NETTING AND OFFSET PRINCIPLES IN ENERGY TRANSACTIONS CRAIG R. ENOCHS Jackson Walker L.L.P. 1401 McKinney, Suite 1900 Houston, Texas 77010 State Bar of Texas 24 th Annual Advanced Oil Gas & Energy Resources Law Course October 5-6, 2006 Houston, Texas Chapter 9
34
Embed
NETTING AND OFFSET PRINCIPLES IN ENERGY TRANSACTIONS CRAIG R. ENOCHS Jackson Walker L.L.P. 1401 McKinney, Suite 1900 Houston, Texas 77010 State Bar of.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
NETTING AND OFFSET PRINCIPLES IN ENERGY TRANSACTIONS
CRAIG R. ENOCHS Jackson Walker L.L.P.
1401 McKinney, Suite 1900Houston, Texas 77010
State Bar of Texas24th Annual Advanced Oil Gas &
Energy Resources Law CourseOctober 5-6, 2006Houston, Texas
Chapter 9
2
Introduction
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
II. Treatment in Bankruptcy
III. Treatment in Energy Commodity Contracts
IV. Treatment in Joint Operating Agreement
3
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
A. Netting1. Net all transactions to a single amount
2. Usually bilateral and determined by discussions between the parties in advance
3. Single agreement
4. Routine, recurring procedure
4
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
A. Netting5. One payment is made
6. Benefits:• Convenience • Efficiency• Reduces the number of invoices and payments
7. Bookouts
5
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
A. Netting Example:
Party A and Party B are Parties to a NAESB. Under the NAESB:
•Party A owes $1,000,000
•Party B owes $250,000
Result:
Party A pays Party B $750,000
6
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
B. Setoff1. Sometimes referred to as “offset”
2. A creditor’s right to reduce the amount of a debt by the amount the creditor owes the debtor
3. Any excess will still be owed to the creditor
4. Usually unilateral and communicated by notice from one party to the other
5. Usually arises when contractual relationship ends and debtor can’t or won’t pay
7
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
B. Setoff6. Arose under common law
7. One contract or multiple contracts • Setoff across affiliates may not be enforceable
8. Benefits • Extinguishes obligations without further action
• Eliminates credit risk to the extent of the setoff
• Eliminates cash flow risk
8
Party A Party B$50,000
$25,000
Party B: Files for bankruptcy
Party A: Terminates transactionsLiquidates transactions
Result:
With Single Agreement Setoff Party A pays $25,000 Party B pays $-0-
Without Setoff Party A pays $50,000Party B pays $25,000 in bankruptcy dollars
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
B. Setoff 1.Single Agreement
MMBtu
9
Party A Party B
Power$10,000
MMBtu$50,000
Party B: Files for bankruptcy
Party A: Terminates transactions Liquidates transactions
$25,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment B. Setoff 2. Cross-Product
10
Party A Party B
Power$10,000MMBtu$50,000
Result:
With Cross-Product Setoff Party A pays $15,000 Party B pays $-0-
With Single-Agreement Setoff Party A pays $25,000 and Party B pays $10,000 in bankruptcy dollars
Without Setoff Party A pays $50,000 and Party B pays $35,000 in bankruptcy dollars
$25,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment B. Setoff 2. Cross-Product
11
Power
MMBtu$50,000
$25,000
Party B and Party B Affiliatefile for bankruptcy
Party A:Terminates transactions
Liquidates transactions
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party B and Party B Affiliate owe to Party A
Party A owes to Party B and Party B Affiliate
MMBtu $50,000.00
Power $40,000.00
$90,000.00
MMBtu $25,000.00Power $55,000.00
$80,000.00
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment B. Setoff 3. Triangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
12
Power
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
Result:
With Triangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product Setoff
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment B. Setoff 3. Triangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
Party A pays Party B and Party B Affiliate $10,000
Party B and Party B Affiliate pay Party A $-0-
13
Power
MMBtu$50,000
$25,000
With Cross-Product Setoff Party A pays Party B $-0- Party A pays Party B Affiliate $40,000Party B pays Party A $30,000 in bankruptcy dollars
With Single Agreement Setoff Party A pays Party B $25,000 Party A pays Party B Affiliate $40,000 Party B pays A $55,000 in bankruptcy dollars
With No Setoff Party A pays Party B $50,000 Party A pays Party B Affiliate $40,000 Party B pays Party A $80,000 in bankruptcy dollars
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment B. Setoff 3. Triangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
14
Derivatives
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
•Party B: Files for bankruptcy
•Party A: - Terminates transactions
