Issuance of securities under asymmetric information (Myers/Majluf 1984) 1. Empirical validity of the theorem of irrelevance 2. Model assumptions of the Myers/Majluf approach 3. An underinvestment equilibrium 4. A numerical example 5. The Pecking Order Theory 6. Information costs under different institutional frameworks
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Issuance of securities under asymmetric information
(Myers/Majluf 1984) 1. Empirical validity of the theorem of irrelevance
2. Model assumptions of the Myers/Majluf approach
3. An underinvestment equilibrium
4. A numerical example
5. The Pecking Order Theory
6. Information costs under different institutional frameworks
1. Empirical validity of the theorem of irrelevance
Price variation in response to stock emissions at US capital
markets
Average 2-day-excess returns at the time of the announcement
Kinds of stocks: Excess returns of stocks emitted by industrial firms:
Common stocks -3,14%
Preferred stocks -0,19% Convertible preferred
stocks -1,44%
Convertible bonds -2,07%
Straight bonds -0,26% Source: Quelle:Smith (1986): Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 1, S. 5
2. Model assumptions of the Myers/Majluf approach
Characteristics of a perfect capital market 1. Same market entrance conditions for all market participants, possibility of
unlimited borrowing, short-selling, only one interest rate (borrowing rate =
lending rate)
2. No transaction costs, no tax
3. Everyone acts as a price taker
4. Symmetric and efficient information,
5. No arbitrage possibilities
Notation of Myers/Majluf (1984)
I = Investment volume of additional investment
S = Investable reserves of the firm, liquidity („financial slack“)
E = Issuing volume
P = Market value of old shares if event: no emission
P´= Market value of old shares if event: emission
a = Net present value of the present investment, as a random variable ~A ,
with market value equal to expected value A E A= (~)
b = Present value of the additional investment, as a random variable ~B ,
with market value equal to expected value B E B= (~)
Va(E) = Market value of old shares given an emission of E
Information Structure in Myers/Majluf (1984)
Time: t = -1 t = 0 t = 1
Manager’s Insider Information:
Distribution of ~A and ~B , S a, b, S
a, b, residual S
Information open to the public :
Distribution of ~A and ~B , S
Distribution of ~A and ~B , S, E
a, b, residual S
=>
Symmetric information
Asymmetric information
Symmetric information
Decision of Management
Raise capital or invest?
Pay off
3. An underinvestment equilibrium
Underinvestment in Myers/Majluf (1984)
b
Region M´: Invest and raise capital
b = (E/P´(S+a)) - E
Region M: No Investment
a = -S
a = P´-S a
b = -E
Market equilibrium given asymmetric information
Supply of stocks:
Management raises capital and invests, if
V E I S V Ea a( ) ( )= ! " = 0
=> !
! ++ + + " +
P
P EE S a b S a( )
=> E bE
PS a+ !
"+( )
Demand for stocks:
At the stock exchange, the firm receives a market price conditional on the
market participant’s perception of the distribution of a and b as well as their
knowledge of the manager’s investment strategy.
Given an emission, the market price is
! = + ! + !P S A M B M( ) ( )
with )
~()(
and ),~
()(
SIEBEMB
SIEAEMA
!="#
!="#
4. A numerical example of Myers/Majluf (1984)
state: s11 s12 s21 s22
pij: 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
A: 20 20 6 6
b: 4 2 4 2
Given: S = 0, I=10 and hence E = 0 or E = 10.
If the management invests in each state, it follows: