Netherlands 1940

7/30/2019 Netherlands 1940

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By Victor van Zutphenand Wayne Turner


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The Netherlands at War

During World War I the Netherlands managed to stayneutral. Tis eature and the atrocities committed by theGermans in Belgium in World War I led to a strong anti-war

commitment in Dutch politics, symbolised by a broken riedisplayed by the supporters o this posture. It was hoppedthat a neutral stance deter aggression. Although some ad-vocated a total abolition o the armed orces, this did nothappen, but the Deence budget saw extensive cuts. Teresult was that the armed orces modernisation was sloweddown and the conscripts received less training and were inewer numbers.

ReaRmamentWith Hitlers rise to power the international situation dete-riorated. Finally the Dutch politicians realised that the state

o deence needed improvement. A programme was startedin order to rearm. As weapons producing countries did sotoo, the Dutch ound it hard to get the arms and equip-ment they wanted and needed. Much o the weaponry andammunition was ordered rom German companies, or theiroreign-based subsidiaries. Tis led to many delays.

Te British or their part were not too keen to send weaponryand ammunition to the Dutch, as Dutch neutrality was ono use to the British. Besides, the Dutch had reused to ex-tradite the German Kaiser ater World War I.

Nevertheless the army mobilised in 1939 and preparationsor the deence o the country were initiated. Tis meant

that in some areas the troops had to dig ortications,consuming precious time. On the other hand, these troopshad the benet o said ortications, when the Germansarrived. Because o the neutrality, which was still the mainover-riding strategy, or political reasons the deence hadto be arranged acing all possible directions. I neverthelessattacked, the plan was or the Netherlands to ally itsel withthe enemies o the attacker. Note that during the Phony Warboth German and Allied aircrat that entered Dutch airspace

were shot down!

Defensive PlanTe Dutch realised that they could not withstand a Germanonslaught or a prolonged period. Te idea was to hold onuntil relieved by a more powerul ally. It was expected thattwo to three months would be sucient. In retrospect thismust be considered too optimistic given the amount o am-munition and manpower available.

Te idea was to use the time honoured Vesting Holland(Fortress Holland), the western part o the country, ulti-mately deended to the East by the New Dutch Water Line.Tis line was strongly deended by large inundations oroods. o the South, Fortress Holland was deended by the

wide rivers like the Maas (Meuse). o create more depth a

deensive line was created urther to the East, running North-South. Te Grebbelinie(Grebbe Line) ran rom the IJsselmeer(Lake IJssel) via Amersoort, Veenendaal, Grebbeberg (near

Wageningen) and Ochten to the river Waal. Here it linked to

the Maas-Waalstelling (Meuse-Waal position), which linkedto the Peel-Raamstelling. Te latter ran rom North to Southvia Ravenstein, Grave, Mill, Heleenaveen, Meijel and Weert

to the border with Belgium.

Belgium however reused to link up to this line and created adeensive line urther west, leaving a gap through which thePeel-Raam position could and eventually would be anked.Secret negotiations with the French asking them to ll thegap ailed. Te French were only prepared to move up toBreda in order to protect their own ank. In the end thetask o lling the gap was given to the Lichte Divisie(LightDivision). Tis was a bicycle mounted mobile reserve behindthe Peel-Raam position.

WeaPonsAt the outbreak o the war the Dutch had a variety oweaponry and equipment, ranging rom obsolete to modern.Some newer systems were available as ordered (notably the2 tl AA guns), others in limited numbers (Solothurn Anti-tank ries). Te artillery had both new and obsolete guns. Itis however a myth to say that the Dutch army was completelyoutdated, as it would be equally wrong to say that it was stateo the art. Both Belgium and France used old artillery piecesto make up the numbers needed, as did the Germans. More

worrying was the limited amount o ammunition available,insucient or any prolonged battle.

the PositionsAs mentioned the Dutch intended to hold on until relievedby an ally. Tey realised that not all o the country couldbe deended. Te troops along the border were very thinlyspread out, their sole role being to sound the alarm in caseo a German attack. Further inland were yielding lines,designed only to slow the enemy. Notably the Wonsstellingguarding the entrance to the Astluitdijk (Enclosure dam),the IJsselstelling, guarding the approach towards theGrebbelinie and Maaslinie, guarding the approach towardsthe Peel-Raamstelling.

Te purpose o these lines was to slow the German advance

as much as possible in order to allow the main lines o re-sistance to prepare themselves. Beore the war the DutchCommander in Chie, GeneraalReijnders had wanted boththe Grebbelinie and the Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie (NewDutch Water Line) to be strongly ortied. Should theGrebbelinieall, the army would have a strong and preparedposition to all back on. When the government would notgrant him the necessary nancial means, GeneraalReijndersresigned.

Generaal Winkelman (retired) was called back to activeduty and succeeded Generaal Reijnders as Commanderin Chie. He was orced to choose between the Nieuwe

Hollandse Waterlinie and the Grebbelinie. As the works onthe Grebbeliniewere more complete than most, the choiceell upon this line as the main line o deence or the VestingHolland. Most o the Grebbelinie had extensive inunda-


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tions (ooded areas) in ront o the ortications. Near theGrebbeberg(mount Grebbe) however, the land was too highto be ooded. Here the Dutch, rightly, expected the mainGerman attack on the Grebbielinie. Te Peel-Raamstellingalso had extensive protection by inundations. Near Millhowever there was also a dry sector. It was hoped that thelatter line would hold the Germans, but the main deensiveeort would rest on the VestingHolland.

the GeRman PlanTe Germans had planned to overrun the Netherlands

in one day and then turn south to cut o the French andBritish orces. Furthermore General Student wanted toprove that his airborne army was capable o more than smallscale actions. He was allowed to try and end the war in theNetherlands within hours. o this aim a large orce o the22nd Airlanding Division (22. Lutlandedivision) would landon the three airelds that surrounded Den Haag (i.e. notthe Dutch capital, but the seat o government, Te Hague).Tese troops were to cut o Den Haag rom all directions,breaking the Dutch governments control over its orces andhopeully capturing the Dutch queen, government and high


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command, orcing them to surrender and leading the coun-trys military to lay down their arms, all within hours atertouching down. One idea mooted was to bring a bouquet oowers or Her Majesty the Queen, but she never got it! TeGerman airborne rst o all had to despatch one reinorcedcompany to seize o the Belgian ortress Eben-Ebmal, as itsguns could re upon German orces crossing o the river Maasat Maastricht. Te rest o the airborne army was sent to theNetherlands. Other orces were detached to take the bridgesat Moerdijk, Dordrecht and Rotterdam, thus opening thesouth ank oVestingHolland or the army (Montys idea in1944 wasnt totally original).

On the ground, the German eld army was to attack in ourprongs. Te rst (mostly cavalry) was to occupy the northernprovinces and nd a way either to cross the IIsselmeeror tocross theAsluitdijk. Te second was to attack the IJssellinieand subsequently the Grebbelinie. Te third was to attack the

Maaslinie, subsequently the Peel-Raamstellingand to attackthe VestingHolland rom the South, creating a pincer withthe second line o attack. Te ourth line o attack was onlyaimed at the Netherlands (province Limburg) in order togain access to Belgium. It would attack theMaaslinie, crossthe river and proceed into Belgium.

the BattlefoRDen haaG:GeRmanysfiRstDefeat

A historian once dubbed the German actions around DenHaag Germanys rst deeat in WWII. Tis may be a bitover the top, but the act is that not only did the Germanairborne troops not reach any o their objectives in this eldo operations, they were orced on to the deensive.

22. Lutlandedivision (22nd Airlanding Division) was charged

with attacking Den Haag rom three sides and eectivelycutting it o rom the rest o the country, disabling the chaino command. Furthermore, special task orces were to maketheir way into Den Haag and to capture the Dutch Queen,government and high command. o this end the divisionreceived one battalion oFallschirmjger(paratroops).

At the time three airelds surrounded Den Haag. o theNorth lay aireld Valkenburg, to the West Ypenburg andto the South Ockenburgh. Valkenburg and Ypenburg wererst attacked by Stuka dive bombers. As well as damagingbuildings these attacks also did much to shatter the moraleo the troops guarding these airelds. Te air attacks weresoon ollowed by German Fallschirmjger. Tese landed notquite on top o the airelds, but in open ground very closeby, taking ull advantage o the conusion ollowing theStuka attacks. Both airelds were quickly seized and broughtunder control. Although Ockenburg was not bombed theFallschirmjgerhad the element o surprise on their side andquickly took the aireld.

Te next stage o the plan was to bring in the airland-ing inantry. Tese men were not highly trained eliteFallschirmjger, but regular (light) inantry that had beentrained to quickly disembark rom Ju 52 transport airplanes.Te combined orce was to set out to lock down Den Haag.

