metaphorically stretch and shape themselvesfor a moment to accommodate to the novel situation. For example, anAmerican who is visiting Australia would tune his/her schema for thewolf or the rabbit familiar to North Americans in order to understand aTasmanian wolf or a rabbit bandicoot. His/her perception and memoryof these animals would depend on simply ®ne-tuning pre-existing sche-mas. Accretion refers to a gradual and permanent modi®cation of a


schema. Each time a schema accommodates to a novel object, event, orsituation, it registers the results. Slowly, the shape and complexity ofthe schema modify itself to the requirements of the environment. Agood example of this process is the situation in which sojourners whohave stayed in the host culture for a prolonged period of time (e.g.,more than ®ve years) cannot distinguish their native culture schemasfrom those acquired in the host culture because of their prolonged ex-posure to the host environment. Finally, restructuring is an abrupt andmassive change in existing schemas. According to Rumelhart andNorman (1978), restructuring may come about spontaneously afterenough exposure to discrepant experiences, through conscious re¯ectionon one's experience, or through active e�orts to reorganize what oneknows. The last case includes formal education in which teachers try toimpose schemas. Thus, the following axioms are included:

Axiom 10: In the host culture, sojourners experience the stages ofself-regulation and self-direction. In the stage of self-regu-lation, they try to resolve ambiguities and to establish inte-gration of information using pre-existing schemas (theirnative-culture schemas) by gradually modifying them. Inthe stage of self-direction, on the other hand, they activelytry to reorganize their native-culture schemas or to gener-ate new schemas in order to adapt to the host culture en-vironment.

Axiom 11: In the host culture, sojourners' initial experiences are man-ifested as cognitive uncertainty and anxiety because oftheir lack of the PSI schemas of the culture.

Implications

Implications of this study will be drawn when other studies are exam-ined from the perspective described here. As an example, this paper willanalyze intercultural communication studies which have been intensivelystudied by Gudykunst and his colleagues (Gudykunst, 1983a,b, 1988,1991, 1993; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984, 1986, 1989; Gudykunst, Yang,& Nishida, 1985). Through these studies, Gudykunst (1993) claims that`è�ective [intercultural] communication is moderated by our ability tomindfully manage our anxiety and reduce our uncertainty about our-selves and the people with whom we are communicating'' (p. 38). Theunderlying theoretical propositions of his claim come from uncertaintyreduction theory developed by Berger and his colleagues (Berger, 1979,

H. Nishida768

1992; Berger & Bradac, 1982; Berger & Calabrese, 1975). When peopleinteract with a stranger, they may have a strong desire to reduce uncer-tainty about that person. Their attempts to reduce uncertainty in anovel situation involve a pattern of information-seeking (uncertainty re-duction) and tension (anxiety) reduction. Primarily, uncertainty re-duction theory deals with interpersonal communication between peopleof the same culture. This indicates that the theory has two major pre-suppositions: (a) Interactants share the PSI schemas of their culture;and (b) interactants manage to reduce their uncertainty by gaining miss-ing data about the stranger mainly through data-driven strategies.

Intercultural communication, however, di�ers from interpersonalcommunication in three aspects: (a) Interactants in intercultural com-munication may not share the PSI schemas of each other's cultures; (b)uncertainty and anxiety may be the resultant psychological states whenstrangers (both sojourners and immigrants) do not have appropriateschemas of the host culture; and (c) information-seeking behavior ofstrangers is not limited to gaining data about the other interactant, butcan be found in the situations where they try to acquire the PSI schemasof the host culture: for example, reading books about the host culture,attending an intercultural communication training, or talking withfriends who have lived in the host culture for a prolonged period oftime. These di�erences may indicate that we must be cautious of thedirect application of uncertainty reduction theory to the domain ofintercultural communication because the theory does not cover stran-gers' information-seeking behavior about the PSI schemas of the hostculture.

