MWEMBECHAI RIOTS: RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL VIOLENCE?

MWEMBECHAI RIOTS: RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL VIOLENCE?

Ernest T. MallyaDepartment of Political Science and Public Administration

University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Background to ‘Religious’ Tanzania:

In Tanzania there are three main religious followings:

Islam, Christianity and the indigenous religions. The break

down by numbers is hard to tell because since the 1967

census the religion item has never appeared on the census

form. However, reliably calculated estimates in percentage

are that Christians and Moslems share two-thirds of the

population. It is also estimated that there are slightly

more Moslems than there are Christians. The remaining one-

third is shared by the remaining religions. There are also

many atheists. But, when talking about religions in

Tanzania, people refer mostly to Islam and Christianity.

Islam is said to have come to the East African coast at

around 700 AD when Arab traders arrived with trading as

their main aim. Since the Arabs came as merchants, the

spread of Islam went hand in hand with trading, and, where

they reached for trading Islam was also preached. Note that

in East Africa Islam was not spread via Jihad (holy war) as

in some other parts of the world. Since the Arabs’ contact

was initially with the coastal areas, the same areas have

become the stronghold for the religion, followed by those

inland trade-route areas. Compared to the form of education

that Arabs merchants found in the areas they ventured into,

Islamic education was much more formal in that it was taught

in specific venues, there were formally appointed teachers,

and a standard duration.

Christianity, on the other hand, came with European

missionaries. The first to arrive were of the Holy Ghost

denomination who arrived in Zanzibar in 1863, and moved to

the mainland in 1868 settling at Bagamoyo. By the time

Germany annexed Tanganyika, there were already five

missionary groups operating there. With the multiplication

of these religious groups, some missionaries moved to other

parts of the country such as Kilimanjaro. The European

missionaries respected local languages and in most cases

2

they imparted education (both religious and secular) in

those languages. Local communities were often suspicious of

the missionaries but with the onset of colonial rule (and

with the penetration of cash economy posing new pressures

and opportunities), parents willingly sent their children to

mission schools. By the time the First World War broke out

the mission schools had enrolled more pupils than those in

schools run by the colonial administration. The difference

in the content of what was taught by the two religions was

to have some impact in the future of Tanganyika. Moslems

were taught religious matters and the Arab language with

minimal secular education whereas Christians combined both

religious and secular education. Mission schools were

exclusively for those who converted to Christianity.

In the history of Europe, it has been shown that religion

and state were for a long time closely related. In some

states this relationship is still very vibrant; in some

those who hold religious authority have the political

authority as well (Moyo: 1982:67). During this era,

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religion was used to, among other things, to legitimize

state authority (Smith, 1971: 2). In Africa today we have

two main state-religion relationship categories - the

confessional states and the secular states (Moyo, op. cit.:

63). The former category includes those countries that have

declared that religion has a lot of input into the political

processes, for example, Sudan and Libya. The latter category

includes those states which claim to be secular i.e. those

which allow religious freedom to their citizens but would

attempt not to mix religion with politics. Tanzania is

constitutionally such a state. As such the constitution

gives this freedom and one should not be segregated because

of his/her religious beliefs when it comes to state related

matters like politics.

Reality After Independence

With the coming of Independence in 1961, some predominantly

Christian areas of Tanzania had more schools on comparative

terms in that there were church-run schools plus those of

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the government. These areas included Kilimanjaro, Bukoba,

Mbeya, and Arusha. After Independence, the church-run

schools continued to enroll Christians only until after 1967

when the former President Nyerere through the Arusha

Declaration nationalized all schools except seminaries and

thereafter enrollment was for everybody who qualified

academically (see for example, Morrison, 1976: 95). This

opened up more chances for Moslems in the then exclusively

Christian schools. The implications of the above reality

was that there were significantly more middle and top public

officials who were Christians in Tanzania after

Independence. However, this was a result of history; and

efforts by the first Independence government did not end in

nationalizing the extra schools that Christians had access

to. The government also introduced quotas for positions in

its secondary schools so that there could be some regional

balance as some regions were somehow behind in the

educational league. Since there are regions that are

predominantly Moslem (Coast and Lindi, for example) and

others that are predominantly Christian (Kilimanjaro and

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Ruvuma for example), this also meant that Moslems were

guaranteed more chances for advancement to secondary school

than when everything was left to academic performance

criteria alone.