At this point things turned sour or the Germans. As areaction to the German airborne actions in Norway theDutch had reinorced the deence o these airelds by addingHMG nests covering the runways. Tis was unknown to the

Germans. Te Fallschirmjgerhad tried to knock these nestsout, but stood no chance in the open eld. Te eect wasthat incoming Ju 52s had to land through a hail o re. Notonly was this lethal or the airlanding troops, it also had adevastating eect on the state o the aircrat. Many o these

were unable to take o again to make space or the ollow-ing wave. Beore long the airelds were blocked with brokendown planes, preventing any new ones rom landing. o addto the problems, came the act that Valkenburg aireld wasrather new and the ground still too sot or heavier aircrat.Te Ju 52s tended to sink too ar into the ground to move o.

As a result many Ju 52s looked or alternative landing places.Grassy meadows in the vicinity seemed a good idea. Howeverthese were too sot to provide a solid landing ground ora ully laden Ju 52. Many upturned upon landing. Otherstried to land on the (two lane) highways. In such cases, thelanding successul, but taking o was no longer possible.Finally many saw the sandy beaches as a good alternative.

Again landing was hazardous, leaving many planes upturnedin the sot sand. Again, there was no chance o taking oagain. Finally the German command decided not to send

in any more waves o troops. Te commander o the opera-tions on the ground, Gra Von Sponeck, was supposed toland on Ypenburg. He ound himsel landed on a beach nearOckenburg, to where he headed.

Tis was one o the problems the Germans aced. Tereaction by local, most junior, ocers was swit. akinginitiative local units were rushed to the scenes, blocking exitso the airelds, trapping the Germans. Tese actions wereperormed by ocers with whatever units they could muster,rom trained regulars to recruits.

Once the picture had become clear to higher commandthe matter was dealt with in a more coordinated manner.

What artillery was available was rst brought to bear onOckenburg, supporting an inantry attack on the aireld anddemolishing more stranded Ju 52s in the process. Te attack

was a success. Von Sponeck withdrew with his men to nearbywoods where they dug in. Subsequently artillery was madeavailable or both Ypenburg and Valkenburg. Te attack on

Ypenburg was also supported by armoured cars. Eventuallythe Germans were overcome. Many were taken prisoner.Most o them, notably the highly trained Fallschirmjger,

were put on transport ships to Britain.

Meanwhile, the pressure on Von Sponecks unit was in-creased, orcing him to withdraw again and again. aking

up stragglers on the way his unit was nally encircled in thevillage Overschie. Te Dutch conducted a nal attack onOverschie. Tey managed to penetrate the German positions,

when the order came to surrender! Te Dutch governmenthad surrendered ollowing the Rotterdam bombing disasterand the German threat to do the same to Utrecht.

thetakinGofBRiDGesat moeRDijk,DoRDRechtanD RotteRDamTe Germans intended to take the Vesting Holland by apincer movement. One attack was on the Grebbelinie, theother entered Vesting Holland rom the south and linked

up with the troops that had landed around Den Haag. Inorder to achieve this German armoured orces had to quicklybreak through the Peel-Raamstellingand race via Dordrechtto Rotterdam. As later in the war, bridges were essential and


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speed was o the essence. Tey had to be taken intact andheld until relieved. General Student entrusted this opera-tion primarily to his Fallschirmjger, supported by airborneinantry.

In the early morning o 10 May 1940 Stuka dive bombersattacked the Dutch troops guarding both ends o theMoerdijk bridge. Although their senior ocer was aware thatthe Germans had crossed the border, he did not anticipate

any Germans reaching this position soon. Hence he hadntput his troops on alert and most were sleeping. Te eecto the Stukas under these circumstances was devastating. Alarge orce oFallschirmjgerdropped close by both positionsand rushed to their objective. Many Dutch soldiers werecaptured still in their nightwear. Tis bridge was securely inthe hands o the Germans.

Further north, one company oFallschirmjgerdid the sameat the bridge in Dordrecht. In Rotterdam, the Germanscould not land a large orce o paratroopers in the middleo the town to secure the bridge immediately. o prevent theDutch rom blowing the Willemsbridge a taskorce o air

landing troops landed with seaplanes near the bridge to takeit. Te main orce dropped onto Waalhaven aireld atera preliminary Stuka attack. A swit Dutch counterattackprevented the taskorce rom reaching its objective. Finally,the Germans barricaded themselves in an oce building onthe northern bank, near the bridge. Tis orce was unable tomove, but could prevent Dutch orces crossing the bridge.Meanwhile, the attack on Waalhaven was successul and soonthe Southern part o Rotterdam was held by the Germans,yet the bridge was still contested.

aking the bridges was one thing; keeping them was a totallydierent matter. Te Dutch High Command realized thedanger and was keen to put an end to it. In the South, lightmobile orces were sent to keep the Germans where they

were, whilst the French would send an armoured columnto drive them out. Tis column however was bombed andstraed by the Lutwae, orcing it to withdraw. Te Dutch

on the southern end held their position, but were not strongenough to orce the Germans o the bridge. A Dutch attemptto bomb the bridge ailed; one bomb missed the target andthe other ailed to explode.

In Dordrecht, however, the Dutch were swit to respond.Tis was mostly on the initiative o several junior ocersand NCOs. Te German Fallschirmjger were in morethan a little trouble and clung on by their ngernails, yet

cling on they did. Between Moerdijk and Dordrecht moreFallschirmjger dropped as support to both the attacks onMoerdijk and Dordrecht. Tese troops started to make their

way into Dordrecht. Fierce street ghting broke out. On theDutch side the Light Division (cyclists) was ordered to putan end to it and joined in the ght. On the German sideGeneral Student sent as strong a reinorcement as he couldmuster once he secured his position in Rotterdam. In this he

was helped by the act that the air landing troops originallyintended or Den Haag had been allotted to him once it

was realised the airelds around Den Haag could not receivethem and they had marched rom alternative landing sites.

In Dordrecht, the bridge was still contested despite erceeorts on both sides to gain the advantage. Tis situationlasted until German armoured units nally linked up withthe Fallshirmjger in Moerdijk and subsequently raced toDordrecht. Here they ound that the Dutch had musteredsome anti-tank guns and put them to good use knockingout several German armoured cars. Nevertheless the inuxo German reinorcements sealed the ate o the Dutch inDordrecht. However, the experience with the Dutch anti-tank guns would have consequences though in Rotterdam.

In Rotterdam, both sides had tried in vain to take theWillemsbridge. Both had good positions to deny the otheraccess to the bridge. Te Germans were very anxious thatthe Dutch might blow the bridge, which the Dutch indeedintended to do, but were unable to. When the news arrivedat Students HQ that the armoured troops had reachedDordrecht the rst idea was that these would immedi-


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ately charge across the bridge. However, the experience inDordrecht and the erce Dutch resistance made the Germans

weary o this plan. Student and, ollowing the link up, hisnew superior Schmidt reckoned that the Dutch positions onthe northern end o the bridge had to be bombed prior tothe assault in order to knock out any anti-tank deence. Tisidea coincided with growing impatience within GermanHigher Command about the prolonged ghting in theNetherlands.

Tey had planned to attack the Belgians, French and Britishrom their northern ank as soon as these troops becameree ater the taking o the Netherlands. Te prolongedghting had already led to the diversion oLutwaeunitsintended or the attack rom the east on Belgium in avour othe operations in the Netherlands. Gring himsel urged ora swit end to the ghting with whatever means necessary.Even Hitler had given instructions to get it over with. So it

was decided that the Dutch positions in Rotterdam oppositethe bridge were to be bombed.

Te only bomber unit available at that point was a unit with

He 111 bombers. It was decided that these were to take oand keep contact with their base as long as possible, so theraid could be called o in case o a surrender. As a secondarysaety measure red ares would be red in case the raid wasto be called o. Te Germans had demanded the surrendero Rotterdam, threatening to destroy the city otherwise.

From the Dutch point o view the situation was not hopeless.Although they could not take the bridge, they could eec-tively keep it closed to all German trac. German airborneattacks on Den Haag were successully beaten o and theloss o the bridge would mean the southern perimeter oVestingHolland would be breached. Te Dutch played ortime. Te (in act second) ultimatum was turned down, as itbore no rank, name or signature o the German commander.However, the Germans were led to believe that the com-mander o Rotterdam, Scharroo, was willing to negotiate asurrender.

Upon this news Schmidt gave word to the Lutwaethat thebomber attack was to be postponed. Te Heinkels however

were already airborne and out o radio contact with theirparent airelds. Schmidt was not inormed about this. Hesent out a new ultimatum this time properly signed, sealedand delivered. Beore the ultimatum had run out thoughSchmidt noticed the Heinkels approach. Immediately hegave the order to shoot the red ares. One bomber group

noticed a red are and broke o the attack. Te other didnot and bombed its target, in the centre o the old city oRotterdam. As res broke out the dry wood in the old build-ings did the rest. Te res spread beyond the capability oany re brigade. Scharroo believing this to be a deliberate actby the Germans and earul o more damage to the popula-tion, surrendered the town to the Germans. Te Southernperimeter oVestingHolland was breached.

allieDsuPPoRtLike the Poles, the Dutch expected to be helped by the oeso whoever attacked them. Once the Germans attacked,

both the British and French would become Dutch allies.However, neither country was ready or war when theGermans launched their attack. All the orces that the Britishcould muster in signicant numbers were already deployed

in northern France and, according to a planned move intoBelgium to take positions there. All the British oered in as-sistance was some bombing sorties and some special actionsaimed at rescuing as much gold bullion as possible rom thebanks and demolishing oil supplies near Rotterdam.

Te French supplied a larger orce in support o the Dutcheorts. Tat is to say, the French realized the threat to theirnorthern ank should the Germans managed to break

through the Dutch southern most deences. o secures thisank an armoured mobile orce was sent to Holland. But atthe border between Belgium and Holland they encounteredthe rst o many setbacks.

When the alarm was raised in the Netherlands all borderunits were ordered to place and prime their road obstaclesand mines. Although the troops acing southwards towardsBelgium did not see the point o doing that when the attackcame rom the east, no one questioned the order and it wasduly executed. Te French lost precious time clearing theseobstacles and making their way towards Breda.

At Breda, a meeting was held with the already stressed com-

mander o the Peel division whose orce was already retreat-ing. It was decided that part o the French orce would movenorthward and take up position amongst the Dutch in themore northerly part o the intended new line. Had they donethis, they would have met the German light armoured troopsthat were racing towards Moerdijk. However, the command-er o this detachments bluntly reused to go that ar northand took position on the south ank o the Dutch. Tis ledto more rustration and deterioration o the morale o thealready shaken Dutch troops. Tey were promised Frenchhelp, but that ailed to materialise. As mentioned above,the Dutch ell back again and so the French were orced to

withdraw. In addition, the French attempt to support theDutch in their eort to retake the Moerdijk bridge was oiledby the Lutwae.

When the Germans drew closer to the coast, reaching theprovince o Zeeland, the French main orce ell back, ba-sically towards the border with Belgium, a necessary movein order to prevent the Germans rom attacking the rear otheir army ghting in Belgium. However, part o the Frenchorce remained Zeeland.

When the Netherlands surrendered on 14 May 1940 Zeelanddid not and to continued the struggle. However, what moraleremained was soon drained ater the remnants o the Peel

division had passed through the Dutch lines telling the mosthorrible tales. Furthermore, many did not see the point incontinuing the ght, now that the rest o the country hadsurrendered. o complicate matters the cooperation with theFrench was non-existent. Te French did communicate withthe Dutch, but thought the prepared orward line and mainline o resistance poorly sited. Instead o supporting theselines, they set up their own positions. When the Germansarrived in ront o the orward line it was abandoned withouta ght.

Te brunt o the attack now ell on the main line o resist-ance. Te battalion commander was determined to make astand and had a meeting with his company commanders.During this meeting the German artillery started shellingthe position. Te battalion commander ordered his companycommanders to rush to their companies and hold ast. Soonater he got the word that two o them had remained with a


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neighbouring company, reusing to go back to their originalcompanies. Ater an express order these ocers set o again,only to stop, both at the command post o the rst ocer.Te second ocer did not go urther. Again an express,direct order rom the battalion commander was necessaryto get this ocer on the move. As soon as he had nallyreached his company, he took it with him in an unauthor-ized retreat. Seeing this the other company commander lethis command post ollowing suit, not being bothered bythe ate o his company. His men however soon noticed hisdeparture and ollowed his example. Tus the main line oresistance became untenable and the ew remaining deend-ers withdrew beore the Germans could attack. Te French

were outraged and nicknamed the Dutch boches du Nord,the Germans o the North.

Now that the Dutch main line o resistance had allenZeeland practically lay open or the Germans. Te French

withdrew to the south and took up position on the southbank o the Sloedam. Tey were supported by those Dutchtroops still willing to ght. At least the command struc-ture had improved, now that the French had taken overallcommand.

Te Germans attacked the Sloedam in orce and werethoroughly beaten back. Te Germans drew up artillery,bombarded the Franco-Dutch position and were againbeaten back. Ten the Germans called or a Stuka air strike.Now the French experienced what many Dutch had alreadyundergone. Material damage was limited but the moraleo French and Dutch alike was broken. Te third Germanattack over the Sloedam went like a hot knie through butter.For French and Dutch it was Sauve qui peut(Every man orhimsel).

the Battleof millanD BRaBantAs mentioned beore, the Germans had to breakthrough theMaaslinieand the subsequent Peel-Raamstellingast in orderto link up with the airborne troops o General Student andbreach the Southern perimeter oVestingHolland. Te early

warning units along the border had done their job, resultingin many destroyed bridges. However, some ell intact intoGerman hands, either by sheer speed or byruse de guerreusing

German Brandenburger commandos in Dutch uniorms.Te most important result or the Germans was the captureo one railway bridge. Tis allowed an armoured train,ollowed by an armoured troop train, to advance towardsthe Peel-Raamstelling, more precisely: towards Mill. For bothparties Mill was the key to taking the Peel-Raamstelling.

Te deenders o the Peel-Raamstellinghad been alerted andhad manned their positions when a train appeared. Open-mouthed, they watched it approach, wondering when theDutch army acquired such trains. In act, the Dutch armydid not have any armoured trains, which dawned upon thedeenders once both trains passed through their positions.

Te Dutch did have an excellent Anti-tank deence, namedasparagus. Tese were steel beams that were lowered at anangle into slots in the track bed. Once primed only engi-neers/pioneers could remove them with heavy gear. For thisreason placing and priming was not done without properauthority. As the order had not yet been given, the asparagus

werent placed and the trains could pass through the Dutchpositions unopposed. At a sae distance the German trooptrain unloaded nearly a battalion o inantry. Te trainsthereater made their way back behind German lines. At leastthat is what they had in mind. Ater realizing their mistakethe Dutch were quick to install the asparagus and or goodmeasure dug up some mines and placed them on the rail

road. Te work was just nished as the armoured train reap-peared and was then thoroughly demolished.


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tal commander was concerned to relieve his trapped trainbattalion and recognised the need or speed. Te Germaninantry commander had to attack whatever the cost and it

was made clear that there was no artillery support available.Reluctantly he obliged and set up a plan o attack. Just asthe attack was about to set o and much to his surprise, aight o Stukas appeared, attacking both Mill and Dutchpositions to the North. Tis attack had been requested by aneighbouring German unit that was held up by re comingorm Mill.

As beore, the eect o the Stukas did more damage tothe Dutch morale than to the Dutch positions. Once theGermans attacked many Dutch soldiers let their positionsand ed, both rank and le and ocers. Meanwhile the di-visional commander ailed to properly command his troops.

As his command crumpled beore his eyes he ordered a ullretreat to a second deensive line. In act, the retreat becamea rout. Te troops at Mill however did not receive the orderand stood their ground until they were almost surrounded.

Te second line o deence proved to be inadequate and

Dutch morale was now very low. Tis was not helped by theact that the promised French support did not materialise.As soon as the Germans arrived and showed some aggressionmost o the Dutch troops looked or reuge urther back.Tere were examples o companies that stood their groundbut had to withdraw when they became in danger o beingcut o because neighbouring troops had already ed.

A third line o resistance was ordered. In the chaos this orderwas not received by many troops and this line never ma-terialized. Te Peel-Raamsteling had been breached in oneday. Te German armoured column destined to relieve theparatroopers had been able to race towards Moerdijk almostunhindered. But, ater that they would meet more spiritedopposition.

Te eventual French support did not prove to be what theDutch had expected. One negative actor was that no provi-

Te German battalion split up into two orces, one o onecompany, one o two companies, each advancing on eitherside o the railroad. Te single company was noticed by alieutenant o a section o an 8-Staalgun battery. He askedpermission, and received it, to turn his guns and re uponthis oe. Despite this re the Germans pressed on. Te lieu-tenant suggested to his captain that the ull battery should

join in. Te captain tried in vain to reach headquarters. Hewas one o the rst to experience the inadequate leadershipo his divisional commander, who was more occupied inshiting his headquarters than leading the battle. Acting onhis own initiative, the captain had the ull battery turned90 degrees and open re. Tis proved enough to orce theGermans back.

However, the other German task orce managed to captureseveral bunkers and trenches by attacking rom the rear. But,they ailed to ully break the line, became pinned down, andhad to wait to be relieved. Meanwhile, the commander o theLight division had started to withdraw part o his divisiontowards VestingHolland according to plan. Tese troops wereto ght against the airborne troops around Dordrecht. Tecommander realized that a breach o the Peel-Raamstellingcould jeopardize his withdrawal. He ordered a unit omotorcycle hussars to reinorce Mill and help to retake thebunkers and trenches. As the hussars set o, no one thoughto inorming the commander o the Peel-Raamstelling, northe local commander at Mill. Both could have advised thehussars about a covered approach. As it was, the hussarsattacked the German positions in the Peel-Raamstellingacross an open eld. Although this threatened the Germans,they were able to repulse attempts to retake the position.

