1ST EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
NATURAL RESOURCES (Atty. Edison Batacan)1ST EXAM COVERAGE CASE
COMPILATION
1
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALSRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME
COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT),petitioner,vs.HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA,respondents.G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE
LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA,
represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,respondents.G.R. No.
L-44092 April 15, 1988ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING
COMPANY,petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,
VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA,
represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA,respondents.CRUZ,J.:The Regalian doctrine reserves to the
State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private.1In
the cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a
common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.These cases
arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land
filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf
and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and
Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According
to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots
6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964.2The application was separately opposed by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry
Development, as to lots 1-9.3In support of the application, both
Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received
Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. She
testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her
parents under claim of ownership.4Alberto said he received Lots 6-9
in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land
was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas,
avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire
fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the
time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
father.5Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the
realty tax receipts from that year to 1964,6Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to
1964.7Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the
successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date
of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and
exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment,
its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts,
and its payment of taxes on the land.8For its part, Atok alleged
that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the
Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on
December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office
of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from
these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots
as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as
the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.9The
location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section
21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that:SEC. 21. All
valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands
both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which
they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the
United States, or of said islands.The Bureau of Forestry
Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929.
Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.10The trial court*denied
the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove
their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought to be
registered.11The applicants appealed to the respondent court,*which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting
their mining claims.12In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by
virtue of their mining claims.Both Benguet and Atok have appealed
to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its
argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining
companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.It is true that the subject property was
considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested
in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly
declared that:There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are
within the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and
Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of
plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E.
Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the
location of the June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the
Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly
claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June Bug
mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World
War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug,
and also conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and
trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for
taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.The Emma and Fredia
claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1
to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.The June Bug mineral claim
of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok having
been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and
had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.It is not
disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration
was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of
the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws
existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court
inMcDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia(42 Phil. 749), a valid location
of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said
the court in that case: The moment the locator discovered a
valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his
location in accordance with law, the power of the United States
Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession
and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become
mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be
granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands
cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations;
and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By
such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from
the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v.
Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc.
546)."The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not
only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to
the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to
a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining
claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v.
Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When
a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a
grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession,with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of
the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining
locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after
the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)It
is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent
for as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical
purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent
as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent.We agree likewise with the
oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the
mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and
not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right
from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private
properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof
without due process of law.13Such rights were not affected either
by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those
agricultural in nature for this was made subject to existing
rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically
provided that:SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public
agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant.Implementing this provision,
Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:Any provision
of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under
Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid
and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are
hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date
of their respective locations.The perfection of the mining claim
converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain.14By such act, the locators
acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it.15As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to
transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.It is true, as
the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was
subject to the "vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture
by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by
acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la
Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.First,
the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous,
adverse and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants was
insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration
in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their
predecessors-in-interest.16The trial judge, who had the opportunity
to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to
his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with
grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis.17Second,
even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de
la Rosas had really been in possession of the subject property,
their possession was not in the concept of owner of themining
claimbut of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The
property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as
agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining
locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace
them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that
she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below"18but
she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed
to be the owner of the said land.The Court of Appeals justified
this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface
rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle
that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface
but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height.19Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is
classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.Under the
theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting
on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere
with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest
he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high
can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where
is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface
rights?The Court feels that the rights over the land are
indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In
the instant case, as already observed, the land which was
originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became
mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected.20As long as mining operations were being undertaken
thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with
a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying
the surface.What must have misled the respondent court is
Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:Sec. 3. All mineral
lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or
associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession
at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of
land for agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, or for
any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership of,
nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be
found on or under the surface.SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the
right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all
areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are
excluded and excepted from all such patents.SEC. 6. The ownership
of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such titles.This is an application of the
Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply
reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right
to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of
the State to which such minerals belong.The flaw in the reasoning
of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the
land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposessimultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it
is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the
State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral
land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede
the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss
sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.21Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective
mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution
of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them
and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes.WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated
April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated
March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to
costs.SO ORDERED.REPUBLIC v. QUASHARepublic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-30299 August 17,
1972REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and/or THE SOLICITOR
GENERALpetitioners,vs.WILLIAM H. QUASHA,respondent.Office of the
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.Quasha,
Asperilla Blanco, Zafra & Tayag for respondent.REYES J. B.
L.,J.:pThis case involves a judicial determination of the scope and
duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and
corporations controlled by them, under the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution as of 18 September 1946, or the so-called Parity
Amendment.The respondent, William H. Quasha, an American citizen,
had acquired by purchase on 26 November 1954 a parcel of land with
the permanent improvements thereon, situated at 22 Molave Place, in
Forbes Park, Municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, with an
area of 2,616 sq. m. more or less, described in and covered by T.
C. T. 36862. On 19 March 1968, he filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, docketed as its Civil Case No. 10732,
wherein he (Quasha) averred the acquisition of the real estate
aforesaid; that the Republic of the Philippines, through its
officials, claimed that upon expiration of the Parity Amendment on
3 July 1974, rights acquired by citizens of the United States of
America shall cease and be of no further force and effect; that
such claims necessarily affect the rights and interest of the
plaintiff, and that continued uncertainty as to the status of
plaintiff's property after 3 July 1974 reduces the value thereof,
and precludes further improvements being introduced thereon, for
which reason plaintiff Quasha sought a declaration of his rights
under the Parity Amendment, said plaintiff contending that the
ownership of properties during the effectivity of the Parity
Amendment continues notwithstanding the termination and effectivity
of the Amendment.The then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo (and
later on his successors in office, Felix V. Makasiar and Felix Q.
