News Media and Peace Building in Asymmetrical Conflicts: The Flow of News between Jordan and Israel

News Media and Peace Building inAsymmetrical Conflicts: The Flow of Newsbetween Jordan and Israel

Gadi Wolfsfeld, Eitan Y. Alimi and Wasfi KailaniThe Hebrew University of Jerusalem

This study explores the role of the news media in asymmetrical conflicts after countries have signed apeace agreement. While most research has focused on the inherently negative role the press plays inattempts to bring peace, this study attempts to look at this issue using a more dynamic perspective. Thetheoretical argument focuses on how political factors affect the quantity and quality of the news flow andsome of the ways in which leaders can sometimes overcome the obstacles they face in promotingencouraging news about peace. The model considers two political factors that have a major impact onmedia performance: the relative level of political power of the two sides and the varying amount ofhostility. To illustrate the importance of these factors we focus on the flow of news between Jordan andIsrael between 1999 and 2002. The major findings from content analyses of news articles (N = 859)appearing in both countries show that while Jordanians are exposed to massive amounts of mostlynegative information about Israel, the Israeli public reads almost nothing about Jordan. Despite all this, itwas also found that the initiation of diplomatic relations between the former enemies allowed for thecreation of important ‘news slots’ that were previously unavailable. This development created space for lessthreatening types of news and also allowed leaders from both Jordan and Israel to initiate some positivestories about peace, even during some of the darkest periods.

The role of the news media in peace processes is an important topic that receivessurprisingly little attention in the field of conflict resolution.1 It should be clear,however, to even the most casual observers that the news media play a critical rolein attempts to lower hostilities among antagonists. The public, after all, receivesvirtually all of its information about ‘the other side’ from the media (Beaudoinand Thorson, 2002) and thus this flow of reports and images is likely to have asignificant effect on the political atmosphere surrounding any attempts atreconciliation.

The research that has been done until now is far from encouraging. It has beenfound that there is an inherent contradiction between the process associated withthe construction of news and the needs of a peace process (Galtung, 1998;Wolfsfeld, 2004). A successful peace process requires patience, and the newsmedia demand immediacy. Peace is most likely to develop within a calm envi-ronment and the media have an obsessive interest in threats and violence. Peacebuilding is a complex process and the news media deal with simple events.Progress towards peace requires at least a minimal understanding of the needs ofthe other side, but the news media reinforce ethnocentrism and hostility towards

doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00683.x

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adversaries. The standard definitions of what is considered news generally ensurea steady flow of negative and threatening information about the other side.2

A fuller assessment of the role of the news media in conflicts must also considerthe demonization of the enemy that normally precedes any peace process (Bar-Tal, 2000; Bronfenbrenner, 1990; Kempf, 2003; Mitchell, 1981). In times of warthe news media are major agents for mobilizing public support for the continueduse of violence. No peace process begins with a culturally blank slate, but rathera slate filled with terrible images of death and destruction that remain animportant element in collective memories.

This study attempts to contribute to the literature in this field in two ways. First,it will focus on the role of the news media at a later stage: after the two sides havesigned a formal peace agreement.While peace making usually rests on an initialmutual understanding by the parties involved that their respective interests will bebetter served by entering a peace process than continuing to fight, peace buildinghinges more upon ‘invisible effects’ of conflict rather than on physical effects only(Miall et al., 1999). To sustain peace it is imperative to go beyond the concernwith resolution of issues and interests to focus on the restoration and building ofrelationships between the populations involved (Lederach, 1997). There is goodreason to believe, then, that the role of the news media during this stage will bejust as important as at other stages of the process. As pointed out by YaacovBar-Siman Tov (2004), a stable peace can only be maintained if it is supported bya large proportion of the public.

The second way in which this study seeks to be innovative is to attempt to adopta more dynamic view of the role of the news media in peace processes.Althoughit is impossible to dispute the inherent tension between news and peace, it will beargued that the extent to which the media play a negative role tends to vary overtime and circumstance. Thus, we were especially interested in understandingthose circumstances in which the news media provide more encouraging storiesabout the other side.

We shall be looking into these issues by examining the flow of news betweenJordan and Israel in the period between 1999 and 2002. The two countries signeda formal peace agreement in October 1994 and went through a number of tenseperiods, especially with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the fall of 2000.Nevertheless, the leaders of both countries continually attempted to maintain andeven advance the peace between them. Thus, this particular case provides us withsome important evidence in our attempt to understand the variations in thequantity and quality of news flows within attempts to build peace.

We begin by proposing a theoretical framework for understanding the role of thenews media in peace processes and those factors that influence it. We thenproceed by describing the research conducted and its underlying logic. Afterpresenting and discussing main findings from the research, we conclude byoffering several theoretical implications for future research on the topic.

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Theoretical Framework

Political Power, Asymmetrical Conflicts and News Flow

International relations and conflict resolution scholars have long agreed that mostconflicts are asymmetrical, meaning that one antagonist is weaker and moredependent on the other. In fact, the bulk of conflicts in recent decades are lessabout honor, status and foreign policy and more about statehood and the role andstatus of nations and communities within states (Azar, 1991; Bercovitch, 1985;1986; Burton, 1987; 1990; Griffin, 1995; Holsti, 1996; Peleg, 1999). In asymmetri-cal conflicts the roots of the conflict lie not only in particular issues of interests,but also in the very structure of the relationship between the parties.

One of the consequences of this imbalance is that the stronger side always has lessneed to resolve the conflict than the weaker side.While it may be oppressive tobe an oppressor it is by far more oppressive to be oppressed (Miall et al., 1999, p.12). This should be especially true after a peace treaty is signed because thestronger side has even less reason to pay attention to the weaker side when thelatter is no longer considered even a minor threat. The Jordanian–Israeli case is noexception in that regard. Once the peace treaty was signed and Israel’s needs forrecognition and security were addressed, Jordan was hardly considered an issuefor most Israelis as was reflected in Israeli news media (Wolfsfeld et al., 2002).This was certainly not the case with Jordan which has been facing economic andsecurity issues even after the signing of the peace treaty in 1994 and especially inlight of the re-emerging wave of violence of September 2000 (Darrat and Hakim,2002).

In order to understand the effects of the relative power of the two sides on newsflow and peace building it is helpful to refer to a more general theoreticalconstruct. The Politics-Media-Politics (PMP) principle (Wolfsfeld, 2004) claimsthat changes in the political environment lead to changes in the way the mediaoperate which then lead to further changes in the political environment.3 Newsis best seen as a social construction in which journalists always employ a set ofworking assumptions about the nature of the political world. Thus, a peaceprocess (or a war) that enjoys a large amount of political consensus will be coveredvery differently from one which is considered controversial. This type of coveragewill then serve to reinforce further the level of consensus around such policiesbecause, inter alia, those who disagree with this consensus will be treated asextremists. These differences in the level of political consensus provided one ofthe reasons why the news media played a much more supportive role in theNorthern Ireland peace process than in the Oslo peace process between thePalestinians and the Israelis.