Human communication must be accurately documented and analyzedbefore useful theories can be developed, re®ned and sometimes rejectedin the light of new ®ndings about human communication which are in-consistent with them. We now know that human memory selects,abstracts, integrates and normalizes information. Inconsistent infor-mation may be forgotten, while consistent information may be gener-ated at later recall. All these various phenomena can be convenientlysummarized by a schema theory. Le Voi (1993) claims:

There is an intimate relation between the theory [schema theory] and thephenomena, and because schema theory captures many di�erent facts about

memory, we follow a long tradition and claim that this theory is an expla-nation of those characteristics. Of course, it may not be the only possible ex-planation, or even the best one, but if one theory accurately describes severaldisparate facts . . . we can propose it as an explanation. (p. 176)

Thus, the application of schema theory to sojourners' cross-culturalcommunication may be a necessary step for us to accurately documentand analyze the phenomena.


CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper was to examine schema theory in order toexplicate the phenomena of intercultural communication, especially ofsojourners' cross-cultural adaptation. Eight primary types of schemas,which are central to human social interactions, were investigated, andthese schemas' functions for processing information were examined.Furthermore, when applied to sojourners' cross-cultural adaptation,schema theory suggested eleven axioms in the following functionaldomains of schemas: the development of schemas, internal organizationof schemas, schema-driven versus data-driven functions, and schemamodi®cation and change.

In future studies, theorems must be generated and tested in the ®eldin order to verify the axioms formulated here. When this is done, thetheory can be used for the design and implementation of cross-culturalstudies to facilitate individuals' adaptation to the host culture environ-ment.

REFERENCES

Abelson, R. P. (1981). Psychological status of the script concept. AmericanPsychologist, 36, 715±729.

Adler, P. S. (1987). Culture shock and the cross-cultural learning experience. In

L. F. Luce & E. C. Smith (Eds.), Toward internationalism (pp. 24±35).Cambridge, MA: Newbury (Original work published 1972).

Anderson, J. R. (1983). The architecture of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.Andersen, S. M., & Klatzky, R. L. (1987). Traits and social stereotypes: levelsof categorization in person perception. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 53, 235±246.Augoustinos, M., & Walker, I. (1995). Social cognition: an integrated introduc-tion. London: Sage.

Bailey, K. D. (1970). Evaluating axiomatic theories. In E. F. Borgatta (Ed.),

Sociological methodology (pp. 48±71). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.Barnlund, D. (1975). Public and private self in Japan and the United States.Tokyo: Simul.

Barsalow, L. W., & Sewell, D. R. (1985). Contrasting the representation ofscripts and categories. Journal of Memory and Language, 24, 646±665.

Berger, C. R. (1979). Beyond initial interaction: uncertainty, understanding, and

the development of interpersonal relationships. In H. Giles & R. St. Clair(Eds.), Language and social psychology (pp. 122±144). Oxford: Blackwell.

Berger, C. R. (1991). Chautauqua: why are there so few communication the-ories: communication theories and other curios. Communication Monographs,

58, 101±113.

H. Nishida770

Berger, C. R. (1992). Communicating under uncertainty. In W. Gudykunst & Y.

Y. Kim (Eds.), Readings on communicating with strangers: an approach to

intercultural communication (pp. 5±16). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Berger, C. R., & Bradac, J. J. (1982). Language and social knowledge: uncertainty

in interpersonal relations. London: E.E. Arnold.

Berger, C. R., & Calabrese, R. J. (1975). Some explorations in initial interaction

and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication.

Human Communication Research, 1, 99±112.

Berry, J. W. (1975). Ecology, cultural adaptation, and psychological di�eren-

tiation: traditional patterning and acculturative stress. In R. W. Brislin, S.

Bochner & W. L. Lonner (Eds.), Cross-cultural perspectives on learning (pp.

207±228). New York: Sage.

Bhatt, A. K., & Fairchild, H. H. (1984). Values of convergence for Indian stu-

dents in the United States. Psychological Reports, 55, 446.

Blalock, H. H. (1969). Theory construction: from verbal to mathematical formu-

lations. Englewood Cli�s, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bock, P. (Ed.) (1970). Culture shock: a reader in modern anthropology. New

York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Bochner, S. (1982). The social psychology of cross-cultural relations. In S.

Bochner (Ed.), Cultures in contact: studies in cross-cultural interaction.

Oxford: Pergamon.

Bower, G. H., Black, J. B., & Turner, T. J. (1979). Scripts in memory for texts.

Cognitive Psychology, 11, 177±220.

Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K.

Srull & R. S. Wyer Jr. (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 1±36).

Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Brewer, M. B., Dull, V., & Lui, L. (1981). Perceptions of the elderly: stereotypes

as prototypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41, 656±670.