Antonio) contended that the land acquired by plaintiff constituted
private agricultural land and that the acquisition violated section
5, Article XIII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which
prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to
non-Filipinos, except by hereditary succession; and assuming,
without conceding, that Quasha's acquisition was valid, any and all
rights by him so acquired "will expireipso factoandipso jureat the
end of the day on 3 July 1974, if he continued to hold the property
until then, and will be subject to escheat or reversion
proceedings" by the Republic.After hearing, the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Judge Pedro A. Revilla presiding) rendered a
decision, dated 6 March 1969, in favor of plaintiff, with the
following dispositive portion:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring that acquisition by the plaintiff on 26 November
1954 of, the private agricultural land described in and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36862 in his name was valid, and
that plaintiff has a right to continue in ownership of the said
property even beyond July 3, 1974.Defendants appealed directly to
this Court on questions of law, pleading that the court below
erred:(1) In ruling that under the Parity Amendment American
citizens and American owned and/or controlled business enterprises
"are also qualified to acquire private agricultural lands" in the
Philippines; and(2) In ruling that when the Parity Amendment ceases
to be effective on 3 July 1974, "what must be considered to end
should be the right to acquire land, and not the right to continue
in ownership of land already acquired prior to that time."As a
historical background, requisite to a proper understanding of the
issues being litigated, it should be recalled that the Constitution
as originally adopted, contained the following provisions:Article
XIII CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATIONOF NATURAL RESOURCESSection 1. All
Agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession
at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water right for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.Section 2. No private corporation or
association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands
in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, nor may any
individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred
and forty-four hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and
twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four
hectares. Lands adapted to grazing not exceeding two thousand
hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or
association.xxx xxx xxxSection 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.Article XIV GENERAL PROVISIONSSection 8. No franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under
the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such
franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character
or for a longer period than fifty years. No franchise or right
shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation, except
under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the public interest so
requires.The nationalistic spirit that pervaded these and other
provisions of the Constitution are self-evident and require no
further emphasis.From the Japanese occupation and the reconquest of
the Archipelago, the Philippine nation emerged with its industries
destroyed and its economy dislocated. It was described in this
Court's opinion inCommissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et
al.,L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, 187, penned by Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, in the following terms:It was fortunate that
the Japanese Occupation ended when it did. Liberation was hailed by
all, but the problems faced by the legitimate government were
awesome in their immensity. The Philippine treasury was bankrupt
and her economy prostrate. There were no dollar-earning export
crops to speak of; commercial operations were paralyzed; and her
industries were unable to produce with mills, factories and plants
either destroyed or their machineries obsolete or dismantled. It
was a desolate and tragic sight that greeted the victorious
American and Filipino troops. Manila, particularly that portion
south of the Pasig, lay in ruins, its public edifices and business
buildings lying in a heap of rubble and numberless houses razed to
the ground. It was in fact, next to Warsaw, the most devastated
city in the expert opinion of the then General Eisenhower. There
was thus a clear need of help from the United States. American aid
was forthcoming but on terms proposed by her government and later
on accepted by the Philippines.The foregoing description is
confirmed by the 1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and
Insular Affairs to the United States Congress:When the Philippines
do become independent next July, they will start on the road to
independence with a country whose commerce, trade and political
institutions have been very, very seriously damaged. Years of
rebuilding are necessary before the former physical conditions of
the islands can be restored. Factories, homes, government and
commercial buildings, roads, bridges, docks, harbors and the like
are in need of complete reconstruction or widespread repairs. It
will be quite some while before the Philippine can produce
sufficient food with which to sustain themselves.The internal
revenues of the country have been greatly diminished by war. Much
of the assessable property basis has been destroyed. Foreign trade
has vanished. Internal commerce is but a faction of what it used to
be. Machinery, farming implements, ships, bus and truck lines,
inter-island transportation and communications have been
wrecked.Shortly thereafter, in 1946, the United States 79th
Congress enacted Public Law 3721, known as the Philippine Trade
Act, authorizing the President of the United States to enter into
an Executive Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which
should contain a provision that The disposition, exploitation,
development, and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and
mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils,; all forces and sources of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines,
and the operation of public utilities shall, if open to any person,
be open to citizens of the United States and to all forms of
business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
United States citizens.and that:The President of the United States
is not authorized ... to enter into such executive agreement unless
in the agreement the Government of the Philippines ... will
promptly take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment
of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to permit the taking
effect as laws of the Philippines of such part of the provisions of
section 1331 ... as is in conflict with such Constitution before
such amendment.The Philippine Congress, by Commonwealth Act No.