There are a number of scholars in the field of political communication who makesimilar points about the influence of the political environment on the way thenews media function. Daniel C. Hallin (1986) was one of the first to argue that

376 GADI WOLFSFELD, EITAN Y. ALIMI AND WASFI KAILANI


the changing role of the news media in the Vietnam War is best explained byinitial changes in the level of consensus among the US elite rather than majorchanges that were initiated by the news media (see also Bennett, 1990). PiersRobinson (2001; 2002) and Robert Entman (2004) present more complexmodels along this line and both these theories are also consistent with the PMPmodel. The major difference between the PMP principle and these otherapproaches is the emphasis on the cyclical nature of this dynamic and the attemptto include a broader view of political changes that can affect the ultimate role ofthe news media in political processes.

It is important to emphasize that, despite the emphasis on political factors, the roleof the news media in the PMP cycle is not a passive one. The news media havetheir own professional interests that have major effects on the construction ofnews stories. They do not only reflect political realities but they also activelytranslate them into news stories that are both interesting and culturally resonant.Thus, the fact that threats are always considered more newsworthy than abstracthopes has little do with political variations and everything to do with professionalnorms of what makes for a good story.

When it comes to the role of the news media in peace building, one of the firstaspects of the political environment to consider is the relative power of the twosides because this will have a direct impact on the flow of news (Alleyne, 1996).Consider, for example, the reduction in tension between the United States andLibya. This was clearly a major development for Libya in terms of lowering thelevel of threat posed by the United States and in raising the overall level ofinternational legitimacy of Libya. It is a much less important relationship for theUnited States, however, because Libya has never been considered a major threatto the national security of America.4 One of the important consequences of thislack of symmetry is that there is likely to be much more coverage of the UnitedStates in the Libyan press than coverage of Libya in the US.

The news media of the powerful and the weak have completely different newsroutines for covering one another. The more powerful country employs whatcould be referred to as a ‘distraction’ model for collecting news about theinternational periphery.5 Journalists from the more powerful country tend to keeptheir attention focused internally or on significant threats to themselves or theirallies. Only a major event that takes place on the international periphery (e.g.genocide in Rwanda) is likely temporarily to distract their attention. It can beargued that the weaker country has a similar set of priorities, but because it seesthe other side as a major threat its news media constantly monitor the other side.This lack of symmetry in the news flow takes place even if one country has a free,democratic press and the other a controlled press (as is the case with Israel andJordan, respectively). This discussion is reminiscent of the work that was done inthe 1970s and 1980s on the New International Information Order which favoredinternational efforts to reduce the imbalance in the amount and quality of news



flow between developed and developing countries (Fore, 1982; Stevenson andShaw, 1984).

Why is all this a problem? What difference does it make if the more powerfulcountry has much less news about the weaker country? Some might claim thatthis situation might even be a blessing.After all, a lack of news is certainly betterthan negative news. In other words: no news is good news. Journalistic indiffer-ence might allow policy-makers greater room for working behind the scenes intheir attempts to bring the countries closer together.

The problem is that unless the general public is involved in any attempts atreconciliation, peace between the two sides remains tentative and fragile (Bar-SimanTov, 2004). The central assumption underlying peace building is that theremust be continual efforts at solidifying any peace accord between former enemiesfor it to last. To put it differently, a general sense of goodwill can serve as a bufferwhen things go wrong between antagonists – as they almost always do. Inaddition, despite what was said about the advantages of indifference for policy-makers, political leaders may have little interest in dealing with issues that are nothigh on the public agenda. They are more likely to deal with immediate threatsthan those that have been relegated to history.

It may prove especially difficult to lower the level of hostility within the popu-lation of the weaker side. Although these citizens receive more news about themore powerful side, many of those stories are likely to be negative. The reason forthis has to do with the fact that, as indicated, news is much more likely to focuson conflict than on cooperation. In addition, if the weaker side feels that the morepowerful antagonist is ignoring them, this too can lead to a certain amount offrustration and anger among the weaker population.

Varying Levels of Hostility

This brings us to a second, more variable feature of the political environment thatcan influence media coverage: the level of hostility between the two sides at anyparticular point of time. Just as the path to peace is rarely smooth, the subsequentroad towards reconciliation has no shortage of potholes.Almost all countries haveissues and events that can sour relations between them and this is especially likelyto be the case with countries that have a history of violent conflict.

The level of hostility is likely to have two types of effects on the news media. Firstis what can perhaps best be called ‘the real world effect’.When there are actualevents (e.g. acts of political violence) that increase the level of tension between thetwo countries the news media will naturally focus on these events and coverageof the other side is likely to be negative. In addition, however, journalists alsomake editorial decisions about how much to highlight such incidents and how tointerpret them, and tend to carry out an active search for more bad news(Wolfsfeld, 2004).As the level of tension rises, political elites are also more likely



to promote hostile messages – partly because they want to exploit an opportunityfor more coverage – and this too can further raise the level of hostility.

The ways in which the news media can intensify the actual level of hostility canbest be explained using a metaphor. The level of political hostility can be thoughtof as fire, and news media coverage as wind. If there are no significant firesbreaking out, then the level of wind (how much coverage is given) becomes lesssignificant. As the fires become more frequent and intensive, however, the windbecomes a critical force in fanning the flames. This dynamic may be especiallydangerous within the weaker country because, as noted, that country’s press islikely to give much more coverage and attention to such events.

Despite this dynamic, it is reasonable to assume that the range of hostility betweentwo countries after the signing of a peace agreement will be different from theone that existed when they were enemies. If there is no imminent threat of warbetween the antagonists, negative coverage of the other side should be lessthreatening than that which existed before an agreement was signed. In addition,if political leaders have an interest in preserving or expanding the peace betweentheir nations, they can initiate constructive policies and actions that can generatemore reconciliatory news coverage.

One way to think about this last point has to do with the notion of news slots(Wolfsfeld, 2004). News slots can be defined as topic areas that are routinelycovered by journalists.6 The initiation of an ongoing peace process inevitablyleads to the creation of news slots that were unavailable in the past.An importantexample has to do with the opening of negotiations between two antagonists.Until such talks begin, the vast majority of news stories deal with the securitythreat posed by the enemy and the ongoing confrontation. Once negotiationshave begun editors must retool in order to cover a different type of news story.Journalists with knowledge and experience in diplomacy, for example, willbecome more important than those who cover the military beat. The fact that adiplomatic news slot has been opened may prove equally important after a peacetreaty has been signed for this provides a pathway for covering the normalizedrelations between the two countries.

