Nancy Sherman - Aristotle on Friendship and Shared Life

7/27/2019 Nancy Sherman - Aristotle on Friendship and Shared Life

1/26

International Phenomenological Society

Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared LifeAuthor(s): Nancy ShermanSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Jun., 1987), pp. 589-613Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230 .

Accessed: 30/09/2013 03:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 142.103.160.110 on Mon, 30 Sep 2013 03:13:58 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips


2/26

PhilosophyndPhenomenologicalesearchVol. XLVII, No. 4, June 987

AristotlenFriendshipandthe hared ifeNANCY SHERMANYale University

Inthispaper want to consider hevalueoffriendshiprom nAristote-lianpointofview. The issue s of currentnterestiven ecent hallengestoimpartialistthics otake more eriouslyhecommitmentsndattach-ments f a person.' nwhatfollows want to enter hatdebate nonlyrestricted ay by strengtheninghechallenge rticulatedn Aristotle'ssystematicefense ffriendshipnd the shared ife.After ome introductoryemarks, begin byconsidering ristotle'snotion hatgood living rhappiness eudaimonia)2 or n individual ec-essarily ncludesthehappinessof others.Sharedhappinessentailstherational apacity orointly romotingommon ndsaswell as the apac-ity oidentifyith ndcoordinate eparate nds.This extended otion fhappinesspresupposes he extension fself hrough riends,ndnextRecent hallenges ome from awrenceBlum,Friendship, ltruism,nd Morality Bos-ton: Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1980); BernardWilliams,"Persons, Character ndMorality" n Moral Luck (New York: CambridgeUniversity ress, 98i), pp. i-id;JohnCottingham, Ethicsand Impartiality," hilosophical tudies43 (i983): 84-99;and AndrewOldenquist,"Loyalties,"TheJournal fPhilosophy 9 (i98z): 173-93.The impartialistlaims we treat elf nd those extensions f self s one among others,giving he nterestsfothers he ameweight s we giveour own. The opponent rguesthat he ommitmentsnd attachmentsfa persondeserve pecialtreatment,nd with-out them ife acks valueandmeaning. he debate has stirred antians ndutilitariansalike tofind ositionswithin heir heories hat re friendliero thegoodsoffriendship.StephenDarwall explores he utilitariannd Kantianreplyn "Impartialistthics ndPersonalRelationship" unpublished).A morerecent ersion f hispaper s "Why Par-ticularistshould be Liberals" forthcoming).arbaraHerman articulateshe Kantianposition n "Rules, Motives, and Helping Actions,"Philosophical tudies45 (i984):369-77.Cf. her"MutualAidandRespectforPersons," thics94 (i984): 577-60? and"Integritynd Impartiality,"he Monist 66 (i983): ?33-50.Eudaimonia, s thefinal oodforhumans,s the ctivityf oul naccordancewith irtueand reason iog8a3-i8). Aristotle lso refers o eudaimoniaas good living nd doingwell (iog8bzi).

ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE 589

This content downloaded from 142 103 160 110 on Mon 30 Sep 2013 03:13:58 AM
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/26

consider ertainminimal onditions ecessary or ttachment.inally,discusshow Aristotle's otion f a friend s "another elf" scompatibleboth with conception ftheseparateness fthe ndividuals nd of thedistinctive ays nwhich ach individual ealizesvirtuewithin sharedlife.Aristotle nd KantBefore ettingut Aristotle's iew, t s worth nticipating reply n hispart to the Kantian position on friendships it has been articulatedrecently y StephenDarwall andBarbara Herman.3 he replywillbringintofocusaspectsofAristotle's thicaltheory hat presuppose n myaccount.According o Darwall, reasonsfor an agent to act based onfriendly otives re constrained yreasonsbased on principles fright.This deontological onstraintnfriendshipsdevelopedbyHerman.Herclaim s that he mpartial ointofviewoftheCategoricalmperativesrequiredboth to set theconditions f permissibilityoractingout offriendly otives s well as to imposeobligatorynds which henmightbest be fulfilled y friendship.4hus, Herman speaks of a doubleacknowledgment,uchthat nacting rom riendshiperecognize hat naddition o thatmotive, ur action ither atisfies duty ris within er-missible onstraints.nthisway motives ffriendshipreconstrainedyanoverall espect or ersons s ends nthemselves,uch hat nacting utoffriendshipe neither verlook he utonomyf a friend,ordisregardourdutiesto others o whom we are not attached.Herman's ndDarwall's defense ffriendshipsof a piecewith hegen-eral Kantian enet hat hepursuit fhappiness ofwhichfriendships apart)5 sframed ya lexically ighermoralvaluewhichhas its ourcenotinthe entiments,ut nprinciplesfpractical eason.6Whilefriendships

Darwall, "Impartialist thics";Herman, "Rules, Motivesand Helping Actions.""What s requireds that gentswho act from motion lso actpermissibly.ndwherethere s an obligation o help,we are required o acknowledge hismoral claim,eventhoughwe may give help out of compassion,etc." "Rules, Motives and HelpingActions,"p. 376.OnKant'sviewfriendships a part fhappinessnso far s it s based on emotion r ncli-nation.Friendship ased on mutual espect,ncontrast, illhave ntrinsic oralworth.Cf. Doctrineof Virtue,rans.Mary . Gregor Philadelphia:UniversityfPennsylvaniaPress, 964), pp. 140-45. NeitherHerman norDarwall discussthiscase. I raise somedifficultiesor hiscase at theendofmypaper.

6 So Kantsays: "And since none the ess reason has beenimparted o us as a practicalpower that s,as one whichs to have nfluencen thewill; ts rue unction ust etoproduce willwhich s good . . . Such a willneed not onthispurposebe the ole andcomplete ood,but tmust ethehighest oodand the ondition fall therest,ven fallour demandsforhappiness. n that case we can easilyreconcilewith the wisdom of

590 NANCY SHERMAN

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


4/26

maybe instrumentalo acting rom moralmotive in that hey rovidethe upportingonditions or ts nculcationndflourishing),nso far sthey rebasedonemotions, heyack ntrinsic oralworth ftheirwn.7Now Aristotle's osition s quite differentn manycounts. But onecentral isagreementsthis:ForAristotle,he thical phere literally,hatwhich efers o characterethos)) does notdistinguish etweenmoral ndnon-moralvalue, as the Kantian understands hat distinction. hus,excellence fcharacterwill ncludephysical trengthndgood birth oteasily ssignable o theKantian phere fthemoral;andattachmentsndsentiments, hile excluded from Kantian viewof themoral,will beamongmotives orethical ction. Accordingly,he fact hatwe can beblindedby friendship,r because of t act with oo parochial n interest,does not,forAristotle,herebyemove t from he thical phere fvalua-tion.8Rather, hatfactmerely pens t to adjudicationwith ther laimsandto udgmentsbout ts ppropriatenessn ight fthoseother onsid-erations hatmustbe given heir ue.ThusAristotlencludesmotives fattachmentwithin he ethicalsphere,while still acknowledging on-straintsntheir ermissibility.o ingeneral,Aristotleays,friendsretobepreferrednthe ssignmentf ourhelpand aid (Ii 55a7-9; i i6oai-8)butnot lways nd not tallcosts.Forexample,twould bewrong ohelpa friend efore eturningenefitsue others, r togivea loan to friendsbefore epaying creditor,exceptwhenhelping friendsespecially ineornecessary"i i64bz5-i165 a4). Similarly, artialitysinappropriatenspecific ontexts,uch s inthe aseof a public fficial here hefair dju-dication of claims is a part of the description of that office(1134a33-35bi).9 But on Aristotle's iew,this is just to say that the

nature ur observationhat he cultivationf reasonwhich s required or he firstndunconditioned urposemay n manyways, t least nthis ife, estricthe ttainmentfthe econdpurpose namely, appiness which salways onditioned,"GroundworkoftheMetaphysics f Morals,trans.H. J.Paton New York:Harperand Row, 1956),p. 64.According o Hermanand Darwall, friendships ay have intrinsic alue thoughnotintrinsic oralvalue.Noteon Kant'sownview, heres a restricteday nwhich ertainfriendships ayhave moralworth see note 5 above.On a Kantianview,friends illalsohave nstrumentalalue n so far s socialrelations re needed o sustain ndnourishthecapacities f a self s a rational hooser.A criticism f friendships merelynstru-mental eems obe at theheart fCarolGilligan's riticismsfKohlberg. f. CarolGil-lingan, n A Different oice (Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityress,I98z).