733, authorized the President of the Philippines to enter into the
Executive Agreement. Said Act provided,inter alia, the
following:ARTICLE VII1. The disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, mineral, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public
utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the
United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by United States citizens,
except that (for the period prior to the amendment of the
Constitution of the Philippines referred to in Paragraph 2 of this
Article) the Philippines shall not be required to comply with such
part of the foregoing provisions of this sentence as are in
conflict with such Constitution.2. The Government of the
Philippines will promptly take such steps as are necessary to
secure the amendment of the constitution of the Philippines so as
to permit the taking effect as laws of the Philippines of such part
of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of this Article as is in conflict
with such Constitution before such amendment.Thus authorized, the
Executive Agreement was signed on 4 July 1946, and shortly
thereafter the President of the Philippines recommended to the
Philippine Congress the approval of a resolution proposing
amendments to the Philippine Constitution pursuant to the Executive
Agreement. Approved by the Congress in joint session, the proposed
amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in
November of 1946. Generally known as the Parity Amendment, it was
in the form of an Ordinance appended to the Philippine
Constitution, reading as follows:Notwithstanding the provision of
section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen,
of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the
Executive Agreement entered into by the President of the
Philippines with the President of the United States on the fourth
of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three, but in
no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public
utilities, shall, if OPEN to any person, be open to citizens of the
United States and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United
States in the same manner as to and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.A
revision of the 1946 Executive Agreement was authorized by the
Philippines by Republic Act 1355, enacted in July 1955. The
revision was duly negotiated by representatives of the Philippines
and the United States, and a new agreement was concluded on 6
September 1955 to take effect on 1 January 1956, becoming known as
the Laurel-Langley Agreement.This latter agreement, however, has no
direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by herein
respondent Quasha of the property in question was made in 1954,
more than one year prior to the effectivity of the Laurel-Langley
Agreement..IBearing in mind the legal provisions previously quoted
and their background, We turn to the first main issue posed in this
appeal: whether under or by virtue of the so-called Parity
Amendment to the Philippine Constitution respondent Quasha could
validly acquire ownership of the private residential land in Forbes
Park, Makati, Rizal, which is concededly classified private
agricultural land.Examination of the "Parity Amendment", as
ratified, reveals that it only establishes an express exception to
two (2) provisions of our Constitution, to wit: (a) Section 1,
Article XIII, re disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain and other natural resources of the Philippines; and (b)
Section 8, Article XIV, regarding operation of public utilities. As
originally drafted by the framers of the Constitution, the
privilege to acquire and exploit agricultural landsof the public
domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to
operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities
owned or controlled by them: but the "Parity Amendment" expressly
extended the privilege to citizens of the United States of America
and/or to business enterprises owned or controlled by them.No other
provision of our Constitution was referred to by the "Parity
Amendment"; nor Section 2 of Article XIII limiting the maximum area
of public agricultural lands that could be held by individuals or
corporations or associations; nor Section 5 restricting the
transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to those
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain (which
under the original Section 1 of Article XIII meant Filipinos
exclusively), save in cases of hereditary succession. These
sections 2 and 5 were therefore left untouched and allowed to
continue in operation as originally intended by the Constitution's
framers.Respondent Quasha argues that since the amendment permitted
United States citizens or entities controlled by them to acquire
agricultural lands of the public domain, then such citizens or
entities became entitled to acquire private agricultural land in
the Philippines, even without hereditary succession, since said
section 5 of Article XIII only negates the transfer or assignment
of private agricultural land to individuals or entities not
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Clearly,
this argument of respondent Quasha rests not upon the text of the
Constitutional Amendment but upon a mere inference therefrom. If it
was ever intended to create also an exception to section 5 of
Article XIII, why was mention therein made only of Section 1 of
Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV and of no other? When the
text of the Amendment was submitted for popular ratification, did
the voters understand that three sections of the Constitution were
to be modified, when only two sections were therein mentioned?A
reading of Sections 1 and 4 of Article XIII, as originally drafted
by its farmers, leaves no doubt that the policy of the Constitution
was to reserve to Filipinos the disposition, exploitation
development or utilization of agricultural lands, public (section
1) or private (section 5), as well as all other natural resources
of the Philippines. The "Parity Amendment" created exceptions to
that Constitutional Policy and in consequence to the sovereignty of
the Philippines. By all canons of construction, such exceptions
must be given strict interpretation; and this Court has already so
ruled inCommissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Guerrero, et al.,
L-20942, 22 September 1967, 21 SCRA 181, per Justice Enrique M.
Fernando:While good faith, no less than adherence to the
categorical wording of the Ordinance, requires that all the rights
and privileges thus granted to Americans and business enterprises
owned and controlled by them be respected, anything further would
not be warranted. Nothing less would suffice but anything more is
not justified.The basis for the strict interpretation was given by
former President of the University of the Philippines, Hon. Vicente
G. Sinco (Congressional Record, House of Representatives, Volume 1,
No. 26, page 561):It should be emphatically stated that the
provisions of our Constitution which limit to Filipinos the rights
to develop the natural resources and to operate the public
utilities of the Philippines is one of the bulwarks of our national
integrity. The Filipino people decided to include it in our
Constitution in order that it may have the stability and permanency
that its importance requires. It is written in our Constitution so
that it may neither be the subject of barter nor be impaired in the
give and take of politics. With our natural resources, our sources
of power and energy, our public lands, and our public utilities,
the material basis of the nation's existence, in the hands of
aliens over whom the Philippine Government does not have complete
control, the Filipinos may soon find themselves deprived of their
patrimony and living as it were, in a house that no longer belongs
to them.The true extent of the Parity Amendment, as understood by
its proponents in the Philippine Congress, was clearly expressed by
one of its advocates, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong:It is
amisconceptionto believe that under this amendment Americans will
be able to acquire all kinds of natural resources of this country,
andeven after the expiration of 28 years their acquired rights
cannot be divested from them. If we read carefully the language of
this amendment which is taken verbatim from the Provision of the
Bell Act, and, which in turn, is taken also verbatim from certain
sections of the Constitution, you will find out that the equality
of rights granted under this amendment refers only to two subjects.