The creation of less threatening news slots also provides opportunities for politicalleaders that were unavailable before relations were initiated. Thus, they caninitiate summits and meetings that can potentially serve as a counterbalance to themore negative news that is so common. This is one way such governments canmake peace at least a little bit more newsworthy.

There are both theoretical and methodological advantages in examining howmuch these news slots expand and shrink within varying political environments.First, instead of only focusing on the quantity of coverage, it provides a moredetailed understanding of the quality of news flowing between the two countries.Secondly, it can provide insights about which news slots provide opportunities for



the production of constructive news stories about peace and/or the other side.Finally, from a methodological perspective the division of news stories about theother side into different coverage topics is a procedure that can easily be trans-ferred among different cultural contexts.

A Summary

The central aim of this research is to understand better the ways in which newsflow can vary between countries engaged in a peace-building process. Whileprevious studies have focused exclusively on the inherently negative role of thenews media in attempts at reconciliation, we seek to suggest a more dynamicapproach. There would be little point in conducting this type of research if thenews media always played the same destructive role in every situation. One of thegoals of this study is to learn something about those contexts in which the newsmedia can also contribute something constructive to peace-building efforts.Given this aim, a special effort will be made to focus on those factors that raiseand lower the quantity and quality of the flow of information between the twosides.

It is believed that the theoretical principles developed here can be helpful inunderstanding the flow of news in similar types of conflict in other settings.Nevertheless, the explanatory variables presented should only be seen as a verypartial list of the types of political and media factors that can affect efforts atreconciliation.

The Political and Media Environments in Jordan and Israel

When compared to most attempts at conflict resolution, the peace processbetween Jordan and Israel was relatively short and simple (Eisenberg and Caplan,2003).Although the two countries fought two wars (1948 and 1967) and a ‘warof attrition’ (1968–70) both maintained back-door communication and coop-eration channels, especially during times of crisis. Since the Mandatory period,the Zionist leaders (and later Israel) saw the Hashemite regime in Jordan as theleast hostile of their Arab neighbors and as a political and geographic bulwarkagainst their more extreme enemies such as Syria and Iraq (Susser, 2000). Israelisalso had a remarkably favorable opinion of the late King Hussein (Rubinstein,2004). The king was considered an extremely charismatic leader who exudedtrust and a genuine desire for peace. The fact that both countries linked them-selves to Western countries (i.e. primarily the US and the UK) also contributedto a relatively smooth process towards agreement.

The Palestinian issue has always played a major part in Jordanian–Israeli relations(Nevo, 2003; Susser, 1992). Massive numbers of Palestinian refugees fled to Jordanduring the wars in 1948 and 1967, a fact that had a devastating impact on thecountry. In the 1970s and 1980s the Jordanian leadership feared that an Israeli plan



to transfer Palestinians from the West Bank to the East Bank would result inJordan becoming a Palestinian state, at the expense of the Hashemites and theinterests of Transjordanians (Lynch, 1999). Israel and Jordan often feel threatenedby dynamic manifestations of Palestinian nationalism and self-determination,particularly following the armed clash between the Hashemite regime and thePalestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1970 (‘the Black Sep-tember’). This helps explain why the large number of Palestinians living in Jordanhave been a source of both conflict and cooperation between the two countries(Ginat and Winckler, 1998).

The fact that so many Jordanians (up to 65 per cent of all Jordanian citizens) areeither Palestinian in origin or related to Palestinians means that every variation inPalestinian–Israeli relations has an immediate effect on Jordanian–Israeli relations.If not for the initial optimism associated with the Oslo peace process, it is hard tobelieve that Jordan would have been willing even to begin negotiations withIsrael. The Jordanian–Israeli peace accord was signed in October 1994,only a yearafter the Oslo accords had been signed by the Palestinians and Israel.

When Binyamin Netanyahu became prime minister of Israel in May 1996, headopted less conciliatory policies towards the Palestinians and this served to sourrelations with Jordan. The election of Ehud Barak in May 1999, on the otherhand, led to an increase in optimism in the area. Barak brought about thewithdrawal of Israel from Southern Lebanon in May 2000 and entered intoserious negotiations with both Syria and the Palestinians. The lowest point inpost-peace relations between Jordan and Israel took place after the outbreak ofthe Second Intifada in late September 2000, shortly after which Jordan reacted toIsraeli policies by recalling the country’s ambassador. These different periods willserve as focal points for examining the effects of varying levels of hostility on thenews flow between the two countries.

There is one more dimension of the two political environments that is importantto note. The Israeli elites and general public have always been much moresupportive of ‘normalizing’ relations between the two countries than theircounterparts in Jordan (Scham and Lucas, 2003). To put it differently, many, if notmost Jordanians oppose the very idea of building peace with Israel which hastraditionally been seen as ‘the enemy’ (Lynch, 1999, p. 166). The major explana-tion for this can again be traced to the fact that the Palestinian–Israeli conflictremains unresolved. For Israelis the conflict with Jordan is over, while forJordanians it is very much alive.

This brings us to the description of the media environments in the two countries.The Israeli news media are comparable to most other Western countries.Whilethere is a certain amount of government supervision over the broadcast media,newspapers (which will be the focus of the present study) are independent andcommercial. There are four daily national newspapers, two of which wereincluded in this study.By far the most popular newspaper is Yediot Achronot,which



maintains a semi-tabloid format that includes both a good deal of ‘popular’content as well as some serious political analysis. The Israeli media environmentis thought to be relatively sensationalist, especially concerning security issues(Caspi and Limor, 1999; Wolfsfeld, 2004). One consequence of such an editorialpreference would be to emphasize events tied to concrete threats and violencerather than more long-term issues – such as Israel’s relations with Jordan.

The newspaper Ha’aretz, on the other hand, is a serious broadsheet aimed at themore elite elements of society. This is the major reason for its relatively low levelof circulation. It is also considered the most liberal of the daily newspapers anddevotes proportionally more space to foreign news and Arab affairs.

The media environment in Jordan is more complex. The newspapers have acertain amount of independence but it is forbidden to criticize the king and/orthe royal family. The journalists’ union (the Association of Jordanian Journalists)has always expressed hostility towards Israel in keeping with what they believe arethe feelings of most Jordanians (Wolfsfeld, 2004). Indeed, any Jordanian journalisthaving contact with Israelis runs the risk of being expelled from the union andboycotted by other journalists. On the other hand, editors cannot go too far incriticizing the ‘normalization’ process with Israel because this is the king’s officialpolicy. From time to time, the government questions journalists to assess their rolein creating problems with friendly or neighboring countries. Such questioningcould develop into different kinds of punishment, such as investigation or evenimprisonment. Thus, Jordanian journalists find themselves trying to balance thecompeting demands of their readers and the monarchy.7

For most of Jordan’s media history the majority of newspapers have beenbroadsheets, except for the last post-1989 period (period of democratization,liberalization and privatization – see, for example, Ryan [2002]), which witnessedthe appearance of different kinds of commercial, more liberal, more sensationaland party papers.8 The two major national dailies are Al-Ra’y and Al-Dustur.Al-Ra’y tends to reflect the government’s views and policy; traditionally formalannouncements and governmental declarations have been vocalized through thisdaily.Al-Dustur is well known for its opinions section and opinionated journalists.Jordanians who look for analytical news buy Al-Dustur while those who look forwider, somewhat more popular coverage buy Al-Ra’y.

