NEGOTIATING THE SINGLE AO': NATIONAL INTERESTS AND CONVENTI ONAL STATECRAFT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY by Andrew MoravcsikDepartment of Government an d Center for International AffairsWorking Paper Series #21The ai m of this paper is to explain the unexpected "relaunching" of the European Community, which took the form of the Single European Act an d the program for completing the internal mark et by 1992. The data presented here challenge the common view that the Single Act was the result of an elite alliance between the Commission, Parliament, an d supranational business interest groups-a view consistent with neofunctionalist regional integration theory. An alternative view is presented, whereby EC reform rests on interstate bargains between Britain, France, an d Gennany. The essential precon ditio n for reform was the convergence of Europ ean economic policy preferences following the reversal of French domestic policy in 1983, combined with the bargaining leverage that France an d Germany wielded against Britain by exploiting the threat of creating a "two-track" Europe and excluding Britain from it. These findings suggest that neofunctionalist theories of regional integration must be supplemented, or perhaps supplanted, by a "modified structural Realist" approach drawn from regime theory, which stresses more traditional conceptions of national interest and power.
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8/4/2019 Negotiating the Single Act: National Interests & Conventional Statecraft in the European Community (WPS 21, 1989…
Department of Governmentand Center for International Affairs
Working Paper Series #21
The aim of this paper is to explain the unexpected "relaunching" of the European Community, which
took the form of the Single European Act and the program for completing the internal market by 1992.
The data presented here challenge the common view that the Single Act was the result of an elitealliance between the Commission, Parliament, and supranational business interest groups-a view
consistent with neofunctionalist regional integration theory. An alternative view is presented,
whereby EC reform rests on interstate bargains between Britain, France, and Gennany. The essential
precondition for reform was the convergence of European economic policy preferences following the
reversal of French domestic policy in 1983, combined with the ba rgaining leverage tha t France and
Germany wielded against Britain by exploiting the threat of creating a "two-track" Europe and
excluding Britain from it. These findings suggest that neofunctionalist theories of regional
integration must be supplemented, or perhaps supplanted, by a "modified structural Realist"
approach drawn from regime theory, which stresses more tradit ional conceptions of national interestand power.
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Even more important than mutual recognition are procedural changes in
decision-making. The SEA expands the use of majority •voting in the Council of
Ministers and, at least implicitly, suppresses the national veto. Since January 1966,
majority voting, where foreseen in theory by the Treaty of Rome, had been limited inpractice by the informal "Luxembourg Compromise," in which France unilaterally asserted
that any member state could veto a proposal in the Council of Ministers by declaring that
a "vital" or "very important" interest was at stake. The expansion of majority voting
under the SEA seeks to limit the role of the national veto, but is limited almost entirely
to decisions relating to the internal market. With the exception of a few minor initiatives
(such as the inclusion of collaborative research-and-development programs under the
treaty), other potential areas of European integration such as political cooperation, social
legislation, monetary policy and further procedural reform, as well as fundamental
constitutional issues such as enlargement are subject to neither the new approach nor
majority voting.3
According to the public statements of European leaders, the plan for market
liberal ization by 1992 was primari ly a response to the perceived economic weakness of
Europe. Politicians perceived this failure through persistent high unemployment and
long-term decline in international competitiveness vis-a-vis the United States and Japan,
particularly in high-technology industries such as electronics and telecommunications.
The prescription found in the 1992 initiative was derived from classical economic
liberalism: what holds Europe back is internal barriers, which generate administrative
costs for governments and firms and which preserve suboptimal economies of scale." To
compete with American and Japanese firms, European firms must be encouraged toiI
exploit an "internal" market of Continental proportions. Accordingly, the White Paper
offers a wide-ranging package of measures designed to remove administrative, technical,
financial and personal barriers to cross- border trade and ownership.
Yet awareness of possible economic benefits did not automatically call forth
a European program of liberalization or reform of EC decision-making. Free-trade
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changes in exogenous variables. Once initiated, integration is self-sustaining. Haas!
explained systems change--fundamental moments of reform in which new issues are taken
up, new decision-making procedures adopted or new members admitted--as the result of
spillover.20
iSpillover can work through various mechanisms, two of which concern us here.
The first is inherent in the nature of economic development. Once integration begins ina certain sector, it is argued, the economic and social linkages between issue areas will
require regulation in new areas to preserve the gains tha t have been made. A second
mechanism is the creation and empowerment of supranational organizations, both private
and public, which eventually supplant their domestic counterparts. These organizations
then shape the further path of integration.f"
Haas predicted that as integration advances, interstate bargains are no longer
limited to the minimum common denominator of national preferences or a simple
compromise between opposing positions, but move toward a pattern of accommodationI
in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek
to attain agreement by means of compromises "upgrading common interests.,,22 In other
words, governments engage in a process of log-rolling. The willingness of governmentsi
to make positive trade-offs in turn creates opportunities for supranational administratorsI
to ac t as "institutionalized mediators" and to "seize upon crises" as opportunities for
"creative personal action..., the solution of which upgrades common interests among the
actors.,,23
Hence neo-functionalism, at least in its most systemic variant, would lead us
to expect to observe exactly what the commentators above have described: increasing
domestic and international interest group influence for internal market liberalization and
pressure from within supranational institutions like the .European Parliament and
leadership by an active European Commission would propel integration beyond the stage
of lowest-common-denominator bargaining.f"
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I. I am grateful to Kalypso Nicolatdis for collegial encouragement and criticism from thebeginning and to David Dessler, Peter Hall, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Diane
Orentlicher, Joseph Nye, Helen Wallace and the participants in the Ford Foundation European
Institutions Seminar at Harvard University for comments on an earlier draft. I would also like toexpress my appreciation to the Center for European Studies at Harvard University, the Krupp
Foundation, and the Morris Abrams Fellowship for essential research support, and to the European
Community Visitor's Programme for organizing and financing a research trip in January 1989.This article is based in large part in interviews with European officials conducted at that time.
