Narcoterrorism: One Stop Shopping for All Things Terror Related

Evan Jean Wilson PhD Candidate, Lancaster University Lancaster, UK

Narcoterrorism: One Stop Shopping for All Things Terror Related

The term narcoterrorism has been around since the early 1980’s when President

Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru used it to give a name to the attacks his police forces

were facing from drug traffickers. (Hudson, 1993) The term refers to one of two types of

terrorism; international drug dealers who use terrorist tactics to maximize their profits or

terrorists who use drugs to fund their organization and operations. (White, 2006) Latin

America is the birthplace of narcoterrorism and the region has become synonymous with

the term narcoterrorism. The groups in Latin America that use narcoterrorism have been

the focus of much drug related public policy, efforts at drug eradication and intervention

by external actors, normally, unsuccessful. These groups have, as of yet, not been

eradicated and continue to profit from the drug trade using terrorist tactics to make more

money.

It has not escaped the notice of other terrorist organizations that narcoterrorism,

for the most part, has been a successful way to increase profits and fund operations. This

has led to the wide spread use of narcoterrorism to fund terrorist campaigns all over the

world. Even organizations that are morally opposed to the use of drugs have resorted to

using narcoterrorism to fund their organization. “It includes organizations like Hamas,

Islamic Jihad, the PLO and Hizbollah, Syria and the Lebanon in the Middle East, ETA in

Spain, the IRA in Ireland, the FARC in Colombia, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Laskar

Jihad in Indonesia, the North Korean and Chinese governments, in Asia, and the

Chechens in Russia to name a few.”(Ehrenfeld, 2002) Drugs have funded a variety of

groups; from ethnic separatist and religious extremist to drug lords. “The existing

prohibition system has made the narcotics trade one of the most lucrative businesses in

the world, second only to the weapons sector.” (Corti and Swain, 2009) The current

estimates are over one trillion dollars US spent on military expenditures and close to 321

billion dollars US spent on the illegal drug trade. (Perlo-Freeman, 2009, Pollard, 2005)

Coca and Poppy are more valuable than diamonds, emeralds, platinum,

and gold combined.

Currently, there are many different and varied ideas on how to stop terrorist

organizations from using narcoterrorism to support and fund their organizations. There

has been no simple answer addressing the narcoterrorism problem and each idea has been

complex and dependent on many factors for success. The focus of much of the policy

surrounding narcoterrorism has focused on the Latin American variant of drug dealers

using terrorist tactics and has neglected terrorists using drugs to fund their organizations

and operations.

What is Narcoterrorism?

According to the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (Ideas and Tv), terrorism

and drugs are linked. For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11th that Al Qaeda

perpetrated on the USA were directly funded by opium profits from Afghanistan and the

Taliban. (Company, 2001) Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have issued special fatwas to justify

and allow the use of the drug trade to their followers enabling them to raise the funds

they need for their organizations. The creating of narcotics growing, manufacturing and

distribution facilities in an area experiencing conflict is likely to help the non-state actor

disproportionately as there are few legal outlets for growing and producing narcotics. The

monetary gain that comes from the narcotics industry are used to pay fighters, acquire

weapons, and provide legitimacy with local populations. This creates an instrumental

way for a group to side step a government’s use of force and control over sovereign

territory. (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2003) “Today the bulk of the global cultivation of

opium and coca is taking place in conflict zones, while the trafficking of their derivatives

has come to heavily involve insurgent and terrorist groups operating between the source

and the destination areas of illegal drugs.” (Cornell, 2007)

The term narcoterroism means more than organizations that are involved both in

terrorism and drug trafficking. It has evolved into meaning cooperation between drug

traffickers and terrorist organizations. Arrests of international drug traffickers in recent

years have highlighted that link between drug and terrorism has become more wide

spread than initially thought. With groups collaborating on international levels to share

resources and helping each other with activities. (Björnehed, 2004) Many criminal

organizations cooperate with terrorists. Their cooperation ranges from trading in illegal

drugs, diamonds, counterfeiting money and identification papers, stolen cars and arms,

and people smuggling. This cooperation between terrorists and criminal organizations has

been extensively documented by the British National Criminal Intelligence Service.

(Ehrenfeld, 2002)

The distinction between the two groups has become increasingly difficult to

distinguish. There are certain differences that are seen in most cases, however, this is not

always the case and more frequently the trend has been towards hybrid organizations that

deal in both types of narcoterrorism equally. This has made defining narcoterrorism a

challenge for the researcher and an even bigger frustration for law enforcement officials.

Both drug traffickers and terrorists operate on the underside of society, so it isn’t

surprising that they have come in contact with one another. What has been a surprise is

that they are cooperating and learning from one another. Narcoterrorists, use the

accumulation of wealth and power as their driving force, while terrorists aim to make a

statement and create fear in a certain population and/or government. Both groups on the

surface have nothing in common, however, once you look deeper, they share many goals

and tactics. The leadership structures of both groups have become very similar, with drug

traffickers taking on the terrorist quality of running their organization with cells in hopes

to avoid infiltration by law enforcement and contain any infiltration that law enforcement

makes. The groups have also begun sharing resources and knowledge. Both require

certain goods such as fake passports and identity documents, ways of laundering money

and obtaining weapons. (Björnehed, 2004) Terrorists have learned how to use the same

smuggling and document creation resources and corridors that narcoterrorists have used

for decades to move both people and weapons in and out of target areas. In addition, they

now also use the same money laundering facilities that narcoterrorists use, something

they have just recently learned how to accomplish.

The DEA outlines two types of narcoterrorism; drug traffickers that use terrorist

methods and terrorists who use drug trafficking as income. An international drug

trafficker is the first type of narcoterrorist, using terrorist tactics to increase their profits

and to produce, ship, and distribute drugs. These international drug dealers form alliances

with terrorist groups to assist in their operations and to learn new methods in which to

operate. For example, three members of the Irish Republican Army were arrested in

Bogotá, Colombia on August 11, 2001 and accused of training members of FARC in how

to build explosive and use arms effectively. (Hanson, 2009) “The men, James

Monaghan, Martin McCauley, and Neil Connolly, were traveling using false passports,

and found to have traces of explosive on their belongings. All three were subsequently

charged with training FARC members in the use of explosives” (Burgess, June 5,

2002)This type of narcoterrorist does not use the money to fund any further organization,

keeping all the money they have collected from the sale of illegal drugs for themselves.

