-
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found
athttp://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fbss20
Download by: [200.198.136.137] Date: 18 November 2015, At:
10:19
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
ISSN: 1468-3857 (Print) 1743-9639 (Online) Journal homepage:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fbss20
NATORussia security challenges in the aftermathof Ukraine
conflict: managing Black Sea securityand beyond
Sharyl Cross
To cite this article: Sharyl Cross (2015) NATORussia security
challenges in the aftermath ofUkraine conflict: managing Black Sea
security and beyond, Southeast European and Black SeaStudies, 15:2,
151-177, DOI: 10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017
To link to this article:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017
Published online: 20 Jul 2015.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 1547
View related articles
View Crossmark data
-
NATORussia security challenges in the aftermath of
Ukraineconict: managing Black Sea security and beyond
Sharyl Crossa,b*
aKozmetsky Center, St Edwards University, 3001 South Congress
Avenue, Austin, TX78704, USA; bKennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars,
Washington, DC, USA
(Received 23 March 2015; accepted 31 March 2015)
NATOs relationship with the Soviet Union and then Russia has
been central todening the European regional and global security
conguration for decades.This article explores the potential
consequences of the Ukrainian conict for thecurrent and future
NATORussia relationship. The analysis focuses on deningspecic
challenges and risks for NATO and Russia in managing the
evolvingsecurity environment of the Black Sea region. The author
offers an assessmentof the potential for future NATORussia clashes
or cooperation in the BlackSea, and for broader regional and global
security. Some recommendations aresuggested for managing the future
NATORussia relationship during this periodof heightened uncertainty
and risk.
Keywords: NATO; Russia; Ukraine; Black Sea; Sevastopol
Men will not put up with terrible conditions like these for the
sake of a cross or anhonor, or because they have been threatened:
there must be another, higher motiva-tion. This motivation is a
feeling that surfaces only rarely in the Russian, but lies dee-ply
embedded in his soul a love of his native land. Only now do the
stories of theearly days of the siege of Sevastopol, when there
were no fortications, no troops,when there was no physical
possibility of holding the town & there was neverthelessnot the
slightest doubt that it would be kept from the enemy of the days
whenKornilov, that hero worthy of ancient Greece, would say as he
inspected his troops:We will die, men, rather than surrender
Sebastopol, & when our Russian soldiers,unversed in
phrasemongering would answer: We will die! Hurrah!-only now do
thestories of those days cease to be beautiful historic legend and
become a reality, afact. You will suddenly have a clear and vivid
awareness that those men you have justseen are the very same heroes
who in those difcult days did not allow their spirits tosink but
rather felt them rise as they joyfully prepared to die, not for the
town but fortheir native land. Long will Russia bear the imposing
traces of this epic ofSebastopol, the hero of which was the Russian
people. (Tolstoy 1855/1986)
Nikolai Tolstoy, serving as an ofcer in the Russian Army in the
Crimean War. (TheSebastopol Sketches, December 1855)
Introduction
The relationship between NATO and the former Soviet Union and
now Russia hasbeen at the centre of European and international
politics for over 60 years. Manfred
*Email: [email protected]
2015 Taylor & Francis
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2015Vol. 15, No. 2,
151177, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Woerner signalled a clear change in the EastWest relationship in
response totransformation in the former Soviet bloc during the rst
ever visit of a NATOSecretary General to Moscow in 1990: The time
for confrontation is over. Thehostility of mistrust of the past
must be buried. We see your country, and othercountries of the
former Warsaw Treaty Organization, no longer as adversaries butas
partners (NATO 1990).
Despite these overtures, NATO and Russia have not been able to
achieve thestated intention of forging a partnership. Russias
sensitivity regarding the enlarge-ment of the NATO Alliance has
been a consistent source of serious tension.Although few might have
anticipated the deterioration of the European/Eurasiansecurity
environment that we have witnessed as a result of the Ukrainian
conict,in many respects, Russias clash with the West over Ukraine
might have beenanticipated.
Regrettably, despite all the changes and new opportunities that
were created asa result of the collapse of the Soviet empire and
the end of the Cold War, NATOnations and the Russian Federation
still remained very much locked into a percep-tual mindset of a
bifurcated Europe. While many in the international
securitycommunity attempted to move the frame of reference to new
realities and buildinga common European security community among
nations with signicant sharedinterests, there were also those who
continued to frame and amplify issues in termsof the great game or
contest among the West and Russia. Therefore, rather thanfostering
a collaborative security community in which nations in the
Balkans,Caucasus or Central Asia could maintain and develop ties
both with the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, these countries
were positioned so as to have tomake a choice either the West or
Russia.
The tensions between Russia and the West have culminated in the
current crisisin Ukraine, which threatens not only to devastate the
society, but also to unravel allprogress achieved in building
greater peace and security in Europe and the worldsince the end of
the Cold War. The recent annexation of Crimea and intervention
insupport of separatist groups in the East represent a desire of
the Russian leadershipand society to re-assert Russias role in
protecting perceived interests and challeng-ing United States and
Western inuence among their close neighbours.
Moscows behaviour with respect to Ukraine has elicited strong
objection in theWest. At the Wales Summit of September 2014, the 28
members of the NATO Alli-ance issued the statement suggesting that
Russias aggressive actions againstUkraine have fundamentally
challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and atpeace (NATO
2014) and also afrming that NATO nations condemn in thestrongest
terms Russias escalating illegal military intervention in Ukraine
(NATO 2014). NATOs Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted in
January 2015that: Crimea has been annexed-borders have been changed
by use of force -for therst time since the Second World War. And we
see that Russia is destabilizingUkraine and supporting the
separatists in eastern Ukraine (NATO 2015a).Alexander Vershbow,
NATOs Deputy Secretary General, described the conse-quences of
Russias action for the international security environment in Oslo
in2015, noting that
To the East, Russia has torn up the international rule book. It
has returned to astrategy of power politics. It threatens not just
Ukraine, but European and global secu-rity more generally Russias
aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident,
152 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
but a game changer in European security. It reects an evolving
pattern of behaviorthat has been emerging for several years (NATO
2015b)
Russias recent actions in Ukraine have resulted in sanctions
from the West andrepositioning of United States (US) and NATO
forces and resources in Europeaimed to reassure allies. Experts in
the US, Russia and Europe warn that we havemoved into a new Cold
War or even potential Hot War with the RussianFederation since the
rules of the game during the current period of conict are farmore
ambiguous than during the decades of the Cold War.
Building NATORussia security collaboration: interests,
opportunities andperpetual tensions
The NATORussia relationship has been central in the evolution of
Russias rela-tionship with the West since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. George F. Kennan,principle architect of Americas
post-Second World War containment strategy, hadpredicted in 1997
that Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error ofAmerican
policy in the Cold War era (Kennan 1997). Kennan warned that Such a
decision may be expectedto impel Russian foreign policy in
directionsdecidedly not to our liking (Kennan 1997). Indeed,
perhaps there has been nosingle greater irritant in Russias
post-Cold War relationship with Western countriesthan the issue of
NATOs continued existence, enlargement, increasing relevanceand
success. Because of Moscows confrontational relationship with NATO
duringthe decades of the Cold War, the growth of the NATO Alliance
closer to the terri-tory of the Russian Federation has tended to be
perceived as a deliberate strategyto encircle or weaken Russia. The
fact that nations of Eastern and Central Europe/Georgia and Ukraine
frequently justied interest in pursuing membership in NATOwith the
aim of seeking protection from Russia only strengthened that
perceptionof NATOs intentions in Moscow.
