Nicaragua’s Grand Canal: A Case Study in Political and ...

Global Advances in Business Communication

Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 5

2016

Nicaragua’s Grand Canal: A Case Study in Politicaland Economic CultureMichael S. DoyleUniversity of North Carolina at Charlotte, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.emich.edu/gabcPrior to Vol.4 iss.1, this journal was published under the title Global Advances in BusinessCommunication.

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Recommended CitationDoyle, Michael S. (2016) "Nicaragua’s Grand Canal: A Case Study in Political and Economic Culture," Global Advances in Business andCommunications Conference & Journal: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 5.Available at: http://commons.emich.edu/gabc/vol5/iss1/5

Nicaragua’s Grand Canal: A Case Study in Political and Economic Culture

Cover Page FootnoteThe primary research for this case study article, conducted in Nicaragua from 2/26/15 to 3/7/15, was fundedby the Department of Languages and Culture Studies at UNC Charlotte. For their hospitality and assistanceduring my research visit, I am particularly grateful to Mr. David A. Beam, Consul General, U.S. EmbassyManagua, and his Embassy colleagues Karen Schneegans, Press Section / Public Diplomacy, and Felix E.Cisneros, Senior Information Specialist, Public Affairs Section.

This article is available in Global Advances in Business Communication: http://commons.emich.edu/gabc/vol5/iss1/5

INTRODUCTION: A MULTIFACETED PEDAGOGICAL CASE STUDY

The proposed Nicaraguan Grand Canal mega-project—whether promised land or

pipe dream—serves as the basis for the following short case study in political and

economic culture, with interested regional and global stakeholders. It can be

useful for multiple fields such as business, policy, foreign affairs, public relations,

logistics, tourism, intercultural communication studies, business communications,

and the emerging field of language for specific purposes (LSP). Regarding the

latter, it can be applied via translation as a language and culture learning tool for

pedagogical objectives such as business Spanish or business Chinese. This short

case study is neither a research nor a theoretical contribution per se, rather it is

intended to serve as a theory-based pedagogical piece for developing critical

thinking, problem-solving, and presentational skills, illustrative of the didactic

genre, in a way that is applicable to multiple fields. Following the short case study

and its pedagogical prompts, concluding observations will refocus briefly on case

studies such as this as an effective pedagogical methodology in the expanding

field of LSP studies that is seldom given due consideration.

CASE STUDY: THE NICARAGUAN GRAND CANAL

The June 13, 2013 Sandinista government’s ratification of Nicaragua’s 173-mile

mega-project designs for an interoceanic Grand Canal, to stretch from Punta

Gorda on the Caribbean coast to Brito on the Pacific, by way of Lake Cocibolca

(an indigenous name meaning “sweet” [freshwater] sea), has been painted as both

promised land and pipe dream (Agurcia Rivas, Alaniz E., Alaniz L., Anderson,

Cardenal, Duarte Pérez, et al.). Canal construction rights have been granted to

HKND Group (the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment

Company), backed by the mysterious Chinese billionaire Wang Jing, dubbed “el

loco del Canal” [the Crazy Man of the Canal] (Villa), reminiscent of the great

skepticism once faced by Ferdinand de Lesseps when the iconic French engineer,

builder of the Suez Canal, undertook the construction of the Panama Canal in

1880. In the Panama Canal project, the U.S. and France were the competing

geopolitical stakeholders. Now, in Nicaragua, it is primarily the geo-strategic

interests of the U.S. and China. Supporters of the Nicaraguan Grand Canal,

largely the Sandinista government and its staunch supporters, troll the lure of

benefits such as the construction of two modern seaports and the income-

generating transit of gigantic Post-Panamax ships between them, an international

airport, a free trade zone, new cement and steel factories, resort development for

upscale tourism, and the creation of some 58,000 jobs by 2030 (Enríquez, Kraul).

Opponents from many quarters have protested the lack of transparency in the

proceedings, the absence of compelling feasibility studies and cost-benefit

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analyses, the ecological risks to the largest freshwater lake in Central America

(and to its fisheries, flora and fauna—Kraul reports that “scientists and

conservationists are warning that the project is an environmental disaster in the

making”), the expropriation of some 7,000 farms, and the forced relocation of

many ancestral residents, the prospect of which has led to violent demonstrations

in several affected communities (Enríquez, Shaer).

