Nile Water, African “Fertility”, & A New Vision for The …...basin (Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt), and propose that the emerging conflict over the Nile water, although appears at

NileWater,African“Fertility”,&ANewVisionforTheWayForward

*

ElfatihABEltahir,

RalphM.ParsonsLaboratory,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology

ELTAHIRGroupResearchReport#5,January2017

*Antique lithograph of Rhoda Nilometer by David Roberts from the mid-1800s. This Nilometer was built in the Ninth century to monitor the Nile floods.

2

Abstract

TheconflictovertheNilewaterhasreceivedsignificantattentioninthelastfew

years.Aparticularlyimportantdevelopmentwastherecentdecisionbythe

EthiopiangovernmenttobuildalargedamontheBlueNile(theGreatEthiopian

RenaissanceDam,orGERD)toproduceelectricity.Here,IfocusontheEasternNile

basin(Ethiopia,SudanandEgypt),andproposethattheemergingconflictoverthe

Nilewater,althoughappearsatthesurfacetobecausedbytheintroductionof

GERD,isrootedinabroaderAfricanchallengethatIcalltheAfrican“fertility”

challengeshapedbyrapidpopulationgrowth,andpoorsoilproductivity.Ialso

highlightseriousdeficienciesinthestrategiesonwaterresourcesofthethree

countriesthatneedtoberemediedbeforearegionalresolutionoftheconflictcanbe

reached.Ishowhowdevelopmentofanegotiatedagreementresolvingtheapparent

conflictonNilewater,inthenearfuture,isconsistentwiththegenuinenational

interestsofeachofthethreecountries.Iconcludebyofferinganewvisionforthe

wayforward,proposingfivespecificelementsthatshouldbeincludedforanyfuture

agreementtobecomeviable,andremainsustainable.

3

Introduction

TheconflictovertheNilewaterhasreceivedsignificantattentioninthelastfew

years.ThisattentionhasbeenassociatedwiththerecentdecisionbytheEthiopian

governmenttobuildalargedamontheBlueNile(theGreatEthiopianRenaissance

Dam,orGERD)toproduceelectricity,mostlyforexporttoneighboringcountries.

Thisdecision,whichwasannouncedsuddenlyandwithoutpriorconsultationwith

neighboringNilebasincountries,isconsistentwithEthiopia’slong-termplanto

utilizeitshydropowerpotentialtogenerateelectricitythatcanbetransmittedinto

neighboringcountriesinexchangeforbadlyneededhardcurrency.Thedam,

currentlyunderconstruction,isrelativelylargecomparedtopreviousdesignsfor

thesamelocation.ThiscausedseriousconcernsinEgypt,reflectingworriesabout

thesecurityofEgypt’scurrentshareintheNilewaterintheshort-andlong-term.

TheAfricanFertilityChallenge

Mostofthedevelopedworldhassucceededinreducingthewomenfertilityrateand

stabilizingthepopulation,whileimprovingthefertilityofsoilsandagricultural

productivity.Incontrast,Africais“travelling”downthesame“fertility”roadbutin

thewrongdirection!Ingeneral,thefertilityrateofAfricanwomenisthehighest,

andfertilityofAfricansoilsisthelowestcomparedtoothercontinents.

4

Figure1:MapoftheNilebasin(SiamandEltahir,2015)

5

ThecurrentrateofpopulationgrowthinAfricashouldtriggerseriousglobal

concernssinceacontinentthatiscurrentlyhosting15%oftheworldpopulationis

projectedtocontribute50%oftheanticipatedincreaseintheworldpopulation,by

2050,doublingitspopulationfrom,roughly,onetotwobillion,SeeFigure2.

Atthesametime,therateofapplicationoffertilizersandotheragricultural

technologiesinAfricaisthelowestcomparedtoanyothercontinent,andthusthe

productivityofAfricansoilsisthelowestcomparedtootherregionsoftheworld.In

fact,someregionsofAfrica,ratherthanbeingfertilized,arebeingactivelydepleted

oftheirnaturalfertilitythroughunsustainablecultivationpractices,SeeFigure3.