There has been a pattern in the United StatesRussian
relationship largely inu-enced by NATO issues characterizing each
presidential transition. Initially, both BillClinton and Boris
Yeltsin, George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, and Barack Obamaand
Dmitry Medvedev pledged commitment to develop strategic
partnership, butinevitably clashes of interests thwarted the
realization of this objective.1
While Clinton and Yeltsin had expressed the desire for USRussia
partnershipand even friendship, two major issues involving NATO
were central during thedecade of the 1990s, leading to more
sobering appraisals of prospects for realizingthese strategic
partnership aspirations. Despite US/NATO attempts to
downplayRussias opposition to NATO enlargement, every Russian
President has expressedsustained objections to expanding the
Alliance. Former Soviet President, MikhailGorbachev, made the point
(conrmed in an interview with the author) that he hada gentlemens
agreement with ofcials of the rst George H.W. Bush Administra-tion
that removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe and German
unicationwould not be followed by NATO expansion.2 As early as
1994, Russias PresidentBoris Yeltsin warned of a Cold Peace falling
over Europe, stating that plans forexpanding NATO would create new
divisions and sow seeds of distrust.3
The Kosovo air war was the second critical factor that deated
the initial highexpectations for building Russias cooperation with
NATO. While Russian peace-keepers had been successfully deployed to
serve alongside NATO forces in former
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 153
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Yugoslavia, Moscows traditional interests in the Balkan region
and historic ties toOrthodox Serbs created differing views on
sources of conict in the region andpositions regarding appropriate
responses to the implosion of former Yugoslavia.Russians tended to
conclude that NATO enlargement and the NATO Kosovo airwar
demonstrated that Western countries would take advantage of Russias
transi-tional domestic turmoil and weakness. Following the Kosovo
war, Russian ofcialforeign and security documents reected
reassessment of the potential for coopera-tion with Western
nations. Russias rst Foreign Policy Concept of 1993 was decid-edly
pro-Western, stating that Russia and the West possess common
understandingof the main values of world civilization and common
interests (Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Russian Federation
1993), while Russias National Security Conceptissued in 2000 noted
that NATOs transition to the practice of using military
forceoutside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security
Council sanction coulddestabilize the entire global strategic
situation.4
NATO and Russia had initially established the Permanent Joint
Council (PJC)to manage consultations and security collaboration,
but the PJC was dissolved dur-ing the period of greatest strain
over the Kosovo conict. In the aftermath of theKosovo war in
February 2000, during the visit of NATOs Secretary General
LordGeorge Robertson to Moscow, a joint statement was issued with
Russias PresidentVladimir Putin agreeing to re-establish NATORussia
dialogue on a wide range ofsecurity issues (NATO 2000, 20). In May
2002, the NATORussia Council (NRC)was established, providing for
Russian participation in consultative decision-makingfrom the
outset with the then 19 NATO member countries, rather than after a
deci-sion had been reached as in the prior PJC arrangement. Thus,
while Russia wouldnot have a veto over NATO actions, Moscow could
be assured a place at the tableand active role in the
decision-making process from the point of initial deliberationfor
any Alliance action.
Until the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, NATO and Russia
resumedcooperation in addressing several critical security issues
and to develop an exten-sive range of practical security
collaboration in the areas of military-to-militaryexchanges,
counterterrorism, nuclear non-proliferation, maritime security,
airspaceinitiatives, cyber security, crisis management, civil
emergency planning and more.However, although most in Moscow
considered the mechanisms for consultation inthe NRC to constitute
a signicant improvement over the prior PJC arrangement,still NATO
and Russia had by no means reached the full potential for security
col-laboration. Russians continued to complain that they would
never accept juniorpartner status in NATO and to resist NATO
enlargement.
George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin established a positive
personal rapport atthe outset. One might remember George W. Bush
making the famous comment dur-ing his rst meeting with the Russian
leader in Slovenia in 2001 indicating he hadlooked into Vladimir
Putins soul and found him to be straightforward and that hecould be
trusted. However, differences over continued NATO enlargement,
recogni-tion of Kosovos independence, the Iraq War and missile
defence culminated inRussias intervention in Georgia and concern
about new Cold War at the conclu-sion of the Bush presidency.
Vladimir Putins posture toward NATO became increasingly
combative in thelatter stage of his rst presidency. At the Munich
conference in 2007, Putin chargedthat it is obvious that NATO
expansion does not have any relation with themodernization of the
Alliance itself or ensuring security in Europe. On the
contrary,
154 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of
mutual trust (Putin2007). After failing to comply with the terms of
the Conventional Forces in Europe(CFE) Treaty requiring Russia to
withdraw forces from Moldova and Georgia,Putin announced in July
2007 that Moscow would no longer participate in the CFETreaty which
had been regulating the deployment of troops and weapons systemsin
Europe since 1990. The NATORussia relationship was further strained
by thepossibility of fast-track or eventual NATO membership for
neighbouring nations onRussias borders, Georgia and Ukraine. Russia
had also opposed recognition ofKosovos independence, and would
later claim that independence on the partof South Ossetia and
Abkhazia held greater historical legitimacy than in the case
ofKosovo. In 2008, Putins successor, Dmitry Medvedev, would advance
a newEuropean Security Treaty proposal suggesting Russias complete
dissatisfactionwith the current European security architecture
(Ofce of the President of theRussian Federation 2008).
Russias incursion into Georgia in August 2008 shocked Western
ofcials andprompted a fundamental reassessment of Moscows
intentions toward neighbouringnations and the wider international
community. In response to the Russo-GeorgianWar of August 2008, the
NRC was temporarily suspended. NATO condemned thedecision of the
Russian Federation to extend recognition to South Ossetia
andAbkhazia. In the immediate aftermath of the Georgian military
intervention, circum-stances between Russia and the West had led
several specialists of the American,European and Russian academic
communities to argue that it was obvious that anew Cold War had
developed or would inevitably dene the
US/EuropeanRussianrelationship.
By January 2009, when Barack Obama assumed the Presidency, the
state ofUSRussian relations was more strained than at any period
during Russias post-Soviet experience. At the Munich Security
Conference in February 2009, US VicePresident Joseph Biden
pronounced early on that the new Administration sought topress the
reset button with Moscow, suggesting there are many areas where
theUnited States can and should be working together with Russia.5
One of the majorobjectives in the Declaration of Alliance Security
issued at NATOs 60th Anniver-sary in 2009 aimed to build a strong
and cooperative relationship with the RussianFederation (NATO
2009a).
In May 2009, NATO Allied Ministers formally resumed the NRC.
Theyagreed to use the NRC as a forum for dialogue with Russia on
all issues, toinclude areas where they agree to disagree with a
view toward resolving prob-lems and building practical cooperation.
NATO and Russia would not agree onthe issue of recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Allies assured that theoption of Georgian
membership in NATO remained open, but also signalled thatthe
timetable for Georgian accession into NATO would not be immediate
orfast-track.
Shortly after assuming responsibility as NATOs Secretary General
in September2009, Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivered his rst speech in
Russia at Moscow StateInstitute of International Relations (MGIMO)
entitled NATO and Russia, partnersfor the future (NATO 2009b).
Rasmussen stressed that he had been committedfrom the rst day in
his position as NATO Secretary General and Chair of theNRC to work
toward transforming the NATORussia relationship into a
truestrategic partnership (NATO 2009b). Secretary General Rasmussen
advanced athree-point strategy for improving NATORussia relations
concentrating on
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 155
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
enhancing practical security cooperation, building condence and
trust, andundertaking joint review of common twenty-rst-century
security challenges.
In June 2010, following bilateral meetings held in Washington,
PresidentBarrack Obama suggested that he and Russias President
Dmitry Medvedev hadsucceeded in resetting the USRussian
relationship.6 Obama noted that the twoleaders discussed issues of
disagreement to include Moscows conict withGeorgia, and at the same
time pledged to broaden cooperation in other criticalareas.
Signicantly, in a period of only a few months, the United States
and Russiasucceeded in concluding a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) agreeing tomutual reductions and inspections. In addition,
Russia had agreed to provide NATOcritical transit support in
Afghanistan which would later include access through theUlyanovsk
base on Russian soil.
Russias then President Dmitry Medvedev expressed commitment to
worktogether with NATO members toward creating a modernized
partnership. Whileconsultations in the NRC had been suspended in
the aftermath of the GeorgianWar, the exchanges were resumed with
both parties emphasizing that the NRC mustremain operative even in
times of serious tension to ensure continued exchange ofinformation
and problem-solving. In November 2012, NATO and Russia completedthe
Joint Review of Twenty First Century Common Security Challenges
that furtherdened the extensive range of shared security challenges
faced by NATO andRussia, and identied priorities for deepening
cooperation in counterterrorism andother areas.
Representing agreement on the part of all 28 members, the NATO
StrategicConcept issued in 2010 explicitly afrmed that the allies
want to see a truestrategic partnership between NATO and Russia
(NATO 2010). The documentconrmed further that the security of NATO
and Russia is intertwined , andthat NATO poses no threat to Russia,
and a strong and constructive part-nership based on mutual
condence, transparency, and predictability can best serveour
security (NATO 2010).
Although the re-set appeared to reverse the downward spiral in
US/NATORussia relationship, differences again emerged. Despite
initial expectations that suc-cessfully concluding an agreement on
European missile defence could serve as agame changer shifting the
USRussia relationship to a genuine strategic partner-ship, the
United States/NATO nations and Russia remained deadlocked in
failingto reach an agreement. Russias President Dmitry Medvedev had
initially proposeda sector approach whereby Russia would be
responsible for intercepting missilesover Russias territory bound
for NATO nations. The Obama administration rejectedthe proposal
outright noting that NATO could never rely on non-NATO countriesto
include Russia for protecting the security of Alliance members. The
UnitedStates and NATO would insist on retaining responsibility for
managing the inter-ception of missiles that might be targeted at
the territories of NATO members.Moscow insisted that they would
reject any proposal disrupting the current deter-rence regime or
that NATOs interceptors might be targeted today or in the futureat
Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles limiting the capacity
to respond to arst strike. After failing to make progress in
overcoming differences on missiledefence, the Moscow leadership
threatened to respond with measures, includingplacing Iskander
missiles in Kaliningrad to counter the deployment of NATOballistic
missile defence assets.
156 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Russias parliamentary and presidential elections in 20112012
were also asource of tension. Many in Western nations and among
Russias intellectuals weredismayed at a political process that
appeared to fall far short of standards forEuropean-style
democratic practice. Suppression of protest movements and storm-ing
the homes and conscating money and equipment of opposition leaders
under-mined the legitimacy of Russias political process. The lack
of a strong organizedopposition virtually ensured Putins return to
the presidency with the potential thathe would serve for two more
six-year terms. Signicant differences between theUnited States,
NATO and Russia were evident in the response to the Arab Springand
the conicts, especially in reacting to the implosion in Libya and
Syria.Moscow tended to favour stability and the status quo in the
region, while theUnited States and NATO have been more inclined to
commit force in support ofregime change. There were concerns among
Moscows leadership that mass move-ments fuelled by social media as
in North Africa and the Middle East might promptsimilar upheavals
to Russias south or even within the territory of the
RussianFederation. Other points of friction in the USRussia
relationship including theimposition of the Magnitsky Act and
Edward Snowden issue also tended to impedethe initial progress of
the re-set.
Immediately prior to Moscows intervention in Ukraine, there was
a perceptionthat the Obama administration was turning attention
away from Russia. Anymomentum to move past an initial re-set
appeared to stall. NATOs enlargement,out-of-area missions and the
perceptions of US dominance of the NATO agendahad continued to
present a sustained source of difculty for Moscow over thedecades
since the end of the Cold War.
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin might have anticipated that
the UnitedStates and Russia would emerge from the Cold War as two
leading or hegemonicpowers in world politics that could cooperate
in addressing major internationalsecurity challenges. Instead of
two leading powers working in the interest of worldsecurity, Russia
found its status and inuence considerably diminished.
NATOsintervention in former Yugoslavia left the perception in
Moscow that their views orobjections would not be taken seriously
among the United States and its Westernallies. As a historic
European power and major superpower during the decades ofthe Cold
War, this state of reduced status and inuence was unacceptable for
theMoscow foreign policy community. Gorbachev and Yeltsin came to
be perceivedamong many in Russia as having compromised Russias
interests with the West.Historian of the Russian Academy of
Sciences Henry A. Tromenko perhaps bestcaptured the sentiment in an
interview with the author in Moscow in 1995, stating:How many
compromises has our nation made in foreign and security policy
sinceGorbachev introduced reforms? And how many compromises has
your countrymade in response? Not one. And now NATO will expand
7
The desire to restore Russias great power status or to avoid
being relegated toa position of weakness as in the 1990s has been a
major priority for Russias for-eign policy community during the
PutinMedevdev tandem leadership. Presidentialstatements and ofcial
foreign policy documents have called to reassert a strongand
self-condent Russia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation2007; Ofce of the President of the Russian Federation
2014). The Russiannational identity is largely based on a perpetual
great power image and a specialdestiny in the world unique to
Russias culture and experience (Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the
Russian Federation 2008b, 2013). There have been consistent
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 157
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
suggestions that the current global power balance featuring US
dominance willnot advance Russias interests, and Moscow has sought
to formalize strategicpartnerships with China and other nations to
balance US power and to promotetransition of the international
community to a multipolar world order featuring sev-eral poles of
inuence (Valdai Club 2014). The Moscow leadership emphasizesthat
critical decisions in the international sphere must be made on a
collectivebasis, rather than by unipolar decision-making authority
(Valdai Club 2013,2014).
Putin appears to be determined to assert Russias inuence in
playing a criticalrole in regional conicts as was evident in
Moscows proposed diplomatic settle-ment temporarily preventing the
imposition of US military action against of theregime of Bashar al
Assad in Syria in 2013. Syria hosts the only Russian militarybase
outside the CIS at the port of Tartus, and military sales between
the countrieshave been signicant. Russia and China have held to a
position of non-interferencein Syrian internal affairs, while the
United States and other NATO nations haveperiodically called for
the use of force prompted by the objective of ending thehuman
rights abuses of Bashar al-Assads regime.
Vladimir Putin and many in the Moscow foreign policy community
and societyhave had difculty coming to terms with the loss of
empire resulting from the dis-mantling of the Soviet Union. As Igor
A. Zevelev has observed, the UnitedKingdom possessed a distant
empire, but the Soviet Union was an empire whereno borders divided
Russia from its neighbours (Zevelev 2008 cited in Cross 2009,220).
At the same time, Putins widely cited statement of 2005 that the
collapse ofthe Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the twentieth centuryshould not imply that his
intention was to reconstitute the empire. While not seek-ing to
reconquer Ukraine or other nations of the former Soviet Union,
Moscowdoes want to make sure that regimes are instituted and
sustained in these societiesthat will present no harm to Russias
interests. Moscow tends to assume a postureof entitlement in its
so-called zone of privileged interests, and has not been ableto
deal with Georgia or Ukraine (or other neighbours) as genuinely
sovereignnations deserving status of complete autonomy from Russian
inuence and control.Moscows Foreign Policy Concept issued in July
2008 established the pretext forRussias intrusion in post-Soviet
neighbouring nations by including a reference toprotecting Russians
living outside its borders, a provision signalling a prelude
forintervention in Georgia and later Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of theRussian Federation 2008a). In commenting on the
Ukrainian conict, Russian For-eign Minister Sergei Lavrov afrmed
this commitment, noting that an attack onRussian citizens is an
attack on the Russian Federation, perhaps suggesting thatMoscows
intervention following Ukraine, in the Baltics (particularly in
Estonia orLatvia with signicant Russian populations) or elsewhere,
could not be ruled out.8
The concept of Novorossiya has been invoked by Vladimir Putin
establishing abasis for Moscow to carve out an alternative pillar
to Western inuence in theinternational community. In describing
Russias interests in Ukraine, Putin madethe point in 2014 that: I
would like to remind you that what was calledNovorossiya back in
the tsarist days Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson,Nikolayev and
Odessa were not part of Ukraine back thenThe center of theterritory
was Novorossiysk, so the region is called Novorossiya. Russia lost
thoseterritories for various reasons, but the people remained
(Taylor 2014). Putin andhis colleagues make clear that Russia must
establish a democracy and foreign
158 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
policy orientation consistent with Russias traditions, culture
and moral values.Traditional Russian cultural values are often
contrasted with the decadence of theWest in contemporary Russian
society and media. Moscows national narrative hasbeen directed for
several years toward presenting Western society as the
other.Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov have also suggested that
Russias foreign policyshould be guided by religious values. The
concept of the Russkiy Mir (RussianWorld) refers to Russian
citizens and the Russian diaspora based on the RussianOrthodox
faith, common historical memory and values. The relationship
betweenthe Kremlin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Orthodox
Church has becomemuch closer under Putins leadership. In his 2013
speech to the Valdai forum,Vladimir Putin states: We can see how
many of the Euro-Atlantic community areactually rejecting their
roots, including Christian values that constitute the basis
ofWestern civilization. They are denying moral principles and all
traditional identities (Cathey 2013; Curanovic 2015; Valdai Club
2013). Russias policy in Ukraineis thus depicted as not only
important for securing national interests, but alsoreecting the
(Christian) moral obligation to assist those in need and in terms
of acivilizational clash between traditional Russian cultural and
religious values andnihilistic materialism and lack of commitment
to moral heritage in the West(Cathey 2013; Curanovic 2015; Valdai
Club 2013).
Vladimir Putins popularity within Russia is largely explained as
a result of theperception that he is willing to stand rm in support
of Russias interests in dealingwith the West. Russia has come to
resemble a modern Czarist regime in Putinssecond term. Putins
deance of the West on Ukraine has only enhanced his sup-port at
home, and to appear to compromise Moscows interests on Ukraine
could infact unleash an erosion of domestic support for Putins
leadership.
