NATO CONTENTS Nº2 Summer 1999 - Volume 47Bill Clinton, speaking to the press during NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington last April. (Belga photo) A defining moment for NATO:

ISSN 0255-3813

NATO

Javier Solana

3 A defining moment for NATO: The Washington Summit decisions and the Kosovo crisis

Ambassador Sergio Balanzino

9 NATO’s humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisis

General Wesley K. Clark

14 When force is necessary: NATO’s military response to the Kosovo crisis

Anthony Cragg

19 A new Strategic Concept for a new era

Ambassador Klaus-Peter Klaiber

23 The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s door open

Frank Boland

26 NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative — Preparing for future challenges

Charles J. Dale

29 Towards a Partnership for the twenty-first century

Crispin Hain-Cole

33 The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Rationale and aims

Focus on NATO

28 New Chairman of the MilitaryCommittee

33 New PermanentRepresentative of Portugal

Summit Documentation

D1 The Washington Declaration

D1 Statement on Kosovo

D2 An Alliance for the 21st century

D7 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept

D13 Membership Action Plan (MAP)

D16 Defence Capabilities Initiative

Cover: The opening ceremony for NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in

the Mellon Auditorium in Washington on 23 April (Reuters photo); and a British

NATO soldier carries a Kosovar baby in the Bejane refugee camp near Skopje

(Belga photo).

CONTENTSreview Nº2 Summer 1999 - Volume 47

Publisher: Peter Daniel - NATO, 1110 Brussels, BelgiumPrinted in Belgium by Editions Européennes

Editor: Keir BonineAssistant Editor: Vicki NielsenProduction Assistant: Felicity BreezeLayout: NATO Graphics Studio

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3NATO review Summer 1999

ethnic cleansing andallow the displacedKosovar Albaniansto return to theirhomes in peace andsecurity.

At the same time, the Alliance is continuing toadvance significantly our project of adapting NATOfor the 21st century.

ATO’s 50th year has already become one of themost important in the history of this Alliance.

In the last months alone, the Alliance has success-fully conducted a complex and intensive air campaignin the Balkans and is now leading a multinationalImplementation Force in Kosovo (KFOR), on the basisof UN Security Council Resolution 1244. These operations have been in pursuit of a single objective: to reverse the Belgrade regime’s horrific policy of

At April’s 50th anniversary Washington Summit, Alliance leaders took a series of key decisions to betterprepare NATO for the security challenges it may be confronted with in the next half-century. The factthat these issues were tackled in the midst of Europe’s most serious crisis since the Alliance's inception

attests to NATO’s willingness to act in the face of a serious threat to stability on the continent. Inresponding to the Kosovo crisis, the Alliance has sent a strong signal that it will defend the basic

values of the Atlantic community: liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

N

US President Bill Clinton (left)

and NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier

Solana (centre)lead the way forAllied leaders on a walkabout at the Washington

Summit. (Belga photo)

NATO SecretaryGeneral Javier

Solana (right),alongside

US President Bill Clinton,

speaking to thepress during NATO's

50th AnniversarySummit in

Washington last April.

(Belga photo)

A defining moment for NATO: The Washington Summit decisions and the Kosovo crisis

Javier SolanaSecretary General of NATO


Several thousandKosovar refugeespass into Albania at the Morinaborder crossing on 4 May,reporting that theconvoy had comeunder fire fromSerb police, whohad taken awayseveral men.(Reuters photo)

▼

Separately, each of these activities would bedemanding enough. Together, they illustrate how challenging the Alliance’s political agenda hasbecome, as we enter the second half-century ofNATO’s existence.

It was therefore very timely that the WashingtonSummit took place in April. For the Summit provid-ed Allied Heads of State and Government with theopportunity to reflect on Kosovo and on adapting theAlliance. On both issues, our leaders wholeheartedlyendorsed the course of action that NATO has taken.

I believe that NATO’s efforts to bring lasting peaceto Kosovo were — and continue to be — the right andjust response to a policy of indefensible repression andbrutality in the closing months of the 20th century. TheAlliance could not stand aside and watch while theYugoslav Government carried out its deliberate and

terrible actions against the Kosovar Albanians — eth-nic cleansing, mass killings, eliminating the identity ofan entire people. These atrocities could not go unan-swered as long as we had the power to act.

From the outset of the Kosovo crisis, no effort wasspared by the international community and by NATOto reach a peaceful solution. Military operations beganas a last resort, after the Belgrade regime had rejectedall proposals for a political settlement. It was then thatthe Alliance launched its military actions — aimedsolely at ending the violence and reversing the repres-sive policies of the Yugoslav leadership. They werenever aimed at the Serbian people.

Today, with the withdrawal of Serbian forces andthe deployment of KFOR, there is hope anew for thepeople of Kosovo. Our unity and resolve forcedPresident Milosevic to meet the demands of the inter-

Finnish PresidentMartti Ahtisaari, the EuropeanUnion’s envoy(left), and Russianenvoy ViktorChernomyrdin(centre) meet withYugoslav PresidentSlobodan Milosevic(near right) inBelgrade on 3 Juneto secure hisacceptance of the internationalcommunity's peaceplan for Kosovo.(AP photo)

national community: to stop the violence; to withdrawSerb forces from Kosovo; to deploy an internationalsecurity force; to return the refugees to their homes;and to find a durable political solution for Kosovobased on autonomy within the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia.

The conflict has now ended in Kosovo. Hostilitiesby Serbian armed forces and police against theKosovar civilians have ceased, apart from a few isolat-ed incidents. And the deployment of KFOR is in fullswing. At full strength it will amount to some 50,000men and women. KFOR will provide security for theinternally displaced civilians in Kosovo, for the return-ing deportees and refugees, and for the internationalhumanitarian agencies supporting them. It will alsouphold the rights of all the people of Kosovo, whatev-er their ethnic origin.

The Kosovar refugees in the makeshift camps inAlbania and the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia(1) are begining to return. These people, vic-tims of President Milosevic’s repressive policies, havebeen expelled by the hundreds of thousands. TheAlliance has been helping these two countries and oth-ers surrounding Yugoslavia to maintain their stability— in fact, we began providing assistance as early aslast summer, when the first signs of possible destabili-sation appeared. NATO’s humanitarian actions werecrucial in providing emergency relief to the seeminglyendless streams of refugees pouring over the borders.And as KFOR troops deploy, they are doing everythingpossible to meet the immediate needs of the thousandsof internally displaced persons in Kosovo, until civil-ian relief agencies are in a position to take over.

We were able to conclude the air campaign suc-cessfully because Belgrade realised the Alliance wouldnot yield on the conditions set by the internationalcommunity. The Washington Summit reinforced ourmessage to Belgrade — NATO would continue untilthe job was done.

However, the Summit was not only about Kosovo.It was also a working meeting at which new initiativeswere adopted and earlier ones completed — all withone aim: to prepare NATO for the security challengesahead.

A long-term vision for South-eastern Europe The Summit provided an opportunity to launch

work on a set of initiatives to enhance security inSouth-eastern Europe. These initiatives will comple-ment other efforts underway in the European Unionand the Organisation for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE). NATO has a variety of means at itsdisposal to assist in this effort. We have created newconsultative arrangements between the Alliance andthe states neighbouring Yugoslavia on matters relatedto South-eastern Europe. We will also build on theexisting mechanisms of the Partnership for Peace (PfP)and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) togive substance to our promise of assistance. For exam-ple, we will promote regional cooperation in the EAPCand set up special NATO security cooperation pro-grammes for the countries in the region. And we willgive our PfP activities and exercises a stronger region-al focus.

These measures, complementing the political andeconomic assistance of other institutions, are a furtherdemonstration that the international community is notonly concerned with the current crisis, but also withwhat happens afterwards. We will strive to ensure thatthe Balkans are not condemned to perpetual volatility.


(1)Turkey recognises theRepublic of Macedoniawith its constitutionalname.


Allied leadersengage in anearnest discussionon Kosovo at the start of the50th anniversaryNATO Summit on 23 April inWashington.(Reuters photo)

Enhancing NATO’s military capabilitiesKosovo demonstrates the need for diplomacy to be

backed by credible military force. To have a decisiveimpact on a crisis, without inflicting undue harm oncivilians or putting our own troops at unnecessary risk,requires a unified command and modern equipment.NATO has both, and the Summit has ensured that theAlliance will continue to have the right assets andcapabilities to do the job.

NATO’s new command structure, optimised for thefull range of Alliance missions, including crisis man-agement — and able to incorporate contributions byour Partner nations — will make sure that the Allianceremains capable of reacting quickly and effectively toany challenge. Our new Defence CapabilitiesInitiative is specifically designed to address the chal-lenge of maintaining the interoperability of Alliedforces in an era of rapid technological change. This

Initiative will help preserve NATO’s technologicaledge. The Alliance’s revised Strategic Concept —also adopted at the Washington Summit — strikes anew balance between NATO’s traditional task of col-lective defence and its new missions of crisis manage-ment. In this way, it will ensure that the Allianceremains an effective instrument for security and stabil-ity in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Building more operational PartnershipsKosovo is a challenge for all countries in the Euro-

Atlantic area. All nations have a stake in maintainingsecurity and stability in the area and all should be ableto make their contribution. That is why NATO has cre-ated mechanisms — such as the Partnership for Peaceand the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council — to drawall countries of this continent into a common approachto security. These mechanisms are demonstrating theirrelevance now. NATO is providing humanitarian assis-

tance to Partner countries bordering Yugoslavia to takecare of the Kosovars purged by Yugoslav securityforces.

The continued stability of these countries remainsessential to the wider stability of Europe. The Summithas endorsed improvements to PfP to give Partners astronger role in NATO-led crisis response operationsand to make our joint cooperation more operationallyeffective. Similarly, the EAPC has been accorded amore operational dimension, particularly through thefacilitation of humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.

Enhancing dialogue and cooperationAs part of the Washington meetings, Allied leaders

met with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma — thefirst NATO-Ukraine Summit. Even if Russia did notchoose to attend the meetings, Allied leaders expressedtheir desire and interest in maintaining strong patternsof consultation and cooperation with Russia through

the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Theymade clear that NATO and Russia are too important toignore each other. NATO’s relationship with the sixMediterranean Dialogue countries was also given aboost, with new initiatives to deepen cooperation in theMediterranean region.