Howdoesuseoffertilizersrelatetowhatappearstobeaconflictonwater?The

massofcropproducedperunitvolumeofwaterusedanywhereistoalargedegree

dependentontherateofapplicationoffertilizersandthetypeofseedsused(see

Figure3).InordertoexpandagriculturalproductioninAfrica,therearetwo

possibleroutes:horizontalexpansionusingmorelandandmorewater,orvertical

expansionusingthesamelandandwatervolumebutproducingmorecropaidedby

fertilizers,betterseeds,andmoreefficientwaterusetechnology.Thefirstroute

leadstowaterandlandconflicts.Thesecondrouteavoidsconflicts.

6

Figure2:PopulationofAfrica(UN,2012)

0.0#

0.5#

1.0#

1.5#

2.0#

2.5#

3.0#

0.0#

0.5#

1.0#

1.5#

2.0#

2.5#

3.0#

1950# 1975# 2000# 2025# 2050#

Popu

la'o

n)(Billions))

Africa)

Low#Fer0lity# High#Fer0lity# Medium#Fer0lity#

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Figure3:Cropproductivityindifferentcountriesagainstfertilizeruseintensity.(FAO(2009))

8

ForthesakeofrealdevelopmentinAfrica,andtoachieveimprovedstandardsof

living,thisAfrican“fertility”situationneedstobereversed.Thecontinentneedsto

takeaU-turnandstart“driving”intheoppositedirectionofthe“fertility”road!

Significantinvestmentsareneededinordertocontrolpopulationgrowth.Themost

efficientapproachtoreducefertilityrateofAfricanwomenistoinvestineducation

ofAfricangirlsinordertoincreasefemalesecondaryschoolenrollmentlevels.

Simultaneously,significantinvestmentsareneededinordertointroduceand

enhanceagriculturaltechnologyintheformoffertilizersandbetterseeds.

IntheNilebasin,thesituationofpopulationgrowthistypicalofothersub-Saharan

Africancountries.ThecombinedpopulationofEthiopia,Sudan,andEgyptmore

thandoubledinthelast30yearsorso.Thecurrentratesofpopulationgrowthare

veryhighandrangefromaround1.5%to3.0%dependingonthecountryanddata

source.

Asaresult,itwouldbesafetopredictthatthepopulationofthethreecountries,

whichincreasedfromabout100millions30yearsagotoabout200millionstoday,

willnearlydoubleby2050,approachingabout400millions,SeeFigure4.Atthe

sametime,theNilebasinsuffersfromasoilfertilityproblem.AsidefromEgypt

wheresoilfertilityisinrelativelybettershape,theratesofapplicationoffertilizers

inSudanandEthiopiaareamongthelowestcomparedtoothercountries.

9

Figure4:PopulationofEasternNilebasin(Egypt,Ethiopia,andSudan),UN(2012),“MediumFertilityProjection”

0"

50"

100"

150"

200"

250"

300"

350"

400"

450"

0"

50"

100"

150"

200"

250"

300"

350"

400"

450"

1970" 1990" 2010" 2030" 2050"

Popu

la'o

n)(M

illions))

10

Ingeneral,ifwefocusontheentireEasternNilebasinregionincludingEgypt,

Sudan,andEthiopia,wecanexpresscropproductionperyear,percapita,denoted

byCas

𝐶 =𝑊.𝑇𝑃

(1)

Where

C :cropproductionintonspercapitaperyear

W :totalwatervolumeusedincubickilometersperyear

T :agriculturalproductivityintonsofcropspercubickilometerofwater

P :humanpopulation

Therateofchangeofcropproduction,withrespecttotime,contributesdirectlyto

thegrowthrateingrossdomesticproduct(GDP)percapitaintheregion.We

expressthatratethroughsimplemathematicalmanipulationofequation1,by

𝜕 ln(𝐶)𝜕𝑡

= 𝜕 ln(𝑊)𝜕𝑡

+ 𝜕 ln(𝑇)𝜕𝑡

− 𝜕 ln 𝑃𝜕𝑡

….(2)

ThisisabeautifulequationthatIcallthe“EquationofAfrica’sFuture”!Itexplicitly

relateslong-termgrowthincropproduction,andhenceregionaleconomy,tothe

ratesof:climatechange,adoptionofagriculturaltechnology,andpopulationgrowth

(thesethreetopicsareofgreatinteresttomeandoccupyasignificantfractionofmy

EconomicGrowth

ClimateChange

TechnologyAdoption

PopulationGrowth

11

researchactivityatMIT!).Theaboveequationexpressesclearlythat,leavingclimate

changeasidefornow,thefractionaleconomicgrowthattributabletocrop

productionpercapitacanbeenhancedthroughadoptionofagriculturaltechnology

suchasfertilizersandbetterseeds,andwouldsignificantlybehamperedbyrapid

populationgrowth.

