My fifteen years_in_government-moise_tshombe-1967-103pgs-pol

MY FIFTEEN MONTHSIN GOVERNMENT

MOISE TSHOMBE

University of PlanoPiano, Texas

1967

Copyright

1967by

University of Piano PressPlano, Texas

Library of Congress Catalog Card No . 67-22557

Copyright 1966 by Les Editionsde la Table R de -4. Opera t3aioilParis. All

Manufactured in United States of America

My Fifteen MonthsIn Government

TranslatedbyLewis Bernays, 0. B. E .

CONTENTS

Preface 7

Note 9

I. Return to Leopoldvilleand Formation of Government11

II . The Fight Against the Rebellion27

III . Diplomatic Problems43

IV. Settlement of OutstandingMatters in Dispute With Belgium71

V. Economic Recovery and Matters of Finance . . . 77

VI . Reconstruction & President Kasavubu93

VII. In Opposition 105

Epilogue 113

Preface

Africa today looms large in the problems of theworld . Laden with mineral wealth and natural resourcesand strategically situated below Eurasia and betweentwo great oceans, the Atlantic and Indian, it is a primetarget of the new colonialism of the twentieth century .

Africa's indigenous people are newcomers to thecivilized world as we know it today . Yet they are ridingthe great revolution of rising expectations and holdinfluential voices in the councils of the world .

In the heart of this emerging continent lies theCongo which is the embodiment of all the wealth andthe conflict that characterize Africa itself .

From that new land there has come one voice thathas captivated the imagination of the world . MoiseTshombe, though African to the marrow, understandsthe western world as well as the ambitions of the newcolonialism that comes from the East .

Thrust into the Prime Ministry by the demands ofvirtually all of the rudderless leadership of the Congoafter the great debacle of the early 1960's, Moise

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Tshombe plunged into the task of reconstruction withthe vigor of a great leader .

He writes in "My Fifteen Months of Government"of his aspirations for Black Africa, his estimate for theold and his distaste for the dictatorship of the newcolonialism, his respect for, but not reliance on, tradi-tion in guiding his people for the long struggle ahead .

"My Fifteen Months in Government" gives to theworld an insight not only into a continent but into aman we can assume will one day again take a colorfulseat in the councils of the world .

8

Robert MorrisPresident

Univerity of Plano

Note

This book is not one of memoirs . It is too early forme to be publishing memoirs, but in the difficult situ-ation in which may country finds itself I have thought ituseful to recall the various steps which marked the workof my government during fifteen months .

Many sincere persons have failed to understandwhy and how I resigned . They will find in these pages anexplanation of the events which brought about myresignation .

Moise Tshombe

9

PART I

MY RETURN TO LEOPOLDVILLE

AND THE

FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

I

My Return To Leopoldville

And The

Formation Of The Government

After fourteen months of voluntary exile in EuropeI landed on the 24th of June, 1964, at the airport ofNdjili. I had been summoned to return in the hope thatI might save the Congo which appeared to be in dangerof complete collapse . I knew that I faced a dramaticsituation and that difficulties without number awaitedme. But I had been assured on all sides that I was theone man who had the slightest chance of success in ourefforts to save the situation . I had been told this bymany; others had caused me to be informed of this view ;and yet others had implored me to return immediately .

I had arrived and had hardly placed foot on Afri-can soil before I was accosted by a Congolese officer, anaide sent by Prime Minister Adoula . He almost pushedme into a waiting car and we started instantly throughthe night toward the city . This happened so quickly thatsome people suspected that I had been kidnapped .

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Many of my friends were indeed anxious for mysafety, for they knew that my fourteen months inEurope had been caused by the fact that in March andApril 1963 it had been imperative that I place a consid-erable distance between the Congolese authorities andmyself. In June 1964 these friends were deeply con-cerned lest the rancor and enmity towards me stillexisted and that I might have been lured back only to beentrapped . However, I had the formal guarantee ofGeneral Mobutu and I felt no anxiety as the carwhisked me along . We followed the road to the militarycamp where Prime Minister Adoula lived behind themassive protection of paratroopers .

At daybreak I entered his residence . He was still inbed and his aide went to awaken him. A few momentslater he appeared in his pajamas . He embraced mewarmly, laughing loudly and seemingly happy and re-lieved to see me.

I have had differences with him in the past, but Iesteem him as a man . I could not approve of all hispolicies, but he did make a real effort to save hiscountry from anarchy, and he had often given proof ofcourage. He had failed and now faced imminent catast-rophe. He was aware of this ; he no longer controlledanything; and had no idea what should be done . Heinformed me with emotion of the death of JasonSandwe who had been assassinated by rebels a few dayspreviously at Albertville .

"You, Tshombe", he said, "are the only solution" .Almost the same words were used by General Mobutuwho had arrived in haste and assured me of his pleasureat seeing me . He also thanked me for having trusted his

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word and for having come . He assured me that it was hewho had moved Adoula to recall me .

The Prime Minister invited us to breakfast, duringwhich we had a lively discussion of the existing situationin the country . This was dominated by the powerfulrevolt which was causing bloodshed in Kivu andNorth-Katanga and which was spreading from East toWest. General Mobutu raised his arms to heaven intelling me of his trip to Kivu from which he had justreturned and which had left him depressed and seriouslydisturbed . Several thousand rebels armed with clubs andassegais had routed several battalions of the nationalarmy. The soldiers were scared of the practices ofsorcery and witchcraft which, they thought, made therebels completely invulnerable .

I shall describe in another chapter what I know andwhat I think of this rebellion . For the moment it isenough to say that at the time of my arrival it wasexpanding rapidly and that Leopoldville itself felt grave-ly menaced. Nearly every day, in the capital of theCongo, explosions were heard, and people were fearingthe worst. Already the embassies and various foreignorganizations were preparing to recall their personnel .The government of Adoula was as unpopular as it couldbe; the people were muttering, growling and complain-ing . A spark would be sufficient to set fire to powdereverywhere.

"And so," concluded my companions, "there is noone left but you . You alone could attempt a nationalreconciliation . And you might succeed."

I was not as optimistic as they, but I could notrefuse. During my voluntary exile I had maintained

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contact with Congolese politicians of all shades ofopinion, and they had all seen in me the only possiblesavior. I have never had so many friends as at thatperiod, but I was in no sense fooled . They were allseeking to attract to themselves the favour of a possibleally; they all hoped, in promoting my return, to be ableto install themselves in my good graces and rise with meto power. None the less I thought it might be possible,in view of the gravity of the situation, to provoke apsychological shock that would enable me to drawtogether all the political forces in service to the publicgood, and to convince those who could not be madeMinisters that there were many other methods of ren-dering public service in a young country just emergingfrom serious crisis, and one obviously destined forconsiderable development in the future .

I said all this to Adoula and Mobutu who bothencouraged me heartily .

At nine o'clock that morning I called on thePresident of the Republic, Mr . Joseph Kasavubu . Hehad been notified of my return and was expecting me .His reception of me was distinctly cool, which rathersurprised me. Kasavubu is not of a demonstrative tem-perament; he is a somewhat withdrawn type and silent .While he is a wise man, he is highly sensitive and onefeels that he values the retention of his presidential jobas highly as his life .

He was not pleased to see me . He was aware of mypopularity and he obviously suspected me of aspiring tothe position of the principal office of the Republic .Actually he regarded me as his only possible rival andhe felt that my spectacular return at a moment when the

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whole world regarded me as politically dead wouldassuredly react greatly in my favor .

He said to me : "I had not expected you so soon . Iwas counting on your return, but you should havewaited until the new Constitution had been framed . Youwould then have re-entered political life by the normalroute of election ."

Obviously President Kasavubu was content for meto return, but on condition that I join the ranks and thatI come simply to support the prestige of the moribundregime. He wished me well in some subordinate place,but he did not wish that I should appear as the savior ofthe country . I knew full well, of course, that alone Icould save nothing, and that there should be the closestunderstanding between the President and myself . I toldhim that in positive terms . He listened to me somewhatblankly. I described the dramatic state of affairs in thecountry. He seemed to be surprised to learn that thingswere so bad .

When we left the residency Adoula, who had beenpresent at the interview, said : "You see, he does notunderstand the situation ; it is beyond him ."

The rest of the day was one long series of meetingswith men of affairs in the political world. Mr. Adoulainstalled me in a guest house of the government next tohis own official residence at Kalina . My waiting roomnever emptied . Nobody doubted that I would be en-trusted with the formation of the provisional govern-ment required under the new Constitution . Under theterms of that document the government of Adoulawould resign on the 30th of June and the Presidentwould choose a new Prime Minister who would, with his

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new Cabinet, govern the country until the next generalelection, which would mark the beginning of the newlegitimate government . I would have to consider anddiscuss the constitutional problem, but it was well thatthe people should know at once that the new Constitu-tion gave to the President of the Republic wider powersthan those contained in the Constitution conceived inBrussels in 1960 on the model of Western democraticinstitutions .

Everybody seemed to be convinced that the forma-tion of the government would be entrusted to me, butPresident Kasavubu hesitated to give me this missionwhich could give me considerable advantages in the racefor the Presidency if I should aspire to that position . Idid not covet it . I hoped that Mr . Kasavubu would keepthis post in which he had had experience, but I alsohoped that we should be able to work together in ouraim effectively to govern the country . I told him thisand repeated it at every opportunity while others alsotold him the same. All the major politicians besieged thePresident's office and urged Kasavubu to nominate meto form a government . On the 3rd of July he yielded .

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At the commencement of my consultations I wasfairly optimistic . The Congolese people rejoiced at myreturn. I had not yet had any real contact with themasses and I sought to avoid it until I could see moreclearly that there was a real rebirth in the land . Butwherever I went I saw faces light up in smiles because Iwas bringing hope. The newspapers welcomed my re-turn . The politicians, as I have stated, pushed meforward . In short, from a psychological point of viewthings looked good .

From the 3rd of July I encouraged consultation . Iinvited each of the large political parties to give me alist of candidates for ministerial positions from which Iwould choose those who seemed most suitable . I wouldbear in mind the necessity of having a governmentrepresentative of the provinces, since it was primarilythe provinces that were revolting against the authorityof Leopoldville .

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At that time there were three large political parties :- The C.D.A . (Congres Democratique Africain), whichcontained the more moderate elements ; The CommonFront, which represented the followers of Lumumba ;and the Radeco, which was the party of Mr . Adoula andwhich one might describe as the party of the centre butwhich at that moment had hardly any following .

The negotiations lasted six days . Six days of talk .The groups had hardly named their candidates beforethey split as there was no agreement on the choicesmade . Two responsible members of the Common Frontcame to blows . As for the C.D .A. it crumbled frominternal dissension, while the Abaku, the party of Kasa-vubu, insisted on presenting its own candidates .

Naturally I also appealed to the refugee rebels inBrazzaville where they had founded the C.N.L., theCommittee of National Liberation. The C.N.L. sent mean emissary, Mr . Lubaya, whom I would make Ministerof Health .

The members of the C .N.L. in Madrid had con-tacted me on various occasions, urging me to join theirrebellion . I told them that in my opinion we needed apolicy of national reconciliation and that it was for thatreason that I was willing to meet with them . Ourdiscussions had lasted three days . They were difficultbecause they talked of nationalizations and of doctrinaltheories whereas in my opinion the problem of theCongo was not one of doctrine or theory. None the lessI sought an accord with them, feeling that I should tryeverything .

I induced Mr . Thomas Kanza to come from Lon-don . He also represented rebels . I was thinking of

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naming him Minister of Foreign Affairs . He is a collegegraduate, young, intelligent and courteous . He had beenthe representative of the Congo at the United Nationsand Ambassador in London . He was active in rebelcircles and he enjoyed a wide acquaintance in interna-tional circles. And lastly, since 1960 he had aspired tobe Minister of Foreign Affairs . He had one majorobstacle in his career, President Kasavubu . It was an oldfamily feud among the Bakongo . Mr. Daniel Kanza, thefather of the young diplomat, has long sought to acquirethe prestige of "King Kasa" in the Bas-Congo, and heeven founded in 1960 a dissident Abako party .

None the less I hoped that Mr . Kanza would joinmy government. I told him so, and he accepted withgratitude . I thought the matter was settled when, duringour conversation, General Mobutu entered with a suit-case . "Look," he said, "what has just been found in theluggage abandoned by the rebels at Bolobo . A mountainof documents ." He emptied the contents on a table andpromptly commenced the inventory. We were helpinghim, Mr. Kanza and I, when suddenly Mobutu ex-claimed again "Look! Here's a letter signed by ThomasKanza!" He read it . The writer was addressing theChief of the rebel camp of Gambona atCongo-Brazzaville and he exhorted him to continue thestruggle until final victory . Kanza stood aghast. I soughtto comfort him, assuring him that there would be ageneral amnesty and that he had nothing to fear . I eveninvited him to dine with me that evening . He did notcome to dinner because as soon as he left me hehastened to Brazzaville . We shall soon be finding Mr .Kanza again as "Minister of Foreign Affairs" in therebel "government" of Stanleyville .

2 1

By the 9th of July my government was ready . I hadno doubt disappointed many individuals for I wantedthe governing body to be small in order to make itefficient . In addition to the functions of Prime MinisterI had assumed charge of Foreign Affairs, of Informa-tion, of the plans for coordination of Labor, Post Officeand Telecommunications. In addition to myself therewere to be ten Ministers :Messrs .