Widening NATO’s zone of stabilityKosovo demonstrates that this continent still suf-

fers from divisions that must be overcome. We remaindetermined to erase any remaining dividing lines, aswas demonstrated by the admission of the CzechRepublic, Hungary and Poland into the Alliance. Thisprocess will continue and the door to NATO willremain open for future members. To this end, theSummit unveiled a Membership Action Plan: a seriesof measures that will help aspirant countries to betterprepare themselves for future membership. In this waywe will ensure that NATO’s enlargement process con-



NATO SecretaryGeneral JavierSolana is greetedby Kosovarrefugees at theCegrane refugeecamp in the formerYugoslav Republicof Macedonia* on 12 May. (Belga photo)

(*)Turkey recognisesthe Republic ofMacedonia with its constitutionalname.

tinues to create incentives for reform in Central andEastern Europe, and therefore towards Europe’s long-term stability.

Building a European Security and Defence IdentityNATO's future will also require a stronger role for

the European Allies and a re-balancing of the vitaltransatlantic relationship. That is why, at the Summit,NATO's leaders welcomed the new impetus given toefforts to strengthen the European security and defencedimension and reaffirmed the Alliance's support forthese efforts. The Summit recognised the significantprogress achieved in building the European Securityand Defence Identity within theAlliance on the basis ofdecisions taken in Berlinin 1996 and directedthat it should be fur-

Maintaining a dynamic Atlantic CommunityThe Kosovo crisis demonstrates above all the need

for Europe and North America to stand together.Transatlantic unity and resolve remain our most pre-cious assets. It was through unity and resolve that wemaintained our security throughout the Cold War; it isthrough unity and resolve that we have prevailed in theKosovo crisis, achieving a political solution, and arenow working to bring South-eastern Europe back intomainstream Europe. The overwhelming support givento us by our many Partner countries at the WashingtonSummit confirmed a fundamental truth: the countriesof Europe and North America share not only a commonheritage, but a common destiny.

Fate does not hold back its surprises until we feelready for them. Indeed, we would have liked to com-memorate the 50th anniversary of this Alliance underdifferent circumstances. We all would havepreferred only to highlight NATO’s

ther developed. Building on the arrangements devel-oped between NATO and WEU, the Alliance standsready to define and adopt the necessary arrangementsfor close cooperation with the EU as that organisationassumes a greater role in security matters. The involve-ment of all European Allies in these developments is ofparticular importance for the Alliance. The new NATOcommand structure and the implementation of theCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept will pro-vide valuable tools for the Alliance, not only for its ownoperations, but also to support European operationswhere the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.

achievements, rather than be concerned with a crisis ina region where this continent shows its darkest side.But in deciding to become engaged, to make peace andlong-term stability in the Balkans our concern, we havesent a strong signal that in our Atlantic community, val-ues have a meaning.

This was the central message of our WashingtonSummit — a message that will reinforce the many ini-tiatives that this historic meeting has generated for thebenefit of stability and security in Europe, a messageworthy of our Atlantic community. ◆


his year, we have witnessed theworst refugee crisis in Europe

since the Second World War. Theaggression by Serb military and policeforces against Yugoslav citizens ofAlbanian origin in Kosovo forced morethan 1.5 million Kosovars from theirhomes, nearly a million of whom fledor were forced out of Kosovo. Thisexodus resulted in untold hardship andsuffering for the people of Kosovo andhas had a major impact on neighbour-ing Albania, the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia(1), Montenegroand Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In response, the international com-munity set in motion a major reliefeffort to provide assistance to therefugees and the most affected coun-tries. This effort, led by the UnitedNations High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR), has brought abouta high level of cooperation amonginternational and non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs), donor nations,as well as neighbouring countries.Most significant has been the majorinvolvement of NATO, its memberstates and its Partners in the overallhumanitarian effort. While NATO is

In response to the mass expulsion of refugees from Kosovo by Yugoslav forces, NATO has forced a halt to this ethnic cleansing

through an air campaign against the perpetrators, providedhumanitarian assistance to the victims of this tragedy, and will

soon begin helping the refugees return home. NATO hasworked tirelessly to support the work of the humanitarianorganisations in relieving the suffering of the refugees by

coordinating the airlift and storage of relief supplies, buildingshelters and other infrastructure, providing emergency

medical care, and much more. As NATO forces start imple-menting the peace, the challenge will be to help over one

million refugees to return home to a safe and secure environ-ment in Kosovo, and rebuild their homes and lives.

NATO’s humanitarian support to the victims of the Kosovo crisis

Ambassador Sergio BalanzinoDeputy Secretary General of NATO

(1)Turkey recognises theRepublic of Macedoniawith its constitutionalname

NATO DeputySecretary General

Ambassador SergioBalanzino listens to an Italian aidworker during a

visit to a makeshiftrefugee camp

outside Kukes,northern Albania,on 7 April 1999.

(Belga photo)

Map reproducedcourtesy of

the on-line Perry-Castañeda Library

Map Collection,University of Texas at

Austin,http://www.lib.

utexas.edu/Libs/PCL/Map_collection/

Kosovo.html.▼

T


not a humanitarian organisation, its considerable capa-bilities complement those of the relief agencies and canassist in meeting many of the basic needs of refugees.

NATO’s response to the refugee crisis has beenthreefold. NATO’s air operations against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, which began on 24 March,brought a halt to the Yugoslav aggression which forcedso many Kosovars to flee their homes. At the sametime, NATO has provided an unprecedented level ofhumanitarian support to alleviate the suffering of thoserefugees. Now that Serb forces have finally compliedwith the international community’s demands to pull outof Kosovo, NATO is leading an international peaceimplementation force which will help the refugees toreturn home.

Coordinated disaster responseNATO support for the UNHCR-led humanitarian

operation in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia has been coordinated through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre(EADRCC). The EADRCC began to assist UNHCRback in June 1998, as soon as it was established, wellbefore the latest phase of the refugee crisis. After itsinitial mission of assisting UNHCR in moving urgent-ly needed refugee relief supplies from Sarajevo toTirana last year, the EADRCC continued to maintainpermanent contact with UNHCR regarding the evolv-

ing crisis in and around Kosovo. In doing so, the EAD-RCC developed a good working relationship with itscounterparts in UNHCR — in Tirana, Skopje, Brusselsand, most importantly, at UNHCR headquarters inGeneva. When Yugoslav aggression against ethnicAlbanians began to generate large numbers of forcedexpulsions and refugees, UNHCR again turned toNATO for assistance in:

■ managing the airlift of relief supplies; ■ easing pressure on the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia by transferring some refugees to NATOcountries on a temporary basis;

■ off-loading and providing immediate storage of aidcargoes;

■ setting up refugee camp sites; and■ providing information regarding numbers and loca-

tions of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Now that Serb forces have finally left Kosovo, theNATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is providing basiclife support to IDPs and refugees, critical infrastructurerepairs and demining.

Managing the airliftThe massive expulsions of refugees from Kosovo

into Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia prompted many nations spontaneously to

▼

An Italian soldiercomforts a weepingKosovar refugeewaiting to beevacuated to theElbasan refugeecamp further southon 6 May, awayfrom the danger of shelling near thenorthern Albanianborder.(Belga photo)

A French UNHCRhelicopter, taking

off over a truckcarrying newly-

arrived USparatroopers atTirana's Rinas

military airport on 19 April,

is shuttling aid to refugee camps

in Albania.(Reuters photo)

fly relief supplies into those countries. Initially, noneof these operations was coordinated with UNHCR. Inorder to allow UNHCR to develop a more comprehen-sive picture of what humanitarian assistance was beingprovided, the EADRCC proposed an arrangementwhereby humanitarian aid flights into the region wouldbe given air clearance only after they had been verifiedand prioritised by UNHCR. The EADRCC broughttogether the major players in air clearance —Eurocontrol, Regional Air Movement CoordinationControl (RAMCC), SHAPE’s Refugee SupportCoordination Control and NATO’s Defence SupportDivision — in order to develop an agreed set of proce-dures which is being successfully used to coordinatehumanitarian and military flights.

The EADRCC also provided direct assistance toUNHCR’s newly established United Nations AirCoordination Cell (UNACC) at UNHCR headquarters

in Geneva. Today, almost all of the personnel workingin the UNACC are from NATO. Several nations hadprovided the EADRCC with a number of air operationsspecialists, but it soon became clear that, unless morepersonnel could be provided to the UNACC, therewould be no UN air operations to support. Therefore,the EADRCC transferred several of its air operationsspecialists to the UNACC in Geneva.

Temporary relocationNATO countries responded to appeals from

UNHCR and the Skopje government by offering toprovide temporary asylum for more than 110,000Kosovar refugees in the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia. They have provided aircraft to move morethan 60,000 people to all 19 NATO member countries.Partner countries also responded by providing tempo-



French soldiersbuild tents at the Stankovacrefugee camp on30 April to helpaccommodate some20,000 Kosovarrefugees, who hadflooded into theformer YugoslavRepublic ofMacedonia* duringthe preceding four days.(Belga photo)

rary asylum to more than 10,000 refugees. Together,NATO and its Partner countries have provided tempo-rary homes for more than 95 per cent of all the human-itarian evacuees to date. This has helped provide thecountry with a measure of security and stability, makea success of the UNHCR humanitarian evacuation pro-gramme and, most importantly, improve the humani-tarian conditions in the refugee camps in that countryas well as the conditions for the evacuees.

Logistical supportAlliance military forces have also made major con-

tributions in support of humanitarian relief efforts inboth the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia andAlbania. NATO military personnel provided directsupport at the airports in Skopje and Tirana by off-loading cargo, providing temporary storage and, inmany cases, trans-shipping cargo to its ultimate desti-nations.

In Skopje, NATO personnel provided essential sup-port during the peak of the refugee crisis when largeamounts of badly needed humanitarian aid were arriv-ing by air. Now that the most acute phase of the crisisin the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia haspassed, UNHCR and other international organisationsare better able to assume greater responsibility for thereception and onward movement of their aid cargo.Nevertheless, NATO military personnel stand ready toprovide logistical support again if required.