(Judiciary, 2003b)

The second type of narcoterrorist is the terrorist group that uses drugs to fund

their organization. These organizations don’t normally start out as international drug

dealers, but instead use drugs cultivation and production as a resource in which to make

money to support their organization and the organizations operations. (Judiciary, 2003b)

In this instance, there is a great deal of variety among terrorist groups as to their level and

involvement in drug trafficking. (Judiciary, 2003c) At times the use of drug trafficking to

raise funds for terrorist operations has an extra ingredient to it. Not only does it provide

money for the organization, some groups see it as weakening the government in a

targeted area by flooding the population with highly addictive drugs, as well. (Judiciary,

2003a) These addictive drugs further the recruitment propaganda that terrorists use to

gain new members showing that that the western civilizations that the groups target are

‘evil’ and necessarily need to be destroyed due to their citizens use of morally

reprehensible drugs and loose morals in general. As Hoffman insists “the terrorist is

fundamentally an altruist: he believes he is serving a ‘good’ cause designed to achieve a

greater good for a wider constituency [whereas] the criminal serves no cause at all, just

his own personal aggrandizement and material satiation.” (Hoffman, 2006)

Terrorist groups have two types of funding needs; operational support needs and

organizational maintenance needs. What the finding will support will vary based on their

exact type of organization, however, the funding needs remain the same. “Terrorist

financing requirements fall into two general areas: (1) finding specific terrorist

operations, such as direct costs associated with specific operations and (2) broader

organizational costs to develop and maintain an infrastructure of organizational support

and to promote the ideology of a terrorist organization.” (Force, 2008)

The definitions of each group, terrorists and drug traffickers seem straight

forward, however, it is not that simple. With in each group there are subsection and

further divergences from the core goals of each. Many factors need to be taken into

account when defining a group as drug traffickers or terrorists. It should also be noted

that there is no agreement among experts on an exact definition of the term terrorism

itself. This is because the definition has changed over time and what is considered

terrorism is different from what was considered terrorism 30 or 40 years ago. (Hoffman,

2006) The actual definition is important because without a precise definition it is easy to

classify any type of violence or threat a particular political entity doesn’t like as

‘terrorism’ and thus the term begins to loose its meaning. There is a saying that by Walter

Laqueur which has become very common in the struggle to find a definition for

terrorism; ‘one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter’ (Laqueur, 1977) this still

holds true today due to the every changing nature of both the definition and the actions

that are classified as terrorist.

The following graph shows some of the intricacies that are interwoven in the

discussion of what exactly narcoterrorism is and how it should be defined.

Narcoterrorism Typologies Types Method of Operation Purpose

Terrorist Narcoterrorism

Actual Narcoterrorism

Direct involvement of terrorist organizations in some or all phases of drug trafficking.

Financing their terrorist activities, purchasing arms and ammunition.

Insurgent Narcoterrorism

Providing protection for drug traffickers

Gaining economic power to lance their political agenda and accumulating the arsenal necessary to fight against an existing government.

Taxing drug traffickers Actual insurgent engagement in drug producing and trafficking

State Sponsored Narcoterrorism

Sponsoring terrorist organizations that smuggle illicit drugs

destabilizing opponent governments and bringing about a change in the political system

Myth Narcoterrorism

Exaggerating or making up links between insurgent/terrorist groups and the illegal drug trade by using political power.

Getting domestic and international support for imposing national or foreign policies

Drug Trafficker Narcoterrorism

State-employed Narcoterrorism

Controlling the drug trade through secret government agencies or actually using these agencies to traffic drugs

Obtaining financial power for the secret operations that cannot be carried out openly by a state and destabilizing opponent governments.

Criminal Narcoterrorism

Employment of terrorist-like tactics by drug trafficking organizations

Protecting and increasing wealth and cultivation land.

(Cakir, 2002)

Drugs are easy to transport and are not easily caught. The illegality of drugs makes

them a highly sought after resource for terrorists given there high profit margins and little

susceptibility to economic swings. (Cornell, 2005b) The use of drug money by organized

crime and non-state actors i.e. terrorist groups has been increasing since the end of the

Cold war when support for terrorism by state governments dried up. (Makarenko, 2003)

“As state financing declined, non-state violent actors gradually overcame their aversion

to financing from organized crime.” (Cornell, 2005b)

As this financing dried up terrorists had had to begin using drug money to assist

their organizations. Many convinced their support bases that drug and drug money were

furthering there cause due to the fact that they not only received money from the sale of

drugs, but also the drugs were seen as a way to destabilize the country they were being

consumed in, namely Western Democracies. These terrorist groups up until they began

using drug money had been able to convince themselves and their support groups that

they had very altruistic aims, however, after they began using the money from drug sales

it has become harder to maintain this altruistic ideal.

The line between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations

continues to blur, to the point now where it is very difficult to make a definitive

determination and place a group in one category or the other. The difficulty comes from

adaptability and ever changing nature of terrorist groups and drug trafficking

organizations. You will note later on in this article that most of the drug trafficking

organizations in Latin America grew out of left and right wing paramilitary groups that

opposed the governments in the region.

The Colombian government classified these groups as terrorist organizations and as

the groups have continued to evolve over time in order to evade detection and ultimately

capture. They continued to employ the terrorist tactics they once used to fight for a cause

to increase their money and assets in the region. Originally, this change in tactics, to

using drug money, was out of the need to further finance their organizations. However, it

quickly became a question of how much money could be made and industrious morally

loose people quickly moved into power and changed the vary nature of these groups.

These groups eventually evolved into nothing more then drug trafficking rings, however,

they still use the rhetoric from when they were first established to try and sway public

opinion. However, the main players in the groups now are mainly concerned with profits

and gaining more material assets with which to expand the drug trade and drug profits

with.

The shift in goals of these groups has been a constant thorn in the side of law

enforcement. Money is a powerful incentive to keep fighting and the cultivation of drugs

produces huge sums of money that the traffickers and terrorists alike want to keep viable.

The scramble after 9/11 to address terrorism funding and limit the access terrorist groups

have to such funding has increased the appeal of using drugs to finance terror, as drugs

are a fairly secure market in which no significant gains have been made in curb drug

trafficking or the market for consumption. (Sanderson, 2004)

Columbia and Afghanistan are both well known to have long established ties to

terrorism and the drug trade. Each has been a chief cultivation area for coca or opium

poppy, while at the same time each has suffered from a long term armed conflict.

(Cornell, 2005b) Both countries have active terrorist groups operating within their

borders and have contributed massive quantities of narcotics to the drug trade. A lesser

know group that has been linked heavily with heroin and cocaine trafficking is Hezbollah

who normally operate out of Lebanon, but have recently begun drug trafficking

operations in other countries outside of the middle-east, such as, Paraguay, Brazil, and

Argentina. The problems these groups create are not simply contained within the borders

of these countries but also spill over and create regional and worldwide problems. The

US Drug Enforcement Agency believes that up to 60% of groups on the United States

‘Foreign Terrorist Organization List’ have links to drugs and that 19 of the 43 groups on

the list have been definitively linked with the drug trade. (Levitt, 2009) Interpol agrees

that drugs have become the predominant means for funding terrorism. (Zeese, 2001)

Drug Traffickers

As of 2009, the U.S. State Department has officially classified three organizations

working within Columbia as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO); the National

Liberation Army (ELN), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), and the

United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC). (State, 2009) These groups, which are

based in Columbia, bring in a great deal of money from the illegal drug trade. This

money is used for organizational expenses and for financing terrorist operations.

(Judiciary, 2003b) Such as the December 2009 kidnapping and death of Luis Francisco

Cuellar, the Governor of Caquetá, Colombia at the hands of FARC leaders.

