Neorealism, Neoliberalism and the International System

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 DOI: 10.1177/030437548801300101

1988 13: 5Alternatives: Global, Local, PoliticalMary Ann Tétreault

Regimes and Liberal World Orders  

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Afternativcs XI11 (1988), 5-26

Regimes and Liberal World Orders

MARY ANN T~TREAULT*

Theories that set out to describe the structure and explain the operation of the modern world order are often unclear and incomplete because of conceptual problems in defining the system as a whole and the nature of the actors whose relationships constitute it. The term most frequently used to describe this system is hegemony’, y:t descriptions of hegemony and how it operates tend to load the concept with images arising from multiple patterns of system dominance by one state, causing it to explain both more and less than a given empirical situation might warrant. As a result of overgeneralization and the omission or, at best, surface examination, of important elements of modern hegemony, these theories are less useful to policy-makers in today’s hegemon, the United States, than they might be. This article is an attempt to expand and clarify the concepts of hegemony, empire, and regime, in the specific context of liberal international economic orders and then to use these concepts to analyze the structure and evolution of the post-Second World War hegemonic system.

Hegemony and empire Part of the difficulty in developing theories of hegemony may lie in their problematiques. As defined by Robert Cox,* the problematique of a theory is a historically conditioned awareness of certain problems and issues that, either implicitly or explicitly, guides the translation of one’s understanding of reality into an articulation of the basic mechanisms of interaction within a system. Since hegemonic theories about the modern world are based on conceptions of cycles of power, the most obvious danger is that a single cycle might be the template for the analysis of all cycles. The inclusion of a developmental component, a feature of George Modelski’s theory of long cycles of global politics3 and of Robert Keohane’s functional theory of regimes,‘ allows the problematique itself to shift from one period to another. This reduces the power of the theory to generalize but preserves its descriptive accuracy and its open-endedness.

General theories designed to provide global explanations of the rise and decline of world powers over al! of historical time, such as Robert Gilpin’s

‘Department of Political Science and Geography, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23508, USA.

0304-3754/88/01/0005-22/$03.00 0 1988 Alternativts

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6 Regimes and Liberal World Orders

theory of war and change,’ achieve their analytical power at the expense of empirical accuracy. For example, Gilpin equates hegemony and empire because both are systems dominated by a single actor: even though the mechanisms of control and the patterns of growth and decay of hegemonies and empires are quite different. He also redefines Samir Amin’s concept of “social f~r rna t ion”~ in a way !that subsumes developed communist and capitalist states under a single rubric, “modern industrial nation-state.”8 This obliterates Amin’s intended distinction between capitalist and other forms of economic organization based on who controls the means of p rodu~ t ion .~

Gilpin does not look for the possibly different effects of capitalist and communist political economies on the design and operation of world orders because he does not believe that the nature of a political economy affects basic patterns of dominance or their extension or decay. lo Modelski also explicitly rejects Marxian analyses, especially those that equate the development of the modern world system with the development and spread of capitalism.” His reasoning might be termed mercantilistic in that he says that what he is rejecting is the axiom that “economics causes politics” in favor of its inverse, This may be so but, as a result, Modelski gives short shrift to the economic institutions that underpin each of the cases of hegemony he discusses.

Keohane is less inclined to discount the insights of Marxists in speculating on the relationship between capitalism and hegemony, though he too dismisses elements of Marxian theory, calling them “murky” and lacking empirical support.I2 But Keohane also notes that Marxian theories are not inherently inconsistent with his concept of hegemonic cooperation, citing Steven Hymer’s notion that capitalists face problems of collective action just as states do, and justifying the examination of conditions under which cooperation is likely to occur as equally useful to those interested in the “contradictions of capitalism” and those interested in “the tensions inherent in a state

Marxists like Immanuel Wallerstein believe that the. state system and capitalism grew up together and are parts of the same whole.’* For Wallerstein, capitalist classes benefit from the fragmentation of power across many nation-states which vitiates the ability of governments to control their behavior. l5 This explanation of the relationship between capitalism and the state system is viewed from the perspective of the economic actors rather than the states, and reflects the Marxist bias that Modelski does not like which favors the primacy of economics over politics to define and explain social reality. However, the symbiosis between capitalism and the nation-state system can also be viewed from the perspective of the state, through the prism of its instrumental values. Gilpin points out that the political unit that dominates any given period of world history is the one that takes the best advantage of scale economies in military and economic organization.I6

In the case of the rise of the nation-state system, geopolitical factors, comparable levels of economic development, and the social norms underlying what we have come to call the balance of power system, made it impossible to create a European empire despite repeated attempts to do so. At the same time, the national economies of European states became increasingly

‘*

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MARY ANN T~TREAULT 7

interdependent as capitalist organization spread during the long 16th ~en tu ry . ’~ Banks, trading companies, and other economic actors enabled nation-states, unwilling to sacrifice wealth for self-sufficiency, to forge international economic linkages to compensate for their inability to achieve maximum scale economies domestically. From this perspective, the development of capitalism can be seen as a response to a local failure of military technology to overcome conditions obstructing the creation in Europe of an economically self-sufficient imperial unit.

The irony is that the nation-state turned out to be a persistent form of political organization capable of meeting a number of political and economic needs simultaneously. Gilpin believes that the nation-state became the dominant modern political form because it was able to solve the fiscal crisis of feudalism.” Krasner sees the spread of the nation-state as a function of the triumph of sovereigntl over great power primacy as a basic principle of the international system.’ The European state system can also be viewed as both the outcome of and the mechanism necessary to preserve religious pluralism. The Protestant reformation, which shattered the ideological unity of Europe under Catholicism, also blocked the development of a new transnational religious basis to mediate future political unification.

Another revolutionary consequence of the reformation was the Peace of Westphalia, the blueprint of basic principles that still govern relations among nationdstates. The Westphalian principle ofcuju regio, eius religio was meant to discourage attempts by European leaders to use religion to justify imperialism against their neighbors. Domestically, religious conflicts reduced the legitimacy of court elites with respect to internal challenges to their right to govern without the consent of nongovernmental elites such as merchants, bankers, and land owners. This process is perhaps clearest in England, although, to varying extents, it affected domestic politics in other European states as well.

On the one hand, financial elites such as the bankers and merchants in the City of London were disproportionately members of dissenting religious sects, religiously alienated from the Catholic Stuarts and even their Church of England successors. On the other hand, even though the creation of state churches, such as the Church of England under the Tudors, provided aspiring national leaders with the means, in the form of confiscated church lands, to sell large properties to raise money, it also contributed to the greater economic independence of the cccountry” elite. As these people grew more alienated from the court because of religious and political differences with the Stuarts, they had greater means to challenge the absolutism of Stuart rule.**

As a result of these religious and economic shifts, the 17th century English revolutions created a domestic governing structure that relinquished extensive power to economic elites in and out of government. The royal power to tax was severely restricted, and the thrust of English foreign policy shifted from “land wars in Europe in pursuit of primarily dynastic objectives . . . to sea wars across the world in pursuit of primarily economic objectives.””