Operation Allied HarbourIn order to achieve more effective coordination of

civil and military air movements in Albania,

the government granted control over its airspace toNATO. NATO military forces therefore took overdirect operation of the airfield at Tirana, includingmanagement of air traffic control and ground handlingof all humanitarian and military flights. NATO andAlliance countries also provided specialised groundhandling equipment and teams for the reception andoff-loading of aid cargo. NATO teams provide addi-tional temporary storage at the airport as well as secu-rity for aid cargo. Finally, NATO provides direct logis-tical support for the onward movement of vitallyneeded aid cargo, both by military truck convoys andby helicopter.

Even before Council approval on 15 April ofOperation Allied Harbour — the NATO operation tosupport humanitarian relief efforts in Albania — themilitary forces of individual Alliance countries werealready aiding the refugees. Moreover, while NATOforces provided support to previous humanitarian oper-ations, this was the first NATO operation specificallydeveloped for a humanitarian mission. Contingentsfrom NATO and non-NATO nations are participatingin this NATO-led operation, coordinating the efforts ofmilitary forces in direct support of the Albanian gov-ernment and UNHCR.

Building refugee campsThe unprecedented influx of refugees into the for-

mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the largenumber of ethnic Albanians forced from their homesand stranded in “no-man’s land” overwhelmed thecombined capacities of the government in Skopje,UNHCR and the

(*)Turkey recognisesthe Republic ofMacedonia with its constitutionalname.

A Kosovar refugeewoman walks to

collect water nearthe refugee tent

city at Kukes,northern Albania,

on 15 May.(AP photo)

various relief agencies in the country. In order to meetthe urgent need to increase refugee shelter capacity,NATO forces in the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia were put to work on a round-the-clockbasis to rapidly build a number of refugee camps. In amatter of days four major refugee centres were up andrunning, providing shelter to all the refugees in thecountry, with a fifth centre established subsequently.

These refugee centres werebuilt by NATO at the request ofUNHCR and according to itsspecifications, and were immedi-ately turned over to the control ofthe designated NGOs, whileNATO continued to provide cer-tain essential technical supportuntil such time that the necessarycivilian support capabilities couldbe brought on-line. UN HighCommissioner for Refugees, Mrs.Sadako Ogata, in publiclyexpressing her appreciation, citedthis as the perfect example of howNATO can best support UNHCRoperations.

In Albania, the challenge fac-ing NATO’s Albanian Force(AFOR) was even greater. Therefugee population was substan-tially larger than in the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia,and the AFOR Commander, Lt.General John Reith, also had toassume control of various on-going efforts by individual coun-tries’ military forces to constructthe necessary shelter. Like their counterparts in theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, GeneralReith and the forces under his command have done anoutstanding job in constructing 14 shelters with capac-ity for 68,000 refugees.

KFOR and the safe return of refugeesNATO personnel have clearly demonstrated the

Alliance’s commitment to support the refugees in theultimate humanitarian effort, which is their safe returnto Kosovo.

NATO forces fully understand and are prepared toaddress the complete absence in this ravaged provinceof civil and economic structures and systems associat-ed with normal life. Restoring tolerable living condi-tions in Kosovo calls for immediate life-saving aid forthose who have been hiding in the hills and forestsunder appalling conditions; the establishment of law,order and civil administration; and the reconstruction

of destroyed infrastructure. Once there is a functioningcivil administration that no longer needs NATO’s mili-tary support — even if still supported by other interna-tional and non-governmental organisations — KFOR’scivil-military (CIMIC) responsibilities will end.

Spearheading NATO’s CIMIC efforts will be aCombined Joint Civil-Military Task Force (CJCMTF),


working directly for the KFOR commander to supportthe force and the civil environment. The CJCMTF willalso liaise with international and non-governmentalorganisations to facilitate their eventual take-over ofprojects and responsibilities. All NATO CIMIC opera-tions are planned with the clear understanding that,once immediate needs have been met, civilian organi-sations are best suited to continue all humanitarianefforts.

I visited the region myself in April and witnessedfirst hand the refugee situation in the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia and Albania. It was the plightof these refugees that strengthened the Allies’ resolveto reverse the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and enablethe refugees to return to their homes in a safe andsecure environment. With the end of the crisis, an enor-mous amount of work and reconstruction lies ahead ofus today. NATO is determined once again to face thischallenge and to succeed in its endeavours to bringpeace and stability to South-eastern Europe. ◆

rom the air over Kosovo, at refugee camps inAlbania and the former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia(1), Allied military forces were con-fronted daily with the horrific consequences of“ethnic cleansing” — the deliberate violent expul-sion of an entire people from their native land.Even from 15,000 feet above Kosovo, the evidencewas all too clear: empty, destroyed villages; hundredsof thousands of people on the move; the smoke of thou-sands of burning homes. On the ground, the stories ofcruelty and abuse — summary executions, organised

rape and beatingsperpetrated on young and old alike — bore even closerwitness to the campaign of terror waged by the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia against its Albanian minority.Operations Allied Force and Allied Harbour wereintended to reverse the effects of this crime.


General WesleyClark, SACEUR, in the cockpit of a jet fighter duringhis visit to theIstrana air base in northern Italy on 29 May.(AP photo)

A line of Serbianmilitary vehiclesleaving southernKosovo passes aKFOR contingent of US Marinesdeploying to thetown of Pozaranjeon 14 June.(AP photo)

F

After months of escalating repression against the Kosovar Albanians and a string of broken agreements with the international community,NATO took a stand against the military machine of Slobodan Milosevic on 24 March 1999. NATO’s air operation sought to force Belgrade to

stop its brutal ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, while at the same time NATO forces have been providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of his onslaught. The success of the air campaign forced

Milosevic to meet NATO’s demands and laid the foundationfor the implementation of peace. A NATO-led internationalforce began to deploy immediately on the heels of the Serbwithdrawal, its mission to implement the peace agreementand secure the return of hundreds of thousands of Kosovar

refugees.

When force is necessary: NATO’s military response to the Kosovo crisis

General Wesley K. ClarkSupreme Allied Commander, Europe


▼

Applying force and lending assistanceThese two NATO operations — one applying direct

force and the other humanitarian assistance, along withadvance elements of a peace implementation force —represented the commitment of military forces to theattainment of NATO’s political objectives. They werethe latest in a series of military responses directed byAlliance political leaders that began almost immediate-ly after the Yugoslav government started violentlyrepressing the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

NATO demonstrated its resolve tostem the rising tide of violent repression in Yugoslaviawith an Alliance air exercise back in June 1998, a portvisit to Durres by Standing Naval Force Mediterraneanthe following month, and two regional PfP exercises inAugust and September 1998. The Alliance’s politicalleaders employed the well-developed planning capa-bilities of the Allied Command Europe commandstructure to signal to the Yugoslav government ourdetermination to come to grips with the problem.President Slobodan Milosevic did not heed the mes-sage, and by October 1998, the situation had deterio-rated nearly beyond salvaging.

As Yugoslav attacks on Kosovo’s civilian popula-tion grew in ferocity in the autumn of 1998, it becameclear to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that strongermeasures would be required. Consequently, followingSerb refusal to meet NAC demands for compliancewith United Nations Security Council Resolution1199, requiring the withdrawal of excess forces fromKosovo, and in light of the pending humanitarian cata-strophe, the NAC prepared orders to Allied forces toorganise air operations against Yugoslavia. Hundredsof Allied aircraft assembled for the attack and diplo-matic initiatives gained momentum from the explicitNATO threat.

Milosevic agreed to a cessation of hostilities,deployment of Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) ground verifiers, and aNATO air verification mission. After NATO issued anactivation order (ACTORD)(2), he was coerced intoagreeing to pull back his excess forces and take heavyweapons away from his police, revert to normalpeacetime police activities and respond with propor-

tionate force to provocation. The Alliance’s militaryforces provided essential support to the Kosovo

Verification Mission (KVM) with its own aeri-al verification mission, a verification coordina-tion center and an extraction force for theOSCE mission.

Escalating violationsTrue to form though, Milosevic violatedeven that agreement. By December, it was

clear that military reinforcementshad moved in: a battalion

near Podujevo

and another bat-talion on the line of communication from Stimle. TheYugoslav government billed these movements as rou-tine training exercises but failed to notify the OSCE aspreviously agreed. These “training exercises” devel-oped into full-fledged offensive operations. In succes-sive meetings in late December in Belgrade, wereminded the new Yugoslav Chief of Defence GeneralOjdanic and Police Chief General Djurdevic that theywere not in compliance with their commitments toNATO.

During January and February, more forcesappeared in violation of the October agreement. Evenin the midst of meetings and peace talks at Rambouilletand subsequently in Paris, the VJ (Yugoslav Army) andMUP (Special Police) attacked around Vucitrn andKosovska Mitrovica. All evidence pointed to massivereinforcements, a steady increase in fighting, anddeliberate preparations for future operations.

Operation Allied ForceAfter diplomatic efforts failed to gain Milosevic’s

agreement to a peace plan, endorsed by NATO and theContact Group(3), including Russia, NATO respondedon 24 March. Operation Allied Force launched a sys-tematic air campaign to attack, disrupt and degradeSerb military potential and deter further Serb actions.Allied forces faced a formidable enemy, but because oftheir courage and professionalism, that enemy is muchless formidable today than when this conflict began.

Operating on two lines of air operations, the NATOcampaign focused at the outset on destroying, isolating


(2)An ACTORD puts thenational forces desig-nated for the operationunder the operationalcommand of the MajorNATO Commanderresponsible and authorises him to beginoperations at a time andunder conditions speci-fied, as necessary, by theNorth Atlantic Council.

(3)The Contact Group on theFormer Yugoslavia con-sists of France, Germany,Italy, Russia, the UnitedStates and the UnitedKingdom.

A Royal Air ForceHarrier jet armedwith rockets andair-to-air missilesstreaks through

cloud cover.(Reuters photo)


British Pumamilitary transporthelicopters bringKFOR soldiers andequipment intoKosovo on 13 June.(Belga photo)

A storm overKosovo is viewedon a radar screenin the CombatInformation Centeraboard the USSGonzales in the Adriatic Sea.(Reuters photo)

and interdict-ing the VJ/MUP forces inside and around

Kosovo, and preventing a continuation of their aggres-sion, or its intensification. At the same time, the Alliedcampaign pursued an array of strategic target sets.These included logistics forces outside Kosovo withthe ability to reinforce or support forces in Kosovo, theintegrated air defence system, higher-level commandand control, petroleum storage facilities and other tar-gets that feed Serbia’s military and security machine.