The United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC) “is an umbrella organization

which organizes 13 different self-defense groups” (Judiciary, 2003b) AUC claims its

goals are solely the defense and protection of sponsors in areas that lack adequate

governmental structures from insurgent attacks. However, it must be noted here that what

is meant by defense and protection of sponsors is really only the defense and protection

of the people and land that coca is grown on. Therefore, they fight mainly with the

government, other drug trafficking operations, and the local people who do not want their

land taken or do not wish to cooperate with drug trafficking. Operations undertaken in the

name of the AUC include: assassination, engaging guerilla combat units, kidnappings,

massacres and bombings all of which are considered terrorist acts when put in the context

of the War on Drugs. According to Hanson, “there are three types of armed groups:

paramilitaries that did not demobilize [after democratic control of Colombia was restored

in 1958]; groups in collusion with drug cartels; and criminal gangs that have arisen to

fight for a share of the drug trade.” (Hanson, 2008a) These groups all work under the

heading of AUC and claim allegiance to them.

“In 2001, the AUC killed at least 1,015 civilians, a statistic that greatly surpasses

the 197 civilians killed by the FARC.” (Garcia, 2002b) The use of very deadly tactics

such as bombings and massacres are aimed at displacing the civilian populations so that

the group can take control of very rich farmland and increase their production of coca.

This group operates as if it were an actual military organization; it is fully supplied with

arms and equipment, it also pays salaries to its members and has a military type chain of

comnad. “In 2000, AUC leader Carlos Castano claimed 70 percent of the AUC’s

operational costs were financed with drug- related earnings.” (Judiciary, 2003b) It also

now operates with a cell type of terrorist organization to help avoid any infiltration from

law enforcement and information leaks with in the group to the outside.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) has as its objective to

overthrow the government of Columbia and replace the government with a socialist

dictatorship. FARC is known for using a variety of terrorist tactics including; bombings,

extortion, assassinations, kidnappings, and engaging in guerilla warfare with the

Columbian police and military. Although the many of these terrorist tactics bring in

money for the organization, drug trafficking is the main source of income for the group.

“It appears that much of their agenda is based upon protecting and exploiting drug-

trafficking operations in Columbia and the region.” (Judiciary, 2003c) Research has show

that as early as the 1980’s FARC began working on its relationships with the Columbian

drug cartels and began assisting them with logistical concerns such as protection and

movement of illegal drugs. “Today, they are involved in all the processes of drug

trafficking from taxing the cultivators of the coca and poppy plants, to controlling the

manufacturing laboratories and even distributing the drugs themselves.” (Garcia, 2002a)

According to testimony by US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Deborah A.

McCarthy “revenue received from narcotics cultivation, taxation and distribution

provided at least half of the funding that the FARC rely on to support their terrorist

activities” (Judiciary, 2003a) It is not believed that they engage in any type of terrorist

operations outside of Latin America. It is estimated that they also take in between $500

million and $600 million annually from kidnappings, extortion, and unofficial taxes it

levies on the areas it controls for ‘protection’ and social services. (Hanson, 2009)

According to a study by Diaz & Sanchez, 47% of communities, which were

involved in the growing of coca, had FARC activity as well, where the control group of

non-coca growing communities only 28% had FARC activity. (Diaz and Sanchez, 2004)

It is believed that of the 110 operational units, similar to a military division, in the

country at least 60 of them are involved directly with drug trade. FARC has been known

to have operational bases in the South Eastern one-third of the country, a heavily

mountainous and jungle-laden part of the country. (Hanson, 2009)

The National Liberation Army (ELN) has for many years conducted terrorist

operations in Columbia. ELN has favored kidnappings and bombings as their preferred

method to raise funds, not unlike the FARC. The aim is to control more territory and

make as much money as possible using the drug trade, shakedowns and kidnappings of

rich members of society. The ELN has focused on building up their military power and

the group’s members have engaged in quite a bit of social work as well. ELN is the

smallest of the three groups operating in Columbia. This may in part be due to the fact

that the ELN has not engaged as actively in the drug trade as the other two groups.

(Judiciary, 2003c)

In 2006, ELN realigned its priorities to gain more influence in urban areas. “There

are indications that it would like official political recognition, but it has not stated clearly

what such recognition would entail.” (Hanson, 2009) ELN operates almost wholly in

northeastern Colombia. The group receives support from roughly 3,000 members and it is

rumored that there are an additional 3-4,000 active supporters of the group. (Hanson,

2009)

Recently, there has been evidence collected by the US Government to support the

idea that FARC has been reaching out to international terrorist organizations and seeking

a state sponsor for additional technical expertise and money. (Judiciary, 2003a) The IRA

and FARC have been definitively linked through several court cases and the admissions

of Sinn Fin, there is also speculation that the group has ties with HAMAS and ETA in

Spain.

There has been some suggestion that Venezuela has offered FARC both monetary

and operational assistance. If this is proven true it is highly likely that Venezuela will be

added to the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. (Hanson, 2008b)

Most recently members of ETA and FARC have been indicted by a Spanish judge of

assisting one another in attempted attacks on Colombian officials in Spain, the

investigation showed both groups received assistance from the Venezuelan government.

(Channel, 2010) Both members of FARC and ELN often cross over the border into

Venezuela to avoid detection by members of the Colombian Military and police forces

conduction sweeps. The territories directly adjacent to Colombia in Venezuela and

Ecuador have become notorious for safely harboring the drug trade and other illegal

activities. (Hanson, 2009)

The shift away from ideological based conflict and towards only controlling the

drug trade has been a slow process for FARC and ELN. However, it is hard to deny this

shift has taken place. Both have entered into alliances with drug cartels, protected the

cultivation of drugs in the region, and increasingly become involved in drug trafficking

themselves. It now seems that both FARC and ELN have at their core the thirst for profits

and are no longer as concerned with ideological reasons for fighting. (Cornell, 2007)

Very few if any of the locals still support these groups as legitimate resistance

movements and now understand acutely the gravity of the drug problem in Latin

America.

Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) have begun operating

in the region as well. Members of these organizations have become members of the

communities in the tri-border area (Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil) setting up

businesses and generally integrating themselves into the community. They raise large

amounts of money by controlling the sale and movement of illegal contraband.

(Judiciary, 2003b) Hezbollah and HAMAS have traditionally avoided the drug trade on

religious objections the Qur’an prohibits the use of any form of intoxicant and in general

any type of ‘unlawful behavior’. (Ali, 1975) However, the FBI believes that drug

trafficking has become a major source of funding for the organizations in recent years. In

2002, US authorities broke up a drug ring in which was providing pseudoephedrine to

drug rings in the US Southwest. The individuals were directly linked to several middle

eastern countries and the money was tracked being placed in bank accounts that have

been used by HAMAS and Hezbollah. (Holguin, 2002)

Although there are no direct ties between the organizations and the drug trade a

great deal of the profits end up in Hezbollah and HAMAS’s bank accounts. (Judiciary,

2003c) A senior US official has said that “the early evidence suggests that groups like

Hamas and Hezbollah benefit far more from U.S.-based funds than Osama bin Laden's al

Qaeda network.” (Holguin, 2002) The two most recognizable groups who have major

connections with the drug trade and trafficking illegal narcotics are the Taliban in

Afghanistan and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Terrorist Groups

Afghanistan and the Taliban have been directly linked with narcoterrorism. Al-

Qaeda’s involvement with the Taliban both politically and economically has been public

knowledge for sometime. (Committee, 2009, Cornell, 2005a, Shaffer, 2005)