The Nicaraguan Ley del Canal Interoceánico (Interoceanic Canal Law)

has authorized HKND to appropriate whatever land it may deem necessary for

purposes of the project. Poet, former Minister of Culture (1979-1987), and

Catholic priest Ernesto Cardenal, an iconic leader of the Sandinista Revolution,

has come out forcefully against the Sandinista government’s backing and

blessings for the Canal, predicting that it will go down as one of the greatest

boondoggles in the country’s history (Cardenal). Opinions regarding the

possibility of the Canal often vary within the same family: hard skepticism, with a

prediction by one executive-level brother that the odds of ever building the canal

are at most 10%, while another executive-level brother leans on the hope that it

could have “una repercusión positiva” [a positive repercussion] if given the

chance: “no podemos oponernos a, o atacar, un proyecto solo porque no nos guste

la ley” [we can’t oppose or attack a project just because we don’t like the law].1

Enrique Alaniz Castillo, Director of Research at FIDEG, the Nicaraguan NGO

Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global, considers that the

success, and perhaps even the mere proposal, of a project such as the Grand Canal

works toward a positive rebranding of Nicaragua, which the world too often

continues to typecast in terms of the civil war and violence of the 1970s and

1980s.

Shrouded in “secretismo” [secrecy] and “permisología” [“permitology,”

the “art” of securing official permits], the Canal Law covers Wang Jing and

HKND with a stipulation of total confidentiality regarding construction matters.

There is no clear view to process or accountability. Rural protesters, one of whom

declared ominously—when considered in the context of the need for positive

rebranding referenced by E. Alaniz—that “estamos en guerra [we are at war]”

against the Canal and the government that supports it,2 have gone so far as to label

president Daniel Ortega as a “vendepatria,” a traitor and sellout of the homeland:

1 Author interviews on Nicaragua’s current economic conditions, concerns, and opportunities with

Enrique Alaniz Castillo of FIDEG (http://www.fideg.org/quienes-somos), on March 5, 2015, and

with his brother Luis Alberto Alaniz Castillo, Main Economist on Economic Issues, at FUNIDES,

the Fundación Nicaragüense para el Desarrollo Económico y Social, “an independent think tank

specializing in research and analysis of policies in the areas of socioeconomic development and

institutional reform,” on March 6, 2015 (http://funides.com/quienes-somos/?lang=en and

http://funides.com/nuestro-equipo/?lang=en). 2 Author interview with a long-term Nicaraguan resident of Ometepe Island who was wary and

wanted to remain anonymous.

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“¡Ortega vendepatria, le vendiste nuestras propiedades a los chinos!” [Ortega, you

traitor, you sold our lands to the Chinese], and “¡Fuera, Ortega! ¡Fuera

vendepatria!” [Out with Ortega, out with the traitor!].3 This notion of a

presidential sellout plays also on linguistic and cultural fears that have been

widely reported, such as: “Under the banners ‘Our land is not for sale!’ and

‘Chinaman, go home!’ Nicaraguan farmers and cowboys vowed to defend their

properties from government expropriation and Chinese encroachment” (Rogers

and Miranda 1), also documented by Enríquez under the popular slogan of “¿Qué

quieren los campesinos? ¡Que se vayan los chinos!” [What do the farmers want?

For the Chinese to go away!]. Even farmers who are members of the Frente

Sandinista political party have felt betrayed by president Ortega: “Nos traicionó.

Tracionó nuestro voto. Vendió las tierras y nos vendió a nosotros como a unos

animales. No tenemos para dónde ir. Nos está vendiendo como esclavos” [He

betrayed us. He betrayed our vote (for him). He sold our lands and sold us like we

were animals. We have nowhere to go. He is selling us like slaves.] (Enríquez 43).

Language itself plays a role in stoking resentment and resistance against

the Canal, as “Chinese surveyors, with the muscle of heavily armed Nicaraguan

soldiers and police, have been fussing about the countryside taking unwelcomed

measurements of people’s properties and homes, then chattering amongst

themselves in a foreign tongue” (Rogers and Miranda 3). A complaint has been

that “the nosy foreigners don’t speak Spanish and don’t explain themselves”

(Rogers and Miranda 4).4 Not being able to understand the language of those who

are busily laying the groundwork for their planned relocation compounds for

many Nicaraguans the apprehensions brought on already by the lack of

transparency in the governmental proceedings. A lack of interlingual

understanding is heaped upon a lack of political and economic clarity. The official

spokesperson for the Nicaragua Grand Canal project, Telémaco Talavera, has

countered that “in principle the Canal belongs to Nicaragua, not to the Chinese, in

spite of the fact that it is being built by foreign investment, the Canal will be

safeguarded by the Police and the Army because it belongs to the Nicaraguans”

