Marshall Space Flight Center Presentation to ASQ Roy W. Malone, Jr., Director MSFC Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) NASA S&MA at the Crossroads The role of NASA Quality Insight/Oversight for Commercial Crewed Launch Vehicles 3/9/10 https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100017704 2020-07-14T23:09:25+00:00Z
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NASA S&MA at the Crossroads · Marshall Space Flight Center Presentation to ASQ Roy W. Malone, Jr., Director. MSFC Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA) NASA S&MA at the Crossroads .
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Transcript
Marshall Space Flight Center
Presentation to ASQ
Roy W. Malone, Jr., DirectorMSFC Safety & Mission Assurance (S&MA)
NASA S&MA at the Crossroads The role of NASA Quality Insight/Oversight
IF WE Co.UlO I"IAXIMIZE 5I-lAR~HOLOER VALUE BY !)EllING U)(,.JE1t QUAlITY ITE~ . , •
Co.M , • , I 'FO I<.Go.T ABOUT THAT o.NE .
. . ,WOVI..DN'TWE HA.VE A. FIDUC AA Y 'P..ESPON· 51 BIl IT't' TO DC iT? E
aU:E.S1iON : IS QuAlITY ....LH<~ II"IPORTA.NT THA.N
tD~i~Yl[ NG THE I.AI..J1
I 'M SURE ITS IN THE TOP FOUR.
I.oJ-!AT If l.JE MAO TO. LIE TO A.CHiEVE QUA.l T't'?
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Marshall Space Flight Center
Agenda
The Journey Current S&MA Oversight/Insight
Model The Change The Issue Potential NASA relationship with
Commercial Partners Commercial “X” FRR – Are you Go
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Marshall Space Flight Center
Shuttle FRR - Are you Go?
“There has to be an optimum balance among technical performance, time schedule and cost.”
Dr. Eberhard Rees - Director of Marshall Space Flight Center (March 1, 1970 - Jan. 19, 1973 ) – speaking to the World Management Congress in Munich in 1972
Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, the Rogers Commission reported in 1986:• S&MA was not included in technical issue discussions.• Inadequate S&MA staffing at MSFC – “Reductions in the safety,
reliability and quality assurance work force at Marshall and NASA Headquarters have seriously limited capability in those vital functions (safety program responsibility) to ensure proper communications.”
“A properly staffed, supported, and robust safetyorganization might well have avoided these faults(addressing faults within the S&MA organization that contributed to the Challenger Accident)….”
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Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) reported in 2003:
• “Throughout its history, NASA hasconsistently struggled to achieveviable safety programs and adjustthem to the constraints and vagariesof changing budgets”
• “The Board believes that the safetyorganization, due to a lack of capabilityand resources independent of the Shuttle Program, was not an effective voice in discussing technical issues or mission operations pertaining to STS-107.”
The Journey (cont.)Marshall Space Flight Center
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Marshall Space Flight Center
Current NASA Oversight/InsightModel
Level II
Level III
Level IV
AA
Pro
gram
/Pro
ject
Aut
horit
y
Technical Authority
• AS9100 Registration / Compliance• Procurement Quality• Hardware Qualification & Acceptance • Manufacturing & Test Quality• Assure Requirement Compliance• Control of Nonconforming Material• Industrial Safety Monitoring• Program Critical Hardware Moves
MSFCSRM&QA
Current S&MA Oversight/InsightModel
MSFC PrimeContractor Onsite
SRM&QA
Defense Contract Mgt. Agency
Onsite (DCMA)
PrimeContractorSRM&QA
Marshall Space Flight Center
• Procurement Quality Surveillance• Hardware Qualification & Acceptance• Manufacturing & Test Quality GMIPS• Assure Requirement Compliance• Control of Nonconforming Material MRB • Industrial Safety Monitoring• Program Critical Hardware Moves
MSFCSRM&QA
Current S&MA Oversight/InsightModel
MSFC PrimeContractor Onsite
SRM&QA
Defense Contract Mgt. Agency
Onsite (DCMA)
MSFC PrimeContractorSRM&QA
Marshall Space Flight Center
• AS 9100 Registration / Compliance• Procurement Quality• Hardware Qualification & Acceptance DD 250• Manufacturing & Test Quality• Assure Requirement Compliance• Control of Nonconforming Material MRB• Industrial Safety Monitoring• Program Critical Hardware Moves