Te lack o a sucient amount o bridges led to huge tracjams around the available water crossings. All troops were

in a hurry and disputed priority. It wasnt until the GermanFeldgendarmerie took over trac control that the situationimproved. Te only unit that managed to reach the Peel-Raamstellingin time was an inantry battalion. Te regimen-


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sions had been made or coordinating the actions o both

armies. o make matters worse, the Dutch High Commandhad assigned the commander o a division in ull retreat withthe extra task o coordinating with the French.

theBattlefoRthe GReBBeBeRGTe Grebbelinie (Grebbe Line) was the main deensiveposition o the Dutch army. Tis eastern wall o FortressHolland stretched rom the IJselmeer to the Grebbeberg bythe Rhine. Tis line lay east o an old Napoleonic line whichhad been modernised, called the Nieuwe Waterlinie. It wasbetween these two lines that GeneraalWinkelman had tochoose. Te Grebbeliniewas ortied with WWI style trench

systems with the ront line containing most o the pillboxesand heavy weapons, while the weaker stop line was designedor the ront line troops to all back to, and counterattackrom i the ront line was compromised. Te Grebbeliniehadto be deended with all the manpower and means available.Teir motto was: to the last man, and the last bullet.

With a height o 52 meters the Grebbeberg, was reerred toas mountain by the Dutch. Nonetheless, it was a strate-gic position with visibility over a vast area. Te Germansdecided to concentrate their attacks on the deensive linehere and had two advantages. Te zoo on top o the hill hada tourist lookout tower which German spies made extensive

use o in the days beore war. Secondly, the area in ront othe Grebbeberg had restricted elds o re because o localorchards and armhouses. Te government wouldnt permitthe removal o these because compensation would have tobe paid to the owners. Deence o the Grebbeberg ell tothe 8th Inantry Regiment, with support rom the divisionsmachine guns, mortars and Antique 6-Veld artillery. Behindthe mountain around Rhenen stood sixty guns o 75mm,105mm, 120mm and 150mm, all with pre-plotted co-ordi-nates along expected lines o advance.

oPeninG movesWith the rontal attack on the Grebbeberg the Germansintended to keep the main Dutch Field Army occupied whilstthe German airborne troops and ast armoured troops madetheir anking move towards Rotterdam. Nevertheless theGerman High Command needed and expected a swit break

through, Te German 207th ID reinorced bySS Standarte

Der Fhrerplanned to punch through the deences on theIJsellinie and take the Grebbeberg on the rst day. Teirarmoured trains had been stopped or destroyed and theyhad determined deenders to contend with in several places.Even ater they had broken through the IJsellinie, the cavalryo the 5th Hussars delayed the Germans with ambushes andskirmishes, nally alling back to the ront line trenches inthe evening.

Already behind schedule, the SS troops prepared to stormthe Grebbeberg. At 0200 the German artillery unleashed hellon the Dutch positions in a our hour barrage. At dawn theSS inantry attacked the weak area in ront o the main line,

this area was dotted with many command posts and observerpositions, the radio operators in these positions discoveredthat most o their communications had been severed by theGerman bombardment. Tese positions were still able to putup sti resistance and the SS became rustrated that ater aposition was taken another one blocked their path. Someprisoners were either shot outright, used as labour to draginantry guns or herded in ront o attacking units as livingshields. As darkness ell the German command could onlylook on in rustration as it took one whole day to clear this

weak area and even so the ront line still stood intact.

Due to the lack o good intelligence the Dutch Corps com-

mander General Harberts rmly believed that they wereacing no more than a ew dozen bold Germans, ratherthan two ull SS battalions, and the Dutch 4 th Division wereordered to retake the orward positions during the night.Te SS Standarte Der Fhrercommander o the 3rd Battalion,ObersturmbannhrerWckerle also planned a daring nightattack on the ront line trenches. Artillery rom both sidespounded the area in preparation, but the ensuing chaosmeant that both night attacks were oiled.

About midday the German artillery bombardment on theront line ceased. Te SS322. Regiment, which had beenusing the ditches and the side o the dike to creep into

position, stormed the trenches with sudden erocity. Tedeending troops and pill boxes in the ront line threw every-thing they had at the SS but the earless stormtroopers kepton coming. Once the single line trench was breached it was


10/28

0

relatively easy or the Germans to roll up the position andthe deenders were orced to withdraw to the reserve line orace attack rom three sides.

At the same time the Dutch air orce managed some strangruns and bombing raids on the German troops on the roadsand their artillery, raising the morale o the Dutch troops.

With the ront line crumbling the commander o one othe two inantry battalions that deended the Grebbeberg,

Major Jacometti, rallied about a platoon deending the stopline and started a counterattack. He led the way, shouting:DOWN WIH HE JERRIES but this brave attempt

was repulsed and Major Jacometti was killed by the over-whelming German re.

By the end o the day the SS had been ordered to withdrawand rest or a planned anking night attack on Achterberg,

while regular Heer troops replaced them on the ront line,ready or an assault on the reserve line at dawn the next day.SS ObersturmbannhrerWckerle was determined to provethe SS could nish the job. He gathered a task orce o about200 men and launched a surprise night raid on the reserve

line, the SS shock troops punched through the line along theroad. Using POWs as cover they tried to push into Rhenenover the railway viaduct. Te attack was repulsed and thereserve line was restored cutting o the SS troops. Wckerle

was wounded and with about 50 survivors barricaded them-selves in a nearby actory.

Te Dutch also planned a anking night manoeuvre throughAchterberg, but due to delays it wasnt until 0700 beoreour battalions o exhausted Dutch reinorcements made thecounterattack rom the North. Te Dutch air orce straedthe German positions and artillery in a coordinated attack.Te SS were also making their anking attack at the same

time and both orces smashed into each other, the SS dugin and used their machine guns in strategic positions topin down the Dutch assault in the open ground betweenthe deence lines. Te counterattack had ailed and morale

was beginning to all, when suddenly the air was lled bya terrible shrieking noise as 27 Stuka dive bombers hit theDutch positions. Te Dutch troops ed in panic at the soundand eect o the screaming aircrat.

Meanwhile the German 322 IR assaulted the reserve lineon top o the mountain, but the Heer troops were beatenback. A second attack saw the stop line dissolve into brutalhand-to-hand ghting with bayonets and grenades. Major

Landzaat 8RI Battalion Commander held his Commandpost near the entrance to the zoo with grim determination.Once all ammunition was used up, and the building was be-ginning to collape around them, he sent the survivors awaythanking them or their heroics. According to legend hethen charged the enemy with a pistol in each hand. Howeverthe story could not be authenticated. Aterwards his wieound his charred body in the burned down rubble o hisHQ. Authentic or not, or his conduct he was rewardedtheMilitaire Willemsordemedal, the highest Dutch militaryaward.

Te trapped SS group disguised themselves as Dutch troopsand tried to cross the viaduct over the railway line, but theGermans were given away by their boots and repulsed.

A second attempt also ailed and Wckerle himsel waswounded a second time.

By this point the Dutch high command knew the Grebbebergwas lost and retreated with 50,000 troops leaving a thinscreen to ool the Germans. Te Germans prepared or anassault on the city o Rhenen. Ater a preliminary bombard-ment they assaulted only to nd the city deserted. Te battleor the Grebbebergwas over and symbolized the stoic deter-mination o the Dutch deenders. Te Germans named thehill euelsberg(Devils Mountain).

the noRthTe northern provinces o the Netherlands were only lightlydeended. Te German progress was swit until they reachedthe rst seriously ortied deensive line, the Wonsstelling.Tis position covered the approach to the Asluitdijk. Withmounting pressure rom superior numbers this line waseventually breached. Te Asluitdijk was the gateway tothe province Noord Holland, part o the Vesting Holland.

When it was made two ormidable ortications wereconstructed, not unlike the later Altantic Wall. As the lowDeence budget could not bear this, the costs were includedin the costs to build the dyke itsel, to be paid by another

ministry, and thus were no aected by Deence budget cuts.Kornwerderzand was armed with our 50mm guns and 21Schwarzlose HMGs. In the nick o time a couple o AA gunsand AA machine-guns were added.

For the Germans Kornwerderzand was only accessiblealong the dyke. Even more important, the commander oKornwerderzand had kept the morale o his troops intactdespite the act that all day long eeing Dutch troops hadpassed the position claiming that all was lost. Te resistanceat the Wonsstellinghad bought the deenders the necessarytime to have Kornwerderzand ully prepared.

As the Germans were aware o the strength o Kornwerderzandthey did not charge headlong into it. Instead they tried tobomb the position into submission rst. But, the newlyacquired AA deence proved to be a nasty and ecientsurprise. Next, the Germans undertook a reconnaissancein orce supported by artillery. Te Dutch commander letthe Germans advance to about 800 meter rom the Dutchpositions beore opening re. Tis orced the Germans to

withdraw losing three dead and many wounded. Despite thelimited loss o lie the Germans were so impressed that theydubbed the dyke otendam(death dam).

