Found Sci (2013) 18:419448DOI 10.1007/s10699-011-9278-zNewtons
Neo-Platonic Ontology of SpaceEdward SlowikPublished online: 8 July
2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011Abstract
ThispaperinvestigatesNewtonsontologyofspaceinordertodetermineitscommitment,
if any, to both Cambridge neo-Platonism, which posits an
incorporeal basisfor space, and substantivalism, which regards
space as a form of substance or entity. A non-substantivalist
interpretation of Newtons theory has been famously championed by
HowardStein and Robert DiSalle, among others, while both Stein and
the early work of J. E. McGuirehave downplayed the inuence of
Cambridge neo-Platonism on various aspects of Newtonsown spatial
hypotheses. Both of these assertions will be shown to be
problematic on variousgrounds, with special emphasis placed on
Steins inuential case for a non-substantivalistreading. Our
analysis will strive, nonetheless, to reveal the unique or
forward-looking aspectsof Newtons approach, most notably, his
critical assessment of substance ontologies, that helpto
distinguish his theory of space from his neo-Platonic
contemporaries and predecessors.Keywords Newton Space Neo-Platonism
SubstantivalismAmidthescholarlydebatesurroundingNewtonsnaturalphilosophy,twoseeminglyele-mentaryaspectsofhistheoryofspacehavebeen,hitherto,seldomquestioned:rst,thatNewton
reckons space to be a form of independently existing substance or
entity, a thesisoften dubbed substantivalism; and second, that
Newtons view was deeply inuenced byhis seventeenth century
neo-Platonic predecessors, especially Henry More, whose
ontologyultimatelygroundstheexistenceofspaceuponanincorporealbeing,
i.e., GodorWorldSpirit. A number of important investigations have
begun to challenge even these ostensiblysafe assumptions concerning
Newtons philosophy, however. Among these notable reapprais-als is
the work of Stein (e.g., 1967, 2002) and DiSalle (e.g., 2002,
2006), who conclude thatthe content and function of Newtons concept
of absolute space should be kept
separatefromthequestionofNewtonscommitmenttosubstantivalism.
Stein(2002)furthercon-tends, more controversially, that Newton does
not sanction substantivalism apropos space. Arelated, albeit much
more nuanced, interpretation that parts fromthe traditional
substantivalistE. Slowik (B)Winona State University, Winona, MN,
USAe-mail: [email protected] 3420 E. Slowikreading may also be
evident in an inuential early article by McGuire (1978a), who
arguesthat space for Newton is the general condition required for
the existence of any individualsubstance (1978a, 15).1Turning to
the second of our traditional assumptions regard-ing Newtons
spatial theory, Stein (2002, 269) rejects any significant
neo-Platonic content;whereas McGuire had earlier conjectured that,
though Platonic in character, the primaryinuence on Newtons
ontology is Descartes Meditations, rather than the eclecticism
ofRenaissanceNeo-Platonism,
ofwhichwendlittleevidenceinDegravitatione(1983,152).2This essaywill
examinetheontologyof Newtons spatial theoryinorder todeter-mine the
adequacy of these non-substantivalist, anti-Platonist
interpretations. While Sect. 1will introduce the main
non-substantivalist strategies, Sects. 24 will be devoted toa
lengthy critical examination of the strongest formof
non-substantivalist interpreta-tion, in particular, the arguments
offered in Stein (2002) that drawupon Newtonsearly unpublished
tract, De gravitatione. As will be demonstrated, Newtons
spatialtheory is not only deeply imbued in neo-Platonic
speculation, contra the revisionisttrend, but
theseneo-Platonicelementslikewisecompromiseanystrongnon-substantiv-alist
interpretation. Throughout ourinvestigation, however,
thespecicdetailsandsub-tletiesofNewtonsparticularbrandofneo-Platonismwill
becontrastedwiththeontol-ogies of his contemporaries and
predecessors, and by this means a more adequategraspof the
innovations andforeword-lookingaspects of his theoryof space
canbeobtained.1Substantivalism is itself a complex subject, with
various explanations spotlighting different aspects of theconcept:
e.g., Sklar (1974, 161), whose famous contribution focuses more on
its status as an independentlyexisting entity, whereas Earman
(1989, 1214) places greater emphasis on the topology of spacetime
points. Adetailed exploration is beyond the bounds of this essay,
but we will largely side with Sklars approach, mainlydue to the
fact that spatial points/parts are not the central issue as to the
neo-Platonic basis of Newtons spatialontology. Indeed, as will be
demonstrated, the possible independent existence of space per se
(and not just itspoints/parts) is the key feature as regards
neo-Platonism. Moreover, since a substantivalist, or any other
theoryof space approaching substantivalism, must address the
question concerning howthe spatial points/parts relateto the whole
of space, this issue is not the best means of determining a
commitment to substantivalism
(sincethereisnoclearprecedent,aswillbearguedinthecaseofNewton).However,ifforcedtogiveaquicksynopsis,then,followingSklarsdefinition,Newtonsspaceisnotsubstantivalist,sincespacenecessarilydepends
on God; but it is substantivalist if independence only means
independent of matter. The essaywill also argue that, while strong
non-substantivalism fails (since Newtons space is deeply
metaphysical andtheological in orientation), weak substantivalism
is nonetheless a consistent interpretation (although difcultto
corroborate). See, also, footnotes 4, 8, 9.2The ensuing analysis
will attempt to demonstrate that Cambridge neo-Platonism and the
(quite similar)Gassendi-Charleton philosophy is the primary inuence
on Newtons ontology of space. McGuire comments,furthermore, on the
question of [the Cambridge neo-Platonist] Henry Mores inuence on
Newtons doctrineof extended space, concluding that it is minimal in
the period from 1664 to 1668 (1983, 152; where thefour year span,
16641668, covers the then accepted period for the composition of
Newtons major treatiseon the ontology of space, the De
gravitationesee footnote 17 on the recent dating of this work). In
con-trast, McGuire later concedes that a possible inuence on
Newtons concept of emanation (see Sect. 2) isHenry More (1990,
105); and, in his most recent work (2000, 2007), he successfully
pursues a number ofneo-Platonic threads in Newtons natural
philosophy. Nevertheless, these post-1990 reappraisals fall short
ofretracting McGuires earlier demotion of the Cambridge
neo-Platonist inuence, and thus the justied author-ity of McGuires
pre-1990 work is likely to give a misleading impression of his
evolving conception of theseissues (if examined in isolation from
the later output). In private discussion, McGuire has indeed
conrmedthis potential mischaracterization of his overall Newton
scholarship, adding that the newer dating of the
Degravitationeprovided a crucialstimulustotheevolutionof
hisviews.Finally,unlessotherwisenoted,allitalics in citations are
from the original, and all references to neo-Platonism refer to the
seventeenth centuryvarieties then popular in England.1 3Newtons
Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space 4211 Two Non-Substantivalist
Conceptions of Newtons Absolute SpaceBefore launching into an
investigation of the specic details of their arguments, it would
behelpful at this point to delineate the general strategies
employed by the principle proponentsof a non-substantivalist
interpretation.The rst claim is that, apart from his metaphysics,
Newtons concepts of absolute spaceand time in the Principia (1999,
408415) are best regarded as definitions, or mathematicalconcepts
or structures, required for the successful application of his
physics, namely, for thethree laws of motion and the theory of
gravity (and including the mathematical apparatus asso-ciated with
these hypotheses). That is, Newton may have engaged in the sort of
ontologicalspeculation on the nature of space common among
seventeenth century natural philosophers,but the really important
aspect of his overall theory is the realization that a
spatio-temporalconcept belongs in physics just in case it is dened
by physical laws that explain howit is to beapplied, and how the
associated quantity is to be measured (DiSalle 2002, 51). A
thoroughaccount of these definitional structures is beyond the
scope of this essay, but they can be brieydiscussed: Newton erred
in positing absolute space (spatial position) and absolute
velocity,but he was correct as regards absolute time and absolute
acceleration (and, hence, rotation).3We can label this strategy the
weak non-substantivalist interpretation of Newtons physics,for it
allows other approaches to his natural philosophy that take into
account the metaphysi-cal disputes common in that era.4The weak
reading gains credibility in the rst edition of thePrincipia
(1687), which contains little, if any, metaphysics. Substance and
God barelyappear in the rst edition of the Principiayet, later
editions of the Principia (the GeneralScholium of the second
edition, 1713), the later Queries to The Opticks, and various
non-publishedwritings(tobediscussedbelow)doindeedpickuptheseontological
themes,3That is, unlike the relationists (Descartes, Huygens,
Leibniz, etc.), Newton understood that the motions andinteractions
of material bodies could not be adequately treated by recourse to
their relative motions alone(e.g., the famous bucket experiment in
the Principia; 1999, 408415). Absolute spatial position and
abso-lute velocity, however, would eventually be seen as overly
rigid and unnecessary structures for an adequatetreatment of
acceleration within the context of Newtonian physics. As DiSalle
comments, a four-dimensionalspacetime structure equipped with an
afne connection would have sufced for Newtons purposes
(2002,35).4In reecting on the question, What concepts of time,
space, and motion [in Newtons Principia] are requiredby a dynamical
theory of motion?, DiSalle offers what is possibly his most
forthright endorsement of theweak non-substantivalist line: Asking
this question about Newtons theory does not deny its connection
withhis profound metaphysical convictionsnot only about space and
time, but about God and his relationshipto the natural world. On
the contrary, it illuminates the nature of those convictions and
their relationship toNewtons physics. For Newton, God and physical
things alike were located in space and time. But space
andtimealsoformedaframeworkwithinwhichthingsactononeanother,andtheircausalrelationsbecomeintelligible
through their spatio-temporal relationsabove all, through their
effects on each others state ofmotion. (2002, 38; emphasis added).