Brislin, R. W. (1981). Cross-cultural encounters. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.

Brower, I. C. (1980). Counseling Vietnamese. Personal Guidance Journal, 58(10),

646±652.

Burgoon, J. (1985). Nonverbal signals. In M. Knapp & G. Miller (Eds.),

Handbook of interpersonal communication. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage.

Cannon, W. B. (1968). Self-regulation of the body. In W. Buckley (Ed.),

Modern systems research for the behavioral scientist: a sourcebook (pp. 256±

258). Chicago, IL: Aldine.

Cantor, N., & Mischel, W. (1979). Prototypes in person perception. In L.

Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 12). New

York: Academic Press.

Cantor, N., Mischel, W., & Schwartz, J. C. (1982). A prototype analysis of

psychological situations. Cognitive Psychology, 14, 45±77.

Caudill, W., & Scarr, H. A. (1962). Japanese value orientations and culture

change. Ethnology, 1, 53±91.

Chase, W. G., & Ericsson, K. A. (1982). Skill and working memory. In G. H.

Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (pp. 1±58). New York:

Academic Press.


Chen, G., & Starosta, W. (1996). Intercultural communication competence: A

synthesis. Communication yearbook (Vol. 19, pp. 353±383). Thousand Oaks,

CA: Sage.

Chi, M. T. H. (1981). Knowledge development and memory performance. In M.

P. Friedman, J. P. Das & N. O'Conner (Eds.), Intelligence and learning (pp.

221±229). New York: Plenum Press.

Church, A. T. (1982). Sojourner adjustment. Psychological Bulletin, 91, 540±572.

Cleveland, H., Mangone, G. J., & Adams, J. G. (1960). The overseas Americans.

New York: McGraw Hill.

Cohen, G., Kiss, G., & Le Voi, M. (1993). Memory: current issues (2nd ed.).

Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.

Crain, W. (1992). Theories of development: concepts and applications. Englewood

Cli�s, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Das Gupta, P. (1994). Images of childhood and theories of development. In J.

Oates (Ed.), The foundations of child development. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dinges, N. (1983). Intercultural competence. In D. Landis & R. Brislin (Eds.),

Handbook of intercultural training: issues in theory and design (Vol. I, pp. 176±

202). New York: Pergamon Press.

European value systems study group (1982). Main European Report,

Amsterdam.

Fischer, A. H. (1991). Emotion scripts: a study of the social and cognitive facets

of emotions. DSWO Press.

Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation,

from category-based to individuating processes: In¯uences of information and

motivation on attention and interpretation. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances

in experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp. 1±74). New York: Academic

Press.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition. Reading, MA: Addison-

Wesley.

Fivush, R., Hudson, J., & Nelson, K. (1984). Children's long-term memory for

a novel event: an exploratory study. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 30, 303±316.

Forgas, J. P. (1985). Person prototypes and cultural salience: the role of cogni-

tive and cultural factors in impression formation. British Journal of Social

Psychology, 24, 3±17.

Furnham, A. (1988). The adjustment of sojourners. In Y. Y. Kim & W. B.

Gudykunst (Eds.), Cross-cultural adaptation (pp. 42±61). Newbury Park, CA:

Sage.

Furnham, A. (1992). The adjustment of sojourners. In W. B. Gudykunst & Y.

Y. Kim (Eds.), Readings on communicating with strangers (pp. 336±345). New

York: McGraw-Hill.

Furnham, A., & Bochner, S. (1986). Culture shock: psychological reactions to

unfamiliar environments. London: Routledge.

Giles, H. (1978). Linguistic di�erentiation between ethnic groups. In H. Tajfel

(Ed.), Di�erentiation between social groups (pp. 361±393). London: Academic

Press.

Giles, H., & Johnson, P. (1981). The role of language in ethnic group relations.

In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup behavior (pp. 199±243). Oxford:

Blackwell.

H. Nishida772

Giles, H., Mulac, A., Bradac, J. J., & Johnson, P. (1987). Speech accommo-

dation. In M. McLaughlin (Ed.), Communication yearbook (Vol. 10, pp. 13±

48). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American life. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Gudykunst, W. B. (1983a). Similarities and di�erences in perceptions of initial

intracultural and intercultural encounters. The Southern Speech

Communication Journal, XLIX, 49±65.