Dieser Aufsatz ist meinem Uronkel Andreas Fleissig gewidmet, der die Notwendigkeit einergesamtkontinentaler europdischer Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft vor einem halben Jahrhundert vorgesehenund analysiert hat. I
I
2. The quotation is from Article 8A, as amended by the Single Act. The general literature on1992 is exploding. The best negotiating history of the Single European Act, written by anintelligent insider who took comprehensive notes, is Jean De Ruyt, L' Acte UniQue Europeen:Commentaire (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1987). For other useful historiesand commentaries, see Peter Ludlow, Beyond 1992: Europe and its Western Partners (Brussels:Center for European Policy Studies, 1989); Michael Calingaert, The 1992 Challenge from Europe:Development of the European Community's Internal Market (Washington, DC: National PlanningAssociation, 1988) and Angelika Volle, GroBbritannien und der europaische EinigungsprozeB(Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fu r Auswartige Politik, February 1989), pp.46-76. For a collection of important German articles and documents between 1985 and 1989, seeJochen Thies and Wolfgang Wagner, eds. Auf dem Wege zum Binnenmarkt: europaische Integration
und deutscher Foderalismus (Bonn: Verlag fu r internationale Politik, 1989). For an excellent casestudy of the 1992 negotiations compared with previous experience, see Roy Pryce, ed. The
Dynamics of European Union (London and New York: Croom Helm, 1987). On the provisions of
1992 as a new form of multilateral economic negotiation, see Kalypso Nicclaidis, "MutualRecognition: The New Frontier of Multilateralism?" in Network Politics (Paris: PrometheePerspectives No. 10, June 1989), pp. 21-34.
3. The Luxembourg compromise, which was announced to the world in a press communique, hasno legal standing. Quite the opposite, it has been interpreted as an attempt to circumvent legalprocedures under Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome that were used to adopt the Single Act. Fo rthe text (in French), see Philippe Moreau-Defarges, Quel Avenir pour quelle Communaute? (Paris:Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, 1986), p. 50; for a discussion of its history, see JohnNewhouse, Collision in Brussels: The Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965 (London: Faber and
Faber, 1967) and Michael Palmer and John Lambert, et al. European Unity: A Survey of theEuropean Organizations (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), pp. 251ff.
4. EC Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, "The Economics of1992: An assessment of the potential economic effects of completing the internal market of theEuropean Community," European Economy No. 35 (March 1988).
5. This article offers no more than a preliminary attempt to apply international relations theoryto the negotiation of the Single European Act. A more definitive test of this explanation ofsystems change lies beyond the scope of this paper, since it would necessarily place the Single Act
and the White Paper in the context of a systematic, comparative analysis of the success and failureof major EC internal market initiatives between 1950 and the present. A process-tracing analysisof the Single Act negotiations is nonetheless a necessary first step in this research agenda.
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6. Among the factors mentioned are declining American hegemony, increasing competition from
US and Japan, the emergence of services on the GAIT agenda, the success of the EMS, theelimination of other issues from the EC agenda, changes in the nature of trade from goods toservices, economic stagnation since 1973, the beginnings of economic recovery in the mid-1980s,the abandonment of Europe at the Reykjavik summit, increased German assertiveness, the decisionto tie the initiative to a clear deadline, the clarity of Lord Cockfield's prose, and many others.For summaries of some of these arguments, see Michael Calingaert, 1992 Challenge, p. 7;
Economist (9 July 1988), p. 8; Peter Ludlow, "Beyond 1992," European Affairs (Autumn 1988),pp . 19, 21.
7. Calingaert and Ludlow and others stress these forces. In addi tion , see Axel Krause, " Whatafter European Integration?" European Affairs (Autumn 1988), pp . 46-55.
8. For strong claims about the importance of this group in inspiring reform, see Marina Gazzo,"Introduction," in Towards European Union: From the "Crocodile to the European Council inMilan (Brussels-Luxembourg: Agence Europe, 1985), pp . 7-10.
9. Among the most influential parliamentary reports is Michel Albert and James Ball, Toward
European Economic Recovery in the 1980s: Report presented to the European Parliament (31August 1983). Chapter 5 of the report, written by Albert, does focus on the importance ofresearch programs like ESPRIT, as well as standards, frontier barriers and employs the expression
"the costs of Non-Europe." See also "Resolution on the need to implement the internal Europeanmarket," Official Journal of the European Communities (OJEC) [CI27/9, 9 April 1984];"Report...on consolidating the internal market," European Parliament Working Documents [A 2
50/85 and A 2-50/85, 31 May 1985].