(Duarte Pérez).5 However, the police and the army are in an odd position of being

enforcers for Chinese interests that many Nicaraguans perceive as not being in

3 Flyers seen and photographed by author posted on telephone poles in neighborhoods and

roadways in and around Managua. See also Enríquez, pp. 7, 38 and 43, e.g.: “en la

manifestaciones populares contra HKND ahora enarbolan pancartas en las que llaman

“vendepatria” a Ortega” [in popular protests against HKND banners are waved calling Ortega a

traitor and sellout of the homeland]. 4 One can assume similar language barriers and resentment toward the French and English

languages when France and the United States were busy building the Panama Canal. 5 Author translation of “en principio el Canal es de Nicaragua, no es de los chinos, pese a que se

está haciendo con una inversión extranjera, el Canal estará resguardado por la Policía y por el

Ejército porque es de los nicaragüenses.”

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their own best interest, while simultaneously defending Nicaraguan sovereignty

even as they move in to relocate many ancestral residents against their will.

Equally odd is the prospect of having a Chinese-funded and Chinese-built canal

defended by the Nicaraguan police and army in a country notorious for

expropriation.

The possibility of a lucrative transoceanic canal through Nicaragua has a

very long history: “The place most nineteenth-century North Americans expected

to see the canal built, including the President [Grant] was Nicaragua (…) through

Lake Nicaragua” (McCullough 28). Long before the French and Americans chose

the current Panama Canal site, Nicaragua and the San Juan River ranked at or

near the top of five possible locations for a trans-isthmus project: one across

southern Mexico, one across Nicaragua, and three across what is today Panama,

which had not yet become an independent nation from Gran Colombia

(McCullough, 28 and 131). Dating as far back as 1529, Pedrarias (Pedro Arias de

Ávila, governor of Castilla del Oro, the name of the Central American Isthmus at

the time) and the engineer Juan Bautista Antonelli were responding to orders from

Charles V and then Philip II of Spain to plan a canal through Nicaragua that

would link the Atlantic Ocean with the South Sea (the Pacific Ocean).6 Indeed,

Eric Farnsworth, current vice president at the Americas Society and Council of

the Americas, has reminded us recently that “There have been over 70 attempts to

build a canal in Nicaragua, but it hasn't happened” (Ordóñez 2/15/15).

If constructed, the Nicaragua Grand Canal, which broke ground on

December 22, 2015 with “the start of an access road to let through heavy

equipment” (Ordóñez), and which is scheduled for a completion within an

astounding five-year time frame, will become a game-changer in terms of the

6 Author’s visit to the Plaza de Francia in Panama City, Panama, “dedicated to the French effort to

build the Panama Canal and the thousands of people from around the world who died during the

process” (http://cascoviejo.com/plaza-francia/). The “dozen marble plaques provide [chiseled in

print] details of the labor of construction the Canal,” the first of which memorializes the earliest

involvement by Spain transcribed by author):

La idea de encontrar o de crear artificialmente una vía que, abriendo por su

centro el continente Americano, acortase el paso a las Indias Orientales, surgió desde el

descubrimiento del Nuevo Mundo por Colón.

Ya en 1529 Álvaro de Saavedra, cumpliendo órdenes concretas de Carlos V,

levantaba los primeros planos de un canal por Panamá, mientras Pedraria y Antonelli

hacían lo propio para otro por Nicaragua.

[Author translation: The idea of finding or artificially creating a path that, by cutting

across the middle of the American continent, would shorten the passage to the East

Indies, first appeared with the discovery of the New World by Columbus. Already in

1529 Álvaro de Saavedra, under specific orders from Charles V, was drawing up the first

plans for a Canal through Panama, while Pedraria y Antonelli were doing the same

through Nicaragua.]

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greater volume and lower cost of goods being shipped from East Asia to

importers and markets in the United States (Ordóñez, see CNBC video). The

Nicaragua project will be “three times as long and almost twice as deep as its rival

in Panama” (Watts). Talavera has predicted a demand for the largest possible

maritime vessels, giant container ships that even the recently expanded Panama

Canal, which on June 26, 2016 opened its new locks to massive neo-Panamax

vessel commercial transit, will be unequipped to handle: “There will be a need for

world shippers to reduce time, costs and pollution, and that will be an opportunity

for Nicaragua and the rest of the region” (Ordóñez). On the other hand, Jean-Paul