As the campaign progressed, it grew in intensity.However, it was not a campaign against the Serbianpeople. It focused specifically on the forces of repres-sion from top to bottom to coerce a change in theirbehaviour or, failing that, to degrade and ultimatelydestroy their means of repression. Allied planners, tar-geters and pilots worked diligently to prevent injuriesand loss of life among the civilian population and toprevent collateral damage.

Aiding their endeavour was precision weaponry,which reduced collateral damage and limited the expo-sure of aircraft to Serb air defences. The campaignemployed the highest proportion of precision weapon-ry ever used in an air operation. Precision strikeweapons were used against point targets and, in somecases, strike aircraft actually attacked individual tankson the ground with laser-guided weaponry.

With the weather creating unfavourable conditions,pilots often flew through heavy overcast and clouds,hampering their ability to see the targets. Despite can-cellation of air strikes and very few days of favourableweather conditions, the results tell the story of thepower of the campaign.

Allied pilots flew 37,465 sorties, of which over14,006 were strike missions. By comparison with pre-vious campaigns, support sorties outnumbered strikesorties. This campaign, facing unpredictable reactionsfrom Yugoslav defences, required protective combatair patrols in multiple locations, on some days up to

seven, around the area. The incidentinvolving the two MiGs, shot down by acombat air patrol over Bosnia andHerzegovina on 26 March, illustrated theneed to maintain these patrols and theireffectiveness.

Long distances between targets andair bases required a high number oftanker support sorties. Tankers kept ourfighters and bombers in the air forextended time periods, enhancing flexi-bility and maximising their loiter timeover Kosovo. The number of sortiesalso reflected considerable ancillarysupport: reconnaissance and airborneearly warning and control aircraft. In

this respect this was the most heavily leveraged aircampaign yet seen.

The air campaign’s successThe Yugoslav integrated air defence system had

been seriously damaged. Without continued suppres-sion it would have recovered quickly; it was a race ofAllied destruction against Serb reconstruction and

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repair. Day by day, Yugoslavia lost its early warningradars, missiles, and fighters; and slowly but steadilythe Yugoslav forces lost the ability to maintain situa-tional awareness of the air campaign.

Command and control, the brains behind the brutal-ity, was degraded but was still functional at the cam-paign’s conclusion. This network, hardened fordecades with redundant command and control andfacilities, experienced frequent failures. The impact ofthese failures was reflected on the ground and in dis-ruption of the chain of command’s ability to managethe battlefield. Television stations and transmitterswere struck because they were a part of his militarymachine, prolonging and promoting this conflict.

Regarding other significant strategic targets, theAllied operation hit the Serb electric power systembecause, like the body’s circulatory system, everythingin the military system depends on it. Air strikes alsodestroyed oil and petrol facilities and stocks needed tokeep tanks on the move. Serbia had been importingfuel by ship through Bar and up the Danube to close thegap between what it had and what it needed. Analystsreported temporary disruptions in the Yugoslav supplychain; units in Kosovo were told to cease operations, to

hold back, conserve fuel, and wait. Some units hadeven run out of petrol.

It was vital to cut off the supply routes that allowedMilosevic to keep his forces fuelled and able to contin-ue their missions of ethnic cleansing. Destroyedbridges prevented Serb forces from moving reinforce-ments into Montenegro, and slowed down reinforce-ments moving into Kosovo.

As the campaign progressed, Allied forces closedin on Serb forces on the ground in Kosovo — the cam-paign’s top priority. In favourable weather, theseforces felt the full weight of NATO air power. Serbforces were relegated to hiding during the day andmanoeuvring at night. When they formed up to fightthe UCK, the Kosovar armed elements, they greatlyrisked NATO strikes. They dispersed into smallerunits, which made them more vulnerable to the UCK,whom, after a year of continuous operations, the Serbscould not defeat. This was an army in decline; an armythat knew it was losing.

Serb forces were transformed from well-equipped,efficient, and lethal units into isolated forces increas-ingly weakened in their campaign of brutality. Everyday marked another event that highlighted the disrup-tion in their ranks — mass desertions, resignations bysenior army officers, and generals under house arrest.

Humanitarian responseIn the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and

Albania, forces from the ACE(4) Rapid Reaction Corps(ARRC) and ACE Mobile Force (LAND) (AMF(L))have been addressing the direct results of Milosevic’sactions against Kosovo Albanians — easing the suffer-ing of hundreds of thousands of refugees. In theprocess, they have foiled Milosevic’s attempts to desta-bilise Yugoslavia’s neighbours.

As the scale of the humanitarian crisis grew expo-nentially in early April, the Alliance’s political leadersordered its reaction forces into action. The ARRC hadbegun deployment to the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia during the Rambouillet talks to prepare forimmediate introduction as the Kosovo implementa-tion force in the event of a peace agreement. As thou-sands of refugees entered the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia, the ARRC swiftly reorgan-ised to deliver food, water and other supplies, buildrefugee camps and shelters, and transport peopleaway from the border areas. The AMF(L) deployedits headquarters to Albania and, in what becameOperation Allied Harbour, took over control ofnational forces that were rushing to aid the refugeespouring into that country. In both cases, NATO’sreaction forces brought order to chaos within a fewdays.


(4)Allied Command Europe


A Kosovar boy inthe Stankovacrefugee campwaves to a KFORhelicopter carryingtroops and suppliesinto Kosovo on 13 June.(Reuters photo)

Jubilant Kosovarsgreet GermanKFOR troopsarriving in Prizren,Kosovo on 13 June. (AP photo)

The ARRC and AMF(L) saved countless lives andprovided an essential emerging response until otheragencies, chiefly the United Nations High Commis-sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs), could arrive on the scene.Although UNHCR has taken over as lead agencytoday, the ARRC and AMF(L) continue to supporthumanitarian relief operations in both countries.

Bringing it to a closeSo, as the Serb

regime’s forces wereweakened, ours strength-

ened. The Alliance gained airsuperiority. Serb planes were

destroyed whenever they chal-lenged NATO aircraft. Allied

pilots destroyed over 90 Yugoslavaircraft, six in flight. We knocked

out large numbers of surface-to-airmissile launchers and radars. And

with each passing day, NATO dic-tated events on the ground. By

the suspension of the air cam-paign on 10 June, Operation

Allied Force had 912 aircraftand over 35 ships — almost

triple the forces that thecampaign started with.

In summary, theair campaign was

a success. Weprosecuted the

campaign in ane f f e c t i v e ,methodical ,and system-atic mannerthat avoidedn e e d l e s scasualties,minimisedcollateraldamage,

and achieved its objectives. It was progressive andintensified during its course of 78 days, aided by thearrival of spring and improved weather.

Clearly President Milosevic was willing to absorb ahigh degree of punishment. But in spite of this, theYugoslav forces were vulnerable to collapse. Erosion ofsupporting infrastructure and morale had cumulativeeffects that could not be hidden for long behind propa-ganda or his silence to the international community. Inerror, he banked on the crumbling of the Alliance.

Instead, NATO’s resolve anddetermination strengthened.

Milosevic knew he hadmiscalculated and couldnot win. This becameincreasingly clear to hisarmed forces and theSerb government too,

resulting in the signing ofthe Military Technical

Agreement by Yugoslav authori-ties and NATO on 9 June.

Now NATO is fully occupied with its next task —deploying the Kosovo peace implementation force(KFOR). KFOR began deploying on 12 June on theheels of the withdrawing Serbs. This is a huge operationthat is not risk free. Our forces are entering difficult ter-ritory but approach this task,too, with courage and profes-sionalism. However, this oper-ation will not be completewithout the safe return of therefugees, our central objec-tive. Only then will militarycommanders count theirtasks as successfully com-pleted. Success heremeans another begin-ning. The end to racialconflict and ethniccleansing would mean aturning point toward anew future in the Balkans,where democracy flourish-es rather than the evilsof intolerance andrepression. ◆

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Preparing the groundlliance Heads of State and Government commis-sioned an updating of the Strategic Concept attheir Summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997.

Their aim was to ensure that the Alliance’s strategytakes full account of trends in European security andprovides the political framework for developments inNATO’s military capabilities to meet the challenges ofthe new century. This entailed a detailed review of theAlliance’s political and military roles against the back-ground of the profound changes that have taken placesince the 1991 Strategic Concept, concentrating onsuch key issues as the Alliance’s fundamental securitytasks, the evolving strategic environment, the growingcommitment of NATO to crisis management and con-flict prevention, the promotion of security and stabilitythrough partnership and dialogue, NATO enlargement,

One of the key results of the Washington Summit was the approval of the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. This docu-ment, the authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives, sets out NATO’s political and military strategy in thecontext of the major developments in European security since the end of the Cold War and reaffirms the Alliance’s

fundamental commitment to collective defence. Building on the 1991 Strategic Concept’s approach towards a European security archi-tecture based on cooperation and partnership rather than political confrontation and military competition, the new Concept also reflects new

commitments in the fields of crisis management and partnership in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

A

A new Strategic Concept for a new eraAnthony Cragg

NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations

During theWashingtonSummit, the

leaders of Alliedand Partner

countries meet inthe Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council(EAPC), one of

the principalinstruments of the

Alliance'slongstanding policy

of partnership,dialogue and

cooperation withdemocratic

countries of theEuro-Atlantic region.

(NATO photo)

the development of the European Security and DefenceIdentity (ESDI), and arms control.

This thorough examination was carried out in twostages. During the first half of 1998, the Allies con-ducted a series of conceptual debates on the principalissues to be addressed in the update. This work pro-vided the starting point for a detailed review ofAlliance strategy by means of a series of draft texts.The review extended over a period of some 15 months,with the final issues being resolved during the Summitmeeting itself on 23 and 24 April 1999.

Core commitmentsThe Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance’s

essential and enduring purpose as being the commit-ment to safeguard the freedom and security of its mem-

bers by political and military means. It affirms theAllies’ shared values of democracy, human rights andthe rule of law, and their determination not only todefend one another but to contribute to the peace andstability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.

Against this background, the Concept sets out theAlliance’s fundamental security tasks. These representa balance between continuity and change as comparedwith the 1991 Concept. Functions such as collectivedefence have, of course, been at the centre of theAlliance since its establishment. It was, however, alsoessential to reflect new commitments in the fields ofcrisis management and partnership that the Alliancenow performs in order to enhance the security and sta-bility of the Euro-Atlantic area. The fundamental secu-rity tasks of the Alliance are set out in the box on thefacing page.