8 For the claim that Aristotlenonetheless oes have a moral theory, ee T. Irwin's"Aristotle's onception fMorality" nd mycomments n Proceedings fthe BostonAreaColloquium nAncient hilosophy, ol. I, ed.JohnCleary New York: UniversityPressof America, 986), pp. I15-50.In a similar ein, nIX.9 Aristotle istinguishesetween n objectionable ndunobjec-




5/26

expression fvirtue hrough riendship ustbe harmonizedwithotherends nthegood life.Andthis s a consequence f his moregeneral iewthatparticularhoicesmustbe attentive o all theethically elevant ar-ticularitiesfone's situation.Accordingly, choice s appropriateor hitsthemean) only f tgivesdue considerationnthisholisticway.Moreover, onstraintsn thepermissibilityf an action, n so far sthey risefromhe xpressionf other irtues,o notappeal to principlesexclusive f sentiments.nmaking n all consideredudgmentfwhat sbest n a particular ituation,nagent ppeals both o thepassionaldispo-sitions hexeis) nd rationaludgmentlogos)ofthephronimos,rpersonof practicalwisdom.To theextent hat hephronimos epresents pointofviewofexperience nd reflectiveudgment emovedfrom rrelevantbiases NE 11.9 io9bi-9) we might ay there ssomethingikean appealto an impartial ointof viewinthe assessment f action.However,forAristotle, he pointofview is alwaysthatofhuman excellence, onsti-tuted, s itis, byemotional s well as rational apacities.The consider-ationsoffriendshiprewithin, ather han outside, hatpoint of view.Furthermore,t sthepoint fviewofa specificerson oncretelyeact-ing ospecificircumstances.ssuch hepoint fviewofthephronimossnever eally legislative ne,eithernthe enseofapplying eneral ulesfrom hetop down,or inthe enseofconstructingawsfrom hebottomup (as I believethe Kantian does in testingmaxims). In deliberatingbetween hecompetinglaimsofnearand far,'0 he virtuous gentwillcorrect or iasesthatprejudice. utthisnever equireshe bstract elib-erative ointofviewofanyonewhomight acetheoptions.Myanteced-enthistoryf nterestsndknowledge fmypastare notdetachable rommydeliberative osition.Accordingly,or heAristotelian, oralreasonsfor ction ndthedeliberationsfa moral gentwill ppealtothese. heylimit heoptionspresented s well as thereasonsfor ction.As a result fthese orts fassessments,tmayturn ut that laimsofthosemoredistant imit he claims of friendship.ut theseclaims,ofwidergenerosity,ustice r the ike,do nothavea privileged osition n

tionablepartialityoward elf. n thefirstase an individual s partial o himselfn thesense thathe takesmorethan his fair hareof certain fought or" or scarce perima-chata) goods. Werightlyensure his ndividual orhis actions nvolve violation f us-tice; they rea case ofpleonexia, aking or neselfwhat othershave a legitimatelaimto.In the econdcase an individual s partial n the ense hathe desires o makehis owncharacter irtuous nd tomakehimselfhe eatof virtue. his ndividuals notguiltyfacriticizable elf-interest,or nwanting hathe be virtuous, e does notviolateothers'claims.The implications thatthe endof virtue s not a scarce resource ividedup byprinciples f distributiveustice.Cf. ii68b15-i6,69a3z; MM izizb8-z3.IO Theexpressions Thomas Hill's. I owe thanks ohimfor ncouragingme toclarifyomeissues n this ntroductoryection.

592 NANCY SHERMAN



6/26

thegood life.Theydo not always rump ther irtues, or re they onsti-tuted ny ess by passionaldispositions."Moreover, hesepassional dis-positions re neither lindnor rrational orces, ut rationallynformedand guided ntentional tates.Unlike heKantian, hen,Aristotle oes not merely ermitttachmentwithin theoryfmoralityonstitutedrimarily y mpartiality.ather,hemakesattachmentssential o theexpression f virtue ndlivingwithfriends structural eature f good living, s I shall be arguing hortly.These are some broaddifferencesetweenKantand Aristotle n thequestion ffriendship.heyhave to dogenerally ith he ources fvaluefor ach, and themethod f arbitratingetween ompeting laims.At the

conclusion fthepaper shalltakeupa final ifference.uttoappreciatethis,we mustfirst xploreAristotle's osition n some depth.Friends s ExternalGoodsTo beginwith,we must et down some definitionaloints.Byfriendship(philia)Aristotleypicallymeansthemutually cknowledged ndrecip-rocal relation f good will and affectionhatexists among ndividualswhoshare ninterestneach other nthebasisofvirtue, leasure r util-ity NE VIII.z). Alsoincluded mongfriendshipsre thenon-chosen ela-tionsof affectionnd carethatexist mong familymembersnd fellowcitizensNE VIII. z; VIII.9, X.6). nthis aper willbe most nterestednthewayinwhichbest ortoffriendship,amely, hefriendshipf virtu-ous individualswhat willsometimesall"character riendship")iguresinthe account ofhappiness.To a limited xtent, shall also discuss hephiliaoffamilys itsheds ight nmygeneral ccount. should lso stressfrom hestart hatwhilewomen,onAristotle's iew,are excludedfromthebest orts ffriendshipsontheground hat heyack the apacities orfullvirtue), shallnonethelessry o overlookthishistorical rejudice,and for hepurposesof thispaper,allowmyself xampleswhichwouldopen the ranksof thevirtuous o women.With his aid, et'stry o understand heway nwhichfriendsigurenAristotle'seneral cheme fgoods. nNE 1.8Aristotlergues hat irtue,as a good, s alone nsufficientorhappiness, ndrequiresnaddition er-tainexternal oods.The argumentsroughlyhis:Happiness, onceivedofas doingwell and livingwell (iog8bzi), requiresnotmerely thical(and intellectual)virtues,but activitieswhich manifest hose excel-

So Aristotlemaintainshat ppeal to some sortofwide sentimentfattachment ouldideally eplace hemoredetached oint fviewof ustice: For lawgivers rgefriendshipmore than justice . . . for where there s friendship here s no need for ustice"(11I55az4-8).




7/26

lences.'2Withregard o ethicalvirtue,ndsofcharactermustbe realizedand implementedn action.'3 But forthis,the properresources ndopportunities ustbe athand.Among hese esources rexternal oodsare friends:Yetevidently,s we said,happiness equires n addition xternal oods;fort s mpossi-bleornoteasyto do excellent eeds without esources. oran individual erformsmanyactions hroughheuseof nstruments,hrough riends, ealth ndpolitical ffice. nd thelack ofother oods spoilsone's happiness, uchas fine irth, ood childrennd beauty. orone wouldhardly ehappy f ne were horoughlygly, rbornof ow birth rsolitaryndchildless. io99a3 i-b4)In thispassage, Aristotle as in mind two classes of externalgoods

(whichhe recapitulatest ioggb27): thosewhich re nstrumentsfhap-piness, .e. those hingswhich re by nature ooperative nd useful stools io99bz7), andthosewhich renotmerelynstrumental,utwhichare necessary or and intrinsic o happiness i.e., "belongnecessarily"huparcheinnagkaionoggbz7 and the ack of whichmars happinessioggbz).'4 Friends igurenthe istof bothtypes fexternal oods.Thefirst lass ofgoods is somewhat traightforward.riendsmay be instru-ments ndtools nthe ense nwhichmoney ndpolitical onnection re.Theyprovideus with themeansforthe promotion fparticular nds.Thus we depend upon the aid and support f friends or ccomplishingends we cannotrealizeon our own.Theway nwhichfriends igurenthe econdclass ofgoods, however,is more difficulto grasp.Forwhilefriendshipas intrinsic orth cer-tainlyAristotleakesthe oveparents how toward hildren o be an endin its own right - MM iziibi-z, and friendship n general,"choiceworthyor tsown sake" 1159 z 5), it does so not nthe enseofhaving ome isolatedvalue, ike thatof an "adventitious" leasure cf.ii6gbz5-7) whichmightbe added to happiness s one moreseparateconstituent.'Ratherts ntrinsic orth sof a muchmorepervasiveort,

I do not subscribe o the nterpretationf NE X.6-8 in which ntellectualontemplationisa dominant ood of happiness.Cf.J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle n Eudaimonia,"Proceed-ings ftheBritish cademyo (1975): 339-59. I argue the case also in my review fAnthony enny's he Aristotelianthics, ournal f theHistory f Philosophy9(i98i): 100-104.