Uncertainty regarding Russias future political development and
lack of claritywith respect to Russias desire for either
integration with the Western securitycommunity or rather strategic
independence has been a major barrier to deepeningNATORussia
security collaboration. Russias statements and actions were
ambigu-ous in viewing NATO as both bloc threat and at the same
time, potential part-ner. The Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation issued in 2010 includedamong main external military
dangers
the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization(NATO) global functions carried out in violation
of the norms of international law,and to move the military
infrastructure of NATO members closer to the borders of theRussian
Federation
and at the same time the document lists the development of
relationswithother intergovernmental organizations (the European
Union and NATO) underthe heading main tasks to deter and prevent
military conict. Clearly, Putinsreturn to the presidency in 2012
was accompanied by greater distancing from theWest, preference for
strengthening Russias reliance on structures perceived
asalternatives to NATO, such as the CSTO collective security
organization andEurasian Union, and building stronger ties with
China and the BRIC nations.Moscows current leadership calls for
establishing strategic alternatives to Westernintegration and
practices for managing security. However, even in the aftermath
ofthe initial repercussions and mutual reprisals resulting from the
conict in Ukraine,the new Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation issued in December 2014 still
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 159
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
leaves open the possibility of a dialogue of equals with the
West. Many analystsmade an issue of the description of NATO and
NATO enlargement in the 2014Military Doctrine as a danger or
threat, but such references concerning NATOappeared in the previous
iteration. The new 2014 Military Doctrine does emphasizethe need
for non-bloc models, and presents a more threatening description of
theglobal security environment than the prior version.
Despite the fact that the United States/NATO nations and Russia
have differentstrategic visions and objectives, Russias cooperation
remains critical for Europeanand global security. Nations of the
NATO Alliance share a vast array of commonsecurity interests which
are also of highest priority for the Russian Federation fortoday
and in the decades ahead, such as arms control, weapons of mass
destruction,proliferation, countering violent extremism and
terrorism, preventing escalation ofregional conicts apart from the
European continent and more. Russia can be apotential spoiler,
signicantly damaging NATO interests, and the risk of confronta-tion
between NATO and Russia has reached the greatest level since the
collapse ofthe USSR as a result of the crisis in Ukraine. Russias
vast territory and geographicreach adjoining Europe, the Middle
East and Asia makes the nation a major playerfor regional and
global security. Russia retains a nuclear arsenal rivaling that of
theUnited States, and combined gas/oil resources as a leading
global net energy expor-ter. Russias status as a Permanent Member
of the UN Security Council with vetoauthority, and membership in
other major international organizations provides thecapacity for
exerting considerable inuence in shaping the world security
agendaand determining vital collective security responses. NATOs
resources and capabili-ties are not innite, and thinking more about
how to ensure the constructivedevelopment of US/NATO relationships
with both Russia and China and otheremerging powers as well as
out-of-area international organizations that might
shareresponsibilities and costs in global security is only
reasonable. NATO nations havecertainly recognized the importance of
Russia to European and global security, andthus managing this
relationship has presented among the most serious challengesfor the
Alliance.
The NATO leadership had hoped that establishing the unique
NATORussiapartnership might provide a basis for constructive
security collaboration, even withMoscows objections to NATO
enlargement and allied out-of-area missions.NATOs intention has and
remains to establish a reliable security partnership withRussia.
However, Moscow has never been able to overcome the perception
ofNATO as a military bloc poised against Russia, and they do not
view NATO as theproper organization to ensure adequate
representation of Russias interests in majorEuropean, Eurasian and
global security spheres. In March 2000, Vladimir Putin sur-prised
the audience when asked about joining NATO, when he responded why
not?9 but only of the basis of equal of partnership 10 Putin has
consistentlysuggested the Russia would work with NATO, but only
from a position of strengthor on an equal basis.
Battle for the future of Ukraine
Tensions between NATO and Russia have reached an unprecedented
scale as aresult of the recent conict in Ukraine and Russias
annexation of Crimea. Thestruggle in Ukraine over developing closer
ties with the European Union or theCustoms Union brought the ouster
of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in
160 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
February 2014, opening a power vacuum for the pro-Western
Euromaidan move-ment to move to the forefront of Ukrainian
politics. The involvement of externalpowers, the United States,
European nations and Russia taking sides in the conicthas led to an
implosion of the nation dividing Ukraine in an EastWest civil
war.
NATO reacted by suspending all practical civilian and military
cooperation withRussia, though political channels of communication
have remained open. At theWales Summit in September 2014, NATO
announced the creation of a RapidReaction Force to reassure allies
and as President Barack Obama said to serve asa signal to Russia to
avoid any future potential aggression similar to the ongoingghting
in Ukraine 11 The allies demanded that Russia stop and withdraw
itsforces from Ukraine and that Russia must use its inuence with
the sepa-ratists to de-escalate the situation and to take concrete
steps to allow for a politicaland a diplomatic solution which
respects Ukraines sovereignty, territorial integrity,and
internationally recognized borders (NATO 2014).
The United States and its NATO allies have repositioned
equipment and forcesin the Baltics, East-Central Europe and the
Black Sea region. Additional multina-tional exercises among NATO
allies and plans for military training are underwayfor Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine to enhance capacity to work alongside
NATOforces as well as to provide for their own defence. In June
2014, the US Congressauthorized President Obama to advance the
European Reassurance Initiative, pro-viding for additional US troop
rotations and presence across Europe, but especiallyon the
territory of newer NATO allies.12 This initiative authorized
funding for air,land, and naval exercises involving US forces in
collaboration with NATO alliesand partners in Europe and Eurasia.
This funding initiative supports US EuropeanCommands Operation
Atlantic Resolve directed toward afrming US commitmentto collective
security among NATO allies and partners in Europe in response
toRussias intervention in Ukraine.13
The Obama Administration together with members of the European
Union haveimposed harsh sanctions on the Russian Federation in
response to Russias beha-viour in Ukraine, and the United States
Congress has pressured the US President toprovide lethal military
aid to the government in Kiev to assist in countering thethreat
posed by separatist groups receiving support from Russia in Eastern
Ukraine.Particularly in the United States, Vladimir Putin has been
widely demonized in thepublic and media as a result of actions in
Ukraine with former US Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton comparing
the Russian leader to Adolf Hitler. The movementof United States
forces in Europe is intended to bolster capacity in the event
offurther attempted encroachments from Moscow among NATO
nations.
At the same time, outrage among European nations over Moscows
violation ofUkrainian sovereignty notwithstanding, statements among
NATO allies haveemphasized that they still continue to believe that
a partnership between NATOand Russia based on respect for
international law would be of strategic value (NATO 2014). NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg afrmed again in early2015 that
We continue to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship
withRussia, including reciprocal condence building and transparency
measures Hecontinued:
We have for many years worked together with Russia in ghting
terrorism. And ter-rorism is a threat and a problem for many
countries, including Russia. And thats thereason why we still
strive for a more cooperative and constructive relationship
with
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 161
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Russia. Because we think it is important that Russia-which is
our biggest neighbor inEurope-and NATO are able to work together on
important issues, like for instance,ghting terror (NATO 2015a)
NATO Ambassador Vershbow also afrmed:
We do not seek confrontation with Russia. And neither are we
looking for regimechange. What we do want is for Moscow to change
its behavior; to abide by the verygood rules that Russia itself
once subscribed to; & to return to the spirit ofcooperation
(NATO 2015a)
Much of the academic and policy analysis on the Ukraine crisis
tends to focus onoffering assessments of the importance of Ukraine
for Russia and the West.Moscow ofcials frequently refer to the
existential importance of Ukraine forRussia, and in contrast, some
suggest that Ukraine is insignicant for the UnitedStates. Neither
of these descriptions is quite accurate. Ukraine is clearly of
funda-mental strategic and economic importance for Russia, and of
considerablegeostrategic and economic interest certainly for Europe
and to a lesser extent(though surely not insignicant) for the
United States.
Ukraine, the second largest nation in Europe, has rich
agricultural land andsignicant hydro-carbons and mineral resources.
The nation holds Europes thirdlargest shale gas elds, and Ukraine
has been a main transit route for Russiannatural gas provided to
Europe. The location of Ukraine at the Black Sea alsosignicantly
enhances the geostrategic signicance of the nation.
For Russia, Ukraine holds a much higher importance than either
Kosovo orGeorgia. Given the cultural-religious heritage of Kievan
Rus, Ukraine has beenviewed historically as a part of Russia.
Russias former Permanent Representativeto NATO, Dmitri Rogozin,
explained Moscows objection to Ukraines membershipin NATO stating
that Ukraine was in fact the Mother of Russia, and that separa-tion
from Ukraine could never be accepted.14 Reecting on the return of
Crimea toRussia, Vladimir Putin afrmed: We have always believed in
Russia that Russianand Ukrainian are one people.15
If one should doubt the historic signicance ascribed to Crimea
and Sevastopolfor Russia, the observations offered in 1855 during
the period of the Crimean Warof the then young ofcer Leo Tolstoy at
the outset of this article afrms that thearea would always remain a
priority for Russia. In a speech marking the oneyearanniversary of
the signing of the treaty with Crimea, Putin praised the
patriotismand support the Russian people had shown for Crimean
Sevastopol return to hisnative shores, and stated that We are
talking about the historical origins of thesources of our
spirituality and statehood and the importance to link genera-tions
and times, as did much of our historic ancestors for our country 16
TheSevastopol port and Crimea have been depicted in Russian
literature and culture asrepresenting a central theater in the
Crimean War and the Second World War forthe display of Russian
military glory and valour. Crimea had been part of Russiafrom the
time of the establishment of the naval base under Catherine the
Great in1783 until Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the
Russian Soviet Federa-tion of Socialist Republics to the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic (Kramer2014). Sevastopol provides Russia
ice-free port access year round, and the meansto project maritime
and other military and commercial assets into the
Balkans,Mediterranean and the Middle East. The lease accord Russia
signed on the Black
162 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Sea port with Ukraine in 1997 was set to expire in 2017, but
Ukraines formerPresident Viktor Yanukovich had offered an extension
of the lease to 2042. Therehave been periodic disputes between
Ukraine and Russia over the past several yearsregarding terms of
implementation of the prior agreement. With the ouster
ofYanukovich, Moscows determination to draw a line with respect to
Ukraine mustbe largely motivated by the desire to maintain control
of the Black Sea port andeet.
Since Ukraines independence in 1992, a number of factors have
continued toplace strain on the RussiaUkraine relationship. The
historical memories andnational identity within Ukraine remain torn
between the West and East alongethnic Ukrainian and Russian
allegiances and Catholic and Orthodox afliations.In the past, the
Western and Central territories of Ukraine had been tied to
theHapsburg Monarchy, Poland, and Lithuania, while the North Black
Sea and East-ern regions were more closely aligned with Russia.
Today, disputes still existover the place of Kievan Rus with
respect to the historical development of theUkrainian nation and
Russia. The legacy of the Soviet empire still inuences thebilateral
relationship between contemporary Russia and Ukraine, and
Ukrainesenergy dependence on Russia has continued to leave Kiev
vulnerable toMoscows leverage. The protection of the rights of
ethnic Russians (17% ofUkraines population) residing in Ukraine and
the majority Russian population inCrimea has been a major issue
between Kiev and Moscow. Alleged Westerninvolvement in Ukraine and
Georgia during the coloured revolutions, andMoscows apprehensions
about these neighbouring countries moving closer toNATO and the
European Union have been central sources of tension. Ukrainesformer
pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovichs initial rejection of the
EUaccession agreement in favour of supporting Moscows Customs Union
triggeredthe current conict in February 2014.
Ukraine faces tremendous challenges ahead as the nation suffers
endemicproblems lacking viable and legitimate institutions and
capacity for effective gover-nance. Excessive state control,
corruption and pervasive cronyism have continuedto inuence the
political and economic systems in Ukraine since independence.Even
prior to the devastation resulting from the current implosion of
the country,Ukraine suffered budget decits, hyperination, and
comparably low GNP ($3960in 2013), with a standard of living below
that of several neighbouring nations inEurope and Eurasia
possessing far fewer resources than Ukraine. The nation
facesserious challenges in meeting the scal demands necessary for
economic recovery.Long-term investment (in terms of decades) in
political, security and economiccapacity building will be necessary
to develop the institutional structures and tradi-tions necessary
for Ukraines growth. The challenges of recovery and future
growthwill only be magnied by the losses incurred as result of
conict on Ukraines soil,and the difculties compounded in the
country because of competing views amongmajor external powers
regarding the future of the nation. Perhaps most important,the
Ukrainian people must determine whether differences among various
groupscan be reconciled and minority relationships can be protected
in some type of fed-eral structure once again uniting the Eastern
and Western areas of the country.Whether those who identify with
the Ukrainian language and historical narrativeand allegiance
toward Europe can coexist alongside those who prefer to more
clo-sely align with a Russian-led cultural and geostrategic world
in the aftermath ofsuch a violent struggle remains to be seen.
Absent reconciliation within the country
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 163
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
and well-orchestrated sustained provisions of support from the
outside, Ukrainecould remain locked in a prolonged frozen conict
leaving the beleaguered nationin a state of uncertainty with little
hope for progress.
Black Sea case: risks and challenges
Maintaining access to the port city of Sevastopol and security
of the Black SeaFleet constitute the primary strategic source of
the current conict betweenUkraine and Russia. As a result of
Russias annexation of Crimea and the war inUkraine, the Black Sea
region has again become a theatre of heightening tensionand risk
between NATO and Russia. The Black Sea has always served as a
criti-cal centre for the mix of commerce and cultures of Europe,
the Middle East, andAsia, and has been prone to regional conict
involving leading external powers.Historically, the region was
controlled by ancient Greece and Rome, theByzantine and Ottoman
empires, Czarist Russia, and by the Soviet Union. Russiaclashed
with European powers and Ottoman Turks over securing control in
theBlack Sea region during the Crimean War 18531856. The current
mix of the sixBlack Sea littoral nations, including NATO members
Bulgaria, Romania andTurkey together with Russia and conict-ridden
Ukraine and Georgia creates anenvironment potentially ripe for
becoming a serious regional ashpoint.
Russias annexation of Crimea, seizure of the Ukrainian eet and
plans for fur-ther upgrading and expanding military presence in the
region has altered the priorbalance of power in the Black Sea
area.17 Russia intends to construct a new navalbase at Novorossiysk
by 2016, and to deploy additional warships and submarinesto the
area.18 In December 2014, Russias Ministry of Defense announced
that 80new warships would be added to the Black Sea Fleet by
2020.19 Even prior to theCrimean War, Moscow had been implementing
upgrades of the Black Sea Fleet.20
Moscow signed an agreement with Abkhazia in 2014 to enhance
military ties andfurther strengthen control over the Eastern Black
Sea.21 The Russian Ministry ofDefence has announced plans to
modernize the Crimea Belbek airbase includinghousing modern SU-27
aircraft, SU-30 ghter bombers, MIG-29 ghters, andTU-22 long-range
bombers.22 Russia is deploying additional ground units to thearea
with the most sophisticated equipment and weaponry.23 Reports
suggest thatMoscow intends to divert the prior funding allocation
for leasing the area fromUkraine to upgrade and expand its military
forces positioned in the region. Analystshave observed that the
combined navies of Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia are nomatch for
Russias naval presence in the region. With the second most
powerfulmilitary force among NATO nations, Turkeys naval presence
is more substantial,but not sufcient alone to challenge Russias
regional naval capacity.
The Black Sea is also critical for NATO and Euro-Atlantic
security. Theregion includes not only NATO member nations and
partners, but also othercountries that aspire to NATO membership.
Strides have been made over the pastfew decades to enhance regional
security cooperation, democratic transition andsecurity sector
reform. NATO nations require unfettered access to the Black
Searegion for ensuring security in the Balkans and Middle East. The
region iscritical for NATOs communication and access in Afghanistan
for managing thepost-war transition. Securing regional energy
infrastructure through the Black Searegion is vital for meeting
Europes energy needs (Baran and Smith 2007;
164 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Triantaphyllou 2007). Prior regional cooperation in combatting
piracy, search andrescue, and counterterrorism initiatives among
NATO nations, to include Russia,and the Black Sea regional
neighbours have also been signicant.