While acknowledging Newtons profound metaphysical convictions,which
include space, time, and God and his relationship to the natural
world, DiSalle adds that space andtime also formed a framework for
understanding the causal relationships among bodies. The
implication ofthis assessment, arguably, is that the content or
role of space and time for Newton may not be exhausted by
theirconstructive function in his physics. The fact that DiSalle
does not seriously engage the details of Newtonsmetaphysics in
order to counter the traditional substantivalist line thus lends
support for this weak readingalthough he does come close at times:
Newton was not a substantivalist, at least not in the now-standard
useof the term (emphasis added), since Newton was critical of
substance ontologies, and he did not regard theparts of space as
possessing an intrinsic individuality, whereas the modern
substantivalist (often) does viewspacetime points as irreducibly
basic existents (2006, 37; see, Sects. 3 and 4, and footnotes 1, 8,
and 9, forrelated discussions). Once again, this appraisal leaves
open the possibility that other notions of substance, notin the
now-standard use of the term, might apply in Newtons case. The weak
non-substantivalist reading ofDiSalle has been conrmed in private
communication, moreover (2009). Incidentally, one of the rst
mod-ern cases made for a weak non-substantivalist interpretation of
Newton is Toulmin (1959), although Steinslandmark (1967, 277282) is
better known (and also hints towards a strong non-substantivalist
reading).1 3422 E.
SlowikthustryingtoinferNewtonsoverallcommitmenttotheweakthesisremainsdifculttogauge.While
the weak non-substantivalist interpretation will not be examined in
depth in thisessay, one of the most meticulous investigations of
Newtons concepts of space and motion,namely, Rynasiewicz (1995),
would seem to be consistent with it. Stein (2002), on the
otherhand, apparently sanctions a much stronger position, namely,
that Newtons metaphysicaldeliberationsdonot, infact,
advocateaformofsubstantivalismcall thisthestrongnon-substantivalist
interpretation. Whereas the weak thesis is largely conned to
Newtonshandling of the concepts of space, time, velocity, etc., as
they appear in his physics, throughstressing their constructive and
foundational role in setting up his physics, the strong
thesisactuallyengagesNewtonsmetaphysicalwritingsinanattempttocountertheprevailingconsensus
that Newton endorsed substantivalism. Stein claims that Newtons
metaphys-icsofspaceisthat spaceis(somekindof)effect
oftheexistenceofanything, andtherefore of the rst-existing thing
(2002, 268). In essence, Stein interprets Newtons meta-physics as
sanctioning a conception of space that does not t either
substantivalism or itschief rival, relationism, which holds that
space is merely the relations among physical ex-istentsindeed,
theviewthat
SteinattributestoNewtonisverymuchlikeSteinsownmetaphysical
interpretation of space (spacetime), as a passage from an earlier
essay makesclear: Stein claims that spacetime structures are an
emanative effect of the existence ofanything (Stein 1977, 397),
where the phrase in quotation marks, emanative effect, is anobvious
allusion to Newtons spatial hypotheses (as will be explained
below). If space isconceived as an effect of the existence of
anything, as Stein regards both Newtons andhis own theory, then it
is quite difcult to pin an ontology to this thesis, let alone a
com-mitment to substantivalism. That is, space is not an
independently existing
substance/entitybecauseitdepends(insomemanner)ontheexistenceofanything,presumably,physi-cal
bodies or elds, thus violating the independence clause for
substances. But, neither isit a mere relation, since the domain (as
the set of possible values) of the spatial
relationsinagivenuniverseatanyinstantisnotlimitedtotheactualspatialrelationsamongthematerial
existents at that instant, as it is under a strict relationism.5In
short, Steins non-ontological interpretation of Newton,6like his
own hypothesis of space, would seem to favora third-way (tertium
quid) between the prevailing substantivalist and relationist
ontolo-gies.75While a strict relationist connes space to the actual
relations among existing objects, weaker forms of rela-tionism dene
space as the actual and possible relations among existing objects.
Yet, even on the these weakerforms, certain meaningful physical
states-of-affairs would seem to be ruled out, such as a lone
rotating body inan otherwise empty universe (because there is
nothing relative to which it could rotate). These
considerationsthus render even the weaker forms of
relationismunacceptable for Newtons spatial theory (unless the
possiblerelations include a bodys relations to earlier states of
itself).6Throughout this essay, the term non-ontological as applied
to Stein (2002) denotes a non-causal, non-being, and hence
anti-neo-Platonic reading of Newtons spatial theory; a reading that
is motivated more bymodern epistemology and the philosophy of
science/physics than Early Modern metaphysics, since the
causal,being, and neo-Platonic aspects of Newtons theory are
systematically downgraded or rejected altogether fora sort of
structuralist conception of space. See, also, footnotes 9 and
18.7Steins rejection of the traditional substantivalist and
relationist ontologies is a leading theme throughout hiswork (e.g.,
1967, 1977), although a thorough discussion is not relevant to our
investigation. Further aspectsof Steins interpretation are
critically examined in Slowik (2007), including a more detailed
investigation ofthe substance/accident dichotomy in Newton, and the
third-way notion of space.1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space
4232 Newton and Strong Non-Substantivalism: Making the
CaseInitially,
thestrongnon-substantivalistanalysisofNewtonsspatialconceptslooksquitepromising.
In the unpublished tract, De gravitatione, which most likely
predates the Prin-cipia, Newton insists that space has its own
manner of existing which is proper to it andwhich ts neither
substance nor accident [i.e., property] (Newton 2004, 21). Space is
not asubstance because it cannot act upon things, yet everyone
tacitly understands this of sub-stance (21), nor is it an accident,
since we can clearly conceive extension existing
withoutanysubject,aswhenweimaginespacesoutsidetheworldorplacesemptyofanybodywhatsoever,
(22). The substance/accident doctrine holds that all existents come
in oneof two exclusive types: either self-dependent substances, or
the properties that can only existwithin, or inhere in, a substance
(see, e.g., Bolton 1998, 179). In contrast, Newton consis-tently
refers to space as an affection (affectio) or attribute
(attributa), which may signifyhis attempt to employ neutral terms
without substance/accident overtones:8Space is an affection of a
being just as a being (Spatium est entis quatenus ens affec-tio).
No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some
way. God iseverywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in
the space that it occupies;and whatever is neither everywhere nor
anywhere does not exist. And hence it followsthat space is an
emanative effect (effectus emanativus) of the rst existing being,
for ifany being whatsoever is posited, space is posited. (25)Much
of the ensuing investigation will attempt to unravel the
complexities of this fairlyenigmatic passage.2.1Space as a
Necessary Consequence or
ResultBasedlargelyontheevidenceintheabovequote,SteincontendsthatNewtondoesnotderive
his Idea of spaceits ontological status includedfrom his theology
(as has oftenbeen claimed); for he tells us that if anything is
posited, space is posited (Stein 2002, 268).Since God is the rst
existing thing, space (in some sense) results from the existence
ofGod (268), but this does not detract from Newtons general
hypothesis that space (in somesense) results from the existence of
anything (268). He adds:But this sense of the wordsimply a
necessary consequence, with no connotation ofcausal efcacy or
actionexactly ts the rest of what Newton says; indeed, thismeaning
might have been inferred directly from Newtons words: [S]pace is an
ema-native effect of the rst-existing being, for if I posit any
being whatever I posit space:the second clause tells us precisely
what the rst clause means. (269)8Newtons understanding of substance
presumably draws from the wide variety of substance concepts
preva-lent in the seventeenth century. For instance, some portions
of his concept reect, say, the Cartesian line thatit is an entity
that can exist independently of all other beings (except God, of
course), but other elements ofhis concept introduce more novel
ideas, such as the ability to act upon things. Overall, Newtons
substanceconcept is difcult to accurately x relative to his
contemporaries and predecessors, largely because he seldomprovides
any details when employing this term. The same is true (in fact,
more so) for his employment ofaffection and attribute, which seem
to denote a property that is necessary for a beings existence,
whereasan accident (such as red, triangular, etc.) is not. Newton
refers to space as an attribute/affection of all being,while
denying that it is an accident, thus demonstrating (apparently) its
necessity for all being (more on thisbelow). See, once again,
Bolton (1998), for these metaphysical categories, as well as
Carriero (1990), for moreon Newtons use of affection.1 3424 E.
SlowikSteins attempt to attribute a strong non-substantivalist
conception of space to Newtonstands out rather clearly in this
passage; for, stripped of its ontological connotations, spaceas an
emanative effect becomes simply space as a necessary consequence or
result of theexistence of anythingand, of course, it is just this
type of non-ontological notion of spacethat Steins theory counsels,
i.e., space as a non-causally generated fact, with little or
noontological associations.9Howplausible are Steins arguments for
the strong non-substantivalist thesis? While
someoftheobjectionswill havetoawait thefollowingsections,
whereintheontologyoftheCambridge neo-Platonists will be discussed
in greater detail, there are a few difculties thatcan be raised
directly. Above all, Newton never explicitly states that space is a
necessary con-sequence or result, which is a description that, as
noted above, seemingly equates space witha form of logical or
conceptual fact, as opposed to an ontological, causal feature of
existingbeings.10Presumably Newton would have emphasized this
non-ontological notion of spacein a more lucid manner, since his
application of the relevant terms, especially emanativeeffect,
often parallels the decidedly ontological meaning given to these
very same terms inearlier neo-Platonist
tomes.Moreover,otherpassageswouldseemtosupportthetraditionalontologicalpictureofNewtons
spatial theory. After dismissing a substance/accident ontology,
Newton nonethe-less adds: much less may [space] be said to be
nothing, since it is something more than anaccident, and approaches
more nearly to the nature (naturam) of substance (Newton 2004,22).