The evolving strategic environmentOne of the main purposes of the Concept is to sur-

vey the strategic environment and assess foreseeablesecurity challenges and risks. It concludes that inrecent years there has been continuing but generallypositive change and that the Alliance, among othermutually reinforcing organisations, has playedan essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the ColdWar. It reaffirms the conclusion in the 1991Strategic Concept that, while the threat ofgeneral war in Europe has virtually disap-peared, there are other risks and uncertain-ties facing the members of the Allianceand other states in the Euro-Atlanticregion. These include ethnic conflict, theabuse of human rights, political instabilityand economic fragility.

Alliance security can also be affected byother risks of a wider nature. The spread ofnuclear, biological and chemical weapons and theirmeans of delivery is, for example, seen as a matter ofserious concern. The global spread of technology mayalso result in the greater availability of sophisticatedmilitary capabilities to potential adversaries.

Security in the coming yearsOne of the distinguishing features of the Alliance’s

1991 strategy was its commitment to a broad approachto security, encompassing complementary political andmilitary means and emphasising cooperation withother states sharing the Alliance’s objectives. Thiscomprehensive approach, while remaining a centralfeature of the new Strategic Concept, has been sub-stantially developed. It comprises the following essen-tial elements:


(From left to right)Prime MinisterLionel Jospin andPresident JacquesChirac of France,Chancellor GerhardSchröder andForeign MinisterJoschka Fischer of Germany, andFrench ForeignMinister HubertVedrine, at theEuropean UnionSummit in Cologne,Germany, on 3 June 1999. EU leaders agreedto establish a defence andsecurity arm tolessen Europeandependence on US military force. (Belga photo)

all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries is underlined,with the aim of preserving peace, promoting democra-cy, and contributing to prosperity and progress. TheEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership forPeace, the special relationships with Russia andUkraine, and the Mediterranean Dialogue are con-firmed as the principal instruments of this policy.

Enlargement: The Strategic Concept confirms thatno European democracy whose admission would fulfilthe objectives of the Washington Treaty will be exclud-ed from consideration for membership of the Alliance.It restates the expectation that further invitations toaccede to the Alliance will be extended in comingyears.

Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Prolif-eration: The Alliance’s support for arms control, dis-armament and non-proliferation is reaffirmed togetherwith the commitment to seek to enhance security andstability at the lowest possible level of forces consis-tent with NATO’s ability to fulfil the full range of itsmissions.

The Preservation of the Transatlantic Link: Theindivisibility of European and North American securi-ty is underlined, together with the importance of astrong and dynamic partnership between Europe andNorth America in support of the values and interestswhich they share.

The Maintenance of Effective MilitaryCapabilities: Adequate military capabilities are calledfor which will be effective under the full range of fore-seeable circumstances, from deterrence and collectivedefence to crisis response operations.

The Development of the European Security andDefence Identity within the Alliance: The StrategicConcept confirms that ESDI will continue to be devel-oped within the Alliance on the basis of the decisionstaken by Alliance Foreign Ministers in Berlin in 1996and thereafter, and that the process will require closecooperation between NATO, the Western European

Union (WEU) and, if andwhen appropriate,

the EuropeanU n i o n .

ConflictPrevention and

Crisis Management: In pur-suit of its fundamental security tasks (see box) theAlliance will seek, in cooperation with other organisa-tions, to prevent conflict or, if a crisis arises, to con-tribute to its effective management, consistent withinternational law, including through the possibility ofconducting crisis response operations. The StrategicConcept sets out the Alliance’s policy in this field.

Partnership, Cooperation and Dialogue: TheAlliance’s determination to pursue its long-standingpolicy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue with


THE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY TASKS OF NATO

To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations commit-ted to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, theAlliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a sta-ble Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth ofdemocratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolutionof disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate orcoerce any other through the threat or use of force.

Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of theWashington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Alliedconsultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, includingpossible developments posing risks for members’ security, and forappropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common con-cern.

Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat ofaggression against any NATO member state as provided for inArticles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

- Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consen-sus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to con-tribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in cri-sis management, including crisis response operations.

- Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperationand dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with theaim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capaci-ty for joint action with the Alliance.

US President BillClinton (right)

and British PrimeMinister Tony Blairconfer during the

Washington Summit,demonstrating the

strong and dynamictransatlantic link

that underpins the Alliance.(Belga photo)


Military guidelinesThe final part of the

Strategic Concept establishesprinciples and missions for theAlliance’s forces and is thus thetranslation of its political pur-pose and tasks into guidelinesfor the NATO MilitaryAuthorities to develop intodetailed concepts and plans.The strategy calls for the contin-ued development of the militarycapabilities needed for the fullrange of the Alliance’s missions,from collective defence to peacesupport and other crisis responseoperations. These include theability to effectively engageopposing forces, deployabilityand mobility, survivability offorces and infrastructure, sus-tainability and interoperability.Flexibility in the ability to gen-erate forces to conduct the fullrange of Alliance missions isalso highlighted, as is the needto be able to operate in multina-tional and joint formations. TheStrategic Concept confirms that,while the circumstances inwhich any use of nuclearweapons might have to be con-templated are extremely remote,they continue to play a key rolein preserving peace and prevent-ing coercion and war.

Meeting the challenges of a new centuryWith the new Strategic

Concept, the Alliance has set aclear course for its future politi-cal and military activities. Itprovides a durable conceptualfoundation for the Alliance’srole in ensuring the security ofits members and promotingpeace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region at large and willbe an essential guide as theAlliance prepares to meet thechallenges and opportunities ofa new century. ◆

BACKGROUND TO THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The initial formulation of NATO strategy was known as “The StrategicConcept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area“. Developed between October 1949 and April 1950, it set out a strategy of large-scale operations forterritorial defence. In the mid-1950s the strategy of “massive retaliation“ wasdeveloped. It emphasised deterrence based on the threat that NATO wouldrespond to any aggression against its member countries by every means at itsdisposal, specifically including nuclear weapons.

Discussions of possible changes in this strategic approach began later in the1950s and continued until 1967 when, following intensive debate within theAlliance, “massive retaliation” was replaced by the strategy of “flexibleresponse”. This concentrated on giving NATO the advantages of flexibility and ofcreating uncertainty in the minds of any potential aggressor about NATO’sresponse in the case of a threat to the sovereignty or independence of any sin-gle member country. The concept was designed to ensure that aggression of anykind would be perceived as involving unacceptable risks.

The above strategies were enshrined in classified documents, which provid-ed guidance to national governments and points of reference for military plan-ning activities. They were not addressed to the general public. Although theunderlying concepts were well known, little public discussion about their detailswas possible because their effectiveness depended greatly on secrecy. Theyreflected the realities of the Cold War, the political division of Europe and theconfrontational ideological and military situation which characterised East-Westrelations for many years.

As the Cold War continued, however, the Alliance also sought to reduce itsdangers and to lay the grounds for progress towards a more positive relationshipwith the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. The HarmelReport, published in 1967, thus established defence and dialogue, includingarms control, as the dual pillars of the Alliance’s approach to security.

With the end of the Cold War era, the political situation in Europe and theoverall military situation were transformed. A new Strategic Concept evolvedduring the two years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. This was debated anddiscussed within the Alliance and was completed in November 1991. Bearing lit-tle relation to previous concepts, it emphasised cooperation with former adver-saries as opposed to confrontation. It maintained the security of its membernations as NATO’s fundamental purpose but combined this with the specific oblig-ation to work towards improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole.In other respects, too, the 1991 Strategic Concept differed dramatically from itspredecessors: it was issued as a public document, open for discussion and com-ment by parliaments, security specialists, journalists and the wider public.

In 1997, NATO leaders agreed that the Concept should be re-examined andupdated to reflect the changes that had taken place in Europe since its adoption,while confirming the Allies’ commitment to collective defence and the transat-lantic link and ensuring that NATO strategy is fully adapted to the challenges ofthe 21st century. Intensive work was undertaken throughout the Alliance to con-clude the revision by the time of the Washington Summit.

In common with all other Alliance business, the approval of the Conceptrequired consensus on both the substance and the language of the document byall the member countries of the Alliance. Against the background of the accessionof three new member countries, representatives of the Czech Republic, Hungaryand Poland were present from the outset of the discussions. The new StrategicConcept was formally approved by Alliance Heads of State and Government atthe Washington Summit on 24 April 1999.

The leaders of the threenewest Allies were formallywelcomed into the Alliance atthe Washington Summit meet-ing on 24 April 1999. At thesame time, NATO Heads ofState and Government reaf-firmed their commitment to theopenness of the Alliance andpledged that the Alliance wouldcontinue to welcome new mem-bers. But they went beyond amere declaration of intent.They also launched aMembership Action Plan(MAP), a programme of activi-ties to assist aspiring countriesin their preparations for possi-ble future membership.

ATO is an open communi-ty, not a closed shop.This has been evident

since the very beginning of theAtlantic Alliance, as Article 10of the Washington Treatymakes clear, and has beendemonstrated on several occa-sions. NATO has admittednew members throughout itshistory: Greece and Turkeyjoined the Alliance in 1952, theFederal Republic of Germanyin 1955, Spain in 1982 and,most recently, the CzechRepublic, Hungary and Polandbecame full members lastMarch, increasing the numberof Allies to 19.


NATO leaders demonstrated their commitment to keeping NATO’s door open to new members by launching aMembership Action Plan (MAP) at their Summit meeting in Washington last April. A complement to existing

Partnership structures, the MAP will help aspirants to set practical objectives and planning targets in their quest for membership and inobtaining feedback on their progress towards this goal. The MAP is not an automatic ticket to membership, but it does provide opportunities

to strengthen an aspirant’s candidacy for membership and, thus, will help future members climb the steps leading to NATO’s open door.

N

The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s door open

Ambassador Klaus-Peter KlaiberNATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs

Czech PresidentVáclav Havel

speaks during aceremony at the

Capitol at the startof the Washington

Summit on 23 April, the first

formal occasion tobring the leaders ofthe Czech Republic,

Hungary andPoland together

with other Allianceleaders, since the three new

members joined theAlliance last March.

(NATO photo)

“The Parties may, byunanimous agreement, invite

any other European state in a position to further the

principles of this Treaty andto contribute to the security ofthe North Atlantic area

to accede to this Treaty. (....)”