Pluralist structures of government and ideological support for their establishment and spread were not confined to England, The philosophy of mixed government was also very attractive to the citizens of Florence, both

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because the invention of printing popularized Aristotelian notions of civic culture throughout Renaissance Italy, and because of local political conditions, especially the threatened takeover of Florence by Giangaleazzo Visconti of Even though the translation of recovered Aristptelian ideals into institutional frameworks was uneven and slow, their spread weakened autocratic domestic regimes throughout Europe and contributed to an environment favorable to the growing transnationalism of Europe’s political economy. At the same time, the differentiation of church and state and a growing emphasis on participatory forms of government fostered by the writings of the “contract theorists,” helped to form an independent identification between the citizen and the state, nationalism, which governmental elites could tap to gain support against internal and external threats.23 Nationalism confirmed the position of the nation-state as the dominant politicaI form.

Modelski believes that there is an intimate connection between the rise of the nation-state and the rise of hegemonic powers, which he calls global powers.24 In his view, the reason is that nation-states are “the most effective units for fighting global war,” the mechanism that originates hegemonic cycles.25 But one could also view hegemony as an order that produces a transnational economy despite the reality of divided sovereignty. Under such circumstances, international economic links must be forged by actors that can present themselves as relatively independent of any sovereign power.26 From this perspective, although one can agree with Gilpin that hegemony and empire are both core-directed systems linking the political economies of their constituent units while providing military security and a unifying ideology, they are also profoundly different.

Hegemonies arise when and where empires are impossible to create and sustain. They are more complex and more fragile than empires because nationalism and the principle of sovereignty both limit the power to command and justify internal challenges to the hegemon. The ideological basis of hegemonic legitimacy is weaker than the European tradition justifying imperial forms:

[i]n . . . the imperialist vision of history, political society was envisaged as the existence among men of the hierarchical order existing in heaven and in nature; its legitimation and its organizing categories were alike timeless.. , .27

Regimes and Liberal World Orders

In contrast, hegemony is time-bound and depends on consent.

Hegemony andconsent The’critical dependence of hegemony on consent is clear in the writings of the I talian Socialist Antonio Gramsci.

“Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion. To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases2’

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To Gramsci, state power is rooted in a social order reflecting the ideology of a dominant class and its translation into the social bases of support for a regime. Thus, the “state” consists not merely in government institutions and the persons running them, but rather in the whole complex of civil society. Cox takes Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as the basis of legitimate relations of dominance and subordination within a domestic society and translates it to the realm of world order. In this sense, hegemony requires a dominant state to create a world order that is “universal in conception. . . [one] which most other states . . . could find compatible with their interests.” Hegemonic world orders themselves arise out of successful domestic hegemonies whose 6 C energies. . . expand beyond the state’s boundaries.” They are set up to regulate conflict among states, but even more than that, they are “globally-conceived civil societies] . . .” that link the “social classes of the countries encompassed by [them] .y’29 Hegemonic world orders are fun- damentally transnational.

The survival, if not the establishment, of hegemonic world orders is dependent on substantial levels of consent-the acceptance of the essential “rightness” of the order by participating states and the dominant classes within those states. National interests must be satisfied by the hegemonic world order, and civil societies must share the world view on which the hegemon’s own domestic system is based.30 The military forces of a hegemon can then safely be directed against those seeking to interdict the operation of the political economy, outsiders, or inferior insiders on whom a disproportion- ate share of the costs of systemic adjustment are im osed, rather than against challengers seeking to take control of the system.

However, hegemonic, or global, wars are generally wars among insiders struggling for control of the system.3z Ultimately, hegemonic wars represent the collapse of consent of second-tier powers to control from the center. Consent is difficult to maintain because the liberal political economies characteristic of modern hegemonie~ ,~~ while efficient at the maximization of economic welfare, are deficient at its equitable distribution. As hegemonies age, power disparities and moral deficiencies arise or become more obvious. Tensions develop among states seeking to maximize national power and wealth. The transnational character of hegemony also produces tensions between and among interdependent states and the economic actors that provide much of the linkage between them.

The foreign policies of hegemonic powers compete for resources and control over outcomes with domestic interests.34 Hegemonic systems are primarily economic rather than strategic, thus foreign policy cannot plausibly be represented as based on transcendental goals requiring the sacrifice of immediate and individual interests because economic policies are so obviously connected to empirical states of affairs.35 This means that the consensual basis of hegemony also depends critically on the degree of consent present in the domestic politics of participants with respect to the distribution of benefits between the domestic and global orders. Internal consent is problematic for a hegemonic power because, in modern times, such powers have been weak states. Indeed, one might argue that a highly centralized state would seek to impose control through imperial rather than hegemonic means,

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as France did in the Napoleonic era and Germany during the Third Reich. In + the three cases of modern hegemony about which most scholars agree, the

Dutch, the British, and the American, the state was able to assume its hegemonic role only because of the active participation of domestic elites who perceived that hegemony would, benefit their own interest^.^^ The fragility of consent, both domestically and internationally, is one reason why hegemonies are relatively short-lived: “[tlhe fruit of hegemony is ‘decline’. . . .’y37

The longevity of empires and the differences in the ways that they decay from the ways that hegemonic systems collapse give some insight into the vastly different kinds of organization each form constitutes. Empires hold together through military force and the denial of local sovereignty via the substitution of a local governing elite controlled by the imperial power for an independent local elite. The government of an imperial domain may include natives, but this elite is responsible and responsive to the imperium rather than to the locality. The imperial economy is based on the power of the imperiurn to command the resources of the colony and to back up its command by force. Pieces of an empire may break away as the result of the operation of the loss of strength gradient.38 But even wars of national liberation, such as the American revolution against the British, do not signify the end of an empire because relationships between the imperium and its constituent parts are relatively independent of one another.