IntheEasternNilebasincountries,theanemicrateofadoptionofagricultural

technologycombinedwiththerapidgrowthinpopulationwouldsignificantly

reducecropproductionpercapitaandtheassociatedGDPpercapita.Undersuch

regionalconditions,countrieswouldnaturallytrytoachievemoregrowththrough

maximizationoftheirshareofthelimitedwaterresource,attheexpenseofother

countriesthatsharethiscommonresource,hencedeepeningtheapparentconflict

overwater.Underthishypothesis,theGERDissueisonlyasymptomofthemore

serious“disease”thatIcalltheAfrican“fertility”challenge.

Now,comingbacktotheissueofclimatechange,weemphasizethehighdegreeof

uncertaintyaboutthefutureclimateintheEasternNilebasin,SeeFigure5.The

IPCCmodels,whicharethemostaccuratetoolsforpredictingthefutureclimate,

seemtodisagreeonthesignofthepredictedchangeinrainfalloverEthiopia.Asa

resultourknowledge,atthemoment,ofthefutureriverflowintheEasternNile

basinisquiteuncertain.However,futureclimateprojectionsarelikelyto

12

Figure5:PredictionsofFutureClimateintheNileBasin:temperature,precipitation,andnumberofmodelsthatarepredictinganincreaseinrainfall.OverEthiopia,about10to11modelsoutof21modelsarepredictinganincrease,andasimilarnumberarepredictingadecreaseinrainfalloverEthiopiaduring(June,July,andAugust).(FromBokoetal.,2007;IPCCreport,ThemorerecentIPCCreportshowssimilarresults)

13

improvewithtimeasthescienceofregionalclimatechangepredictionmakes

furtherprogress.Hence,waterpolicyintheNilebasinneedstobecraftedinaway

thatcanflexiblyadapt,asmoreinformationaboutfutureclimatebecomesavailable.

WaterStrategiesintheEasternNileCountries

Thestrategiesguidingplanningandmanagementofwaterresourcesfollowedby

Egypt,Sudan,andEthiopia,allseemtosufferfromsignificantdeficienciesandmay

notreflectrealnationalinterests.Letusbrieflyunpackthisstatement,anddiscussit

foreachofthethreecountries.

TheEgyptianstrategytowardstheNilewater,thoughnotarticulatedpublicly,seem

tomostobserversasoneofpreservingthestatusquo.Undercurrentconditions,

EgyptisutilizingthelionshareoftheNileriverflowvolume,SeeFigure6.Hence,it

wouldbetemptingforEgypttopreservecurrentconditionsandcontinuetoenjoya

disproportionallylargeshareintheNilewater.Asexplainedbelow,suchastrategy

isindeedshortsighted,andwouldnotservethenationalinterestsofEgyptinthe

long-term.

Egyptislocatedatthemouthoftheriver,andisrelativelythemostgeographically

disadvantagedintheNilebasin.Byvirtueofitslocationrelativetothetwoother

countries,EgyptreceiveswaterthatalreadypassedthroughEthiopiaandSudan,

andhenceEgypt’swatershareisinherentlyvulnerabletoregulationbyeitherofthe

twocountries.

14

Figure6:Inter-annualfluctuationsintheflowoftheNileriveratAswan(Eltahir,1996)

15

ThisfactexplainsthedesireinEgyptthroughhistorytoreachbindingagreements

tosecureitsshareintheNilewater,aswasthecaseinthe1929agreementbetween

UnitedKingdomandEgypt,andthe1959agreementbetweenSudanandEgypt.