Godefroid Munongo (Conakat) - Interior & PublicFunctions ;

Dominique Ndinga (Abako) - Finance ;Leon Mamboleo - Justice ;Albert Kalonji (Radeco) - Agriculture ;Jean Ebosiri (C .D .A.) - Economics ;Jules-Leon Kidicho (Common Front, M.N.C .L .)

-Transport, Communications and Public Works ;Frederic Baloji (C .D.A .) - National Education ;Adolphe Kishwe (Common Front - P.R .A .) -Mines, Land & Energy;

Joseph Ndanu (Puna) - Youth and Sports ;Andre Lubaya (C.N .L . - U .D .A.) - Public Health .Among the malcontents were, of course, all the

members of the previous government. They had beenexcluded on principle. In order that the Congolesepeople should realize that a new era had opened I haddecided against the retention of a single individual of theold regime .

My Cabinet had hardly taken the oath of officebefore the difficulties commenced . At Brazzaville theC.N .L. accused Lubaya of treachery because he hadagreed to serve in my government. However, Lubaya

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had been duly authorized to that end and had beeninstructed to assure me that all the rebels of Brazzavillewould return to the Congo under a legally constitutedgovernment. In order to clear the air, I sent MinisterMamboleo to Brazza. He met Mr. Gbenye, the respon-sible principal of the C .N.L ., who assured him that hewas in perfect accord with me and that he wished toreturn, but the authorities of Brazzaville had forbiddenit .

I had no alternative but to govern regardless ofopposition . I was encouraged to go forward by a visit Ireceived one morning from a follower of Lumumba,whose name I may not disclose, who laid before me awhole battery of terrorist apparatus . "There", he said,"it is finished . It was I who caused explosions. Now it isended and we are all going to work together to save theCongo ."

All together! That is just what I hoped for . One ofthe first acts of my government was to release allpolitical prisoners . The doors of the prisons wereopened . Mr. Kasavubu sought to make one exception ;he did not wish to free Mr . Gizenga, who had beenlanguishing for two years on the islet of Bula Bema inthe mouth of the Congo river . I had to argue with himstep by step to convince him that there could be noexceptions if we really sought to bring about effectivenational reconciliation . Gizenga was an important lead-er in Kwilu, which was in rebellion, and in the interna-tional sphere he had almost the stature of a symbol . Inorder to prove our sincerity Gizenga must be freed .

Kasavubu yielded, and I was myself able to presentGizenga to the crowds of Leopoldville .

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However, on the rebel side resistance continued . Icould not fail to see in this traces of foreign influencesince I knew that only a few days earlier all the rebelleaders were disposed to come to an understanding withme. I had ceased all military operations as evidence ofmy good faith . Regardless of this, the rebellion contin-ued .

None the less, the Congolese masses understoodthat a great opportunity for the restoration of order andunity had arrived . On the 18th of July I was at theStadium before forty thousand people . I addressedthem ; I explained to them ; I presented my government .And by their loud applause they proclaimed their confi-dence. I paraded through the streets of the town, and bythousands people cried to me "Tshombe, Save us ." It isnot for me to describe the reception they gave me, butobservers were vastly surprised at the enthusiasm of thecrowds . At that moment I symbolized for the people ofthe Congo the hope of a better life . I promised thecrowds better justice and more prosperity if they wouldtruly help me in rebuilding the country . The enthusiasmof the crowds made it quite clear that they would help .

My intentions had been made clear to the wholeworld . I wanted to restore order, to repair the economy,and to reconstruct . It was for that, with efficiency inmind, that I had allocated unto myself several of themore important portfolios . In the situation in which theCongo found itself, I had to be a one-man-orchestra .

Western governments could hardly imagine what aherculean task it is to govern a country like the Congo .In Africa, the Chief is the father of all ; he must be

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active and interested in everything . Everyone has theright to call on him, to explain personal problems, andevery head of government must pass the best part of histime in the almost ceaseless reception of callers . In theCongo I could not even count on efficient administrativeassistance, for the departments had all suffered terriblyduring the past four years . There is no need for me todescribe at length the decay and dilapidation every-where .

It was necessary to do everything and to be every-where .

From the moment of my installation as PrimeMinister I undertook many quick journeys into theinterior . I wanted the people of the provinces to knowthat from then on the government would be thinking ofthem and their interests . This government was in itselfthe result of the anger of the provinces with Leop-oldville. That was neither a new nor an unusual phe-nomenon. In any country as vast as the Congo it wouldhave been the same. The capital cities of all countrieshave a tendency to neglect the distant provinces and toorganize their policies around the interests of the bigcity. That is why at the very moment that the worldtends to form larger groupings one observes at the sametime a recrudescence of regionalism .

I went to Bukavu, to Paulis, to Stanleyville, theentire zone most directly menaced by the rebellion . Andeverywhere the people acclaimed me as a savior . I willadmit that for all the reasons that are so well known, Ihad some qualms and was none too assured when Iarrived at Stanleyville . And I was pleasantly surprised,for nowhere had I met such a warm reception .

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I delivered speeches all the time, always explainingthe same truths, always seeking to convince my listenersthat things could and must change .

My first care, of course, remained the rebellion . Onmy way to Bukavu I called at Bujumbura, where Ihoped to meet Mr. Soumialot, who directed the opera-tions of the rebels. He would not come, but he sent oneof his associates, Mr . Foca, to whom obviously I hadlittle to say . Normally I would have been able to inducethe rebels to lay down their arms . Normally, that is,without the intervention of foreigners . Not having beenable to see Soumialot, I sent him Mr . Bagira, leader ofM.N .C . of Kivu, whom I had released from prison . Itwas a vain demarche. The rebellion continued . On thefifth of August Stanleyville fell to the rebels .

It became evident to me that the task was going tobe infinitely more difficult than I had imagined . Insteadof being able instantly to dedicate all my powers and allthe resources of the country to its reconstruction, itwould be necessary to fight and crush the rebellion .

At Bukavu I met Colonel Mulamba who was at hiswits' end . The town was virtually surrounded . The armywas demoralized . New attacks by the rebels were ex-pected . The only protection was that of the Bashipeasants who watched the roads for the protection oftheir herds from rebel raids . But the Bashis were dividedinto two camps of which one seemed to favor the rebels .Its Chief, the Mwami Kabare, had been imprisoned fortwo years by Adoula's government, and he retained aviolent hatred of everything emanating from Leop-oldville .

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PART II

THE FIGHT AGAINST THE REBELLION

Nevertheless, Colonel Mulamba remained full ofanxiety. He complained that there was no militaryassistance from the Belgians, despite the fact that Bu-kavu was militarily a crucial area. I was aware that therole of Belgian technical military assistance was theformation of a new army, and not to fight with thearmy. In theory that was sound enough, provided thatwe had several years before us, but in the condition ofthe Congo we had only a few weeks in which to restoreorder .

Mulamba asked me to do everything possible tosend him troops from Katanga . I took immediate actionand a few days later a Katangan company arrived justin time to support the best elements of the A .N.C.and the gallant warriors of Kabare who had placedthemselves under the orders of Colonel Mulamba .

Thanks to these measures Colonel Mulamba suc-ceeded in mid-August in saving Bukavu .

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In the course of my journey in the interior of theCongo in July, I discovered a situation that was at oncetragic and full of promise . Tragic, because the rebellionwas spreading rapidly. Full of promise, because thepeople were demanding only two things, - order andwork. That may be too brief a summary, for the peoplewere also hungry for justice . They had been cheated bythe politicians ; independence had brought them nothingbut suffering . Everywhere the masses were ready torevolt, not in an organized movement, but in a diverse,dispersed manner . At that moment no unanimity ofmovement was possible and it was for that reason thatthe uprising could not save the Congo, even if it werethe result, at the start, of perfectly legitimate grievances .

I shall not discuss at length the causes of the revoltfor I think they are well known . Severe censure has beenpassed on the whole of new, emerging Africa, its frauds,its corruption, the incompetence of its administrativeand political bodies . There are a thousand explanations

31

for this situation, but the principal reason was the factthat the colonial powers had left us with administrationsof a Western type, much too rigid to suit such individ-ualists as us Africans . Europe itself is far from the unityit has been seeking during the past twenty years, but sheseems to have looked to us in the Congo for a degree ofwisdom that she does not herself possess . As long as thecolonial system prevailed, with its means of coercion, itcould function . Even in the partition of Berlin, thecoming of liberty and democracy initially shook thewholly artificial edifice that was constructed there . Ofall this I shall have more to say when I approach theproblems of political and administrative reconstructionin the Congo .

For the moment we faced one stark fact: the wholeof the Congo had had enough of suffering and injustice .It wished to shake off the unjust and inefficient yoke ofLeopoldville . The people felt themselves abandoned .They saw their Chiefs abuse their authority . That's notaltogether untrue, but in exchange the Chief renders realservices and assumes the security and subsistence of hissubjects. But in this new Africa the political Chiefsabandon all their duties and occupy themselves mostlywith their rights and privileges . I am hardly exagger-ating. I know that there are exceptions and that theblack continent has produced some veritable statesmenwho have at heart the interests of the people, but theyare swamped among their problems .

In short, the Congo had had enough. It was readyfor any adventures . It would have been easy for me toexploit the situation. Before my return to the Congo therebel leaders had urged me to ally myself with them . In

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accepting I could have definitely ensured the success ofthe rebellion, but it seemed evident to me that such asuccess would have no future and that it would involvemy country in more serious difficulties than ever . More-over I would have been playing into the hands of certainforeign powers which were encouraging the rebellionwith the obvious purpose of grasping the black continentfor their own benefit .

I do not believe that any country in the world couldescape all foreign influence . As long as such influence isnot confined to a single power I regard it as beneficialand I have never been able to understand those whoseek to enslave Africans in a sort of cultural andpolitical ghetto . But it is obvious that such influencesare harmful if they seek in any way to invade ourfreedom . The only means of escaping from constraininginfluences is to dominate and control them . That is thecourse the African countries should pursue . But I see nosense in rejecting certain foreign influences, even if theyare abusive - and they often are - only to embraceother influences which might be even worse .

When the plots of international communism en-courage quarrels among the Congolese, it is not thewelfare of the Congo that they have in view, but that ofinternational communism. In the subversive plans of theCommunists the main object was to destroy . Theywould tell me that they would then build in Africa abetter society. Let us remember that Colonialism alsoproclaimed a desire to build a better society ; it failed,just as will fail all attempts at development in Africawhich are not led by us Africans . I believe that weconstitute a human group markedly different from oth-

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ers, and I do not think that formulas which work inEurope or Asia would be successful with us . In myopinion the black world will be obliged to discover itsown original solutions . I believe it will find them . I donot say that we should disregard the experiences ofEurope and Asia ; they might well enlighten us . For me,as Prime Minister of the Congo, the problem was tocreate such conditions as would enable my country todevelop economically, politically and culturally so thatit could occupy the place to which it is entitled on theinternational scene . My own experience as a formermerchant had often caused me to minimize the impor-tance of international affairs and to attach more impor-tance to more immediate problems - those of product-ion and those of the low level of life of the masses . Thatstill holds good, but, though it is true that the first careof a statesman should be the welfare of the people, he ischarged with many other cares among which thecountry's prestige abroad is most important . I shall betold that the best way to create prestige in the world isto present the image of a happy, contented people . I amin absolute agreement . In accepting the post of PrimeMinister I had hoped to be able to devote myselfprincipally to the tasks of economic development andreconstruction . A thousand other cares prevented mefrom giving to those things all the time and energy Iwished .

In July 1964 I found myself captain of a ship thatwas leaking everywhere. There was a need to reach thepeople. I travelled in all directions explaining to thepeople and speaking from a full heart . I told them thatthe rebellion was no solution . I urged them to workharder rather than destroy . I called upon them to rally

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around me, so that all together we might redeem thesituation and chase all the disorder and corruption fromour institutions. I told them all the harm that badpolitics had caused them. I sought to arouse a vastenthusiasm which would create the psychological cli-mate necessary for the reconstruction . I explained thatthey should not destroy the schools and dispensaries,that they must not harass the whites, that our future didnot lie in turning back and shrouding ourselves intradition . We must not ignore our traditions, but wemust not make of them a refuge; we must make them apoint of departure toward controlled evolution . I advo-cated obedience of the traditional Chiefs who were in aposition to understand and guide the aspirations of themasses . I did not regard the old order as necessarily abrake on development. On the contrary I thought it thebest foundation for the launching of development alongregional lines . I know well that some parts of Africahave advanced far beyond the stage of their old estab-lished order, and I do not pretend that my formulashould be applied everywhere . There exist in Africatremendous differences in the degree of the politicalevolution of the masses. It is for this reason that I donot believe in rigid commitment to any one formula .Quite often ethnic conflicts ha, ,e been stressed, but Ithink these would soon disappear if one could find themeans to administer each region with special concernfor its own particular needs .