More German artillery was brought up. As a countermeas-ure the commander o Kornwerderzand asked the navy or

support. A ship with 150mm guns came to their aid. Helpedby spotters in Kornwerderzand it silenced the German artil-lery. Only ater the surrender did the Germans nd out thisre did not come rom Kornwerderzand itsel, but rom the

Waddenzee.

By now the German commander had given up hope otaking Kornwerderzand and gave order to start preparationsor crossing the IJsselmeerand land upon the coast oNoordHolland, leaving a small orce in ront o Kornwerderzand.

For the successul deenders o Kornwerderand, the orderrom the government to surrender came as a completesurprise, not to say a shock. Tey could not believe it to be

true, but sadly it was.


11/28

Dutch Special Rules

Dutch Inantry and Gun teams attempting to Dig Insucceed on a roll o 3+.

When conducting Deensive Fire, Inantry and Gun teamsthat are Dug In or in Entrenchments can shoot over any

Man-packed or Light Gun teams that are also Dug In orin Entrenchments.

Defensive fiGhtinGDutch deence was designed so the army could hold out or

a couple o months to allow a new ally, such as Britain orFrance to come to their aid. Te Dutch expected a classic waro deence with trenches and ortied positions would playan important role.

When ring a Bombardment Dutch Artillery platoons witha Sta team may re-roll rst ailed attempts to Range In onan Aiming Point in the opponents Deployment Area.

PRe-PlotteD aRtilleRyTe Dutch expected to ght deensive war. Tey pre-plotted

artillery bombardment along expected routes o advance.

A Dutch Inantry Gun Platoon, or a Field Gun ArtilleryBattery equipped with 8-staal guns, can only re aBombardment i it has three or more guns.

A Dutch Inantry Gun Platoon, or a Field Gun ArtilleryBattery equipped with 8-staal guns, ring a Bombardmentmust re-roll successul rolls o Hit to conrm its hits.

antique aRtilleRyTe 5.7cm 6-veld and 8.4cm 8-staal guns are very old designs.Tese old artillery weapons dates rom the 19th Century anddont have modern recoil mechanisms and consequentially aslow rate-o-re.


12/28

Infanteriecompagnie HQ

Headquarters

13

divisional support platoons

regimentalsupportplato

ons

infanteriecompagnie

(infantRycomPany)

You must field one platoon from each box shaded black and may field one platoon from eachbox shaded grey.

Infanterie Platoon

infantry

13

Combat

platoons

Headquarters

Weapons

platoons

Anti-tank Platoon

anti-tank

15

Field Gun ArtilleryBattery

artillery

21

Infanterie Platoon

infantry

13

Infanterie Platoon

infantry

13

Infanterie Platoon

infantry

13

Infanterie Machine-gunPlatoon

maCHine-guns

14

artillery

15Infantry Gun Platoon

14Infanterie MortarPlatoon

Armoured Car Platoon

reConnaissanCe

19

23

Cavalry Platoon

infantry

20

20Bicycle Infantry Platoon

Anti-tank Platoon

anti-tank

1

5


artillery

21

21Howitzer Artillery Battery

Air Support

airCraft

22

infantRycomPany

Light Anti-aircraftPlatoon

anti-airCraft

22

22Medium Anti-aircraftPlatoon

French platoons are Alliesand follow the Allies

rules on page 70 of therulebook.

maCHine-guns

14Infanterie Machine-gunPlatoon

14Machine-gun Bunkers

Medium CombatPlatoon

23

19

Light Combat Platoon

24Deep ReconnaissancePlatoon

17Mariniers Platoon

2

4Fusiliers PortsPlatoon

Motorcycle InfantryPlatoon


13/28

Infanteriecompagnie HQ

Kapitein

Kapitein

Company CommandRifle team

Company HQ

Korporaal

Anti-tank Section

20mm Solothurn anti-tank rifle

Infanterie Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant

Infanterie SquadRifle team

Sergeant

Rifle team

Infanterie Squad

Sergeant

Infanterie Squad

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command Rifle team

Rifle team Rifle team


infanteRiecomPaGnie hq

motivationanD skillIn many cases the troops had had more exercise with shovels digging ortications than withtheir rifes. However, what they lacked on experience was in many cases made good by theindignation about the German attack and the act that they had ortications. Other troopshad ample opportunity or training. Well handled, your men could give the enemy a nastysurprise. An Inanterie Compagnie is rated asConfdent Trained.

heaDquaRteRsCompany HQ 15 points

oPtionAdd 20mm Solothurn anti-tank rife team or+15 points.

As commander o a Dutch rie company 1940 you knowthat your men have spent much time digging trenches. Onthe other hand you know that they are quite angry about theGerman onslaught. Properly led, this could make the dier-ence between standing their ground and withdrawing. You

wish Higher command had spent more time in combinedsta exercises. Now it is up to you to show initiative andcreativity and hold your ground, or play it sae with thehigher command.

reluCtant

Confident

fearless

ConsCript

trained

veteran

Headquarters

Combat Platoons

infanteRie Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Inanterie Squads 85 points

oPtionReplace all Rife teams with Rife/MG teams or+10 points per Inanterie Squad.

Te inantry platoon is the core o the Dutch army. It consists

o three squads. Ocially each squad should have elevenmen. However an average o eight is more consistent withthe actual amount elded. Most platoons had each squadarmed with one Lewis LMG. Te rearmament schedule hadnot been ully completed by May 1940. Tereore a consid-erable amount o platoons had only two LMGs instead othree.

infanteRiec

omPaGnie


14/28

Infanterie Machine-gun Platoon

Luitenant

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command Rifle team

Sergeant

Machine-gunSection

Korporaal

Machine-gunSection

Korporaal

Machine-gunSection

M.08/15 HMGM.08/15 HMGM.08/15 HMG

Infanterie Mortar Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant Sergeant

Mortier van 8

mortar

Mortier van 8

mortar

Mortier van 8

mortar

Mortier van 8

mortar

Mortar Section Mortar Section

Sergeant

Mortier van 8

mortar

Mortier van 8

mortar

Mortar SectionHQ Section

Luitenant

Command

Rifle team

Observer

Rifle team

Machine-gun Bunkers

Luitenant

Sergeant

Bunker

Luitenant

HMG Pillbox

HMG Pillbox

Sergeant

Bunker

Bunker

HMG Pillbox

Sergeant

Bunker

HMG Pillbox

WeaPons Platoons

infanteRie machine-Gun Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Machine-gun Sections 75 points

2 Machine-gun Sections 55 points

By 1940 the Dutch military had procured and producedunder license about 3000 HMGs. Each Battalion had 12HMGs and the rest were in pill boxes. Tese were a mix o2200 7.92mm Schwarzlose M.08 and 800 Vickers.

Although the Schwarzlose was a WWI HMG with slower

regimental suPPort Platoons

infanteRie moRtaRPlatoonPlatoon

HQ Section with:

3 Mortar Sections 130 points

2 Moratr Sections 95 points

oPtionAdd Observer Rife team or +15 points.

Plans to raise platoons with light mortars had not beenrealized by 1940. Te heavymortier van 8 is all the Dutchhave as poor mans artillery. As such the weapon is equal toits German counterpart.

machine-Gun BunkeRs

foRtifications4 HMG Pillbox 320 points

3 HMG Pillbox 240 points

2 HMG Pillbox 160 points

oPtionAdd up to one Anti-tank Obstacle per bunker or+100 points per obstacle.

Add up to three Barbed Wire Entanglements per

bunker or +10 points per entanglement.Add up to three Trench Lines per bunker or+5 points per Trench Line.

Deending Fortress Holland were several deensive lines.Strung out along these lines were about 2000 Pill boxes.Tese were able to deny the enemy access to bridges andother vital points. However, most o these pill boxes lacked

ring slits to the rear. When the enemy had broken throughthe lines there was little the occupants o the bunkers coulddo. So hit the enemy beore he breaks through!

Inanterie Mancine-gun Platoons may make CombatAttachements to Inanterie Platoons.

rate o re and less reliability than its German counterparts,it proved a useul weapon keeping the enemy at bay.


15/28

Infantry Gun Platoon

Luitenant

Luitenant

Sergeant Sergeant

Gun Section Gun Section

CommandRifle team

Horse-drawn wagon Observer Rifleteam

6-veld gun

Horse-drawn limber

6-veld gun

Horse-drawn limber

6-veld gun

Horse-drawn limber

6-veld gun

Horse-drawn limber

Anti-tank Platoon

Luitenant

luitenant

HQ Section

Command Rifle team

Sergeant

Anti-tank Section Anti-tank Section

Sergeant

Anti-tank Section

Sergeant

4.7cm Bhler gun

Trado truck

4.7cm Bhler gun

4.7cm Bhler gun

Trado truck

Trado truck

infanteRiec

omPaGnie

infantRyGun Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

2 Gun Sections 80 points

1 Gun Section 45 points

oPtionsAdd Horse-drawn wagon and limbers or +5 pointsor the platoon.

Add Observer Rife team or +5 points.

