Neorealism in International Relations – Kenneth Waltz

The Limits of Neorealism Marginal States and International Relations Theory

Kenneth Waltzs Neorealism in International Relations

By: Jo Jakobsen

1What is Neorealism? also known as Structural Realism introduced by Kenneth N. Waltz in his book Theory of International Politics it seeks to explain how states, in particular the most powerful ones, behave, and how they interact with each other on the international arena.In Waltzs conception of structure, we need to note 2 things: Anarchy as the ordering principle in international system there is no higher authority above the states results to a self-help system; consists of states that are autonomous and functionally undifferentiated actors who must be prepared to fend for themselves.In Waltzs conception of structure, we need to note 2 things: Distribution of capabilities across the units/states inhabiting the international system. power vary significantly differentiated according to the amount of power they possess variations in power yield variations in the types and magnitudes of structural constraints hence variation in how states behavePool Table as International Politics

Cold War

What did the old powers do? due to the threat from the Soviet Union, they had to rely for American protection through an alliance Europe became consumers of security and as a result accept US influence in European affairs as an effect, they became economically and militarily weakened (Paris & London had no longer a stronghold on resources)Main PointsStructural constraints that arise from distribution of powers force states to act according to the means that would best help realize their objectives (survival or security) powerful states can and indeed should or must do more than less powerful states but shouldnt get too excited about the power-projection opportunities that arise simply from having great capabilities.Nazi Germany

acknowledging and abiding by the structural constraints of the system is vital for any state that seeks successfully to fulfil its objectives, key among which is security.United States superpower post WW2 expanded greatly starting in Western Europe and assumed greater responsibilities it had the capabilities to do so perceived to be in the interest of national security to do so as relative power increases, interests expand- and they also expand geographically

Checks and Balances US and Soviet Union could not expand (militarily, economically and ideologically) into Western Europe due to the check each does to the other. structural constraint on the achievement of hegemony as states arise that have the means or capabilities to expand, others need to react lest they face the risk of extinction or, in any case, a loss of sovereignty, autonomy, or control over their own fate.The peculiar thing about bipolarity, Waltz has famously and rightly stated, is that, on a global scale at least, only the two superpowers possess the means required to balance each other (having allies helps, but for purposes of balancing, they are all disposable under bipolarity). states are normally and graduallysocialized into accepting the view that power needs to be balanced but are not automatically socialized. Ex. France and Great Britain as great powers ended due to ignorance to balancing Nazi Germanys powerWar states do not wish to fight wars; indeed, they tend to fear war more than anything else, and that fear generally works as a significant constraint on state behavior, instilling some degree of prudence into leaders. The basic sources of war and peace thepermissive causesof war and peace are exactly the two fundamental elements of the structure of the international system: anarchy and the distribution of power.

misconception about anarchy that because there is no one to stop war, it will happen conflict of interest sometimes escalate to war war occurs because there is an imbalance in power war becomes a conquest with potential fruitful result The basic cause of armed conflict is the lack of a global sovereign (a world govt with a police force) to stop war from occurring.

Anarchy causes war and sometimes it stops war from occurring, the key variable is distribution of power.

What happens in an anarchic world where neither bipolarity and multipolarity characterizes the distribution of power?

What happens under unipolarity?Unipolarity occurred when Cold War ended and Soviet Union collapsed leaving US as the only superpower. relative power based on the possession of material resources rather than use The world is unipolar because the United States commands aggregate material resources (especially but not exclusively military capabilities) of a magnitude that no other state in the world is remotely close to matching.

US stands alone in terms of power resources and capacity to act US does not have to act globally even if its absolute and relative power allows it to. If US decides to stay home to protect its security and prosperity they would still remain to be the unipole due to the actual distribution of resources. A sudden reversal to isolationism would spell the end of American hegemony but not of unipolarity. US will unlikely resort to isolationism Power shapes interest: the more power the more extensive the interests. US behaves like a hegemon because it has the power to behave like one. no peer competitors owns a military machinery that takes up 40% of world military spending economy twice as large as the next one unmatched technological and academic prowessDangers of Unchecked Power once the countervailing power disappears, the temptation to do a lot is present, hence expansion of influence-attempts toinstitutionalize(and, where possible, expand)the world orderof which the U.S. itself has been the key shaper. the response of other major states to unipolarity How will the other major powers respond to U.S. unipolarity and U.S. hegemony? Specifically, will the other major powers attempt to balance the mighty American power?

90s to early 2000s Unipolarity and American hegemony have as yet not been seriously challenged. U.S. power has been and still is so overwhelming that balancing is largely rendered impossible, ineffective, and indeed also quite risky considering that it might lead to serious confrontations with the superpower at a time where no other state can confidently expect to pose a real military challenge against it.

What about now? the picture has changed somewhat in the last few years partly in the form of the resurgence and assertiveness of Russia, but in particular with the rise of China and its conscious translation of speedy economic growth into military capacityspecifically aimed at countering U.S. military power in East Asia.

In an anarchic world, where interests collide, where survival and security constitute the basic goals of states, where the distribution of power largely shapes what states can and cannot do and whom they have reasons to fear and not fear, the biggest gamble one takes is to remain oblivious to the risk posed by unchecked power.