Despite all these efforts, the number of Moslems in

institutions of learning remained significantly lower than

that of Christians well in to the 1990s. The implications

are that even in other sectors where educational

qualifications are needed one is likely to find more

Christians than Moslems competing for positions. As such,

some Moslem leaders started to claim that the first

Independence government favoured Christians and that new

efforts should be made to compensate for the lost ground.

Some other Moslem leaders though, urge Moslems to build more

schools and encourage their children to pursue education

rather than just complain. However, the modality for this

“compensation” would always be elusive. On the other hand,

two things remain a fact until now: that by nationalizing

the mission schools Nyerere opened up more schooling

opportunities for Moslems; and that there are more schools

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in the Christian dominated areas of the country

(Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, Mbeya) than there are in Moslem

dominated areas (Coast, Lindi). This presupposes that the

gap is not likely to close in the near future.

Religious Tolerance?

In a survey of political and civic culture of Tanzania

carried out in 1994 by the Department of Political Science

and Public Administration of the University of Dar es

Salaam, religious tolerance, among other variables, was

studied. Intermarriages were used to gauge the level of

social prejudices in society. People with different social

identities like religion may cooperate in many other ways

but find it unacceptable to marry outside their circles. A

series of questions were asked on how respondents would feel

if their son(s) or daughter(s) were to marry members of

families which belonged to political parties, religions,

ethnic groups, race, or class other than their own. As far

as intermarriages are concerned, the results were that, at

the general level there was little difference in responses

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whether it was a son or a daughter being married to families

belonging other social identities. The following is the

summary of the responses in percentages for the approval of

such marriages, and below is a table showing the results of

three other factors – political party, race and tribe.

FIGURE 1 : Responses: Son Marrying From aDifferent Religion,

PoliticalParty, Race, or Tribe

ParentsReaction

F A CT O RReligion

P.Party

Race Tribe

Pleased 14.1% 17.7%

18.2% 24.5%

Displeased

43.7% 30.3%

30.3% 18.7%

Indifferent

34.8% 40.6%

43.8% 49.0%

RespectDecisionofchildren

2.9% 3.5%

3.1% 3.3%

Dependson Factor

0.5% 0.3%

0.4% 0.6%

Depends(unspecified)

0.3% 0.2%

0.3% 0.3%

Depends 0.2% 0.1 0.1% 0.2%

8

on SpouseFamily

%

Others 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%

No Answer 3.1% 6.8% 3.2% 3.1%

As far as religion is concerned, this is the social identity

that shows the highest prejudice of the five identities used

in this study. Recent religious assertiveness is no doubt a

part of this trend. There is, therefore, need to be

concerned because the ‘religious vote’ surfaced in electoral

campaigns in the 1995 elections despite Tanzania’s claim

that ours is a secular state. The reading in the study

findings as far as religion is concerned is that of the five

social identities used, parents would tolerate less if their

children would marry spouses from a religion different from

theirs. When the same variable is measured in Zanzibar and

Mainland separately, Zanzibaris are overwhelmingly

intolerant to intermarriages as the percentage goes up to

90% (Pemba at 97.3% and Unguja at 82.8%).

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Underdevelopment and Secularism: A Contradiction?

The modernization theory has it that secularism is one of

the characteristics of a modern society (see for example,

Lerner, 1970). Other characteristics include individualism,

urbanization, representative government, the application of

science and technology in day to day activities, care for

the needy and old, rationality and growth of income (Nash,

1964; Levy, 1966; Black, 1966). Rustow (1967: 1-5) in a

brief discussion of what constitutes modernization sums up

that modernization is the “process of widening control over

nature through closer cooperation between men”. Similarly,

Black associates modernization to man’s capability to

increase knowledge, permitting control over his environment

and which is accompanied by scientific revolution (op. cit.:

7). The constitution of Tanzania claims that the state in

Tanzania is secular. Secularism holds that everything is

worldly and things like religion, scientifically unfounded

beliefs, superstition etc. should be put aside if man is to

act freely. But to be secular, it would seem, the other

characteristics of a modern society ought to be there. This

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is much so when one considers the indispensable scientific

approach to matters. Science liberates individuals from

superstitious beliefs that one would find they keep haunting

individuals in underdeveloped societies. When one compares

the reality of Tanzania as far as the other characteristics

are concerned, doubts immediately enter the scene. The

population is, by and large, of a collectivist character

than individualist. Indeed, the policies that were followed

until not so long ago encouraged the population to have that

character. Traditionalism, which is still dominant in the

rural areas, encourages collectivism rather than the

individualist pursuit of advancement. The application of

scientific knowledge and technology is at a very low level.

The rural population, which comprise more than 70% of

Tanzanians use archaic tools in their production activities.

For example, the hand hoe is a common cultivation tool.

Tanzania is just starting the process of institutionalizing

the brand of democracy that would allow for a representative

government of the kind implied in the modernization theory –

the liberal democracy. The multiparty system introduced in

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1992 is still very shaky, with most of the parties finding

it difficult to contest elections – of all the activities

political parties should make sure they undertake. As for

income, Tanzanians are known to have the second lowest per

capita income in the world. And for most of the 1980s it was

falling rather than growing. When we turn to rationality

which in the context of modernization theory implies

standardization, consistency and order each and everyone

ought to abide by, it is all too clear that rules and

regulations are not followed in the government bureaucracy,

nor are they followed in many other sectors and places. The

rampant corruption in public service is indicative of this.

Lastly, urbanization in Tanzania is also at a very low level

in that only about 25% of the population is urban based

compared to the developed world, where the percentage is as

high as 73 on average (UN, 1993: 5). It is therefore,

questionable whether the state in a country like Tanzania,

can truly be secular as one would want to make believe. The

separation of the church and the state, in particular, has

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been doubted by many in Tanzania itself especially from the

Muslim camp (see for example, Jumbe, 1994).

Moreover, with the low level of development, it is clear

that religious organizations are still called upon by the

government to help in the development process. In many

cases, such organizations have the same development agenda

as that of the state. They have focused their efforts in

education, health, social services etc., areas to which the

government direct a lot of resources. Recently, in the

privatization process, some institutions nationalized in the

past were reverted to religious organizations, which run

them before. In such a situation where religious

organizations share the same development agenda with the

state, there inevitably arises some kind of competition in

delivery. The beneficiaries of these deliveries would then

have more loyalty to the one that delivers better.

Religious organizations happen to have delivered better in

many instances especially after the current policies of cost

sharing in social services. Reflected on the political

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scene, therefore, one can rightly say that if one is to

mobilize the religious sentiment in a country where the

state does not deliver political goods and services, it

would tend to be a very simple task. The state in Tanzania

does not hide its need for assistance from religious

organizations in development issues, as statements by

various political leaders have indicated. Indeed other

indicators of this religiousness of the state would include:

the national anthem (with the title God Bless Africa) in

which God is asked to do nearly everything including

the consolidation of freedom and unity;

every National Day religious leaders are invited to

participate in celebrations and are asked to pray

for the nation;

the national (state) radio would open its broadcasts

with prayers from the two major religions –

Christianity and Islam;

when natural disasters strike, politicians would

open advise the people to seek refuge in prayers

rather than science and technology.

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The 1998 “Religious” Riots at Mwembechai in Dar es Salaam

i) Theoretical Perspective:

There are many social scientific theories which try to

explain revolutions, collective violence and the milder

forms of social upheavals that are witnessed in many places

all over the world. If we may follow Theda Skocpol (1979),

she categorizes these theories into four:

The Marxist theories,

The aggregate-psychological theories,

The system/value consensus theories, and

The political-conflict theories.