3 Accordingly, ristotle omments hat happiness ould neverbe ascribed o a person,however irtuous, ho slept way his ife r out of nertia ailed o realizehis capacities(io99ai-6).

14 My remarks ere are indebted o T. Irwin's lassification f the two types f externalgoods n "Permanent appiness:Aristotlend Solon" presented o theBostonArea Col-loquium nAncient hilosophy, anuary,985. Irwindoes not explore, s I do, the pe-cial way inwhich friendships an intrinsic ood.'5 Gauthier-Jolifmply omethingike heview criticizen their ccount fthe econd lass

594 NANCY SHERMAN



8/26

providing hevery orm nd mode of ifewithinwhich n agent an bestrealize her virtue nd achieve happiness.To have intimate riends ndfamilys to have nterwovennone's life,n an ubiquitiousway,personstowardwhom and with whom one can mostfully nd continuouslyexpressone's goodness.Inwhatfollows want o pursue hisnotion ffriendships structuringthegood life ndsuggest hat t s becauseof thisrolethatAristotle allsfriendshe"greatest" nd "mostnecessary" fexternal oods i i69bio,II54a4), withoutwhom we wouldn'tchoose to live "even fwe had allothergoods" (I 55a5-6,cf. i69bi6-I7). As suggested, riendshipre-ates a context r arenaforthe expression fvirtue, nd ultimatelyorhappiness.This can be seen nvariousways. t provides eneficiariesorvirtuousction, swellas opportunitiesor ction nd sentimentnavail-able to the solitary r childless.'6However, wantto suggest hat t isessential o thegood life n a more fundamental ay. In particular, textends ndredefinestsboundaries,nsucha waythatmyhappiness rcomplete ood comes to include hehappiness f others. hushappinessorgood livingsascribable ome,not as an isolated ndividual, ut as anextended elfwithattachments,r friends.Happiness as Including he Happiness of OthersThe kernelof thisis in Aristotle's emarks n 1.7 regarding he self-sufficiencyfgood living. elf-sufficiencys a criterion fthegood lifeentailinghata life s "lacking nnothing," herebeingno othergoodwhichwhen dded to twould makethat ife esirableio97bI5-zz). Butsincefriendsreamongthegoodswhichmakea life elf-sufficient,elf-sufficiencysrelational nd thegoodlife lifedependent ponand inter-wovenwithothers:

By elf-sufficientedon'tmean or solitaryndividual,orneivinglifelone,utfor arents,hildren,ndwife,nd ngeneralorll friendsndfellowitizensincehumaneings bynatureoliticalnd ocial.io97bg-ii; f. i69bi8-ig)For humanbeings heself-sufficientife s a life arger hanthatofoneindividual. o theMagna-Moraliareminds s, "we arenot nvestigating

ofexternal oods: L'Ethiquea Nicomaque Louvain:PublicationUniversitaires,970),Vol. Z.I, p. 71.'6 On thenotion hat riends llowfor ustained irtuousctivity,f.X.9 I7oa5-8. JohnTrooper iscusses he second class ofgoods as providing pportunitiesn thisway inAristotle n theGoods ofFortune"PhilosophicalReview94 (i985): 173-96. MarthaNussbaum takes up a relatedview of friendships an externalgood whichprovidesobjectsfor heexercise f virtue nchapter z of TheFragility f Goodness. Luck and

Rational elf-Sufficiencyn GreekEthicalThought: he TragicPoets,Plato, ndAristotleCambridge:CambridgeUniversityress, 985).




9/26

the self-sufficiencyf a god, but of humanbeings" (izi8a8), and theEudemian explains, "for our well-being s relational (kath'heteron),whereas in the case of a god, he is himselfhis own well-being"(iz45bi8-i9).

It is important o emphasizethat the self-sufficiencyristotle as inmind s self-sufficiencyith egard ot merely o iving, utto livingwell.Accordingly,hemost mportantort ffriendshipoes notmerelynableus to live,butenablesusto flourish. hese considerationsind xpressionin NE IX.9 and EE VII.iz whereAristotle gaintakesup therelation ffriendshipo self-sufficiency.o inIX.9 he reports heview of some,thatthe elf-sufficientersondoes notrequire riends,for hethings hat regood belong o him, nd being elf-sufficient,erequires othing urther"(ii69b5-7). Aristotle'sdisagreement ii69bzz-8, and EE iz44b6ff.)centers n the interpretationf self-sufficiency. personwho lackedfriends, ho perhaps penthis ife n solitary ontemplation,might aveminimal equirementsormaterial oods.He might e moreor less self-sufficientnthematerial onditions fliving.But he couldneverbe self-sufficientith egard ogood activity.heproblemwith hosewho claimotherwises that hey ail o conceive ffriendships based on somethingmore hanutilityr transientleasures, ndself-sufficiencys somethingcorrespondinglyroader (i i69bz3-7).'7 Thus, these later passagessharpen hedefinitionn1.7ofself-sufficiencys relational y specifyingmorepreciselywhat sortofrelationshipor friendship)he elf-sufficientlifenecessarilynvolves.The upshot f thesepassages,then,s thatwhilethe elf-sufficientoli-tarymaynotneedothers s meansor nstrumentsor iving or onlymini-mally o), he will stillneed others o share nds anddesign life ogetherwiththose endsinmind:

Forwhenwe arenot nneed f omething,henwe allseek thersoshare ur njoy-ment. ndwecan udge hemetterhenwe are elf-sufficienthanwhennneed,ndwemost eedfriendshoareworthyf iving ogetherith s. EE Iz44bi8-22)Thus thebest ort ffriendshiprovides s with ompanionswithwhomwe can sharegoods and interestsn a jointly ursued ife.This sort ofsharedhappiness onstituteshetruly elf-sufficientife.There is considerablefurther videncefortheclaim that friendshipentails weaving f ives ogethernto ome shared onception fhappi-ness.Aristotle ursuesthese ssues with some insightn theEudemian17 In theEE Aristotle ays thatthemost self-sufficingersonwill need useful riendsndfriends hat amuse himonlyminimally,nd will not value too highly uch relations

(I244b5-I5). But sufficiency ithregard to these means is only one aspect of self-sufficiency,s I have arguedabove.

596 NANCY SHERMAN



10/26

Ethics, nd I wantto consider hosetextsnow.In theEE Aristotledds a new dimension o hisdiscussion f friendshipas itappears ntheNE and MM. At z3 6b3-6 he argues hat hebest ortof friendshipmong virtuous dults character riendship) isplaysnotonly theacknowledged eciprocation f affectionnd goodwill,buttheacknowledged eciprocation f a choice of one another:

It sapparent romhese hings hat heprimaryort ffriendship,hat monggood per-sons,requiresmutual ffectionantiphilia) nd mutual hoice antiprohairesis) ith egardto one another . . This friendshiphusonlyoccursamonghumans,for hey lone areconsciousofreasonedchoices prohaireseis).Again,at EE Iz37a3off. he makes a similar oint:

If the activity f friendships a reciprocal hoice,accompanied by pleasure,of theacquaintanceofone another,t s clearthatfriendshipftheprimary ind s ingeneralreciprocal hoice (antiprohairesis)f the things hat are without ualification ood andpleasant,because they re good and pleasant.The significancef the claim rests n Aristotle's echnical erm, ro-hairesis.As I have arguedelsewhere, prohairesiss a reasonedchoicethat s expressivefa character nd the overallends ofthatcharacter.'8

The choiceof a friend xposes this apacity f practical eason n a per-spicuousway.For nchoosing character riend, e select another elf"(I I7ob6-7) whoshares senseofour commitmentsndends, nd a senseofwhatwe taketo beultimatelygoodandpleasant" n iving.We chooseanother o be a partnernthe ointpursuit fthese nds. n so doing,wechoose to arrange ur livesarounda loyalty o another, nd aroundawillingness o choose ends and pursuitswithin he context f this oy-alty.'9However, inceforAristotleherealtestpeiran) ffriendshipomes nspending ime ogethersuzesai Iz37b3 5-37),thechoices hat re consti-tutive fthefriendshipre not so much he nitial verturess thosethatindicate capacity o shareand coordinate ctivities veran extendedperiodoftime."They re thechoices hat ndicate wo ives an be inter-i8 Cf. my "Character,Planning nd Choice in Aristotle,"Reviewof Metaphysics34

(I985).'9 Cf.EE I 2I4b7 onprohairesiss a capacity o arrangeifewith egard o certain nds. t salso interestingonote hat ntheNE Aristotle haracterizeshronesisnd mplicitlyheprohairesisf theperson f wisdom s a rightudgmentorthos ogos I44bz2-8), andas a judgmentfwhat staken o bebest NE III.3 i i i 2zbi ff.).Heretoo, nthenotion fchoosing friend,he erminologyspresent. hefriendshipeflects stable udgmenttokekrimenonebaion 237bi i), and correct ecision krisin rthen237bI2), as deter-minednotso much n advance,but as borne out by time nd trusti237bi3-i8).10 "Thosewho becomefriends ithout he est f time re not realfriends utonlywishtobe friends"EE IU37bi7-i8).