Gudykunst, W. B. (1983b). Uncertainty reduction and predictability of behavior

in low- and high-context cultures. Communication Quarterly, 31, 236±251.

Gudykunst, W. B. (1988). Uncertainty and anxiety. In Y. Y. Kim & W. B.

Gudykunst (Eds.), Theories in intercultural communication. Newbury Park,

CA: Sage.

Gudykunst, W. B. (1991). Bridging di�erences: e�ective intergroup communi-

cation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Gudykunst, W. B. (1993). Toward a theory of e�ective interpersonal and inter-

group communication: an anxiety/uncertainty management (AUM) perspec-

tive. In R. L. Wiseman & J. Koester (Eds.), Intercultural communication

competence (pp. 33±71). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Gudykunst, W. B., & Nishida, T. (1984). Individual and cultural in¯uences on

uncertainty reduction. Communication Monographs, 51, 23±36.

Gudykunst, W. B., & Nishida, T. (1986). Attributional con®dence in low- high-

context cultures. Human Communication Research, 12, 525±549.

Gudykunst, W. B., & Nishida, T. (1989). Theoretical perspectives for studying

intercultural communication. In M. Asante & W. Gudykunst (Eds.),

Handbook of international and intercultural communication (pp. 17±46).

Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Gudykunst, W. B., Yang, S. M., & Nishida, T. (1985). A cross-cultural test of

uncertainty reduction theory: comparisons of acquaintances, friends, and dat-

ing relationships in Japan, Korea, and the United States. Human

Communication Research, 11, 407±455.

Gullahorn, J. T., & Gullahorn, J. E. (1963). An extension of the U-curve hy-

pothesis. Journal of Social Issues, 19(3), 33±47.

Hall, E. T. (1959). The silent language. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

Hammer, M. R., Nishida, H., & Wiseman, R. L. (1996). The in¯uence of situa-

tional prototypes on dimensions of intercultural communication competence.

Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 27(3), 267±282.

Hampton, J. A. (1982). An investigation of the nature of abstract concepts.

Memory & Cognition, 9, 149±156.

Hofstede, G. (1984). Culture's consequences: international di�erences in work-re-

lated values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. London:

McGraw-Hill.

Hudson, J. A. (1990). The emergence of autobiographical memory in mother-

child conversation. In R. Fivush & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remem-

bering in young children (pp. 166±196). New York: Cambridge University

Press.


Hudson, J. A., & Nelson, K. (1983). E�ect of script structure on children's story

recall. Developmental Psychology, 19, 625±635.

Hudson, J. A., & Shapiro, L. R. (1991). From knowing to telling: the develop-

ment of children's scripts, stories, and personal narratives. In A. McCabe &

C. Peterson (Eds.), Developing narrative structure (pp. 89±136). Hillsdale, NJ:

Erlbaum.

Johnston, R. (1965). Immigrant assimilation. Perth, Western Australia: Paterson

Brokensha.

Kant, I. (1963). Critique of pure reason (2nd ed.) (N. K. Smith, Trans.). London:

Macmillan. (Original work published 1787).

Karmilo�-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on

cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kim, Y. Y. (1978). A communication approach to acculturation processes:

Korean immigrants in Chicago. International Journal of Intercultural

Relations, 2(2), 197±224.

Kim, Y. Y. (1982). Communication and acculturation. In L. A. Samovar & R.

E. Porter (Eds.), Intercultural communication: a reader (3rd ed., pp. 359±368).

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Kim, Y. Y. (1987). Facilitating immigrant adaptation: the role of communi-

cation and interpersonal ties. In T. C. Albrecht & M. B. Adelman (Eds.),

Communicating social support: process in context (pp. 192±211). Newbury

Park, CA: Sage.

Kim, Y. Y. (1988). Communication and cross-cultural adaptation. Clevedon:

Multilingual Matters.

Kim, Y. Y., & Ruben, B. (1992). Intercultural transformation. In W.

Gudykunst & Y. Y. Kim (Eds.), Readings on communicating with strangers:

an approach to intercultural communication. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Klineberg, O., & Hull, W. F. I. V. (1979). At a foreign university: an inter-

national study of adaptation and coping. New York: Macmillan.

Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Values and value orientations in the theory of action. In

T. Parsons & E. A. Shilds (Eds.), Toward a general theory of action (pp. 388±

433). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kluckhohn, F. R., & Strodtbeck, F. L. (1961). Variations in value orientations.

Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

Lalljee, M., Lamb, R., & Abelson, R. P. (1992). The role of event prototypes in

categorization and explanation. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.),

European review of social psychology (vol. 3, pp. 153±182). Chichester: Wiley.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of

emotion. American Psychologist, 46, 819±834.

Le Voi, M. (1993). Overview. In G. Cohen, G. Kiss & M. Le Voi (Eds.),

Memory: current issues (2nd ed.). Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.

Littlejohn, S. W., & Jabusch, D. M. (1982). Communication competence: model

and application. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 10(1), 29±37.

Lysgaard, S. (1955). Adjustment in a foreign society: Norwegian Fulbright gran-

tees visiting the United States. International Social Science Bulletin, 7(1), 45±

51.

Mandler, J. M. (1984). Stories, scripts, and scenes: aspects of schema theory.

Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

H. Nishida774

Mandler, J. M. (1988). How to build a baby: on the development of an accessi-

ble representational system. Cognitive Development, 3, 113±136.

Manstead, A. S. R. (1991). Emotion in social life. Cognition and emotion, 5,

353±362.

Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 63±78.

Markus, H. (1980). The self in thought and memory. In D. M. Wegner & R. R.

Vallacher (Eds.), The self in social psychology. New York: Oxford University

Press.

Markus, H., Crane, M., Bernstein, S., & Siladi, M. (1982). Self-schemas and

gender. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 38±50.

Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: a social psychologi-

cal perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 299±337.

Matlin, M. W. (1989). Cognition. Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

McCroskey, J. E. (1984). Communication competence: the elusive construct. In

R. N. Bostrom (Ed.), Competence in communication (pp. 259±268). Beverly

Hills, CA: Sage.

Mehrabian, A. (1972). Nonverbal communication. Chicago: Aldine.

Minsky, M. L. (1977). Frame-system theory. In P. N. Johnson-Laird & P. C.

Wason (Eds.), Thinking: readings in cognitive science (pp. 355±376).

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, D., Collett, P., Marsh, P., & Oshaughnessy, M. (1979). Gestures: their

origins and distribution. London: Jonathan Cape.

Newell, A. (1989). Uni®ed theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.

Nishida, H. (1979). Variations in Value Orientations and Cultural Change in

Japan and the USA: An Intercultural Perspective. Unpublished doctoral disser-

tation, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

Nishida, H. (1985). Japanese intercultural communication competence and

cross-cultural adjustment. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 9,

247±269.

Nishida, H. (1992). Gokai no kouzou: America-jin to hataraku toki no chishiki to

gijutu no reporto [The structure of misunderstanding: A report on knowledge

and skills for working with Americans in the U.S.A]. Tokyo: Diamond-sha.

Oates, J. (Ed.) (1994). The foundation of child development. Oxford: Blackwell.

Oberg, K. (1960). Cultural shock: adjustment to new cultural environments.

Practical Anthropology, 7, 177±182.

O'Keefe, B. J., & Delia, J. G. (1985). Psychological and interactional dimensions

of communicative development. In H. Giles & R. St. Clair (Eds.), Recent

advances in language, communication and social psychology (pp. 41±85).

London: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Padilla, A. M. (Ed.) (1980). Acculturation: theory, models and some new ®ndings.

Washington DC: Westview.

Parkinson, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1992). Appraisal as a cause of emotion.

Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 122±149.

Patel, V. L., Evans, D. A., & Chawla, A. (1987). Predictive versus diagnostic

reasoning in the application of biomedical knowledge. Proceedings of the


Ninth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Seattle,

Washington, 221±233.

Pichert, J. W., & Anderson, R. C. (1977). Taking di�erent perspectives on a

story. Journal of Educational Psychology, 69, 309±315.

Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press.

Rosch, E. H., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: studies in the in-

ternal structure of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7, 573±605.

Ruble, D. N., & Stangor, C. (1986). Stalking the elusive schema: insights from

developmental and social-psychological analyses of gender schemas. Social

Cognition, 4, 227±261.

Rumelhart, D. E. (1975). Notes on a schema for stories. In D. G. Bobrow & A.

Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: studies in cognitive science

(pp. 211±236). New York: Academic Press.

Rumelhart, D. E. (1980). Schemata: The building blocks of cognition. In R. J.

Spiro, B. C. Bruce & W. F. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical issues in reading com-

prehension (pp. 33±58). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. (1978). Accretion, tuning, and restructur-

ing: three models of learning. In J. W. Cotton & R. Klatzky (Eds.), Semantic

factors in cognition (pp. 37±53). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Sanford, A. J. (1985). Cognition and cognitive psychology. London: Lawrence

Erlbaum Associates.

Schank, R. C., & Abelson, R. P. (1977). Script, plans, goals and understanding:

an inquiry to human knowledge structures. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Shaver, P., Schwartz, J., Kirson, D., & O'Conor, C. (1987). Emotion knowledge:

further exploration of a prototype approach. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 52, 1061±1086.

Shaw, R., & Pittenger, J. (1977). Perceiving the face of change in changing

faces: implications for a theory of object perception. In R. Shaw & J.

Bransford (Eds.), Perceiving, acting and knowing: toward an ecological psychol-

ogy (pp. 103±132). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Snyder, P. Z. (1976). Neighborhood gatekeepers in the process of urban adap-

tation: cross-ethnic commonalities. Urban Anthropology, 5(1), 35±52.

Spilich, G. J., Vesonder, G. T., Chiesi, H. L., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Text proces-

sing of domain-related information for individuals with high and low domain

knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 275±290.

Spiro, M. E. (1955). The acculturation of American ethnic groups. American

Anthropologist, 57, 1240±1252.

Sudweeks, S., Gudykunst, W. B., Ting-Toomey, S., & Nishida, T. (1990).

Developmental themes in Japanese-North American relationships.

International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 14, 207±233.

Taft, R. (1966). From stranger to citizen. London: Tavistock.

Taylor, D. A., & Altman, I. (1987). Communication in interpersonal relation-

ships: social penetration theory. In M. E. Rolo� & G. R. Miller (Eds.),

Interpersonal processes: new directions in communication research (pp. 257±

277). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Taylor, S. E., & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic bases of social information pro-

cessing. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cogni-

H. Nishida776

tion: the Ontario symposium (Vol. 1, pp. 89±134). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence

Erlbaum.Taylor, S. E., Fiske, S., Etco�, N. L., & Ruderman, A. J. (1978). Categoricaland contextual bases of person memory and stereotyping. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 778±793.Teske, R. H. C., & Nelson, B. H. (1974). Acculturation and assimilation: a clari-®cation. American Anthropologist, 1, 351±367.

Thorndyke, O. W. (1984). Applications of schema theory in cognitive research.In J. R. Anderson & S. M. Kosslyn (Eds.), Tutorials in learning and memory(pp. 167±192). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

TorbioÈ rn, I. (1982). Living abroad: personal adjustment and personnel policy in

the overseas setting. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.Tulving, E. (1985). How many memory systems are there? AmericanPsychologist, 40, 385±398.

Turner, J. C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group. Oxford, UK: BasilBlackwell.

Turner, R. M. (1994). Adaptive reasoning for real-world problems: a schema-

based approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.Ward, C. A., & Kennedy, A. (1996). Crossing cultures: the relationship betweenpsychological and socio-cultural dimensions of cross-cultural adjustment. In

J. Pandey, D. Sinha & D. P. S. Bhawuk (Eds.), Asian contributions to cross-cultural psychology. New Delhi, India: Sage.

Watzlawick, P., Beavin, J. H., & Jackson, D. (1967). Pragmatics of human com-munication. New York: Norton.

Wiseman, R. L., & Koester, J. (1993). Intercultural communication competence.Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Wiseman, R. L., Hammer, R. R., & Nishida, H. (1989). Predictors of intercul-

tural communication competence. International Journal of InterculturalRelations, 13, 349±370.

Yum, J. O. (1982). Communication patterns and information acquisition among

Korean immigrants in Hawaii. Human Communication Research, 8(2), 154±169.

Zola-Morgan, S., & Squire, L. R. (1990). Neurophysiological investigations of

memory and amnesia: ®ndings from humans and nonhuman primates. In A.Diamond (Ed.), The development and neural bases of higher cognitive functions(pp. 434±456). New York: New York Academy of Sciences.


Nishida Schema Theory

Documents