10. There were nascent trends toward reform in other EC inst itutions as well. In the landmark
Cassis de Dijon case of 1979, the European Court had introduced the principle of mutualrecognition of certain kinds of legislation, whereby members states could be compelled torecognized functionally similar legislation in foreign countries as binding. In the Council ofMinisters, there had been a steady increase in majority voting. Ten decisions were taken byqualified majority between 1966 and 1974,35 between 1974 and 1979, and more than 90 between1980 and 1984.
In addition, two more subtle arguments have been advanced. Helen Wallace views the SingleAct as "a return on investments made over many previous years" in developing a distinctive
internal negotiating culture within the EC. See "Making Multilateralism Work: Negotiations in theEuropean Community," (mimeo., August 1988), p. 6. Roy Pryce sees the Council as having beentrapped by its own rhetoric in documents like the "Solemn Declaration" at Stuttgart: "...thecumulative effect of repeated rhetorical commitments was to make some form of action eventuallyinescapable." See "Past Exper ience and Lessons for the Future," in Pryce, ed. Dynamics, p. 276.But it is unclear whether either of these arguments is intended as an alternative to the argument
advanced here (e.g. see Pryce, p, 278 on the role of member states).
I I . On the role of business, see Lawrence G. Franko, "Europe 1992: The Impact on GlobalCorporate Strategy and Multinational Corporate Strategy," (mimeo., University of Massachusettsat Boston, September 1989); Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992: Recasting the EuropeanBargain," (manuscript to appear in World Politics, no date), pp . 9-10; Financial Times (14 February
1984); Axel Krauss, "Many Groups Lobby on Implementation of Market Plan," Europe Magazine(July/August 1988), pp . 24-25; Ludlow, Beyond 1992, pp. 27-30; Calingaert, The 1992 Challenge,p. 8; Wallace, "Making Multilateralism Work," p. 7.
12. For Dekker's proposals, see "Europe 1990: An Agenda fo r Action" (Philips, 1984) and hisspeeches at the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, e.v., Bonn, 9 October 1984; Centerfo r European Policy Studies, Brussels, II January 1985; The Institute of Directors, London, 30May 1985; The Association of Corporate Treasurers, London, 22 May 1986. The four aspects ofthe Dekker plan were administrative simplification of border formalities, harmonization of TV A
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("suppremir par etapes Ia fluctuations de Ia TVA aux frontiers"), standardization of technicalnorms, and liberalization of government procurement. On Dekker's view of the role of business,see Dekker's "Europe's Economic Power - Potential and Perspectives," (Speech at the Swiss Institutefor International Studies, 25 October 1988).
13. Jacques Delors, et al. La France par l'Europe (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1988), pp. SO-51.
14. See Calingaert, The 1992 Challenge, p. 9. For Delors' version, see Delors, et al. La FranceDar l'Europe pp. 49-50. Institut ional reform was opposed by the UK and Denmark; defensecooperation by France, Ireland, Greece and others; and monetary reform by the UK, Denmarkand the Netherlands. Interview with Jacques Delors, 22 September 1989.
15. On Delors intent ions, I draw on an interview with Delors, 22 September 1989. See also thespeech by Lord Cockfield, "The Completion of the Internal Market," Institute for InternationalEconomics, Washington, 24 May 1988, cited in Calingaert, The 1992 Challenge, p, 9.
16. Ludlow, Beyond 1992, pp, 27-30; Calingaert, 1992 Challenge, passim.; Dusan Sijanski,"Communaute europeenne 1992: gouvernement de comites," Pouvoirs 48/1989, pp. 72-80; HelenWallace, "Europaische Integration," in Thies and Wagner, eds. Auf dem Weg, pp, 127-128;Sandholtz and Zysman, "1992: Recasting the European Bargain," pp. 9-10.
17. Neo-funct ionalism is a research programme of great empirical and theoretical richness,particularly as regards the political process by which economic integration between states takes
place. It is not my purpose here to elaborate this literature further, nor to attempt acomprehensive critique, but simply to demonstrate that the widely-held views about the causes ofthe 1992 initiative outlined above are consistent with the essential assumptions of neofunctionalism.
The locus classicus is Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political. Social and EconomicalForces. 1950-1957 (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958). For later critique, commentary andelaboration, see Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patternsof Change in the European Community (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Lindberg andScheingold, eds. Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Peace in Parts (New York: The Free Press, 1971); MichaelHodges, ed. European Integration (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972); Charles Pentland.International Theory and European Integrat ion (New York: The Free Press, 1973); Paul Taylor.The Limits of European Integration (Beckenham: Croon, Helm, 1983). For a current researchagenda based on some of the same premises, see William Wallace, "The Changing Shape of WesternEurope," (Paper delivered at the ISA Conference, London, 30 March 1989).
18. See Haas, Uniting, Chapter One. The richness of detail and ambiguity of Haas' analysis m.ightlead one to argue that this first assumption is the only one that characterizes neo-functionalism.After all, Haas appears to concede in the Uniting of Europe that spillover can be positive ornegative and that functional demands for further integration will proliferate only if thesupranational organization's actions promote them. In this form, however, nee-func tionalism istautological. The interesting claims are teleological and process-oriented. For an attempt toaddress these criticisms, see Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and DifferentialPatterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," InternationalOrganization (Autumn 1964), pp. 705-737.