11/26

woven togethernto some coherent attern f good living.Significantly,ristotle oes discuss these sortsof choicesunder thenotionofhomonoia, iterally ameness f mind, r more diomatically,consensus etween riends. omonoia, he argues n theEE, is arrivingtthe same choice about practicalmatters he- ute prohairesis), s in thecase of civicfriendship, here ellow itizens gree bout whoshouldruleand who shouldbe ruled Iz4ia3 '-3; cf.NE IX.6). In the ase of ntimatefriendships,he consensus s not about who should rule,butabout howand what ort f ife o live ogether: Some have thoughtriendshipo beunanimity f feeling nd thosewho have such a consensus o be friends.But friendshipsnota consensus oncerningverything,uta consensusconcerning ractical matters ortheparties nvolved and concerningthosethings hatcontributeo living ogether" hosa eis to suzen sunte-nei1z4iai6-i8).The notion of consensuscan be seen as an extension f Aristotle'snotion of reciprocal hoice (antiprohairesis).n choosing friend, nechooses to make thatperson partof one's life nd toarrange ne's lifewith hatperson'sflourishingas well as one's own) inmind.One takeson, tyou ike, heproject fa shared onceptionfeudaimonia.Throughmutualdecisions bout specific racticalmatters,riendsegin oexpressthat hared commitment.Consensusbetweenfriendsan takevarious forms. o, forexample,two friends ometo a mutualdecision bout how to actfairlyndhonor-ably oward notherwhohaswronged hem, rabouthowbest oassistfellow itizenwho has come upon hard times.Any happiness r disap-pointmenthat ollows romhese ctionsbelongs o bothpersons, or hedecisionto so act was jointand theresponsibilitys thus shared.Thisnotion f ointdeliberation rovides n importantnterpretationfAris-totle'smore ompressedemark hat haracterriendsive ogether,ot nthewayanimalsdo, by haringhe amepasture, ut"by sharingnargu-ment nd thought" koinonein ogonkai dianoias I I 7ob i - z).But equally, consensusmay expressonlya moregeneral greementabout endsandpursuits. wo friendsmay hare heconviction hat em-perance ntheir ersonal ives s ofutmostmportance, et ach realizesthat nd n a differenttyle ndmanner.One does tthrough scrupulousdiet, heotherby refusingo takepart nfrivolous ossipaboutothers.Their ommitments toanend,rather han oparticularwaysofexpress-ing it.But theremaybe a morecharacteristicortof consensusnfriendship.In this ort fcase friendsealize hared ndswhich re constitutivefthe

598 NANCY SHERMAN



12/26

friendshipnd whichdo notpre-existt."' Thus specific ommon nter-estsdevelopwhich rea product ather hanpre-conditionftherelation,so, together,myfriendnd I developa loveforGeorgianhouses havinghad no real interestn them arlier.Aristotle'smphasis n developingfriendshipshrough ime ndthrough sharedhistory f mutual ctivitysuggests hisnotionofthecommongood. Buta qualifications inorderhere.Whilespecific nd sharedwaysof being virtuouswill be amongthosevalues peculiar o a specific riendship,heacquisition fvirtuousstates fcharactermustpre-existnyfriendshipased on virtue. hat s,the gentsmust hooseeachother,npart, n thebasisofa firmnd stablecharacter. hrough heparticularriendship,he ommitmentsfcharac-ter will deepen and express themselves n ways peculiar to andconditioned ythatfriendship.uteven o,a well-cultivatedenseof vir-tuemustbe inplacefrom he-start,na way nwhich love ofGeorgianhouses need not be.Withinfriendship appiness s shared notherwaystoo. Individualscometoidentifyith neanother,uchthat venwhere ctivities re notjoint, r endsnotshared, ne individual's appiness ffectshehappinessof theother.Whena friend oeswell, feelhappy oo. Aristotlexplainsthis ort f"singlenessf mind" mia psuche-E I z4obz,bg-io) throughthe notions fsympathynd empathy,nd argues hat hese entimentsareheightenedhemore ntimate friendship.o at IX.io, Aristotleays,themore xclusive he ttachmento a friend,hebetter ble I amtomin-ister to a friend'sneeds and to identifywith her joys and sorrows(II7ia6ff.) It may be because ofmy ntimate nowledge fher, canimaginehow she feels nthat ituation,rknowinghowI would feel r(havefelt)nthat ort f ituation,ndknowinghe ssimilar o me n cer-tainways, magine he mustfeel hatway. In theEE Aristotlendicatesthatfriendsmight xpressnotmerely ympatheticdentificationfsomesort oumoon sullupeisthai),utempathy, feelinghe amepain .(alla kai tin autin lupe-n) forexample,whenhe is thirsty,haringhisthirst), f this were possible,and if not, what is closest to it" (EEIz4oa36-9). Butthequalificationuggests hatthisHumean-likempa-thy,.e.,coming o feel he ameeffect, ay nthe nd be neither ecessarynorsufficientorpractical oncern. tmight e enoughthat be able toimagine rommy wnpointofview,orfromwhat taketo be that fmyfriend's,whatshe is experiencing. hus, in tragedy, ristotle ays,werespondwithpity ndfearwhenwe imaginewhat twould belikefor s,in our own circumstances,o suffer similarfate perito homoion).zz"

I am gratefulo Gregory rianosky orurgingmeto develop thispoint.Cf. Poetics1453a4-6, Rhetoric 385bI3-I4.




13/26

To appreciate hecharacter's lightwe needn't eel ust whatthecharac-ter feels.There s a further ay in whichwe experience friend's appiness rsorrow s our own.Accomplishmentsndfailures, hich renotexplic-itlyour own, are nonetheless, hrough n extension f self, ourcesofpride and shame. So Aristotle ays in Rh. 11.6: "And individualsfeelshame whenever heyhave acts or deedswhichbring ome disrespect,either heir wn,or those ftheir ncestors, r those fother ersonswithwhom theybear some close relation" I385ai-3). Thus, when our chil-drendo well,we feelpridein their chievements,nd whentheydopoorly, hame, s ifwe ourselveshad fallen hort. t is not thatwe areresponsible or their rrors though as parentswe may be), but thatthrough he sense of belonging nd attachment, e identify ith andsharetheirgood.Butfriendship ay nvolve he nterweavingftwo ives nquitea dif-ferent ay. This can be seen as follows:Within given ndividual's ife,choices prohaireseis)rticulate heendsof characternsome unified ndcomprehensive ayover time.So, deliberation eflects sense ofplan-ning, nd an ability omake choicesthatbestpromotenota single nd,but a coherent ystem f ends. Choices of action are withregardnotmerelyothepartsofgood living, ut withregard othewhole, nd theunity f ends thatentails II4oaz6-z8, iI45ai-z).This model of planning s extended o the shared ife f friends. ndsare coordinated otmerelywithinives,butbetween ives.Thus, ustas aparticular hoice make s constrained y mywider ystemfobjectivesandends, o too s tconstrainedy he ndsofa friend. o, for xample,fa contemplatedctionofmineprecludes friend rom ealizingnimpor-tantgoal ofhers, hen hat considerationwillfigurenmy udgment fwhat soverallbest. tmaynotbeaneasymatter etermininghose nter-ests houldprevail, ndaswith nydecision fthemean,decidingwhat srightwillrequiregiving ue considerationo all relevant oncerns.Butwhateverhenature f the olution, hepoint obe stresseds thatwhat srelevant o thedecisiongoes beyond heeudaimoniaof a single,solatedindividual. heendsofmyfriendmust e taken nto ccount,ust s minemust,ntheoverall ssessmentfwhat s to be done. ndeed, he urvivalofthefriendshipependsuponourwillingnesso exhibit oyaltynthisway.AttachmentndWiderAltruismI haveargued hat hrough riendshipn individual's appinessbecomesextendedto include the happinessof others. This presupposessomenotion f an extended elf, ra self nlarged hroughttachments.want

600 NANCY SHERMAN



14/26

to explore hismomentarily,roposing ertainminimal onditions eces-saryforfriendships attachment. ut first wantto contrastttachmentwitha wider ense ofaltruism.Altruisticentimentsuch as goodwill eunoia),kindnesscharis) ndpity eleos) are constitutivef variousvirtues n Aristotle'scheme, .g.generosityeleutheriotis)magnificencemegaloprepeia), ndmagnanim-ity megalopsuchia). he definitionfkindnessnRhetoric 1.7 s usefulfor urpurposes.t sa willingnessogive assistancehupourgia) owardsomeonenneed" I3 85ai 8),and "isgreatf t sshown oward omeoneingreatneed, r nneedofwhat s mportant r what sdifficultoget, rsomeonewho has need n a crisis, r f hehelpers the nly ne orfirstneor the most mportantne" (I385aig-zI).73 Accordingly,n acting utofkindness, ur sympathy oesout to an individual ecause of the cir-cumstances e happensto findhimselfn, and not because ofwho thespecificndividual appensto be. There s a kindofanononymitynourresponse.The situations differentn friendship.We act out of a morespecificoncern or particular erson, ndbecause t s thatpersonwhois inneed and notanother),whatwe can do and arewilling o do, andwhatothers ount nus todo,is often reatercf.NE IX.8 ii 69ai 8-3 ).These remarksmightuggesthefollowing bjection: hatwhenwe actout ofkindness ather hanfriendship,e somehowoverlook hepersonwho s theobjectofourgoodwill ndconsider immerelys anoccasionfor he xercise four virtue.Wemightven eem o care na priggish aymoreforour virtue, han fortheparticular ersontowardwhom it isbeing expressed.24 ut on Aristotle'sview, I act forthe sake of thebeneficiary,hetherrnot haveanenduringrprior ttachmento him.Eventhoughnwider asesofaltruism hebeneficiarys ina sense nter-substitutabley others, hisdoesn'tdiminishmyconcern or hispersonnow. Aristotlemakes thepointas follows: To be a friends to wishanotherwell nd desire ood things orhim, forhis ake and notforyourown'> (Rh. I38ob37; cf. I38ib37). But equally,kindnessoutsideoffriendshipepends pon offeringssistance not nreturn or omething,norfor some advantageto thehelperhimself, ut for that of theone23 Although indness an be describedngeneral erms,cting rom indness oesnot omedownto following general ule.To have a reliable isposition, heremustbe, as a partof thatdisposition,omecognitive raspof thegeneral orts fcircumstancesnwhichthatdispositionwould be appropriatelyxercised.But this involves flexibilityorespond o new and oftenunfamiliar ccasions.24 Theobjectionmight eansweredfwe say,notthat actfor he ake of my irtue,utforthe ake of thispersonbecause ofmyvirtue. hatis, myvirtue xplainswhy ammoti-

vated to make thispersontheobject of myconcern.Cf. BarbaraHerman,"Rules,Motivesand HelpingActions,"pp. 370-71.

ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE 6oi



15/26

helped" (Rh. I385a18-i9)."5Thus, friendshipoesbeyondgoodwill, nsofar s it s directed owarda specific erson,not easily ubstituted y others cf.NE IX.5). So I mayhavea wellcultivatedense f altruismr evenbea friendlyort fpersonand one who tends o treatmyfriends ell,butthe xercise fthosevirtu-ous statesdoesnot tself ecureformethegood offriendship.orthat,haveto become ttached o a particular erson, nd another erson o me,in a way thatdisplaysmutualregard nd affectionII5bz8-56a5) aswell as a historyf shared ctivities.Moreover,whilevirtuous tates fcharacter ependuponexternal onditions or heir xercise,he bsenceof favorable onditions oesnotnecessarily estroyhem.Butthis snotso inthe aseoffriendship.orfriendships more n activityhan stateof character,nd a virtuous ctivity,nlike ther irtuous ctivities,hatdependsupona specific erson s itsexternal onditions6nthe bsenceof thatperson, here s no friendship.ConditionsforAttachmentThe notion f attachments a themewhich ecursnAristotle's iscussionoffriendship,utmost xplicitly ithin he ccountofnatural hilia,ortherelation f affectionnd caring etween arent nd child.Thoughhisremarks boutthe family ave beenfor hemostpart gnored, hey recrucial for n accountof theway inwhicha selfbecomes extended rattached oparticularthers. heprimaryextshere re NE VIII.i z andPol. 11.I.We canbegin o consider he onditions or ttachmentnrather roadoutlineby contrasting ristotle's iewswith heteachings f Diotima ntheSymposium. he ascentoferos, according oDiotima,requires hatthe oveof a particularndividual e transformednto morenoble oveof therepeatable nd universal ualitiesof that ndividual s they refound n otherpersons s well as in impersonal mbodiments,uch asinstitutionsndsciences. heclaim sthat hereinstantiationfthosefea-turesn other ndividuals ufficeso makethosenew ndividualsbjects f25 ThedifferenceorAristotleetween he wocases s not that treat friendmoreforhisown sakethan do a stranger,ut hatwhen fail o, commit deeperwrong nd showa greater ailing f character.As Aristotleays,"a wrongbecomes ntensifiedn beingexhibitedowards hose hat re morefully riends,o that twillbea more erriblehingto defraud friendhanfellow itizen, nd moreterrible ot to helpa brother han astranger,nd more erribleo wounda fatherhan nyone lse" (NE VIII.9 ii6oa4-6).z6 Aristotleoes not xplicitlyaythis nd eaves topenat I 55a4 as to whetherriendshipis a virtue r somethinge.g.,activity) ccompaniedbyvirtue. t s also noteworthyhat

at I io5b22 Aristotleistsphiliaas a passion,but herehe seems o have n mindfriendlyfeelings opposed to friendship.

6oZ NANCY SHERMAN



16/26

love.Aristotle's rgument, e shall see, mplies hat notionof friendshipbased on Diotima's model violates certainpsychologicalfeatures fattachment.t violatesthe strong ense of friendships self-referential,i.e.,that friendsmyfriendnd s treated s she s because he tands naparticular elation ome.For on Diotima'smodel, here s no clearsensethat the reduplicated bjectsretain hatstrong nd special relationof"beingmine"characteristic,resumably,fthe nitial ttachment.hesenseof belonging asbeendiluted,Aristotle illsuggest, y there eingjusttoo many ndividualswithwhom can reasonably xpect odevelopan intimate elation. he psychological eature fexclusiveness, harac-teristic f friendship,s absent.Let's consider hesepoints more closely n the context f Aristotle'sremarks n Politics I.i." Here Aristotlemake these points n arguingagainstPlato's radical claim in Republic V that politicalharmony ndunity equire heabolitionof the nuclearfamily.n its place will be theestablishmentf a communisticamilyn which theyouths f thecitybecome he ommon hildren ftheoldergeneration.latodescribes t asfollows:

Forno matter homhemeets, ewillfeel hathe smeeting brother, sister, father,mother, son,a daughter r theoffspringr forebearersf each. (Rep. 463c)Thatcity, hen,sbestorderednwhich hegreatest se the xpressionmine" and"notmine"ofthe samethingsn thesameway . . . (Rep. 462c)Now Aristotle's iew is thata notionofphiliawhichrequires hisextended seof"mymother," my son," etc.,cannotbe sustained:For

when"mine" is used as in theRepublic"each of two thousandor tenthousand pplyingt to the samething" iz6za8), "theexpressionsmyson' or 'myfather'become less frequent"hbkistaegein on emon -huion atera - aterahuion z6zbI7). The notionofstandingna spe-cial relation o an individualbecomesweakened,on the one hand, bycommonownership fora son becomes only fractionallyne's own(iz6zaz-6)), and on theother, y having oo many onswithwhom tospreadone's love.Aristotle ormulateshismorepreciselyn terms ftwoclosely elatedpsychological rinciples: There aretwothings bove all thatmakeper-sons ove andcare:Theyarea sensethat omethingsone'svery wn or27 The mportancefthese extswas brought o my ttention yM. Nussbaum, n "Shame,Separateness,ndPoliticalUnity:Aristotle's riticism f Plato" inEssaysonAristotle's

Ethics,ed. Amelie 0. Rorty Berkeley:Universityf California Press, i980), pp.395-435.