If Newtons concept of space, as Stein contends, is not ontological,
then one would notexpect Newton to declare that spaces nature is
closer to a substance than an accident. Putdifferently, if space is
a non-ontological, necessary consequence of a beings existence,
itwould seem to follow that Newton should reject any application of
the substance/accidentdichotomy to spaceone would not expect, once
more, that he would try to place the conceptsomewhere between these
ontological positions.119There are also hints of a third-way
structuralist rendering of space in Steins analysis of Newton. In
the Degravitatione, it is claimed that the parts of space are
individuated by their positions, so that if any two couldchange
their positions, they would change their individuality at the same
time and each would be convertednumerically into the other (Newton
2004, 25; see, also, the Scholium on space in time in the
Principia, whichroughly makes the same argument, Newton 2004, 66).
As regards this quotation, Stein reasons: This canbe taken, in
rather modern terms, as saying that space is a structure, or
relational system, which can beconceived of independently of
anything else; its constituents are individuated just be their
relations to oneanother, as elements of this relational system
(Stein 2002, 272). A relational system [of the parts of space],as
dened by Stein, is not to be confused with relationism, however.
See, Slowik (2007), for more on thisissue.10In a later writing,
Newton does refer to innite space and time as modes of existence in
all beings, &unbounded modes &consequences of the existence
of a substance that which is really necessary
&substantiallyOmnipresent & Eternal (Koyr and Cohen 1962,
9697; see, also, Sect. 4.1). The use of the term conse-quences, in
this passage, might be taken to support the non-ontological
interpretation of Newtons conceptof spaceyet, it is used in
conjunction with the basic ontological term, modes, which denotes
the specicway in which a being manifests a general property (e.g.,
circular is a mode of shape). Consequently, it isnot clear whether
this passage actually assists or harms the non-substantivalist
cause.11This counter-argument is not conclusive, of course, since
Newton may be merely relying on known onto-logical categories to
describe a unique position. Stein, on the other hand, reads Newtons
quote (that spaceis closer to substance) as pertaining to the
rejection of an accident ontology: namely, in that [space] needsno
subject to support its existence (2002, 267). Presumably, subject
and support are used here tosignify an accidents inherence
(support) in a substance or being (subject), for, if these terms
refer generallyto any subject, then it would directly contradict
Steins (later) claim that space results from the
existenceofanything(268;whichnecessitatesasubject,ofcourse).Thisthesis,thatspaceneedsnosubjecttosupport
its existence, thereby complements his non-ontological reading of
emanative effect. Yet, as will bedemonstrated below, incorporeal
spirit (God, or a world soul) is the subject required for Newtons
space.1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space 425On the whole,
the best evidence for Steins interpretation appears in the
quotation exam-ined at length above, where Newton claims that space
is an emanative effect of the rstexisting being, for if any being
whatsoever is posited, space is posited (Newton 2004, 25;Et hinc
sequitur quod spatium sit entis primario existentis effectus
emanativus, quia positoquolibet ente ponitur spatium, Newton 1962,
103), whereupon Stein reasons that the secondclause tells us
precisely what the rst clause means (Stein 2002, 269). Yet, in the
De grav-itatione, the term emanative effect is not used with
reference to any being whatsoever,but only to God or the rst
existing being. To avoid the obvious theistic implications,
Steintakes the phrase, rst existing being, to pertain to any rst
existing being, presumably even amere corporeal beingbut this
interpretation strains credibility. On Newtons theology, onlyGod
(or possibly a world soul) can qualify as the rst existing being,
as the context of theDe gravitatione makes clear. Once again, the
evidence for Newtons incorporeal ontologicalfoundation for space
will emerge in more detail in the ensuing sections, where the
distinctionbetween emanation and space as an attribute of being qua
being will be explained, but anumber of important criticisms can be
mentioned straight away.First, if Newtons concept of emanation is
merely the claim that if any being whatsoeveris posited, space is
posited, then one would expect a much more general application of
theemanation concept to other beings, especially corporeal being.
The fact that Newton neverentertains the possibility that space
could emanate froma material body, or anything else thatis situated
on the ontological chain of being below God (or a world soul)
strongly suggeststhat Steins readings of emanative effect and rst
existing being are much too broad.12Second, as regards Steins
equating rst existing being with any rst existing being,a serious
difculty resides in the historical fact that there were clear
precedents among
theearlierCambridgeneo-Platonistsforemployingsuchphrases,
likerstexistingbeing,with reference to God alone. In Mores
Enchiridium Metaphysicum (1679), there are severalnotable instances
of such terms in his well-known comparison of the metaphysical
titlesascribed to both God and spatial extension (see also De Smet
and Verelst 2001 on this):For this innite and immobile extension
will be seen to be not something merely real but something divine
after we shall have enumerated those divine names or titleswhich
suit it exactly, Of which kind are those which follow, which
metaphysiciansattribute to First Being. Such as one, simple,
immobile, eternal, complete, independent,existing from itself,
subsisting by itself, incorruptible, necessary, immense,
uncreated,uncircumscribed, incomprehensible, omnipresent,
incorporeal, permeating and encom-passing everything, being by
essence, being by Act, pure Act. (More 1995, 57)As is evident given
the references to being by essence, being by Act, etc.,
Moresdiscussion of First Being relies heavily on concepts that can
be traced back to AristotlesMetaphysics; in particular, the
existence of an eternal, immovable rst substance requiredto ground
the worlds lesser, nite, and mutable substances.13These traits of
First Being,12The term emanative effect only appears three times in
the De gravitatione. Besides Steins favorite ofthese three
quotations (i.e., space is an emanative effect of the rst existing
being, ), there are: [space] isas it were an emanative effect of
God and an affection of every kind of being (21); and, space is
eternal induration and immutable in nature because it is the
emanative effect of an eternal and immutable being
(26).13Inhisdepictionofthetraitsofinniteextension,Moreaddsthatitisnecessarythatitbeimmobile.Which
is celebrated as the most excellent attribute of First Being in
Aristotle (1995, 58). In the Metaphysics(Bk. XII, 1071b11071b10),
Aristotle concludes that it is necessary that there should be an
eternal unmov-able substance. For substances are the rst of
existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things
aredestructible (Aristotle 1984, 16921693). In short, the intended
meaning of Newtons rst existing beingalmost certainly follows Mores
usage, which, in turn, is based on Aristotles reasoning. More
importantly, as1 3426 E. Slowiktherefore, are only applicable to
God or a world soul, although Mores interesting point isthat most
also apply to space: That which, however, is the rst Being and
receives all oth-ers, without doubt exists by itself, since nothing
is prior to that which sustains itself (59;emphasis added).
Moreover, a similar use of language and concepts pervades Mores
earlierworks, such as the crucial section on emanative causation in
The Immortality of the Soul(1659) that refers to God as the First
and primest Essence (1997b, 35). Accordingly, thehistorical context
of the terms and phrases in Newtons work would seem to fatally
undercutSteins reading.2.2Efcient Causation and Cambridge
Neo-PlatonismAs Stein admits (2002, 271), his interpretation runs
counter to the prevailing consensus amongEarly Modern and Newtonian
scholars, who have concluded, by and large, that Newtonsspatial
ontology is thoroughly imbued with neo-Platonic natural philosophy:
see the com-mentaries by Burtt (1952, 261), Jammer (1993, 110),
Koyr (1965, 89), Funkenstein
(1986,96),Hall(2002),tonameonlyafew.EdwardGrantsassessmentisfairlyrepresentativeof
this position: if space is Gods attribute, does that not imply it
is somehow an accidentor property of God (1981, 243)? A notable
exception to this line of reasoning, however,ispresented inan
inuential earlyarticleby McGuire(1978a), which presentsa view
ofNewtonsconceptofspacethatcanbeinterpreted,albeitonlysupercially,assimilartoSteins
assessment. McGuire initially sides with a less ontological, more
factual or conse-quential interpretation, arguing that space for
Newton is the general condition required forthe existence of any
individual substance including its characteristics (1978a, 15).The
relation between the existence of a being and that of space is not
causal, but oneof ontic dependence. Newton is dening one condition
which must be satised so thatany being can be said to exist. In
short, the phrase, when any being is posited, space isposited
denotes an ontic relation between the existence of any kind of
being and thecondition of its existence. (1978a, 15)Possibly
prompted by Carrieros criticisms (1990), McGuire later qualied this
account ofNewtons spatial theory, concluding that the relation
between divine being and the innityof space can be seen (in a
curious sense) as a causal dependency, and, moreover, one that hasa
legacy in theological and philosophical thought (1990, 105).14It
will be useful to explorethese issues in somewhat greater depth,
for they shed light on a likely source of Newtonsdescriptive phrase
emanative effect.McGuirecontendsthat thereisamedieval precedent for
construingtherelationshipbetween God and space as under the rubric
of efcient causation, yet, since the notionof an eternal and
efcient cause does not involve any activity, production, or active
efcacybetween it and its effect, it is difcult to distinguish
natural or ontic dependence in these con-texts from the notion of
causal dependence between eternal things (105). The
difcultiesFootnote 13 continuedthe subsequent investigation of the
De gravitatione will demonstrate, Newton likewise demands an
innite,immobile rst existing being to ground the existence and
extension of lesser, mobile entities.14McGuire (2007), following
(1990, 105), likewise connects his earlier ontic dependence
hypothesis withefcient causation: It seems evident that emanative
causation, as Newton understands it, reects this rela-tionship
between Gods necessary existence and spaces uncreated nature: space
exists always because Godexists necessarily. Moreover, since the
notion of an eternal and efcient cause does not necessarily
involveactivity, production, creation, or active efcacy between it
and its effect, the distinction between ontic andcausal dependence
essentially collapses (123124).1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of
Space 427concern howcausation can link eternal things, namely, God,
space, and time, which are nottemporally prior to one another.
McGuire offers the example of Augustines foot eternallyembedded in
dust, and thus eternally causing its footprint (105), as a
characterization of thisspecial form of efcient causation. As
pointed out above, Newtons inuential older contem-porary, Henry
More, in his The Immortality of the Soul (1659), had employed the
concept ofan emanative cause in just this manner in explicating the
extension of immaterial substance.More contends that there exists a
spatially extended, immaterial Secondary Substance thatis
coextensive with the extension of material substance: he states
that we have a rationallapprehension of that part of a Spirit which
we call the Secondary Substance. Whose Exten-sion arising by
graduall Emanation from the First and primest Essence [God]
(1997b,35). More holds that an Emanative Effect is coexistent with
the very Substance of that whichis said to be the Cause thereof ,
and explains that this Cause is the adequate and imme-diate Cause,
and that the Effect exists so long as that Substance does exist
(1997b, 33).While there remain significant differences between
McGuires and Carrieros understandingof Newtons use of
emanation,15they nonetheless concur that traditional ontological,
andspecifically causal, issues are at play; indeed, both agree that
there are a number of Scholasticand, not surprisingly, neo-Platonic
precedents for Newtons handling of emanative causationas a unique
type of efcient causation.16Stein criticizes the allegation that a
form of neo-Platonic causation underlies Newtonsspatial hypotheses,
however. Commenting that the grounds for thinking that Newtons
the-ory of emanation is neo-Platonic, or Cambridge Platonic, are
very weak (2002, 269), Steinasserts that emanation is distinct from
creation for the neo-Platonists, and all being (exceptGod) is
created; thus space is not created, and thus (presumably) not a
being. Yet, as justdiscussed, there is a Scholastic form of
causation that does t Newtons use of emanation(which he obtained
via More). It is true that Newton lists uncreated (increata) among
thecharacteristics of space (33); but, as Carriero (1990, 113115)
explains, this use of uncre-ated is almost certainly due to the
fact that, for Newton, the cause of a created being is priorin
time, whereas an emanative cause is co-existent with (not
temporally prior to) its effect.This interpretation of Newtons use
of creation is corroborated in the De gravitatione when hedeclares
that extension is not created (creatura) but has existed eternally
(since extension isan emanative effect of an eternal being; 31).
Equally important, Newtons hypothesis closelyfollows Mores
reasoning, since More both denes an emanative cause as co-existent
withits effect, as well as lists uncreated among the attributes of
space (see Sect. 2.2).17Finally,15One of the main points of
contention is how space relates to the divine essence. While
various aspects ofthese traditionally theological issues will be
discussed below, an in-depth examination is beyond the scope ofthis
essay. Both commentators agree, however, that More likely inuenced
Newtons quite similar hypothesis(McGuire 1990, 105; Carriero 1990,
112115; see, also, footnote 2).16While providing a brief synopsis
of the natural philosophy of the Cambridge neo-Platonists is
difcult,the central feature is probably the rejection of a purely
mechanical account of the material world (i.e., thatall material
phenomena can be completely explained through the interactions and
impact of inert matter inmotion). Rather, the neo-Platonists
appealed to God, or spirit, as an active agent, or foundational
basis, forall natural phenomena. See, e.g., Garber et al. (1998).
As mentioned above, Charletons natural philosophy,which is
decidedly Gassendian at least as regards space, adopts an
incorporeal basis for space, and thus
isstrikinglysimilartoCambridgeneo-Platonisminmanyrespects,althoughthereareimportantdifferences(e.g.,
Newtons repudiation of a substance-accident metaphysics for
space).17More is less forthcoming on the uncreated status of space
in his earlier The Immortality of the Soul,although it is strongly
implied in his discussion of emanative causation: By an Emanative
Cause is under-stood such a Cause as merely by Being, no other
activity or causality interposed, produces an Effect (1997b,32).
Newtons list of the characteristic of space versus matter, in the
De gravitatione, thus reveals a knowledgeof Mores later
Enchiridion, rst published in 1671, as do many of the other
features detailed in our investi-gation (namely, the being as being
hypothesis, see Sect. 4 below). Indeed, it is highly unlikely that
Newton1 3428 E. Slowikas Carriero also observes (114), while Newton
states that space is uncreated, he never statesthat space is
uncaused.Consequently, despite Steins best effort to argue for a
non-ontological version of Newtonstermemanativeeffect,
thehistorical context
renderssuchaninterpretationextremelyimplausible. In short, since
More also denes the spatial extension of incorporeal substanceas an
emanative effect, and given that Mores hypothesis stands as a clear
instance of hisneo-Platonic ontology, there can be little doubt as
to the direct inspiration, and thus likelyintended meaning, of
Newtons use of the identical phrase emanative effect.18Besides
emanation, a veritable host of sixteenth and seventeenth century
natural
philos-ophersproposedotherhypothesesonthenatureofspacethatcloselyparallelNewtons,including
many thinkers in England with whom he was directly acquainted (most
impor-tantly, in addition to More, Isaac Barrow and Joseph
Raphson). For instance, the idea
thatspaceliesoutsidetheScholasticsubstance/accidentcategorieswasalmostcommonplaceinthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies:Fonseca,Amicus,Bruno,Telesio,Patrizi,andGassendi,
to name a few, all favored this notion, and, more significantly,
theological con-cerns are heavily implicated in their respective
views. These last two, Francesco Patrizi andPierre Gassendi, in
addition to More, probably comprised the main source of inuence
onNewtons developing views of space, although their inuence was
likely obtained indirectlythrough More and Walter Charleton,
Gassendis foremost English advocate. One can nd asurprising number
of close similarities between the individual hypotheses of these
naturalphilosophers and Newtons concept of space: for example, an
atomistic or stoic cosmology,with a nite material world set within
an innite, three-dimensional void space, is commonto all (except
Patrizi, who lls empty space with light). Patrizi, like Newton,
also emphasizesthe mathematical aspect of space, which can receive
all geometric shapes, and further arguesthat, while neither
substance nor accident per se, space is nevertheless a type of
substancenot covered by the Scholastic categories; i.e., space is
closer to the traditional concept ofsubstance (Brickman 1943, 241).
With Gassendi, Patrizis ideas on space would be developedin a
direction that would prove highly attractive to the later Cambridge
neo-Platonists. OnGrants summation, space, for Gassendi, is an
absolutely immobile, homogenous, inactive(resistenceless), and even
indifferent three-dimensional void that exists by itself whether
ornot bodies occupy all or part of it and whether or not minds
perceive it (Grant 1981, 210).More importantly for our analysis,
Gassendi holds that space is both uncreated and co-eter-nal with
God, although, like many Scholastic predecessors, he also believes
that God is inevery place while not actually extended in the same
manner as body (see Sect. 4 below). Thepotential impiety involved
in claiming some form of independent status for space wouldprove a
source of concern for the Cambridge neo-Platonists, who
nevertheless developedFootnote 17 continuedwas not familiar with
this, quite important, work of Mores later years. The arguments for
a later dating ofthe De gravitatione (in Dobbs 1991, 130146), i.e.,
after 1680, thereby gains support, since Newtons treatiseexhibits
signs of several of Mores major works, including the Enchiridion.
McGuire (1978a, 41, n. 27) hadearlier remained a bit circumspect
about the inuence of Mores Enchiridion based on the earlier date
suppliedby Hall and Hall for the De gravitatione (Newton 1962, 90),
i.e., circa 1666; but McGuire has since advocatedthe later date
(2007, 112). See, also, footnote 2.18Another instance of the use of
emanation that parallels Newtons, although with respect to time, is
employedby J. B. van Helmont, a natural philosopher in the early
half of the seventeenth century who Newton had stud-ied. See,
Ducheyne (2008). Finally, it should be noted that this essay does
not take sides on the complex issuesassociated with causation in
Newtons natural philosophy; e.g., whether emanative causation more
closelyresembles an efcient or formal causea fruitful topic of
further exploration, needless to say. The main pur-pose of the
discussion of causation is to refute the idea, espoused in Stein
(2002), that deates the ontologicalsignificance of the seventeenth
century concepts linked to emanative causation (see footnotes 6 and
9).1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space 429their respective
spatial hypotheses roughly along Gassendian lines, at least as
regards spacesindependence from body.19It is against this
historical backdrop that any assessment of theimport of Newtons
concept of space must be examined, especially the relationship
betweenGod and space.3 Neo-Platonism and Determined Quantities of
Extension3.1Is God Necessary for Newtons Spatial Theory?For the
advocate of the strong non-substantivalist thesis, a possible
rejoinder to the evidencepresented above would be to concede that
ontological factors do play a major role in Newtonsspatial theory,
but that these ontological factors need not be specifically
theological in kind.That is, the strong non-substantivalist
position might be compatible with a position that sim-ply argues
that God is not required for the existence of space, as allegedly
evident in his claimthat space is an affection of every kind of
being (Newton 2004, 21).20This form of argu-ment may, in fact, lie
at the center of Stein (2002); for, in defense of his approach, he
insiststhat on the objective or ontological side, , Newtons
doctrine about space and time, in thelight of his explicit
statements, did not teach that space and time per se, or their
attributes,depend upon the nature of God (297).21As regards the
question, Can we conceive
space19ThebestoveralltreatmentoftheseissuesstillremainsGrant(1981).
TranslationsofPatrizisspatialhypotheses are provided in Brickman
(1943). For Gassendis philosophy of space, see his Syntagma
philo-sophicum (published posthumously in his Opera Omnia, 1658),
parts of which are translated in Brush 1972,and Capek 1976.
Gassendis ideas informthe main content of Charletons discussion of
space in his, Physiolo-gia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charletoniana (1654), a
work known to Newton (see footnote 27). In the
Physiologia,Charleton comments on the possible charge of impiety
that can be leveled at a theory, like his, that makesspace
independent of God in various respects (6869). See, also, footnote
35.20Incidentally,
thisversionofthestrongnon-substantivalistpositionstilldiffersfromtheweakvariety(explained
in Sect. 1), since it continues to maintain that Newtons actual
ontology of space is non-substantiv-alist. The weak version, in
contrast, only claims that Newtons handling of his definitions and
concepts relatedto Absolute space, etc., do not obligate
substantivalism (or relationism), and thus Newtons approach
pointsforward to a third-way conception of space that eschews the
standard ontological dichotomy.21A similar interpretation of Stein
(2002) has been put forward by Andrew Janiak: Stein (forthcoming)
notes that Newtons view is not rst and foremost a theological one,
for its rst premise is that space is anaffection of all entities.