19. For elaborations of this view, see Nye, Peace in Parts; Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's
Would-Be Polity. I
20. See Haas, Uniting of Europe, Chapter 8 ("The Expansive Logic of Sector Integration"),especially pp, 30I, 313, in which he argues that there was a "direct causal connection" between the
negotiation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the Euratom and
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Economic Community treaties in 1957, resulting from a "clearly predictable institutional and
procedural impact" of the ECSC. Thus, he predicts, "...the logic of intergovernmental relationswithin the framework of the EEC-Euratom-ECSC Council of Ministers, its associated committees
of national experts, working under the prodding of supranational Commissions, can lead only tomore collective decision-making in the effort to overcome the inevitable crises and unforeseen
contingencies." It is true, of course, that Haas later retreated from this position, arguing, fo r
example, that the process of functional linkages was important, but the direction of the effect
("spillover" or "spillback") was indeterminate. This retraction does not blunt the critique in thispaper, since it nonetheless maintains that interest groups and supranational officials will spearhead
any movement, regardless of direction. See also Haas, "International Integration: the European and
the Universal Process," reprinted in Hodges, ed . European Integration, pp. 93ff; Haas,"Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard, A New Europe? (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1964).
21. On these interpretations of spillover. see Footnote 19. and Haas, Uniting of Europe. especiallypp. xiii-xiv; Haas and Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration," p.707. For variations, see Joseph S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in RegionalOrganization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.. 1971), pp . 86-107.
Changes in the interests and expectations of domestic actors comprise a third mechanism.Interest groups, politicians and and officials mobilized by the initial steps toward integration willalter their views, thus breaking down nationalist inhibitions toward further integration. Although
the process of spillover may work in part through domestic politics in member states, it is in allcases a systemic result of previous integration decisions, and thus should proceed independently
of differences in domestic political arrangements. This more complex mechanism is not tested inthis article, bu t see the section below on "The Domestic Roots of Regime Theory."
22. Haas, "International Integration: the European and the Universal Process," pp . 93ff.
23. Haas and Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Integration," p, 707; Haas,"International Integration," p, 96.
24. Haas stressed both national and supranational dynamics, and the stress he lays on each remainsopen to debate. For example, in the Uniting of Europe he predicted the "uniting" of supranational
interest groups, but the prediction has the same ambiguity as the title of the book. One can
imagine a variant of neo-functionalism which works entirely through changes in values,
expectations and interests at the national level and coordination between state policies at thesupranational level, without any power or influence being transferred to EC officials and
organizations or to supranational interest groups. This paper seeks to assess the validity of thesystemic, supranational variant of regional integration theory. For some throughts about analternative, see also page 39-41.
25. See Juliet Lodge, "EC Policymaking: Institutional Considerations," in Lodge, ed. The European
Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter, 1989), p. 28; Taylor, Limits,Chapters Three and Ten.
26. Lindberg an d Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, Chapters 5 and 6, especially pp . 243ff.In neo-functionalist language, heads of state are "dramatic-political actors." See also Keatinge and
Murphy, "European Council's Ad Hoc Committee," in Pryce, ed. Dynamics, p. 231. On Haas 'views, see The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA: University of
California, 1975).
27. On the appropriateness of regime theory, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Reflections on the Nation
State in Western Europe Today," Journal of Common Market Studies (September/December 1982),pp , 33-35. The closest variant of regime theory applied here is "modified structural realism" asset forth in Robert Keohane, Neo-Realism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press,1986), pp , 192-195 and Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
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Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 61-64. Keohane writes that "theconcept of international regime is consistent both with the importance of differential power and
with a sophisticated view of self-interest."
28. For a defense of this tripartite distinction, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Disciplining Trade
Finance: the OECD Export Credit Arrangement," International Organization (Winter 1989), pp .
174-176.
29. Hoffmann, "Reflections," p, 26. See also David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent
Structure Debate?" International Organization (Summer 1989), pp. 441-474.
30. See Foreign Minister Genscher's comments at the opening session of the IntergovernmentalConference, summarized in Gazzo, Towards Eurooean Unity II, pp. 28-29, and also the German
draft on new powers for the Parliament, summarized in Gazzo, illli!., p, 39-40. On German viewstoward the CAP, see Gisela Hendriks, "Germany and the CAP: national interests and the European
Community," International Affairs (Winter 1988-89), pp . 75-87. The German stand against moreintensive monetary cooperation softened in 1988-1989.
It might be argued that Italy, too, is a major state with a veto. But this hardly changes the
analysis, since Italy was a net beneficiary from the EC budget and the Common Market, andItalian leaders were traditionally among the Community's most consistent supporters of a strongParliament.
31. This account of the foreign policy of the first Mitterrand presidency draws heavily on Gabriel
Robin, La Diplomatie de Mitterrand ou Ie triomphe des apparences. 1981-1985 (Paris: Editions dela Bievre, 1985).
32. One suspects that Mitterrand and his ministers were looking for a way to limit agriculturalspending without appearing to have been responsible for it. Hence, the attempts to cast Thatcher
as a scapegoat and the fact that, although the French government became more accommodatingof agricultural reform and French ministers spoke out occasionally overgenerous support, theyremained one of the staunchest supporters of generous agricultural subsidies as late as the Brusselssummit of February 1988. Paul Taylor , "The New Dynamics of EC Integration in the 1980s," inLodge, ed. European Community, p. 6.