Firstly, it refers to exploitation of natural resources, and
secondly, it refers to the operation of public utilities. Now, when
it comes to exploitation of natural resources, it must be pointed
out here that, under our Constitution and under this amendment,
only public agricultural land may be acquired, may be bought, so
that on the supposition that we give way to this amendment and on
the further supposition that it is approved by our people, let not
the mistaken belief be entertained that all kinds of natural
resources may be acquired by Americans because under our
Constitution forest lands cannot be bought, mineral lands cannot be
bought, because by explicit provision of the Constitution they
belong to the State, they belong to our Government, they belong to
our people. That is why we call them rightly the patrimony of our
race. Even if the Americans should so desire, they can have no
further privilege than to ask for a lease of concession of forest
lands and mineral lands because it is so commanded in the
Constitution. And under the Constitution, such a concession is
given only for a limited period. It can be extended only for 25
years, renewable for another 25.So that with respect to mineral or
forest lands, all they can do is to lease it for 25 years, and
after the expiration of the original 25 years they will have to
extend it, and I believe it can be extended provided that it does
not exceed 28 years because this agreement is to be effected only
as an ordinance and for the express period of 28 years.So that it
is my humble belief that there is nothing to worry about insofar as
our forest and mineral lands are concerned.Now, coming to the
operation of public utilities, as every member of the Congress
knows, it is also for a limited period, under our Constitution, for
a period not exceeding 50 years. And since this amendment is
intended to endure only for 28 years, it is my humble opinion that
when Americans try to operate public utilities they cannot take
advantage of the maximum provided in the Constitution but only the
28 years which is expressly provided to be the life of this
amendment.There remains for us to consider the case of our public
agricultural lands. To be sure, they may be bought, and if we pass
this amendment, Americans may buy our public agricultural lands,
but the very same Constitution applying even to Filipinos, provides
that the sale of public agricultural lands to a corporation can
never exceed one thousand and twenty-four hectares. That is to say,
if an American corporation, and American enterprise, should decide
to invest its money in public agricultural lands, it will be
limited to the amount of 1,024 hectares, no more than 1,024
hectares' (Emphasis supplied).No views contrary to these were ever
expressed in the Philippine Legislature during the discussion of
the Proposed Amendment to our Constitution, nor was any reference
made to acquisition of private agricultural lands by non-Filipinos
except by hereditary succession. On the American side, it is
significant to observe that the draft of the Philippine Trade Act
submitted to the House of Representatives by Congressman Bell,
provided in the first Portion of Section 19 the following:SEC. 19.
Notwithstanding any existing provision of the constitution and
statutes of the Philippine Government, citizens and corporations of
the United States shall enjoy in the Philippine Islands during the
period of the validity of this Act, or any extension thereof by
statute or treaty, the same rights as toproperty, residence, and
occupationas citizens of the Philippine Islands ...But as finally
approved by the United States Congress, the equality as to
"property residence and occupation" provided in the bill was
eliminated and Section 341 of the Trade Act limited such parity to
the disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of
lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the
Philippines (V. ante, page 5 of this opinion).Thus, whether from
the Philippine or the American side, the intention was to secure
parity for United States citizens, only in two matters: (1)
exploitation, development and utilization of public lands, and
other natural resources of the Philippines; and (2) the operation
of public utilities. That and nothing else.Respondent Quasha avers
that as of 1935 when the Constitution was adopted, citizens of the
United States were already qualified to acquire public agricultural
lands, so that the literal text of section 5 must be understood as
permitting transfer or assignment of private agricultural lands to
Americans even without hereditary succession. Such capacity of
United States citizens could exist only during the American
sovereignty over the Islands. For the Constitution of the
Philippines was designed to operate even beyond the extinction of
the United States sovereignty, when the Philippines would become
fully independent. That is apparent from the provision of the
original Ordinance appended to the Constitution as originally
approved and ratified. Section 17 of said Ordinance provided
that:(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall
enjoyin the Commonwealth of the Philippinesall the civil rights of
the citizens and corporations, respectively, thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)The import of paragraph (17) of the Ordinance was
confirmed and reenforced by Section 127 of Commonwealth Act 141
(the Public Land Act of 1936) that prescribes:Sec. 127. During the
existence and continuance of the Commonwealth,and before the
Republic of the Philippines is established, citizens and
corporations of the United States shall enjoy the same rights
granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under this
Act.thus clearly evidencing once more that equal rights of citizens
and corporations of the United States to acquire agricultural lands
of the Philippines vanished with the advent of the Philippine
Republic. Which explains the need of introducing the "Parity
Amendment" of 1946.It is then indubitable that the right of United
States citizens and corporations to acquire and exploit private or
public lands and other natural resources of the Philippines was
intended to expire when the Commonwealth ended on 4 July 1946.
Thereafter, public and private agricultural lands and natural
resources of the Philippines were or became exclusively reserved by
our Constitution for Filipino citizens. This situation lasted until
the "Parity Amendment", ratified in November, 1946, once more
reopened to United States citizens and business enterprises owned
or controlled by them the lands of thepublic domain, the natural
resources of the Philippines, and the operation of the public
utilities, exclusively, but not the acquisition or exploitation of
private agricultural lands, about which not a word is found in the
Parity Amendment..Respondent Quasha's pretenses can find no support
in Article VI of the Trade Agreement of 1955, known popularly as
the Laurel-Langley Agreement, establishing a sort of reciprocity
rights between citizens of the Philippines and those of the United
States, couched in the following terms:ARTICLE VI2. The rights
provided for in Paragraph I may be exercised, in the case of
citizens of the Philippines with respect to natural resources in
the United States which are subject to Federal control or
regulations, only through the medium of a corporation organized
under the laws of the United States or one of the States hereof and
likewise, in the case of citizens of the United States with respect
to natural resources in thepublic domainin the Philippines only
through the medium of a corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines and at least 60% of the capital stock of which is owned
or controlled by citizens of the United States. This provision,
however,does not affect the rightof citizens of the United States
to acquire or own private agricultural lands in the Philippines or
citizens of the Philippines to acquire or own land in the United
States which is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
and not within the jurisdiction of any state and which is not
within the public domain. The Philippines reserves the right to
dispose of the public lands in small quantities on especially
favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who
are its own citizens. The United States reserves the right to
dispose of its public lands in small quantities on especially
favorable terms exclusively to actual settlers or other users who
are its own citizens or aliens who have declared their intention to
become citizens. Each party reserves the right to limit the extent
to which aliens may engage in fishing, or engage in enterprises
which furnish communications services and air or water transport.