SinceEthiopiadoesnotrecognizetheseagreements,thenationalinterestofEgypt

seemstolieinastrategythatwouldseektoarriveatalegallybindingagreement

withEthiopia.

AsthepopulationinAfricakeepsincreasingatthecurrentfastpace,andthe

legitimateaspirationsfordevelopmentofAfricancountriesareincreasingly

recognizedworldwide,suchanagreementincludingEthiopiaforthefirsttimeneeds

tobereachedassoonaspossibleinordertosecureEgypt’sshareoftheNilewater.

TimeisnotonEgypt’sside,sincewhathasbeenachievedin1959maynotbe

feasibletodayandwhatmaybeachievedtodayisnotlikelytobefeasibleadecade

fromnow.Interestingly,suchconsiderationforurgencyrunsdiametricallyopposite

totheapparentlyadoptedstrategybyEgypt:preservingthestatusquo!

TheEthiopianwaterstrategyimplicitlyrevealedthroughthespecificinvestment

plansannouncedinthelastdecadeorsoemphasizesdevelopmentofthe

hydropowerpotentialofthecountrybyconstructingaseriesofdamsontherivers

originatinginEthiopia.Giventhelargedischargeintheserivers,andthediverse

topographyofEthiopia,hydropowerdevelopmentisanaturalchoice.Thepurpose

ofthesedamsisgenerationofelectricity,mostlyforexporttosurrounding

countries.Suchastrategymakeseconomicalsense,sinceEthiopianeedstosecure

16

significantinfluxofhardcurrencyintothecountry,aninfluxthatcannotbeachieved

otherwiseduetotheapparentlackofsignificantoilandmineralresources.

However,forsuchstrategytosucceedtherehavetobeviablecustomerswhoare

capableandwillingtopayforEthiopianelectricity.EgyptenjoysaGDPpercapita

thatisroughlydoublethecorrespondingGDPforSudan,andfourtimesthatof

Ethiopia.Hence,Egyptseemstobetheidealcandidateasacustomerforthe

Ethiopianelectricity.Significantanalysisandstudieshavebeencarried,sponsored

bytheNileBasinInitiative,whichconfirmtheeconomicfeasibilityoftransmitting

electricityfromEthiopiatoEgypt.

WheretheEthiopianwaterstrategyisdeficientisinthepoor“business”approach

takenbyEthiopiainexecutingtheplanforitshydropowerdevelopment.The

Ethiopianapproachseemstoalienateratherthancultivateagoodbusiness

relationshipwiththemainpotentialcustomer,whosecriticalroleisneededforthe

successofEthiopia’sbusinessplanforhydropowerdevelopment.Forexample,the

developmentandsuddenannouncementofGERDplanswascarriedoutwithout

priorconsultationwiththeregionalpartnersincludingEgypt.Astheconstructionof

theGERDprogresses,andthedateforfinallyproducingtheelectricitygetscloser,

thecriticalroleofEgyptasthemaincustomeroftheproducedelectricitywill

becomemoreandmoreevident.

Finally,Sudan’slocationbetweenEthiopiaandEgyptisamorecomplex

geographicalposition,andwouldnecessarilydictateawaterstrategythatismore

17

complexthantheothertwocountries.Inotherwords,astrategicpositionwhere

SudaneseinterestsarepresentedasperfectlyalignedwiththoseofEgypt,or

perfectlyalignedwiththoseofEthiopia,isnotconsistentwiththefactsof

geography.

Insomerespects,theinterestsofSudanalignwiththoseofEgypt.Giventhelarge

potentialofarablelandthathasnotbeendevelopedyet,Sudanhasaninterestin

makingsurethatinfrastructuredevelopmentinEthiopiaiscarriedoutinwaysthat

arestructurallysafe,anddonotsignificantlyimpacttheflowamountandsediment

regimedownstream.ThisisespeciallytruegiventhefactthatSudandidnotyet

utilizeitsfullshareoftheNilewateraccordingtothe1959agreement.Asthat

importantthresholdisapproachedinthecomingyears,Sudaneseworriesabout

watersecurityshouldcomeclosertothesurface,aligningsomeoftheinterestsof

SudanclosertothoseofEgypt.