33. The economic and political reasons behind Mitterrand's decision are disputed. The decisive
economic argument appears to have been made by the Treasury to Laurent Fabius, who toldMitterrand that leaving the EMS would undermine confidence in the economy and ultimatelycompel the French government to impose as much austerity as would continued membership. The
decisive political condition appears to have been the decline of the French Communist Party,which allowed Mitterrand to align himself with the moderate wing of the Socialist Party. On thisissue, see David Cameron, "The Colors of a Rose: On the Ambiguous Record of French Socialism,"(Cambridge, MA: Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1987); Peter Hall, Governing
the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France (New York: Oxford, 1986),pp. 193, 201ff; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Why Economic PoliciesChange Course (Paris: OECD, 1988), pp, 56-64; Philippe Bauchard, La guerre des deux roses: dureve a la realite ]981-1985 (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1986).
34. The speed with which Mitterrand began to manipulate Europe as an electoral issue isdemonstrated by his consideration of a plan to hold a referendum on enlargement in early 1985.
See Financial Times (6 March 1985). See also Moreau-Defarges, Quel avenir, pp, 97-98.
35. See his speech at the European Parliament, 24 May 1984, reprinted in Gazzo, ed. Towards
European Union, pp, 82-85.
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36. Robin, La diolomatie de Mitterrand, pp. 145, 219. For another, equally ironic but morepositive assessment, see Philippe Moreau-Defarges, "'...J'ai fait un reve...' le president FrancoisMitterrand, artisan de l'union europeenne," Politiaue Etrangere (Fall 1985)
37. Thatcher supported the goal enshrined in Article 61(2) of the amended treaty, by which "theliberalization of banking and insurance policies shall be affected in step with progressiveliberalization of movements of capital." Cited in Taylor, "New Dynamics," pp. 8-14 and
Department of Trade and Industry, The Single Market: the facts (London: HMSO, 1988). Britainhad also created an independent regulatory agency, OFTEL, under the Telecommunications Act
of 1984, presaging the Commission recommendation found in the Green Book of 1987. See alsoFinancial Times (17 June 1985); Todd, A Practical Guide, p. 1.4; International Herald-Tribune (2July 1984).
38. Financial Times (26 January 1982), cited in Taylor, Limits, p. 240-241. Geoffrey Howeechoed Cheysson's point of view: "The negotiation launched at Stuttgart and continued at Athensin 1983 in December 1983 is not just about the budget and the CAP. I t is about the whole future
shape and direction of Europe." Geoffrey Howe, "The Future of the European Community:Britain's Approach to the Negotiations," International Affairs (Spring 1984), p, 190.
39. Here I draw heavily on Paul Taylor's insights in "New Dynamics". For earlier versions of thesame thesis, see Corbett, "1985 Intergovernmental Conference," p. 268-269 and Francoise de la
Serre, La Grande-Bretagne et la Communaute eurooeenne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,1987), p. 193-4, 207-209.
40. The quotation is from Taylor, "New Dynamics," p, 3.
41. For a summary of the debate, see Helen Wallace with Adam Ridley, Europe: The Challengeof Diversity (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), especially Chapter 5; Eberhard Grabitz,
ed. AbgestUrfte Integration: eine Alternative zum nerzkommlichen Integrationskonzept (Kehl amRhein: Engel Verlag, 1984); Moreau-Defarges, Ouel Avenir.
42. Heinz Stadlmann, "Die europaische Gemeinschaf t nach der franzosischen Ratsprasidentschaf't,"Europa-Archiv (8 October 1984), pp. 447-454. The Franco-German agreement on procedure wasonly partial, since France did not support German efforts to strengthen the Parliament, whilepreferring to replace Article 235 of the Treaty with one that would have sanctioned the creationof a "differentiated Europe," with different sets of members involved in different programs. TheFrench traditionally support diplomatic flexibility to facilitate projects like EUREKA, whichinvolve only some countries of the Community or countries outside of the EC. See De Ruyt,
L'acte unique, p. 99.
43. Robin, La diplomatie de Mitterrand, p. 219; Gianni Bonvicini, "The Genscher-Colombo Planand the 'Solemn Declaration on European Union' (1981-1983), in Pryce, ed. Dynamics, pp. 174187.
44. Robin, La diolomatie de Mitterrand, p. 219; De Ruyt, L'acte Unique, pp. 35, 315-324. I t
is perhaps significant that in 1982 the French backed the other countries in overruling a Britishveto on the question of cereal prices. This decision, reportedly taken by Mitterrand himself,suggests that the French government, or at least its President, already accepted that the veto beused only in exceptional circumstances.
45. Guardian (3 February 1984); Rudolf Hrbek and Thomas Laufer, "Die Einheitliche EuropaischeAkte," Europa-Archiv (June 1986), pp. 173-184.
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46. The standard was not a high one. Tradi tional ly, the Presidency of the Council had not beentaken seriously. See Colm O'Nuallain, ed. The Presidency of the European Council of Ministers(London: Croon Helm, 1985), especially the concluding chapter by Helen Wallace.