The United States also reserves the right to limit the extent to
which aliens may own land in its outlying territories and
possessions, but the Philippines will extend to American nationals
who are residents of any of those outlying territories and
possessions only the same rights, with respect to, ownership of
lands, which are granted therein to citizens of the Philippines.
The rights provided for in this paragraph shall not, however, be
exercised by either party so as to derogate from the rights
previously acquired by citizens or corporations or associations
owned or controlled by citizens of the other party.The words used
in Article VI to the effect that ... This provision does not affect
theright of citizen of the United States to acquire or own private
agricultural lands in the Philippines, or citizens of the
Philippines to acquire or own land in the United States which is
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ...must be
understood as referring to rights of United States citizens to
acquire or own private agricultural lands before the independence
of the Philippines since the obvious purpose of the article was to
establish rights of United States and Filipino citizens on a basis
of reciprocity. For as already shown, no such right to acquire or
own private agricultural lands in the Philippines has existed since
the independent Republic was established in 1946. The quoted
expressions of the Laurel-Langley Agreement could not expand the
rights of United States citizens as to public agricultural lands of
the Philippines to private lands, when the Parity Amendment and the
Constitution authorize such United States citizens and business
entities only to acquire and exploitagricultural lands of the
public domain. If the reopening of only public lands to Americans
required a Constitutional Amendment, how could a mere Trade
Agreement, like the Laurel-Langley, by itself enable United States
citizens to acquire and exploit private agricultural lands, a right
that ceased to exist since the independence of the Philippines by
express prescription of our Constitution?We turn to the second
issue involved in this appeal: On the assumption that respondent
Quasha's purchase of the private agricultural land involved is
valid and constitutional, will or will not his rights expire on 3
July 1974?For the solution of this problem, We again turn to the
"Parity Amendment". Under it,Notwithstanding the provision of
section one, Article Thirteen, and section eight, Article Fourteen,
of the foregoing Constitution,during the effectivity of the
Executive Agreement entered into bythe President of the Philippines
with the President of the United Stateson the fourth of July,
nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and thirty-three,but in no
case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development, and
utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public
utilities, shall, if open to any person, be open to citizens of the
United states and to all forms of business enterprise owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United
States in the same manner as to, and under the same conditions
imposed upon, citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines.
(Emphasis supplied)It is easy to see that all exceptional rights
conferred upon United States citizens and business entities owned
or controlled by them, under the Amendment, are subject to one and
the same resolutory term or period: they are to last "during the
effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into on 4 July
1946", "but in no case to extend beyond the, third of July, 1974".
None of the privileges conferred by the "Parity Amendment" are
excepted from this resolutory period.This limitation of time is in
conformity with Article X, Section 2, of the Philippine Trade Act
of 1946, as embodied in Commonwealth Act No. 733. It says:ARTICLE
X2. This Agreement shall have no effect after 3 July 1974. It may
be terminated by either the United States or the Philippines at any
time, upon not less than five years' written notice. It the
President of the United States or the President of the Philippines
determines and proclaims that the other Country has adopted or
applied measures or practices which would operate to nullify or
impair any right or obligation provided for in this Agreement, then
the Agreement may be terminated upon not less than six months'
written notice.Respondent Quasha argues that the limitative period
set in the "Parity Amendment" should be understood not to be
applicable to the disposition, or correlative acquisition, of
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, since such lands
can be acquired in full ownership, in which event, under Article
428 of the Civil Code of Philippines ART, 428. The owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.The owner has also a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover
it.and that since any period or condition which produces the effect
of loss or deprivation of valuable rights is in derogation of due
process of law, there must be "a law which expressly and
indubitably limits and extinguishes the ownership of non-citizens
over private agricultural lands situated in the Philippines validly
acquired under the law existing at the time of
acquisition."Strangely enough, this argument ignores the provisions
of the "Parity Amendment" prescribing that the disposition and
exploitation, etc. of agricultural lands of the public domainare in
no caseto extend beyond the third of July 1974. This limitation
already existed when Quasha in 1954 purchased the Forbes Park
property, and the acquisition was subject to it. If the Philippine
government can not dispose of its alienable public agricultural
lands beyond that date under the "Parity Amendment", then,
logically, the Constitution, as modified by the Amendment, only
authorizes either of two things: (a) alienation or transfer of
rights less than ownership or (b) a resoluble ownership that will
be extinguished not later than the specified period. For the
Philippine government to dispose of the public agricultural land
for an indefinite time would necessarily be in violation of the
Constitution. There is nothing in the Civil Law of this country
that is repugnant to the existence of ownership for a limited
duration; thus the title of a "reservista" (ascendant inheriting
from a descendant) inreserva troncal, under Article 891 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, is one such owner, holding title and
dominion, although under condition subsequent; he can do anything
that a genuine owner can do, until his death supervenes with
"reservataries surviving", i.e., relatives within the third degree
(Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 661,
695). In truth, respondent himself invokes Article 428 of the Civil
Code to the effect that "the owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without otherlimitations than those established
by law". One such limitation is the period fixed on the "Parity
Amendment", which forms part of the Constitution, the highest law
of the land. How then can he complain of deprivation of due
process?That the legislature has not yet determined what is to be
done with the property when the respondent's rights thereto
terminate on 3 July 1974 is irrelevant to the issues in this case.