The Marxists see social revolutions and the other forms of

social discontent which can result in confrontation between

the state and the population as being “class-based movements

growing out of objective structural contradictions within

historically developing and inherently conflict-ridden

societies” (Skocpol, op. cit.,: 6). Key elements in these

theories include the status of the mode of production and

the division of labour involved, as well as the technology

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that facilitates the exploitation of this labour leading to

the creation of surplus. The way this surplus is

appropriated (which is normally exploitative) is central in

the creation of this “conflict” that engulfs society thereby

leading to confrontation. Under ideal conditions such state-

society confrontation leads to a new mode of production,

with a new class in power. The aggregate-psychological

theories, (see for example Ted Gurr, 1970) on the other

hand, attempt to explain revolutions in terms of people’s

psychological motivation for engaging in political violence.

We shall pursue these theories further below, as we shall

apply one of these to the Mwembechai riots. The system/value

consensus theories (see for example Chalmers, 1963) explain

revolutions as violent responses of ideological movements to

severe disequilibrium in social systems. And, the political-

conflict theories argue that governments and various

organized groups contending for power should be placed at

the centre of attention when looking at the causes of

collective violence and revolutions (see for example, Tilly,

1973). Basically the political conflict theories differ from

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those of the aggregate-psychological ones in that they

emphasize much on the need to have some kind of organization

before anything like collective violence can lead to

confrontation. To the likes of Tilly, no matter how

discontented an aggregate of people can be, they are not

likely to be able to effect some political action if they

are not organized.

Let us now turn to the aggregate-psychological theories, and

specifically Gurr’s approach to revolutions and collective

violence, and try to explain the Mwembechai riots. Riots are

a collective behaviour. Sociologists define collective

behaviour as “those forms of social behaviour in which

usual conventions cease to guide social action and people

collectively transcend, bypass, or subvert established

institutional patterns and structures” (Turner and Killian,

1986: 3).

They characterize collectivities as having:-

Members but lack defined procedures for recruitment

and identification;

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Leaders but lack procedures for selecting and

identifying;

Members are those who happen to be participating in

a specific event; and

Orientation towards an object of attention and

arrive at a shared objective but these are not

prearranged.

Collectivities have common characteristics among the

participants. These characteristics become the

identification agent when such incidents (as riots) occur.

The most common are: social class, income, education,

downward mobility, and relative deprivation (ibid.: 20).

There could be other characteristics.

According to Gurr (1970: 11,19), riots are the milder form

of political violence, which involve spontaneous action. This

action is normally unorganized. It is worth noting at this

point that the classification of political violence by Gurr

preempts criticisms such as those of the political-conflict

theories which argue that the discontented must be organized

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in order to effect some kind of political action. Political

violence is that collective violence that is directed towards

the political system. Conspiracy (involving political

assassinations, mutinies etc) and internal wars (that aim at

deposing the current regime) are the other levels of

political violence. Gurr confines the reasons for riots to

relative deprivation. He says that, rioters normally

perceive relative deprivation first. Then discontent

develops, and that is followed by the politicization of the

discontent. Once this discontent is politicized,

actualization of the discontent in violent action against

political objects and actors would come with the arrival of

a precipitating event. Let us see what some of these key phrases

of the theory mean.

Relative deprivation is the perceived discrepancy between men’s

(and women’s) value expectations and their value

capabilities. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions

they think they are capable of attaining and maintaining

given the social means available, and value expectations are

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the goods and conditions of life to which people believe

they are rightfully entitled.

There are some societal conditions that would lead to

increased level of expectation without increasing the level

of capability. This discrepancy would end up intensifying

discontent. Among the general conditions that have such

effect are the gains of some sections of the society while

others are not, as well as the promise for new

opportunities. In general the sources of rising expectations

are captured in what we can call the demonstration effect. The

following are likely to act as demonstration effect:-

Exposure to other/foreign models of life

Emergence of new ideologies

Value gains of reference groups

Value disequilibria (welfare, power and individual)

We will discuss these briefly before I relate these to what

actually happened on the days of the riots in the next

section.

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Exposure to new models of life:

Since the coming of liberalization in 1986, Tanzanians have

been exposed to new models of life. This has been

facilitated by the opening up to the world via video

cassettes and television, tourism, freer press, more

travelling and so on. The youth in particular can now see

what their colleagues are doing in other countries – good

and bad. These have an impact on their expectations.