17/26

proper o oneself to dion) and a sensethat hat bject s all one has, .e.,it mustdo" (to agapeton) iz6za8). The latter otion s mostpoignantnthe aseofnatural hilia,for heresa sensehere nwhich his hild r thisparentmust, ydefault, uffices my wn. Therelation sfixed r perma-nent EE i z6ob35),and the ttachmenthrives n its xclusiveness.Whenthe relationbecomes too inclusive, nd theobjectsof attachment oonumerous, ny givenattachment ecomes diluted, iterally, watery"(hudare-z6zbi6).Bothprinciples xpress xclusiveness,houghndistinct ays.The firstsuggestshat hewhole ofan object s one's own, .e., t s notcollectivelyownedorcollectivelyaken are of.The secondsuggestshat here re noother uchobjectswithwhomone stands n the amerelation; hat s, theobjectof attachments not substitutable.n theextendedfamily f theRepublic,Aristotle rgues,bothprinciples re violated.He illustratesheviolation f thefirstto idion) bythefollowing nalogy:as with house-hold that s neglectedwhen t s taken are of bytoo many ervants,o toochildrenreneglectedwhenthey rethecommonresponsibilityfmanyindividuals. or eachparent asses responsibilityntosomeone lse,withthe resultthat the children are in the end inadequatelycared for(i z6 b3 3 8). The children,n turn, acking sense hat hey elong xclu-sively o a particularndividualhos hekastou) instead f as they o, toany one ofmany tou tuchontos)), ailto developthe ntensityffeelingcharacteristicf theparent-childelation iz6ib3g-6zaz). The inabilityto form ttachmentssexplainedbythe bsenceof a senseof toagapeton- a sense hat given arent annotbe exchanged or nother. he impli-cation, hen,sthat lthough arents ndchildrenftheRepublicrefer oone another s "mine," the senseofbelonging equisite or ttachmentcannotbe sustained n the absense of exclusiveness.It is worthnoting hatAristotle's emarks eem to runcounter o thesort f division f abor he himself ouldadvocatefor hehouseholdNEi i6zazo-z9, Pol. I.). Foronhisview, achparent, s well as thevariousslaves,has differentoles nthemanagementf thefamily. he divisionincreases, atherhan mpedes, fficientare.However, thinkAristotle,evenhere,does notabandon thesystem fdivision f abor.Rather, hecruxof hisargumentsthatPlato, nrequiringhat hemanyparents f achild ll fill he amefunction,ules ut thepossibilityf aneffectiveys-tem f shared are. ndeed,Aristotle's wopsychological rinciples ouldbe consistentwith notionof division flabor,so longas he stipulatesthat t sa specific spectof thecareofa child hat sprimarilyne's own(to dion), ndthat he hild nturn, ependsuponthat elation obe con-sistentlyilled yone particularndividual to agapeton).

604 NANCY SHERMAN



18/26

AlthoughAristotle wells on thecase of naturalphilia, his remarksabout exclusiveness ave more general pplication, s suggested ythediscussionn NE IX.io. There Aristotle rguesthatthe number f inti-mate friendships ny individual can have is highly imited (I I 7iaio-I 5;cf.EE I3 8a9-io). Forsuchfriendshipsequire considerable evotionof energy nd time, nd precludenot only other uchfriendships,utother oyaltiesnd commitments.hey recultivatedndsustainedt thecostof other nvestmentsftime nd interest. ere t s significanto notethathisremarksrerelevant ot merelyo thecultivationf friendships,butto the cultivationfinterestsngeneral.In thediscussion f thefamilyn NE VIII.iz, Aristotle ontinues isaccount of the conditionsfor attachment)8The requirementhat afriend e "one's own" or to idion s here pecifiedn terms fparentsov-ingchildren as in somewaybelonging o themselves" hos heautontionta)and childrenn turn oving arents as insomedegree erivingromthem" (hos ap ekeinonti onta) (ii6ibi8-i9, ii6ibz7-3o). The lovebetween iblings,nAristotle's iew, s initially,t least, love rooted nthiscommon enseofbelonging o parents i i6ib3o).Although heseremarksmake someappeal to biologicalconnections,these yno means xhaustwhatAristotleakes o be relevantrmost en-tralto attachment.he sense ofbelonging etweenparent nd child smoregenerallyikethatofcraftsmano product poiema): in bothcasesthemakers"are favorably isposed (eunoi) to what theythemselvesmake" (MM iziib35-39). Here, belonging s an attachmentwhichresults romreating product. hesenseofone's own requires he enseofmaking omethings one's own.Thisseemsto be true, n Aristotle'sview, ven mong dultfriends.orhesuggestsdultfriendsmold"eachother apomattontai I7zaiz), and influence reatly hecourse of lifeeach follows.Moreover,nthecaseofparents,heproductiveffortsre notmerelyofbringinghildrennto theworld,butofnurturingnd raising hem:"Forparents rethecauseofchildren'sxistence ndnurture,nd fromtheir irth nward, f their ducation" i I 6za6-7). Theparents' roduc-tion, hus, songoing ndconstant,guidedbymemoryndhope" (MMi z i i b3 8).While t s mportanto note hatAristotleescribes mother'slove as greaterhan father's, e needn'tunderstand imto be claimingthat t is becausea mothers morebiologically onnectedwithherchil-dren.For hegoeson to say, "giving irth o childrensmore aborious"(NE ii68azO-8, ii6ibz7, EE Iz4ib5ff.). Itis theactivitynd labor (toz8 I discuss hese ndrelatedssuesnmy issertation,ristotle'sheoryfMoral duca-tion,Harvard University,982.




19/26

prattein) that makes for the greaterattachment. o he generalizes:"Everyone ovesmore he hings hey ave brought bout through ffort,for xample, hosewho have workedfor heirmoney ove it morethanthose who have inheritedt . . . and for thesereasons,mothers ovetheir hildrenmorethanfathers"i i6zazzff.). Thisreading eems o beconfirmed y Aristotle's iological heory, ccording o which hemoth-er'sbody s regarded s merelyheaccidentalmatternwhich heform,carriedbythe father'sperm, s instantiated.9 s such, t is the father,and not the mother,who bears the essentialbiological relation o thechild.The idea ofa purely estationalmother, hohasnogenetic elationto the hild he bears,would not bea terriblytrange otion o Aristotle.

Itis also worth peculatinghatgivenAristotle's iewofthemother'sprimary unction n the household,her abor will extend o thenurtureand earlyupbringing f children.While she herselfwill lack educationand by nature, he full uthority nd controlof rationalpowers (Pol.i z6oaI4), she neverthelesswill be capable of executingorders forrunning household nwhichthe children's arly ducation s a part.30Her love and intimate nowledge f her childrenwill be important le-mentsnthat ducation, ndsignificantounterpartso the ess personal-ized aspectsofpublic education ii8ob8-iz). AlthoughAristotle oesnot developthesepointsabout women, theydo not seemin principleinconsistent ithhis viewof women's ubordinate irtuendrationality.The attachmentfchildrenoparents,nturn,s notmerelyrprimar-ilybiological, n Aristotle's iew,butan intentionalesponse o the ffec-tion nd nurture isplayed oward hem s belovedobjects.Thisemergesfrom everal emarks ristotlemakes.For a start, esays"childrenovetheir arents nly fter imehaselapsedwhenthey recapableof under-standing nd discrimination"ii6ibz4-6). Most fundamentaln thisprocess sdistinguishingheir wnparents rom ther dults.So inPhys-ics I. I, Aristotlexplains:"Children t first all all men father' nd allwomen mother,' nd onlylaterdistinguishach of themfromother

29 There s clearer vidence orbiological ttachmentn Aristotle's laim thatmothersovetheir hildrenmorenot onlybecauseof theiraborbut because "theyknowbetterhanfathers hat he hildren re their wn" ( i 68a26). Although hemother'smattersacci-dentalto thechild, he mother onethelessan be certain f herown contributionn away the father annot.30 On the roleof women nancient ociety, f. mages ofWomen nAntiquity,d. AverilCameron nd AmelieKuhrt London: Croom Helm, Ltd. i983), esp. MaryLefkowitz,"InfluentialWomen"; Susan Walker,"Women and Housing in Classical Greece:theArchaelogical vidence" Riet Van Bremen, Women and Wealth." Cf. also thehelpful

source book by Mary Lefkowitz nd Maureen Fant,Women'sLife in GreeceandRome (London: Duckworth,g82).