All this does not really divert me from my subject .The Congolese rebellion was not, as I have alreadystated, a single, unanimous movement. The causes wereeverywhere the same, but there was no sense of solid-arity. Actually the rebellion epitomized all the centrifug-

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al tendencies of the Congo. The Chiefs sought to gatherall their forces together, but they did not succeed ingiving the whole even a minimum of cohesion . It was arevolution without a frame . Its leaders quarrelledceaselessly . They were divided between pro-Chineseleanings (Bocheley-Davidson), and pro-Russian(Gbenye). They had nothing in common except a totalincapacity to command obedience of the rebel bands .

These were the reasons why I could not makecommon cause with the rebels . I chose a differentcourse. I decided to try to save what could be saved,endeavoring to extricate from the mire the existinginstitutions : institutions deficient in many ways, but atleast existing . I knew full well that it would not be easy,but I was convinced that there was no alternative . Ihoped to be able to induce the rebels to lay down theirarms, and I would certainly have succeeded if it had notbeen for foreign influences which manifested themselvesin the neighboring capitals of Brazzaville and Bujum-bura .

In August 1964 it became evident that the revolu-tion would continue . It covered three-fifths of thecountry. A few more weeks and it would be in Leop-oldville; it would be everywhere. My first aim, therefore,was to block its expansion . The reports furnished to meby General Mobutu had left me without any illusionsconcerning the army .

After the ceremony of swearing-in the Government,Mobutu had informed me of the dramatic situation inregard to army supplies. "There is nothing", he said,"in any of the depots except a few hundred Mauserrifles". It was then that I offered to place at his disposal

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the Katangan gendarmes who had remained loyal to me,together with all the equipment, armament and air-planes of which they retained control .

I had no illusions as to the value of these troops . Iam not suggesting that the Katangan soldiers lackedcourage, but the army was badly trained and the sol-diers knew it ; they felt but little confidence in them-selves and in their officers . Moreover, it must be admit-ted that some elements of the army were in largemeasure responsible for the discontent among thepeople, for they had been "living off the land" for fouryears and had exerted pressure on the villagers .

In defense of General Mobutu it must be recogniz-ed that he took command in extremely difficult circums-tances. He became chief of an army that had mutiniedand the general was obliged to integrate in it thousandsof Gizenga's followers of the Stanleyville secession andthe gendarmes from Katanga . I do know that from thatmoment the soldiers from Katanga brought full honorto the army of the Congo and fought with superbcourage in many terrible battles. On the other hand thetroops of the Gizenga party earned for themselves ahorrible fame in assassinating twelve Italian aviators ofthe O.N .U. at Kindu and twenty European missionariesat Kongola .

The military problem was essentially one of enlist-ment and organization . The Belgians helped a little withorganization, but not with recruiting . They did not wishto extend their aid further on the principle ofnon-participation by Belgian officers in military opera-tions. I simply had to find more effective aid. I mightget it little by little, but time was pressing .

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The dilemma was dramatic . The rebellion had to bestopped. The zones in the East, ravaged by the rebels,had to be relieved . If I sought to confine myself exclu-sively to bilateral military agreements, the Congo wouldsoon be convulsed in total anarchy . It was necessary atall costs to find effective military forces, and to find themrapidly. It was in these circumstances that I took theoccasion to engage foreign volunteers. Belgium hadconsented to send me a military adviser intimatelyacquainted with the Congo . This was Colonel Van-dewalle. I told him to organize the 5th MechanizedBrigade, consisting of foreign volunteers. Katanga gen-darmes and soldiers of the A .N.C. I counted on Amer-ican aid to permit the rapid equipment of this brigadewhich would as soon as possible be sent to Stanleyville .

In the meantime other foreign volunteers werespeedily organized in small groups which would set offwith great haste to the regions most immediately me-naced. In a few weeks several hundred men had beenrecruited .

I knew I would be violently criticised for this, butthere was so little time . I recall that we were on the edgeof the abyss . I would ask other African countries tosend troops to help us to restore order, but they wouldnot be able to help ; they had barely enough troops fortheir own needs .

While I was busying myself with the promotion ofthe fight against the rebels, they committed themselves

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in the territory they occupied to innumerable and ter-rible extortions. Recognized Chiefs, intellectuals andgovernment officials were killed in most shocking andappalling ways . The people were crazed by a wave ofsheer barbarism . In the regions of the North and Eastthousands of persons were executed in front of themonuments erected to the memory of Lumumba . Wit-nesses reported that the flagstones around the monu-ment at Stanleyville presented the appearance of guttersin a slaughterhouse. The rebels were bent on the de-struction of the entire elite of the country . They heldsome two thousand European hostages for whose fatethe worst was feared . Some efforts were made by theRed Cross to bring about the release of the Europeanwomen and children, but they failed .

By the beginning of November, the Fifth Mechan-ized Brigade of Colonel Vandewalle was ready . It left itsbase at Kamina to proceed to the North . It made rapidprogress, liberated Kongolo and Kindu, and dashed onto Stanleyville .

For some time past I had been receiving anxiousappeals from the United States and from Belgium . Bothwere naturally greatly concerned for the safety of theirnationals who were prisoners of the rebels . They fearedthat the advance of the army would be too slow and thatthe rebels might massacre the hostages as soon as thebattle reached the streets of Stanleyville. The UnitedStates and Belgium requested authority to organize araid of paratroops on Stanleyville . The Belgium para-troops, who had come via Ascension Island, would bedropped at dawn on the airport of Stanleyville . Thanksto the element of surprise they would rapidly invest the

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city and liberate the hostages, among whom was theAmerican missionary, Dr . Carlson . I was convinced thatthe Fifth Mechanized Brigade would take Stanleyvillewithout much difficulty . It was a well-disciplined force,doubtless insufficiently equipped, but in spite of every-thing very efficient since it had succeeded in passingvictoriously through a number of ambuscades in thecourse of its journey which had covered several hundredkilometers .

I saw clearly the arguments against the use ofBelgian paratroops. There would be cries of Belgianinterference in the internal affairs of the Congo . Itwould be forgotten that it was the Congolese army,aided by foreign volunteers, which had done all the workand made the long journey; and only one thing would beremembered - that it was the Belgians who had liber-ated Stanleyville. Not only would the Congolese armyfeel itself frustrated and cheated of a victory that it wason the point of winning since it was so rapidly approach-ing Stanleyville, but African extremists would raise thecry: "Colonialist Aggression" .

None the less I accepted the offered paratroops .President Kasavubu was against it, but I could not thinkof declining an operation which might perhaps save thelives of so many. Perhaps! We shall never know whatwould have happened without the paratroops. Wouldthere have been fewer or more deaths? Nobody can tell,but it is certain that if I had rejected the Bel-gian-American operation I would have been chargedwith responsibility for all the deaths . I think today thatthere might have been fewer killings of Europeanswithout the paratroops' attack ; it was that, and not theoffensive of the Congolese army, that gave the signal for

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the massacre of Europeans . But of course this is nothingbut an opinion which cannot be proved or disproved .

On the 24th of November 1964 the Belgian para-troops and the Fifth Brigade arrived at Stanleyville andfreed the hostages on the right bank of the river . Therebels had had time to kill 26 hostages, among whomthere were both women and children, but there weremore than a thousand who escaped . The missionary, Dr .Carlson, was among the dead. On the left bank twen-ty-nine Europeans, almost all missionaries, men andwomen, were assassinated. And in other rebel centersmassacres were repeated . A total of about three hundredEuropeans died in atrocious ways, as when at Mungherethey were bound with wire and thrown into the river .There were many women and children among them,many missionaries .

I think with emotion of all these victims .I think with emotion of the tens of thousands of

Congolese who were massacred by the rebels in thisfractricidal butchery .

It is vain to tell me that history is written in blood .I believe that all these horrors could have been avertedif there had not been beyond our borders countries thatwere encouraging the rebellion-if there had not been atBujumbura and at Brazzaville Chinese diplomats far toonumerous to be engaged in diplomacy .

At that moment the rebellion was broken, but notdefinitely crushed . Military pressure could not be re-

41

laxed . This became clear when several months later ameeting took place in Brussels between General Mobutuand Messrs. Harriman and Spaak to discuss ways andmeans of making more effective the operations of thearmy. It was there agreed that the United States andBelgium should make greater efforts to furnish addition-al military supplies . Thanks to these measures thevictories of the A.N.C. were slowly consolidated .

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PART III

DIPLOMATIC ACTION

III

Diplomatic Action

When I returned to Leopoldville at the end of June,1964, the Congo had no longer any international credit .In this respect my country was the laughing-stock of theworld. We still had a few questionable friends but manyenemies in whom our weakness inspired scornful arro-gance. It is always pleasant, when one is small ormediocre, to see a giant knocked down, and there arethose who seek to make the plight of the giant asdifficult as possible . At Bujumura, at Brazzaville, atDar-es-Salam, in Cairo, at Algiers, at Accra the rebelsmet with generous assistance . The rebel chiefs couldoperate freely from the territories of Burundi andBrazzaville. From Tanzania they received arms, mostlyChinese, and in Congo-Brazzaville veritable trainingcamps were created for the rebels. The best known ofthese was at Gambena, from where various offensiveactions were launched against the Congolese army .

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At that time Brazzaville and Bujumbura were thetwo main centers of Communist Chinese penetration inAfrica. At Brazzaville the Chinese intervened quiteopenly in the administration of the State . Burundi, lesstrusting, passively allowed the dozen Chinese who con-stituted the Embassy of Peking to operate . But Burundiwas to finish later by chasing this Embassy from its soilwhen the Government perceived that the diplomats ofPeking took too great an interest in the internal prob-lems of the country, even inviting citizens of Burundi tosee propaganda films in support of the revolutionaries .

For the Congo of 1964 it was absolutely essentialthat the revolution be crushed . I tried, as is well known,to negotiate directly with the rebel Chiefs . I encounteredrebuffs, despite the promises that had been made to mebefore my return to the Congo. I have no doubt that therebel leaders were sincere when they made those promis-es, but it became clear that those who were pulling thestrings did not wish to lose so good an opportunity todestroy the Congo and that they were opposed tonational reconciliation . I have already stated that I sentMr . Mamboleo to Brazzaville to contact Mr . Gbenyeand he returned after having seen the rebel Chief . Thelatter had explained that while he was in favor ofnational reconciliation, the authorities in Brazzavillewould not permit him to leave their territory .

I decided that a military victory would not put adefinite end to the disorders unless the foreign influencescausing the revolt could be stopped . Look at the map ofthe Congo ; look at its borders ; you will see that it isquite impossible to prevent infiltration . It would benecessary, therefore, to persuade neighboring countries

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to stop aiding the rebels and to urge them to respect theGovernment of Leopoldville. I took steps in July toimpress upon the world that the Congo was a land to berespected .

In July a Conference of Non-aligned Powers washeld in Cairo . The Congo was invited and I decided toattend, but Nasser sent me telegram after telegram tosay that I could not preside over the Congolese delega-tion. Were they afraid of me? I wished to go to Cairo totell all those who criticised me that I sought to save mycountry, but that in order to do so I must have theneutrality, if not the good will, of all those countriesthat called themselves non-aligned . I would tell themthat in my opinion the Conference of Non-alignedPowers would have no meaning if they persisted ininterfering in the internal affairs of others . But Nasserwould not agree ; his telegram was denunciatory . He wasagreeable to President Kasavubu coming, but he did notwish to see me. I still wished to go, but my Governmentand President Kasavubu were opposed . The Presidentdecided that no one should go to Cairo . I had to admitthat that was the wisest course, and I had to yield .

I did not go to Cairo, but a few weeks later aConference of the countries belonging to the Organ-ization of African Unity was to be held at Addis Ababa .Emperor Haile Selassie issued the invitations . The Em-peror held himself above the rivalries of Africans, andhe stated that I had a right to state my case and thatAfrica must listen . The Ministers of Foreign Affairs ofthe Arab States, with the exception of Algeria, did notattend at Addis Ababa in person because an Arabconference was being held in Cairo at the same time .

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Their absence did not distress me ; quite the contrary . Iwas certain that I could make myself understood amongthe black countries and that I would be able to dissipatethe misunderstandings that separated us . I was not at allsure that the delegates of Arab extremism would wish tohear me. But even if the extremists were disposed tolisten to me I doubt whether they would have been ablereally to understand . Anyway it was evident that neitherNasser nor Ben Bella would ever overcome the prejudicethey held against me . By my efforts to find an Africansolution to the problems of Black Africa I menacedtheir hopes of taking over the direction of an Africaunited under their influence . Did they not see that for usthat would be a new form of colonialism? Black Africapreserves bad memories of the influence that certainArab countries had exercised in the past . The peoplepreserve vivid memories of the operations of slavetraders from Egypt and the Sudan only eighty yearsago .

I certainly do not wish to suggest that all ArabStates wish to conquer Africa ; it is the dream of acertain number of ambitious leaders who are swayed bypolitical passions rather than the immediate problems oftheir countries .

I arrived at Addis Ababa on the 5th of September .I was received with all the honors due me as PrimeMinister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of a greatcountry .

I was not entirely free of anxiety when I arrived at

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Addis Ababa. I had intended to oppose consideration bythe Conference of the problems of the rebellion in theCongo, but President Kasavubu would also be at theConference. There was but one course for me to pursue- to grasp the nettle, to breach the wall of hate thatsurrounded me, and to demonstrate to my friends that Iwas strong enough for them to dare to proclaim them-selves my friends .