Ideologically, the Taliban were opposed to the use and production of drugs, drug

consumption was strictly forbidden, but due to the fragile economy in Afghanistan,

opium production and trade continued out of sheer financial necessity. The Taliban have

been directly involved in growing, producing, shipping, and distributing heroin since the

end of the Soviet-Afghan conflict. “Antidrug officials in Afghanistan have no hard

figures on how much al-Qaeda and the Taliban are earning from drugs, but conservative

estimates run to tens of millions of dollars.” (Mcgirk, 2004)

The end of the Soviet-Afghan conflict created a power vacuum in the country that

lead to an Islamic Fundamentalist organization seizing power after a civil war for control

of the country. The lack of government and effective security in the country during the

civil war made it very easy for a well-organized al-Queda to impose their will on the

country and promote their interests within the government and the country in general. “It

soon became clear that Taliban rule was detrimental to Afghan and international security,

as evidenced by their sanctioning of continuing narcotics production -despite its un-

Islamic quality- and shelter for al-Qaeda and other terrorists.” (Gandhi, 2003)

Historically, opium poppies have been the crop of choice for farmers in Southern

Afghanistan. Poppy is easy to transport due to its low weight, doesn’t require much

aftermarket care (refrigeration, quick sale to market, storage, etc.), and has an almost

guaranteed market. Poppy production for the most part provides stability in income that

many other corps such as fruits and vegetables do not.

“To ensure a minimum level of food security, those households without land, or

with insufficient land to meet their basic needs, seek to obtain access to land through

either tenancy or sharecropping arrangements.” (Mansfield, 2002) For years, the growing

of opium was promoted through the use of alternate payment systems that calculated the

amount of rent a farmer needed to pay on the basis of how much poppy the land could

grow and created a system of credit based on what was expected as opposed to what

actually was. Landowners would require their payment whether the crop did well or

poorly it made no difference. This created a situation where the poor landless farmers

were saddled with the financial risk of growing poppies rather then landowner. (Corti and

Swain, 2009) In Southern Afghanistan “opium has come to represent a commodity to be

exchanged, not only for the purchase of food but as the means for achieving food

security, providing the resource poor with access to land for agricultural production and

credit during times of food scarcity.” (Mansfield, 2002)

The US has chosen to deal with the drug problems that are plaguing the country and

becoming a major source of funds for the insurgency with a simple eradication policy.

Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood believed that because the US had

several wins against drug traffickers in Colombia using the eradication policy that it

would work for Afghanistan in the same way. (Relations, 2009) The US policy has

created great hardship for the farmers who have their crops eradicated. A major part of

any eradication policy must be alternative crop development. Unfortunately, in

Afghanistan this has not been the case and many farmer have become resentful and

uncooperative with the efforts to move to a legal agricultural product. “The fact is that

US counter-narcotics efforts- with eradication in the driver’s seat- were artificially

separated from broader efforts to deal with the insurgency and even drove some farmers

and landowners into the arms of the Taliban because it failed to provide alternative

livelihood options.” (Relations, 2009)

SIDE BAR

Drug eradication policies began in the 1960’s with the US war on drugs and were

originally aimed at coca production. The actual eradication is done in various ways now,

mainly through the spraying of chemicals that kill the plants or through manual

destruction of the plants where people actually go through the fields either cutting,

burning or knocking down the plants dependent on what type of drug is being eradicated.

There are several issues that are associated with drug eradication which have caused

much controversy throughout the years. One of the most sever problems that drug

eradication opponents cite is that eradicating the crops rarely hurts the suppliers who

have vast amounts of crops and only angers the local population that depends on the

crops for their survival. In addition, it is extremely difficult to separate legal crops from

illegal crops in terms of eradication as they are often grown side by side making it

difficult if not impossible to only eradicate the illegal crops creating even more hardship

for local populations. Drug eradication also causes scarcity in the economic sense driving

up demand and prices for the drugs which were eradicated, making it much more

profitable for the drug producers and distributors.

Many small farmers are growing poppies because it is the only crop that they can

support their families with. “From the point of view of Afghan farmers, eradicators of

poppy cultivations are the main source of their insecurity.” (Corti and Swain, 2009)

Many farmers would choose to grow other crops if they were available and financially

viable. However, due to the years of neglect in the infrastructure of Afghanistan it is

almost impossible for the farmers to grow, store, and ship legal goods. There are no

irrigation or cultivation resources for the farmers to grow crops that need more care in a

hostile agricultural environment. The storage facilities for perishables goods such as

fruits and wheat have all but been destroyed or occupied by poppy growers. The roads

and transportation needed to get legal crops to market no longer exist in the country due

to a series of civil and wars as well as neglect from the nonexistent government in the

periods of conflict. “Many peasant farmers find themselves trapped by debt, and feel they

are left with no alternative but to grow opium poppy, which can be stored for long

periods and is more easily transported.” (Relations, 2009)

The Taliban and insurgents in the region make growing poppies exceptionally easy.

They provide farmers with loans to support themselves with and seeds at the beginning of

the planting season, which they deliver to the farmer. When it comes to caring for the

fields and harvesting the crop the Taliban provides men to do whatever is necessary, from

supplying additional people to harvest the poppies, providing armed men to fight any

eradication efforts, to providing bribes to the necessary government officials to ensure

that the fields are not included in any eradication plans. The Taliban also come and

collect the crop from the farmer, alleviating any troubles that the farmer may have in

transporting the crop or selling the poppies to outside processors. (Relations, 2009)

“The Tabliban has transformed itself into something closer to the Mafia then a

traditional insurgency, particularly in its strong hold of southern Afghanistan.”

(Relations, 2009) Insurgent groups in the region often have a great deal of autonomy and

are now working with drug traffickers. The insurgents generally cooperate with the

traffickers so that they are able to raise money to fund operations. While the traffickers

work in conjunction with the insurgents merely out of opportunity and to gain access to a

high quality product. The trafficker’s main motivation is profit and they have no interest

in the morality of doing business with the insurgents.

The Taliban runs a sophisticated taxation system that supplies them with the funds

necessary to sustain the insurgency. The way the system works is:

“Taliban commanders charge poppy farmers a 10 percent tax, called an ushr, on the product at the farm gate. Taliban fighters augment their pay by working in the poppy fields during harvest. Small traders who collect opium paste from the farmers pay the Taliban a tax, and truckers pay them a transit tariff for each kilo of opium paste or heroin

smuggled out of the country. The Taliban is paid for protecting the labs where the paste is turned into heroin. Finally, the biggest source of drug money for the Taliban is the regular payments made by the large drug trafficking organizations to the Quetta shura, the governing body of the Taliban whose leaders live in Quetta, the Pakistani boarder city.” (Relations, 2009) The type of insurgency the Taliban is fighting in Afghanistan is cheap to fund and easy to

organize. According to several sources within both the US government and the Afghan

government it is estimated that the Taliban is funding the insurgency on roughly $125

million a year. US forces have begun calling Taliban fighters the ‘$10 Taliban’ because

that is what they are paid for one day of fighting. Although, the rate goes up if they plant

improvised explosive devices or are responsible for the kidnapping or killing of soldiers.