In contrast, a hegemony is indivisible. I t is a whole system rather than a collection of colonial relationships. The “loss” of a subordinate partner threatens the system as a whole because such a loss reflects badly on the legitimacy of the hegemon and reduces the willingness of the rest of its partners to follow its leadership. Even in hegemonies predating capitalism, such as the Athenian system around the time of the Peloponnesian Wars, the expectation that a critical loss of legitimacy would result if the Melians were permitted to shift from the controI of Athens to neutrality between Athens and Sparta was sufficient to move the Athenians to destroy Me10.s.~’ In modern times, the challenge of Charles De Gaulle to US hegemony eroded the bases of consent on foreign policy among the United States and its allies.40 The lengths to which a hegemon will go to retain authority in a vital area is sometimes described as merely an effort to protect the access of its economic agents to the subordinate country:’ but the salience of the domino theory in US foreign policy demonstrates perceptions of the unity of US hegemony by US pol icy-maker~.~~

Hegemonies and empires may coexist, as in the case ofGreat Britain during the 19th century when it was a hegemonic power in Europe and an imperial power over its Colonies. Where the case of 19th-century Britain comprises the problematique of a theory of hegemony, the distinction between hegemony and empire may be 0verlooked.4~ But since the Second World War, nationalism and the predominance of the principle of sovereignty over the principle of great-power primacy has meant that the “sovereign national state has emerged as the only legitimate constitutive form of political organization in the international Although some patron-client relationships still resemble imperial orders, and the United States has intervened, sometimes with force, to keep smaller clients within the hegemonic fold, the

Regimes and Liberal World Orders

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MARY ANN TETREAULT 1 I

legitimacy of patron control of client policies faces increasing challenges. Washington has frequently found itself a target of the “tyranny of the weak” because of the increase in autonomy its patron activities confer on sovereign clients, 45

The most critical skill of a hegemon is to be able to induce and sustain cooperation. Early in a hegemonic cycle, consent and cooperation are functions of the military victory that brought the hegemon to its position of leadership. In Gilpin’s theory, this is because victory in a hegemonic conflict aligns the hierarchies of power, the physical capabilities of states, and prestige, the authority of states based on their reputation for power, especially military power.46 To Gilpin, the primary basis of hegemony is coercion, although he notes that the legitimacy of a given world order is also rooted in a community of interests because the leading state supplies public goods such as military security and international economic regimes to lesser states, and because the religion or ideology promoted by the leader justifies its domination of the other^.^' The leader can maintain its position as long as it uses its power prudently to bear the economic and strategic burdens that underlie its prestige. Other states in the system will not challenge it unless the hierarchies lose their alignment due to the decline of the power of the hegemon relative to that of a rising challenger of its authority.

Modelski believes that the connection between global war and the birth of a new world order is unfortunate: “world wars produced an order that generated more world wars and, in that unusual but important sense, perpetuated itself.” This pathology arises from the polarities and cleavages characteristic of domestic and international systems whose histories include internecine conflict, Unlike Gilpin, Modelski looks a t hegemonic conflicts as generators of global systems that decay “inevitably” and relatively rapidly because of “the burden of earlier disasters” and because they lack “mechanisms for recharging their batteries. . . .’’48

Keohane addresses directly the problem of providing mechanisms for maintaining, if not recharging, the ability of a system to persist once the energy of the hegemonic power has run down. Keohane substitutes a functional theory of regimes for the “basic force model” of hegemony. This is not a universal theory that can be applied to any hegemonic system, but is specific for the present situation in which the power of the United States is declining relative to that of its allies.49 According to Keohane, even using modified structural realist criteria that define states as maximizers of core values and the power to protect them, it is both possible and rational for the participants in the several regimes established by the United States in the post-Second World War era to continue to cooperate within them to achieve common goals. Because Keohane and other regime theorists such as Stephen Krasner advocate the preservation of regimes initially created to confirm and perpetuate US global leadership, regime theory has been criticized as essentially a US pursuit and one that is ~elf-serving.~’ However, reg’ imes are theoreticaIIy interesting in their own right, both because they offer a model of interstate relations only partially based on coercion, and they provide a way to examine international systems on several levels of analysis simultaneously.

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12 Regimes and Liberal World Orders

Regimes ** Regimes are defined as the “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making

procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue- area.’y51 “Principles are coherent sets of theoretical statements about how the world works.” Norms are standards of behavior consistent with principles. “Rules and decision-making procedures refer to specific prescriptions for behavior in clearly defined areas.”52 Regimes express themselves structurally, through the establishment of regular patterns of international interactions, and behaviorally, both through the rules, norms, and procedures that their members establish and by their subsequent, regime-directed conduct. This aspect of regimes allows one to focus on the connection between systemic and individual level behavior.

Like every other paradigm through which we examine human behavior, regime theory comes with its own normative content. It assumes that the basic realist model of international relations is incomplete and that structural factors such as the distribution of power among states do not by themselves determine international behavior. Some regime theorists take a narrow approach to the modification of realist tenets. These modified structural realists include the maximization of welfare with the maximization of power as goals of modern states, and thus straddle the line between the realist and the liberal rationalist traditions of analysis. They see regimes as the product of a sophisticated calculation of self-interest based on notions of Pareto optimality and perceptions of the impossibility of achieving optimal outcomes in the absence of c ~ o p e r a t i o n . ~ ~ Modified structural realists are rationalists who use the state rather than the firm or the individual as their basic unit of analysis; they view regimes as the outcomes of bargaining among and within states .54

A different approach is taken by the so-called Grotians whose perspective on international relations operates at a different level of analysis. The Grotian tradition is based on theories of natural law which “treated individual men, rather than the groupings of them as states, as the ultimate bearers of rights and duties.”55 Although Grotians may accept the realists’ interpretation of the Hobbesian tradition which says that “states are the principal reality in international they “reject the assumption that the international system is composed of sovereign states limited only by the balance of power. Rather . . . Sthey] suggest that elites are the practical actors in international relation^.^'^ Their focus on human behavior rather than on mechanistic power models allows Grotians to deal rationally with the existence of social constraints on otherwise possible types of behavior: “states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institution^."^^

Rather than seeing the behavior of decision-makers as conditioned by the structure of the system, Grotians see the system as conditioned by the behavior of decision-makers. From this perspective, regimes are not just intervening variables or alternative ways of understanding the exercise of power by nation-states. They are the framework within which virtually all international relations take place, “even those, such as major power rivalry, that are traditionally looked upon as clear-cut examples of anarchy.