Methods

Studying the role of the news media in the attempts at building peace betweenJordan and Israel provides a useful case for exploring these ideas. As noted, thepeace process that led to the signing of the peace agreement between the twocountries was relatively short and cordial (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2003, p. 87) andthis was reflected in media coverage of the process leading up to the actualsigning, especially in Israel. However, a previous study that was carried out after



Binyamin Netanyahu became prime minister in 1996 suggested that as timepassed the role of the news media in both countries became more negative(Wolfsfeld et al., 2002).

In this study we will be examining a longer time frame and asking differentresearch questions.As discussed, we are interested in looking more closely at howthe quantity and quality of news reflects the relative level of power of the twocountries and the level of hostility at different points of time. In addition, we areinterested in exploring the types of news stories that manage to overcome all ofthe obstacles discussed and provide a more positive image of the other side.Sometimes researchers can learn as much from studying exceptions to the rules asthey do from studying the norm.

We focused our attention on newspaper stories9 published over a four-yearperiod: 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2002. This time period provided us witha variety of political environments that enabled us to investigate how differentlevels of hostility influenced the flow of news between the two countries. Twonewspapers were used from each country: Yediot Achronot and Ha’aretz from Israeland Al-Ra’y and Al-Dustur from Jordan. First, different dates were randomlyselected from each of the four years. It was decided that it was best to focus onthe same dates in both Israel and Jordan. Thus, holiday and fasting dates in whichnewspapers were not published in one of the countries were excluded. In Israelit was decided to limit the analysis to the first three pages of every issue, whichusually constitute the news section. In Jordan, however, this strategy had to besomewhat modified because of two special sections that deal specifically with theconflict: ‘Palestinian News’ and ‘Arab and International News’.10 Whenever agiven article appeared in the news section and continued in subsequent pages, theentire article was analyzed.

The decision as to why a given article was chosen for analysis rested on theappearance of ‘keywords’. In the Israeli newspapers we used keywords such as‘Jordan’ and/or ‘King Hussein’ and/or ‘King/Prince Abdullah’; in the Jordaniannewspapers we used the keywords ‘Israel’ and/or ‘Palestine’ and/or the ‘occupiedlands/territories’ – and, again, only if those keywords appeared in the headline orthe sub-head or the first paragraph of an article was its content analyzed.11 Weended up with a sample of 3,108 news articles in the Jordanian press and 82articles in the Israeli press. Due to the difficulty in handling such a massivenumber of Jordanian news articles we decided to reduce the sample to a moremanageable size using a systematic sampling procedure (every fourth article). Thisresulted in a sample size of 777 news articles representing one-quarter of theoriginal sample for Jordan.

Measurement and Variables

A coding sheet was constructed for the purpose of analyzing the content ofthe news articles, comprising a variety of operational items/questions. Two



types of coding questions were used. The first type of coding questions dealtwith the more technical and objective features of the news articles (e.g. ‘pagenumber’ or ‘size’). The second type of coding questions dealt with the moresubjective and interpretive features of the text (e.g. ‘nature of coverage’ or‘aspect of interest’).

The variables ‘aspect of interest’ and ‘nature of coverage’ were central to ourattempt to examine the quality of information about the ‘other’. The variable‘aspect of interest’ deals with news slots or specific topic areas covered. The coderswere asked to identify the main topic area on which the article focused (‘Towhich of the following aspects would you relate the article?’) and were providedwith a list of possible aspects.After comprising a list of aspects and performing thepilot and testing for inter-coders reliability, we ended up with four aspects/topics:‘Economy’; ‘Political/International’; ‘Internal/Cultural’; and ‘Security/Intifada’.12

We also provided the possibility of ‘Other’ (e.g. a lament about King Hussein),which was excluded from the analysis given the small amount of cases in thiscategory. Due to overlaps we asked the coders to identify three possible news slotsemphasizing the importance of listing the most important one first.

The news articles were also divided into three evaluative categories in order togauge the overall valence of the story: positive, mixed/unclear and negative.13

Making such distinctions is never easy, but coders in both countries were giveninstructions that increased the reliability of the coding. Focusing on linguisticelements (e.g. superlatives, depictions, catchphrases, etc.), the coders were asked toconsider the perspective of the average Jordanian or Israeli.Was the news storythey had read more likely to leave a more positive impression about the othercountry, a more negative one or neither?14 If the answer was neither, or if theywere at all unsure about the answer, they were asked to code the story asmixed/unclear.

Before the actual coding of the news articles we performed a pilot test designedto check the applicability of the questions and the response categories. For thatpurpose, we selected 40 articles, making sure they encompassed a vast array ofevents, dates and newspapers, and coded them according to the coding sheet.Asa result, various changes were made in the questions such as altering the wordingof specific questions or the wording of categories, further distinguishing betweencategories or combining categories. We then tested for inter-coders reliability.Two coders in each country were trained and provided with an identical set of40 coding items/news articles to be coded independently.15 The inter-coderreliability (using Scott’s pi) results ranged between 0.79 and 0.88 for the codingquestions used in the analysis below.

Results

Our first claim deals with the effects that differences in political power have onthe flow of information between the parties.We assumed that the asymmetry in



political power would be reflected in the amount of news about the other sidethat is published in each country. The findings presented in Table 1 provide apowerful demonstration of this dynamic. As noted, the figures are based on asample of 50 days/newspaper issues and an annual estimate based on this sample.16

The differences between the countries are striking. There is a river of informa-tion flowing to the Jordanian public about Israel and a mere trickle of storiesflowing in the opposite direction. The ordinary Jordanian reads at least twelvetimes more about Israel over a year than the average Israeli does about Jordan(based on the fact that most Israelis read Yediot Achronot). Israel is clearly consid-ered a major actor by the Jordanian press and Jordan is considered (at best) aminor player by Israel.

There are also some interesting differences between the different newspapers,especially in Israel. As we expected, the more elitist newspaper Ha’aretz is morelikely to cover Jordan than the more popular paper Yediot, although evenHa’aretz’s readers will have the chance to see only about two articles a week.Although the differences are smaller, the Jordanian newspaper Al-Ra’y providesmore coverage of Israel than Al-Dustur. This may be due to Al-Ra’y’s havingmore extensive contacts with international news agencies and a bigger reportingstaff. This finding reinforces our claim that – however important – looking atpolitical variables does not provide a complete explanation for the constructionof news stories. The news media also make independent decisions about whichtypes of news will be of interest to their readers.