(Committee, 2009) This may not seem like a great deal of money, but if you take in

comparison what the average household income is for a year $800 which averages out to

about $2 a day, it is a highly profitable endeavor to work for the Taliban. (Agency, 2010)

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in a June 2009 report has said,

“opium poppy cultivation continued to be associated with insecurity. Almost the entire

opium poppy-cultivating area was located in regions characterized by high levels of

insecurity.” (Relations, 2009) There are media reports that Al-Qaeda and Osama bin-

Laden have been financially involved in Afghanistan’s heroin trade as well. “Through the

taxation of illicit opium production, the Taliban were able to fund an infrastructure

capable of supporting and protecting Osama bin-Laden and the Al-Qaeda organization.”

(Judiciary, 2003b) However, there are a growing number of analysts and experts that are

beginning to believe that Al-Queda is having a reduced impact in the region and

financing from Afghanistan’s poppies is not finding its way into the Al-Queda coffers as

easily as it had before the US invasion. As the number of poppy producers and farmers

go up it is harder and harder to control flow of drugs and money in both directions, to the

farmers and to the manufacturers.

Hezbollah is Lebanese based and is organized into two sections; a political wing

and a military wing. The main goal of the organization has continued to be the expulsion

of Israel from Southern Lebanon. They continue to violently fight against Israeli interests

anywhere in the world. (Lee, 2007) The group makes use of bombings, suicide attacks,

kidnappings, extortion, sniper attacks and launching rockets to further its goals. It has

also become a large provider of necessary public services such as health care and

distributing food and water to those in need. “Intelligence officials believe that

Hizbollah’s drug profits help pay for “social welfare” programs that have enabled the

group to gain popular support in its home base of Lebanon.” (Stakelbeck, 2004) This has

made the classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization a very challenging process

for law enforcement around the world due to the fact that the organization is

democratically elected and group provides “a range of philanthropic and commercial

activities including hospitals, medical centers, schools, orphanages, rehabilitation centers

for the handicapped, supermarkets, gas stations, construction companies, a radio station

(Nur) and public service television station (Al Manar).” (Hizbullah, 2010) In addition,

until the mid-nineties they were also responsible for providing a great deal of the utilities

in Beruit.

Hezbollah has a long record of illegal activity in the Islamic world emerging after

the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. “While Hezbollah is involved in a wide variety of

criminal activity, ranging from cigarette smuggling to selling counterfeit products, the

connection between drugs and terror is particularly strong.” (Levitt, 2009) Since 9/11 the

role of drugs in funding Hezbollah’s operations has continuously increased. There are

large populations of Lebanese citizens in the South American tri-border region and in

West Africa. The Lebanese in West Africa have become "market-dominant minority," a

term used by Amy Chua, she notes, "the extent of Lebanese market dominance in Sierra

Leone – historically and at present – is astounding." (Chua, 2002) The Lebanese

domination in Sierra Leone is only one example the pattern is repeated through out West

Africa. Hezbollah uses these expatriate groups to organize and manage their drug

trafficking operations. (Levitt, 2009) “Operatives from the terrorist organizations

Hizbollah, Hamas, and according to some reports, al-Qaeda, are able to conduct arms-for-

drugs deals with secular Latin American terrorist groups like the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Peru’s Sendero Luminosos (Shining Path).”

(Stakelbeck, 2004)

Hezbollah has historically been funded and supplied by Iran, however; recently

Hezbollah has been using a greater amount of drug money to fund its operations and

social services that it provides to the Lebanese people. (Lee, 2007) The increasing

activity in Latin America “is a concern principally because of the connections between

the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah.” (Stavridis,

2009) Many see the increase in Hezbollah’s activities as a shift to a new more aggressive

Iran. Many in the US government believe strongly that Hezbollah’s activities of recent

are attempts by the Iranian government to reach out to local government who in the past

have been anti-American and begin relations with those who are willing to listen.

(Prothero, 2009)

In August of 2008, a major Colombian/Hezbollah drug smuggling ring was

dismantled in the tri-border region of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. The DEA was able

to place an undercover officer in the money laundering portion of the ring, which lead to

any different areas and allowed the officer to gather intelligence on many of the groups

operations. The profits of this drug trafficking ring went directly into the coffers of

Hezbollah. (Kraul and Rotella, 2008) The profits were in excess of $1 million from the

sale of small amounts of drugs which are easily transported with out detection in the

region. (Senate, 2009) “Chekry Harb, a Lebanese national who uses the nickname

“Taliban”, was arrested as the leader of the group and described by Colombian and US

authorities as a “world-class money launderer” who cycled hundreds of millions of

dollars a year in drug proceeds through banks from Panama to Hong Kong to Beirut.”

(Prothero, 2009) As recently as October of 2009, a second Hezbollah drug smuggling and

money-laundering ring was broken up in the same tri-border region of Paraguay,

Argentina, and brazil. This ring was responsible for sending hundreds of thousands of

dollars to Hezbollah in Lebanon to support their operations there. In addition, these

Hezbollah rings were able to support and offer assistance to radical Islamic groups

plotting to blow up major fuel lines at New York’s JFK airport in 2007. (Stavridis, 2009)

Hezbollah also has operatives in United States and Canada and has been implicated

in drug rings in these countries. The Hezbollah cells in these two countries have been

accused of distributing large quantities of pseudoephedrine, which is one of the main

ingredients in methamphetamine. (Lee, 2007) The groups were purchasing

pseudoephedrine in Canada, an ingredient in many cold medicines, and smuggling it into

the US to sell to Mexican drug cartels in the US Southwest. The pseudoephedrine was

then used to produce methamphetamine and sold throughout the US. (Press, 2002)

Argentina has also felt the presence of Hezbollah very acutely through two attacks

that took place in the country. It is believed that in 1992, Hezbollah with the help of the

Iranian intelligence service detonated a large bomb under the Israeli embassy in Buenos

Aires, Argentina. Following in 1994, a second bombing occurred at the Asociacion

Mutual Israelita in Buenos Aires. A suicide bomber drove a van into the building causing

over 85 deaths, most of them Israeli. (Norton, 2009) The two Argentinean attack shows

that Hezbollah has had a presence in Latin America for almost 20 years, so it is no

surprise that they have crossed paths with the drug traffickers and begun networking with

them and supplementing Hezbollah coffers with drug money.

One of the main concerns for law enforcement in the US is that Lebanon and many

countries in the EU do not recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, classifying it

instead as either a legitimate political party or a valid political resistance organization.

This means that the terrorist financing laws do not affect Hezbollah so as long as they and

their supporters abide by international and Lebanese law regarding financial transactions

and reporting they are not subject to any forfeiture of assets or repercussions for raising

money for the group. (Affairs, 2009) “In South America, businesses run by members of

sizeable Shiite communities in Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina and

other countries often serve as cover for Hezbollah fund-raising cells.” (Prothero, 2009)

Another concern that many in the international community have is that there have

been several cases where Hezbollah is paying for covert intelligence gathering by

promising large amounts of drugs to the would be mole. In this way Hezbollah is able to

know the workings of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and with little chance of

interception bring large quantities of drugs into Israel. (Kulick, 2009) The IDF officer

gave Hezbollah informants’ details about the military patrols along the border with

Lebanon, as well as the number and location of the troops along the boarder. “The

information was used to facilitate drug smuggling across the border while circumventing

Israeli authorities.” (Azoulay et al., 2008) Hezbollah sees this as one of many ways of

destabilizing the Israeli government and continuing its fight against their occupation of

Southern Lebanon.