I was well received at Addis Ababa . Emperor HaileSelassie surprised me by his knowledge of the state ofaffairs in the Congo and by his keen judgment . He is aman of great experience, wisdom and prudence . Heencouraged me to persevere in my efforts at reconstruc-tion in my country .

Mr. Diallo Telli, Secretary General of the Organ-ization of African Unity, was also friendly . After anhour's conversation he told me that I did not conform inany way to the reputation of me that he had heard atConakry, at Algiers and in Cairo . He is a passionatedoctrinaire, thoroughly convinced that the future ofAfrica lies in extremism, whereas I hold on the contrarythat moderation offers us infinitely better chances ofsuccess . Moreover, moderation is much closer to theAfrican temperament. For the African the essentialvalues of life lie in joy and pleasure . The doctrines of theextremists have in them nothing African : they arestrained, hate-ridden and restive, while the idea ofhappiness is a total stranger to them . The extremists arewilling to sacrifice the happiness of the African peoplesto dreams of grandeur . I am myself an ardent partisanof grandeur for Africa, but I am convinced that Africacan only be truly great in remaining herself, - wise andhappy. As soon as all the contradictory passions are

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exhausted Africa will find her grand destiny . I have notthe least doubt that she will one day enjoy considerabledevelopment and that the time will come when she willmake an important contribution to the welfare of theworld of the future .

At Addis Ababa, therefore, I presented myself as arealistic leader of Africa . I knew full well that doctrinesof moderation were little calculated to arouse greatenthusiasm among nationalists, but I was persuadedthat the part of common sense was the part of wisdom,and that if urged with determination it would win out inthe end. Beyond the artificial and temporary ex-citements of the moment, beyond the fabricated pas-sions, there was the real Africa, badly organized, poor,tortured by leaders who did not hesitate to sacrifice theinterests of the people for the sake of their doctrinaireideas. To me it was evident that it is this basic Africa,which is the real Africa, that will win the final victory,even if only after a thousand bloody conflicts. Might wenot be able to avoid those conflicts? Surely we mustcontinue to try. It was for this that I had come to AddisAbaba on that 6th of September 1964 .

I assured the assembled delegates that I had notcome to the Conference to accuse anybody . I suggestedthe sending to Leopoldville of a committee of inquiry,the members of which would be chosen at the Confer-ence. In the same spirit I offered to dispense with theservices of any mercenaries whose presence in theCongo might seem to the Committee to be undesirable .I expressed the wish that friendly African States mightsend us detachments of troops and police . These couldundertake the maintenance of law and order in the

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tranquil regions and in those which had been recentlypacified. This would relieve the military strain on myGovernment and would permit of our sending our owntroops into the troubled areas .

When I had concluded I was greeted with applauseof much greater warmth than I had dared hope . Theonly ones who preserved their air of pouting sulkinesswere Egypt, Algeria, Mali and Guinea . All the othercountries were in accord with me .

During the Conference I had opportunities formany private discussions which revealed that I hadmore friends than I had thought . But many of thesefriends urged me to proceed with all haste towards thepacification of the Congo, and they pressed me to seekcontact with the rebels whose delegates were present .The Conference had met my wishes by excluding themfrom its sessions, but I was urged by many to meet withthem . I refused, and I explained for the umpteenth timethe real nature of the Congo .

A few days before, I had received in LeopoldvilleMr. Mennen Williams, American Under-Secretary ofState, and I had expressed the same views to him . Healso wanted me to promote national reconciliation andsuggested that I include in my Cabinet men in whom hehad confidence, like Adoula and Bomboko . I told himthat he might be right in placing faith in these gentle-men, but it was perfectly clear that the Congolesepeople wanted change and did not wish to see any of theformer Ministers in the new Government . It wouldweaken all my efforts if I were to concede this point . Itwas essential that the Congo should know that there hadbeen a new beginning and that all ties had been ruptured

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with the political practices which had been at the root ofall the discontent . I stressed the fact that the country nolonger had an effective administrative or political struc-ture, and that I stood before crowds crying out to besaved, and that my only hope of success lay in theircoherence and their continued goodwill. If I were tochange my line of conduct I would profoundly deceivethe Congolese people who expected me to be differentfrom other politicians, and wanted me to rescue thecountry from all the corrupt practices that the peoplehad come to know so well .

Mr. Williams understood the situation full well .One of my preoccupations was the reform of the policeforce of Leopoldville . That force had been seriouslydemoralized following a riot in 1963 . Efforts had beenmade to reorganize it, and to that end a hundredKatangan policemen were brought from Elizabethville .

I outlined to Mr . Williams a plan which I hadalready prepared and which could be brought into forceimmediately with aid from the United States. Mr .Williams expressed a wish that I make an appeal forAfrican troops to replace the white volunteers. I hadthought of that before him . I made the appeal, but itbrought no results . It is true that I made it a conditionthat I should select the countries that could send metroops as I wished to be sure that no extremist countriesshould profit by the occasion to infiltrate my country .This seemed to me to be an obvious and elementaryprecaution .

The foreign volunteers had been recruited individ-ually; they were entirely subject to my government and Iwas sure of being able to control them . They were verily

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soldiers of the Congolese army . It was evident that wewould not have any comparable control over any contin-gents supplied by foreign armies. Despite all its draw-backs, the foreign volunteers constituted the sole forcesafeguarding the sovereignty of the Congo .

The Conference at Addis Ababa concluded with thepassage of a resolution creating an ad hoc commissionto promote nation-wide reconciliation within the Congoand to seek to restore amicable relations between thegovernments of Congo-Leopoldville, Burundi andCongo-Brazzaville . The committee was composed of therepresentatives of ten countries and would be presidedover by Mr . Kenyatta, the head of the government ofKenya .

The resolution passed by the Organization of Afri-can Unity called upon "all who are fighting in theCongo to cease hostilities in .order to seek, with the aidof the Organization, a solution which would open thedoor to complete reconciliation and the restoration oforder throughout the country ."

In the same document I was urged "to ceaseimmediately the recruitment of mercenaries and, inorder to facilitate the solution of this African problem,to deport as speedily as possible all the mercenaries nowin the Congo."

Lastly, the resolution appealed to all foreign gov-ernments to end their interference in the internal affairsof the Congo .

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So far as I was concerned this ad hoc commissionhad only one mission to fulfill, - to put an end to theforeign aid keeping the rebellion alive ; but efforts wouldbe made to go further and to lead me, under the aegis ofthe commission, to renewed discussions with the rebels .The Commission was to meet at Nairobi on the 16th ofSeptember .

I went to Nairobi and there I met Mr . Kenyatta,who impressed me as being a man of great kindlinessand goodwill. But from all appearances he had noproper appreciation of conditions in the Congo and heseemed to dream of my being able to reconcile every-body. It was obvious that this idle dream stemmed froma noble and generous nature . I recapitulated for hisbenefit all my views on the situation in the Congo. Heunderstood my arguments and once again the rebelswere excluded from the meetings of the commission . Itwas decided by the commission that a sub-committeeshould be appointed which would go to Bujumbura andBrazzaville to endeavor to restore normal relations withLeopoldville and the neighboring areas . In short theOrganization of African Unity decided to limit itself tothe role of appeasement .

It now remained for me to tackle an importanttask . A conference of non-aligned countries was to meetat Cairo on the 6th October . I knew that my presencethere was manifestly not desired. Nasser made severalattempts to dissuade me from attending, and Ben Bellaannounced that he would never sit under the same roofwith me. And yet it was important that I go in order toconvince the African world of the soundness of myviews .

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The journey began badly . The Egyptian Embassyhad the passports of my delegation and said the docu-ments could not be found. The ill will of the EgyptianEmbassy was only too apparent, and I decided that weshould proceed without passports . At the last momentMr. Mustapha, an Egyptian diplomat, delivered thepassports, but with obvious reluctance . When the diplo-mats accredited to Leopoldville assembled to bid mefarewell, not an Egyptian was present . But suddenly Mr .Mustapha showed up - in a sports shirt . I told him ofmy discontent in the matter of the passports, whereuponhe became so indignant and irate that I had to ask himto leave the plane . He left while muttering that he wouldtelegraph to his government so that they might treat methe way I had treated him . A strange incident which didnot, I thought, reflect high diplomacy .

But that was only the beginning . Things becamemore complicated when the airport at Cairo forbade theBoeing Air-Congo to land on the pretext that all therunways were out of service. This was untrue for dozensof planes landed that day, bringing numerous delega-tions. But they did not want me. My plane was divertedto Athens. There, at the airport, I met Emperor HaileSelassie who had come from Bulgaria and was on hisway to Cairo . I told him of my misadventure, whichmade him very indignant . He promised to lodge aprotest in Cairo and to see that I was received as wasmy right .

I had no alternative but to take a regular flight toCairo . At midnight I took a seat in a Boeing of the AirEthiopia Line . There was, of course, no question ofrefusing the Ethiopian Company the right to land, and a

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few hours later I found myself on Egyptian soil . I wasmost cordially received . Nasser had sent an aide and acar for me. I was taken to the Oruba Mansion, one ofthe most beautiful residences in Cairo . The aide con-ducted me most amicably to the room that had beenreserved for me, and after assuring himself that I lackednothing he took his leave . I thought I would inspect mynew quarters and went out to the landing, intending togo down to the salons. But outside my door stood asoldier who would not permit me to proceed . I wasNasser's prisoner .

My prison was a gilded cage with beautiful silkdrapes and objets d'art aplenty . I like such things ofbeauty, but it was my liberty that I wanted. I was not toregain it for three days . They were strange and anxiousdays. I was cut off from the world and was not per-mitted to telephone my Embassy or the members of mystaff who had been placed in semi-surveillance in severalhotels in town . I had one visit only, that of Nasser'sChief of Cabinet, who confirmed that I was a prisoner .His pretext for this was that the Egyptian Embassy inLeopoldville had been surrounded by Congolese troops .Nasser's purpose was obviously to prevent my address-ing the conference of the non-aligned, and the incidentsin Leopoldville had nothing to do with my detention .Anyway the incidents in Leopoldville were of a quiteminor character and were the result of my confinement,for when he heard of my imprisonment in Cairo theMinister of the Interior had decided to keep a closewatch on the movements of the members of the Egyp-tian Embassy . In the circumstances it was a perfectlynatural and normal thing to do . During my brief captiv-ity I had plenty of leisure to meditate upon my own

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situation and that of my country. Since my return toLeopoldville at the end of June I had succeeded informing as effective a government as possible . I hadpursued every likely avenue towards a peaceable endingof the rebellion and, having failed, I had inaugurated themilitary campaign against the rebels . In the meantime Ihad, in the realm of diplomacy, achieved some successeswhich permitted me to hope that perhaps the foreignpowers who were helping the rebels might withdrawtheir aid. I was shocked to realize the terrific cost of allthis. The cost of the army was seemingly a bottomlesspit engulfing thousands of millions, and gravely menac-ing the precarious balance of the national budget . But Ihad no choice; I was convinced that if I succeeded inrestoring peace throughout the land, the revival of theeconomy would be such that the Congo would soon beable to return to a healthy financial state .

I pondered also the destiny of Black Africa, which,after shaking off the yoke of colonialism, was ex-periencing a series of grave crises and seemed to beunable to find herself while plunging thoughtlessly intoadventures inspired from abroad . Black Africa possessesan enormous latent dynamism, but she has not yet beenable to find the means of expression . While startingfrom our native traditions we must do everything pos-sible to build an Africa which will be modern whileremaining Africa. It is we alone, we blacks, who mustdiscover the formulas . We must not depend upon thewhites. They can help us, but they must not take ourplace in discovering systems suitable for us . CertainAfrican intellectuals, in particular the Senegalese presi-dent, Mr. Senghor, have launched the idea of "Africansocialism". I think we must probe in that direction .

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Occasionally, in the midst of these meditations, Ireceived a little news from the outside . I learned that theLiberian president, Mr. Tubman, had threatened toleave the conference if I was not released . Others weremoving in the same sense; the black African countriessaw clearly that beyond my own particular case it wasall Africa that was menaced by extremism . As a resultof much pressure Nasser was obliged to permit me toleave. He had me conducted to the airport and I wasunder surveillance until a regular flight on the SabenaAir line took off for Athens .

My mission to Cairo was then terminated. Allthings considered, I think it was successful, as mydetention had produced more understanding and moresympathy than any talks of mine could have done . Iwas, of course, fully aware of the fact that whilemoderate Africa came to my aid, there were others whohad retired to seek new ways of encompassing my ruin .The governments of Egypt, Algiers, Guinea and Maliwere all considering new ways and means of aiding therebels .

On my return to Leopoldville after my adventure inCairo I was profoundly moved to discover that myfellow countrymen had followed events closely withgreat indignation over my misfortunes . Hundreds ofthousands met me and hailed me with delight . Nasserhad done me an outstanding service for at that momentI was made aware of a sense of complete unanimity ; allthe politicians felicitated me ; everybody supported me .General Mobutu foamed with rage when talking of theArabs. I wanted to convoke a meeting with the massesat the stadium to tell them of the precise situation, butGeneral Mobutu advised me to wait a few days . He .