Varying Political Environments and the Flow of News

We now turn to the influence of changing political environments on the flow ofnews between the two countries. We chose to look at the three very differentpost-agreement periods that were described above. The first period (1 January1999 to 18 May 1999) was dominated by increasing tension between thePalestinians and Israel due to the rise of the right-wing government led by Prime

Table 1: Estimated Average Number of Articles per Year in the Jordanian andIsraeli Press

Number of articles by yearIsrael

(Yediot)Israel

(Ha’aretz)Jordan

(Al-Dustur)Jordan

(Al-Ra’y)

1999 49 104 338 6882000 12 55 381 6942001 67 104 485 8352002 18 104 651 700Average estimate per year 37 92 463 730N articles per week 0.8 2.1 10.5 16.5



Minister Netanyahu. This period also included one major event in Jordan – thedeath of King Hussein – that received a considerable amount of sympatheticcoverage in Israel.As noted, the second era (19 May 1999 to 28 September 2000)was, for the most part, a time of relative optimism in the Middle East. It beganwith the election of Prime Minister Ehud Barak who entered into seriousnegotiations with both Syria and the Palestinians, and for a time it seemed as ifpeace was possible. It is important also to note that there were no major events inJordan during this period that generated a good deal of news interest in Israel.The final period (29 September 2000 to 31 December 2002), coinciding with theSecond Intifada, included the withdrawal of the Jordanian ambassador from Israel.There were two other noteworthy events that took place during this period.A border clash occurred in December 2001 in which an Arab gunman killedan Israeli soldier and wounded three others, and a US diplomat was murderedin Amman in December 2002.

As discussed, it is critical to look at both the quantity and quality of news flow. Ifwe return to the metaphor of the river, any potential impact on the environmentwill be determined by both the volume of water and the extent to which it ispolluted. Even if a certain amount of positive news about the other side shouldbreak through it will have little impact if it comes in such small quantities that fewmembers of the public even notice. This point can be better understood bylooking at the findings that are presented in Table 2.

The first thing to note is how unlikely it is for citizens in Israel or in Jordan toreceive encouraging news about the other side. Apart from one exception theproportion of negative news about the other side is always greater than theproportion of positive news.Even during the more optimistic period when Barakwas prime minister, the Jordanian press had almost twice as many negative storiesabout Israel as positive stories. The one exception to this rule is the Israeli presscoverage of Jordan during the Barak period, in which 39 per cent of the storiesare positive. Even here, however, one could hardly consider this very significantbecause (first) it is also the period in which the total number of Israeli news storiesabout Jordan is extremely small and (second) it tends to be an Israeli ethnocentricperspective which, only indirectly, portrayed Jordan in a positive light. Thefollowing excerpt from Ha’aretz (3 September 1999, p. 2) is indicative in that itportrays Jordanian measures against Hamas as positive and contributing to Israel’sown struggle against the movement:

Defense Echelon: Jordanian moves against Hamas are ‘historic’

Satisfaction on both the political and defense echelons at the moves taken by Jordanin the last couple of days against the Jordanian-based Hamas leadership. Highdefense official told Ha’aretz yesterday that:‘These are dramatic moves of historicalsignificance’. This week, Jordanian police force raided several Hamas offices inAmman and arrested some of the movement’s top activists while declaring otherswanted ...‘We have been demanding this ever since signing Oslo’ [said the defensesource] ‘but this time it appears to be fully implemented’.



Tabl

e2:

Tone

ofN

ewsp

aper

Cove

rage

inTw

oCo

untr

ies

duri

ngTh

ree

Peri

ods

Posi

tive

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ed/in

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ativ

eN

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timat

edar

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spe

rwee

kPe

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cles

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ntpa

ge

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anya

huer

aJo

rdan

11.3

%(6

)35

.8%

(19)

52.8

%(2

8)53

17.1

255

%Is

rael

11.8

%(2

)23

.5%

(4)

64.7

%(1

1)17

5.49

24%

Bara

ker

aJo

rdan

19.9

%(5

1)42

.2%

(108

)37

.9%

(97)

256

22.7

851

%Is

rael

38.5

%(5

)42

.6%

(6)

15.4

%(2

)13

1.16

39%

Intif

ada

era

Jord

an15

%(7

0)26

.6%

(124

)58

.4%

(272

)46

625

.83

42%

Isra

el19

.2%

(10)

44.2

%(2

3)36

.5%

(19)

522.

8319

%

Not

es:

Sam

ple

size

:Jor

dan

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06).



Given the fact that there is about one article a week about Jordan – and it is morethan likely not on the front page17 – only the most interested of Israelis is likelyto notice them. The results from the Barak period reinforce the conclusion thatwhen things are relatively good between the two countries the Israeli news mediahave even less interest in covering Jordan. One of the ironies about news andpeace building is that as soon as journalists can cross the border to cover the otherside, they have little motivation to do so. It is worth noting that no Israeli newsmedium has a correspondent permanently stationed in Amman.

The second and more obvious finding is that the proportion of positive andnegative stories is directly influenced by the level of tension between the coun-tries. Thus, the most negative coverage in both countries is during the Netanyahuperiod and during the Intifada. More intriguing, however, is the fact that quite afew positive stories do break through even in the darkest periods. Thus, it issomewhat surprising that 15 per cent of Jordanian news stories are positive duringthe long and bloody period of the Intifada. Given the importance of focusing onhow such stories break through the wall of hostility, we shall return to this issuebelow.

Table 2 also gives fairly clear evidence of the different coverage norms in the twocountries. As discussed, Israeli journalists relate to Jordan as part of the Arabperiphery and thus unless something major happens there is no reason even tolook in that direction. We have referred to this as the ‘distraction’ model ofreporting. This routine also leads to a much greater variance in the number ofstories about Jordan in Israel. Thus, due primarily to the death of King Husseinduring the Netanyahu era, one finds 4.7 times more stories about Jordan duringthis period than during the Barak era when there were no major Jordanian eventsof interest to Israel. The Jordanian press, on the other hand, is constantlymonitoring what Israel is doing and thus the variance among the different periodsis significantly lower. The amount of coverage during the intensive period of theSecond Intifada is only 1.5 times more intensive than during the Netanyahuperiod.

The Importance of News Slots

In order to learn more about variations in the quality of news (i.e. positive ornegative stories) we examined the actual coverage of topics.As discussed, exam-ining news slots is important for they provide a deeper understanding about thetrue nature of news flow between the two countries during different politicalperiods.We were especially interested in trying to learn about which slots providesignificant amounts of encouraging news about the other side.