The law, making power has until that date full power to adopt the
apposite measures, and it is expected to do so.One last point:
under the "Parity Amendment" the disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization of lands of the public domain, and
other natural resources of the Philippines, and the operation of
public utilities are open to citizens of the United States and to
all forms of business enterprisesowned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by citizens of the United Stateswhile under the
Philippine Constitution (section 1, Article XIII, and section 8,
Article XIV) utilization of such lands, natural resources and
public utilities are open to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at leastsixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens...It is thus apparent
that American business enterprises are more favored than Philippine
organization during the period of parity in that, first, they need
not be owned by American citizens up to 60% of their capital; all
that is required is that they becontrolledby United States
citizens, a control that is attained by ownership of only 51%aof
the capital stock; and second, that the control by United States
citizens may be direct orindirect(voting trusts, pyramiding, etc.)
which indirect control is not allowed in the case of Philippine
nationals.That Filipinos should be placed under the so-called
Parity in a more disadvantageous position than United States
citizens in the disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization of the public lands, forests, mines, oils and other
natural resources oftheir own countryis certainly rank injustice
and inequity that warrants a most strict interpretation of the
"Parity Amendment", in order that the dishonorable inferiority in
which Filipinos find themselves at present in the land of their
ancestors should not be prolonged more than is absolutely
necessary.FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby reversed and set aside;
and judgment is rendered declaring that, under the "Parity
Amendment" to our Constitution, citizens of the United States and
corporations and business enterprises owned or controlled by them
can not acquire and own, save in cases of hereditary succession,
private agricultural lands in the Philippines and that all other
rights acquired by them under said amendment will expire on 3 July
1974.AYOG v. CUSIRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN
BANCG.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG,
DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO
ADORMEO, VIDAL ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS, MAXIMO
BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR.,
HERACLEO CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS, NICASIO DE LEON,
JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA, DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA,
ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA,
MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO, PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC,
RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON,
NICOLADA NAQUILA, TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR.,
DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO PANARES, VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO,
JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO
VALMORES,petitioners,vs.JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and BINAN
DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES
and DIRECTOR OF LANDS,intervenors.AQUINO,J.:This case is about the
application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
(disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public lands)
to a1953sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a sales
patent and Torrens title were issued in1975, and to the1964decision
of the trial court, ejecting some of the petitioners from the land
purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by the Court of
Appeals. That legal question arises under the following facts:On
January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded
to Bian Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales
Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio
Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of
about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of the lot
protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision
of August 30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants
to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was made
from that decision.The Director found that the protestants
(defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now
petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarded to
the corporation and, therefore, they could not be regarded asbona
fideoccupants thereof. The Director characterized them as
squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons (p.
30, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of execution
but the protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land
(p. 28, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA).**Because the alleged
occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against
them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). The
forty defendants were Identified as follows:1. Vicente Abaqueta 21.
Eniego Garlic2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic3. Julio Ayog 23.
Rufo Garlic4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales5. Generoso Bangonan
25. Julian Locacia6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban7. Jose
Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos
Militante9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila10. Anastacia Vda.
de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo
Omac12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday13. Galina Edsa
33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa15.
Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa17.
German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton
Sante19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani20. Constancio Garlic 40.
Cosme VillegasThat ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the
patent. The trial court found that the protests of twenty of the
abovenamed defendants were among those that were dismissed by the
Director of Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned.OnJuly 18,
1961the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by
Binan Development Co., Inc. OnNovember 10, 1961, an official of the
Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it
was stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation
and other requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the
purchase price of the land (p. 248, Rollo).It was only more than
thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No.
5681 was issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced area
of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered. Original Certificate
of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee.The Director of
Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of
Natural Resources, recommending approval of the sales patent,
pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the
said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution,
that the land in question was free from claims and conflicts and
that the issuance of the patent was in conformity with the
guidelines prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of
Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to
the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution (p.
258, Rollo).Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in
approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted that the
applicanthad acquired a nested rightto its issuance (p. 259,
Rollo).Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the
ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants (out of forty), namely, Julio
Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy, Generoso Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio
Enoc, Jose Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto, Toribio Naquila, Elpidio
Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon Samsa, Rebecca Samsa,
Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan, testified that they entered
the disputed land long before 1951 and that they planted it to
coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28, Record
on Appeal).The trial court did not give credence to their
testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the Bureau of
Lands that in 1953 the land was free from private claims and
conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision of the Director
of Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against the
sales award (p. 30, Record on Appeal).Furthermore, the trial court
during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8, 1964 found
that the plantings on the land could not be more than ten years
old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the sales
award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to
vacate the land and to restore the possession thereof to tile
company. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on December
5,1975in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs, Sante,
CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the decision was denied by this
Court on May 17,1976in Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals,
L-43505.After the record was remanded to the trial court, the
corporation filed a motion for execution. The defendants, some of
whom are now petitioners herein, opposed the motion. They contended
that the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on January
17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legally
impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the
constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area."The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution
because of the manifestation of the defendants that they would file
a petition for prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the
instant prohibition action was filed. Some of the petitioners were
not defendants in the ejectment case.We hold that the said
constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Bian Development Co., Inc. because it had
already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time
the 1973 Constitution took effect.That vested right has to be
respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional
law."A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property
legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of
property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No.
6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy"
(Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51
Phil. 498, 502).The due process clause prohibits the annihilation
of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal
of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16
C.J.S. 1177-78).It has been observed that, generally, the term
"vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed interest,
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected
against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note
71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal,
192 Atl. 2nd 587).Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973
opinion ruled that where the applicant, before the Constitution
took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the
Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales patent, there
would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for refusing
to issue or release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).In Opinion No.
140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant had
fulfilled the construction or cultivation requirements and has
fully paid the purchase price, he should be deemed to have acquired
by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area
limitation in the new Constitution would not apply.In Opinion No.