Ontheotherhand,SudanandEthiopiasharelegitimateaspirationsforachieving

realeconomicdevelopment.BothcountriesarelocatedupstreamfromEgypt,thus

enjoytheadvantageofbeingabletoregulatethewaterflow,andaresignificantly

poorereconomicallybycomparison.UpstreamwaterregulationinEthiopiacan

potentiallyimproveefficiencyofelectricityproductionfromhydropower,and

enhancethepotentialforirrigationdevelopmentinSudan.Thesefactorstaken

togetherwouldtendtoaligntheinterestsofSudanclosertothoseofEthiopia,

especiallyinthecallforEgypttoconsidertheneedsforequitableutilizationofthe

18

Nilewatermoreseriouslyandtoofferseriousconcessionstotheupstream

countries.

Contrarytothiscomplexpicture,thewaterstrategyforSudaninthelastfew

decadestendstooscillatebetweenbeingfullyalignedwithEgyptianpositionsand

beingfullyalignedwithEthiopianpositions.Whatwouldbeinthenationalinterest

ofSudanisa“triangulation”strategythatwouldalwaysidentifyandmaintaina

distinctsetofcommoninterestswithbothEgyptandEthiopia,formingauniqueset

ofnationalinterestsforSudanintheNilewater.

ANewVisionForTheWayForward

Here,IofferadeeperdiagnosisoftheapparentconflictontheNilewater.Whatis

oftenseenatthesurfaceasawaterproblemanddiscussedinthecontextofsharing

acommonresourceisinessenceareflection,orasymptom,ofadeeperproblem:

theAfrican“fertility”challengethathasbeendescribedabove.

Inmovingforward,andinordertoeffectivelyaddresstheconflictontheNilewater,

thekeyisnottofocusonhowwefillareservoirbehindadamhereorthere,but

insteadtoaddresstherootcauseoftheproblembyreversingthefertilitysituation:

findwaystodecreasewomen’fertilityrate,andenhancethesoilfertilityintheNile

basin.Hence,inanyfutureagreementsordeclarationabouttheNilewater,the

priorityshouldbegiventohowandwhentotaketheappropriatemeasuresto

addressthehumanpopulationandsoilproductivityproblems.

19

Educationisprobablythebestapproachtoaddressthepopulationprobleminthe

long-term.Inparticular,agoalofeducatingallAfricangirlsuntilthesecondary

schoollevelshouldbeadoptedintheNilebasinandbeyond,SeeFigure7.Educated

womenwouldpredictablychoosetohavefewerchildren.Educationofthegeneral

publicaboutthepopulationchallengethroughtheofficialchannelsofschoolsand

mediaaswellastraditionalchannelsandreligioninstitutionssuitableforthe

Africancontextislikelytobeeffectiveinaddressingthecriticalchallengeof

populationinthelongterm.AfewAfricancountriesinthenorthandthesouthhave

beensuccessfulincontrollingtheirpopulationproblems.Lessonsandsuccessful

approachesidentifiedinthesecountriescanbetriedelsewhereinthediverse

countriesoftheAfricancontinent.

MyproposaltofocusonagriculturaltechnologygoesbeyondtheNilebasinandto

thewholecontinentofAfrica.Iproposethatadoptionoftechnologiesthatimprove

agriculturalproductivityinAfricawillresultinsignificantdesirableoutcomesalong

fourdimensions:

A. Accelerateeconomicdevelopment,andachievefoodsecurity;

B. Reducetheintensityofemergingconflictsoverwaterbetween

differentcountries,suchastheoneintheNilebasin;

20

Figure7:Womenfertilityrateversuspercentofgirlsenrolledinsecondary

school,fordifferentcountries(EarthPolicyInstitute(2015))

21

C. Resolveapparentconflictoverlandbetweenneedsforhorizontal

agriculturalexpansionandneedsforenvironmentalconservation;

and,

D. EnhancecapacityofAfricansocietiestodealwiththechallengesof

climatechange

AnegotiatedagreementonsharingthewaterresourcesoftheBlueNilebetween

Sudan,Egypt,andEthiopiaseemsnecessaryandurgentinordertoensuresecurity

andstabilityintheEasternNilebasin.Asarguedabove,Egyptneedstoreachan

agreementassoonaspossibleinordertosecureitsshareoftheNilewaterfor

futuregenerations.Similarly,EthiopianeedstorecognizethecriticalroleofEgyptas

themainpotentialcustomeroftheelectricityproducedintheBlueNile,and

cultivateabetter“business”-likerelationship.Hence,findinganegotiatedresolution

oftheapparentconflictontheNilewater,inthenearfuture,maynotbeas

antitheticaltothegenuineinterestsoftheEasternNilecountries,asitmayseemat

thesurface.