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Statesmen nearly always perceive themselves as constrained by principles, norms, and rules that prescribe and proscribe varieties of beha~ior.”~’

The power of values, expectations, and perceptions to create structure and constrain behavior is recognized by national leaders who seek to impose their intepretations of reality on elites and masses in their own and other nations. The power that results from control over the interpretation of reality can be translated into other forms. For example, the successful reinterpretation by the United States of the causes of the Second World War to include nationalistic intervention in the world economy permitted the reimposition of an international gold standard and the establishment of a multilateral trading regime whose chief beneficiary was the United States“ even though most European analysts and statesmen had regarded such an eventuality as unthinkable given anticipated post-war economic conditions and their perceptions that blind adherence to just such a system had been a major cause of the Great Depression and thus the war.61

The Reagan administration has been even more successful than its predecessors in interpreting the causes of underdevelopment as internal rather than external or systemic,62 causing the impetus behind calls for a new international economic order to falter. The power of ideas to shape policy is not exclusive to realist explanations of events. The widely shared contemporary interpretation of the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo as a successful application of economic sanctions shifted the foreign policy of the United States from its structural realist underpinnings toward one more characteristic of US foreign policy in the 18th and early 19th ~ e n t u r i e s . ~ ~ T o the Grotians, principles and norms shape behavior at least as much as conventional attributes of power. The views of Gramsci and Cox are closer to the Grotian than to the realist perspective.

Liberal regimes Whether we assume, as realists do, that states create regimes to maximize their self-interest over the long term, or if we take the Grotian position that regimes are social systems that include elements of spontaneous orders as well as elements of negotiated orders,64 that is, that regimes include unintended as well as intended principles, norms, and patterns of behavior, regime theory is still problematic for the analysis of liberal systems because formal statements of regime theory cast it entirely in terms of state behavior. But liberal systems are based, to varying degrees, on the principle of laissez faire, and even though critics of market systems in politics and economics point out that laissezfaire is not the totally natural and spontaneous pattern that Adam Smith believed it to be,65 liberal theorists and liberal statesmen insist on the principle of nonintervention by the state in the economy as a theoretical ideal and an ideological tenet. Viewing liberal capitalism under hegemonic leadership as an international order providing a single international economic regime for multiple sovereignties, we can see the functional importance of substantial autonomy for nonstate economic actors to preserve the relative independence of local politics from the global economy.66 Thus, the analysis of liberal regimes from a state-centric perspective is neither theoretically nor empirically justified.

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14 Regimes and Liberal World Orders

The multinational corporation and the liberal state Although a nonstate actor such as a multinational corporation is, to some extent, a creature of its home government, it is far from entirely or even primarily so. There are at least two reasons for this. First is that states and corporations have divergent as )well as common interests. Their common interests tend to be political and strategic, arise from shared national perspectives and positions, and focus on the creation of rules to implement the principles of the regimes that will mediate the global political economy during the next hegemonic cycle in a way that benefits both the state and the multinational economic actors based in its terri t~ry.~’ The perception that the interests of governmental and nongovernmental elites are convergent, an apparent characteristic of the beginnings of hegemonic cycles, adds to the coherence and force of new hegemonies. Divergent interests tend to be economic; they become more obvious as the hegemony matures and the hegemonic state must adjust to shifting power distributions by becoming more accommodating and less nationalistic with respect to the distribution of hegemony-generated benefits. Nongovernmental hegemonic elites prefer to adjust to changing conditions by demanding that their home government maintain the system that benefits their activities, while nonhegemonic elites call for more nationalistic behavior to protect their interests, threatened by the domestically based multinationals as well as by foreign competition.

These differences arise because of basic disparities in the organization and goals of economic and political actors. T o take the most general and fundamental example, it is the goal of the state to internalize externalities, to control the distribution of public goods in such a way that all who benefit can be required to pay for them.6a But a corporation’s goal is just the opposite. In order to improve its competitive position, it seeks to externalize internalities, to impose on outsiders what otherwise would be normal costs of doing business.

This behavior is evident across a wide variety of issue areas ranging from taxes to regulation. Regulatory uniformity through the establishment of common markets is intended to reduce the relative advantages of some states over others, but where infrastructural advantages outweigh regulatory uniformity, the better off members of a common market usually reap further advantages: to him that hath, more shall be given. The results of private decisions by economic actors require politically directed redistribution if regimes are to be maintained.69 Unfortunately, nongovernmental elites, whether or not they participate in the international regimes that link the economies of sgvereign participants in the hegemonic system, resent and resist redistributive measures that do not favor their interests directly. As a result, the domestic economy of the hegemon is weakened and conflicts between it and the states it must accommodate in order to avoid a challenge to its authority become sharper.70

A second reason why the interests of the state and the corporation diverge is because the corporation, given its multiple personalities and the relations between these individual personalities and the states where they are located, has divided national loyal tie^.^' Perhaps the most frequently cited example of this situation occurred during the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo, when officials

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of Aramco, the joint venture company owned by four US firms, Texaco, Mobil, Chevron, and Exxon, decided to comply with the policy of the Saudi government and stop shipping oil to the United States. Even though the multinational oil companies collectively redistributed the loss of production from embargoing states across importing countries, countering the desires of Arab governments to differentiate among oil importers based on their stances toward the Arab-Israeli conflictY7* they did not challenge the policy directly as their home governments did, and their public behavior conformed to host government demands and expectations. The divergence between oil company and home government interests is also illustrated by the refusal of companies based in the UK to favor their home government in the allocation of scarce supplies.73

The degree of freedom within which the corporation operates is a function of both of these characteristics of its relationship to the state, and of the unique balance of power between a state and a corporation in a specific situation. This balance is affected by the extent to which territory creates advantages or disadvantages for one or the other.74 The corporation has the advantage of independence from territory. TO a very large extent, it may pick up and locate anywhere that it can maximize its ability to externalize costs. The state has the advantage of territoriality and its concomitant resources, including markets. Sovereignty permits the state to bar the corporation from what might be a very attractive territory in the absence of a mutually agreeable division of costs between them. The relative advantages as opposed to the disadvantages of territoriality vary by industry, with the particular mix of state endowments and choices, and over time. Before the oil revolution of 1973, many analysts believed that the advantages lay with the cor orationa7’ Since then, the advantages Seem to have shifted to the state.’ But the relations between the corporation and the state are dynamic, and the relative advantage shifts over time. Also critical to the operation of hegemonic systems is the fluidity of advantage among states themselves.

Large corporations and financial institutions benefit from the creation and maintenance of hegemonic world orders through their instrumental roles as participants. Their normal activities, at least at first, reinforce the economic strength of the dominant powers in such a system77 and provide the substrate for integrating the economies of all participating states. In return, their opportunities for growth and profits are enhanced. But the alliance between the state and the multinational corporation or international bank is always uneasy. The demands of economic rationality as well as the high degree of independence of these internationally operating economic actors from state control make them dangerous partners, even when mutual cooperation is a goal of both sides. Indeed, the economic agents of hegemonic states often hasten their decline by continuing to behave in ways that are economically rational for themselves when changes in the relative power of members of a hegemonic system would dictate a shift from principles, norms, and rules that emphasize the “automatic” operation of international regimes to one emphasizing a higher degree of government intervention and negotiati~n.’~

Liberal regimes are antithetical to hegemonic stability. Transactions based on exchange rather than command produce returns for both sides. This tends

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to reduce power disparities between states over time, undermining hegemonic power.” The ideology of liberal regimes advocates behavior that protects the autonomy of economic actors at the expense of the development of mechanisms of control by governments to decrease uncertainty and the 1ikeIihood of sudden shocks. In our era, sovereignty justifies increasing the autonomy of states and reduces th’eir willingness to submit themselves to such mechanisms as long as they can perceive advantages in independent action.“ The first aggravates the vulnerabilities of all participants to the results of the normal operation of international markets and the second supports subordinate state retaliation against hegemonic regimes that make them vulnerable.” The structural problems of modern hegemonies greatly outweigh those arising from venality and ineptitude.