6o6 NANCY SHERMAN



20/26

adults" i84biz-I4). The implication rom hesepassages s that s chil-dren becomecapable of discriminatingheirown parentsfrom theradults, hey ometo recognize heir arents' pecial affection or hem.Theyperceive hemselves as" (hos I I68 b 8) belongingn a special andexclusiveway. In additiontheyperceiveparents' ove as unfailing ndabundant. o Aristotleays,"Of all the kindsoffriendship e have dis-cussed, t s nthefriendshipsetween in hat ove spresentnthegreat-estdegree malista), nd especially o inthe relation fparent o child"(MM i 2iibi8-zo). It sgiven romhe tart s soon as a child sborn NEi i6ibz5), and is given non-instrumentally,or its own sake (MMIzi ibz7-35), without debts incurred for benefits onferred MMIziibzz-z7, EE Iz39ai8). The child's ttachmentsa response o theseperceptionsf love.AFriend s Another utSeparate elfThe senseofbelongingndexclusivityhatmarks hefilial elation salsocharacteristicf adult friendships. owever, in the relationbetweenparent nd child, hechild s ina significant aynotyet eparate. Forthe child, lacking in mature rational capacities (NE IIIib8-95II44b8-iz, EE Iz4ob3I-33, Pol. Iz6oaII-I4) is dependent pon theparent's eason.A parentmakes choices prohaiareseis) or childandpromoteshis good in a way thatwould be inappropriatewithin dultfriendship.So Aristotleaysan adultfriend s "another elf,"butequally, nhisown words, "a separateself" (autos diairetos) EE I245a3o, a35; NEII7ob7, MM 12I3aI3, a24). Thisentails hat uchfriendsromote achother'sgood ina privileged ay (as onlyanother elf an),but na waythat s nonethelessmindful f thematurerationalagencyof each. So,given he imilarityfcharacter riendsndthe xclusivityftherelation,each s n a position o knowhow best ohelp he ther,ndhowtohelp na waythatmostreassuresndpleases. nthose aseswheredecisions renot oint, ntimate nowledge f each other's biding nterestsutseachina position o offerounsel ndsupport or he ortofchoices hatgiverealshapeto each other's ives.Yet within his xtended nd interwovenlife, he ndividuals onetheless etain heir eparateness.

3I This is explicit n the following emark rom he Magna Moralia: "For there oes notseemto be any usticebetween son and hisfather,r a servant nd his master anymore hanone can speak of usticebetweenmyfoot ndme, or myhand or anyof myotherimbs.For a sonis,as itwere, partof his fatherhospermeros i), nd remainsountilhe takes herank fmanhood nd is separated choristhei)rom im, ndbecomesthen n equal and a peerwithhisfather" MM II94biI-I7).




21/26

Aristotle's otion of self-sacrifices important n understandingheway nwhich selfbecomes xtended et eparate hrough riendship.nintimate nd deep friendshipshere s a levelofpractical oncern nd will-ingness o help one another hatfar xceedsthe sortof concern hownalesser riend. ne comestocounton an intimate riendna wayone doesnot upon a stranger r mere cquaintance NE VIII.9). Aid is givenwith-out even havingto ask (Rh. I386b35), and oftenwithouta returnexpected.But t s notclearthatthisgreaterwillingnesso help s inthecase of truefriendshipest thought fas self-sacrifice.or if friendshipextends he elf, hen ne s not o much acrificingneself,s actingntheinterests f thisnew extended elf.

Aristotles indeed oatheto viewsuch actions s self-sacrifices,ut fordifferent,hough elevant easons. n X.8 oftheNE and 1.I3 oftheMM,hesuggestshatgiving friendmaterial oods, nd even heopportunitiesfor ctionandchoice i i 69a32-4), doesnotconstitute sacrificef self,(indeed t sa caseofself-love). or what mattersmost o the elf, amelyreason (ii68b28-69a3) and the capacityto choose excellentdeeds inaccordancewithreason, s bythatvery ctionpreserved. o there s noreal sacrifice ere because the virtuous ndividualdoes not forfeit isrational apacity r thedesire o use t nmaking imself he eatofexcel-lence. We might ind hisdeeplyunsatisfying.or itfailsto distinguishbetween righthoicewhich xercises ur rationalnatures,ndtheout-comeofthe hoicewhich iterallynds nthedeathofour reason.The lat-ter sof course sacrifice. hedistinctionarallels hatbetween heplea-surewhichfollows he xcellent xercise f a state ndthepleasurewhichcomesfromccomplishinghe ndforwhich he ctivity as undertaken.Thoughfailingoaccomplish urendsmayresultnunhappiness,makingtheright hoicesand exercisingwell our abilitiesbrings, n Aristotle'sview, tsown rewards. erhaps nthisnarrow ense, hevirtuousgent'ssacrifice or friend s not a loss. Forno matterwhat the external ut-come, he gentwillhave the atisfactionfhaving xercisedwellhisabil-ities.3'Implicitnthis egard or eason sa certainimitationnwhata char-acterfriendangive nother.How onecanhelp, s limited,mongotherthings, y nacknowledgmentftherational gency feach. nso far s afriends another elf, nhelping friend,n individual annotpre-emptthatfriend's ational gency, r desire o makechoicesforhimselfwithregard o virtuousiving. or t s ustbecausethat ther ndividual aluesvirtue ndpractical easonthathe has been chosen s a friendndsome-onewithwhom life an bespent. hey re virtue riends,npart, ecause3z This eemsobethe ombinedorcef i698a2o ff.nd ii7bi-zo.6o8 NANCY SHERMAN



22/26

they re capable of ivingnrelation oone anothern a waythatdoesnotmake one the lave of theother.33he result sthat uch ndividuals ro-mote ach other's nterestsnly ncertainways notbydirectlymakingchoices for each other unlessthese are jointlydeliberated hoices orhomonoia),but by givingeach greater pportunities orchoice,andgreatermeansfor herealization f ends.These meansmay nclude carce(perimachata)material esources,s Aristotleuggests ere, uttheymayalso include ought orpsychological oods,such as support nd esteemand confidencenour endeavours. oAristotle emarksntheRhetoric:tis characteristicffriends,hat they raise hegood qualitieswe possess,and especiallythose which we fearmightnot in factbelongto us"(I 38 a3 5-bi; cf. 38 bIo-I4). We givefriendsupport nd confidencentheseways, withoutminimizingheir eparateness.There sfurthervidence or he eparatenessfselveswithin haracterfriendship. e can take up the ssueby considering he possibility f adiversityfidealsofvirtuous haracters. n Aristotle's iew, havingvirtuous haracter mplies havingall the virtues, r complete virtueII45ai-z, io98aI7-i8).34 For thevirtuesmplyone another nd areinseparable.However, hepattern f unified irtuesmight e differentndifferentersons. o oneindividualmight eespecially onest, his irtueseeming o gain pre-eminenceverothers,while another ndividual sespecially enerous, er nteractions eingmarked, bove all, bya senseofkindness nd bounty.Each individualhas all the othervirtues, ndexercises hem ppropriately,s external onditions llow.Butas a resultofnature, evelopmentndresources,ertain irtues avegainedgreaterexpression nd prominencen each individual's ife.35

Now individuals hat ome togethers character riendsmight e simi-lar yetdifferentnthe bove sense hatwhile hey harevirtue s an over-allend,they xpress t, ttimes,nwaysthat redistinct et omplemen-

Here drawon the mplicationf Aristotle's emarks t I I 24b3 that hemagnanimousperson cannot ive nrelation oanother, xcept friend. orthatwould beslavish. SeeT. Irwin'snotes n this assage nhis translation ftheNicomacheanEthics Indianapo-lis: HackettPublishing ompany, 985), p. 327.34 Aristotle'semarks an be understood s making ither heweaker laimthat hevirtuesare inprinciple onsistent,r the trongerlaim that nactualcases ofaction, hey annever ontingentlyonflict. understand imto be making hefirst, eakerclaim.3" There s implicitvidence or omethingikethis nAristotle's iew at Politics 3z9a9ff.Therehe argues hatdifferentirtues r character raits ain pre-eminencet differenttimesn an individual'sife: Inasmuch s thesedifferentunctionselong o a different

prime f ife, nd onerequireswisdom ndtheother trength,hey re to be assigned odifferentersons." owe thanks o T. Irwinforbringinghispassagetomy ttention.