Article 10, The North Atlantic Treaty,Washington DC, 4 April 1949

NATO review

A flag-raisingceremony is held atNATO Headquarterson 16 March towelcome the threenew members intothe Alliance.(NATO photo)

NATO enlargement: Past, present and future When the Cold War ended ten years ago, NATO

Allies shared one fundamental conviction: Europecould not grow together as long as the main institutionsremained closed to the Eastern half of the continent.Not to offer our Eastern neighbours the prospect ofjoining NATO and the European Union (EU) wouldhave amounted to the continuation of an implicit divi-sion of Europe — a division between a self-confident,secure West, and an uncertain, insecure East. Theenlargement of NATO was thus both necessary andinevitable.

Yet the Allies also shared the view that for NATO’senlargement to contribute substantively to Europeansecurity, the process needed to be managed in such away as to create no new dividing lines. Moreover, asNATO’s efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis demon-strate, membership in the Alliance entails not onlyrights and obligations, but also requires concrete mili-tary means and capabilities. For this reason, futureNATO members would therefore have to undergo aperiod of “apprenticeship” to bring their forces up toNATO standards. In short, for enlargement to achieveits goals, a structured process was required.

The 1994 Brussels Summit provided a generalcommitment to NATO’s eastward expansion. This wasfollowed by “The Study on NATO Enlargement” in1995, which set out the Alliance’s approach in moredetail. Based on the study’s findings, the Alliance con-ducted an “intensified dialogue” on membership ques-tions with interested Partners. This intensified dia-logue provided Allies with valuable information onindividual Partners’ preparations for membership, andallowed participating countries aspiring to NATOmembership to learn more about the workings of theAlliance and the responsibilities and obligationsinvolved.

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO leadersinvited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland tostart accession talks with the Alliance, thereby deliver-ing on their promise to admit countries able and willingto contribute to the goals of the Washington Treaty.These accession talks were followed by the signing andthe subsequent ratification of accession protocols. Theformal accession of the three new members took placeon 12 March 1999.

Also at Madrid, NATO leaders reaffirmed the open-ness of the Alliance to other new members in a positionto further the principles of the North Atlantic Treatyand to contribute to security in the North Atlantic area.They also decided to continue and broaden the intensi-fied dialogues and to review the enlargement process at

their next meeting in 1999. From then on, the dialogueswith interested Partner countries were conducted intwo formats: a series of high level meetings (at thelevel of Head of State, Prime Minister, Foreign and/orDefence Minister) were held with the North AtlanticCouncil, and a comprehensive dialogue was conductedbetween senior officials from Partner countries and ateam from the NATO International Staffs.

Throughout this process, interested Partner coun-tries had been asking for better practical advice andfeedback to assist them in their preparations for even-tual membership. The Washington Summit in April1999 provided a fitting opportunity to respond to thisdesire. NATO was able to draw upon the experiencegained not only during the three years of intensifieddialogue meetings, but also through the integration ofthe three newest members into the Alliance. The resultwas the Membership Action Plan, which providesassessment and feedback mechanisms for partnersaspiring to NATO membership.

Mechanisms of the MAPThe MAP comprises the following elements:

■ Each aspirant is invited to submit an annualnational programme on its preparations for possiblemembership, covering political and economic,defence/military, resource, security and legal aspects.This programme should set objectives and targets onall issues relevant to membership. It should also pro-vide specific information on steps being taken, respon-

▼

24

sible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule ofwork on specific aspects.

■ A focused feedback mechanism on progressmade by each aspirant on its programmes will be estab-lished to provide both political and technical advice.Meetings will take place in a 19+1 format(1) with theNorth Atlantic Council and other NATO bodies ifrequested, and with a NATO Team. The NATO Teamwill include specialists on the specific subjects to bediscussed from NATO’s International Staff, theInternational Military Staff, and the NATO MajorCommands. Feedback and advice on MAP issues willbe provided through mechanisms based on those cur-rently in use with Partners (for instance in thePartnership for Peace framework), as well as 19+1meetings and NATO Team workshops. The workshopswill be particularly valuable, as they will enable in-depth discussion among experts on the entire spectrumof issues relevant to membership.

■ Annual clearinghouse meetings with eachaspirant at 19+1 will help dovetail bilateral and multi-lateral assistance in the defence/military field to thecountry concerned with the aim of maximising theeffectiveness of assistance programmes.

■ Planning targets will be elaborated with aspir-ing countries to cover the areas most directly relevantto nations seeking to align their force structures andcapabilities with the responsibilities involved in even-tual Alliance membership. These will build on existingPartnership Goals(2) and will be subject to review,allowing for detailed feedback.

Each spring, the Alliance will draw up a report forindividual aspirants providing feedback focused ontheir progress in the areas covered in their individualnational programmes. This document will form thebasis for an annual spring meeting of the NorthAtlantic Council with each individual aspirant.

The MAP does not replace the Partnership forPeace (PfP) programme. In fact, participation in PfPfor aspiring countries remains essential, as it provides awell-established way of developing progressive inter-operability with Alliance forces. Moreover, theWashington Summit put into place a coherent packageof measures for a more operational Partnership, tostrengthen the ability of Allies and all Partner coun-tries, including membership aspirants, to work togeth-er. The provisions of the MAP will complement theseactivities available under PfP by addressing the broad-er spectrum of preparations required for eventual mem-bership.

The MAP provides aspiring countries with a varietyof opportunities. It is up to them to select and make useof elements of the MAP at their discretion. Like PfP,the MAP is guided by the principle of self-differentia-tion. Aspirants are free to match their participation withtheir own national priorities and circumstances and todecide upon their own implementation measures andtimetables.

The MAP provides for a range of activitiesdesigned to strengthen an aspirant’s candidacy formembership. It does not, however, provide a checklistfor aspiring countries to fulfil, nor would their partici-pation in the programme prejudice any decision by theAlliance on issuing an invitation to begin accessiontalks. Decisions on invitations for membership willcontinue to be made on a case-by-case basis by allAllies and by consensus, taking into account political,security and military considerations.

Keeping the door openNATO’s three new members will not be the last.

NATO’s door remains open and the MembershipAction Plan is clear evidence of the Alliance’s com-mitment to continuing the enlargement process. TheAllies recognise the great efforts being made by theaspiring countries and the MAP is designed to helpthem reflect eventual NATO membership require-ments in their own national plans and preparationsdirected at that goal. While the MAP brings no guar-antees of eventual future membership, assistance andadvice given through the MAP should help aspirantsto take the difficult decisions necessary to reform theirnational armed forces and prepare for possible, futureNATO membership. The MAP is thus another steptowards a Europe in which each state can find its right-ful place. ◆

Summer 1999

(1)The 19 Allies plus the aspirant.(2)Partnership Goals areplanning targets devel-oped with Partner coun-tries in the context of thePfP Planning and ReviewProcess (PARP). Theyaddress issues related toforces and capabilitiesPartner countries makeavailable for NATO-led PfPoperations.

25

he Defence Capabilities Initiative arises from therecognition that, in order to meet the challengesresulting from the fundamental changes in the

security environment, improvements to the Alliance’scrisis response capabilities are necessary. During theCold War, NATO planning focused on defence againstlarge-scale aggression directed at Alliance territory.This scenario required pre-determined defence plansand made predictable demands on the capabilities ofAllies. The large scale of national contributions andtheir concentration in a few geographical areas meantthat nations provided their own logistic support,though this was often reinforced by the host nation.Transport to deploy forces and equipment could berequisitioned from commercial sources under emer-gency powers.

Force deployment was to be assisted by host nationsupport agreements and existing infrastructure, somecommon-funded by the Alliance. The planning sce-nario assumed that such a large-scale conflict would berelatively short before a conclusion was reached by

military or political means. Consequently there waslittle need to make provision for sustaining forces overa long period, including through force rotation. Therequirement for interoperability between Allianceforces was also relatively limited.

Since then the security environment has changedgreatly, as reflected in the Alliance’s new StrategicConcept approved at the Washington Summit. NATOwill continue to maintain capabilities to deal withlarge-scale aggression against one or more of its mem-bers, though such a threat is unlikely in the foreseeablefuture and it would probably entail a relatively longwarning time. Potential threats to Alliance security arenow more likely to arise from regional conflicts, ethnicstrife or other crises, especially on the Alliance’speriphery or beyond. These factors require continuedAlliance solidarity and the maintenance of an effectivemilitary capability, including greater emphasis on ele-ments commensurate with the new environment, tominimise risks and prevent crises from threatening theAlliance itself.


At last April’s Washington Summit, Alliance leaders launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative to equip NATO for thedefence and security challenges of the 21st century. NATO has already undergone a fundamental transformation sincethe early 1990s, with significant changes in its force and command structure, as well as taking on new tasks, including

a developing crisis response capability as seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina and more recently in Kosovo. It has alsodeveloped the ability to support WEU-led operations. But work remains to be done, such as developing an effective rapid

deployment capability and employing more advanced technologies, and this is what the new Initiative aims to bolster.

T

NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative — Preparing for future challenges

Frank Boland Head, Force Planning Section of NATO’s Defence Planning and Operations Division

An F-16 FightingFalcon from the510th FighterSquadron based inAviano, Italy, refuelsin flight from a KC-135 Stratotankerduring a mission to provide air coverduring OperationAllied Force on 6 May 1999.(Reuters photo)

An F/A-18 Hornetfighter plane on

the aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt gets

ready to take off on a mission over

the Federal Republicof Yugoslavia

on 11 April 1999.(Reuters photo)

Rapid deploymentNATO must therefore be prepared for operations

outside or on the periphery of Alliance territory whereit may not be able to take full advantage of its existingmilitary infrastructure. A demonstrable Alliance rapiddeployment capability will be essential for the credibleand effective use of the threat of military response tomanage crises and prevent escalation. In the event ofmilitary operations, rapid deployment of forces wouldalso be required to deny an adversary the opportunityto consolidate his position.

Force contributions by individual Allies (orPartners and other participating nations in the case ofcrisis response operations) could be relatively smalland may be part of multinational units. This requirescommand and control and information systems in par-ticular to be interoperable at lower levels than in thepast. It also calls for a new approach to logistics.