- Liquidates transactions
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party B and Party B Affiliate owe to Party A and Party A Affiliate
Party A and Party A Affiliate owe to Party B and Party B Affiliate
MMBtu $50,000.00
Power $45,000.00
$95,000.00
MMBtu $25,000.00Derivatives $62,000.00
$87,000.00
Party A
AffiliatePower $5,000
Derivatives $7,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and RecoupmentB. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
15
Derivatives
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party A
AffiliatePower $5,000
Derivatives $7,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and RecoupmentB. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
Result:
With Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product Setoff
Party A and Party A Affiliate pay Party B and Party B Affiliate $8,000.00
Party B and Party B Affiliate pay Party A and Party A Affiliate $-0-
16
Derivatives
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party A
AffiliatePower $5,000
Derivatives $7,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and RecoupmentB. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
Result:
With Triangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product Setoff
Party A and Party A Affiliate pay Party B $-0-
Party B pays Party A and Party A Affiliate $25,000 in bankruptcy dollars
Party A and Party A Affiliate pay Party B Affiliate $33,000 Party B Affiliate pays $-0-
17
Derivatives
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party A
AffiliatePower $5,000
Derivatives $7,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and RecoupmentB. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
Result:
With Cross-Product Setoff Party A pays Party B $-0-Party A Affiliate pays Party B $5,000 Party B pays Party A $30,000 in bankruptcy dollarsParty A pays Party B Affiliate $40,000 Party B Affiliate pays Party A Affiliate $7,000 in bankruptcy dollars
18
Derivatives
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party A
AffiliatePower $5,000
Derivatives $7,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and RecoupmentB. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
Result:
With Single Agreement Setoff Party A pays Party B $25,000Party B pays Party A $55,000 in bankruptcy dollarsParty A pays Party B Affiliate $40,000Party A Affiliate pays Party B $5,000 Party B Affiliate pays Party A Affiliate $7,000 in bankruptcy dollars
19
Derivatives
MMBtu$50,000$25,000
Party A Party B
Party B
Affiliate
$55,000
Power$40,000
Party A
AffiliatePower $5,000
Derivatives $7,000
I. Netting, Setoff, and RecoupmentB. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
Result:
Without Setoff Party A pays Party B $50,000Party B pays Party A $80,000 in bankruptcy dollarsParty A pays Party B Affiliate $40,000Party A Affiliate pays Party B $5,000 Party B Affiliate pays Party A Affiliate $7,000 in bankruptcy dollars
20
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
B. Setoff 4. Rectangular Cross-Affiliate/Cross-Product
•Problems
•Binding all affiliates
•All must sign
•Must state joint and several liability
•Setting off when not all affiliates are bankrupt
•Allocating net proceeds across the bankrupt affiliates
•Open issue with no case law
•Dynegy v. Enron – oral arguments 10/31/06
21
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
C. Recoupment1. A right of a defendant to reduce a plaintiff’s
damages because of a plaintiff’s breach of contract or duty in the same transaction
2. Defensive right• Limited to same transaction as plaintiff’s claim
• Limited to amount of plaintiff’s claim
22
I. Netting, Setoff, and Recoupment
C. Recoupment3. Recoupment is available in contract or at
common law
4. Bankruptcy • Recoupment is a defense, not a claim, so it does not
constitute a claim or preference
• Recoupment permits a creditor to reduce prepetition debts by post petition amounts due to the debtor
23
II. Treatment in Bankruptcy
A. The Automatic Stay1. Arises when a bankruptcy petition is filed
2. Automatic stay prohibits actions including:• Filing or continuing suit on a pre-petition action• Enforcing a pre-petition judgment • Acting to obtain possession or exercise control over property of
the estate• The setoff of pre-petition debts • Debtor’s payment of pre-petition obligations • The termination of contracts with the debtor
3. The automatic stay protects debtors from creditors and creditors from each other
24
II. Treatment in Bankruptcy
B. Safe Harbor Rights1. Forward contracts, swap agreements and financial
participants receive an exemption to the automatic stay • Exemption is referred to as “safe harbor rights”
• Must be forward contract merchants, swap participants or financial participants
• Forward contracts are contracts for the purchase or sale of a commodity more than two days after the contract is entered into, including options, security agreements related to such transactions, and master agreements. (11 USC §101(25))