Rodrigue, a transportation expert at Hofstra University, expresses his reservation

that “[M]ost ports in the United States won't be able to accommodate the larger

ships [dubbed “floating behemoths” by Serrano] that the Nicaragua canal is

hoping to target (…) it would require a hugely expensive investment for U.S.

ports to gear up for those types of ships” (Ordóñez). Yet, in response to the 2016

expansion of the Panama Canal, American ports such as Charleston, SC and

Savannah, GA had already been engaged in deepening their waters in order to

accommodate Super Post-Panamax Megaships, which are “up to 235 feet longer

and 54 feet wider than the current Panamax class” (AIT), so it stands to reason

that similar capacity enhancement would accompany the construction of the

Nicaraguan Grand Canal.

President Daniel Ortega, his staunch Sandinista government, and

supporters of the Grand Canal market it domestically as a promised land for

economic prosperity which not only “would give the Nicaraguan people some

measure of subsistence and development”7 but more optimistically “revolutionize

Nicaragua and convert the country into the third-fastest growing economy in the

world over the next five years” (from 2014-2018). Indeed, government

projections have boasted that the Canal “will lift precisely 403,583 Nicaraguans

out of poverty by 2018, and an additional 353,935 people will be pulled from the

grasps of extreme poverty” (Rogers and Miranda). Francisco López, vice

chancellor at the Universidad Central de Nicaragua, echoes this great hope that

the Grand Canal “will be a development process that will help us get rid of our

main enemy—poverty” (Ordónez). On the other hand, Ernesto Cardenal has

challenged such optimism with his ominous statement that “The Nicaraguan State

will not receive a single centavo in taxes for any of the projects” and that with its

construction, “Lake Nicaragua, which for us is a blessing from God, will become

a curse” (Cardenal). Intertwined tightly around such competing rhetoric are the

wary political adversaries, the Sandinista government of Daniel Ortega and its

opposition, who push for and against a Grand Canal in Nicaragua.

7 Authors translation of “que le daría al pueblo nicaragüense un mínimo de subsistencia y

desarrollo.”

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COMPREHENSION, CRITICAL-THINKING, AND PROBLEM-SOLVING PROMPTS

1. Why is Nicaragua’s Grand Canal presented as either a promised land or a

pipedream?

2. Is the proposed Grand Canal the first time Nicaragua has been considered for

such a transoceanic site? Explain briefly.

3. Why is the Nicaragua Grand Canal referred to as a mega-project?

o How does it compare to the scope of the Panama Canal with which it

would compete?

4. Where does the financial backing for the proposed Nicaragua Grand Canal

come from?

o What is the HKND Group?

o Who is Wang Jing?

5. What geopolitical interests are involved in the Nicaragua Grand Canal

project?

6. How does Nicaragua’s political structure facilitate the financing and possible

construction of the Grand Canal?

o Does the secrecy surrounding the Grand Canal help or hurt

national/international relations? How so?

7. What major benefits do the supporters of building the Grand Canal trumpet?

8. What are five major objections of opponents to the Grand Canal?

9. Who is Ernesto Cardenal and what does he think about the Grand Canal

project?

o Why should what he thinks matter?

10. When exactly did the Sandinista Revolution occur? What were its causes and

outcomes?

o What are some key elements that would go into a country’s rebranding

efforts after a long and bloody civil war?

11. What has the president of Nicaragua been labeled as by some opponents, and

why?

12. What role has language played in the Nicaragua Grand Canal controversy?

o Might it have played a similar role in the building of the Panama

Canal, where French and then English rubbed up against the Spanish

spoken in Panama? Explain.

13. What odd position do the Nicaraguan police and army find themselves in

regarding many ancestral residents?

14. What kind of game-changer does the Grand Canal have the possibility of

becoming?

o What kind of ships would it accommodate? What are some advantages

and disadvantages of these ships?

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15. Do you think Nicaragua’s Grand Canal is a promised land or a pipedream?

Explain.

ROLE-PLAY, PRESENTATIONAL, AND CRITICAL-THINKING SCENARIOS

1. In pairs or small groups: As policy makers in the Nicaraguan government,

devise a strategy campaign to persuade the citizens of Nicaragua that the

Grand Canal will be beneficial for the nation. (Consider reasons such as its

potential to reduce or eliminate poverty in the nation, the jobs it could bring to

Nicaraguans, the infrastructure and tourism development that it could spur,

etc.)