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wanted the army to organize a grand anti-Arab spec-tacle. The background for this was already available ; itdated from the time, of the Belgians who in all theirgrand displays presented a tableau of the anti-slaverycampaigns .

"We have all the details", said the General; "it willbe easy to organize, and for the parts of Belgian officersI have a number of mulattoes with very light skins ."

I was a trifle surprised, but I did not wish to opposethe General. The play was shown at the stadium a fewdays later and I must admit that it was a tremendoussuccess .

To the assembled multitudes I explained how diffi-cult the tasks of government had become since theintrusions of foreign powers in our domestic affairscompelled the authorities to concentrate on problems ofsecurity . I stated that I was overburdened with work;there was so much to do, to decide, to see and tocontrol. We were just a handful of ministers, the heirs ofan administration which, despite the presence of a fewcompetent men, had virtually collapsed under the strainand endless pressure of grave political troubles . Therehad been no dearth of good intentions but the machinehad often idled and almost stopped . It was evident thatamid all my other duties I would soon have to devotemyself to administrative reforms .

But before everything else I must devote my time tothe restoration of normal relations in the field of diplo-macy . On the 30th of November I went to Paris whereI was to be received by General de Gaulle . I was deeplymoved at the thought of finding myself in the presenceof this man who had shown such understanding of

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Africa and whose generous and intelligent policies hadpaved the way to independence for the countries ofAfrica. I believe that all Africans regard de Gaulle asthe greatest of Europeans . Nobody would dare disputethis in Black Africa, not even in Guinea or Mali wherethey may have had some reason to complain of hisharshness .

General de Gaulle received me with great cordial-ity . The interview lasted sixty-five minutes . The Generaltold me his views on the problems of the moment, - inEurope, Africa and the Congo . He told me frankly thathis wish was to help the Africans to be themselves . Inregard to the Congo he surprised me by his thoroughunderstanding of the actual situation of which he knewthe details. He assured me that if we needed Frenchtechnicians for specific purposes he would gladly help usto find them and to see that they were competent andefficient .

France, he said, had no desire to supplant Belgiantechnicians in the Congo, but she would be happy tofurnish experts in any field where we might need them .

The General promised to send me in a few weekstime an eminent official, Mr . Lamy, former Governorof Chad, who would guide in administrative reforms .

Another visit which impressed me greatly was myaudience with Pope Paul VI, with whom the problemsof missionaries were discussed . He felicitated me on thehelp I had rendered to the Catholic missions . He knew Iwas a Protestant, but assuredly that was a point of noimportance . I hope that in our world of the future theremay be neither Catholics nor Protestants, but simplytrue Christians .

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I begged the Sovereign Pontiff to see to it that thechurch should not relax its missionary efforts . I assuredhim that beyond the lamentable massacres which werethe work of madmen was a great mass of people wholoved the missionaries and were keenly alive to all theirgood works and to all they owed them . It would bewrong to suggest that Africans take for granted all thatis done for them, for the great majority of the people ofthe Congo had great faith in missions and missionaries .They were fully alive to the sacrifices made by monksand nuns in going to Africa to preach love and kind-liness and who brought education to their children andhelp to the sick .

I was aware that some church missions and somemissionaries had sometimes erred by the practice ofexcessive paternalism, but that was of little importancein relation to the immense services rendered . I paidhomage to those who had lost their lives in pursuit oftheir apostolic calling . The Congo would never forgetthe part that missionaries had played in its development .

I had planned to leave Rome for New York wherethe Security Council was to examine the tragedy ofStanleyville. I wished to present the story as I saw it,but pressure was brought to bear on me to stay away .My friends feared that my very presence might envenomthe proceedings . I was by no means convinced of thevalidity of their arguments, but I yielded to them ratherthan risk eventual complications .

Besides, I had many other things to do . Since I hadnow restored the diplomatic prestige of the Congo, I feltthat the time had come for me to devote my attention toextremely pressing economic problems . My trip to New

6 1

York having been eliminated, I decided to remain a fewdays in Europe with a view to informing possibleinvestors of the promising openings they might find forthe creation of new industries in my country . I went toGermany where I was received in friendly and encour-aging fashion by President Luebke . Then I soughtcontacts in German industrial circles . Being fully awareof the dynamic energy of German business men, andhaving great confidence in their technical and commer-cial skills, I felt that the Congo must surely interestthem. I had many discussions in these circles, and Iappreciated their frankness and their practical views . Iventure to hope that they found similar qualities in meand I believe that I succeeded in arousing real interest inmy suggestions. Numerous German firms undertook tostudy the question and I gained the impression that myvisit to Germany had been worthwhile . I delivered aspeech in Duesseldorf in which I sought to dispel themistrust and doubts of entrepreneurs. I believe that Isucceeded.

It is true that new political crises in the Congo soonbeclouded all my efforts, but I think that in spite ofeverything German industrialists will be coming . I verilybelieve that one's time is never entirely wasted if onedevotes oneself wholeheartedly to a task, for even if onehas not been completely successful the expended effortwill have contributed in some measure to advancematters . But at that moment I had no idea that mydifficulties were soon to be aggravated by a thousandsimmering complications which I had up to that timebeen able to hold in check .

On the 16th of November I ended my stay inGermany with a brief visit to Berlin . I wished to see the

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Wall of Shame. Viewing that wall I meditated on thestupidity of the calamitous degree of misunderstandingand incomprehension that exists among men . Here wasa people, formerly united, and today shockingly dividedagainst their will by the imposition of compulsion by aminority of rabid doctrinaires . Never as much as inBerlin have I realized so poignantly how utterly hatefulexcessive dogmatism can be .

At Berlin a surprise awaited me in the form of anAmerican military airplane which had been sent to takeme post-haste to Brussels to see Mr . Paul-Henri Spaak,the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs . Mr. Spaakwished to speak to me and begged me to see him at theearliest possible moment. The message was almost anultimatum . I was somewhat annoyed, but I felt that itwas impossible to refuse so urgent an invitation withoutprovoking a useless incident .

I boarded the American plane which soon depo-sited me in Brussels . There I found Mr. Spaak highlyagitated . He had been upset by reading a Congolesedecree which I had signed on the 29th of November . Itcontained provisions intended to clarify the relationsbetween the government of the Congo and certainforeign enterprises in Katanga and Kivu . It had beensuggested in Brussels that the decree pointed to theeventual nationalization of those organizations . I as-sured Mr . Spaak that such a construction of meaningwas entirely false . The purpose of the decree was simplyto affirm the right of the Congo to control the ex-ploitation of its mineral resources. This action seemedto me to be elementary. The decree created nothingnew ; it simply contained a juridical clarification of anexisting situation . In particular it ended the special

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committee of Katanga which had not functioned forfour years. It also laid a firm foundation for thediscussions I would soon be conducting in Brussels onvarious thorny Belgo-Congolese questions . Mr. Spaakunderstood my position and promptly set a date forthose discussions .

I was astonished that this decree had stirred upsuch a fuss in Brussels . In Belgian political circles theywere talking of cancelling all aid to the Congo in orderto recall me to my senses. The reactions of the Belgiansare sometimes truly surprising . I had heard from Gene-ral Mobutu that I must take prompt steps to appease theBelgian authorities as it had been impossible, since thepublication of the decree, to obtain any aid from theBelgians in the realm of military affairs .

Personally I appreciate to the full the help we havereceived from Belgium . I know how much the Congoowes to her, and I have always felt that it was preferableto be aided by a small country rather than by one of thegreat powers . Besides there are occasions when themight of a friendly nation can be of inestimable value .

I am not among those who assert that the Congowould die without Belgium, for I know that is not true,but neither am I of those who claim that Belgium onlyhelps us for her own economic interests . Belgium hasdone great things for the Congo and she has continuedto aid us despite the terrible trials we have livedthrough. I know that there are many close ties whichbind us besides those of an economic nature . We havelived together for eighty years, and that is not easilyforgotten. We were the dominated and the Belgianswere the dominators; we have broken the domination,

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but a part of our heart still remains in Brussels . It is atown where our people feel at home, and no Congolesetravelling abroad would wish to miss a visit to Brussels .

I am aware of the astonishment of some foreignersthat the relations between the Belgians and the Cong-olese have remained so good despite a stormy historyand despite many conflicts which could have estrangedthe governments of the two countries .

It is not that we particularly love the Belgians, butwe know them and we respect them . We know that wecan count on their cooperation even in the face ofoccasional difficulties. There have been many disputesbetween Belgians and Congolese, and there will bemore; but fundamentally I believe our friendship willsurvive all differences, both great and small - some-times, perhaps, with the exchange of invectives and evenin those occasional cases where disagreement is notentirely dissipated .

I know well that they say in Brussels that one mustspeak firmly with the Congolese . It is true, and we likepeople to say what they mean ; but we, too, must be firmwith the Belgians . The difficulty is that the Belgianshate to admit it . I have frequently been astonished attheir surprise when I raised my voice . The whites oftensay that in dealing with the blacks they must armthemselves with patience, but I affirm that this isreciprocal, at any rate as regards the Belgians . We oftenhave to call on all our reserves of patience in discussionswith them when they have reasons, sound or not, forbeing slow to understand us at once .

In the course of my discussions with Mr. Spaak Iwas often aware of his firmness ; I hope he was also

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aware of my own . That is why I held for him the highesteem which I would like to think he reciprocated .

But on that occasion Mr. Spaak did not wish onlyto discuss the unwelcome decree. He thought that thetime had come for me to enlarge my Cabinet and that Ishould include therein Messrs . Bomboko and Adoula. Ireminded him that rightly or wrongly the people of theCongo regarded those two gentlemen as largely respon-sible for their woes ; wrongly, I thought. The desire ofAdoula and Bomboko to do good was beyond question,but neither had been successful in a degree that wouldmerit their being entrusted with the execution of policiesthat were not without dangers .

I have often had disagreements with Mr. Adoula,but he is a political adversary whom I respect . None theless, to include him and Bomboko in my governmentwould be to destroy my whole plan which seeks to gainthe support of the masses and thus create a climatefavorable to the restoration of law and order . I repeatedto Mr. Spaak my reluctance at the moment to takeback these two former ministers in whom I recognizefine qualities that might enable them to serve theircountry in the future, but the time was not yet . Later,perhaps, when I had disposed of more urgent tasks . Iknew, of course, that the Congo should avail itself of allits intellectual forces, but we were a stop-gap regimeand my government was one dedicated wholly to thewelfare of the people. They expected from us newpolicies, and it would be regrettable if, in taking backsome already discredited individuals, I should give theimpression that the government of the country wasgoing back to the old ways . I reminded the Belgian

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Minister of the new constitution of the Congo ; it wasvery clear . The transitory government is required torevitalize old departments and bring them into conform-ity with the times . It is not a normal government ; it is agovernment in transition and I hoped that I might beallowed a free hand to make the most urgent andefficacious changes without having any spokes thrust inthe wheels . We must hold elections to the Legislatureand then proceed to the election of the President . Onlythen will things in general revert to normal .

I cannot assert that my arguments aroused theenthusiastic assent of Mr . Spaak, but he was glad toknow that elections would be organized as soon aspossible .

My readers may be a little surprised that I speak sofreely of the various pressures to which I was subjected,or rather which I repulsed . I do not hesitate to speak ofthem because I know that similar pressures are broughtto bear on the governments of all countries, and thatmine was a relatively normal experience . I cannotpretend that I have not myself often exerted upon theBelgian government whatever pressure I could toachieve my ends . After all, that is politics .

I left Mr . Spaak after making another appointmentfor the discussion of Belgo-Congolese problems .

On the African scene at this period my enemies hadnot been inactive. At the Conference of formerly FrenchAfrican colonies held at Nouakchott on the 10th ofFebruary, my two representatives had been excluded .

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My friends went into action immediately and inducedthe Mauritanian government to reverse this decision . Inthe course of this conference at Nouakchott the Organ-ization for African and Malagasy cooperation wasfounded with a view to promoting the development ofthe former French colonies in Africa . I hoped that theCongo would be included in this enterprise and I wonmy point, for at the next conference at Abidjan on the28th of May the Congo was invited to join the group . Iregard this as a diplomatic victory and a sign, perhaps,that "moderate" Africa is gaining strength .

I went to Abidjan and had the comforting surpriseof being warmly received by a quite considerable crowd .The affair in Cairo was still fresh in everybody's memo-ry, and for the people of the Ivory Coast I was the manwho had resisted the hostilities of Nasser. Friendscrowded in upon me . They told me that the incident inCairo had opened people's eyes and had recalled thelessons of history . They received me with sincere friend-ship in this land which the wise government of Mr .Houphouet-Boigny had made authentically African .

For the moment it was important that the realistsin Africa should make it abundantly clear to the smallfraction of extremists that they must renounce allthought of domination . Africa must choose her ownfriendships and alliances and cannot permit herself tohave imposed upon her those which please Mr . Nasser .

Reviewing my achievements to date, I felt that Ihad succeeded in causing my country to be acceptedanew in the "concert of Africa" and that I had beenable to convince Africa of my single-minded determina-tion to work exclusively for Africa and the Congo . I had

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been able to bring about some of the most difficultdecisions without ever losing sight of my main duty topromote the welfare of my people . I believed that I hadgained every desirable end that it was possible to reachin the field of diplomacy. I still had hardly time tobreathe, but I rejoiced now to be able to devote moretime to the internal problems of my country .