How do they move the money?

“The global war on terrorism- pursued by the west- has made it more difficult for

terrorist groups to finance their activities.” (Corti and Swain, 2009) The increased

awareness of the west has created a need for terrorist organizations to find other sources

of funding; many have turned to illegal and illicit markets for this funding. Groups that

hold territory, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, find it much easier to control

production and cultivation of drugs. While groups such as Al-Qaeda who have no defined

base of operation and certainly no safe space in which to grow and cultivate drugs, find

that it is easier to control the money laundering or the distribution routes that are

associated with drugs. (Felbab-Brown, 2006)

Normally, money laundering is an integral part of drug trafficking. However, in

Afghanistan, the due to the almost complete lack of financial facilities in the regions

where poppies are grown a system called ‘hawala’ is used extensively. The US state

department estimates that up to 80% of all banking that takes place in Afghanistan is

done through hawaladers and no record is kept after the transaction. (Napoleoni, 2003)

“Convenience, security and secrecy make hawala the method of choice for Afghanistan’s

drug traffickers to move and disguise profits with little or no paper trail.” (Relations,

2009)

There are many variants of this system, but in general the system allows a user to

deposit money in one location or country with a ‘hawaladar’ and withdrawal the money

in another country with a different ‘hawalader’ with minimum paperwork or red tape.

The system is very effective and used heavily by terrorist groups and criminal

organizations. Normally, a terrorist will give a large amount of money to a hawalader in

one location, then pick up the money from another hawalader in a different country. This

means that the first hawalader owes the second for the amount of the transaction,

“accounts are settled through additional transactions, commodity exchanges, and normal

banking services.” (Relations, 2009)

Funds are distributed and traded between families and people associated with this

system without ever calling attention to themselves, as no banks are ever involved, little

paperwork or records are kept to identify individuals using this system and those records

that are kept are too fragmented to lead back to the original recipient. (Hoffman, 2006)

Since hawala is so ingrained into the culture of the Middle East it is normally continued

on through families, with many generations working within the hawala system. It is for

this reason that it is so difficult for law enforcement to infiltrate the system and stop it

from being used for illegal transactions. Obviously, dealers that handle drug money or

terrorist money are even more secretive and rarely keep the records after a transaction is

complete, if they keep any record at all. (Relations, 2009)

After drug traffickers and/or terrorists have moved the money they need to store the

money. Ever increasingly the place for doing that is the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The US State department has noted that drug money and terrorist money connected to

UAE has become more frequent in recent years. In attempts to make itself a financial

center for the Middle East UAE has enacted some strict laws on hawalader’s requiring

there registration and compliance with regulatory standards that have been set up to catch

money laundering and terrorist financing. “The Financial Action Task Force, a Paris-

based intergovernmental body that develops and promotes policies to combat money

laundering and terrorist financing, criticized the UAE for failing to exercise regulatory

controls over hawala dealers despite its laws.” (Force, 2008)

Hawala is not the only way to move money around the globe increasingly couriers

are being used to move money. Dubai has extraordinarily loose laws associated with

couriers. Couriers often enter Dubai’s international airport with suitcases filled with cash.

Generally, so long as the courier declares the money there is no attempt to stop them or

figure out if the money is from illicit sources. The US would like to see the government

investigating these couriers and keeping a database of couriers so that it can track them

more effectively and use the information in any intelligence gathering required.

(Relations, 2009)

Failed States and Their Impact on Narcoterrorism

The one thing that most of the countries who are struggling with terrorist

organizations and/or drug traffickers have in common is that at one point in their histories

if not currently they would fall into the category of failed states. Most people think of a

‘state’ more commonly as a country. A country being a political entity that has control of

a specific area of land and is responsible for the protection and well being of the people

within those borders. That means then that a failed state is one where the government is

not able to maintain control over their population and/or territory, for example Somalia

and The Sudan are considered failed states, as their governments are no longer

functioning or in control of the country. “In short, the failed state argument maintains that

the inability of a state to control its own territory creates a vacuum of power from which

the non-state actor can usurp state power and enjoy a freedom of action within the state.”

(Wahlert, 2009)

Failed states have even further reaching security concerns, beyond their oven

borders they create instability in a region and play havoc with the border controls and law

enforcement mechanisms in surrounding countries. The main concern when talking about

terrorism and failed states is the ability of non-state actors to take control of land and

resources and use them as they see fit. What this means for the purposes of terrorism is

that terrorist groups can achieve and maintain a certain territory that they control and use

in whatever way they like. This has been seen over and over again in recent years;

Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Somalia and Chechnya have all suffered from this type of

terrorist infiltration.

The lack of government control in a failed state leaves huge swaths of land open for

use by drug traffickers and terrorist. Creating terrorist training camps and the growing of

narcotics has become synonymous with the failed state. The lack of control makes it very

easy for these groups to do whatever they like without ever fearing any kind of law

enforcement intervention. “Once removed from the economic benefits inherent to the

interdependent structure of the contemporary global system, a failed state turns to

narcotics, terrorism, and other criminal activities in order to compensate for its

disconnection from the global community.” (Wahlert, 2009)

Once these illegal groups, i.e. terrorists or drug traffickers, move in makes it almost

impossible for the citizens in the areas controlled by these groups to do anything about it.

There is no police or military force to control the illegal activities and many of the locals

get pulled into the activities of the groups by shear necessity of survival. These groups

provide money and protection during times of crisis and in a situation where there is no

viable alternative for making money to support families and themselves or provide for the

protection of their families locals often cooperate with the terrorists or drug traffickers to

ensure their continued survival.

After these illegal actors take up residence in a failed state they are able to grow

and thrive. Groups in these situations are no longer worrying about getting caught if they

are doing or planning illegal activities. The lack of control and freedom illegal groups are

granted by default allows them to grow and expand their networks, organize and train

members, as well as, plan and implement attacks knowing that they have a safe haven to

escape to after the attack is committed. The drug trafficker and terrorist thrive in anarchy

and use the lack of government to impose their will and do as they see fit in a failed state.

Several authorities on failed states note that there are some indicators that a state is

in crisis and is about to become a failed state.

1. Rulers may corrupt the government and use the resources of the government for their own purposes,

2. Corrupt elites act together with terrorists, drug traffickers, or other illegal groups with in the country to take control of the materials and resources the country holds,

3. Specific areas do not have the same amount of control that the rest of the country has and therefore are more prone to illegal activities,

4. Transitioning from an authoritarian regime the state loses control of the country due to general lawlessness and loss of authority. (Fukuyama, 2004, Crocker, 2003)

These indicators make it fairly easy to spot failing states if one knows what to look for.

The question then becomes what to do about a failing state.