The fact that Gods innite and eternal existence makes it the case
that space is inniteand eternal is logically parasitic on this rst
premise. That is, given the logical structure of Newtons view,space
would emanate from the rst existent, whatever that rst existent
happened to be, because for
Newtononcewepositanentitywepositspace.ThisjustmeansthatspatialityiswhatwemightcallfollowingGalileos
discussion of the primary qualities of objectsa necessary
accompaniment of the existence of enti-ties (Janiak 2000, 222, fn.
67). As will be explained, there is abundant evidence to support
the idea that spaceis a necessary accompaniment of the existence of
any being for Newtonyet, this viewwas practically stan-dard among
Newtons predecessors and contemporaries (for More, Charleton,
Raphson, etc., also acceptedit: see Sect. 4). However, the claim,
space would emanate from the rst existent, whatever that rst
existenthappened to be, is unsupportable: Newtons use of emanation
in the De gravitatione, as well as its likelysource in More, link
emanation to higher incorporeal/spiritual beings alone (see Sects.
3 and 4 below), and thusNewtons theology does indeed play a
fundamental role in Newtons spatial theory. As with Stein, the
abovequote tends to run together being as being and emanative
causation (see Sect. 4.3), which are two distincthypotheses.
Similar errors occur in Janiak (2008, Chap. 5), although he does
strive to distance his reading fromsome aspects of Steins
interpretation (155163): after arguing that the affection thesis
entails the claim thatspace is an emanative effect of the rst
existing being (142), and that space emanates from whatever
entityis the rst to exist (146), he later goes on to claimthat an
affection is not dependent upon particular objects forits existence
(157)on the whole, such contradictions (which may be only apparent)
make it rather difcultto determine the nature of Janiaks
conclusions. In addition, he mistakenly conates emanative causation
andcreation, the latter involving Gods will (see, footnote 17
above, where More clearly rejects this inference:1 3430 E.
Slowikwithout God? (271), Stein cites a passage from Newtons
critical assessment of Descarteshypothesis which equates spatial
extension with matter:If we say with Descartes that extension is
body, do we not manifestly offer a path toatheism, both because
extension is not created but has existed eternally, and becausewe
have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so [in some
circumstances] itwould be possible for us to conceive of extension
while supposing God not to exist?(Newton 2004, 31)22In commenting
on this passage, Stein concludes that, for Newton, extension does
notrequireasubjectinwhichitinheres,asaproperty;anditcanbeconceivedasexistentwithout
presupposing any particular thing, God included (2002, 271).Yet,
the problem with this rendering of Newtons statement, put simply,
is that Newtonsconceiving space without God does not necessarily
entail that Newton believed that spacecan exist without God.
Indeed, a significant part of Newtons argument against
Descartesontology is precisely this point: that it allows a
conception of spatial extension, as the
essen-tialpropertyofcorporealsubstance,withoutanyapparentconnectionto,orneedof,theconcept
of God. In its place, Newton tentatively advances a neo-Platonic
ontology in whichboth spatial extension and body depend upon
God.3.2The Determined Quantities of Extension HypothesisNewtons
contemplates a world wherein God directly endows spatial extension
with bodilyproperties, such as impenetrability or color, without
requiring an underlying corporeal sub-stance to house these
accidents: If [God] should exercise this power, and cause some
spaceprojecting above the earth, like a mountain or any other body,
to be impervious to bodies andthus stop or reect light and all
impinging things, it seems impossible that we should notconsider
this space really to be a body from the evidence of our senses
(Newton 2004,2728). If we accept this hypothesis, then Newton
contends that we can dene bodies asdetermined quantities of
extension which omnipresent God endows with certain conditions(28);
the conditions being, rst, that these determined quantities are
mobile, second, thattheycanbringaboutperceptionsinminds, andthree,
thattwoormorecannotcoincide.Through this process, these bundles of
quantities can exactly replicate our everyday expe-rience of
material bodies without need of Descartes material substance, or
the Scholasticnotion of prime matter (2731). These determined
quantities, furthermore, are apparently sus-tained and moved
through the exercise of the divine will alone, and Newton makes
repeatedreferences to the relationship between the human mind and
human body, on the one hand,and Gods will and determined
quantities, on the other, to make this point:Since each man is
conscious that he can move his body at will, , the free power
ofmoving bodies at will can by no means be denied God, whose
faculty of thought isinnitely greater and more swift. And for the
same reason it must be agreed that God,by the sole action of
thinking and willing, can prevent a body from penetrating anyspace
dened by certain limits. (27)Footnote 21
continuedByanEmanativeCauseisunderstoodsuchaCauseasmerelybyBeing,
nootheractivityorcausalityinterposed, produces an Effect, 1997b,
32).22The phrase in brackets, in some circumstances, is excluded
from Steins translation. The differences arenot relevant to the
above arguments against his overall position, however, so it will
not be discussed.1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space 431This
passage hence foreshadows Newtons later description of space as
Gods sensorium(in the Queries to the Opticks, Newton 2004, 127140),
since the omnipresence of the divinewill is directly analogous to
the omnipresence of human thought and sensation throughoutthe human
bodye.g., just as humans can move their limbs at will, God can
likewise movebodily quantities through space at will.Therefore,
with respect to the citation provided by Stein, Newtons point is
simply thatany theory, like Descartes, that links bodily extension
to corporeal substance alone, such thatmental properties are
excluded, is apt to mistakenly infer that extended, corporeal
substancecan exist independently of GodWhy?: because the divine
will is erroneously presumed tobe more akin to a mental property on
the Cartesian scheme, such that it has little or no rela-tionship
with the extension of corporeal substance. Newtons attempt to blur,
or minimize,any sharp distinction between mind and body is, in
fact, the method by which his determinedquantities of extension
hypothesis (hereafter, DQE) avoids the atheistic implications of
bothDescartes dualism of mental and material substance, as well as
the Scholastics distinctionbetween prime matter and substantial
form. The passage cited by Stein (in Sect. 3.1) is pre-ceded by an
explanation that clearly shows that Newton rejects any theory, like
Descartes,that ties body, and thus bodily extension, so exclusively
to corporeal substance: For we can-not posit bodies of this kind
[i.e., on the DQE thesis] without at the same time positing thatGod
exists, and has created bodies in empty space out of nothing (31).
For the Cartesiansand Scholastics, however:They attribute no less
reality in concept (though less in words) to this corporeal
sub-stance regarded as being without qualities and forms, than they
do the substance ofGod, abstracted from his attributes. And hence
it is not surprising that atheists ariseascribing to corporeal
substance that which solely belongs to the divine. Indeed, how-ever
we cast about we nd almost no other reason for atheismthan this
notion of bodieshaving, as it were, a complete, absolute, and
independent reality in themselves (32;emphasis added)Consequently,
leaving aside issues of conceivability, the quote provided by Stein
is notevidence that Newton actually accepts an ontology that allows
extension, through its inti-mate connection with body, to be as it
were, a complete, absolute, and independent realityin
themselvesi.e., apart from Godrather, Newton argues at length that
any theory thatallows such an autonomous conception of bodily
extension is in serious error!Newtons neo-Platonic credentials are
in evidence throughout his assault on these Carte-sian and
Scholastic dualisms, moreover. Directly after the quote provided by
Stein, he offersa number of further criticisms against strictly
demarcating the incorporeal and the corporealvia Descartes
distinction in substance:Nor is the distinction between mind and
body in [Descartes] philosophy intelligible,unless at the same time
we say that mind has no extension at all, ; which seems thesame as
if we were to say that it does not exist, or at least renders its
union with bodythoroughly unintelligible and impossible. Moreover,
if the distinction of substancesbetween thinking and extended is
legitimate and complete, God does not eminentlycontain extension
within himself and therefore cannot create it; but God and
extensionwould be two separate, complete, absolute substances, and
in the same sense. But onthe contrary if extension is eminently
contained in God, or the highest thinking being,certainly the idea
of extension will be contained within the idea of thinking, and
hencethedistinctionbetweentheseideaswillbesuchthatbothmaytthesamecreated1
3432 E. Slowiksubstance, that is, but that a body may think, and a
thinking being be extended. (31;modied translation)One of the
remarkable facets of Newtons assessment is that it looks forward to
the Empir-icists skeptical analysis of substance,23but, for our
purposes, the important question pertainsto the relationship
between eminent containment and emanative causation, two separate,
butsimilarly named, metaphysical hypotheses. While the evidence is
rather sketchy, it is possiblethat Newton may regard the emanative
causation of various accidents or attributes, such asextension, as
an ontological consequence of their eminent containment in a higher
incorpo-real being.24If Newton does accept this sort of
metaphysical entailment, then his claimthat extension is eminently
contained in God (in the above passage), renders the
strongnon-substantivalistpositionquiteproblematic,includingtheversionthatonlyinsiststhatspace
is not dependent on God.3.3The Question of Hierarchical
DependenceAt this point, it would be benecial to examine Newtons
concept of emanation as it pertainsto the neo-Platonic ontological
hierarchy or ranking of beings, i.e., the notion that all
types23Newtons DQE hypothesis in the De gravitatione, alongside his
denial of a corporeal/incorporeal dichot-omy for substances and
accidents/attributes, has Spinoza-like implicationsat least in the
sense that Newtonstheory would seem to posit only one
being/substance, God, such that lesser beings/substances are
containedin, or are a part of, God. And, indeed, Newton makes this
very claim in an unpublished tract from the 1690s:The most perfect
idea of God is that he be one substance, simple, indivisible, live
and making live, necessarilyexisting everywhere and always,
understanding everything to the utmost, freely willing good things,
by hiswill effecting all possible things, and containing all other
substances in Him as their underlying principle andplace; a
substance which by his own presence discerns and rules all things,
just as the cognitive part of a manperceives the forms of things
brought into his brain, and thereby governs his own body; (McGuire
1978b,123; emphasis added). On a similar theme, Sklars (1974)
analysis of geometrodynamic theories of spacetimeprompted this
definition of supersubstantivalism: not only does spacetime have
reality and real structuralfeatures, but in addition, the material
objects of the world, its totality of ordinary and extraordinary
materialthings, are seen as particular structured pieces of