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PART IV

THE ADJUSTMENT OF

BELGO-CONGOLESE PROBLEMS

IV

The Adjustment of

Belgo-Congolese Problems

If I was to promote the revival of our economyalong sound lines, it was vitally important to resolve allmatters in dispute between ourselves and the Belgians .The first task was to restore the credit of the Congo inthe lending markets of the world, since in the past fouryears it had failed to honor its obligations . It wouldhave been completely impossible for us to have metthem . The debts were contracted by the colonial power,and the Congo recoiled strongly from the burden of adebt which she had not herself chosen to incur . A partof these debts had been guaranteed by Belgium, whichcontinued to meet the charges upon them as its owncredit was at stake, but this was not done without somelittle resentment on her part .

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In retaliation Belgium continued to retain the shareof the State in the colonial enterprises which was knownas the famous "portfolio". In order to settle the diffi-culties arrangements would have to be made for theCongo to retrieve the portfolio, which means the controlof her own economy, and on the other hand to giveholders of Congolese securities, whether or not guaran-teed by Belgium, a normal return or some legitimatecompensation .

I have already alluded to these negotiations whichfrom the start had given me much cause to worry . AtLeopoldville President Kasavubu was beginning to showserious resentment over my successes . He did not wishme to go to Brussels to settle personally a problem thesolution of which would delight public opinion in theCongo. The preparation of my brief on this subject wasmade somewhat tedious by reason of innumerable sug-gestions from people who felt they had good counsel tooffer. For my part, I did not wish to engage in long,sterile argumentation, for I was assured that the wisestcourse would be for me to discuss the whole problem inBrussels as one businessman dealing with another . Thiswould not prevent me from asking much of the Bel-gians, and possibly obtaining much .

I persuaded the Belgians to assume charge of thetwo-fifths of the foreign debt which had not carried theirguarantee . From my intimate knowledge of Belgiumand the Belgians, I think I am justified in claiming thisas quite a remarkable success .

Difficulties mounted, however, when we came tothe discussion of such vast parastatal organizations asthe C.S .D. (which had already disappeared though its

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assets had yet to be distributed) or the C .N .Ki . (theComite National de Kivu). These were autonomoussemi-private states within the state .

I was told in Brussels that objections had beenraised in financial circles . In spite of his genius fornegotiation, Mr . Spaak had been unable to arrive at asettlement . Heated arguments were in progress, andthere was talk of discussion being broken off altogether .I therefore suggested to Mr . Spaak that I should gomyself to speak to the interested parties . He wished meluck with a smile which indicated clearly that he did notentirely approve . Nevertheless, I succeeded, and weobtained from the Belgian businessmen what Mr. Spaakhad failed to secure,-considerable concessions whichmay be summed up briefly in these terms : in addition tothe participation of Belgium in the settlement of theforeign debt, the right of the Congo to the portfolio wasrecognized . The government of the Congo would controlor recover extremely important participation in thelargest enterprises and in all industrial fields such astransportation, power, mining and agricultural devel-opments. The value of the portfolio was discussed, but Idid not regard this as the most essential element . Whatreally mattered was that thenceforth representatives ofthe government would be able to make their voicesheard within the administrative bodies of all the impor-tant concerns ; the Congo would have a precious instru-ment for the conduct of her political economy . Since thesigning of that agreement the arrears of dividends duethe Congo for five years have been paid .

The negotiation of these agreements had unhappilybeen preceded by a terribly sad event, the death of SirWinston Churchill, a man whose character and life had

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given a high example to all humanity . I was present athis funeral and I conveyed to his country and to hismemory testimony of the great admiration of mycountry .

On that occasion I met a number of diplomats : Mr .Dean Rusk, who represented the United States, andseveral distinguished African personalities of interna-tional reputation, especially from various parts of for-merly British Africa .

During the negotiations in Brussels I was receivedby King Baudouin . It was indeed a joy to me to discoverhow great an interest the King took in all thingspertaining to the Congo and how solicitous he was forher good fortune and her future . I also had the pleasurein Brussels of addressing a well-informed gathering onthe main lines we hoped to follow in the foreign relationsof the Congo.

A few days later I returned to Leopoldville, bring-ing with me the agreements, the title deeds and divi-dends in a black leather attache case given me by Mr .Spaak, and once again I met with a warm and enthu-siastic welcome at the hands of the large crowds thatgreeted me .

Here we were, the beneficiaries of a portfolio whichshould serve as the basis of my whole program for thedevelopment of our economy and for the modernizationof our existing, traditional, economy . Next I drew up aproject for a bank for development, and sent membersof my Cabinet to Washington to coordinate its functionswith the International Monetary Fund, which had aidedthe Congo for several years .

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PART V

THE REVIVAL OF THE ECONOMY

AND FINANCIAL POLICIES

V

The Revival of the Economy

and Financial Policies

The great discourses of Westerners on problems ofdevelopment are generally good and high-sounding, butvery misleading . They often testify to an almost totalignorance of the problems in hand. However, I mustadmit that my African colleagues often sin in similarfashion, since they have too often lost contact with thereal Africa, the Africa of the peasants .

Am I repeating myself? For me there is only onepurpose in politics, the furtherance of the happiness ofthe people, their joy and their prosperity . In the strangeworld in which we live happiness counts for nothing ; thecare one should have for it is supplanted by pride ofachievement. There is preoccupation with the health ofthe people; there is much talk of prosperity, but ofhappiness never a word . Never does one hear a politi-cian devote a speech to the subject of happiness . I thinkit is very important. If people were concerned withhappiness in the feverish passion to create a technical

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world, international politics would be very different . Ido not deny that we must construct our world ontechnical lines but, if in doing so we lose sight of themain essential which is the happiness of the people, weshall never get honest politics .

One gains the impression that politics, in the actualstate of affairs, has no thought of making people happy,but only of using them as in great maneuvers . But Isuppose it has always been so .

In a sphere less redoubtable, but not less innocent,an accessory aim of politics seems to be the promotionof the prosperity of the politicians everywhere . Therehas been given too much publicity to the extravagantluxuries of certain African leaders for me to dare toaffirm that we Africans dream only of the ideal and ofthe happiness of our people . But I think, indeed I amconvinced, that African politics would be quite differentif African statesmen could escape the thousand ne-farious influences which have sought to guide them, ifonly they were able to elude the vast maneuvers ofcorruption that have afflicted Africa since independence .All the disorders and unrest made of our variouscountries an ideal hunting ground for light-fingeredinternational gentry . In Europe and America banditsattack the banks, but with us they do not attack thebanks; their swindles are much more profitable and lessdangerous. Some day I may perhaps tell what I know ofthe activities of the crooks who invaded the new Africato profit by the inevitable weaknesses of a period oftransition as sudden as that of the last few years .

In contemplating the African economy one mustnot forget that eighty per cent of the population is

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engaged in agriculture . A comparison of the moneyspent on agriculture with the sums expended in industri-al and urban communities reveals the former in a highlyunfavorable light. In a sense that is natural, for servicesin the zones of greater population are necessarily morecostly in view of the greater demands of great masses ofpeople. But the difference in Africa is enormous. It is noexaggeration to say that the peasants of Africa areabandoned to their own devices .

We have some excellent universities in Africa,complete and well equipped, but I do not know one thathas a practical school for the study of agriculturaldevelopment . I know one which has a good atomicreactor, the initial cost and the upkeep of which are farlarger than would be the cost of creating a center forresearch in matters pertaining to agriculture . Our stu-dents are taught all the economic theories evolved andpracticed in highly-developed countries, but they aregiven nothing practical in the important area of instruct-ing our rural population . I know that this charge couldbe levelled at all the African universities which areinstitutions essentially suited to Western culture . I amaware that science knows no nationality, but it shouldbe evident that the teaching of the humanities shouldnot be the same in Africa as elsewhere. How manyerrors would have been avoided if the academic leadershad kept this problem in mind . It is certainly one ofgreat difficulty, but it has never been seriously tackledwith determination to find a solution .

In my opinion the universities, both black andwhite, deserve blame for neglecting the importance ofthis problem which is vital to our rural communities . Itis true there is some research and some instruction in

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agriculture, but it is not so much that which matters . Itis, of course, highly important to teach and to improvethe techniques of agriculture, but in rural Africa thepoint of primary significance lies in the field of psy-chology .

Belgium did initiate several "peasant schools" .Some of these were notably successful-the income ofthe peasants grew with their increased productivity ; butthe fact remains that, once these practical technicaldemonstrations terminated, all the lessons learned wereforgotten, and the African, who is obstinately conserva-tive, returned to the old method of his ancestors inwhom he has greater faith than in the "tricks of thewhites" which he does not understand because they werenot sufficiently explained to him . I know that suchinstruction is not easy and I know that many carefullyprepared plans of development foundered . Why? No-body really knows. It was certainly not because oflaziness on the part of the African peasant, for he isconsiderably more enterprising than people think, de-spite the relative ease of subsistence which is his as aresult of our favorable climate .

Why, then, have programs of rural development sooften failed? It should be the task of some scientificbody to grapple systematically with these problems, andto seek methods which could surely be found; to pro-mote a form of rural development which would not beartificial and which would not be imposed by author-itarian technicians, a rural development which would bethe work of the peasants themselves without the con-straint of administrative pressure . That should be thegoal. I have heard that in some parts of Africa a newclass of relatively prosperous peasants has been born .

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Nobody has ever been able to explain to me why whathas proved possible in one region should not be equallyattainable elsewhere .

It is true, of course, that the quality of the soilsmay have had something to do with some of the failures,but this explanation does not seem to me to be suf-ficient. The greater part of the Congo should be capableof extensive development in agriculture ; indeed, theagricultural production in my country should be thelargest of any part of Black Africa ; we should be able toexport our foodstuffs instead of having to buy themabroad as we are doing at present .

Whenever I fly over Africa and see its immense,fertile lands, I wonder how it could be possible that fearof famine should still exist . Occasionally I notice asolitary plantation in the middle of a vast expanse ofneglected territory, and then I tell myself that one daythat entire plain should be covered with similar pros-perous plantations. What white colonizers were able todo in spots here and there, the Congolese peasant shouldbe able to do wherever the soil permits . It is technicallypossible, but for that to be achieved it would be neces-sary to induce rural communities to organize efficientlywith a clear understanding of what should be done .

The development of the economy of Africa must besupported by the development of rural communitieswhose prosperity would provide industry with the mar-kets it needs .

Even though some small improvements may haveoccurred, the weakness of Congolese business still man-ifests itself everywhere in the country's old and estab-lished methods of trade . With few exceptions Congolese

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shops are small and poorly managed ; they do enablehundreds of thousands of my fellow-countrymen to ekeout an existence, living from hand to mouth and buyingprovisions in the tiniest of quantities . For example, ashopkeeper will buy a packet of boxes of matches whichhe will sell at retail . Next he may buy a carton ofcigarettes, sell these likewise at retail, and only go insearch of a new supply when his small stock is complete-ly exhausted . Another, perhaps a woman, has enoughmoney to buy three fish ; she sells them and then goes insearch of another trifling supply . Imagine the lamen-table loss of time and energy, and the economic wasteall that involves!

The creation of the Bank of Development and theconsequent easing of credit will some day change allthis, but in the meantime the existing methods, bad asthey are, permit large elements of our population to live .Utter destitution is rare in Africa . The situation is notat all like that of India where whole populations literallystarve. We do have undernourishment, but rarely fam-ine . However, the undernourishment suffices to put abrake on our progress. To correct this condition weshould form active groups at all social levels, includinguniversity graduates . In Europe there is, of course, avast range of intellectuals among whom we could alwaysfind some individuals exceptionally qualified in sociolo-gical affairs. In all societies it is only a small elite thatlifts the masses to higher levels. The best, the mostintelligent administration in the world would be butlittle effective without a few front-rank leaders to inspireit. In my opinion this is equally true of private institu-tions . An enterprise might have numerous excellentengineers and yet amount to little if the best of them did

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not assume leadership and inspire both confidence andenthusiam .

One of my most constant ambitions is to succeed ingiving to all Congolese an opportunity to show theirmettle, and I am certain that we shall be able to findamong ourselves a sufficient number of gifted men toenable us gradually to dispense with the aid of foreigntechnicians .

Perhaps I should not have dealt with this problemin this chapter on economics, but it is important to bearthese things in mind if one is to approach economicquestions in a practical and efficacious manner . Toooften it is forgotten that economics is not an end initself, but an instrument of human beings for humanbeings . Some economists without sufficient human en-lightenment pursue economics for the sake of econom-ics. That can only lead to endless aberration .

But enough of these general problems.For the moment we had to face a number of

pressing problems . I cannot do better than recall theprogram I outlined when I became Prime Minister, aprogram which could not be implemented because of thedramatic convulsions which were shaking my country . Ihad been able to suppress the uprisings, but I wasunable to effect our economic recovery . I still clung tothis urgent need which was constantly in my mind, but Ihad not the time to devote myself to it with the entireconcentration I could have wished .

My first task was to combat the ever-rising cost ofliving. This had attained alarming proportions by July1964. I did succeed in reprovisioning the consumers'markets which had been alarmingly depleted .