Emergence of new ideologies:

Again the changes started in 1986 when the old guiding

principles of ujamaa (a brand of African Socialism) were put

aside and the market was allowed to determine economic

matters in Tanzania. Later in the 1990s when multiparty

politics was allowed, some leaders of the opposition did put

across some luring interpretations of the market economy.

Such were, for instance, Mr John Cheyo (MP) of the UDP whose

capture phrase in campaigns was “to fill peoples pockets

with cash” (kujaza mapesa).

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Value gains of reference groups:

Each individual or group has a reference point when it comes

to the social position. For instance University professors

would want to compare their positions to that of top army

commanders. It is no wonder, for example, that each time the

generals get new cars – whether loaned to them or belonging

to the army – university professors would have the right to

say “we also should get these loans and/or free institution

transport”! The same applies to other categories of groups

and individuals. So when the members of the reference group

gain, it increases the feeling of relative deprivation on

the other end if there is no similar or better gains.

Value disequilibria:

Values of individuals and groups vary with the position

currently occupied. Once one realizes changes in a

particular value e.g. welfare via economic gains, there is

expected that the power position will have changed also. An

example is a politician who gets access to the cabinet

(gains in power value) but finds that there are no

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commensurate economic gains (welfare value). When there is

such a dislocation that is when we talk of value

disequilibrium. So, there has to be some kind of equilibrium

between power, welfare and individual values. Otherwise

there will be unfulfilled expectations leading to feelings

of relative deprivation.

ii) The Riots: Religious, Political or Economic?

Given the statements by some religious leaders that Moslems

have been disproportionately allocated resources compared to

Christians in the first independence government, plus the

religious prejudice that inevitably exists as the study

referred to above showed, most Moslems believe that is the

case. Further, it is a fact that some Islamic countries

support and promote Islamic fundamentalism in other

countries. Tanzania is said to be amongst the targets of

these forces. The August 1998 bombing of the American

embassy in Dar es Salaam is but a chapter in the operation

of Islamic fundamentalists in Tanzania. The most common way

to promote this fundamentalism is through religious

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preaching. In Tanzania this phenomenon gained currency

during the Second Republic (1985-1995) under former

President Mwinyi. Initially, the preaching sessions used to

focus on own religion’s issues. But with time they turned

into analyzing other religion’s issues including the

questioning of some fundamental beliefs. In short both

religions were being sacrilegious to one another. This led

to the aggrieved religion mounting counter attacks. Some

wise religious leaders on both sides advised the government

to ban these preaching sessions but the government dragged

its feet until the confrontation reached a critical point in

the mid-1990s. Finally the government banned blasphemous

preaching.

However, some mosques and Christian groups in such names as

the “born again” and “Jesus is the answer” continued with

such sermons in defiance of the government order. The

Mwembechai mosque was such a place. The defiance of the

Mwembechai mosque preachers to stop blasphemous sermons

against Christianity led to the stand off between the

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government and the mosque leaders and their followers. The

argument used by the mosque leaders was that the government

was interfering in religious matters while it is stated in

the constitution that the state was secular. For the

government it was a question of law and order as the sermons

by both sides could lead to civil strife thereby breaking

the peace.

February 12th and 13th 1998 riots:

The government’s order to have the police in the environs of

the Mwembechai mosque led the preachers to preaching from

within the mosque but with the same tone of defiance and

slamming the government for its interference with religious

matters. Then came the government order to apprehend some of

the leaders of the mosque believed to be behind the

preaching and the financing of the activities. This is

where the police had to follow the wanted into the mosque

office and even inside the mosque. It was at this juncture

that the precipitating event had arrived. The on-watchers

and those who went for prayers engaged the police. The siege

25

was then on. The police used tear gas, rubber bullets and

finally when things became more chaotic, live bullets. Two

people died on the scene. A third is said to have died later

in hospital. Some were wounded and others suffered from

tear gas effects. Some 250 rioters were arrested. Most

rioters were of the ages between 15 and 35; there were men

and women alike.