spacetime itself (1974, 221). Needless to say, Newtons
DQEhypothesis comes very close to supersubstantivalism, although
the term spacetime in this quote would needto be substituted with
the phrase Gods spatial extension. See, also, McGuire (2000) for a
comparison withPlatos Timaeus. In fact, a possible explanation for
the unpublished status of both the De gravitatione and Tem-pus et
Locus (1978b) may partly reside in the strong hints of Spinozistic
monism discernible in these works.24The distinction between eminent
containment and emanative causation is somewhat vague in the
literature,but, presumably they are distinct hypotheses, and
perhaps can stand alone in a given ontology. For example,one can
hold that God eminently contains the reality manifest in, say, a
stone, but that Gods creation of a stonedoes not employ the
emanationist model favored by many neo-Platonists, who often
marshal an assortmentof light metaphors to describe the causal
process whereby the higher-level entity (the light source)
bringsabouttheexistenceoflower-levelentities(thelightitself,ortheshadow):e.g.,lower-levelbeingsareanimage
of, or a radiation from, a higher-level being, which is a type of
explanation frequent in Moresoeuvre (e.g., 1995, 135). Now, in the
above citation, it is possible that Newton may be simply contending
thatthe Cartesian dualism of mind and body undermines Descartes
previous sanction of eminent containment.Newton claims that
Cartesian dualism entails that God does not eminently contain
extension within
himselfandthereforecannotcreateitbut,asdisclosedinSect.2.2,Newtonrejectsthebeliefthatextensioniscreated,
thus (leaving aside a mere lapse in terminology) the reference to
eminent containment in this passageneed not imply that Newton
actually accepts this thesis. On the other hand, a bit earlier in
the De gravitatione,Newton remarks that created mind (since it is
the image of God) is of a far more noble nature than body,so that
perhaps it may eminently contain [body] in itself (30)and,
importantly, the context strongly favorsthe view that Newton is
elaborating his own view here. Consequently, Newton may accept some
form of theeminent containment thesis. However, Newtons statements
employing just emanative effect (see footnote12) and emanate (see
Sect. 3.3) are alone sufcient to demonstrate his Cambridge
neo-Platonist stance (andthus uphold the argument of this essay),
regardless of the eminent containment issue. On the vexed issue
ofeminent containment in Descartes, see, Gorham (2003).1 3Newtons
Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space 433of being (such as matter, humans,
angels, etc.) ll positions within a hierarchical relationshipof
ontological dependence upon God. By this means, we may gain a
better insight into hisalleged Cambridge neo-Platonism, for the
ontological hierarchy of being is a central featureof neo-Platonic
thought.First of all, Newton strikes a decidedly neo-Platonic note
by allowing for the possibilityof a world soul, an immaterial being
who governs the material world and who ranks justbelow God on the
hierarchical chain. As disclosed in Sect. 2.2, More embraces a
similarnotion, although Newtons endorsement is both more hesitant
and mentioned specifically inthe context of his DQE hypothesis (to
serve as the immaterial basis for the mobile, deter-mined
quantities): some may perhaps prefer to posit a soul of the world
created by God,upon which he imposes the law that definite spaces
are endowed with corporeal properties,rather than to believe that
this function is directly discharged by God (Newton 2004, 30).On
the whole, Newtons De gravitatione would seem to favor some limited
conception ofhierarchical dependence, at least among immaterial and
material beings, for he states thatmind may eminently contain
body:That we are created in Gods image, holy writ testies. And his
image would shinemore clearly in us if only he simulated in the
faculties granted us the power of creationin the same degree as his
other attributes; nor is it an objection that we ourselves
arecreated beings and so a share of this attribute could not have
been equally granted tous. For if for this reason the power of
creating minds is not delineated in any facultyof created minds,
nevertheless created mind (since it is the image of God) is of a
farmore noble nature than body, so that perhaps it may eminently
contain [body] in itself.(30)There are several hints towards a
neo-Platonist model of reality in this discussion, if onlyof a
fairly weak and underdeveloped sort: e.g., minds are images of God,
we share inGods attributes (to a lesser degree), and, mind may
eminently contain matter because theformer has a more noble nature
than the latter. Yet, like More and many other
Cambridgeneo-Platonists, Newtons De gravitatione presents a
material world that is, so to speak, spirit-infusedin fact, there
appears to be a clear line of ontological descent, with God and
hisattributes, which includes extension, situated at the top of the
hierarchy, moving lower tohuman minds (and other lesser spirits),
and terminating at the level of matter. Regarding thepossibility of
a world soul, Newton adds a comments that strengthens this
neo-Platonicreading:theworldshouldnotbecalledthecreatureofthatsoulbutofGodalone,whocreates
it by constituting the soul of such a nature that the world
necessarily emanates [fromit] (31). Throughout the De gravitatione,
Newton places incorporeal beings (spirits, souls)at the top of the
hierarchy, with the lower, corporeal world regarded as emanations
fromtheseincorporeal beings. Finally, since these lesser beings
have a share of Gods attributes, albeitto a lesser degree than
Godand space is an attributeit must be the case that these
beingsalso share in Gods attribute of spatial extension. An
ontology that includes space among theattributes that God emanates
is thus also implicated in Newtons hierarchy of immaterial
andmaterial being, a point that will be developed further in the
next section.3.4The DQE Hypothesis and Strong Non-Substantivalism:
An AssessmentIn previous research of the De gravitatione tract,
careful attention has seldom been devotedto the aspects of the DQE
hypothesis that specifically concern the nature of space. Part of
theexplanation for this oversight might be due to the explicit
context in which the DQE hypoth-esis is rst introduced, namely, as
an account of the nature of body, and notexplicitly, at1 3434 E.
Slowikleaston the nature of space. Yet, if one desires to gain a
better understanding of the ontolog-ical presuppositions of Newtons
overall spatial theory, then the DQE hypothesis is of
crucialimportance. In addition, although Newton states that his DQE
hypothesis is uncertain, andthat he is reluctant to say positively
what the nature of bodies is (Newton 2004, 27), thisshould not
divert attention away from the only hypothesis that he has, in
fact, developed.Not only is a significant portion of the De
gravitatione allotted to the DQE hypothesis, but(as noted above)
Newton makes repeated claims as to the superiority of this
hypothesis incomparison with both the Cartesian and Scholastic
alternatives: e.g., the usefulness of theidea of body that I have
described [the DQE hypothesis] is brought out by the fact that
itclearly involves the principal truths of metaphysics and
thoroughly conrms and explainsthem (31). In summarizing the
importance of this hypothesis, he adds: So much for
thenatureofbodies,whichinexplicatingIjudgethatIhavesufcientlyprovedthatsuchacreation
as I have expounded [the DQE hypothesis] is most clearly the work
of God, and thatif this world were not constituted from that
creation, at least another very like it could beconstituted (33).
Nevertheless, since the endorsement of the DQE hypothesis does
remaintentative, it is possible that other attempts to construct a
theory of material bodies, but whichstill uphold Gods central role,
may have been amenable to Newton.On the other hand, there is an
interesting piece of indirect evidence that may support
thecontention that Newton not only accepted the DQE hypothesis,
even granting his expressedhesitation, but did so until well into
his later years. In a footnote to Pierre Costes Frenchtranslation
of Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding, third edition,
Coste reportsthat Newton provided an account of the creation of
matter, in 1710, that correlates with theDQE hypothesis in the De
gravitatione (Koyr 1965, 92). While this report falls short
ofconclusive proof, it should nevertheless assist in countering any
effort to discredit or belittlethe importance of the DQE
hypothesis. Less specic, but also important, is David
Gregoryssummary of his conversations with Newton in 1705: He
believes God to be omnipresent inthe literal sense for he supposes
that as God is present in space where there is no body, heis
present in space where a body is also present (Hiscock 1937, 29).In
brief, what the DQE hypothesis reveals about Newtons ontology is
that the Westernconception of God, or some spiritual entity at (or
near) the hierarchical level of God, is theemanative cause of
corporeal being, and perhaps eminently contains incorporeal being.
Allof Newtons examples of emanative causation and eminent
containment in the De gravitati-one, as revealed above, involve a
mental/spiritual entity as the sourcei.e., God, the worldsoul,
createdmindsand either matteror space asthe emanative effect or
theeminentlycontained entity.25Thus, even apart from the question
of Gods attribute of extension, sincebody is at (or near) the
lowest rung in the hierarchy, and thereby depends for its existence
onthese incorporeal beings, space cannot be the emanative effect of
matter/body. Put slightlydifferently, emanative causation in the
neo-Platonic tradition, and in the DQE hypothesis,ows down the
hierarchical chain from spiritual beings to, ultimately, matter;
and so itwould be highly unorthodox for Newton to have conceived
spatial extension as the emana-tive effect of material being,
especially given the deep disparity in Newtons characterizationof
space and matter: extension is eternal, innite, uncreated, uniform
throughout, not in theleast mobile, nor capable of inducing changes
of motion in bodies or change of thought inthe mind; whereas body
is opposite in every respect (33). Indeed, this simple
hierarchicalrelationship between God and body, mediated via Gods
attribute of extension, is very likely25In her collection of More
extracts, MacKinnon summarizes the emanation concept as follows:
The uni-verse of Neo-Platonism is formed by emanation from the One,
through the descending stages of intelligence,the soul, and the
world, with formless matter, or unreality, as the ultimate limit of
the emanative power (More1925, 315).1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic
Ontology of Space 435the underlying motivation for Newtons DQE
hypothesis, since he constantly criticizes theopposition (i.e.,
Cartesians and Scholastics) for ascribing to corporeal substance
that whichsolely belongs to the divine (31; see Sect. 3.2)and, once
again, what the Cartesians andScholastics have been erroneously
ascribing to corporeal substance is extension. Therefore,the strong
non-substantivalists contention that, for Newton, space (in some
sense) resultsfrom the existence of anything (Stein 2002, 268), is
inconsistent with the details of theDQE hypothesisapparently only
God, or an incorporeal being akin to a world soul, can bethe
emanative cause of space.26Leaving aside the issue of incorporeal
being, any interpretation that would posit matter asthe emanative
origin of space is likewise unacceptable given the basic
ontological relation-ship between body and space on the DQE
hypothesis. Material bodies are, in effect, portionsof space that
have been allotted certain empirical properties, such as
impenetrability or color,and thus body presupposes spatial
extensionbody cannot, therefore, be the emanative causeof space.