IfEthiopia,Sudan,andEgyptwereregionsofthesameunitedcountry,national

plannerswouldbewisetorecommendanationalstrategyofutilizingthepotential

forrain-fedagricultureintheEthiopianregion,usemostoftheriverflowfor

irrigatedagricultureintheSudaneseandEgyptianregions,aswellasextensive

developmentofthehydropowerpotentialintheEthiopianandSudaneseregionsto

generateelectricitythatcanbetransmittedandsoldinthedownstreamregions.

22

However,thenationalgovernmentunderthishypotheticalsituationwouldalsosee

urgencyinintegratingthemarketsacrosstheregionsofthiscountrysothatsomeof

thewealthgeneratedintherelativelyricherdownstreamregionsisinvested

upstreamtohelpindevelopingtheEthiopianregion,eliminatinganysignificant

gradientinstandardsofliving.Thissimplethoughtexperimentshouldinformany

futureframeworkthatmaybecraftedforanegotiatedresolutionoftheconflictin

theNilebasin.

Here,Iproposefiveelementsthatarenecessarytoincludeinordertostrikea

balance,andachieveasustainableagreementbetweenEthiopia,Egypt,andSudan:

1. Thefirstpriorityistoreachanagreementbetweenthethreecountrieson

curtailingtherateofpopulationgrowth!Atargetpopulationgrowthrateof

about1%ineachofthethreecountries,reachedwithinaperiodofabout10

yearsseemsfeasibleandsufficienttobringthepopulation“crisis”under

control,beforefurthermorestringentmeasuresaretaken.

2. Acommitmentfromthethreecountriestoinvestinnewagricultural

technologiessuchasbetterseeds,moreuseoffertilizers,andefficientwater

usetechnologyincludingmoreefficientuseofwaterinirrigationis

necessary.Allinternationalpartnerswithinterestinthestabilityofthis

regionshouldtryandhelpbringaboutasignificantlevelofadoptionof

agriculturaltechnologyinordertoenhancedevelopmentandeconomic

growth,whilereducingtheintensityofconflictoverwater.

23

3. GiventhenaturaltopographyofEthiopiaandtheassociatedhydropower

potential,EgyptandSudanshouldwelcomeandsupporttheEthiopianplan

fordevelopingitshydropowerpotential.Hydropowerconversionisanon-

consumptiveuseofwater.Insteadofobstructingtheeffortsforbuildingthe

GERD,thetwodownstreamcountriesandespeciallyEgyptshouldcommitto

playingtheroleofareliablecustomerforEthiopianelectricity,soldatfair

marketprice.ThisshouldinsureasustainedfluxofhardcurrencyfromEgypt

toEthiopia,whichwouldfinancebadlyneededdevelopmentplansandhelp

tosustaintheEthiopianeconomy.

4. GiventhenaturaldisparityinthedistributionofrainfallbetweenEthiopia

andEgypt,Ethiopiashouldconcentrateonrain-fedagricultureinsteadof

irrigatedagriculture,andshouldcommittosecuringasustainableannual

fluxofwaterdownstream,closetothecurrentrateofflowintoSudan,tobe

dividedinaseparateagreementbetweenSudanandEgypt.

5. ThecountriesoftheEasternNileBasinshoulddevelopacommonregional

approachtoincorporatethefutureimpactsofclimatechangeonrainfalland

riverflowinanynegotiatedagreement.Climatechangewillmodifythe

hydrologyoftheNile,offeringnewopportunitiesandpresentingnew

challengesthatcanonlybeaddressedthroughcooperationbetweenthe

threecountries.

24

Acknowledgement

Figures2,3,4,and7wereproducedbyDrMariamAllam.Herhelpisacknowledgedandappreciated.

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