• Forward contract merchants are entities whose business involves entering into forward contracts (11 USC §101(26))
25
II. Treatment in BankruptcyB. Safe Harbor Rights
1. Forward contracts and swap agreements receive an exemption to the automatic stay
• Swap agreements are essentially financial derivative transactions, including options or master agreements for derivatives, similar agreements, and security agreements for such transactions. (11 USC §101(53B))
• A swap participant is “an entity that, at any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding swap agreement with the debtor”. (11 USC 101§(53C))
• Financial participants are entities with forward contracts, swap agreements or master netting agreements for a gross dollar value of $1 billion or more in notional or actual principal outstanding on any day in the previous 15 months or gross mark to market positions of $100 million or more in one or more such agreement or transaction on any day in the previous 15 months. (11 USC §101(22A))
• The safe harbor exemption allows the enforcement of contractual rights to terminate, liquidate, and/or setoff obligations
• This allows the creditor to avoid market risk on these obligations • Creates a right almost equivalent to a secured claim to the extent of the setoff
26
II. Treatment in Bankruptcy
B. Safe Harbor Rights2. Safe harbor rights exist to reduce market
disruption when a participant goes bankrupt
3. Safe harbor rights must be created in a contract to be enforced
4. Safe harbor rights protect setoff timing
27
II. Treatment in Bankruptcy
C. Setoff in the Bankruptcy Code - §553(a)1. Equitable right in the discretion of the Court 2. In order to setoff:
a. Obligations setoff must have arisen prior to the bankruptcy proceeding
b. Obligations setoff must be enforceable c. Obligations must be owed in the same capacity
3. Does not create a right of setoff but bars interference with these rights
28
II. Treatment in Bankruptcy
D. Setoff of Collateral
1. Bankruptcy Code §362(b) exempts from the automatic stay:
a. The setoff of settlement payments arising out of forward contracts against collateral
b. The setoff of mutual debts under a swap agreement against collateral
29
III. Treatment in Energy Commodity Contracts
A. NAESB1. Natural Gas
2. Netting• Parties can elect netting of monthly obligations
3. Setoff• Following early termination
• Can elect whether setoff will apply to all agreements or only the NAESB
30
III. Treatment in Energy Commodity Contracts
B. ISDA1. Derivatives
2. Netting• Can elect netting to apply
3. Setoff• 1992 version does not contain setoff
• Parties usually add in the schedule
• 2002 version includes a setoff provision applying to all amounts owed between the parties
31
IV. Treatment in Joint Operating Agreement
A. 1977 and 1982 Model Form Operating Agreements
• “[U]pon default by any Non-Operator in the payment of its share of expense, Operator shall have the right, without prejudice to other rights or remedies, to collect from the purchaser the proceeds from the sale of such Non-Operator’s share of oil and or gas until the amount owed by such Non-Operator, plus interest has been paid.”
• This is the exercise of a lien and security interest rather than a netting or setoff.
32
IV. Treatment in Joint Operating Agreement
A. 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement• “[U]pon default by any Non-Operator in the payment of
its share of expenses, interests or fees, or upon the improper use of funds by the Operator, the other parties shall have the right, without prejudice to other rights or remedies, to collect from the purchaser the proceeds from the sale of such defaulting party’s share of Oil and Gas until the amount owed by such party, plus interest as provided in “Exhibit C,” has been received, and shall have the right to offset the amount owed against the proceeds from the sale of such defaulting party’s share of Oil and Gas.”
• This version provides and explicit, albeit limited, right of setoff.
33
IV. Treatment in Joint Operating Agreement
B. Setoff • Not referred to specifically in 1977 or 1982
Model Form Operating Agreement• 1989 Model Form Operating Agreement Article
VII contains a setoff provision• If a party defaults in paying expenses, or the operator
improperly uses funds, the other parties may setoff the amount owed against the proceeds from the sale of the defaulting party’s oil and gas
34
Conclusion
• Netting, recoupment, and setoff are valuable, each to achieve different goals
• Recoupment and setoff are especially valuable in bankruptcy
• Netting, recoupment, and setoff may exist as procedural or common law rights, but it is advisable to include them in your contracts and to tailor the provisions to suit your needs