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,*

Hegemonic decline Hegemonies decline for a number of reasons. Gilpin concentrates on the hegemon’s relative decline in strategic and economic power, which undermines its prestige and causes it to lose the authority to require that the rules of international interactions that it prefers be observed.82 According to this view of hegemony as an order based on force, the declining hegemon can choose between surrender to a rising power or measures to restore the forces a t its disposal sufficiently to ward off challenges to its power that might lead to hegemonic war and the start of a new cycle with a new hegemon at the helm. This theory is similar to Modelski’s power cycle theory, but even though Gilpin has developed the mechanisms describing growth and decline extensively, he is no better able to pose a solution to the problem of hegemonic or world wars than Modelski was. Gilpin is convinced that cycles of growth and decline are inevitable, powered by the ineluctable workings of the laws of uneven development and diminishing returns, even though he refuses to produce a fixed timetable such as Modelski’s 100-year cycle, and searches for alternatives in the 20th century to forestall the playing out of the scenario he predicts in a world of nuclear powers.

Krasner is concerned that the loss of legitimacy by global liberalism in response to what he sees as a deliberate ideological onslaught by Third World states has already weakened US hegemony and is forcing a shift in the structure of world ordera3. Krasner is less concerned with a decline in conventional measures of power than with the success of a Gramscian war of position against the rules of the game. He is sensitive both to the effects of the economic system that has led to this challenge and to the continued evolution of the state system to the point where sovereignty is not simply an attribute of great powers but of very small and weak states as well. Krasner’s solution to the present conflict over actor autonomy raging between states and the multinational enterprises seen as the agents ofa global system that is inimical to sovereignty is to disengage, to permit the dissatisfied to opt out altogether or to establish “self-reliant” regimes that participate in the hegemonic system only in limited areas. In a sense, this is a strategy of retrenchment and, as Gilpin observed, retrenchment may encourage further opportunism and an even more rapid decline in hegemonic power.

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Keohane has made a persuasive argument demonstrating the usefulness of the regimes underpinninp hegemonic systems to states participating in a hegemonic world order.8 According to his functional theory, regimes are created in the first place to deal with situations of political market failure, where crises or hegemonic imperatives require that behavior resulting in significant levels of externalities be coordinated. Regimes are frameworks within which Pareto optimal outcomes may be achieved among actors whose independent actions are likely to result in outcomes less beneficial or even harmful to most if not all of them. In the process, regimes mediate transactions by defining appropriate behavior; they increase the amount of information available to all participants; and they make it easier for reciprocity to be employed to channel the behavior of participants because they persist over long periods, giving actors the opportunity to punish those who violate system norms. But if they are so useful, why do regimes decay and why do the hegemonic systems they constitute collapse into conflict rather than evolve into stable negotiated orders? It is Keohane’s belief that such an evoIution is possible and, especially in the case of the regimes created under post-Second World War US hegemony, desirable because of the likely impact of modern weapons in a future hegemonic conflict.

Keohane does not deal with an important factor in the decay of ongoing regimes: the cost of hegemonic regimes to the domestic political economy of the hegemon. In both the British and American hegemonies, important elements in the domestic economies of each country were slighted in favor of the needs of hegemonic elites in and out of government. Modern capitalistic hegemonic systems display problems of equity domestically as well as internationally. But inequities take time to become obvious. The conjunction of a new hegemony with the end of a world war conceals the uneven distribution of the costs of hegemonic power to many domestic groups. The entire economy of a new hegemon enjoys a period of rapid growth with little effective competition internationally. But hegemonic leadership is costly to maintain, and requires the diversion of capital and labor from the domestic economy to the military. The strategic costs of maintaining hegemony represent opportunity costs to the economy as a whole. If these costs appear to be too high, domestic dissent will become a feature of the foreign policy process in the hegemonic state, damaging its international position.

As the costs of maintaining hegemony become visible to disaffected domestic groups, the inequities of the system also become more obvious and more salient politically. Hegemonic elites benefit directly from the system through their access to international resources and markets and from the mobility that enables them to move operations internationally to states where costs are lower and/or profits are higher. Both work to the disadvantage of those whose economic activities are limited to the domestic arena: labor; local and national industries and firms; and individuals and firms in the process of capital formation. Since hegemonic regimes reflect the interests of hegemonic elites, as global economic recovery proceeds, a gap appears between the positions of hegemonic elites and other domestic groups. Pressure to renegotiate hegemonic regimes comes not simply from other nations whose growing power justifies their demand for greater benefits from the

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international economy, but also from domestic groups whose dwindling economic power might not be mirrored by a constricted access to political elites. Both sets of interests must be accommodated if the international economy is to continue to operate.

The method of accommodation of each set of interests affects the system as a whole. James Kurth shows that the decision of the UK to maintain the free trade regime that benefited the nongovernmental hegemonic elite represented by the City of London required military Keynesianism in the form of an arms race to pacify manufacturers and labor whose interests would have been served by a different international regime. Block makes a similar argument for the United States during the Marshall Plan and he notes that this course necessarily “sap[ped] the economy’s strength.” Arms races also generate tensions and behavior that can lead to hegemonic war.

US leaders have consistently shown greater concern for the strategic position of the United States than for the political economy that US hegemony provides and protects. Thus, they tend to reach for military solutions to all the problems and conflicts they perceive rather than devoting their primary attention to the nurturance of the economic regimes that knit them to their allies and friends.86 The confusion of hegemony with militarism in the 20th century may prove to be as destructive as the confusion of hegemony with free trade in the 19th century.