The smaller the individual national force contribu-tions, the less efficient the logistic support providedprimarily through national channels and the greater theeffectiveness of the operation as a whole if logisticresources are coordinated multinationally.Operations could be of long duration and more thanone operation may need to be conducted at thesame time, requiring a logistic support systemcapable of providing supplies over an extendedperiod and supporting concurrent operations.There will also likely be a requirement torotate forces during the period of the opera-tion, which will necessitate force structures

capable of providing fresh units when required, andhave consequences for the retraining of units returningfrom an operation.

Advanced technologiesNATO’s potential future adversaries will

probably not be able to mass the scale of forces thatAlliance defence plans were designed to counter dur-ing the Cold War. However, the accelerating pace oftechnological change means that an adversary could,nonetheless, possess weapons capable of inflictingconsiderable damage on Alliance forces. This calls forthe employment of sophisticated defensive andcounter-offensive systems by NATO. The Alliancemust also possess a greater capability to use militaryforce in pursuit of precise objectives in order to min-imise the risk of collateral damage and civilian casual-ties. And it is important that a wide range of Allies cancontribute advanced capabilities to future operations sothat the burden does not fall disproportionately on onlya few. One effect of employing such systems could be

a reduction in the scale of forces needed to fulfilthe requirements of the mission.

Future operations involving European Alliesand possibly led by the Western European Union

(WEU) or the European Union (EU) will face chal-lenges in the management of multinational opera-

tions which could be as demanding as those ofAlliance operations. The development of more

extensive and focused interoperability to underpinmultinational operations and the acquisition of

advanced capabilities by a wider range ofAllies will therefore also contribute to

building the European Securityand Defence Identity within

the Alliance.



Improving Alliance capabilitiesAgainst this background, NATO’s Executive

Working Group, reinforced by senior officials fromnational capitals, examined possible improvements inAlliance capabilities with a particular focus on improv-ing interoperability among Alliance forces, and, whereapplicable, between Alliance and Partner forces. Workfocused on a number of broad areas to identify thesteps that might be taken, in both the short and longterm, to accelerate progress in existing projects and ini-tiate work on other needed capabilities. Those fieldswere selected where improvements in capabilitieswould contribute significantly to meeting the chal-lenges of the future.

The deployability and mobility of Alliance forceswere important areas for examination. Among the fac-

tors considered were the availability of transportassets, including various options for the use of civilianresources such as shared use, and the level of deploy-able infrastructure necessary to permit a NATO-ledforce to deploy in theatre. The sustainability and logis-tics of Alliance forces was also addressed. It is likelythat greater multinationality in logistic support, such asestablishing a Multinational Joint Logistic Centre,could enhance the efficiency of operations. We mayalso need to encourage a different mix of units innational force structures to increase the proportion ofsupport units.

The study also covered the survivability ofAlliance forces and their capacity to effectively engagean adversary. Among the issues considered in this con-text were the need for more — and more capable —reconnaissance and surveillance systems, a combatidentification system, precision-guided weapons thatcan be delivered in day or night in any weather condi-tions, and capabilities to address the risks posed byweapons of mass destruction and their means of deliv-ery. Improvements in command and control and infor-mation systems were also studied to review the scopefor greater interoperability and to ensure the availabil-ity of increased numbers of deployable communica-tions assets.

All these areas need to be complemented by anincreased focus on the development of commonlyagreed military concepts, applicable to a wide range offuture situations. And they also need to take intoaccount factors such as levels of training, increasedstandardisation and enhancing the military capabilitiesand effectiveness of multinational formations. In somecases the Executive Working Group was already ableto identify at this early stage how to improve certaincapabilities. In others, further work will be required toexamine different options and make firm recommen-dations about improvements to be made.

Next stepsTo take this work forward, the Washington Summit

established a High Level Steering Group to oversee theimplementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiativeand to ensure better coordination and harmonisationamong the relevant NATO planning disciplines. It willbe chaired by the Deputy Secretary General and will becomposed of senior officials from national capitals toensure that the Initiative is taken forward quickly withmaximum political support. The Steering Group willwork for two years and, in addition to focusing oncapabilities needed by Allies, it will seek to includePartners in appropriate areas of its work. The aim is toachieve lasting improvements in capabilities and inter-operability to better equip the Alliance for the chal-lenges of the future. ◆

New Chairman of the Military CommitteeIn a ceremony on 6 May at

NATO headquarters, outgoingChairman of the NATO MilitaryCommittee General Klaus Naumann(left), having completed his three-year term, handed over to his suc-cessor, Admiral Guido Venturoni ofthe Italian Navy.

Born in Teramo in 1934,Admiral Venturoni graduated asEnsign from the Naval Academy inLivorno in 1956. He went on to

achieve his Naval Aviator’s wings and Carrier qualification from theUS Navy flight training school in 1959. During his early years in theItalian Navy, he served on board various naval units as Navigationand Communications officer; flew maritime patrol aircraft andbecame an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tactical instructor; and alsoqualified as a helicopter pilot.

From 1969 to 1971, he served in the Staff of the CommanderAllied Naval Forces Southern Europe, first in Malta and then inNaples. He was Commanding Officer of three corvettes, the 2nd HeloSquadron, a frigate and a cruiser. Later, he commanded the 1st Naval Division and then served for a year as Commander-in-Chiefof the Fleet and NATO Commander of the Central Mediterranean(1991-1992).

He has since held several significant appointments within theCentral Staff Offices, including: Executive Assistant to the Chief ofDefence; Head of the Plans and Operations Department both at NavyStaff and the Defence General Staff; Head of the Financial PlanningBureau of Navy Staff; Deputy Chief of Navy Staff; and Chief of Staffof the Italian Navy.

Finally, he served as Chief of the Italian Defence General Stafffrom January 1994 until taking over as Chairman of the MilitaryCommittee. In his new appointment, he will be responsible for advis-ing the North Atlantic Council on military policy and strategy.

(NATO photo)


Initiative (DCI) and the Membership Action Plan(MAP) for Partners aspiring to join the Alliance. Itsupports the DCI in addressing the interoperabilitychallenges associated with future multinational crisisresponse operations; and it reinforces the MAP bybetter focusing PfP participation on essential mem-bership-related issues in defence and military fields.In addition, PfP will likely play a key role in fosteringsecurity and stability in the Balkan region in the wakeof the Kosovo crisis.

ATO Summit leaders approved an enhanced andmore operational Partnership for Peace inWashington last April, further solidifying the

Alliance’s role in Euro-Atlantic security.Partnership, along with crisis management, hasbecome a fundamental security task of the Allianceand remains important in its own right. ThePartnership for the twenty-first century that emergedfrom Washington will also reinforce other Summitinitiatives such as NATO’s Defence Capabilities

Partnership emerged as a central underlying theme at the Washington Summit. Plans were approved by Heads of Stateand Government for an enhanced and more operational Partnership which will provide additional tools to support the

Alliance’s role in Euro-Atlantic security in the new century. In addition, the updated Strategic Concept adopted inWashington establishes crisis management and Partnership as fundamental security tasks of the Alliance. The strength-

ened Partnership will also contribute to the effectiveness of two other Summit initiatives, the Defence CapabilitiesInitiative and the Membership Action Plan. Taken together, these decisions further cement the Partnership’s role as a

permanent fixture of Euro-Atlantic security for the next century.

N

Towards a Partnership for the twenty-first centuryCharles J. Dale

Director of Defence Partnership and Cooperation in NATO’s Defence Planning and Operations Division

Leaders from Allied and Partner countries aftermeeting in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Councilat the Washington Summit on 25 April 1999.

(NATO photo)


SFOR soldiers fromSweden, a Partnercountry, man acheckpoint nearTuzla, Bosnia andHerzegovina, last March.(Belga photo)

Enhancing PartnershipThe Washington Summit brought to fruition a num-

ber of important enhancements to Partnership forPeace that had been launched at the Madrid Summit in1997, and which aimed to make PfP more operationaland to give Partners a greater role in PfP planning anddecision-making. These enhancements represent thecornerstones of the Partnership of the future.

The new Political Military Framework (PMF) forNATO-led PfP operations will provide for Partnerinvolvement in political consultation and decision-

NATO committees, the presence of Partner officers inNATO military structures, and increasing the scope andcomplexity of NATO/PfP exercises.

Reinforcing operational capabilitiesThe Washington Summit also heralded a new stage

in the continuing evolution of PfP. Allies and Partnersdemonstrated their commitment to a more operationalrole for the Partnership by developing a coherentpackage of measures to reinforce PfP’s operationalcapabilities.

Our experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina hasclearly shown how important PfP cooperation is foreffective multinational peace support operations. Theincreased operational dimension of PfP will take intoaccount the lessons learned and practical experiencegained in the IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia andaddress the specific challenges to military effective-ness and interoperability that such multinational opera-tions present.

A new Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)will be developed within PfP to improve the ability ofAlliance and Partner forces to operate together infuture NATO-led PfP operations. It will also provideincreased flexibility in putting together tailored force-

making, in operational planning, and in commandarrangements for NATO-led PfP operations. The PMFwill stand alongside and support the Alliance’sCombined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.

The expanded and adapted PfP Planning andReview Process (PARP) will more closely resemblethe Alliance’s force planning process. PARP will intro-duce Partnership Goals to define forces and capabili-ties declared by Partners for PfP activities. MinisterialGuidance will help shape these forces and capabilities.

Finally, PfP will continue to develop on the basis ofenhanced defence-related and military cooperation,which allows, among other things, for significantlyexpanding Partners’ involvement in the PfP work of

Albanian soldiers watch a parachute-drop exerciseover the Bize training area in Albania during

the NATO/PfP Exercise Cooperative Assembly in August 1998.

(NATO photo)

packages to mount and sustain future NATO-led PfPoperations. The OCC will focus on the forces andcapabilities potentially available for such operations.Its enhanced peacetime working relationships betweenPartner and Alliance headquarters and staffs, andbetween Allied and Partner formations, will facilitatethe integration of these forces into a NATO-led force.Another central feature will be assessment and feed-back mechanisms on the operational capabilities offorces declared by Partners.

The future PfP will also include a programme toincrease the ability of training and education efforts tomeet the current and future demands of Partnership.This programme will strive to improve interoperabilityand to promote greater cooperation and dialogueamong the wider defence and security communities inNATO and Partner nations.