In November 2014, NATOs Supreme Allied Commander for Europe,
USGeneral Philip Breedlove, warned that Russias military assets
being installed inCrimea could bring an effect on almost the entire
Black Sea region 24
NATO nations have stepped up activity in the Black Sea in
response to Russiasactions in Ukraine and the region. Although
there are provisions established bythe Montreaux Convention of 1936
restricting the passage of warships of outsidecountries to 21 days
in the Black Sea area, the United States and NATO part-ners have
managed to extend rotations of vessels through the region by
basingin NATO regional nations and combining assets.25 Operation
Atlantic Resolvelaunched by NATO in 2014 to reassure allies of
maintaining security in light ofRussian intervention in Ukraine
included among several tasks the deployment ofArleigh Burke class
destroyer USS Truxton to the Black Sea in March 2014,involving
participation in exercises with the Romanian and Bulgarian
navalforces (Pellerin 2015; US Department of Defense 2014). The USS
Vella Gulf,USS Taylor, and USS Donald Cook have also conducted
operations in the BlackSea since the Crimean annexation.26 By
summer 2014, both NATO nations andRussia were holding exercises in
the Black Sea region.27 Exercise Sea Breeze14 brought together US
forces with NATO allies and partner nations aimed toenhance
interoperability and cooperation in the Black Sea region.28 The
exer-cises involved ships from the United States, United Kingdom,
Greece, Italy,Romania and Turkey, along with naval patrol planes,
from the United Statesand Turkey. In turn, Russia also conducted
exercises during the same periodinvolving 20 ships and 20 aircraft
including SU-24 ghters with a scenariodirected toward the
destruction of enemy ships in the sea and organization ofair
defense of naval groups and coastal infrastructure.29
Russian ofcials have complained that there have been NATO
violations ofthe 21-day limit stipulated in the Montreaux
Convention (Demirtas 2014).Russias Military Doctrine of December
2014 cites ballistic missile defence assetsin Romania and the
rotation of NATO naval ships in the Black Sea as externalrisks.30
In turn, NATO ofcials have expressed concerns about Russias
deploy-ment of anti-ship and anti-aircraft systems from the Crimean
peninsula. Moscowclaims that they are forced to develop
counter-measures in response to increasedNATO presence in Black
Sea.31 NATO plans to continue to stage persistent jointexercises
and rotations in the Black Sea to respond to Moscows efforts
toincrease its regional strategic presence. In early March 2015,
Vladimir Putinsuggested that Moscow could deploy nuclear weapons in
Crimea if deemednecessary.32
During the period of the recent conict over Crimea and Ukraine,
there havebeen some reported encounters between NATO military
warships and Russianaircraft. In April 2014, a Russian Sukhoi SU-24
made 12 passes at Navydestroyer USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea
(Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014). Itwas reported that the Russian SU-24
came within 1000 yards of the Americanship, at an altitude of 500
feet above sea level (Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014).Problems with the
Aegis system detecting the aircraft in this instance
generatedconcerns about Russian capacity to disrupt or interfere
with these systems(Shinkman 2014; Ybarra 2014). Black Sea buzzes
were reported again in
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 165
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
September 2014 when the Canadian frigate Toronto was overown by
twoRussian Sukhoi SU-24s and an Antonov AN-26 transport plane.33 In
bothinstances, Russians acknowledged the presence of aircraft in
the area, but deniedthe low-altitude yovers. The Russian yovers
were described by US andCanadian military ofcers as unnecessarily
provocative, unprofessional andentailing risks for escalating
tensions. Military accounts suggest that theseinstances have
occurred more frequently than reported in the press. Althoughthese
incidents appear to have been nothing more than the desire to
demonstratepresence, the possibility for accidents or mishaps
particularly in areas of regionaldispute or hostilities where
additional forces are being deployed could provokeserious responses
with the potential of escalation.
Turkey holds the greatest capacity among littoral Black Sea
nations for chal-lenging Russias growing military presence in the
region. Russia and Turkey have ahistory of rivalry in the Black Sea
region. Turkey joined other NATO membernations in expressing
opposition to Crimeas secession, and Ankara has ties andconcerns
regarding the treatment of the minority community of Crimean
Tatars. Atthe same time, Russia and Turkey might share a certain
afnity as a result of beingmarginalized from the European community
in certain respects. For example, writ-ing in the Turkish source
Analist Magazine, Russias former Foreign Minister IgorIvanov
recently offered the observation that:
The prospect of full Turkish membership to EU remains elusive no
wonder that inboth our countries many intellectuals, politicians
and opinion makers are now thinkingabout alternative futures for
Russia and Turkey the two nations with their richhistories, great
cultures, economic potentials and geopolitical ambitions can
hardlyaccept the position of being nothing more but a part of the
European periphery (Ivanov 2015).34
Ankara currently depends on Russia for 60% of its energy
supplies and approxi-mately 40 billion in annual trade. In December
2014, Russia and Turkey signed anagreement to construct a pipeline
across the Black Sea to replace Russias previousSouth Stream
agreement with Bulgaria. Under the terms of this agreement,
Turkeywill receive a 6% discount on Russias natural gas, though the
project will still bedifcult to complete and entail substantial
costs. During the discussions over sign-ing the agreement, Russias
President Vladimir Putin referred to Turkey as a strate-gic partner
(De Waal 2014; Ofce of the President of the Russian
Federation2015). Prior, regional Turkish security initiatives among
the six Black Sea littoralnations aimed toward condence building
and enhancing security including BlackSea Naval Force (BLACKSEAFOR)
established in 2001, and Operation Black SeaHarmony 2004 might be
jeopardized as a result of Russias actions in Ukraine. TheUnited
States had also supported these efforts as a means for building
greater trans-parency, predictability and security in the region.
Maintaining the work of regionalcooperative forums in security and
commerce during this difcult period in whichMoscow participates
such as the projects of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation(BSEC)
zone will be important.35 Given Turkeys inuence in the Black Sea
region,membership in NATO and interests with respect to the Russian
Federation, thecountry might be positioned to exert signicant
inuence toward containing orpotentially mitigating the tendency
toward escalating tensions in the Black Searegion.
166 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
Stakes and risks for NATORussia, suggestions for strategy
(cautious long-term management and selective engagement versus
isolation or confrontation)
In reecting on developments between the United States, NATO and
Russia sinceRussias independence, one can identify critical
mistakes with potentially tremen-dous signicance for international
security. First, perhaps most signicant, thetendency remained to
insist that a choice must be made for new democracies inEurope and
Eurasia to either seek deeper integration in the Euro-Atlantic
securitycommunity or to rely on Russia and the emerging structures
of the Eurasian Unionto the East. The fact is that there should
never have been a need for newly indepen-dent nations of Europe and
Eurasia to make a choice between East and West.There is no reason
that these middle-size (Ukraine) and smaller nations (Georgia),and
others should not pursue closer security and economic integration
both withthe Euro-Atlantic community (NATO, EU and others) and with
Russia. Thesenations require stability and peace in the
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security envi-ronments as an essential
prerequisite for meeting the vast demands and challengesrequired to
support continued productive development in the decades ahead.
Thefact that these countries have been positioned to declare
allegiance to one side orthe other has been detrimental to their
societies, and for the entire contemporaryEuro-Atlantic and
Eurasian security community. It would be important to makeevery
possible effort to promote an environment in which these countries
can pur-sue productive engagements toward both the West and Russia
without sufferingadverse consequences to their respective
interests. Given the current state of divi-sion, it will be no easy
task to shift the zero-sum narrative enforcing the belief thata
gain for one side excludes the other, but we must recognize that
this lingeringEastWest mindset has been counterproductive in every
respect.
Second, expectations regarding United States, NATO and Russia
partnershiphave been unrealistically high. In areas where the focus
was directed toward build-ing practical forms of security
cooperation, there were successes and overallprogress. However, in
holding single issues in which obvious differences exist interms of
priorities and interests such as missile defence up as a game
changer orhinging the entire relationship with Russia on a single
issue, disappointments inevi-tably developed when there was a
failure to meet expectations. Both the West andRussia should have
been more cautious in placing too much emphasis on any oneissue as
a test for the relationship. The United StatesNATO and Russia
relation-ship should be managed in the context of a broad-ranging
security agenda so thatno single conict or difference can derail
the bilateral and multilateral agenda,where so many critical
security interests are at stake for all parties.
The United States and NATO nations and Russia have not been able
to reachagreement on forming a post-Cold War European security
community that wouldsatisfy Moscows expectations for status and
inuence consistent with Russiastraditional role in Europe. Dmitry
Medvedevs European Security Treaty proposaladvanced in 2008 was an
attempt to open dialogue on options, but never accom-plished more
than some preliminary review in Western nations. Given Russias
sig-nicance in European security, it was important for Western
nations to strivetoward meeting Moscows desire for securing an
appropriate role in the Europeansecurity institutions and
community. Rather, as indicated, Moscow came to believethat they
would be in a position of continually sacricing Russias interests
with
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 167
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
the West, and that existing security structures in Europe were
not suited toadvancing Russias fundamental interests.
The United States narrative of Cold War triumphalism, often
neglecting to offerany credit at all to Mikhail Gorbachev and the
Russian side in contributing to theend of the Cold War, only
fuelled the view that Russia lost with the collapse of theSoviet
Union. At the same time, if Medvedevs proposal for a new European
secu-rity architecture was initially intended to suggest that NATO
should be replaced ordismantled, this was certainly an unreasonable
expectation. Nevertheless, bothNATO nations and Russia might have
been well served by devoting greater focusand creativity to
exploring all possible means for adjusting current structures
andpractices to more suitably incorporate post-Soviet Russia in a
way that would becommensurate with Russias place and capacity in
the European securitycommunity.
A common European security community to include Russia only
makes senseas a means of enhancing the security and quality of life
for all of Europe andbeyond. The problem was anticipating dramatic
results to materialize immediatelywithout recognizing the long-term
commitment to developing institutional ties andreliable networks
with Russia that would be required. Perhaps bolder
innovativemeasures were needed earlier on to demonstrate serious
intention and resolve onthe part of the United States, Europe and
NATO allies to include Russia in theEuropean security community. A
large-scale commitment such as the Marshall Planwas probably not
possible or even necessary for Russia following the collapse ofthe
USSR, but there are countless other ways that United States and
Europeanallies might have signalled greater willingness to support
Russia as an equalplayer with respect to the European and wider
international security institutions andissues.