For that purpose the measures were standardized using the following procedure.First, since we were interested in examining variations among three different timeperiods of both quantity and quality of news only the first and primary news slot



(i.e. ‘aspect of interest’) that appeared in a given article was included. Second, toallow comparison between three different periods we used a measure that wasbased on the average number of news stories per month for each period. Thus,the number for each ‘aspect’ represents the number of stories divided by thenumber of news stories per month.18 Finally, a positive news ‘score’ was con-structed based on the percentage of the positive stories category for each newsslot in each period.

The results relating to Jordanian news about Israel (Figure 1) provide us with amore detailed understanding of the news flow. The first thing to note is howvarious news slots expand and contract in reaction to changing political circum-stances. The reason why this is important is that bad news about security issuesis likely to have a very different impact on peace building than bad news on thepolitical/diplomatic front. The impact of learning that Israelis are killing Pales-tinians is likely to be very different in Jordan from learning that there has been abreakdown in peace talks between the two sides. Seen in these terms, thedifferences between the media image of Israel during the Second Intifada andthe other two periods become much more meaningful than is indicated by theforegoing analysis of variations in the quality of coverage.

The category with the most positive topics over time is the political/diplomaticslot. Even during the bloody period of the Second Intifada stories about politicaland diplomatic developments managed to get a significant amount of encourag-ing coverage in the Jordanian press.A closer look at these stories reveals that many

Figure 1: News Slots Concerning Israel in the Jordanian Press in Three PoliticalPeriods

0.91.6

0.3

4.1

0.3

5

0.4

4.3

0.3

4.4

0.6

6.8

0

2

4

6

8

Mo

nth

ly n

um

ber

of

Art

icle

s

Netanyahu (Jan. 1,1999 -- May 18, 1999)

Barak (May 19, 1999 --Sep. 29, 2000)

Intifada (Sep. 30, 2000-- Dec. 31, 2002)

Economy (Positive News = Netanyahu: 20% / Barak: 0% / Intifada: 10%)

Political/Diplomatic (Positive News = Netanyahu: 55.6% / Barak: 37.4% / Intifada: 37.4%)

Internal/Cultural (Positive News = Netanyahu: 0% / Barak: 25% / Intifada: 20%)

Security/Intifada (Positive News = Netanyahu: 0% / Barak: 14% / Intifada: 4.4%)

*N total = 640 – Netanyahu 39/Barak 199/Intifada 402



of them are based on initiatives by the king of Jordan that emphasized both theneed and the possibility of continuing the peace process.19 The following articleappeared in Al-Ra’y (31 July 2002, p. 1) and demonstrates how leaders can initiatepositive news about peace by exploiting the diplomatic slot that becomes availableafter a peace agreement is signed:

His Majesty sets up a working visit to the US and meets Bush tomorrow.The King: ‘it is time to settle peace and justice for the two Palestinianand Israeli peoples’

Jordan succeeded in creating a new track in the Middle East ... Call for a compre-hensive process that involves the Syrian and Lebanese tracks

Colorado-Petra: His Majesty King Abdullah the Second said that Jordan looksforward to a settlement with peace and justice for the two Palestinian and Israelipeoples through a just and comprehensive solution that ends the occupation,establishes an independent Palestinian state, and guarantees security for Israel.

As discussed, both King Hussein and his successor King Abdullah invested atremendous amount of political capital in the peace process with Israel. Add tothat the fact that the newspapers in Jordan are expected to emphasize themonarchy’s positions and activities and we begin to get a clearer picture of howpositive stories about peace with Israel managed to break through. Thus, duringthe Second Intifada,one finds quite a few stories in which King Abdullah is tryingto work with a variety of international parties (e.g. Egypt and the US) to bringabout a ceasefire between the two sides. The opening of the political/diplomaticchannel allowed leaders to generate news stories that provided a certain coun-terweight to the more usual news about violence in the territories. Althoughmuch of the political/diplomatic news is also negative, some of these storiesprovide at least some hope that things will improve. This demonstrates howleaders – or at least those with some control over the news media – can have aninfluence on the flow of news even during periods of crisis.

It is also interesting that the economic slot brought so little good news. ManyJordanians have complained over the years that peace with Israel never broughtthem the ‘fruits of peace’ that were promised. There is little indication that theyreceived any different impression from their news media. There were relativelyfew economic stories that were linked to cooperation with Israel and even theones that appeared were not particularly positive.20 Leaders who hope to useeconomic benefits as a means of solidifying peace face at least two majorobstacles. First, given the fact that the media cover events rather than processes,any gradual improvement in the economy is unlikely to generate much coverage.Second, even if the economy does improve and does get coverage, such benefitsmay not necessarily be linked to the peace process. The evidence about whetheror not the Jordanian economy actually benefited from the peace agreement withIsrael is mixed, so we take no stand on this issue.21

The analysis turns to the news about Jordan that appeared in the Israeli press(Figure 2). It was decided to maintain the same scale as was used in the Jordanian



graph in order to provide a more accurate reflection of the very differentquantities of coverage. As noted, there is little point in talking about the qualityof news coverage without also considering the number of articles that appeared.

There are really only two news slots that are worth referring to: the political/diplomatic slot and the security slot. The appearance of stories in all the othercategories is far too infrequent to have any real impact on attitudes concerningJordan. Some could argue that it is foolhardy to examine even these twocategories, given the small amount of coverage. However, at the risk of beingaccused of clutching at straws, it was again hoped that such an analysis would shedsome light on which news slots bring some positive news about Jordan to Israelis.

The first finding has to do with the fact that, unlike the case of Jordan, thesecurity slot receives less attention than the political/diplomatic category. Thisresult is a useful reminder of the fact that Israel does not see Jordan as a serioussecurity threat and this serves to ‘soften’ the image of the other country – inaddition to lowering interest in it. Even during the period of the Second Intifada,Israelis were more likely to read about Jordan’s political and diplomatic effortsthan to read about any security threats linked to the Hashemite kingdom.

Similar to what was found in the Jordanian press, the political/diplomatic slot isthe most positive of the news categories.Although there were still more negativestories than positive, some encouraging coverage did break through. Here too,

Figure 2: News Slots Concerning Jordan in the Israeli Press in Three PoliticalPeriods

0.1

2.3

00.5

00.5

0 0.1 00.7

0.1 0.1

0

2

4

6

8

Mo

nth

ly N

um

ber

of

Art

icle

s

Netanyahu (Jan. 1,1999 -- May 18, 1999)

Barak (May 19, 1999 --Sep. 29, 2000)

Intifada (Sep. 30, 2000-- Oct. 31, 2002)

Economy (Positive News = Netanyahu: 0% / Barak: -- / Intifada: 66.7%)

Political/Diplomatic (Positive News = Netanyahu: 15.4% / Barak: 40% / Intifada: 26.9%)

Internal/Cultural (Positive News = Netanyahu: -- / Barak: -- / Intifada: 25%)

Security/Intifada (Positive News = Netanyahu: 0% / Barak: 50% / Intifada: 0%)