Due to the fact that almost all of the solutions that address how to combat

narcoterrorism require a functioning state it is imperative that the global community

address failing states and deal with them accordingly. This has become one of the major

problems in the globalization of the economic community; to take part in a globalizing

world, states must have a functioning government capable of making and upholding

agreements and dealing with international situations and trade. (Lee, 2007)

In the past the, world has simply ignored failed states, this is no longer a viable

solution due to globalization. Failed states no longer keep to themselves they harbor

criminals and terrorists and create global insecurity by doing so. Rober Rotberg a leading

expert on state failure has suggested four ways of bringing states out of failure and

making them viable in the globalized world;

1. Improve economic conditions, 2. Reintroduce the rule of law, 3. Reestablish political institutions 4. Create new opportunities for civil society to thrive. (Rotberg, 2002) It is believed that these four improvements will work for areas experiencing terrorism and

drug trafficking from a local source, but they don’t address the problems associated with

larger more advanced groups such as Al-Qaeda which is globalized itself and can move

into new territory and take advantage of what is available at the time and move quickly to

new territory when it needs to.

Take for example, Afghanistan, which has been considered a failed state since the

early 1980’s. The authority of the Karzai government certainly doesn’t reach out side of

Kabul, if even that far. There is a vast amount of corruption in the government and

warlords and/or Taliban forces control most of the countryside. This has put the

government in a position where they must accommodate the corruption and acquiesce to

the demands of these warlords to get anything done. This has made it almost impossible

to reintroduce the Rule of Law, create political institutions that actually work or for civil

society to recover from the years of corruption and repression. (Djavadi, 2009)

Combating Narcoterrorism

“Drugs may not be responsible for commencement of conflict; there is, however, a

positive correlation with conflict duration, as it could lengthen the life cycle of conflicts.”

(Corti and Swain, 2009) The growing, manufacturing and distribution of narcotics makes

it much more difficult to come to a peace agreement as it reduces the incentives for any

kind of negotiated settlement due to the profitability of the drugs. (Cornell, 2005b) Illicit

organizations don’t want to see their drug profits go away so peace agreements that create

areas that are under the control of law enforcement and are safe spaces for locals to stand

up to these organizations are a liability to the group. They would much rather keep

fighting so that they can continue to reap the rewards of drug trafficking.

Most often the response to drugs by government agencies is to suppress the

production of drugs. The US has within the US Attorneys office specialized agents who’s

whole job it to “disrupt and dismantle command and control structure of major drug

trafficking organizations.” (Kerlikowske, 2009) Suppressing drug production often has

the opposite effect, making the drugs that are being produced highly valuable and the

market for them much greater. (Felbab-Brown, 2007) “Forced eradications, increasing

narcotics seizures and repressive operations have little effectiveness because of the

potentially infinite spatial opportunities of a globalized narco-cultivation network.” (Corti

and Swain, 2009) Completely to the contrary the eradication and seizures often lead to an

increased demand for the drugs increasing the profitability and demand for the drugs. The

“U.S. Government remains committed to a five-pillar counternarcotics strategy consisting

of public information, alternative development, poppy elimination and eradication,

interdiction, and justice reform, but acknowledges that challenges remain.” (Kerlikowske,

2009) However, drug usage trends in the US continue to be stagnant for the most part,

with the exception of a marked increase in Methamphetamine usage nation wide.

(Volkow, 2010)

The populations that are involved in growing and cultivating illegal drugs are often

in poverty stricken areas where cultivating the drugs is one of the only ways to provide

the basic necessities of life. Therefore, when the government comes in and eradicates the

drug crops they may win the battle on drugs temporarily, but they lose valuable resources

such as intelligence, support, and the cooperation of farmers and locals in the war on

terror. This has played out over and over again in both Afghanistan and Colombia. The

villagers and farmers are often forced to work with the drug traffickers and terrorist

organizations solely to make sure that the crop, coca or poppy, is safe from eradication

efforts and with it the village or farmers means to support themselves and their families.

In Afghanistan, the US has begun shifting their policies from one of eradication to

one of alternate livelihoods. US authorities are now more interested in intercepting the

ingredients necessary to process raw poppies into heroin and destroying the sites where

heroin is processes. Although they are not taking eradication off the table altogether as

most believe that having eradication programs in place will encourage farmers to grow

legal crops. However, the only way that growing legal crops is feasible is by having areas

that are lawfully governed, secure and not under the control of the Taliban and the

insurgents in the region. The authorities in the region are now focusing on security, by

protecting civilians from the Taliban and staying in the areas they have taken from

Taliban control, they are hoping to create a productive environment for creating a

democratic government and allowing the farmers in the area to successfully grow legal

crops.

Crop substitution or alternative livelihood programs have been around since the

mid-1980’s when the US tried using them in South America to stop the proliferation of

drug growing in Columbia, Peru and Ecuador. Almost all of these programs have failed

due to the prohibitionist policies on drugs that the western world holds. So long as there

is such high demand for illegal drugs they will continue to be more profitable to grow

then legal crops. According to a July 2007 news article in The New Yorker, farmers

receive “about thirty-three dollars from an acre of wheat, and between five hundred and

seven hundred dollars from an acre of poppies.” (Anderson, 2007) It is often suggested

that alternative livelihood programs simply provide further resources for farmers who

have no plans to grow legal crops. (Carpenter, 2004)

The UK which is assisting the Afghanistan government has suggested that

“targeting narco-barons, maximizing access to markets for farmers, reaching out to

Governors and building effective institutional and international development

arrangements to sustain and expand poppy-free provinces,” (Committee, 2009) is the way

forward. The UN has come up with a strategy for dealing with the drug problem in

Afghanistan, which is a multi pronged attack. “The Plan is based on eight pillars,

including institution building, information campaign, alternative livelihoods, interdiction

and law enforcement, eradication, criminal justice, demand reduction and treatment of

addicts, and regional cooperation.” (Bayer et al., 2005)

The UN report indicates that this approach is only valid in the short term and a

long-term plan for the country must find a way of addressing the drug problem on a

national level. It is agreed that only through a long term commitment to agricultural

development, infrastructure revitalization and economic changes can Afghanistan dig

itself out of the problems associated with the drug trade that currently run rampant in the

country. However, some suggest that it may take over 25 years to full realize an

Afghanistan where the drug trade and opium poppies play no role in the country.

One of the most effective ways to combat this and speed up the process of non-

dependence on growing illegal drugs is to legalize, regulate and create a legal market for

the opium in Afghanistan. (Mullins, 2007) If all the regions of the world were supplied

with morphine to meet their demand extra 134 metric tons of morphine, (representing

1341 metric tons of opium) would be needed, so the need for additional supply is there if

the drug companies were to expand there production and distribution to the rest of the

world. (Development, 2008) It is thought that the only way to stabilize the government,

promote a working democracy and enable a viable economic system is by dealing with

the drug problem in Afghanistan. The International Council on Security and

Development (ICSD) released a feasibility study on exactly how legalizing the drug trade

in Afghanistan would work. Their 2005 report, Poppy for Medicine has a complete

economic model and technical specifications on how this program can be successful in

Afghanistan.