Te Dutch army lacked a capable light inantry gun and hadto use the obsolete 6-veld5.4 cm Krupp gun. Tis old gun

was rst used in 1894 and lacked any modern components.Notably the absence o a modern recoil system slowed therate o re, limiting the eect o bombardments. Teir anti-tank rating cant worry anything bigger than an armouredcar. So you have to place them careully and use them or

what they are: inantry support.

anti-tankPlatoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Anti-tank Sections 80 points

2 Anti-tank Sections 55 points

oPtionAdd Trado trucks or +5 points or the platoon.

Te main anti-tank gun was the Austrian made 4.7 cmBhler. Tis highly capable anti-tank gun is able to pen-etrate most German armour. Te Bhler guns would provemost eective during the intensive ghts at the Islands oDordrecht and Rotterdam where 9. Panzerdivision lost about25 armoured vehicles!


16/28

Marinierscompagnie HQ

Headquarters

17

divisional support platoons

regimentalsupportp

latoons

Marinierscompagnie

(infantRycomPany)

You must field one platoon from each box shaded black and may field one platoon from eachbox shaded grey.

Mariniers Platoon

infantry

17

Combat

platoons

Headquarters

Weapons

platoons

Anti-tank Platoon

anti-tank

15


artillery

21

Mariniers Platoon

infantry

17

Mariniers Platoon

infantry

17

Mariniers Platoon

infantry

17


maCHine-guns

14

artillery

15Infantry Gun Platoon

15Infanterie MortarPlatoon

Cavalry Platoon

infantry

20

13Infanterie Platoon

Anti-tank Platoon

anti-tank

15


artillery

21

21Howitzer Artillery Battery

Air Support

airCraft

22

maRine comPany

Light Anti-aircraftPlatoon

anti-airCraft

22

22Medium Anti-aircraftPlatoon


maCHine-guns

14

Infanterie Platoon

infantry

13


17/28

Marinierscompagnie HQ

Kapitein

Kapitein

Company CommandRifle team

Company HQ

Mariniers Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant

Infanterie Squad

Rifle team

Sergeant

Rifle team

Infanterie Squad

Sergeant

Infanterie Squad

Luitenant

HQ SectionCommand Rifle team



maRinieRscomPaGnie hq

motivationanD skillTe Royal Dutch Marines ought bravely to deend the river bridges o Rotterdam againstthe invading Germans. An Marinierscompagnie is rated asConfdent Trained.

heaDquaRteRsCompany HQ 15 points

Te Royal Dutch Marines had a regiment stationed in theRotterdam preparing to leave or the Dutch East Indies(now Indonesia). Tey were immediately ordered halt theirpreparations and to deend the Rotterdam bridges. Tey tookup deensive ront line positions armed only with their light

machine-guns and ries. Between 10 and 15 May 1940 theybravely stopped German Fallschirmjgerorces rom crossing.

reluCtant

Confident

fearless

ConsCript

trained

veteran

Headquarters

Combat Platoons

maRinieRs Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Inanterie Squads 95 points

oPtionReplace all Rife teams with Rife/MG teams or+10 points per Inanterie Squad.

In ve days o ghting the Marines suered heavy casualties,but the bridges were never captured and no German soldiermanaged to cross. It wasnt until the Germans bombedRotterdam that the Dutch relented to German surrenderdemands to save civilian lives.

When the Dutch soldiers came out o their positions tosurrender, the German commander who was expecting aull battalion o men was stunned to see only a ew DutchMarines emerge in their dark navy blue (near black) uniorms.He ordered his men to salute them out o respect or their

bravery and determination and labelled themZwarte duivels(Te Black Devils).

maRinieRsco

mPaGnie


18/28

Dutch maRinesTe Dutch Korps Mariniers is one o the oldest marinecorps in the world. Unlike the Dutch army, no marines areconscripted and all are proessional volunteer soldiers. In1940 there are 1,500 Dutch Marinierswith a strongEspritde Corpsas bets their historic traditions. About hal o thestrength o theMariniersare in the Dutch East Indies, wherethey draw the toughest and most dicult assignments. Te

marine barracks in Rotterdam is the main training base andbarracks or theMariniersin the Netherlands and about 450are stationed there. About 60 marines are stationed at theHook o Holland. While many are veterans who have oughtagainst rebellions in the East Indies, about 200 are in trainingcompanies. TeMarinierstraining is ar more rigorous thanthat o the army, and lasts longer than the entire serviceperiod o the army conscripts. Most expect to see service inthe East Indies with this time spent at home being a restulinterlude. Te Mariniers are organised and equipped verysimilarly to the army inantry companies. Tey do howevercarry a ghting knie, the Sorm Dolk (storm dagger). Tisis sometimes claimed to have ormed part o the inspira-tion or the Fairbain-Sykes knie later used by the Britishcommandos.

the WillemsBRuGIn Rotterdam in 1940 the Williamsbrug crossed the Nieuwe

Maas. Tis was a vital objective in the German plan or theinvasion o the Netherlands since this is the last major waterobstacle between German armoured units advancing rom

the South up a carpet o paratroops dropped to secure themajor bridges, and the troops dropped to seize Den Haag.

A daring plan was developed to land 12 oat planes onthe Nieuwe Maasloaded with 120 soldiers who would rowashore in rubber boats and seize both ends o the bridge.

Also a small group oFallschirmjgerwould land nearby.

On the morning o 10 May this plan succeeded. Quicklythe Mariniers went into action attacking these troops in

buildings on the north end o the bridge. Tey graduallyorced the Germans back, siting machine guns and observersor heavy artillery in the upper oor o Het Witte Huis (A10-story skyscraper once the tallest building in Europe) torake the bridge and prevent the small German orce beingreinorced. Gradually, with support rom the army includingmany recruits in training, the German troops were pushedback to a large bank building at the end o the bridge.

A stalemate then developed with the Dutch unable to orcethe Germans out o their last stronghold and the Germansto the South o the river unable to advance across the bridgeto relieve them. Tis stalemate lasted until the Dutch com-

mander in Rotterdam was orced to surrender. Ten the 60surviving Germans emerged rom the ruins o the bank.When the Dutch Mariniers came out o their positions aGerman ocer is supposed to have been so impressed at the

way in which they had ought and expecting the deenceto have been carried out by ar more men, called them theSchwarte euel(Black Devils) ater the very dark blue tunicsand greatcoats they wore.

A Dutch Marinierscompagnie (Marines Company) uses theollowing special rule in addition to the Dutch special ruleson page 7.

Te Mariniers were supported by the Dutch Army troopsalso deending Rotterdam, providing anti-tank, mortar,machine-gun and artillery support.

feRocious DefenDeRsTe Marines ought hard at Rotterdam.

When Dutch Mariniers Platoons take a Motivation est toCounterattack in Assaults, you may re-roll the die and applythe re-rolled result to Dutch Mariniers Platoons instead othe original result.

sPeCial rules


19/28

DivisionalsuPPoRt

Divisional Support

Armoured Car Platoon

Luitenant

luitenant

Armoured Car

Command Armoured Car

Sergeant

Armoured Car

Armoured Car Armoured Car

Sergeant

Armoured Car

Motorcycle Infantry Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant

Motorcycle Squad

MotorcycleRifle/MG team

Sergeant

Motorcycle Squad

Sergeant

Motorcycle Squad

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command MotorcycleRifle/MG team






motivationanD skillTought the Dutch lacked combat experience, specialist troops had ample opportunity or

training. Well handled, your men could give the enemy a nasty surprise. Dutch DivisionalSupport platoons are rated asConfdent Trained.

reluCtant

Confident

fearless

ConsCript

trained

veteran

aRmouReD caRPlatoon

Platoon3 M.36 or M.38 150 points

2 M.36 or M.38 100 points

Te armoured car platoons are the only armoured units inthe Dutch army. wo types o Swedish designed Landsverkarmoured cars and a DAF armoured cars were in use. Telatter did not see major action in this campaign, althoughthe Germans were quick to press it into service ater theDutch surrender. Te Landsverks perormed well in bothmobile actions as part o cavalry companies and as supportor inantry companies. Remember, they are not tanks!

motoRcycle infantRyPlatoon

PlatoonHQ Section with:

3 Motorcycle Squads 135 points

2 Motorcycle Squads 95 points

As with the armoured cars, the motorcycle units were part othe hussars. As part o a cavalry company they would ghtin conjunction with these armoured cars. However, they alsoserved as support, notably as reconnaissance, to inantrycompanies.

Motorcycle Inantry Platoon use the Motorcycle Reconnaissancerules on pages 196 and 197 o the rulebook.

Dutch Motorcycle Rife/MG teams may not shoot at all unlessthey remain stationary.


20/28

0

Bicycle infantry Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant

Bicycle Squad

Sergeant

Bicycle Squad

Sergeant

Bicycle Squad

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command Rifle team

Rifle team Rifle teamRifle team Rifle team


Cavalry Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant

Cavalry Squad

Sergeant

Cavalry Squad

Sergeant

Cavalry Squad

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command CavalryRifle/MG team

Cavalry Rifle/MG team




Cavalry Rifle/MG team Cavalry Rifle/MG team

Bicycle infantRyPlatoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Bicycle Inantry Squads 85 points

2 Bicycle Inantry Squads 60 points

oPtionsReplace all Rife teams with Rife/MG teams or+10 points per Bicycle Squad.