2. In pairs or small groups: As Nicaraguan opponents of the Grand Canal,

explain your opposition and persuade others to join you. (Consider reasons

such as the loss of ancestral lands that have belonged to families for

generations; the fear of ecological disasters that the Canal could cause in

terms of drinkable water, fisheries, flora, fauna, etc.)

3. In small or large groups: Enact #1 and #2 above, the two sides arguing their

points of view in a public forum.

4. In pairs or small groups: You are possible investors (from Nicaragua or from

abroad, the U.S., China, elsewhere) in the Nicaragua Grand Canal, and you

are discussing the risks and benefits of investing.

5. In pairs or small groups: You are policy makers in the United States and are

apprehensive about China’s construction and possible control over the

proposed Nicaragua Grand Canal, so near to the United States, which could

have serious geopolitical ramifications in the region (e.g., the passage of

Chinese warships?) and beyond. Others disagree with your concerns.

6. In pairs or small groups: You are policy makers in China and would like to

see China increase its brand and impact in the region via the Nicaragua Grand

Canal. Others disagree because they think it could lead to political and

economic problems with the U.S.

7. In pairs or small groups: You are policy makers in Nicaragua who want the

nation to assume a more important leadership role in Central America and in

regional, hemispheric, and global trade. Discuss how the Nicaragua Grand

Canal will accomplish this.

o As part of your discussion, include general rebranding efforts for

Nicaragua.

8. In pairs or small groups: You and fellow Nicaraguans discuss possible

employment opportunities related to the construction, operation, and

maintenance of the Grand Canal, as well as other job opportunities that you

think will come (e.g., at the international airport, the new free trade zone, new

cement and steel factories, resorts for upscale tourism, etc.).

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ADDITIONAL CRITICAL-THINKING, PROBLEM-SOLVING, AND PRESENTATIONAL

ACTIVITIES (INDIVIDUAL, PAIRED, OR IN SMALL GROUPS)

Prepare and present an executive summary of the pros and cons of the

Nicaragua Grand Canal

Prepare and present a policy paper on the Grand Canal

Write a research paper on an aspect of the proposed Grand Canal

Prepare and present a cost-benefit analysis and feasibility study for the

proposed Grand Canal

Prepare and present a short video either for or against the Grand Canal

Design and present competing Web pages for and against the Grand Canal

Conduct an interview with Nicaraguans regarding the proposed Grand Canal

Translate the case study into Spanish, Chinese, and perhaps other languages,

since it represents an international issue

o Work with a translation team, which will need a project manager, to

produce this document

Provide song lyrics in Spanish in favor of the Grand Canal, and substitute

them for the lyrics against it in “Nicaragua no quiero el canal” [see Works

Cited]

o Translate into English or Chinese, etc., the song lyrics of “Nicaragua

no quiero el canal.”

CONCLUSION: LSP THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THIS SHORT CASE STUDY

The story of the proposed Nicaragua Grand Canal sets up the development

of critical thinking, problem-solving, and presentational skills that characterize

the case study as a didactic genre. When considered as an LSP business language

learning tool, or when considered as issuing from LSP theory, this short case

study belongs to both the provisional or partial category of intrinsic theory of

Business Language Studies (BLS) and to the extrinsic or applied theory area.

Following Doyle’s modeling for Business Language Studies theory (2012a,

2012b, 2013), within the provisional or partial domain subset for intrinsic or pure

theory, this case study is medium-restricted in that the development of critical

thinking, problem-solving, and presentational skills is achieved by humans

(author and students) using technology, both in conjunction. It is area-restricted

in that it is delimited by the language[s] and culture[s] involved, primarily but not

limited to the Spanish dialects and cultures of Nicaragua, the setting of the case

study that continues to unfold. It is variously rank-restricted in that the semiotic

units of business language analysis and performance range from word, sentence,

paragraph, text, image, logo (e.g., street banners protesting against the Canal),

sound, company [micro, small, medium, large], industry, sector of the economy,

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national economy, to regional and global economy. It is discourse type-restricted

in that the main genres dealt with are the case study per se and related articles,

reports, interviews, videos, songs, etc. It is time-restricted in terms of the modern

languages used in 2014-2016 to refer to the proposed Nicaragua Grand Canal,

particularly English, Spanish, and Chinese, but also dating as far back as the

Spanish used during the time of Charles V and then Philip II of Spain.

Furthermore, reporting on this story-in-progress can be found in many world

languages. And it is problem-restricted in that the development of critical

thinking and problem-solving skills originates from and focuses on a

consideration of Nicaragua’s Grand Canal in terms of being a promised land or

pipedream (or perhaps a mixed blessing) as presented in a pedagogical case study

in political and economic culture.