*N total = 68 – Netanyahu 17/Barak 12/Intifada 39

When all cases in a given category are considered/coded as bad news it should be ‘0%’ of positive news. However,when there are no cases at all in a given new category it should be ‘--’.



one finds that leaders’ diplomatic efforts were the key to generating such cov-erage. In February 2002, for example, when the Second Intifada was still raging,Saudi Arabia came out with a peace initiative. Egypt and Jordan called on Israelto accept it, and Prime Minister Sharon asked for ‘clarifications’ from thosecountries. The prospects for a genuine peace initiative and the role played byKing Abdullah and President Mubarak were positively covered by Ha’aretz in anarticle from 27 February 2002 p. 1:

Bush Congratulates the Saudi Peace Initiative: European Convoy LeftJerusalem for Riyadh

Sharon: willing to accept clarifications from the Saudis; Egypt and Jordan call onIsrael to comply

Abdullah king of Jordan and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak met yesterday inCairo to discuss the Saudi peace initiative ... According to Jordanian royal sources,the two talked about coordination of their positions in light of the upcoming Arableaders’ summit to take place in Beirut at the end of March.Shortly after Abdullah’sreturn to Amman it was reported the two leaders called upon Israel to ‘respondpositively’ to the Saudi peace initiative in order to reach a comprehensive peace inthe Middle East.

Interestingly, the differences between Ha’aretz and Yediot in terms of the use of thepolitical/diplomatic slot are striking. During all three time periods, the relativeportion of news stories coded as political/diplomatic in Ha’aretz was significantlybigger than that in Yediot. Specifically, during the Netanyahu period the political/diplomatic slot appeared 28 times (62 per cent) in Ha’aretz compared to 17 times(38 per cent) in Yediot; during the Barak period there were 31 references (91 percent) to political/diplomatic issues in Ha’aretz compared to only 3 references (9per cent) in Yediot; and 79 references (72 per cent) to political/diplomatic issuesin Ha’aretz compared to 31 (28 per cent) references in Yediot during the Intifadaperiod.22 The willingness of newspapers to construct these types of stories isdirectly related to their editorial assumptions about their readers.

It is unlikely, of course, that any of this had much influence on Israelis’ images ofJordan or more generally on their beliefs about the possibility for building peacein the region. There was really only one important story during all of theseperiods, the ongoing and often violent conflict with the Palestinians.When theIsraeli public is constantly being confronted with the deafening roar associatedwith so much death and destruction, they are unlikely to pay much attention tothose few news stories that point in a somewhat different direction. The natureof news, after all, is rooted in human nature. People will always pay far moreattention to immediate and concrete threats that are happening in front of themthan any hopeful developments that take place far away in the political distance.

Conclusions

The goal of this study was to understand better the role of the news media inpeace building in asymmetrical conflicts. It was argued that while the news media



usually play a negative role in such efforts, the actual flow of news varies over timeand circumstance. The two political factors considered in this study were therelative level of political power and the varying level of political hostility. Inaddition to demonstrating the validity of these basic theoretical principles, theresearch was also devoted to exploring the ways in which leaders managed topromote peace stories despite the inherent contradiction between news andpeace.

The effect of both of the political factors on the flow of information between thetwo countries was striking. The people of Jordan receive a completely differentview of the relations between the two countries than their counterparts in Israel.They are flooded with information about Israel and most of it is negative. Thecitizens of Israel, on the other hand, have little reason even to think about Jordanunless something unusually dramatic happens. It could be of course that we aremaking too much of this lack of symmetry in the flow of information.After all,it will be the political realities on the ground more than how they are reportedand framed that are most likely to influence the chances of a lasting peace in thearea. Nevertheless, given the fact that the vast majority of citizens learn abouttheir present and former enemies through the news media, it is important to havea better understanding of the role the press can play in attempts at peace building.

Our major conclusions were generally pessimistic, but there were a few rays ofhope. The pessimism comes from two findings. The first has to do with theinherent contradiction between the news-making process and the needs of peace:bad news will almost always trump good news and the fact that two countrieshave signed a peace accord does not change this basic fact. The second source ofpessimism comes from the fact that political power breeds a certain amount ofcontempt.While some differences were found in the different newspapers, it isalmost impossible to convince editors and owners from the more powerfulcountry to give up the profits associated with ethnocentric coverage for the sakeof something as abstract as peace building.

There are, however, two more encouraging findings. First, leaders can, even in themost difficult situations, initiate stories that provide some hope to their people.Revealingly, this was most likely to happen in Jordan, probably because of thelevel of control the monarchy has over the news media. Nevertheless, it doessuggest that leaders can have a positive influence on the tone of coverage. Thesecond note for optimism has to do with the notion of changing news slots. Thepoint to remember is that once a peace treaty has been signed, it not only createsa new set of political structures, it also generates novel news structures for covering theother side. As discussed, even negative stories about diplomatic and economicrelations between the countries remind people that something has fundamentallychanged and that ‘normalization’ is possible, which, in turn, prepares the groundfor further political initiatives.

The process is a dynamic one and, as usual, many questions remain open. Threesuch questions come to mind, which point to promising future research. The first



has to do with exploring further the causes for variations in the relative weightof those factors that influence media coverage.As we have seen, there were timesin which even at the highest level of hostility between the parties good newsabout the other side did get through.While we have pointed to the importanceof leadership initiatives as one possible determinant there is no doubt that otherdeterminants of media coverage are at work such as critical events and culturalresonance. Future research would have to look at the effects of these determinantsjointly and separately.

The second question has to do with the expected influence of transnationalmedia outlets (e.g. Al Jazeera) on the peace-building process. Our theoreticalframework is based on state-centered, local media, yet there is no doubt that theincreased consumption of cross-border information flow influences what publicson both sides know, and how they think about each other. Yet caution should beemployed not to speak of transnational media effects as if they are independent oftransnational political forces. Just as transnational media institutions are at work,so are supranational political institutions.

The third and final question has to do with how these variations in news flowinfluence people’s images of the other side. This is perhaps the most difficultquestion but also one of the most important. As noted, the news media providealmost all the information citizens have about the other side and thus it is hard tobelieve that the nature of news does not have an impact on mutual images.Nevertheless, assessing the extent and type of influence on publics represents anextremely demanding challenge for researchers.

Hopefully, however, this study provides additional insights as to how researcherscan approach these issues in order to gain a better understanding of the role of thenews media in peace building.

(Accepted: 16 January 2007)

About the AuthorsGadi Wolfsfeld, Department of Political Science,The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; email: [email protected]

EitanY.Alimi, Department of Political Science,The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; email: [email protected]

Wasfi Kailani, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;email: [email protected]

NotesWe want to thank the European Commission for their generous support of this research, the Harry S.Truman Institutefor the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, OnnWinkler for his helpful comments on earlierversions of this article, and the devoted help of our research assistants in Jordan and Israel.