The model calls for a village centered approach to the legalization of poppies for

medical use. Advocating a production procedure for the morphine that would take place

entirely in the villages that grow the poppies. “The entire production process, from seed

to medicine tablet, can be controlled by the village in collaboration with government and

international actors, and all economic profits from medicine sales will remain in the

village, allowing for economic diversification.” (Bayer et al., 2005) This is a win-win

situation for all involved, Afghanistan would gain a legal export that is very lucrative, the

communities would gain a steady and reliable source of income, and the military forces

in the country would be able to focus on their mission to rebuild Afghanistan and remove

the threat of the Taliban from the country and to a limit the Taliban’s influence

internationally.

Creating legal markets for opium has worked well for Turkey and India who

supply almost 80 percent of the world’s legal opium. The farmers are heavily regulated

and are required to sell their crops only to the government who then refines the opium

paste or sells it to pharmaceutical companies to refine and make into medications. Of

course, there are huge repercussions for farmers who are caught selling the opium to

anyone other then the government. This system has been effective due to the standards of

governance in these countries and trust in the rule of law. This is something that is

lacking in Afghanistan and would need to be rectified before a system similar to either

India or Turkey was to be put into place. (Relations, 2009)

The implications of putting in a system of legal poppy growing with out first

ensuring that rule of law and security are in place could be catastrophic for both

Afghanistan and the rest of the world. If legal poppy growing were started now with out

these structures in place there would be both a flood of legal opium to the legal market

and an increase in the demand for illegal opium. This would create a situation where

farmers would be easily tempted to grow as much poppy as possible on all available land

to supply both the pharmaceutical market and the black market with enough opium to

meet demands. (Macdonald, 2008)

It is unrealistic to expect that Alternative Livelihood Programs are going to solve

any problem quickly. They are a long-term strategy for moving areas that are producing

illegal substances into producing viable legal crops. Due to the roll that producing opium

poppy plays in Afghanistan; providing income, creating access to credit, ensuring food

security for the year, it is not possible to only address one roll and hope that the other will

follow. “If opium poppy is to be eliminated, even over a small geographic area, a broad-

based and multisectoral effort is required over a number of years.” (Mansfield and Pain,

2005) During the transition years, one idea that has been batted around, and has proved

effective for years in various regions throughout the world is using crops that have a

short-growing time, such as, varieties of cabbage, tomato and cucumber.

Varying the crops planted allows the farmer to plant several crops during the

growing season, which can run from early spring to late fall, using the same field to plant

several short growing crops in quick succession, in the same amount of time that a crop

with a longer growing time would require. The benefit of this is that the farmer can then

sell several crops over the course of the growing season and earning more money then if

they were growing a crop with a long growing time. This in addition with planting fruit

bearing trees that consistently produce in the long run has been proven effective in

several regions through out the world. (Relations, 2009)

Conclusions

It is clear there is not one simple explanation or definition as to what

narcoterrorism is and why it exists. The same can be said for the solutions that have been

proposed to combat it; there are no sure fire ways to end narcoterrorism. There is a giant

pink elephant in the room, the use of drug profits to fund terrorist activities, that no one

wants to deal with and therefore narcoterrorism has grown in leaps and bounds over the

past decade. It is only since September 11th that the world has begun noticing the trend by

terrorists in using drugs to support their operations and accordingly begun proposing

solutions that were not solely based on what has happened in Latin America. Each area

that produces drugs; Asia, Latin America, The Middle East, and Africa has its own set of

containment and suppression issues and therefore requires different approaches.

Generally, narcoterrorism is broken down into two groups; drug traffickers that

use terrorist methods to increase profits and terrorists who use drugs to find their

organization. Practically though it is very difficult to actually categorize organizations

into one or the other. This is because the lines between the two have blurred considerably

due to the amount of money and power that is involved in narcoterrorism.

Many of the drug traffickers that exist in Latin America and around the world

originally started out as either legitimate resistance groups or terrorist organizations with

a very clear mission and goals. However, over time the corrupting influence of money

and power has changed the core goals and beliefs of the organizations and their leaders,

to the point now that they are no longer considered terrorist organization in the strict

usage of the term, but more of drug trafficking networks and organizations.

As for the groups who continue to be included in the category of terrorist groups

that use drugs for funding there has been a huge shift in the groups to allow for this kind

of financing. For many years the majority of these groups were opposed to drug on a

moral level, they weren’t common criminals; they had morals and were fighting for a

cause that would be undermined if it were known to be using drug money to fund itself.

However, in the current economic and globalized world that is present today it is a

necessary evil for most of these groups. Without the funding that drugs provide they

would not be able to maintain and grow their organizations and would have a

considerably harder time functioning.

The necessity of the times we live in is that any group that is to be viable must

cooperate with other organizations and groups. In terms of terrorist organizations and

drug traffickers it means that they have had to learn to work together and get along. They

now share resources and assist each other with training and money laundering when

necessary. Both terrorist organizations and drug traffickers are adept at laundering dirty

money and moving it around the world, but in recent times there have become very few

places to store the money and even fewer ways to move large amounts of money. This

has created a monopoly for some groups in providing these services to the groups.

Hawala dealers and states that have few financial laws are becoming havens for dirty

money and play an integral part in the world of criminal activities. As of 2008, six

countries were listed in The Financial Action Task Forces list of high-risk and non-

cooperative jurisdictions; Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, São Tomé, and

Príncipe. (Force, 2008)

The issue of how these groups are allowed to operate with relative freedom in

failed states has become a priority for most of the industrialized world. Unfortunately,

research on why and how states fail has created even more questions then it has answered

on the issue of illicit activities taking place in these countries. There also seems to be

much disagreement on the actual practicalities of how to move a state from failure and

bring it back into a part of the functioning international system. The one thing that is

clear about failed states though is their use by illegal groups to increase their functional

and economic capacities.

There have been numerous plans and solutions aimed at eradicating both forms of

narcoterrorism, obviously there is not right or wrong answer in this case. It seems that

each of the proposed solutions has its merits, but none will function independently from

the other reforms that are necessary to bring a county out of a failed state status.

Basically, it boils down to the fact that everything must be effectively dealt with slowly

and systematically. There is no one fix that will solve the problem overnight and only

through addressing the greater issues of why narcoterrorism exists will the international

system be effective in its effort to eradicate this source of terrorist funding.

As for the drug traffickers that use terrorist methods to control and increase their

profits most of the same logic in dealing with terrorist organizations apply. Until the root

causes of the failed states that they operate out of and the global prohibitionist policies

that the world takes on drugs are addressed there will not be a significant improvement in

the proliferation of these groups. As these groups function solely for the purpose of

gaining more money it seems logical that when the money dries up so will these

organizations. The only way to make the money dry up is to make drugs legal and create

legal markets for those drugs. In addition it is also necessary to address the societal

problems that drugs create.

We have come to a point in history where the international community must

accept the current realities that drugs play within terrorism and the enormous amounts of

money that drug traffickers are able to accumulate. The challenge now has become, how

to most effectively deal with the problems these two groups create. It is only through

moving forward and accepting the realities that any successes will be made.

Prohibitionist policies and the refusal to acknowledge the role that drugs play in terrorism

has created a massive source of funding that is open for whoever is the most ingenious to

grab and use at will. Addressing the roots of terrorism and drug trafficking is the only

true way to move forward and create a more secure globalized world.

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