March 29th 1998 riots:

The March 29th riots were sparked off by Moslem women

released from custody (arrested from the first riots) and

had claimed that the police incarcerated them while in

custody. They were having a sit-down demonstration against

what they experienced in police hands. Earlier they had

wanted to hold a meeting at the diamond Jubilee Hall in the

city to tell their story to fellow Moslems; however, they

were denied permission by the police on the explanation that

it would have led to public disorder. The women then

gathered at the Mwembechai mosque to tell their tale. The

situation was tensile. Police presence (uniformed ) was

26

minimal. Then the men (who had heard the tale of the women)

started the rioting in the afternoon (2.00 – 4.00pm),

throwing stones at the police, burning government cars,

burning CCM offices and destroying public property that had

any link with CCM or the government in their way. The

situation was calm by about 7.30pm.

Facts About the Riots

Most of those arrested were youths aged between 15 and

35.

Those arrested included Christians as per the people

charged in court.

The rioters attacked government and CCM property.

Where individual property was destroyed, there was no

identification that it belonged to a Christian or a

Moslem; it was indiscriminate.

The rioters targeted the police – a state apparatus.

The police were not disengaging Christians from Moslems

but rather they were confronting groups of rioters on the

rampage.

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The rioters never targeted two Christian churches located

about 100 metres from the mosque down the road towards

the city centre. Within two hundred metres there are two

other churches.

The Mwembechai mosque leaders always stated that the

enemy was the government and its police; they would

always lay the blame on the government rather than

directly blame Christians.

Interpretation of these Facts and a Conclusion

Firstly, this was a case of political violence, rioters

targeting the political system – the CCM as the ruling party

and the government itself. The evidence is that the bearing

was more on some conflict between the rioters (whom we have

seen were both Christians and Moslems) and the government

rather than between Christians and Moslems. The religious

factor came in as the precipitating event for which

discontented people took advantage so that they could

unleash their wrath on the government.

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Secondly, the source of communication in such events

determines the type of people involved in the rioting. The

convergence theory states that the simultaneous presence of

people within a very short period of time in the event area

suggests that they (the rioters) bear similar

characteristics, which have shaped their frame of mind

towards the conceived enemy. The high degree of homogeneity

in relative deprivation of the people around Mwembechai

contributed to the rapid congregation of rioters. In the

case of the Mwembechai area, it is a fact that many people

who could be available at the times these riots took place

are the unemployed and the self-employed petty traders. We

can, therefore, say that many of the rioters are the

unemployed and the self-employed based in the area. And,

this being their predicament, they have some scores to

settle with the government. The mean monetary policy

followed by the current government compared with the

previous has led to many Tanzanians to believe (however

erroneously) that the current government is mismanaging the

economy and therefore the plight they find themselves in.

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This is worsened by the civil service reforms which have

seen many people lose their jobs; as well as the

privatization process that has also contributed to much

unemployment in the public sector.

In conclusion, some Moslems in Tanzania believe that they

have had a row deal from the colonial government as well as

the first Independence government and that some kind of

compensation is needed. This compensation, it appears,

would come in a way of positive discrimination in their

favour in the distribution of political goods and services.

However, there others who believe that the way forward is

for them to work harder and catch up with Christians where

they believe they are behind. As for the social prejudices

which can lead to religious strife, one can say that these

are not at a proportion that can raise alarm yet. The Dar es

Salaam incidents were one amongst very few and as we have

argued above, there were extra-religious reasons for the

rioters actions – basically economic. There is reasonable

religious tolerance in Tanzania as the civic culture survey

30

results indicate. In some important political processes

religion has been kept at bay as was the case in the last

general elections in which voters in the predominantly

Moslem regions like Lindi and Coast voted for the current

president who is Christian rather than the CUF candidate who

is Moslem. And, the political leaders in Tanzania have tried

all the time to make sure that there is representation from

both sides when it comes to the formation such institutions

as the cabinet, and in other appointments. However, in some

areas the government blundered by being very insensitive to

religious feelings, as was the recent case of the regional

parole boards. The boards comprised many Christian leaders

like Bishops and priests while there was a negligible number

of Moslem Sheikhs etc. Furthermore, most of the leaders of

the boards were Christians. The government had to restart

the formation of the boards. But save these rare incidents

the two religions have co-existed quite peacefully over the

years in most parts of Tanzania.

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