1 Exceptions are: Alimi and Peleg (2005); Becker (2004); Berinski and Kinder (2006); Galtung (1998); Gilboa (1998;2002); Gutierrez-Villalobos (2002); Gutierrez-Villalobos (2005); Jaeger (2003); Kempf (2003); Manoff (1998);Shinhar (2003); Spurk (2002); Wolfsfeld (2004); Wolfsfeld et al. (2002).



mailto:[email protected]

2 There are some important and revealing exceptions to this rule, such as the role of the news media in the NorthernIreland peace process ( Wolfsfeld, 2004).

3 In this article we will only deal directly with the first part of this cycle, i.e. the influence of the political environmenton the news media. We must confine ourselves to speculation concerning any subsequent effects on the peacebuilding itself.

4 While it is true that the Reagan administration used force against Libya in the 1980s because it considered Gaddafia major sponsor of international terrorism, it would be wrong to suggest that the US had considered Gaddafi amajor strategic threat to its existence.As we now know international terrorism was not considered a strategic threatprior to 9/11.

5 The ways in which the news media from the cultural center relate to the social periphery is a more general topicin communication research that deals, for the most part, with domestic news (Avraham, 2003; Larson, 2006; VanDijk, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997).

6 It is important to distinguish between the concept of news slots and the better-known concern of news ‘frames’ (seeespecially: Entman, 2004; Gamson et al., 1992; Scheufele, 1999).While there are some interesting overlaps betweenthe two constructs, news slots have to do with administrative decisions about the assignment of reporters, the searchfor certain types of sources and the amount of news space devoted to certain topics.News frames,on the other hand,are interpretive themes that govern the collection of information and the construction of news stories. Thus, onewould want to make a distinction between an increasingly important diplomatic news slot – meaning that there aremore time, space and resources allocated to covering that topic – and a peace frame that (among other things)portrays those who oppose a peace process as extremists.

7 On these points, see Shafeeq Obeidat (2003).

8 By 1997, however, new media restrictions were imposed – the restrictive press and publications law – as part of amore general regression in the political liberalization reform process. For a systematic and detailed analysis of thereform process and its limits, see: Ryan (2002), Wiktorowicz (1999).

9 Originally, we were interested in analyzing television news coverage as well. However, despite some concertedefforts, we were unable to gain access to Jordanian television archives.Another possibility was to look at coverageof the two countries in foreign satellite broadcast networks, especially Al Jazeera. On the one hand, it can be arguedthat Al Jazeera is an important source of information for Jordanian citizens about Israel. However, there are tworeasons why it was decided not to include Al Jazeera and similar stations (in addition to the significant increase inexpenses associated with such an extension). First, it is unwise to attempt to compare television news to print news;these are different worlds of content. Given the fact that we were unable to gain access to Jordanian television news,it made little sense to compare Israeli television coverage of Jordan to Al Jazeera coverage of Israel. Secondly, thereis no reason to believe that as an Arab network the coverage on Al Jazeera will be significantly more positive towardsIsrael than found in the Jordanian press, especially given the fact that Israel’s treatment of the Palestinian issue is amajor focus of coverage in both sets of news media. Nevertheless, it is certainly a good idea to look at this aspectof the coverage in the future.

10 The fact that there are special sections for covering these issues reflects the importance the Jordanian news mediaattribute to the conflict. While it would have been preferable to read the entire newspaper in each country theenormous amount of working hours required would have necessitated significantly reducing the number ofdifferent dates analyzed. In any case, in order to insure that this would not affect the overall results, we examineda smaller sample of entire newspapers in the two countries, and no major differences were found.

11 Several attempts were made to see which set of keywords was the least likely to overlook a significant number ofnews stories about the other side. This resulted in additional keywords such as name of leaders (e.g. Sharon, Barak),cities (Amman, Jerusalem) and any of the above specified keywords used as adjectives such as ‘Israeli army’ or‘Jordanian Parliament’. It is also important to note that the identification of keywords was not computer based but,rather, involved a careful scanning of the entire designated pages.

12 All coverage dealing with military, defense, emergency issues and the like, were treated as ‘security’ topic area. Thesame issues when taking place after 29 September 2000 (the resumption of the Intifada) were treated as ‘Intifada’topic area.

13 It should be noted that this indicator only provides a rough estimate concerning the valence of news stories aboutthe other side. Negative stories concerning violence, for example, are likely to have more impact than negativestories about a problematic meeting between Israeli and Jordanian leaders.While this indicator is not intended tobe a definitive measure, it does tell us something about the overall tone of such coverage and how it changed overtime.

14 It is possible that some ‘negative’ publicity – that deals with problems with a peace process – should be consideredpositive for a peace process.We have decided, however, not to make a distinction between ‘constructive criticism’and ‘destructive criticism’ because this would tremendously complicate the coding and lower inter-coder reliability.Nevertheless, future research might be dedicated to developing a reliable coding scheme along these lines.

15 While already following the first round of coding several questions achieved a relatively high percentage ofagreement between the coders, we decided to leave them for a second round for checking for stability; that is, did



the high percentage of agreement for a specific question occur by chance or not? Still, when high agreementpercentage reappeared, we narrowed the set of questions for the additional coding round.

16 Calculation of the annual estimates is based on the same number of days in both countries (307 days – excludingdays on which newspapers were not issued due to holidays and Shabbat days). Thus, in cases where Ha’aretz hadseventeen articles dealing with Jordan in 1999 we multiplied it by 6.14 (the sum of 307 divided by 50 days).

17 About 20 per cent of the news articles in Israeli press appear on the front page.

18 For example,32.9 is the month average measure for the Intifada period given that the number of days for that period(823) is divided by the number of newspaper issues per month (usually 25).

19 It is noteworthy that 67 per cent of those news articles, in the political/diplomatic slot, dealing with initiatives byJordanian authorities, were coded as positive.

20 Given the fact that the analysis was restricted to the first three pages and the ‘Palestine/Arab and International News’sections of the newspapers, it is possible that there were more news stories to be found further back in the papers.However, this would not change the findings concerning their lack of prominence when compared to the othertopics.

21 While some argue that the peace treaty with Israel benefited the Jordanian economy (Gilbar and Winkler, 2005),other scholars are more skeptical about the economic benefits of the peace process for Jordan. Darrat and Hakim(2002) argue that despite the ‘official story’ there is little evidence that the peace treaty benefited Jordanian citizens,and that the economic benefits are far from being satisfactory (see also Haddadin, 2004; Moore, 2003).

22 Figures are based on multiple response coding. As discussed in the methods section, due to overlaps we asked thecoders to identify up to three possible news slots in a given news article.

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News Media and Peace Building in Asymmetrical Conflicts: The Flow of News between Jordan and Israel

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