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My program for economic recovery was based onone fundamental truth-that any effort that neglectedagriculture was bound to fail . I have already dealt withthe difficulties that confront our agricultural devel-opment. I know that in this field it is impossible to workmiracles. We must face things as they are and accept theCongolese farmer as he is-a hard worker, but unversedin modern techniques, and, above all, despondent afterfive years of misery .

For five years, in many parts of the country, thepeasantry had not seen a trace of useful merchandise forsale . The greater part of imported products was kept forLeopoldville and other large centers, and none pene-trated beyond . The income of the farmer was so limitedthat even if he found the goods he wanted they werepriced beyond his means and he had to do without . Helearned also to grow only sufficient for his own require-ments. He knew from experience that in the absence oftransportation his cotton would rot. One does not needmany such failures to render nugatory all the efforts ofthe agricultural development services . No goods to buy,no production .

The most urgent problem clearly lay in the liber-ated areas where the excesses of the rebels had had thetragic result of dispersing the best of the Congoleseagricultural centers .

The first task was to assure a minimum of adminis-trative organization . It was for this reason that I de-cided to take immediate steps to create administrativeservices strongly officered by the best-qualified Belgiantechnicians. In August 1964 Belgium promised us 62specialists comprising agriculturists, physicians, ac-

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countants, public works, etc . The purpose of thesegroups was to reactivate essential services . They weregiven autonomous powers and were highly paid . Theplan assured a pliable and efficient administration,wherever it was put in operation, as fast as the arrival ofthe Belgian technicians permitted .

During the academic vacations of 1965 the studentsof higher learning joined these forces of reconstructionin the zones that had suffered the rebellion ; severalgroups went into the regions of Stanleyville and Paulis .This was for them a magnificent opportunity to blendtheir theoretical learning with the practical realities, andat the same time to manifest their solidarity with thenation . For the regions which did not suffer from therebellion and where the administrative offices had notbeen disturbed but functioned poorly as a result ofweakness in the central offices, I requested Belgium tohelp by the installation of centers of instruction for theformation of an administrative service along the lines ofthat established at Jadotville in 1960. I felt that suchschools would enable the Congo to improve existingservices and make them more adaptable to changingconditions, for the administration could not remainexactly the same as under the colonial system .

In the realm of specifically agricultural matters, Istarted an experiment in the region of Sandoa . Acommittee was formed of responsible citizens of thearea consisting of lawyers, heads of businesses, localofficials and representatives of any existing organ-izations promoting any form of development . This for-mula brought local leaders together and afforded meansof coordinating their activities in a strictly delimited

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geographical area and seemed to offer the best chanceof success .

In the same spirit a number of agricultural planswere presented to the businessmen of the Europeancommunity in the hope of raising a European loan fordevelopment .

I was preoccupied with the problem of industrialdevelopment, as it was obviously impossible to do muchto raise the standard of living of the masses withoutindustry. The Congo had been fortunate enough alreadyto possess some equipment of various types, but un-happily the rebellion wrought considerable destruction .Not a single lorry or truck remained undamaged . It wastherefore necessary to take immediate steps to repair alldamaged equipment so that accustomed activities ofvital importance to the economy of the region might beresumed. The security of the land obviously dependedon all available means of transport . Considerable creditsfor re-equipment would be required .

I was at this time doing everything in my power toencourage the creation of new industries. There waslittle Congolese capital, and it was therefore necessaryto seek capital from abroad, taking care at the sametime to retain general control of our economy . For thisreason I caused to be promulgated a set of laws govern-ing investments . I introduced methods whereby thegovernment would be associated with foreign investors,and in spite of great difficulties I had the pleasure ofseeing created a number of new enterprises in the Congowhich changed raw materials into finished products .

One hears much about the economic independenceof countries that are being newly developed, and it is

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assuredly a goal worth attaining, but it is obvious thatsuch countries cannot by their own capital resourcesalone reach a sufficiently rapid rate of acceleration fortheir immediate industrial needs . It is consequentlynecessary to turn to foreign investors . This is inevitable,and it often holds good even for many already high-ly-developed countries, among which not even the mostpowerful can pretend to be entirely economically inde-pendent .

For us the problem is to make sure that foreign aiddoes not impose upon us too great a dependence eitheron the financiers or on the foreign countries . This isindeed of prime importance . There are certain steps thatmust be taken even though they may not be pleasing toeverybody. We must face the facts squarely . Objectivelywe must face the realities of a situation, and not tooeasily accept ready-made ideas which may be cleverlypresented to us with excellent slogans, but which mightalso involve us in more trouble than profit . It is precise-ly in this domain that we must preserve absolute objec-tivity of mind. After all, independence of mind is themost important of all forms of independence ; it is thatwhich will enable us to attain our ends despite all thedifficulties that confront us because of our weakness .

Another of my urgent tasks was to put an end tothe pillage of our resources by the international crooks Ihave already mentioned . Some importers have lent

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themselves to profitable operations by invoicing theirimported goods at fictitiously high prices . The lossesthus caused to buyers have been estimated as high astwenty million dollars annually. I imposed a strictcontrol of the quality and quantity of all importedmerchandise .

But the most spectacular fraud, without doubtoccurred in connection with the diamond . It is estimatedthat at times the fraudulent export of diamonds equaledthe value of our officially controlled production . Theannual loss to the national exchequer is believed to haverun to six million dollars . Thousands of peasants aban-doned their fields to pursue their search for diamonds insecret quarries .

The suppression of these frauds is particularlydifficult because it involves fighting against the convic-tion of the people that the diamond is free to everybody,and that anybody finding it may sell it to the traffickerswho infest our country . Control is both difficult andunpopular .

Quite apart from the national loss caused by thesefrauds, they wrought a certain demoralizing effect onthe people of the region. Why cultivate laboriously afield of corn if there are diamonds to be picked up whichprovide easy profits?

The measures I introduced enabled us to bringabout in two months a marked reduction in this illicittrade .

The financial condition of the country had sufferedseriously . The cost of restoring peace and of adminis-

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trative and economic reconstruction had been verygreat, and far surpassed the means at our disposal . Ithad been necessary to pay the provinces various grantsand subventions which had not been checked for manymonths because of weakness of administration, andthese had risen by 22% in 1965 as against 1964 . The costof education had also risen considerably, and in 1965 wehad to pay arrears of wages covering periods of 15 to 20months.

The rebels had taken nearly two thousand millionfrancs from the various branches of the national bank inthe interior. Military expenses had grown to dizzyheights. In 1961 they amounted to two thousand millionfrancs; in 1964 they were six thousand million, and in1965 they were over sixteen thousand million .

The disorganization of the Department of Financemade it difficult to make collections, and this naturallyincreased the budgetary deficit . Radical efforts atstraightening out this chaos were urgently needed, andsteps were taken to engage a team of specialists tointroduce simplified methods of management and moreeffective methods of control .

But serious as these monetary difficulties were itmust not be forgotten that both monetary instabilityand military expenditures were caused by the serioustroubles the country had been called upon to face .Moreover, to attempt to restore the monetary situationby decrees and ordinances would be like trying to reducethe fever of a patient without dealing with his sickness .For measures in the domain of economics and financeto be effective there must be a degree of solid stabilitywithin the country, but for the attainment of this therewas still, alas, much to be done .

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PART VI

POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION

AND

PRESIDENT KASAVUBU

VI

Political Reconstruction

and

President Kasavubu

I was advancing rapidly with the prosecution of mymission. The rebellion was not yet conquered, but it wasbroken and exhausted. I had restored the diplomaticprestige of my country and I had laid the foundation foreconomic recovery. I should have liked to have beenable to devote all my time and energy to that recovery,but I could not forget that I also had the duty toorganize elections and to prepare for the creation of newinstitutions . My own predilection would have been togive first importance to economic matters, but I had toadmit that it was necessary to accelerate the transitionto the required new constitutional regime .

If my efforts were not to be in vain, it would benecessary for me to lean on a national political founda-tion with as broad a base as possible . Up to this point Ihad been above parties, but because of the innumerablepolitical divisions in my country it was necessary for me

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to take the initiative to create a movement of unificationwhich would embrace all the politicians who realizedthat the time had come to close ranks .

With this end in mind I convoked a congress of allpolitical parties at Luleabourg to form the NationalCongolese Convention which became know as Conaco(i.e ., Convention Nationale Congolaise) . I succeeded inconvincing the greater part of my listerners ; and theConaco would include all the parties except those whovaunted themselves as the followers of Lumumba, andalso, except Abako ; the party of Mr . Kasavubu. TheAbako assured me of their sympathy and support, butstated that they preferred to remain a completely inde-pendent political party .

Conaco circulated lists of those seeking election,and I was overjoyed to find among them the names ofmen who had been until then some of my most formi-dable political opponents . Here they were now, at thetime of the elections, my friends! I was glad to acceptthem, as their presence might help considerably towardsthe nationwide reconciliation for which I longed . Butmy very power at that moment testified to the fragilenature of Conaco, for everybody knew that in order tobe elected a candidate had to be a "Tshombist" ; and Ihad good reason to fear that many were rallying to mycolors simply as opportunists and that they would notlast beyond what they considered opportunity . I hopedthat the days of opportunity might be prolonged andthat necessity and advantage would keep my new friendsin a state of relative fidelity to me so that the Conacomight become sufficiently strong to prove itself success-ful in the service of the Congo .

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The rebellion was no longer the grave menace ithad been previously. Fear had diminshed and in somepolitical circles the feeling grew that perhaps a favorablemoment had arrived for them to resume the game thathad made the fortunes of many . As fear dissolved,schism and divisions revived .

Elections took place throughout the land and weresupervised by official observers from other Africancountries . These observers expressed surprise at themeticulous care with which we observed the rules ofdemocratic elections . These foreign observers travelledthroughout the Congo, and they all confirmed theregularity of our electoral operations . Conaco madelarge gains, and I was assured of the control of both theChamber of Deputies and the Senate.

From the moment that the results of the electionwere known, my opponents, who were highly dis-satisfied, laid plans to diminish my influence . Candi-dates who had lost sought under all kinds of pretexts tohave the results annulled . They lost no time in seekingthe support of President Kasavubu to declare the elec-tions void in certain regions where they hoped to be ableto manipulate things more satisfactorily for themselves .

In short, now that I had succeeded in bringingabout an improvement of conditions in the Congo, andhad been able to revive people's hopes, a number ofpoliticians wanted to get rid of me and they set them-selves immediately to the task . An insidious task it was .They were well aware that the weakest link in the

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political chain was President Kasavubu. The situationcalled for the closest and strongest alliance between thePresident and myself, but what I have already describedof his reception of me on my return to the governmentsufficed to show that the President had not the leastdesire for such an entente . Throughout the months I hadhad many disagreements with him . He had been full ofmistrust and he had viewed with the utmost disfavor thegrowth of my popularity and the decline of his own. Myenthusiastic supporters rendered me a poor service thatday when they surged forward to greet me at Kitona inthe presence of President Kasavubu, who went to hisplace completely unnoticed . Since then I have al-ways been careful to avoid arriving before crowds at thesame time as the President, but the damage was alreadydone. President Kasavubu was convinced that I intendedto run for the office of the Presidency of the Republic,and that if I did I would be elected. My politicalopponents did not fail to encourage this conviction andurged him to withdraw from me at the earliest possiblemoment my appointment as Prime Minister .

For my part I did everything possible to appeasethe President . I assured him that I had no desirewhatever to be a candidate in this election, and I feltthat Kasavubu could usefully retain his position as longas he permitted me as Prime Minister to govern thecountry . I even suggested to him a "gentlemen's agree-ment" on this point. I knew, of course, that under thenew constitution the essential powers would be entrustedto the Prime Minister, but I was convinced that theinterests of the country demanded that the Presidentand I sould establish between ourselves the closest andmost faithful degree of collaboration, and that together

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we could evolve a method of government as efficient ashumanly possible .

Mr. Kasavubu wanted none of this . He becamemore and more unfriendly toward me ; but, being deter-mined to do everything possible to arrive at the desiredentente, I denied that there was any conflict between usand I extolled his great wisdom . All my attempts atcharm were of no avail in my efforts to allay thesuspicions of him who was called the Sphinx of MountStanley . Mr . Kasavubu was mistrust incarnate . He waspersuaded that I wanted his job, and suddenly heattacked . He granted interviews in which he declaredthat it was he, and he alone, who held all the powers .

In this he was wrong, for the normal regime of thenew constitution was not yet in force ; the president hadsimply had his functions prolonged at the end of hisoriginal term in order that there might be no break inlegally constituted government . That was what wasdesired at the convention of Luluabourg, which hadestablished a careful program for the induction of thenew institutions by the provisional government .

President Kasavubu could not bear the thought thatit was I who directed the presidential election and hehad made up his mind to do everything possible tothwart me. He wanted me to resign . He presented thisas being merely an indication of his wish scrupulously toobserve the constitution, but that document specificallyrequires that the government resign at the end of thepresidential term six months after the election of thenew parliament. I reminded him that the new constitu-tion clearly provided for a transitory regime to act for aperiod in order to pave the way for the newly-electedministers, including the new President of the Republic .

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Only then would the term of the present regime end . Itwould start the new, the normal, regime, and he, Kasa-vubu, who had not been called upon to vow allegiance toit, had no authority to assume powers which did notproperly belong to him .