At this point, it is difcult to be optimistic regarding the
future of the US/NATORussia relationship. While Democrats and
Republicans in the United States agree onalmost nothing, both sides
can nd common ground when it comes to expressing out-rage,
dissatisfaction and complete lack of trust regarding Russia and
Russias currentleadership. President Barrack Obamas re-set policy
is now widely deemed a failure,and in the worst case, depicted as a
strategy of appeasement.
In Russia, Putin has the support of his population to stay the
current coursewith respect to Ukraine. Again, Putins domestic
approval rating exceeding 80% isat least in part explained by the
perception in the Russian public that they have aleader who will
stand rm in Russias interests, especially with respect to theUnited
States. It would be a mistake to underestimate the resolve of the
Russianpublic in tolerating the pain of United States and
EU-imposed sanctions. As a soci-ety, they have endured much in the
past, and the Russian public is more likely toaccept such material
hardships, rather than yield to pressures that seem unjustiedor
even discriminatory.
The Ukrainian conict also makes quite obvious the serious
differences of view-points that divide Europe and Russia. Europes
condemnation of Russias annexa-tion of Crimea as a breach of
international law and a threat to the security of theinternational
order contrasts sharply with Moscows description of Crimeas
referen-dum as a reection of the will of the people claiming that
Kosovos independenceconstituted more of a violation of
international law. Russian ofcials and mediatend to emphasize the
role of the Fascist fringe in the anti-Yanukovich opposition,and
neglect to acknowledge the core focus of the Euromaidan movement
prompted
168 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
to support the ouster of the corrupt Viktor Yanukovich because
he stood as animpediment to Ukraines deeper productive integration
with the Euro-Atlanticcommunity.
Throughout the past two decades since Russias independence,
there wereefforts toward opening credible lines of communication,
but there was a lack ofsufcient appreciation of the critical need
for promoting wider Western engagementwith Russias foreign policy
community and society. Prior conferences heldbetween NATO and
partner universities in Russia provided excellent means forreaching
the Russian foreign policy community and next generation to
betterexplain US and NATO intentions and policies. While few minds
might have beenchanged as a result of these discussions, still such
open forums for exchangingviews can contribute to overcoming
misunderstanding and distortions. As a resultlargely of media
efforts, many in the Russian public today believe that the
UnitedStates seeks to undermine or even destroy Russia. NATO
members and Moscowmight have considered the bold measure of
instituting a NATORussia DefenceCollege following Russias
independence to provide channels to facilitate routinediscussion
and collaboration between NATO and Russian military institutions.
Thelimited exchanges that were permitted in professional military
education betweenNATO nations and Russia at least helped to open
some lines of communication.Without sufcient dialogue, it was very
easy for misconceptions about Westernintentions to prevail
throughout Russias defense community.
Given the prior tensions between Russia and NATO and the West
over Kosovo,Georgia, and NATO enlargement, in many ways, the conict
over Ukraine was pre-dictable. However, few anticipated that the
United States/NATO relationship withRussia would deteriorate so
dramatically. Both Russia and the West are preparingfor a long
period of strained relationship, and there is not likely to be
muchopportunity for reversing this chill for many years to come if
ever. In retrospect, itmay be that the period since the early 1990s
represented only a brief juncture whena NATORussia partnership
might have been possible, but that any opportunity forre-dening the
post-Soviet relationship with Russia on a more positive
reciprocalbasis has been lost at least for the foreseeable future,
if not indenitely.
It is imperative to exercise caution in the current
circumstances. Every effortshould be made to avoid the acceleration
of the drift toward further confrontation.The potential costs and
risks ahead are quite signicant for all sides. Managementof the
crisis in Ukraine will have signicant and lasting implications in
shaping thegeopolitical and security environment in Europe and
beyond for years to come.
All sides should recognize that there is no future ahead for
Ukraine withoutMoscows cooperation. There have been thousands of
civilian and military casu-alties since the outbreak of war in
Ukraine.36 Every possible measure should bepursued to limit further
loss of life and the catastrophic humanitarian consequencesof the
conict. Supplying additional lethal arms to Ukraine will only
worsen thesituation, and potentially lead to a widening escalation
of conict. The recent con-clusion of the Minsk II ceasere agreement
brokered among German ChancellorAngela Merkel, French President
Francois Hollande, and Russian and UkrainianPresidents Vladimir
Putin and Petro Poroschenko provides some foundation forsecuring
peace, but all rests with the implementation of the terms of the
agreementin Ukraine, especially in the besieged regions of the
Eastern areas of the country.The Russian leadership and media have
touted the agreement as a successful initia-tive on the part of the
Russian leader with his German, French and Ukrainian
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 169
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
counterparts in the absence of United States presence. In this
respect, Putin hasnow established signicant stakes in successful
implementation of the agreement,but it remains to be seen whether
he can exercise sufcient inuence on the leader-ship of the Peoples
Republic of Donetsk and pro-Russian separatist forces inEastern
Ukraine toward achieving a cessation of the conict.
NATO, and especially the United States foreign policy community,
mustdene major interests with respect to Russia and long-term
desired end-states forboth Russia and Ukraine. Especially among the
US foreign policy community,there has been an absence of focus on
dening core American interests withrespect to Russia, and how
specic policy measures are likely to advance effortsin achieving
those objectives. The calls of vocal US Senators for war withRussia
or the demonization of Vladimir Putin overwhelmingly dominate
themedia and even much of the discussion among experts. In fact,
the re-set wasnot a complete failure, but re-set could never
represent more than a temporarytransition, and there was no clear
strategy advanced to follow the initial period.A long term
well-crafted pragmatic strategy that NATO and European partnerscan
support toward a desirable end-state with the Russian Federation is
sorelyneeded.
One might revisit the wisdom of the decision to enlarge NATO,
and there werecertainly costs in terms of the NATORussia
relationship. However, there is nodoubt that NATO and the potential
of the NATORussia relationship will remain acritical factor in
regional and wider global security in the decades ahead. NATOhas
managed to successfully transition from an exclusively collective
defenceinstitution to a collective security organization suited to
respond to critical emergingtransnational security challenges. The
recent enlargement of the Alliance and newpartnership relationships
have only strengthened the diversity of the organizationand thereby
capacity for engaging nations of Europe, Eurasia and beyond.
Largely due to images from the past, Moscow cant appreciate the
practical con-tributions that NATO has made to support the
implementation of complex and dif-cult reforms in the aspiring new
member nations over the past several years. NATOand the EU provided
the associations and assistance to emerging democracies ofthe
Baltics, Central and South Eastern Europe, and Eurasia that no
other agentswere in a position to offer. When the newly independent
countries of the formerWarsaw Pact faced the difcult tasks of
building democratic societies and defencetransformation, they
turned by choice (not force) to the institutions and communi-ties
of the Euro-Atlantic community for consultation and resources in
introducingdramatic security sector and democratic reforms.
There will continue to be nancial challenges for the United
States and allNATO members, but this also creates incentive for
greater and even more efcientcooperation and collaboration.
Notwithstanding the pivot to Asia, the Ukraineconict only further
underscores the importance for the United States to remainengaged
in Europe. The United States must fully appreciate the importance
of ourlong-standing partnerships in Europe, and continue to devote
attention andresources to maintaining these relationships which
should be even more critical inwhat promises to be a very turbulent
security environment of the future. The demo-cratic partnerships of
the transatlantic community provide a foundational baseneeded for
safeguarding interests and security for the United States, Europe,
andthe broader world community.
170 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
It would be a mistake for the United States and Europe to
attempt to isolateRussia. The plunging of the rouble and potential
economic meltdown in Russia isonly likely to have wider economic
and security consequences in the West.Moscow cant fully offset
difculties in the relationship with the West by turningto China,
India, Brazil and other nations, but rather Western partners remain
criticalfor Russia in meeting long-range economic development
needs. The best hope forRussias gradual (again in terms of decades)
evolution toward a more democraticsociety is by sustaining and
enhancing associations and networks with democraticnations of
Europe and the transatlantic community.
It should be understood that it is unrealistic and
counterproductive to believethat the West would be capable of
orchestrating regime change in Russia. The vul-nerability of
Russias political system stems from the fact that control rests
exces-sively in one individual Vladimir Putin. However, criticism
and pressure from theWest is only likely to further enhance the
popularity of the Russian leader. VladimirPutin does not represent
the most extreme anti-Western force within contemporaryRussian
politics. The alternatives could bring an even more anti-Western
orientationto the Kremlin, and the democratic liberal opposition in
Russia presently lackssufcient support or a single strong
personality that could challenge Putin.
The United States and NATO would be better served to pursue a
well-coordi-nated strategy of long-term management of selective
engagement with the RussianFederation, rather than implementing
measures that would further isolate Russiafrom the West or lead to
renewed confrontation. The developments surrounding theconict in
Ukraine have not changed the fact that the United States, NATO
andRussia share common interests with respect to a range of
critical security areas.The threat posed by the global violent
extremist networks of ISIS, Al Qaeda andafliates constitute a grave
threat to humanity and it would be so much better if theUnited
States, NATO and Russia could cooperate to counter such challenges,
ratherthan diverting resources in a resurgent EastWest struggle.