23/26

tary. hey renotmere ook alikesofone another.Aristotleuggests histhoughtt EE VII.'z. In assessing hetruth ftheclaim thata friend sanother elf,he comments:but he haracteristicsfa particularndividualmaybescattered,nd it s difficultor ll tobe realized none individual. oralthough ynature friends what s most imilar, neindividualmayresemble is friendnbody, ne incharacter psyche), r one inone partofthe bodyor character,nd another n another i245a30-34).

The notion that anotherself may not realize all of one's ends orinterestseads Aristotleo remark urtherhatwhilefriends esire o pro-mote hared nds,failing his hey hoosemost f ll to promote ach oth-er's separategood (Iz42b7-9).Thereare several mplicationsn thisnotion of character riends scomplementingne another. irst, ifferencesncharacterrait ndpointof view,whilenot precluding lifeof consensus nd coordination,maynonethelessnable each individual o growand learnfrom he other. nAristotle'soncluding emarks n friendshipnNE IX he alludesto thesedifferencesnd their olein adultethicaldevelopment:The friendshipfgood persons s good, being ncreased ytheir ompanionship;nd

they rethought o become betteroo bytheir ctivitiesnd by mprovingachother;forfrom ach other hey akethe moldof characteristicshey pprove. II7zaIO-I 5)The suppositions thatcharacter riends ealizeto a differentegree(andin a differentanner) articular irtues. ach is inspiredo develophimselfmorecompletelys he sees admirable ualities,notfully ealizedin himself,manifestn anotherwhomhe esteems.RemarksAristotlemakesabout thenotionofemulationntheRhetoric repertinentere:

Emulation, e says, s feltmost ntenselybefore hosewhosenature slike ourown and who have good things hatarehighly alued and arepossibleforus to achieve" I388a3I-z). Character riends,s extendedyetdifferentelves, re eminentlyuited s modelsforemulation.There re also implicationsorAristotle'slaim hat hroughharacterfriendshipshe partiesgain in self-knowledge.6n NE IX.9 and MMIL.I5, Aristotle uggestshatwe learn bout ourselves y having notherselfbefore s whose similar ctions nd traitswe can study rom moredetached nd objective ointofview: "We can study neighbor etterthan urselvesndhisactionsbetterhan ur own" (i i69b3 3-35). For nour own case, passion or favorat times blind our judgment MMI II23 ai6-zo). Through notherust ikeus,yetnumericallyifferent,e36 Cf.JohnCooper's excellent iscussion f theway inwhich friendshipacilitates elf-knowledge, Aristotle n Friendship," ssays on Aristotle'sEthics,ed. Amelie 0.Rorty,p.301-40.

6IO NANCY SHERMAN



24/26

can see ourselves rom pointof view outsideourselves, nd so at a dis-tance.But if another elf need not be exactly imilar, hen self-knowledgemight nvolvecontrasting neselfwith another, nd considering owanotherwouldhave acted nthe ame circumstancesiven hat ndividu-al's differentoint fview.Aristotle'sntroductoryemarksnMetaphys-ics A have application here: "All human beings desire to know bynature . . . and especially delight in discriminating ifferences"(98oazz-z8). Self-knowledge,s a sub-species f knowledge, equires,ultimately,he discriminationfwhat s peculiarly ne's own. Anotherand separate elffacilitateshatdiscovery.

I began his aperwith hepromise o strengthenheAristotelianhal-lenge gainstmpartialistthics, nd in particular gainstKantian heory.Withtheseremarks bout self-knowledge,e are now in a position oadvance nthatdirection.t sa featurefKantian heoryhat nassessingmaxims, artof theassessmentwill dependonwhether he maxims in-cerely eflecturmotives.ndeed, obepersuaded ftheunacceptabilityof certainmotives s not merelyposterior o recognizingwhat one'smotives re,butoften ccomplished ythatrecognition. he issue s oneoftransparency.37etknowing heheart,Kanttellsus,is a difficultndseeminglynscrutablematter.8We cannever e fullyure fwe have toldourselves he truth.However hererewaysofknowing heheart xplicit n an Aristotelianaccount ffriendshiphatneedtobeexploredf he ssueoftransparencyis indeed o betaken eriously. hese nvolve, s we have ust een, nfor-malmethods f elf-reflectionhat eempossible nlywithinntimatendtrusting elations.Before friend, ristotleuggests, ecanbareourselves,ndacknowl-edgethefoibles ndweaknesseswe hidefrom thersRh. 11.6). torieswehavetoldourselvesbout how we failed ohelpanother ecauseof nade-quatemeansor resourcesmay simply ot holdup inthepresence f anintimateompanion. tmaybecomeclear nsuch a context hat he realreason failed o actwas because undervalued nother's eedsor didnotregard heoccasionas sufficientlyenefittinge. Wheredeceit snottheissue,but deeper mbivalencesre,theconflictsmayonly urface eforethosewho seem o knowus betterhanwe knowourselves. hus,throughintimateriends, e cometo a vision fourselves hat s more esolutenddefinitehanourpurelynternalized iew affords. he issue snotsimplythat urowneyes rebiased,but moregenerally,hat heproject fself-

37 See Onora O'Neill, "Kant afterVirtue," nquiry 6 (i983): 387-405.38 The Doctrineof Virtue, p. 440, 445-46.

ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE 6ii



25/26

knowledgerequires xternaldialogue and audience. We need "to livetogether ithfriends nd share nargumentndthought"norder o befully onsciousofthe orts f iveswe are eading I I7obi i-iz).2 With-outfriends, e act inblindnessbout who we really re, and indeed acktruepracticalreason.I want tosuggesthat his onception fself-knowledge,o deeply iedto friendship,s not adequately ccountedfor n Kantian theory.On Kant'sview,friendshipanbe viewed nvariousways.As I said ear-lier nthispaper, nso far s actsoffriendshipre based on emotion ndinclination, heycan be thought f as a component f our happiness.Whilewe do not have a duty o happiness,happiness and friendshipfortiori)re constrained ymoral onsiderations. qually,friendshipndsocial relationsmayfigures themeansforpromotingtherduties, uchas beneficence,nd ingeneral s a meansfor ustainingndnurturingurcapacities s a moral gent. I believe hepoint s well llustratednRawls'Well OrderedSocietynwhichfamilynd social relations layan essen-tial role nthenurturendmaintenancefthemoralpowersconstitutiveoffree ndequal persons.) nboth hese ases, friendship aybethoughtto have intrinsicnd/ornstrumentalalue,butnotmoralworth.But nthe Doctrineof Virtue, antsuggests omething lse. Therehearguesthatfriendshiptself s a positivedutyofend.40Whathe has inmind,moreprecisely,refriendshipsnwhichmutualrespect onditionsintimacy;uchfriendships,e says,we havea duty opromote.Yet evenhere,Kant sdeeply keptical boutthepracticalpossibilityfsuch nti-macy howwill we knowwhat theother eally hinks, ow willweknowthatshewill not reveal our confidencesr hold us in contempt orourfaults), ndopenlyurges principle frespect thatrequires friends]okeepeach other t a properdistance."4'Itthus eemsthat he kindof ntimacy ristotlenvisions s a perma-nentfeature fthegood lifewill be absent ntheKantianmoral cheme.Much moreneedsto be said abouttheplace offriendshipnKant'sgen-eral moral theory.But forthe timebeing,the Aristotelian hallengeremains thatgenuine riendshipsa permanentndpractical eaturefour lives, nd that tis theprivilegedontext nwhichto scrutinizeurmoralmotives. heapparentlynsufficienteight ccorded t ntheKant-iantheoryeveals limitation n theKantian ccountofpractical eason,

I9 I take his o be the onclusionf he rduousrgumentt I 7oa I 5-b14, andmore re-cisely,he onclusionf I7obI I-14.40 The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 140-45.4' TheDoctrinefVirtue,. 141.

6i2z NANCY SHERMAN



26/26

and morespecifically, limitation n theCategorical mperative o testsuccessfullyurmotives.42

41Versionsf thispaperwere readtoaudiences t BrownUniversity, niversityfNorthCarolina at Chapel Hill, and Wesleyan. n addition to helpful omments rom hoseaudiences, amgratefulo MarthaNussbaum,Larry lum, nd R. I. G. Hughesfor heircriticismsnd interest.also owethanks otheNationalEndowment or heHumanitiesforfellowship upportduring heperiod n which was writinghispaper.

ARISTOTLE ON FRIENDSHIP AND THE SHARED LIFE 6I3

Nancy Sherman - Aristotle on Friendship and Shared Life

Documents