I
47. The importance of the shuttle diplomacy is stressed by Delors, who recalls that Mitterrand
met six times each with Kohl and Thatcher. In France, the key decisions taken in this periodwere in meetings a guatre with Mitterrand, Dumas, Delors and his Minister of European Affairs.
Interview with Delors, 22 September 1989.
48. The Quotation is from "Speech of Francois Mitterrand before the Netherlands Government (7February 1984)," released by the Ambassade de France a Londres (CTL/DISCOM/29/84). Seealso "Interview with Francois Mitterrand...(22 May 1984)" (CTL/DISCOM/93/84); his addressbefore the European Parliament on 24 May, reprinted in Gasso, ed. Towards European Union, pp.82-85; and his television interview, reprinted in Le Monde (23 March 1984). On the ideal of aEurope that combines the virtues of market liberalism and social democratic welfare state. see theinterview with Michel Rocard in Intervention (Feb-Apr 1984), p. 102. Mitterrand's conceptionof the internal market nonetheless remained more interventionist than the Single Act: he stressedmanpower training, technology programs and the common external tariff.
49. On the Mitterrand presidency see Stadlmann, "Die Europaische Gemeinschaft"; De Ruyt,
L'acte unique, p. 47-49; The Guardian (25 January 1984); Press Conference with Mitterrand (2
April 1984). For a contemporary critique of these policy changes, see Robin, La DiplomatieMitterrand, pp . 69-81, 133-145, 211-229, especially pp. 145, 212.
50. See also Guardian (3 February 1984); De Ruyt, L'Acte Unique, p. 48; Rocard interview,Intervention.
51. Robin, La diplomatie de Mitterrand, p. 215.
52. Ludlow, Beyond 1992, p. x-xi; Howe, "The Future of the European Community," pp. 188-189.
53. Financial Times (12 March 1984); Observer (25 March 1984); Guardian (24 July 1984). It isunclear whether Kohl's refusal was due to his failure to grasp all the details, to pent-upexacerbation after years of haggling, or, indeed, whether it was a stand on principle.
54. Le Monde (18 March 1984) (5 May 1984). See also his speech before the Bundestag on 28June 1984, excerpted in Gasso, ed. Towards European Union, p. 98.
55. See "Europe: The Future--United Kingdom Memorandum (June 1984)" reprinted in Gazzo,ed. Towards European Union, pp . 86-95, from which the Quotations are taken. Times (18 October1984); Financial Times (22 March 1984); Christopher Tugendhat's article in Financial Times (9January 1985); Malcolm Rifkind, "Fur ein starker geeintes Europa-vein praktisches Programm,"in Integration (April 1985), pp . 49-54; Guardian (30 May 1984); Center for Policy Studies,Making it Work: The Future of the European Community (London: Center for Policy Studies,1984); Statement by Min iste r Roland Dumas (14 June 1984), issued by the Ambassade de Francea Londres (CTL/DISCOM/98/84); Le Monde (15 June 1984). At the same time, a Conservativeparty think-tank issued a report calling for a "relaunching of Europe."
56. Taylor, "New Dynamics," p. 7. Taylor argues that the mood of conciliation was due to thefact that during British and French failure in March at Brussels, they had "looked into the abyss,and were shocked into an awareness of the need to hold themselves back." By taking time toconfess his personal ideals, Taylor argues, Mitterrand was letting Thatcher "see the future."
57. De Ruyt, L'acte unique, p. 261. The Commission later adopted a standard measure of theburden. See EC Commission, Making a Success of the Single Act, p, 28.
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58. "Conclusions of the European Council at its Meeting in Fontainebleau," (26 June 1984),reprinted in Gazzo, ed. Towards European Union, pp. 96-97. On the Spaak Committee, see Hanns
Jurgen Kusters, "The Treaties of Rome (1955-1957)," in Pryce, ed. Dynamics, pp . 84ff.
59. Sunday Times (3 March 1985); International Herald-Tribune (21 March 1985); Financial
Times (15 May 1985).Geoffrey Howe, "GroBbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland alseuropaische Partner," Europa-Archiv (10 November 1984), p. 637. France reportedly insisted that
Italy be excluded, for fear that Italian participation would slow the negotiations.
60. Financial Times (30 November 1984), (3 December 1984), (22 March 1985) and (10 May
1985); Le Monde (30 March 1985). On the Committee's "real task," see Katherine Meenan, "TheWork of the Dooge Committee," Administration (Vol. 33, No.4), cited in Patrick Keatinge and
Anna Murphy, "The European Council's Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs (1984-1985),"in Pryce, ed. Dynamics, p. 227; De Ruyt, L'acte unique, p. 117. France, too, accepted that thefirst priority of the Community must be the creation of an "espace economique interieur
homogene." On the objections of the Quai d'Orsay, presumably to the renunciation of the
Luxembourg compromise, see Corbett, 1985 Intergovernmental Conference, p. 269.
61. Daily Telegraph (12 July 1984); Financial Times (12 September 1984).
62. Financial Times (31 December 1984).
63. Daily Telegraph (4 March 1985).
64. Financial Times (17 June 1985). Both VAT harmonization and harmonization of regulationshad been discussed fruitlessly by the Council fo r a decade.
!