Make all Rife or Rife/MG teams Recce teams or+5 points per team, making the Bicycle InantryPlatoon a Reconnaissance Platoon.

How Dutch can you get? Te Light brigade even had a bicyclemounted music band! In the eld the extra mobility provedto be eective though. Notably behind the Peel-Raam linietheir mobility proved to be vital. Te bicycles were used toget them to the battle, but they ought on oot.

cavalRyPlatoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Cavalry Squads 135 points

2 Cavalry Squads 95 points

oPtionMake all Cavalry Rife/MG teams Recce teams or+5 points per team, making the Cavalry Platoon aReconnaissance Platoon.

Despite having armoured car, motorcycle and bicycleplatoons, the Dutch hussars still had some genuine horsemounted cavalry units. Tese were still trained to charge withthe bare sabre! Fortunately this did not happen. Te hussarsused their mounts as transports and ought dismounted asinantry. Hussar units perormed well in the deence o thelJssel linie. Ater this line was breached they continued tohamper the German advance towards the Grebbelinie.


21/28

DivisionalsuPPoRt

Field Gun Artillery Battery

Luitenant

Luitenant

Sergeant Sergeant

Gun Section Gun Section

Field gun

Horse-drawn limber

Field gun

Horse-drawn limber

Field gun

Horse-drawn limber

Field gun

Horse-drawn limber

CommandRifle team

Staff team Observer Rifleteam

Horse-drawn wagon

Howitzer Artillery Battery

Luitenant

Luitenant

Sergeant Sergeant

CommandRifle team

Staff team

Gun or howitzer

Gun or howitzer

Gun or howitzer

Gun or howitzer

Observer Rifleteam

Horse-drawn limber Horse-drawn limber

Horse-drawn limber Horse-drawn limber

Horse-drawn wagon

fielD Gun aRtilleRyBatteRy

Platoon

HQ Section with:

4 7-Veld 160 points

2 7-Veld 90 points

4 8-Staal 150 points

2 8-Staal 80 points

oPtionsAdd horse-drawn wagon and limbers or +5 pointsor the battery.

Replace horse-drawn wagon and limbers with Tradotrucks or +5 points or the battery.

Te 7.5cm 7-Veldeld gun was a modern weapon, handledwell by their crews. raction was more o a problem. In somecases the crews were unable to withdraw their guns becausethe lack o transport. Had the Dutch higher command spent

more time in combined orce exercises, they could havemade better use o the artillery.

Te 8.4cm 8-Staal eld gun was a very old design datingrom the 19th Century and had no recoil mechanism.

hoWitzeRaRtilleRyBatteRy

Platoon

HQ Section with:

4 10-veld 390 points

2 10-veld 205 points

4 12-lang-12 200 points




oPtionsAdd Horse-drawn wagon and limbers or +5 pointsor the battery.

Replace horse-drawn wagon and limbers with Trado

trucks or +5 points or the battery.

As with the 7-Veldgun, the 10.5cm 10-Veldalso was an upto date gun. As numbers were insucient, the older 12cm12-Staal(12-lang-12) and 15cm 15-Staal(15-lang-17) werekept in service. Although these guns were old they still coulddeliver a massive blow to the enemy orces. Contrary topopular belie, this situation was not unique to the Dutch.Both the Belgian and French army used older artillery toboost the lesser numbers o their modern artillery. In act thegun per man ratio o the Dutch army was not bad at all. Sodont be ooled by the these Old Ladies. Tey might give theenemy a smack across the ace they will remember!

Howitzer Artillery Batteries may not be deployed inAmbush.

Field Gun Artillery Batteries may not be deployed inAmbush.


22/28

Light Anti-aircraft Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant

Anti-aircraftSection

2 tl gun

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command Rifle team

Sergeant


2 tl gun

Trado truck Trado truck

Medium Anti-aircraft Platoon

Luitenant

Sergeant


4 tl gun

Luitenant

HQ Section

Command Rifle team

Sergeant


4 tl gun

Trado truck Trado truck

Sergeant


4 tl gun Trado truck

Luitenant

Flight

Flight

Fokker G-1

Luitenant

liGht anti-aiRcRaft Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

2 Anti-aircrat Sections 50 points

oPtion

Add Trado trucks or +5 points or the platoon.Te Dutch ordered 450 2cm light anti-aircrat guns romOerlikon in Switzerland, and during 1939 the rst 120 weredelivered. Tese guns were designated the2 tl. Te extensiontl (tegen luchtdoelen) meant against airborne targets.

Te 2 tl guns were very modern and reliable weapons. Teyproduced a high rate o re at low ying targets at up to1,500 metres range. Tey were easy to operate and aim.

meDium anti-aiRcRaft Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:



oPtionAdd Trado trucks or +5 points or the platoon.

In 1936 the Dutch army had already displayed an interestin the Swedish 4cm Boors anti-aircrat gun. Ater testingit Dutch military purchasers approached Boors to place anorder, but Boors had no production slots open. Te Dutchinstead sought out other Boors licence holders, initially inPoland and then with Hungary.

Dutch managed to procure 36 Boors guns produced underlicence in Poland in the summer o 1939. Later another tenguns were purchased via Hungary. Te 46 guns ormed 15batteries o medium anti-aircrat artillery, each with threeguns.

aiRsuPPoRt

sPoRaDic aiRsuPPoRtFokker G-1 90 points

During the May war the Fokker G-1 proved itsel a verycapable plane. Unortunately it suered the most rom theGerman rst strike. Many G-1s were hit on the groundat Bergen aireld. At Waalhaven the other squadron oG-1s had been able to scramble prior to the arrival o the

Germans.Tose that made it into the air ought intensively with theLutwaeand managed to claim quite a number o air vic-

tories. In conjunction with various other types o aircrat italso provided support to the hard pressed inantry.


23/28

French Support

Lieutenant

Light Combat Platoon

Command H-35 or H-39

HQ Section

Lieutenant

Combat Section

Sous Officier

H-35 or H-39H-35 or H-39

Combat Section

Marchal des Logis

H-35 or H-39H-35 or H-39

Lieutenant

Medium Combat Platoon

Command Somua S-35

HQ Section

Lieutenant

Combat Section

Marchal des Logis

Somua S-35Somua S-35

Combat Section

Sous Officier

Somua S-35Somua S-35

liGht comBat Platoon

Platoon

5 Hotchkiss H-35 or H-39(1 long and 4 short guns) 250 point

4 Hotchkiss H-35 or H-39(1 long and 3 short guns) 205 points

3 Hotchkiss H-35 or H-39(1 long and 2 short guns) 160 points

3 Hotchkiss H-35 or H-39(3 long guns) 205 points

Te Somua S-35 (pronounced saw-mwa) is considered bymany to be the premier medium tank o the thirties with aclassic combination o speed, range, armament and armour.

As a result o the battles at Hannut and Gembloux whereSomua tanks inicted heavy losses on German tanks, Panzerunits were given orders to take on Hotchkiss tanks but toavoid long-range engagements with the dangerous S-35.

meDium comBat Platoon

Platoon5 Somua S-35 520 points

4 Somua S-35 415 points

3 Somua S-35 310 points

O Frances light mechanised divisions, the rst two wereequipped with the Hotchkiss H-35 light tank, while the

third used the re-engined and updated H-39. Ater years opreparation, the divisions were at ull strength or the battlesin Belgium in May. Tere were ve tanks in each platoon,and the platoon commanders tanks were armed with thelong 37mm SA-38 gun.

motivationanD skillTe Escadron de Combat (pronounced es-ka-drohn de kohn-ba) is the armoured orce o aDivision Lgre Mcanique (DLM) or Light Mechanised Division. Te cavalrymen o anEscadron de Combat are rated asConfdent Trained.

reluCtant

Confident

fearless

ConsCript

trained

veteran

fRenchfRenchsuPPoRt


24/28

Fusiliers Ports Platoon

Lieutenant

Lieutenant

HQ Section

Fusiliers Squad

Marchal des Logis

Command MG team Laffly S20TL truckVB team

Laffly S20TL truckwith two MG

MG teamMG team

Marchal des Logis

Fusiliers Squad


MG teamMG team

Marchal des Logis

Fusiliers Squad


MG teamMG team

Lieutenant

Deep Reconnaissance Platoon

Command Panhard AMD-35

HQ Section

Lieutenant

Scout Section

Marchal des Logis

Scout Section

Marchal des Logis

Panhard

AMD-35

Panhard

AMD-35

Panhard

AMD-35

Panhard

AMD-35

fusilieRs PoRts Platoon

Platoon

HQ Section with:

3 Fusiliers Squads 165 points

2 Fusiliers Squads 120 points

Like Germany, the majority o Frances inantry marchedwith horse-drawn guns in support. However, the mechaniseddivisions were superbly equipped with specialised trucks andarmoured vehicles or almost every role imaginable. For theFusiliers Ports, the vehicle is the Lafy S20L VDP (Voiturede Dragons Portsor ruck-borne Dragoon Vehicle) truck.