Regimes and Liberal World Orders

Restoration or continued decline in US hegemony? The problems of arresting hegemonic decline are more severe for the United States than for earlier modern hegemonic powers because it could not achieve its preferred world order without supporting conditions that led to subsequent competition and conflict. The reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan was the chosen route toward multilateral trade and investment regimes, yet reconstruction rebuilt industries that US firms were not prepared to compete with. The side payments designed to encourage allied cooperation with US foreign economic and strategic policy goals proved to be both costly and often insufficient, for example, when the United States tried to obtain allied cooperation for strategic embargoes of the Soviet Union and Eastern E u r o ~ e . ~ ’ The side payments themselves, including US “permission” for Japan and the nations of Western Europe to operate economies significantly more closed to the United States than the US economy was closed to them, muted internal conflicts among their governmental elites and significant domestic interests such as farmers, but also established an apparently permanent nexus of conflict over welfare within the alliance itself.

The incidence of hegemonic benefits in the United States was more uneven. Government.elites enjoyed the power and authority they exercised as “leaders of the free world.” But their pursuit of power was criticized by domestic groups for whom its results were only marginally beneficial if not actually harmful. The domestic foreign policy consensus, always fragile in the United States, was shaken by the Korean War and demolished by VietnamF8 Economically, business and financial elites with substantial foreign involvement profited directly from their role as agents of US power in the

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global economy. As long as the economy continued to expand sufficiently to permit side payments, such as subsidies and favored tax treatment to be made to politically important firms and groups left out of the direct benefits stream, conflict could be minimized. But the erosion of the post-war regimes and the economy they sustained has made this option less attractive to hegemonic elites in and outside of government.

In general, the impact of hegemony on the hegemon itself aggravates domestic economic conflicts and conflicts over strategic foreign policy. For the United States, with its history of mistrust of the state, disdain for foreign involvements, and a liberal ideology bordering on self-caricature, the costs of hegemony are unusually high. Side payments going abroad are resented as are the limited wars thought to be necessary to maintain a hegemonic position. This resentment, and its political manifestations, have encouraged politicians to look for “cheap” foreign policies such as reliance on nuclear retaliation against a conventional attack on Western Europe, and an emphasis on low-cost “covert” activities in Third World nations.

The Nixon doctrine was not the first sign that the United States would prefer to use foreign forces to pursue its goals. Both the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and the restoration of the Shah in Iran relied on relatively small amounts of US financial and strategic assistance to local authoritarian forces. But the short-term savings associated with having foreigners assume some of the costs ofone’s foreign policies are outweighed by long-term high costs in autonomy and the ability to control events and their outcomes. Vietnamization did not result in a stable South Vietnam allied to the United States any more than a client Shah of Iran represented US interests in OPEC meetings. Ironically, the emphasis on low-cost options in US foreign policy has made US hegemony very expensive.

The economic results of US hegemony have been equally mixed. The use of the US dollar as a reserve currency allowed the United States to pursue irresponsible economic policies while foreigners contributed to the costs- another kind of Nixon doctrine. Yet the size and strength of its economy does give the United States great autonomy in its economic choices. For example, during the first Reagan term it permitted the imposition of historically high real interest rates both domestically and internationally to finance deficits accumulated in the quest for resources to allocate to side payments to powerful domestic groups and to military e~pansion.~’ In the process, the economic and political stability of uncooperative allies has been threatened and the United States has assumed a greater authority than it has enjoyed for many years on issues ranging from the domestic economic policies of countries as diverse as France and Mexico to questions of international management of ocean resources and the regulation of news agencies But the domestic cost of these triumphs has been high, feeding resentment and supporting constituencies that favor trade restriction, a curtailment of foreign aid, and greatly reduced military expenditures.

The law of uneven development predicts that the resurgence of hegemonic power through such means will accelerate the process of decline. However, the resurgence of hegemony at this stage in the power cycle could aid in the recreation of regimes, such as the energy and trade regimes, that have

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undergone extensive decay. But the prospects for hegemonic restoration depend on a correct assessment of the relative economic and strategic positions of important actors in the present world order. If restoration reflects an actual redistribution of strategic and economic power from subordinate actors in the system to the hegemon and its economic agents, pfesent patterns of behavior that rely on US dominance can be continued with little real risk to existing or refurbished regimes. But if the restoration is primarily ideological, a shift to a negotiated order based on more egalitarian principles is preferable, both to preserve existing beneficial regimes and to reduce the likelihood of conflict that could lead to war. Whether such a shift would mean moving toward greater governmental control of presently highly autonomous economic actors or toward more competitive regimes where hegemonic elites would lose their favored status, they can be expected to continue and even to expand their opposition to it.

I t is also critical to examine world order as a matter of choice by governments rather than as the outcome of an undirected process. The tendency of neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin to believe that change in the international system is a product of Newtonian processes in a fundamentally fixed universe re resents a radical departure from realist philosophy. Hans Morgenthau?’ the analyst most closely associated with classical realism by US scholars, believed that system transformation was both desirable and possible, and recommended diplomacy and accommoda- tion as the routes to its achievement. The present ideological dominance of neo-realism makes it difficult for Americans today to view the international system as an arena where governments can create new forms to suit themselves rather than as a set of constraints whose interplay can be modified but not changed in any fundamental way. But it is US interests, not some idealistic vision of a brave new world, that demand a new approach to the problem ofworld order. The United States would be the main beneficiary o fa peaceful transition to a new order that promises to last beyond the time when the “American” century could be expected to collapse of its own weight in expanded responsibilities and diminished resources.

Summary and conclusions Modern hegemonic systems have evolved to link sovereign states into an integrated international economy. In the absence of an imperial order, a single power takes primary responsibility for the creation of regimes, ordered systems that define the parameters of legally and normatively appropriate behavior within the shared political economy. The hegemon provides services such as strategiz protection against internal and external attacks, a reserve currency, and a reservoir from which side payments can be made to elicit cooperation. Hegemonies are consensual arrangements within which force plays a subordinate role to persuasion, exhortation, and economic incentives.

The coincidence of modern hegemony with the development of liberal capitalism and the nation-state system is an indication of why it is dependent on the activities of transnational agents. Liberal capitalism is biased against direct governmental intervention in the economy. Sovereignty is biased against any government’s intervention in another’s affairs. Nonstate agents

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are necessary to link sovereign states’ economies in a way that enables participants to treat the principles and rules regularizing their economic interactions as independent of the nationalistic goals of any of them. This permits the international economy to appear to be divorced from other areas of international relations, and helps to preserve the joint economy even during interstate conflicts. The international consensus on the separation of economic from other international issues is based upon a unifying ideology that legitimizes the leadership of the hegemon and the governing principles of the system.