185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held that where the
cultivation requirements were fulfilled before the new Constitution
took effect but the full payment of the price was completed after
January 17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to a
sales patent (p. 256, Rollo).Such a contemporaneous construction of
the constitutional prohibition by a high executive official carries
great weight and should be accorded much respect. It is a correct
interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV.In the instant case, it
is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in
question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to
doubt or controversy.Its compliance with the requirements of the
Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of
segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's
right to obtain a patent for that land is protected by law. It
cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of
Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).As we cannot review the factual
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot
entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by themselves
and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed portions
of land even before the war. They should have filed homestead or
free patent applications.Our jurisdiction is limited to the
resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution
is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964
final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. On that
issue, we have no choice but to sustain its
enforceability.Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to
avoid agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that the law grinds
the faces of the poor, the administrative authorities should find
ways and means of accommodating some of the petitioners ifthey are
landless and are really tillers of the soilwho in the words of
President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in their stomachs, a
little more shelter over their heads and a little more clothing on
their backs. The State should endeavor to help the poor who find it
difficult to make both ends meet and who suffer privations in the
universal struggle for existence.A tiller of the soil is entitled
to enjoy basic human rights, particularly freedom from want. The
common man should be assisted in possessing and cultivating a piece
of land for his sustenance, to give him social security and to
enable him to achieve a dignified existence and become an
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizen in our democratic
society.To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from
becoming a subversive or from rebelling against a social order
where, as the architect of the French Revolution observed, the rich
are choking with the superfluities of life but the famished
multitude lack the barest necessities.Indeed, one purpose of the
constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural
lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family- size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the
instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons
had owned social unrest.Petitioners' counsel claims that Bian
Development Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil Case
No. 3711, the ejectment suit from which this prohibition case
arose, against some of thepetitioners who were not defendants in
that suit(p. 126, Rollo).Those petitioners are not
successors-in-interest of the defendants in the ejectmentsuit. Nor
do they derive their right of possession from the said defendants.
Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and
separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants.We hold
that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who
were not defendants in that litigation or who were not summoned and
heard in that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no
man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger"
(Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co.,
38 Phil. 514, 520).To enforce the judgment against those who were
not parties to the caseand who occupy portions of the disputed land
distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the defendants
in the ejectment suit,would be violative of due process of law, the
law which, according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the
Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. "The meaning is, that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the
protection of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in
Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See Gatchalian vs.
Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17,
1977, 75 SCRA 234 and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)Contempt
incident.-During the pendency of this case, or at about four
o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan,
Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of
the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with
their tractors a portion of the disputed land which was occupied by
Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners herein. The disputed
land was leased by Bian Development Co., Inc. to the canning
corporation.The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements
thereon worth about five thousand pesos consisting of coffee,
coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the
time the alleged destruction of the improvements occurred. However,
it should be noted that Emberador was not expressly named as a
defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in
the trial court's decision although he was joined as a
co-petitioner in this prohibition case.The petitioners in their
motion of January 11, 1979 asked that the four tractor drivers and
Honesto Garcia, the manager of Bian Development Co., Inc., be
declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the
restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1977,
enjoining specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial
sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil
Case No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).Garcia and the four
drivers answered the motion. The incident was assigned for hearing
to Judge Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First Instance of
Davao. Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at the
instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain, petitioner Lausan
Ayog, a Bagobo, that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore for the
termination of this case.The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or
four months after the said incident, Emberador, in consideration of
P3,500, as the value of the improvements on his land, executed a
quitclaim in favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation
(Exh. 1, 2 and 3).We hold that no contempt was committed. The
temporary restraining order was not directed to Bian Development
Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Emberador was not named
specifically in the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants
to be ejected.For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was
committed against Emberador by reason of the destruction of his
improvements, his remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in
some appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer
of the improvements.In resume, we find that there is no merit in
the instant prohibition action. The constitutional prohibition
relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of
the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive application
to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to
enforce that judgment.WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack
of merit but with the clarification that the said judgment cannot
be enforced against those petitioners herein who were not
defendants in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 3711, and over
whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt
proceeding is also dismissed. No costs.SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC v. VILLANUEVARepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME
COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-55289 June 29, 1982REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of
Lands,petitioner-appellant,vs.JUDGE CANDIDO P. VILLANUEVA, of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Malolos Branch VII, and IGLESIA
NI CRISTO, as a corporation sole, represented by ERAO G. MANALO, as
Executive Minister,respondents-appellees.AQUINO,J.:Like L-49623,
Manila Electric Company vs. Judge Castro-Bartolome, this case
involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the
Constitution that "no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area".Lots Nos. 568 and 569, located at
Barrio Dampol, Plaridel, Bulacan, with an area of 313 square meters
and an assessed value of P1,350 were acquired by the Iglesia Ni
Cristo on January 9, 1953 from Andres Perez in exchange for a lot
with an area of 247 square meters owned by the said church (Exh.
D).The said lots were already possessed by Perez in 1933. They are
not included in any military reservation. They are inside an area
which was certified as alienable or disposable by the Bureau of
Forestry in 1927. The lots are planted to santol and mango trees
and banana plants. A chapel exists on the said land. The land had
been declared for realty tax purposes. Realty taxes had been paid
therefor (Exh. N).On September 13, 1977, the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a
corporation sole, duly existing under Philippine laws, filed with
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the
registration of the two lots. It alleged that it and its
predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land for more than
thirty years. It invoked section 48(b) of the Public Land Law,
which provides:Chapter VIII.Judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.xxx xxx xxxSEC. 48. The
following-describedcitizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefore, under the Land Register Act, to
wit:xxx xxx xxx(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter." (As amended by Republic Act
No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)The Republic of the
Philippines, through the Direct/r of Lands, opposed the application
on the grounds that applicant, as a private corporation, is
disqualified to hold alienable lands of the public domain, that the
land applied for is public land not susceptible of private
appropriation and that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land since June 12,
1945.After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the
two lots, as described in Plan Ap-04-001344 (Exh. E), in the name
of the Iglesia Ni Cristo, a corporation sole, represented by
Executive Minister Erao G. Manalo, with office at the corner of
Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Quezon City, From that
decision, the Republic of the Philippines appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal should be sustained.As
correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the Iglesia Ni
Cristo, as a corporation sole or a juridical person, is
disqualified to acquire or hold alienable lands of the public
domain, like the two lots in question, because of the
constitutional prohibition already mentioned and because the said
church is not entitled to avail itself of the benefits of section
48(b) which applies only to Filipino citizens or natural persons. A
corporation sole (an "unhappy freak of English law") has no
nationality (Roman Catholic Apostolic Adm. of Davao, Inc. vs. Land
Registration Commission, 102 Phil. 596. See Register of Deeds vs.
Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58 and sec. 49 of the Public Land
Law).The contention in the comments of the Iglesia Ni Cristo (its
lawyer did not file any brief) that the two lots are private lands,
following the rule laid down in Susi vs. Razon and Director of
Lands, 48 Phil. 424, is not correct. What was considered private
land in theSusicase was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino
citizensince time immemorial,as inCario vs. Insular Government,212
U.S. 449, 53 L. ed. 594, 41 Phil. 935 and 7 Phil. 132. The lots
sought to be registered in this case do not fall within that
category. They are still public lands. A land registration
proceeding under section 48(b) "presupposes that the land is
public" (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 10, 1967, 20
SCRA 641, 644).As held inOh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil.
890, "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception
to the rule would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it
had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. "InUy
Un vs. Perez, 71 Phil. 508, it was noted that the right of an
occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of
his title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho
dominical incoativo"and that before the issuance of the certificate
of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner
of the land since it still pertains to the State.The lower court's
judgment is reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of the Iglesia Ni Cristo is dismissed with costs
against said applicant.SO ORDERED.
MERALCO v. BARTOLOMERepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME
COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY,petitioner-appellant,vs.JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent-appellees.AQUINO,J.:pThis
case involves the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the
Constitution that "no private coporation or associaiton may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
on ethousand hectares in area".*That prohibition is not found in
the 1935 Constitution.The Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation organized under Philippine laws, more than sixty
percent of whose capital stock is owned by Filipino citizens, in
its application filed on December 1, 1976 in the Makati branch of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prayed for the confirmation
of its title to two lots with a total area of one hundred
sixty-five square meters, located at Tanay, Rizal with an assessed
value of P3,270 (LRC Case No. N-9485, LRC No. N-50801).The Republic
of the Philippines opposed theh application on the grounds that the
applicant, as a private corporation,is disqualified to hold
alienable public lands and that the applicant and its
prredecessors-in-interest have not been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application (pp. 65-66,Rollo).After the trial had commenced, the
Province of rizal and the Municipality of Tanay filed a joint
opposition to the application on the ground that one of the lots,
Lot No. 1165 of the Tanay cadastre, would be needed for the
widening and improvement of Jose Abad Santos and E.Quirino
Streetsin the town of Tanay.The land was possessed by Olimpia ramos
before the Pacific war which broke out in 1941. On July 3, 1947,
Ramos sold the land to the spouses Rafael Piguing and MInerva
Inocencio (Exh. K). The Piguing sapouses constructed a house
therereon. Because the Meralco had installed the "anchor guy" of
its steel post on the land, the Piguing spouses sold the lot to the
Meralco on August 13, 1976.The said land was included in the1968
cadastral survey made in Tanacy by the Bureau of Lands, Plan
AP-04-000902 (Exh. F and H) and was divided into two lots, Lots
Nos. 1164 and 1165, so as to segregate Lot No. 1165 which would be
used to widen the two street serving as the land's eastern and
southern boundaries.The land was declared for realty tax purposes
since 1945 and taxes had been paid thereon up to 1977. It is
residential in character as distinguished from a strictly
agricultural land. It is not included in any military reservation.
Since 1927, it has formed part of the alienable portion of the
public domain.After trial, the lowre court rendered a decision
dismissing the application because in its opinion the Meralco is
not qualified to apply for the registration of the said land since
under section 48(b) of the Public Land Law only Filipino citizens
or natural persons can apply for judicial confirmationof their
imperfect titles to public land. The Meralco is a juridical person.
The trial court assumed that the land which it seeks to register
ispublic land.From that decision, the Meralco appealed to this
Court under Republic Act No. 5440.In contends that the said land,
after having been possessed in the concept of owner by Olimpia
Ramos and the Piguing spouses for more than thirty years, had
becomeprivate landin the hands of the latter, and, therefore, the
constitutional prohibition, banning a private corporation from
acquiring alienable public land, is not applicable to the said
land.The Meralco further contends that it has invoke section 48(b)
of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing spouses
who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of
their imperfect title to the land.In reply to these contentions,
the Solicitor General counters that the said land is not private
land because the Meralco and its predecessors-in-interest have no
composition title from the Spanish government nor possessory
information title or any other means for the acquisition of public
lands such as grants or patents (Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
De Jesus, L-40912, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146, 157; Director
of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, and Alinsunurin vs.
Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975; 68 SCRA 177; 195;
Lee Hong Hok vs. David, L-30389, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 372,
378-9; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals and Raymundo,
L-29575, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 634, 639; Padilla vs. Reyes and
Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 967, 969; Heirs of Datu Pendatun vs.
Director of Lands, 59 Phil. 600, 603).The Public Land Law
provides:CHAPTER VIII. Judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.xxx xxx xxxSEC. 48. The following
describedcitizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:xxx xxx xxx(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by Republic Act
No. 1942, approved on June 22, 1957.)xxx xxx xxxSEC. 49. No person
claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of
the qualifications specified in the last preceding section may
apply for the benefits of this chapter.We hold that, as between the
State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would
cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate
of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b).
Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section
48(b), Meralco's application cannot