As a language learning tool, this subgenre of the pedagogically motivated

case study falls within the applied theory branch of BLS, and per se belongs not

only to the methods and methodology concerns within pedagogy, but also to the

areas of course and curriculum development (i.e., business language courses that

incorporate some form of the case study genre), learner outcomes, and faculty

training (directly or indirectly). Within the tripartite theoretical model for a

business language (BL) course (Doyle 2012a, 2012b, 2013), a short case study

may combine all of the areas—business content, regional/area studies (e.g., a

region- or country-specific setting such as Nicaragua) or cultural context—or it

may emphasize any one of these three fundamental features to varying degrees.

This can be illustrated in an adaptation of the Variable Matrix for Tripartite

Business Language Course Coverage (Doyle, 2012a, 113) to a short case study, as

indicated in Table 1:

Table 1. Variable Matrix for Tripartite Business Language Case Study

COMPONENT DEGREE (%) OF EMPHASIS IN A BL CASE STUDY

Business Content 100 0 0 75 12.5 12.5 50 25 25 33 Other

Cultural Context 0 100 0 12.5 75 12.5 25 50 25 33 Other

Geographic Context (area or region)

0 0 100 12.5 12.5 75 25 25 50 33 Other

As indicated in Table 1, a case study such as the Nicaragua Grand Canal can

easily be designed to develop critical thinking, problem-solving, and

presentational skills predominantly, or even exclusively, in terms of its:

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1. business aspects: e.g., feasibility studies and cost-benefit

analyses, investment, construction, logistics, public relations,

marketing, administration,8 etc.

2. regional/area studies aspects: e.g., how the proposed Grand

Canal relates exclusively to Nicaragua, or to Nicaragua and

Central America, or to Nicaragua and Panama, where a

recently expanded trans-isthmus canal already exists; or to

Nicaragua, China, and the U.S., etc.

3. cultural aspects: e.g., the struggle internal to Nicaragua

between supporters and opponents of the project, ancestral

rights of land ownership versus governmental eminent domain,

nationalistic push-back to what a great many Nicaraguans

perceive as a foreign intrusion or even an invasion by China,

etc.

From the theoretical perspective of a provisional definitional model—that

a BL case study is a didactic subgenre adapted from the multifaceted business

case study with methods and methodology that seek to develop critical thinking,

problem-solving, and presentational skills while simultaneously developing

language and cultural proficiency—the Nicaragua Grand Canal example uses a

variety of prompts and role-play scenarios in order to begin achieving the

definitional outcomes. For the language proficiency aspect, one must imagine the

case study in another language such as Spanish or Chinese.

Regardless of whether or not Nicaragua’s Grand Canal turns out to be a

promised land or a pipedream, a blessing or a curse, the story that is unfolding

provides rich material for an illustrative example of a short case study in political

and economic culture. The example provided calls for an instructor to imagine

and create additional content-question and role-play prompts, as well as employ

other pedagogical methods, to develop critical thinking, problem-solving, and

presentational skills based on the Nicaragua Grand Canal, which could also

include LSP as a learner outcome.

WORKS CITED

Agurcia Rivas, Velia. (2015). “Gran Canal ‘traerá’ a 12,500 chinos.” El Nuevo

Diario. Retrieved January 8, 2015 from

http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/338727-gran-canal-traera-12-

500-chinos/. Online.

8 It would be informative to study the administration of the successful Panama Canal.

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AIT. “East Coast Ports Prepare for Megaships.” Retrieved July 6, 2016, from

http://www.aitworldwide.com/East-Coast-Ports-Prepare-for-Megaships.

Online.

Alaniz Castillo, Enrique. Personal interview. 5 March 2015.

Alaniz Castillo, Luis Alberto. Personal interview. 6 March 2015.

Anderson, Jon Lee. (2014). “The Comandante’s Canal.” The New Yorker.

Retrieved March 7, 2015, from

http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/10/the-comandantes-canal.

Online.

Cardenal, Ernesto. (2014). “The Canal Will Divide Nicaragua Like 2 Germanies,

2 Koreas.” The Nicaragua Dispatch. Retrieved November 12, 2014, from

http://nicaraguadispatch.com/2014/11/ernesto-cardenal-the-canal-will-

divide-nicaragua-like-2-germanies-2-koreas/. Online.

Doyle, Michael Scott. (2012a). “Business Language Studies in the United States:

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Doyle: Nicaragua’s Grand Canal

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