The gravest structural flaws in hegemonic systems include the autonomy of nonstate actors and the origin of hegemony in the aftermath of global conflicts. Hegemonic systems evolve into or coexist with multipolar systems that may, as patterns of strategic order, be stable. But liberal economic orders produce rapid shifts in income, employment, and wealth among the leading states, creating conflict and straining regimes. This makes multipolar economic systems unstable. As the Cost of participation in these systems becomes evident domestically, efforts to insulate the domestic economy or to engage in economically nationalistic behavior contribute to international conflict?‘

States may resort to military Keynesianism to protect vulnerable national economies, leading to arms races that may themselves provoke war. The relative equivalence in the strength of leading state actors makes the conflict marking the end of hegemonic cycles “global” or “limitless” as all of them are eventually drawn in either to rescue or to seize control of the world economy.

The question remains: how can we resolve or ameliorate the structural conflict between the nation-states system and the liberal political economy that connects these states’ struggles for power and wealth to parallel struggles for welfare? Such a resolution is not simply desirable but acutely necessary for the survival of human and other life on Earth in this era when hegemonic war would inevitably be nuclear war. In the conflict between the values associated with sovereignty and those associated with individual and corporate as well as state autonomy, it is the state as the maker of war rather than the others that most needs to be constrained. In the process, regimes and the roles of nonstate agents will also be modified so that the resulting world system can function with a minimum of conflict in the absence of the services of a hegemon.

To Hans Morgenthau and many others, such an order would take the form of a world government capable of regulating the activities of nonstate economic agents as well as of the constituent states themselves. I believe that such a solution is very far from realization, much more than it was in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War when the costs of hegemonic conflict were still so immediately visible and burdensome. I am also not sure that a global regime of any kind would be the best solution. The obliteration of local cultures in the past 200 years without a world government has, like the thinning of the gene pool for domesticated plants and animals, deprived us of a range of variability in human arrangements that we will come to regret, not simply for sentimental but for social and biological reasons as well.

If a global solution is neither possible nor perhaps wholly desirable, what about a regionally organized world order? A suggestion of this kind can be

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found in Krasneds 1985 book Structural Confict. His position in the tug of war between sovereignty and global liberalism is toward the latter, and to preserve the liberal political economy Krasner suggests that regional- ideological, possibly hegemonic, subsystems be permitted to develop from the presently more integrated world order. Inter-subsystem relations would be carefully regulated and formalized, while intra-subsystem relations would be highly integrated and much less regulated. But it seems to me that such an order would be little more than a First-Second-Third World system, perhaps including several Third Worlds. Wouldn’t such an order simply perpetuate neo-colonial and dependency relationships without really dealing with the problem of hegemonic conflicts which are intra-systemic, not inter-systemic anyway? Regionalization along these lines merely extends the occasions for hegemonic, if subglobal, conflicts. Given the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the improvement that such an order is supposed to effect seems nonexistent.

Yet it is difficult to indicate more than a general direction, perhaps even less than that, toward a new order, not only because our visions of the future are necessarily clouded by our perceptions of the present but also because it really is not possible to map any sure path to some place we have never been. The new order will come about, as others have before it, through a combination of accidents and purposefuI efforts that result in outcomes that are stable and satisfactory-we’ll recognize our future only when we’ve lived in it for a long time. I would like, however, to speculate about how such a change might come about using the model of the revolution that has occurred in the international petroleum market.

In our lifetime, a new international petroleum order is taking shape, one that no one predicted in the depth and scope of the reality that is creating itself almost daily. When I was a child, the international oil industry was essentially controlled by a few multinational oil firms based in the three modern hegemonic states: the Netherlands, the UK, and the United States. These firms were challenged by the assumption of sovereignty by states in Latin America and the Middle East, and by nonhegemonic firms whose commitment to the structure of the international oil regime was insignificant beside their commitment to getting a share of the industry’s profits. In 1960, OPEC was formed, an organization that challenged global liberalism through the assertion of sovereignty, and was challenged itself, on its own terms, 15 years later by the International Energy Agency. I have been writing about international energy issues for the past 10 years. During ,that time, a proliferation of institutions and organizations has burgeoned, making the international energy regime one of the most interesting and quickly evolving structures in th% political economy. The new forms and patterns of state and nonstate relations in energy have created a more open market and more oil wealth that is more widely distributed than were possible under the old regime. Critics complain that the new energy regime has reduced energy security; but energy security is not absolute for any country in the world and never has been. Even the self-sufficient Soviet Union must cope with the insecurities of Chernobyls-as must we all.

This new regime is still very much in the process of becoming, yet I think that it holds great promise for those interested in new world orders. The

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international oil regime grows increasingly transparent and open, often in spite of those actors nominally the most powerful, such as the large states and firms that still influence but no longer control it. The new oil regime is also more accessible than the old one, and to more actors and more kinds of actors, from states of all sizes to firms of all characters.

In spite of the greater openness and fluidity of the new regime, the hegemonic states and the international firms that were their agents under the old oil regime have profited from these changes just as Third World countries and nonfavored firms have gained?‘ However, the regime itself is no longer hegemonic. I t is a mixed system that, paradoxically, features both high levels of coordination among states and firms, and a more open market-greater autonomy-for the participants.

Students of world order have much to learn from the international oil regime. Its openness and mixed character preserve and extend the autonomy of all the participants, while the importance of energy to the security and wealth of state and nation has encouraged greater and more extensive coordination among states. In 1970, no one envisioned such an order as now exists. In 1980, even though the events of the previous decade had hastened the dissolution of the old regime and laid down Some of the paths to the new order, what that order would be was still obscure-and remains obscure.

In the last analysis, it is the basic incompatibility between capitalism and sovereignty that drives hegemonic cycles. If we wish to continue to have a linked political economy, global in scope, made up of sovereign states and nonterritorial economic agents, we must grope toward a future where power is diffused yet can be concentrated to some extent, through acts of will, to accomplish agreed goals peacefully. The recent revolution in the international oil regime is at least an indication that such a transformation is possible without the intervention of global war. Thus, we can hope that a peaceful transition to world order based on a transformation of both sovereignty and autonomy can succeed.

Notes and references 1. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,

1981); and Robert 0. Keohane, Ajler Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in tht World Political Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

2. Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” Millenium, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981.

3. George Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State,” Comparative Studies in Sociep and History, 20 April, 1978.

4. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1. 5. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1. 6. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1, p. 29. 7 . Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essoy on the Social Formations of Pcriphcral Capitalism

8. Op tit, Gilpin, note 1 , pp. 108-1 10. 9. Op n’t, note 7 , p. 59.

(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).

10. Op cif, Gilpin, note 1, pp. 85-96. 11. Op cit, note 3, pp. 215-216. 12. Op cit, note 4, p. 44. 13. Op tit, note 4, p. 55.

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14. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the

15. Ibid, p. 15; and Samuel P. Huntington, “Transnational Organizations in World Politics,”

16. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1, pp. 119-121. 17. Op cit, note 14. 18. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1, pp. 118-1 19.’ 19. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1985). 20. Lawrence Stone, “The Results of the English Revolutions of the Seventeenth Century,” in

J. G. A. Pocock (editor), Three British Revolutions: 1641, 1688, 1776 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Regimes and Liberal World Orders

Eurojean World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1973).

World Politics, Vol. 25, April 1973. **

21. Ibid, p. 37. 22. -1. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentiw Political Thought and thc Atlantic

&wbl ican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). ~

23. Op cit, Gilpen, note 1, p. 225. 24. 0) cit, note 3, pp. 231-232. 25. Op cit, Gilpen, note 1, pp. 198-204; and op cit, note 3, pp. 236, 232. 26. Op cit, Huntington, note 15, pp. 346, 357. 27. Op cit, note 22, p. 53. 28. Robert W. Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,”

29. Ibid, p. 171. 30. Op cit, note 19, pp. 76-77; Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, “The Reagan

Administration’s Attempt to Dominate International Development as a Successful ‘Gramscian’ Strategy,” presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, 1986; and Stephen Gill and David Law, “Power, Hegemony and International Theory: Recessions and Restructuring in the Global Political Economy,” presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, 1986.

Milknium, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1983.

31. Op cit, Keohane, Note 1, p. 40; and Huntington, note 15, p. 343. 32. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1, pp. 197-198; and O/J cit, note 3, p. 226. 33. Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World

Politics, Vol. 28, April 1976. 34. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1, pp. 165-168; Karl Polanyi, The Great Tramfornation (New York:

Rinehart & Company, 1944/1957); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System [I: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750 (New York: Academic Press, 1980).

35. Edward Morse, “Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence and Externalization,” World Politics, Vol. 22 (April, 1970), p. 378.

36. John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifllin, 1965); op cit, WalIcrstein note 34, pp. 57-63; and oh cit, Keohane note 1, pp. 159-167.

37. Op cit, Wallerstein, note 34, p. 70. 38. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Organizational Reuolution: A stub in the Ethics of Economic

39. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Tr. Rex Warner (Baltimore: Penguin, 1954). 40. Tracey A. Johnstone, Decreasing Allied Support for Anti-Soviet Strategic Embargoes: A

Demonstration oflhe Declining Hegemony ‘of the United States (Master’s thesis, Old Dominion University, 1986).

Organization (New York: liarper and ROW, 1983).

41. Op cit, Huntington, note 15, p. 359. 42. Bruce W:Jentleson, “The Whole World is Watching: The Credibility Trap in American

Foreign Policy,” presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Anaheim, 1986; and Theodore Draper, “Falling Dominoes,” New York Review of Books, 27 October, 1983.

43. 0) cit, Gilpen, note 1. 44. Op cit, note 19, p. 72. 45. Mark J. Gasiorowski, “International Cliency Relationships and the Client State: a

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Theoretical Framework” (1986, unpublished); “Dependency and Cliency in Latin America,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs,” Vol. 28 (Fall, 1986).

46. Op cit, Gilpen, note 1, pp. 13, 30-31. 47. Op cit, Gilpen, note 1, p. 30. 48. Op cit, note 3, p. 227. 49. Op cit, Keohane, note 1, p. 37. 50. Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Anaiysis,” International

51. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as

52. Op cit, note 19, p. 4. 53. Duncan Snidal, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” in Kenneth A. Oye (editor)

Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and op cit, Keohanc, note 1.

Organization, Vol. 36, Spring 1982.

Intervening Variables,” International Organization, Vol. 36, Spring 1982.

54. 0) cit, Keohane, note 1. 55. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A study o f Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1977). 56. Ibid, p. 26. 57. Op cit, note 51, p. 191. 58. Op cit, note 55, p. 26. 59. Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, “International Regimes: Lessons from

Inductive Analysis,” International Organization, Val. 36, Spring 1982. 60. Fred L, Block, The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study o f United States

International hlonetary Policy from World War 11 to the Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and Armand Van Dormael, Bretton Woods: Birth . f a Monetary system (London: Macmillan, 1978).

61. John Maynard Keynes, “National Self-sufficiency,” Yale Review, Vol. 26, 1933; and op cit, Polanyi, note 34.

62. Nathan Gotfried, Bridging the Gap Between Rich and PO07 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987); op cit, note 19; and op cit, Augelli and Murphy, note 30.

63. Mary Ann Tktreault, “Models, Metaphors, and Foreign Policy,” in Mary Ann T6treault and Charles Frederick Abel (editors) Dependency Theory and the Return of High Politics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986).

64. Oran Young, “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” International Organization, Val. 36, Spring 1982.

65. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1939/1964); and op cit, Polanyi, note 34.

66. 0) cit, Huntington, note 15, pp. 357-358. 67. Op cit, Van Dormael, note 60; Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current

Perspective: The Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956/1980); and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization, Vol. 36, Spring 1982).

68. Op cit, Gilpin, note 1, p. 70. 69. William A. Axline, “Underdevelopment, Dependency and Integration: The Politics of

Regionalism in the Third World,” International Organization, Vol. 31, Spring 1977; and Joseph S. Nye, “Comparing Common Markets,” International Organization, Vol. 24, Autumn 1970.

70. James R. Kurth, “The Political consequences of the Product Cycle,” International Organization, Vol. 33 (1979), pp. 1-34.

71. Mary Ann Tetreault, Revolution in the World Petroleum Market (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1985).

72. Richard Weisberg, The Politics of Cmde Oil Pricing in the Middle East 3970-75 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

73. Ibid. 74. Op cit, note 3, pp. 229-230. 75. Raymond Vernon, Sovereign9 at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US. Enterprises (New York:

Basic Books, 1971); and op cit, Huntington, note 15.

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76. Op cit, note 19. 77. Op cit, note 33; and op tit, note 70. 78. Op cit, note 70. 79. Op cit, Gilpen, note 1, pp. 171-175. 80. Op cit, note 71, p. 245. 81. Op cit, note 19. 82. Op cit, Gilpen, note 1. 83. Op cit, note 19. 84. Op cit, Keohane, note 1. 85. Op cit, Block, note 60, pp. 104-108. 86. Stanley Hoffman, P r i ~ or World Order: Amcrican Foreign Polip Sime the Cold War (New

87. Op cit, note 40. 88. Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, T h Irony of Vietnam: th &stem Worked (Washington:

89. Henry Nau, “Where Reaganomics Works,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 57, Winter 1984-85, pp.

90. Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Stnrgglefor

91. Op cit, Polanyi, note 34. 92. Op Eit, note 71.

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1

York: McGraw Hill, 1978).

Brookings, 1977).

16-19, 25-28.

Powzr and Peucz, sixth edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985).

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