Newton carefully highlights bodys dependence upon space in
describing the DQEhypothesis: extension takes the place of the
substantial subject in which the form of thebody [i.e., the
determined quantities] is conserved by the divine will (29). It
would be quiteodd, therefore, if Newton held that the determined
quantities, as the forms or properties,were the ontological
foundation of their own, as it were, substantial subject.We should
return at this point to the topic of attributes and their
dependence upon God.Throughout Newtons analysis in the De
gravitatione, the dependence upon God of all possi-ble substances,
attributes, or accidents is constantly acknowledged, and this
includes space,of course:For certainly whatever cannot exist
independently of God cannot be truly
understoodindependentlyoftheideaofGod.Goddoesnotsustainhiscreaturesanylessthanthey
sustain their accidents, so that created substance, whether you
consider its degreeof dependence or its degree of reality, is of an
intermediate nature between God andaccident. And hence the idea of
it no less involves the concept of God, than the ideaof accident
involves the concept of created substance. And so it ought to
embrace noother reality in itself than a derivative and incomplete
reality. Thus the prejudice justmentioned must be laid aside, and
substantial reality is to be ascribed to these kinds ofattributes
[i.e., extension], which are real and intelligible things in
themselves and donot need to be inherent in a subject [i.e., an
accident inherent in corporeal
substance],ratherthantothesubject[i.e.,corporealsubstance]whichwecannotconceiveasdependent
[upon God], much less formany idea of it. And this we can manage
withoutdifculty if (besides the idea of body expounded above) we
reect that we can conceiveof space existing without any subject
when we think of a vacuum. And hence somesubstantial reality ts
this. (3233; emphasis added)Since this passage claries to some
degree the relationship between God and the attributeof extension,
it is worth examining in closer detail. As described in Sect. 3.2,
Newton rejectsthe Cartesian and Scholastic accounts because they
foster a conception of corporeal substancethat appears to be
independent of God (as well as incoherent). In its place, Newton
championsa notion of extension as an affection or attribute of God,
which naturally implies that the con-cept of extension, unlike
corporeal substance, cannot be truly understood independently
of26McGuire (1978a, 15) explores a hypothetical interpretation that
would allow beings other than God toground the existence of space;
yet, as disclosed in personal discussion, McGuires purpose was only
to explorethe implications of an emanationist ontology, and not to
put forward the view that Newton actually acceptedthis hypothetical
scenario. Unlike Stein, McGuire has always accepted that Newtons
theology is central tounderstanding his theory of space (see, e.g.,
1978a, 3839).1 3436 E. Slowikthe idea of God. In fact, having
rejected corporeal substance, Newton argues that we shouldascribe
some substantial reality to extension as opposed to corporeal
substance. That spacecan exist in the absence of body in Newtons
cosmology is also furnished as evidence againstassigning extension
to corporeal substance. One should not, accordingly, construe the
termsubject (subjecto) as referring to any subject, whether God or
a lesser substance/beingrather, subject consistently refers to
corporeal substance in these passages. It is only onthis
interpretation that Newtons overall argument makes sense: it would
not be consistentfor Newton to criticize the Cartesians and
Scholastics for positing a conception of corporealsubstance that is
independent of God,andthen put forward his own preferred thesis
thatmakes spatial extension independent of all subjects, taken
broadly, and thus God! Withrespect to the pivotal sentence
italicized in this quote, we can give a more accurate renditionas
follows: substantial reality is to be ascribed to the attribute of
spatial extension, which isa real and intelligible thing-in-itself
and does not need to be an accident inhering in corporealsubstance,
rather than ascribe substantial reality to corporeal substance,
which we cannotconceive as dependent upon God, much less form any
coherent idea of it. Implicit in thisstatement, of course, is the
idea that the substantial reality of the attribute space is
dependentupon God, which is the basis for Newtons preference of the
DQE hypothesis.Newtons DQE hypothesis is therefore quite clear in
assigning to space a form of sub-stantial reality, an admission
that may help to elucidate Newtons earlier claim that
spaceapproaches more nearly to the nature of substance (22). In the
passage quoted directlyabove, spaceisdeclaredtohavesomesubstantial
reality, although, asanattributeofGod, it
isobviouslyneitherasubstancenoranaccident (i.e.,
givenhisrejectionofthesubstance/accident dichotomyregardingspace).
Thenon-substantivalist interpretationofNewtonis, accordingly,
quitecorrect inclaimingthat Newtonsabsolutespaceisnot asubstance.
Yet, given that space is emanative effect of a higher, incorporeal
being, the sub-stantial reality that Newton does bestow upon
extension makes it practically equivalentapproaches more nearlyto
the traditional substance concept: not only can space exist inthe
absence of all corporeal existents, but, on the DQE hypothesis,
spatial extension replacescorporeal substance as the container of
his mobile, determined bodily quantities (see, also,footnote 23).
Therefore, despite a minor tactical victory in rejecting space as a
substance, themore radical non-ontological and non-theological
reading of Newtons spatial theory cham-pioned by the strong
non-substantivalists is simply not upheld under a close scrutiny of
therelevant texts.4 Neo-Platonism and the Ontology of Space: More,
Charleton, NewtonNotwithstanding the evidence presented in Sects. 2
and 3, the strong non-substantivalistswould likely counter that the
traditional ontological conception of Newtons spatial theorycannot
satisfactorily explain two of its important features (while the
non-substantivalist inter-pretation can): rst, why did Newton
utilize affections/attributes in place of the more
familiaraccidents, as manifest in his well-known statement that
Space is an affection of a being justas a being (2004, 25)?; and
second, why is space associated with being just as a
being(ens/entis quatenus ens)? In this section, a more detailed
comparison of Newton, More, andCharleton, will help to shed light
on these mysteries. As will be argued, the second questiondiscloses
a predominate feature of the spatial ontologies of late seventeenth
century Englishnatural philosophy, which Newton shares with both
More and Charleton, whereas the rstquestion is indicative of
Newtons general discontent with the substance/accident
distinction,and in this manner marks a point of departure away from
Mores ontology towards the line1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of
Space 437favored by Gassendi-Charleton. The rationale for focusing
on the these two philosophers,More and Charleton, is that: rst,
their inuence on Newton is well-documented; and sec-ond, they
represent the two dominant positions in Newtons time on the
relevance of the sub-stance/accident dichotomy for space (with
Charleton sponsoring Gassendis popular solution;see Sect.
2).274.1Extension and AccidentsIf one seeks a rationale for Newtons
characterization of space as an attribute (or affection),a likely
candidate is the potential metaphysical difculties associated with
classifying spaceas an accident. In Mores later, Enchiridion
Metaphysicum (1671), space is an accident ofGod in the traditional
substance/accident sense, although More uses the term attribute,
andsometimes affection, instead of accident:The real attribute of
some real subject can be found nowhere else except where in thesame
place there is some real subject under it. And, indeed, extension
is the real attri-bute of a real subject . Indeed, we cannot not
conceive a certain immobile extensionpervading everything to have
existed from eternity and really distinct, nally, frommobile
matter. Therefore, it is necessary that some real subject be under
this extension,since it is a real attribute. (More 1995, 5657)More
is thereby led to conclude that spatial extension must be the
attribute of an incor-poreal substance, and, while the details are
not explicit, More seems to embrace the notionthat attributes
inhere in substances: extension indeed is in the real subject
(1995, 68).28In contrast, Walter Charletons popular tract, although
quite similar to Mores views in manyways, nevertheless parts
company with More by declaring that space is neither substance
noraccident, since it is more general than those two (Charleton
1654, 66), an opinion earlieradopted by Gassendi (1972,
384).2927See, Westfall (1962), and McGuire (1978a), on the
references within Newtons work to More and Charleton.Newtons early
notebook, Quaestiones quaedam Philosophicae (16611665, Cambridge
University Library,Ms Add. 3996, folios 88135), contains evidence
that he had read, at the least, both Charletons Physiologia,as well
as Mores, The Immortality of the Soul.28More tends to complicate
his hypothesis that space is Gods attribute by often referring to
space as anincorporeal substance; e.g., in the ensuing section of
the Enchiridion, he reasons that his theory utilizes
theverysamewayofdemonstrationwhichDescartesappliestoprovingspacetobeasubstance,althoughitbe
false in that he would conclude it to be corporeal (More 1995, 57).