Tapping Partnership’s full potential for crisis managementThe decisions taken at Washington mark a further,

though not the final, stage in the development of thePartnership. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC), which itself continues to mature, combineswith the enhanced and more operational PfP to provideNATO and its Partners with a powerful set of tools tobetter contribute to confidence-building, security andstability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The EAPC hasalready proved its worth as a forum for political con-sultations on topics ranging from Bosnia andHerzegovina and the crisis in Kosovo to humanitariandemining.

We have also seen the benefits of our practical PfPcooperation in defence and military fields. The inter-operability achieved in the first years of the Partnershipwas an early dividend and an important factor in thesuccessful integration of Partner forces in IFOR andSFOR. Both the EAPC and PfP will, however, contin-ue to evolve to meet the challenges of the still dynam-ic security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area.Neither has reached its full potential in crisis preven-tion and crisis management.

Achieving that potential is one of the Partnership’sfuture challenges. The operational dimension of PfP inparticular has largely focused on interoperability, thusproviding the capability to field a NATO-led multina-tional force involving Partners, should that be neces-sary in crisis. The reinforced capabilities now envis-aged will bring this into even sharper focus in future.

PfP has also proved to be a valuable and flexibletool for crisis management. Tailored assistance pro-grammes with Albania, put in place after the internalcrisis of 1997, have helped rebuild the Albanian armed



(Left to right) USPresident Bill Clintonreaches acrossPresident KiroGligorov of theformer YugoslavRepublic ofMacedonia (1) andSlovenian PrimeMinister JanezDrnovsek to shakehands withRomanian PresidentEmil Constantinescu.During theWashington Summitlast April, the Alliesmet the leaders ofthe South-easterncountriesneighbouring Serbiato launch work on aset of initiatives toenhance security inthe region.(NATO photo)

forces and deal with other consequences of that crisis,notably problems caused by the destruction and lootingof ordnance storage sites. The NATO/PfP Cell inTirana is a visible demonstration of the Alliance’sinterest and commitment in the region.

Today, tailored programmes with Albania and theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1) are integralelements of the Alliance’s overall approach to dealingwith the crisis in Kosovo. PfP exercises have providedvaluable operational experience in the region, andpractical assistance through PfP has helped both coun-tries improve their capacity to patrol their borders andmodernise their armed forces.

Strengthening other Summit initiativesAt the Washington Summit, Alliance Heads of

State and Government met with the countries of South-eastern Europe and proposed a consultative forum onsecurity matters as part of NATO’s effort to enhancesecurity and stability in the region. PfP tools andmechanisms could help give substance to this proposal,possibly through targeted security cooperation pro-grammes for the countries in the region, therebydemonstrating PfP’s potential to support peace-build-ing in the wake of a crisis.

The inherent flexibility of PfP will also be demon-strated by its role in supporting the defence and mili-tary aspects of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) forthe nations aspiring to join the Alliance. Under theMAP, aspirants will be able to request tailoredIndividual Partnership Programmes (IPPs) to focus

their PfP cooperation on essential membership-relatedissues. These tailored IPPs will be built around a coreprogramme of cooperation that would be essential foraspirants. This approach will encourage increased spe-cialisation, assessment and feedback in PfP pro-grammes and, in this way, support the planning targetsfor aspirants developed within the general frameworkof the expanded and adapted PARP. Such cooperationwith aspirant countries, while offering core areas ofcooperation through the Partnership Work Programme,could potentially broaden the scope of cooperation forall Partners and thereby strengthen the Partnership as awhole.

A “strategic” partnership for the twenty-first centuryThe Alliance has always viewed its cooperation

with Partners as a dynamic process which wouldevolve progressively as NATO and Partners drew clos-er. PfP’s first five years of active cooperation betweenAllies and Partners represent a success that has farexceeded initial expectations. Yet the Partnership stillholds a huge untapped potential. Allies and Partners aretogether building mechanisms for future “coalitions ofthe able” not only for joint operations, but also for con-flict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation. ThePartnership envisaged will also work towards astronger political dimension to complement its morerobust defence and military cooperation. This will bethe essence of the “strategic” Partnership for the twenty-first century. ◆



Summit(1), Ministers indicated that they were preparedto expand NATO’s effort to address the evolving pro-liferation risk.

Accordingly, the North Atlantic Council was taskedto prepare proposals, in time for the WashingtonSummit, for an Initiative to ensure that the Alliance hasthe political and military capabilities to address appro-priately and effectively the challenges posed by theproliferation of NBC weapons and their deliverymeans.

The Initiative The WMD Initiative should be viewed in the con-

text of the Alliance’s existing approach to proliferation

ATO’s revised Strategic Concept points out that,despite positive developments in the strategicenvironment, the security of the Alliance remains

subject to a wide variety of military and non-militaryrisks, which are multidirectional and often difficult topredict and assess. In this regard, the proliferation ofnuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons andtheir means of delivery is a matter of serious concern.In spite of welcome progress in strengthening interna-tional non-proliferation regimes, major challengesremain with respect to proliferation.

Despite efforts to prevent it through diplomaticmeans, proliferation continues to pose a direct militarythreat to the Alliance. Some states, including onNATO’s periphery and in adjacent regions, seek to sellor acquire NBC weapons and delivery means.Commodities and technologythat could be used to build theseweapons systems are becomingmore common, while detectionand prevention of illicit trade inthese materials and know-howcontinues to be difficult. Non-state actors have also shown thepotential to create and use someof these weapons.

Political decisions In December 1998, Alliance

Foreign and Defence Ministersexpressed their determination toprepare NATO’s forces to suc-ceed in the full range of missionsthat they might have to facedespite the threat or use of chem-ical or biological weapons.

Building on the successfulwork of the NATO groups onproliferation that were created asa result of the 1994 NATO

One of the innovative policies adopted by NATO leaders at the Washington Summit last April was an Initiative to ensurethe Alliance’s ability to address the challenge posed by the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). ThisInitiative, an integral part of the Alliance’s ongoing adaptation, will integrate political and military aspects of Alliance

work on WMD issues and complement other existing international efforts in this area. The centrepiece of theInitiative is the creation of a WMD Centre to facilitate Alliance-wide coordination on proliferation matters.

N

The Summit Initiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction:Rationale and aims

Crispin Hain-ColeHead of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security Section

of NATO’s Political Affairs Division

A specially trainedPolish soldier looks

out from anarmoured vehicle,

as Poland preparedto send anti-

chemical warfaretroops as part of a

UN-led effort duringthe Gulf Crisis. (Reuters photo)

(1)The Senior Polito-MilitaryGroup on Proliferation(SGP) and the NATOSenior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP),under the authority of the Joint Committee on Proliferation (CJP).


issues. It seeks to expand the Allies’ understanding ofproliferation issues, to focus appropriate attention onWMD risks, and to coordinate the activities of the var-ious NATO bodies involved in proliferation matters. Tothis end, it will:

■ Ensure a more vigorous, structured debate at NATOleading to strengthened common understandingamong Allies on WMD issues and how to respondto them;

■ Improve the quality and quantity of intelligenceand information-sharing among Allies on prolifera-tion issues;

■ Support the development of a public informationstrategy by Allies to increase awareness of prolifer-ation issues and Allies’ efforts to support non-pro-liferation;

■ Enhance existing Allied programmes whichincrease military readiness to operate in a WMDenvironment and counter WMD threats;

■ Strengthen the process of information exchange onAllies’ national programmes of bilateral WMDdestruction and assistance;

■ Enhance the possibilities for Allies to assist oneanother in the protection of their civil populationsagainst WMD risks.

The WMD Initiative will integrate political andmilitary aspects of Alliance work on WMD issues andcomplement, not supplant, existing internationalregimes and arms control efforts responding to prolif-eration.

The WMD CentreA WMD Centre will be created in the NATO

International Staff in Brussels to improve coordinationof all WMD-related activities at NATO. It willstrengthen political consultations related to non-prolif-eration, as well as defence efforts to improve the pre-paredness of Alliance forces and contribute to nationalefforts to protect civil populations. The Centre will:

■ Maintain the Matrix of Bilateral WMD Destructionand Management Assistance Programmes, a data-base designed to expand information-sharingbetween member states on national contributions toWMD withdrawal and dismantlement in the formerSoviet Union;

■ Serve as a repository for information on WMD-related civil response programmes in Alliednations;

■ Support the Alliance Groups(2) dealing with WMDproliferation and through them, the North AtlanticCouncil;

■ Develop briefings, fact sheets and other informa-tion documents on WMD issues for a wider publicaudience.

Beyond the AllianceThe WMD Initiative will be implemented first

among the 19 NATO member countries, with participa-tion being expanded to Partner and MediterraneanDialogue countries, where appropriate, as the pro-gramme matures.

The Alliance has already held — or is planning —sessions on proliferation issues with various Partnercountries under the auspices of the NATO-RussianPermanent Joint Council, the NATO-UkraineCommission, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council,and the Mediterranean Dialogue Group.

NATO’s response to proliferation, through theInitiative on Weapons of Mass Destruction, is an inte-gral part of the continuing adaptation of the Alliance tothe new security environment. ◆

New Permanent Representative of Portugal

Ambassador Fernando Andresen-Guimarães (57)has succeeded Ambassador António Martins da Cruz asPermanent Representative of Portugal on the NorthAtlantic Council.

A graduate in Economics from the University ofLisbon, Mr. Andresen-Guimarães joined the ForeignService in 1967 and held posts in the embassies inMalawi and London in the early 1970s. He was appoint-

ed Auditor at the NATODefense College in Rome in1977 and the following yearwas assigned as Counsellor inthe Permanent Mission to theUN in New York.

He went on to serve asConsul-General in Luanda in1982, until being appointedAmbassador to Baghdad in1986 and then to Algiers in1988. Returning to Lisbon in

1991, he was Director-General of Development Aid inthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a year before beingappointed President of the Interministerial Commissionon Macau heading up the Portuguese-Chinese JointLiaison Group.

Mr. Andresen-Guimarães returned to the UnitedStates in March 1995 as Ambassador to Washington, apost he held until taking up his current duties at NATOheadquarters in Brussels on 14 May.

(2)See previous footnote.

Constructionworkers put the

finishing touches onthe Washington

Summit logohanging from the

Ronald ReaganInternational TradeCenter, the venue

for the event tomark NATO’s 50th

anniversary.(Belga photo)

NATO CONTENTS Nº2 Summer 1999 - Volume 47Bill Clinton, speaking to the press during NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington last April. (Belga photo) A defining moment for NATO:

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