65. De Ruyt, L'Acte Unique, pp. 57-59. For the British proposals, see "Europe: The Future,"
which was resubmitted by Britain, and the "Draft Treaty on Political Cooperation," evidently the
same paper that British Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe had presented to the conference offoreign ministers at Stresa earlier in the month. For the proposals of Italy, the Benelux, France
and Germany, and the British proposals above, see Gazzo, ed. Towards European Union:Supplement. For commentary, see Times (London) (21 June 1985).
66. See statement by Mme. Catherine Lalumiere, Secretary of State for European Affairs, before
the National Assembly (11 June 1985), released by the Ambassade de France Ii Londres(CTL/DISCOM/96/85). The French evidently had a certain building in Paris in mind to housethe Secretariat-General.
67. See Gasso, ed. Towards European Union: Supplement, pp, 27-32.
68. De Ruyt, L'Acte Unique, pp. 60-61. The option of invoking Article 236, which allowsamendment by unanimous consent of the Council, had been previously presented in the Italianpre-summit memorandum as a possible compromise between a new treaty and the more ad hocBritish approach. Nonetheless, the vote does not seem to have been planned in advanced by thegovernments who voted affirmatively. See Gasso, ed. Towards European Union: Supplement, pp.3-8.
iI
69. De Ruyt, L'Acte Unique, p. 68. The decision to invoke Article 236 also reenforced the splitbetween political cooperation, which could involve a new treaty adopted by only some of the
nations, and institutional reform, which now had to start from the existing treaty and thus required
unanimity. On the British calculation, see Taylor, "New Dynamics," pp. 10.
70. See De Ruyt, L'Acte Unique, pp. 67-91.
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71. France briefly opposed deregulation of ai r services, but t h e ~ backed down.
72. My account follows Corbett, "1985 Intergovernmental Conference," pp. 247-248. Delors'speech is reprinted in Gazzo, ed. Towards European Unity II, p. 24. See also Gazzo, p. 38;Ludlow, Beyond 1992, p. vi. On Delors' characterization of the role of Germany and Britain, seehis press conference of 27 November 1985, reprinted in Gazzo, ibid., p, 86.
73. There are subtle differences between Corbett's account and that of De Ruyt (L'acte unique,pp. 177-187), which I follow here.
76. Touleman, "Le Mythe de 1992," p. 8; Corbett, "1985 Intergovernmental Conference," p, 248.See also the communique of the Luxembourg summit in December 1985, reprinted (in German)in Thies and Wagner, eds. Au f dem Weg, p. 143.
77. Corbett, "1992 Intergovernmental Conference," pp. 249-250, 259.
78. This section draws on De Ruyt, L'acte unique, p, 112-118, 163-165 and Corbett, "1985Intergovernmental Conference," pp. 245-247. The new internal market articles in question are 8A,100A and 100B (internal market), 28 (common external tariff), 57 (liberalization of professionalqualifications), 59 (liberalization of services), 70 (liberalization of capital movements) and 84(maritime and air transport policy). De Ruyt points out that the Single Act simply extended and
clarified the use of majority voting to areas where the Commission had been acting under the
broad mandate of Article 235 and the old Article 100. And, he reports, fiscal harmonization might
have been absent altogether from the Single Act, had it not been for the subreptitious pressure ofsome delegations.
79. Corbett, "1992 Intergovernmental Conference," p. 255-258, 262-263. The Commission wasgiven implementing powers, bu t these must be exercised at the whim of the Council, sinceCommunity measures may specify the mode of implementation in considerable detail.
80. De Ruyt, L'acte unique, pp. 166-175; Financial Times (28 November 1985); Corbett, "1985Intergovernmental Conference," PP. 245-247. Both Germany and France considered tabling aproposal for majority voting in all areas connected with the extension of the internal market, bu ttheir positions tended to be more moderate once actual commitments were required.
81. De Ruyt, L'acte uniaue, p. 158-161, 166; Gazzo, Towards European Union II, p. 152.
82. De Ruyt, L'acte unique, pp, 166-175; Todd, Practical Guide, p. 1.18-19.
83. De Ruyt, L'acte unique, pp. I72ff. The final procedures for coming to a vote were not setuntil December 1986, after a year of discussion in the COREPER committee of the Council,where it was decided that any member of the Council or the Commission can call for a vote,subject to majority acceptance by the Council and two-weeks advance notification of issues that
might come to a vote. It is unclear whether there is any significance to the precise wording ofthe condition fo r derogation, which has been changed from "vital national interest" to "exigenceimportant" as defined by Article 36. See De Ruyt, pp. 118-119.
84. For speculation on Franco-German intentions, see De Ruyt, L' Acte Unique, p. 272; Corbett,
"1985 Intergovernmental Conference," p. 268. The view that the outcome reflected "a triumph"for British negotiators has been most cogently argued by Taylor in "New Dynamics."
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86. European Parliament's opinion of 9 July 1985 regarding the proposal for an IntergovernmentalConference, reproduced in Gazzo, Towards European Union II, pp. 13-14.