There is a need toremain exible and responsive in order to
effectively meet the inevitable andunanticipated challenges and
threats that are sure to emerge in a dynamic securityenvironment of
unprecedented complexity. Strong networks enlisting a diversity
ofnational partners become more integral than ever to successfully
meeting emergingtransnational security challenges. The United
States, European nations and Russiawould all stand to benet by
working to build the mechanisms and culture of secu-rity
cooperation necessary to manage the daunting challenges of the
twenty-rstcentury security environment. Continuing to seek to
engage Russia in security col-laboration, rather than exclusion
from the Western security community, over a per-iod of decades
provides the best hope for building trust and long-term
constructiveties. All our communication channels should leave open
the possibility of continu-ing to develop the common transatlantic
and European security community for thetwenty-rst century.
Since the period of the outbreak of conict in Ukraine in
February 2014, it hasbeen particularly important for the United
States and Europe to maintain a uniedresponse toward Russia. The
United States was able to generate support for sanc-tions against
Russia, but several Western nations would not welcome US supply
oflethal military assistance to Ukraine, potentially risk
escalating and widening theconict. Although there was initial
agreement on the sanctions regime againstRussia, there is evidence
of potential division ahead. Poland, the Baltic nations andthe UK
remain rmly in support of sanctions against Russia, while other
European
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 171
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
nations may be less willing to support this course. German
Chancellor AngelaMerkel has signalled that the sanctions could be
reversed if the ceasere brokeredin Minsk can be secured. To the
extent that the West can project consistency inmaintaining the
relationship with Russia, there is less opportunity for Moscow
toexploit differences.
NATO must be very clear about what the Alliance would be
prepared to do insupport of members in response to Russias actions.
One of the factors that mighthave contributed to prompting the
conict in Georgia was signalling that theGeorge W. Bush
Administration could be prepared to offer military support or
evento confront Russia in defence of Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili. Thismight have emboldened the Georgian President who
chose to interpret communica-tion from Washington in ways that
contributed to precipitating the conict. In theend, there were
limits to support the United States would be prepared to render toa
non-NATO member bordering the Russian Federation.
It is important that the NATO Alliance provide clear indication
both in commu-nications and actions regarding the circumstances
under which Article V would beinvoked. Russian incursions into the
territory of a NATO country Poland, Romania,Bulgaria, Lithuania,
Latvia, crosses a different threshold than threats to Georgia
orUkraine. Russias new form of hybrid warfare combining cyber,
media, and heavyreliance on local contacts that has characterized
the involvement in Ukraine in sup-port of pro-Russian separatists
raises serious questions for the NATO Allianceabout actions that
actually would constitute an attack on a NATO member nation.For
example, how might Russia leverage ties with Russian communities in
theBaltic nations short of outright deployment of forces and where
would such activitycross the line prompting a NATO response?
Providing reassurances regarding NATO resolve to protect
apprehensive allies,particularly those new members with historic
fears of Russia, is of course neces-sary. Steps such as Operation
Atlantic Resolve increasing continuous land, air andsea presence in
Europe reinforcing NATOs Article V readiness and sending a
clearsignal to Russia are important. At the same time, there is a
delicate balance to man-age increased presence while not risking
further escalation or provocation. Thereshould be no ambiguity that
any Russian intrusion against NATO allied memberswould be countered
by collective NATO reaction. Moscow is not likely to
directlyconfront NATO in the Black Sea or elsewhere or undertake
actions that might pro-voke an Article V response.
It is critical that the United States/Europe, NATO and Russia
maintain openlines of communication during this period to avoid
misperception and misunder-standing that can provoke dangerous
responses. Again, while there were well-estab-lished rules during
the Cold War, the current security arena is in state of
disruptionand uncertainty, where the potential for miscalculation,
accidents, and escalation ofconict with unintended consequences for
all sides is surely possible. The fact thatthe PJC and NRC were
both suspended during the Kosovo (1999) and Georgian(2008) conicts
was cause for concern regarding the reliability of these
channels.The NRC might provide a valuable mechanism for maintaining
communicationlines with Russia during this tense period. At a
minimum, both NATO and Russiashould keep lines of communication and
consultation open in the NRC and throughbilateral
military-to-military channels to manage future differences, conicts
or evencrisis situations.
172 S. Cross
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
In March 2015, Vladimir Putin disclosed that he was prepared to
place Russiasnuclear forces on alert to ensure the annexation of
Crimea (Smith-Spark,Eshchenko, and Burrows 2015).37 Since the
Ukrainian conict, Russian aircrafthave repeatedly violated European
airspace, at times causing close encounters withcommercial ights
(Quinlivan 2014).38 Again, during a period of escalating ten-sions
and heightened uncertainty, all sides must exercise caution and
refrain fromactions that might be misinterpreted or unnecessarily
provocative. The UnitedStates, Europe, and Russia should avoid
unpredictable behaviour or violations ofstandards for regulating
transit in the air and sea that could incite a damagingreaction or
accident.
All should realize that Ukraine is not a viable candidate for
NATO membershipat this time. Even prior to Russias destabilizing
intervention, Ukrainian societywas divided on NATO membership, and
the nation had not made sufcient pro-gress in political or defence
transformation to make the country a qualied candi-date for NATO
membership in the immediate future. Together with the
EuropeanUnion, NATO can still be an important source of support in
the context of theNATOUkraine partnership to encourage Ukraines
continued progress ondemocratic reform and defence transformation,
economic reform, implementing fur-ther measures to counter
corruption and to encourage national reconciliation andprotection
of minority rights.
It is important that NATO not allow Russias action in Ukraine to
jeopardizeprogress for aspiring NATO member nations. While Moscow
must be realisticabout the relationship of NATO to Ukraine, it is
also important for Russia not toexpect to hold a veto authority
over the future of nations which elect to undertakethe rigorous
measures to meet the criteria for NATO membership and if broad
sup-port for membership exists in these societies. There are many
reasons that a nationmight seek membership in NATO aside from the
motivation to secure protectionfrom Russia. The support that
members of the Alliance can provide in offeringexperience in
democratic and defence reform, and sharing security capacities
isinvaluable particularly for smaller and middle-level powers with
competingdevelopmental needs. It could be quite detrimental for the
future of aspiring NATOmember nations in the Balkans (Montenegro,
and others) should the threat ofprompting reprisals from Russia
prevent these countries from advancing towardintegration in the
institutional structures of the Euro-Atlantic community.
A nal point on the Black Sea region, NATO and the littoral
nations of theBlack Sea region would be wise not to lose sight of
the progress that has beenmade over the past two decades in
enhancing regional collaboration and coopera-tion to ensure
security of this critical area. Again, during this period of
heighteningtension and increasing military presence in the region,
the danger for escalatingconict surely exists. Every effort should
be made on the part of NATO andnations of the region to maintain
clear communication, and to attempt to sustainefforts and resources
toward continuing to promote regional security and economicgrowth
of the Black Sea region. Without cooperation of all parties of the
region, toinclude Russia, resources are likely to be dissipated and
the risk of accidents orconfrontation could entail scenarios that
would not be advantageous to any countryof the region.
The United States/NATO relationship with Russia has not
developed so as tomaximize the potential for productive security
collaboration over the past twodecades. The United States, Europe
and Russia have not achieved what those
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 173
Dow
nloa
ded
by [2
00.19
8.136
.137]
at 10
:19 18
Nov
embe
r 201
5
-
statesmen that deserve credit for bringing the dramatic end to
the Cold War mighthave hoped. We have not managed to overcome the
decit of trust, and the linger-ing images of the divisions of the
Cold War still remain very much xed in theframe of reference for so
many in our foreign policy communities, media andsocieties.
Unfortunately, there has been a failure to fully appreciate the
opportunitycreated by the opening offered at the beginning of the
decade of 1990. At the sametime, Russia has moved much closer to
Europe and the West in many respects, andNATO and Russia have
managed to cooperate in a number of critical securityareas. The
United States, European nations, NATO and Russia do not have to
befriends or even partners. During the period of the Cold War, the
United States,Western European powers and Russia managed to
cooperate in areas of criticalshared security interest such as arms
control. The stakes in the relationship betweenthe NATO allies and
Russia are potentially enormous, and this relationship canshape the
future security architecture and landscape in Europe, Eurasia and
thewider global community for decades ahead. No one should
underestimate the chal-lenges and difculties in repairing the
damage created as a result of the recent warin Ukraine, but all
efforts must be devoted to avoiding a further deterioration of
thesituation and circumstances in ways that none of us would
desire.
Disclosure statementNo potential conict of interest was reported
by