I refused to resign but he insisted, seeking toconvince me that it was a mere formality . I would resignand he would at once reappoint me as Prime Minister . Isuggested that his logic was somewhat bizarre : if he wasgoing to reappoint me, what need was there of myresignation?

About that time I had been thinking that themoment had come to widen the base of my government,and I had prepared a reshufflement of ministers . Sincethe departure of Mr . Munongo, who had been electedGovernor of Katanga-Oriental, I had been without aMinister of the Interior . The replacement of this minis-ter had been on my mind and was one appointment thatneeded to be made. And then, suddenly, I learned fromthe newspapers that I already had a new Minister of theInterior. Without consulting me, the President hadappointed Mr. Nendaka .

I knew that Mr . Nendaka had been elected as a"Tshombist", but he had also been among the mostactive individuals in throwing fuel on the fire of differ-ences between Kasavubu and myself. He had virtuallydeclared war by quitting Conaco and forming a newpolitical group which he called the Democratic Front ofthe Congo .

This was the beginning of deep confusion whichwas to continue several weeks and which poisoned thewhole political climate. I saw all my work of recovery

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rapidly dissolve before this offensive, the purpose ofwhich was to subvert my authority and clip my wingsnow that I had successfully taken all measures necessaryfor the recovery of the Congo . My party still remainedthe strongest, but intrigues to weaken it were assiduouslypromoted . Conaco resisted. There would be a few deser-ters, but they would not be sufficient to reverse ourmajority. None the less, the political climate deterio-rated rapidly .

Parliament was to meet on the 13th of October . Onthe 8th Kasavubu called on me again to resign . Irefused . I argued at length that we should place theinterests of the country above those of individuals . Ipointed out that the nation had not yet been brought tocomplete safety, and that the attitude of the Presidentwould expose the whole country to new disaster . Helistened to me with a scornful smile, but I persisted andtold him that his action might well cause a recrudes-cence of all the troubles of the recent past and mightserve as the spark to revive all the political quarrels Ihad sought to reconcile . He continued to smile ; he saidnot a word; he would never speak to me again .

I left in despair . I knew he would dismiss me at theinaugural session of Parliament. On the eve of thatsession I dined with General Mobutu and ColonelMulamba. The latter had just returned from Stanleyvilleand was feeling much disturbed about the situation inthat area. When he learned of the President's attitude hedeclared : "Kasavubu must be mad! He must be in-formed immediately that if he dissolves the presentGovernment the rebellion will be resumed with newcourage. I have just returned from the interior . I knowhow the people feel . I know their sense of unrest. They

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have placed all their hope on Tshombe . To deprive themof Tshombe is to invite catastrophe ."

Mobutu then decided to see Kasavubu and explain,as he told me, all the dangers of his plans . Mulambasuggested that he accompany the General, but Mobututhought it preferable that he should go alone, which iswhat he did . Kasavubu had already retired, and left hisbed to see the General . I do not know what passedbetween them, but several hours later Mobutu tele-phoned me to say that the President had obstinatelyrefused to change his decision .

The following morning Mobutu, who feared pos-sible trouble following the session, redoubled his meas-ures of security and provided an armed escort to protectthe President .

I was deeply disturbed when I arrived in Parlia-ment that morning. My thoughts were in turmoil .Should I submit to the President's action, illegal thoughit was, or should I protest, since I was certain of mymajority? I finally decided to accept the blow eventhough I knew that my friends would reproach me forallowing this to happen to me. I felt that this was thesafer course . Resistance on my part might have led tothe gravest complications, possibly even to civil war .

In dismissing me Kasavubu bestowed on Parlia-ment an interminable address . He recognized theachievements of the Government. Then he changed histone, and in a trembling voice pronounced the dis-solution of the government . I forced myself to show notthe least emotion ; the other Members of Parliamentwere stupefied. Some hissed the President; others weresilent, breathless with surprise . I felt all eyes upon me,

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seeking to gauge my reaction . If, at that moment, I hadprotested, I am certain that I would have had all myfriends behind me . But I had decided on silence and Isaid nothing .

That evening I attended President Kasavubu's re-ception on the opening of Parliament .

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PART VII

IN OPPOSITION

VII

In Opposition .

It simply remained to watch developments. Kasa-vubu must name a new Prime Minister . He chose myformer collaborator, Mr . Evariste Kimba, who, like me,comes from Katanga . No doubt he hoped in choosingKimba to ease the shock to the people of Katanga . Hehad good reason to think of this, for Katanga is wellknown for its solidarity, and it deeply resented mydismissal .

It was not in the name of our old friendship that Ireproached Mr . Kimba for having lent himself to thisshady game. It was simply that he had allowed himselfto fall into a trap. He was delighted to find himselfPrime Minister; he did not see that he would findhimself inevitably a pawn in the hands of Mr . Nendaka .That is precisely what happened .

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There followed a period of utter lunacy . Kasavubuand Kimba formed a government in which they appoint-ed ministers without prior consultation with the individ-uals involved. This was particularly noteworthy in thecase of Mr. Kibwe, whom they made Minister ofFinance, another sop to the people of Katanga. Mysupporters were astonished when they heard that Kibwehad joined the new government, but Mr. Kibwe was inBrussels and only learned of his nomination in a newsbroadcast on the Brussels radio . He promptly declaredto a reporter of La Libre Belgique who interviewed himthat he would remain loyal to his party and that hewould not accept the appointment . He requested thereporter to state categorically that he refused to partici-pate in the government of Kimba .

This was a serious jolt to the plans of Mr . Kimba .The pretense was made in Leopoldville that the reportof Mr. Kibwe's refusal was false, but he returned toLeopoldville a few days later and confirmed his rejec-tion of the post . Quite apart from his loyalty to hisparty, Mr . Kibwe was aware that this adventure ingovernment would be short-lived .

I led the opposition in Parliament. There was somediscussion on regulations to govern proceedings in theHouse, and I decided to test my majority . It held ; it hadactually increased a trifle . On the 5th of November Iintroduced a motion condemning the attitude of Kasa-vubu, demanding that he submit immediately the namesof his ministers for the consideration of Parliament .However, the constitution permitted the President aperiod of one month ; and Kasavubu, Kamitatu, andNendaka took advantage of this delay to seek interna-tional recognition . The president and Kamitatu, Minis-

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ter of Foreign Affairs of the "government" of Kimba,went to Accra where a meeting of the O .U.A. was beingheld . They received a warm welcome at the hands ofMr. Nkrumah . They announced the intention of theCongo to reconcile all the members of that body bydismissing the foreign volunteers from the nationalarmy. They were ready to surrender everything and in afew days they succeeded handsomely in producing ahighly compromising situation .

Meanwhile, in Leopoldville, General Mobutu wasdeeply disturbed by the news from Accra, and heproclaimed flatly that there could be no question ofdischarging the foreign volunteers as long as he neededthem. The President returned from Accra . He expecteda triumphal reception, but he was greeted only withderision except at Dendale, a city in which he hadformerly been burgomaster . The Congolese people didnot approve; they were full of anxiety, fearing that the"pretender" government was leading them to new trou-bles . The people clung to me and begged me, wherever Iwent, to resume power. I sought to calm them as muchas I could .

Finally President Kasavubu could delay no longer .He had to submit the names of his cabinet to the vote ofParliament. He resorted to tactics of surprise by con-voking the assembly late on Saturday evening for thefollowing Sunday morning, November 14th. It was clearthat the followers of Nendaka and Kasavubu had beenwarned not to leave Leopoldville, whereas the membersof my party had left town for their weekend rest . Theleaders of my party pursued the absent ones and suc-ceeded in bringing most of the Conaco members back intime. On the morrow the vote presented the President

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with the snub of rejection . Confidence was refused by134 against 121, with seven abstentions .

Anger choked the President but he did not surren-der . He renamed Mr . Kimba to form a new governmentand secured a further delay of one month before itwould be submitted to Parliament for approval . It wasprodigiously ridiculous .

Dismay grew in Leopoldville over this unconscion-able procedure and, as anxiety grew, the new govern-ment lost authority. On the radio of Leopoldville aviolent campaign was launched against me and againstBelgium. The foreign press of Leopoldville found itselfthe object of very definite threats . Several journalistswere arrested and expelled . As for the official govern-ment journal of Leopoldville, Le Progres, it raged in adelirium of hate against me and my friends . A trulyvigorous campaign was launched .

Mr . Nendaka invented a Belgian military plot tobring about the fall of Kasavubu . I felt a degree ofanxiety for my own safety .

Throughout the Congo there was agitation ; therewas talk of revolt against the new government whichappeared to the people as one favoring the capital asagainst the provinces. I had defended the interests of theprovinces; I was the man of the provinces, and it was assuch that I had brought so much new hope to thepeople .

Then, on the 25th of November, General Mobutuintervened. He relieved Kasavubu of his office andproclaimed himself President of the Republic "ad inte-rim" . The tension felt in Leopoldville immediately re-laxed. There was a great sense of relief, and I felt it

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myself. I congratulated the General and promised himmy support towards a rapid return to our normalinstitutions . I urged my party to support him to thisend .

What happened thereafter was most extraordinary,and no doubt it is too soon for me to be able to give allthe details . But just as everybody thought that theGeneral had made his coup d'etat in order to revert tothe legally established form of government and to or-ganize a presidential election, it was suddenly an-nounced that he had cancelled everything and hadassumed the presidency for five years . All of a suddenthis general, who had always said that he would neverengage in politics, had developed a strange taste for it .

I hoped to be able to bring him back to reason . Iargued that his regime could never be anything but amilitary dictatorship and that he would soon find him-self confronted by immense difficulties. He knew that hestill had need of me, for if at that moment I hadopposed him I would have plunged my country into newseas of trouble .

For these reasons I urged my friends to pass a voteof confidence in Mulamba's government, but alreadythe constitution had been profoundly modified by theunilateral decision of General Mobutu, and the Parlia-ment had been reduced to impotence .

Immediately after the vote in Parliament the Gen-eral moved away from me. I knew that his Belgianentourage approved of his attitude. Once again theBelgians had astonished me .

Constantly the Belgians send new representatives todeal with their interests, and always these new arrivals

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have to go through the same apprenticeship in Africabefore they learn that they have totally misconceived therealities of the land . But meanwhile the damage is done .And after these emissaries have finally learned to under-stand a little, they will be replaced by the newcomerswho will unfailingly make the same mistakes .

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EPILOGUE

Epilogue

Following the coup d'etat of General Mobutu,there was nothing much for me to do in the Congo . Mypresence might even complicate the new situation whichmay perhaps give my country a new chance . Despiteeverything, I hope this may prove to be the case, but totell the truth I have grave doubts as to the General'ssuccess . Although he has often shown great courage, hisfriends know that he can be both weak and impulsive . Inhis hands the Congo is in danger of new perils, but couldI refuse him his chance?

My health had suffered as a result of fifteen mo. ithsof intense activity and anxious strain, and so I decidedto consult my physicians in Brussels and to take a fewweeks' rest in Europe . My intention was to return to theCongo as soon as my health permitted, and to resumethe leadership of my party, the Conaco, and my role inParliament .

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In the meantime General Mobutu passed an ordi-nance whereby he could ignore the Parliament, since itrefused to follow him. However, the same Parliament, afew weeks later, voted supinely in favor of anything thePresident desired . In particular, it voted to deprive meof my seat in Parliament . The only way I can explainthis change in Parliament is that it was obtained byterroristic compulsion . Actually, anybody who dared tocriticize General Mobutu was in danger of death .

The people were given evidence that this was a veryreal danger, for Mobutu caused the public execution offour highly important political personages,-Messrs .Kimba, Mahamba, Bamba and Anany-after a mock-ery of a trial which shocked the whole civilized world .

I was deeply pained to see my country kneel beforea military dictatorship . Every type of dictatorship ishateful to me, but a number of friends have told me thatI was wrong in this detestation and wrong to havepersevered in my policy, which was to be firm but alsoconciliatory when conciliation seemed possible . I havenever wished to compel anybody to follow me . I wouldhate any terroristic policy . My policy was to governwhile seeking to explain things to the masses, andgaining their support . I still regard this as the properway to govern in Africa, and in this way it would bepossible to create a real democracy of an authenticAfrican type .

I do not believe that dictatorships will succeed inAfrica. Everywhere they have resulted in bloodshed evenwhen the original intentions of the dictators were bene-volent . Do not all dictatorships start out with goodintentions, only to end in the most frightful tragedies?

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The dictatorship we see at work in Leopoldville alreadyshows the beginnings of a horrible period for mycountry, which has surely suffered enough in the pastfive years .

The regime of General Mobutu cannot last. Lawand order hang on the slenderest thread . It is byweakness that Mobutu has become a tyrant. He reignsby terror, his ultimate resource . It is inevitable that hisregime must crumble before the rage of the people . Allthe newspaper reporters have testified to the fear thatgripped the crowds during the executions in Leop-oldville. They were all shocked ; they all felt fear .

They will not always be afraid, and it seems to meto be inevitable that they will one day seek to liberatethemselves .

Alas, the Congo which I had succeeded in rescuingfrom a lamentable situation now moves forward to newdramatic tragedy .

Ostend, March 1966 .Paris, June 1966 .

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