87. See the exchange between Pflimlin and Poos, including the note of the Conference Presidency,repr inted in Gazzo, Towards European Union II, pp. 17-20. See also Delors' explicit denial of the
democratic legitimacy of the Parliament in his opening address to the Conference, reprinted inGazzo, illli!., p. 27. On the pragmatist position of the British, see Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey
Howe's comments at the opening session, reprinted in illli!., p. 30. For a response, see Spinelli'sspeech on 2 October 1985 before the German Bundestag" reprinted in Gazzo, illlil., p. 41.Proposals to strengthen the Parliament were discussed, if at all, in large part due to pressure from
the Italians, who were acting in part in deference to the wishes of Spinelli, chairman of theEuropean Parliament Committee on Institutional Affairs and a grand old man of Europe. Interviewwith Benjamin Patterson, European MP, Strasbourg, 19 January 1989. Four years laterparliamentarians are still complaining that the new initiative was not a "Treaty of European Unity,"but a more modest "Single Act." See European Parliament, Rapport. ..sur la strategie du Parliamenteuropeen en vue de la creation de "Union europeene (Document A2-0332/88, 21 December 1988).
88. See the programmatic statement of Spinelli and two associates in the inaugural issue of the"Crocodile" newsletter, reprinted in Gazzo, ed. Towards European Union I, pp. 11-17. See alsoGazzo, ed. Towards European Union II, p, 104; De Ruyt, L'Acte Uniaue, p. 85.
A similar argument can be made about the European Court. It is misleading to view themutual recognition provisions of the Single Act as a simple reflection of evolving Communityjurisprudence, particularly the Cassis de Dijon case of 1979. The Single Act strictly limits"maximalist" judicial precedents set by the Court in recent years, in the same way that it limitsmaximalist ambitions of the Parliament.For example, the Court, interpreting the original Treaty
of Rome in a continuous series of cases since 1966, has tended to allow the Commission broaderpowers to harmonize legislation and has recognized few exceptions under Article 36. The SingleAct, in contrast, revised the treaty to limit the applicability of harmonization to the facilitationof open markets. For a "maximalist" critique, see Pierre Pescatore, "Critical Observationsconcerning the 'European Single Act'" in Gazzo, Towards European Union II, p. 153, 158-159.
89. On the lack of active elite business support for the initial European initiat ives, see Haas, TheUniting of Europe, Chapter Five.
90. Krause, "Many Groups Lobby," p. 24.
91. The tone is heroic, as the opening words of the chapter on Delors' initiative illustrate:"January 1985: the winter was harsh. In Brussels as in Paris, people were shivering. On the topfloor of the Berlaymont, in a vast office that didn't yet seem quite lived in, Jacques Delorsgathered his closest associates around him ..." See Delors, et al., La France par l'Europe, p. 47.
92. See Helen Wallace, "Europaische Integration," pp. 127-128.
93. Financial Times (9 October 1989).
94. This interpretation may imply that the ability to carryon such negotiations may be a function
of the autonomy of heads of government from domestic interests, rather than a function of theirdomestic or international interest group support . As several analysts of the Community havenoted, interest groups and bureaucracies have a tendency to favor the status guo. As a result ofthis, Community involvement in areas has often seemed to reach a point of equilibrium, whereinterests for and against further change are balanced. It may well be the abil ity of heads ofgovernment to gain autonomy from these status guo forces that permits systems change.
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95. Nye, Peace in Parts; Lindberg and Scheingold, Eurooe's Would-Be Polity.
96. See footnote 24.
97. For a similar argument, see Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, "European Integrationand Neo-functional Theory: Community Politics and Institutional Change," (Paper prepared for
Florence Workshop, September 1989). This position may also be implied in Haas' later work. See
Ernst Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," International Organization(Spring 1976), p, 177, 186, 196ff.
98. See Keohane, After Hegemony.
99. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 6. But cf. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes,"International Organizat ion (Spring 1982), pp. 325-55. On the problem of interests, see alsoMoravcsik, "Disciplining Export Finance."
100. For previous work focusing on state-society relations in the world economy, see Hall,Governing the Economy; Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Resoonses toInternational Economic Crises (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Peter Katzenstein, SmallStates in World Markets (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); Katzenstein, ed. Between Powerand Plenty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977); Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism:
Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1988.).
101. It is, however, unclear to what extent the 1992 initiative will lead to unforeseenconsequences. It was probably not foreseen, for example, at least in France, the extent to whichthe liberalization of capital transactions may force countries to harmonize systems for taxingsavings and financial investment. Nor did the British appear to realize that other countries wouldtake the social or structural fund policies as seriously as they have.
102. See Mitterrand's interview, in which he threatens to go forward toward a common monetary
policy without Britain, and Thatcher's response before the House of Commons in Independent(27 July 1989).
103. See Pryce and Wessels, "Search," p. 2; Keohane and Hoffmann, "European Integration.",
104. Analysts who stress power and interests have traditionally been pessimistic. See StanleyHoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe,"Daedalus (Summer 1966), pp. 892-908.
105. The logic is straightforward. If there are two states, each with a veto, the probability ofadoption (assuming a random distribution of preferences) is 25%. If there are three states, eachof which votes yes or no on a proposal, the odds of a 2-1 or 3-0 split in favor are 50%.
106. On the importance of Franco-German relations, see Roy Price and Wolfgang Wessels, "TheSearch for an ever Closer Union: A Framework for Analysis," in Pryce, ed. Dynamics, p. 19.
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