Te well-equipped Fusiliers Portshave twice the repowero a normal inantry platoon with each squad having twoChtellarault FM 24/29 light machine-guns instead o one.Te usiliers mount their light machine-guns on anti-aircratmounts on their squads S20L truck to protect them rommarauding German aircrat while on the march.

DeeP Reconnaissance PlatoonPlatoon5 Panhard AMD-35 165 points

4 Panhard AMD-35 135 points

3 Panhard AMD-35 105 points

Deep Reconnaissance Platoons are Reconnaissance Platoons.

Te French designed their Automitrailleuse de Dcouverte(AMD), Deep Reconnaissance Armoured Cars, to advancear ahead o their division to locate the enemy and reporttheir movements. As they were expected to operate withlittle support apart rom their own motorcyclists, the AMDneeded to be capable o deending itsel. Te Panhard AMDmodle 1935has a two-man turret armed with the excellent25mm SA-35 gun, a shortened version o the towed 25mmSA-34 anti-tank gun that res higher-powered ammunitionto maintain its perormance. Te AMD-35 has two drivers,one acing orward and the other backwards, allowing it to

reverse out o an ambush. Its reliability, its ability to travel186 miles (300km) on a tank o uel, and its near-silentoperation help make it one o the best armoured cars inservice at the start o the war.

tRench WaRfaReFrench troops are trained or trench warare. Teir opera-tional plan is to make a short deliberate advance under covero massed artillery re, then ortiy their position to hold it

while the artillery comes up to repeat the process. While theadvance is slow, it is sure and will eventually result in thedeeat o the enemy.

French Inantry and Gun teams attempting to Dig Insucceed on a roll o 3+.


25/28

Dutch Arsenal

ArmourName Mobility Front Side Top Equipment and Notes

Weapon Range ROF Anti-tank Firepower

aRmouReD caRsM.36 or M.38 Wheeled 0 0 0 Co-ax MG, Hull MG, Hull-rear MG.

3.7cm Boors gun 24/60cm 2 6 4+

Panhard AMD-35 Wheeled 1 1 0 Co-ax MG, Limited vision.25mm SA-34 gun 16/40cm 2 6 5+ No HE.

fRench tanksSomua S-35 Standard Tank 4 3 1 Co-ax MG.

47mm SA-35 gun 24/60cm 2 6 4+ One-man turret.

Hotchkiss H-35 or H-39 (long gun) Standard Tank 3 3 1 Co-ax MG.37mm SA-38 gun 24/60cm 2 5 4+ One-man turret.

Hotchkiss H-35 or H-39 (short gun) Standard Tank 3 3 1 Co-ax MG.37mm SA-18 gun 16/40cm 2 4 4+ One-man turret.

vehicle machine-GunsVehicle MG 16/40cm 3 2 6 ROF 1 i other weapons fre.

tank teams

Weapon Mobility Range ROF Anti-tank Firepower Notes

M.08/15 HMG Man-packed 24/60cm 6 2 6 ROF 3 when pinned down or moving.

20mm Solothurn anti-tank rie Man-packed 16/40cm 3 5 5+

8cm Mortier van 8 mortar Man-packed 24/60cm 2 2 3+ Minimum range 8/20cm, Smoke.

Firing Bombardment 40/100cm - 2 6 Smoke bombardment.

2cm 2-tl gun Light 16/40cm 4 5 5+ Anti-aircrat, Turntable.

4cm 4-tl gun Immobile 24/60cm 4 6 4+ Anti-aircrat, Turntable.

4.7cm Bhler gun Man-packed 24/60cm 3 6 4+

5.7cm 6-veld gun Medium 24/60cm 1 6 4+

Firing bombardments 48/120cm - 2 6 Antique artillery.

7.5cm 7-veld gun Heavy 24/60cm 2 7 3+ Gun shield.

Firing bombardments 64/160cm - 3 6

8.4cm 8-staal gun Heavy 24/60cm 1 8 3+

Firing bombardments 56/140cm - 3 5+ Antique artillery.

10.5cm 10-veld gun Immobile 32/80cm 1 13 2+ Gun shield.

Firing bombardments 88/220cm - 4 4+

12cm 12-lang-12 howitzer Heavy 16/40cm 1 7 2+ Breakthrough gun, Gun shield.


15cm 15-lang-17 howitzer Immobile 24/60cm 1 10 1+ Bunker buster, Gun shield.


Range ROF Anti-tank Firepower Notes

HMG Pill Box 24/60cm 6 2 6 ROF 3 when pinned down.

gun teams

bunkers


26/28

Aircraft Weapon To Hit Anti-tank Firepower Notes

Fokker G-1 MG 3+ 5 5+

Bombs 4+ 5 2+

airCraft

ArmourVehicle Mobility Front Side Top Equipment and Notes

tRucksTrado truck Wheeled - - -

Lafy S20TL truck Wheeled - - - Two passenger-red AA MG.

Horse-drawn wagon Wagon - - -

limBeRsHorse-drawn limber Wagon - - -

Team Range ROF Anti-tank Firepower Notes

Rie team 16/40cm 1 2 6

Rie/MG team 16/40cm 2 2 6

Sta team 16/40cm 1 2 6 Moves as a Heavy Gun team.

fRench infantRyteamsMG team 16/40cm 3 2 6 ROF 2 when pinned down.

VB team 8/20cm 2 1 4+ Can re over riendly teams.

infantry teams

transPort teams


27/28

Modelling the Dutch

m.36 aRmouReD caR

vickeRs hmG team

4.7cm BhleRGun

Dutch Inantry and gun crews are easily represented in Flames O Warby using the miniatures rom the Romanian range.Te Romanians are actually wearing the Dutch helmet and both nations wore puttee leggings around their lower legs. Belts,ammunition pouches and bags are similar.

infantRyPlatoonsuseDfoRDutch:RO701 Company HQ

RO702 Inantrie Platoon

RO704 Machine-gun Platoon

RO705 Mortar Platoon

RSO101 Romanian Artillery Group

Te Solothurn anti-tank rie can be used rom the Hungarian or Italian range.

HU710 Heavy Weapons Platoon (or Solothurn A rie and Scharzlose HMGs)

I701 Company HQ (Fucilieri)

oPtional moDellinGI you are a modeller and like converting, you might like to model your Dutch lightmachine-gunners with Lewis guns. I youd like to make this conversion, Lewis guns(BSO182) are available soon as part o the special order range so you can convert your lightmachine-gunners.

Dutch heavy machine-guns were also dierent, with the Dutch using both the Austrian Schwarzlose (like the Hungarians)and the British Vickers (rom BR704). I youd like to model either o these options some minor conversion work could bemade to merge the Romanian crew with either o these guns.

Check out www.FlamesOfWar.com website for a future, more detailed, modelling article.

Dutch unifoRm colouRsItem Colour Paint

unic and rousers Field Grey-Blue VP904 Dark Blue Grey(or a 50/50 mix o VP930 Dark Blue and VP886 Green Grey)Leather belts, ammo pouchesCavalry leggings Light leather VP984 Flat BrownBread bag, canvas items Khaki VP988 Khaki or VP886 Green GreyBoots Black VP950 BlackHelmets, eld guns & Vehicles Green VP890 Reective GreenMarine overcoats and tunics Dark Navy Blue VP950 Black highlighted with

VP816 Lutwae Uniorm (or another very dark blue)Motorcyclist rousers & Jackets* Black Leather VP950 Black*Oten only the Jackets were worn with normal uniorm trousers.


28/28

5.7cm 6-velDGun

7.5cm 7-velDGun

10.5cm 10-velDGun

12cm 12-lanG-12 hoWitzeR

15cm 15-lanG-17 hoWitzeR8.4cm 8-staalGun

GunsanD vehiclesDutch Name Foreign Name Suitable Model Model to Use

M.36 or M.38 Armoured Car Landsverk Soviet BA-10 SU301

2cm 2-tl gun 20mm Oerlikon gun 20mm Oerlikon gun BR181

4cm 4-tl gun 40mm Boors gun 40mm Boors gun BSO505

4.7cm Bhler gun 47/32 Italian 47/32 ISO503

5.7cm 6-veld gun - 76K/02 without shield FSO501

7.5cm 7-veld gun Krupp 7.5 cm M02/03 gun Italian 75/27 ISO505

8.4cm 8-staal gun - 76K/02 without shield FSO501

10.5cm 10-veld gun Boors 10.5cm M27 gun Skoda 150mm M34 gun RO595

12cm 12-lang-12 howitzer Krupp 12cm M08 howitzer 100/17 howitzer ISO506

15cm 15-lang-17 howitzer Krupp 15cm M18 howitzer 149mm 14/31M Howitzer HU580

rado truck - Lafy W15 or S20L truck FR410, FR420

Netherlands 1940

Documents