More rejects Descartes theory ofspace for many of the very same
reasons that Newton provides in the De gravitatione (and other
works); forinstance, that Descartes theory cannot account for
possibility of a vacuum (which is conceivable). An earlyformulation
of this argument appears in An Antidote against Atheism (1655): If
after the removal of corporealmatter out of the world, there will
be still Space and distance, in which this very matter, while it
was there, wasalso conceived to lye, and this distant Space cannot
but be something, and yet not corporeal, because
neitherimpenetrable nor tangible, it must of necessity be a
substance Incorporeal, necessarily and eternally existent (More
1997a, 338). Mores penchant for conating space as Gods attribute
and space as identicalto Gods substance stands out clearly in this
last quote, and it may have prompted Newtons more carefulattempts
to deny the latter (see below).29Besides Newtons contemporary,
Joseph Raphson (see, Koyr 1957, Chap. 8), another Cambridge
neo-Platonistwhoheldthatspaceisanattribute/accident
ofGodisRalphCudworth(see, Grant1981,
230).However,thePatrizi-Gassendisolution,thatspaceisneitheraccidentnorsubstance,wasquitepopularinEngland:
besidesCharletonandBarrow,
oneshouldaddtheearlierneo-PlatonicphilosophiesofWarnerandHill (see,
Garber et al. 1998, 558561). For additional assessments of Mores
spatial theory, see,Boylan (1980),Copenhaver(1980),
and,forthetheologicalaspectsofNewtonstheory,Snobelen(2001).Palter
(1987, 395398) argues that More did not inuence greatly Newtons
criticisms of Cartesian
motion(intheDegravitatione):thisishighlydebatable,sincecriticismofDescartestheoryofspace,time,and1
3438 E.
SlowikWhilerejectingMoresaccidentconceptionofspace,NewtonsDQEthesis(fromtheDe
gravitatione) does resemble Mores theory in that all extended
things, whether body
orspirit,necessitatetheinnitespatialextensiongroundedinGodsexistence.Throughout,Newtonrepeatedlyclaimsthatextensiondoesnot
existasanaccidentinheringinsomesubject (2004, 22), and this
argument also surfaces much later (17191720) in a paragraphhe
intended for the Des Maizeaux edition of the Leibniz-Clarke
correspondence:TheReader isdesiredtoobserve, that wherever
inthefollowingpapersthroughunavoidable narrowness of language,
innite space or Immensity & endless durationor Eternity, are
spoken of as Qualities or Properties of the substance which is
Immenseor Eternal, the terms Quality & Property are not taken
in that sense wherein they arevulgarly, by the writers of Logick
& Metaphysics applied to matter; but in such a senseas only
implies them to be modes of existence in all beings, &
unbounded modes &consequences of the existence of a substance
which is really necessarily &substantiallyOmnipresent &
Eternal; Which existence is neither a substance nor a quality, but
theexistence of a substance with all its attributes properties
& qualities, . (Koyr andCohen 1962, 9697)In his correspondence
with Leibniz, Clarke had suggested that space is a property ofGod
(2000, 19, 30), and this may have prompted Newton, in the above
passage, to qualifyand correct Clarkes terminology and overall
argument. Since the term property is likelyto be taken as
synonymous with accident, and accidents are often regarded as
contingentfeatures of a beings existence, Newton reminds the reader
that space is not an accident, andthus space does not inhere in God
in the way bodily accidents inhere in
matter.Onthislastpoint,Carrieronotesthat,itisastandardtheologicalpositionthattherearenoaccidentsinGod(1990,
123), yet,
afurthergraveproblemwithviewingspatialextensionasGodsaccidentisthatencouragesamonisticconceptionofspace,suchthatall
lesser spatially extended entities partake of Gods extension, and
hence are located orinhere in God. Leibniz raises some of these
worries in the correspondence with Clarke: Ifinnite space is Gods
immensity, therefore we must say, that what is in space, is in
Godsimmensity, and consequently in his essence; Strange
expressions; which plainly show, thatthe author makes a wrong use
of terms (2000, 45; see, also, footnote 23). Furthermore, aswith
mundane material objects, there is a tendency to conceive the
inherence
relationshipbetweenanaccidentanditssubjectinsuchamannerthatthesubject,inthiscase,God,takes
on the accident, extension, along with all of the consequences
normally associated withextension, e.g., divisibility, location,
three-dimensionality. In the Enchiridion, More strivesto circumvent
this dilemma by ascribing to space some of the same incorporeal
features thatbelong to God, for example, that God and space are
both simple, i.e., indivisible, such thatthey lack separable parts
(More 1995, 58). It is not surprising, therefore, that More
ultimatelyconcludes on the basis of these similarities (among God
and space) that there are two types ofextension, namely, the
divisible extension of corporeal matter and the indivisible
extensionofincorporealspirit(withinnitespatialextensionbeinganattributeofthelatter;1995,Footnote
29 continuedmotion were a constant theme throughout Mores opus, and
thus he likely inspired the more potent series ofcounterarguments
that begin Newtons De gravitatione (albeit Newtons counterarguments
are indeed moredeveloped and unique in numerous ways). However,
Mores inuence on Newtons spirit-based ontology ofspace is a
separate issue from Mores inuence on his critique of Cartesian
motion.1 3Newtons Neo-Platonic Ontology of Space 439118: More
additionally infers the existence of physical monads, which would
constitutematters indivisible basic parts, 7181).304.2Nullibism and
HolenmerismMores conclusion that all being is spatially extended is
likewise supported by his rejectionof two popular hypotheses on the
relationship between God and space: rst, he rejects thenullibist
view favored by the Cartesians, among others, that God is nowhere
in space; and,second, he rejects holenmerism (or holenmerianism), a
belief common among the Scho-lastics, that God is whole in every
part of space (which thereby guarantees that God is notdivisible
even if matter and space are divisible; More 1995, 98148). Given
the rejection ofthese two hypotheses, the seemingly inevitable
outcome is that incorporeal spirit is extended,a conclusion also
adopted by Newtons neo-Platonist contemporary, Joseph Raphson
(see,Koyr 1957, Chap. 8).As with many of his spatial hypotheses,
Newtons anti-nullibist reasoning closely followsMores. As rst
disclosed in Sect. 2, Newton also reckons that both corporeal and
incorporealbeing are extended, as the much quoted passage from the
De gravitatione makes clear: afterdeclaring that, Space is an
affection of a being just as a being, he explains that, No
beingexists or can exist which is not related to space in some way.
God is everywhere,
createdmindsaresomewhere,andbodyisinthespacethatitoccupies;andwhateverisneithereverywhere
nor anywhere does not exist (2004, 25). A bit further, he adds: If
ever spacehad not existed, God at that time would have been
nowhere; and hence he either createdspace later (where he was not
present himself), or else, which is no less repugnant to reason,he
created his own ubiquity (26). As for Gassendi and Charleton, both
reject nullibism forthe same reasons as More, and thus their
natural philosophy may have also been a sourcefor Newtons
anti-nullibism: e.g., no substance can be conceived existent
without Place andTime (Charleton 1654, 66). On the other hand,
Gassendi accepts holenmerism (the divinesubstance is supremely
indivisible and whole at any time and any place; 1976, 94); as
does(presumably) Charleton (1654, 70).If Newton clearly articulates
his anti-nullibist philosophy, his opinions on holenmerismare more
difcult to discern. Indeed, the question as to the manner of Gods
relation to
exten-sionmaycomprisethemostcomplexandperplexingelementinhisspatialmetaphysics.Overall,
numerous passages in the De gravitatione, as well as some later
works, support aclose analogy between the extension of material
beings and Gods extension. He begins byexplaining that [space and
time] are affections or attributes of a being according to whichthe
quantity of any things existence is individuated to the degree that
the size of its presenceand persistence is specied (25). He then
proceeds to compare the quantity of existenceamong God and created
being: So the quantity of the existence of God is innite in
rela-30Moreclaimsthatspaceisindiscerpible,whichmeansitcanbedividedinthought,butnotactually(by
removing or tearing), and this explains why it is simple (1995,
123124). In addition, both More andCharleton believe that space is
incorporeal, and this belief is based largely on the idea that the
dimensions ofspace, like spirit, penetrate the dimensions of
corporeal substance (More 1995, 123124; Charleton 1654,68). Newtons
DQE hypothesis nicely captures this aspect of their philosophy,
since bodies are just parts ofspace endowed with material
propertiesconsequently, Newtons reference to the extension
(diffusion) ofmind throughout innite space (see Sect. 4.2) also
follows these earlier philosophies by closely associatingspace with
a spiritual entity. Yet, while both More and Charleton incorporate
two types of extension, i.e., anincorporeal extension that
penetrates corporeal extension, Newtons DQE hypothesis is more
parsimonious inthat it employs only one, namely, the divine
attribute of extension. Indeed, Newton never (to the best of
ourknowledge) refers to space as incorporeal (or immaterial, etc.),
a quite significant fact that is noted byMcGuire as well (1978a,
42, n. 38).1 3440 E. Slowiktion to the space in which he is
present; and the quantity of the existence of a created thingin
relation to the size of its presence, it is as great as the space
in which it is present (2526).This explanation suggests that God
and created beings do not differ as regards extension,contra
holenmerism, since the same, as it were, metricdubbed, quantity of
existenceapplies equally to both, but with the important exception
that God has an innite quantityof existence and created beings do
not (or need not). Yet, quantity of existence is a fairlymysterious
and undened notion in the De gravitatione, so it is difcult to draw
a specicconclusion based on this use of terminology.In the
subsequent passage, however, a better case can be made that Newton
does side withMores anti-holenmerist strategy: lest anyone should
for this reason imagine God to be likea body, extended and made of
divisible parts, it should be known that spaces themselvesare not
actually divisible (26). So, Newton not only fails to reject the
claim that God isextended, but he also claims, along with More,
that space is not really divisible. It wouldseem, therefore, that
the Newton of the De gravitatione, like More, may have regarded
theindivisibility of space as a solution to the controversy
concerning Gods potential divisibility(see, also, Janiak 2000,
224). Newton rounds out this discussion by drawing an
interestinganalogy between the extension of both Gods being and a
temporal moment: And justas we understand any moment of duration to
be diffused (diffundi) throughout all spaces,according to its kind,
without any concept of its parts, so it is no more