Muslims, Christians and the Left in Bengal ( forthcoming ) in ed Vol

1

Muslims, Christians and the Left in Bengal

One can start the chapter with certain amount of concern, theconcern relates to the absolute paucity of writings on ‘non-Hinducommunities’ in India as Rowena Robinson refers to for want of abetter term. Anthropological and sociological and to a much greaterextent historical materials, are gradually accumulating in thefield, but till very recently writings on religious groups sufferedfrom enormous neglect. The concern is genuine, since the‘Dumontian’ perspective gave predominance to the study of groups inIndia and this invariably prioritized upper-caste, essentializedversions of Hinduism and treated it as synonymous with India. 1 Thischapter finds another problem, to a certain extent specific to WestBengal; while historical, evolutionary accounts are not missingrelating to the study of religious minority communities lodged inWest Bengal, yet contemporary studies primarily analyzingbehavioural responses and/or interactions with the left regime inthe state are extremely scanty, this has helped ground the a priori‘essentialized’ understandings relating to the various communities.Recent reports brought out by the Sachar commission have broughtout the grave fallacy of subsuming specificities of a communityunder generalized notions. The gross neglect of the need toanalyze community behaviour, comportment, explicit needs,attributes or even political expressions particular to a communityleads not only to fallacious distributive norms but adds tomisunderstandings relating to the support bases of the system aswell. Therefore it becomes all the more significant to questionthe nature of the interface between the Left Front government andthe religious minority communities. The chapter focuses primarilyon the Muslims and the Christians, being the two largest religiousminorities in the state and uses information garnered through

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periodic surveys, document analysis as also participantobservation.

The two communities chosen for discussion in the chapterconstitute proportionally the two largest religious minorities inWest Bengal. Muslims are 25.25% and Christians 0.6 %; their workparticipation rates however inverts the numerical proportionconsiderably: the Christians have a work participation rate of38.9% compared to the Muslim 32.9%, this puts the latter fourth inthe category , with the former in the lead, followed by theBuddhists ( constituting 0.3%, but having 35.5% work participation;Sikhs:0.1%; work participation:33.7%). The Parsees, Jews, Baha’is,have some amount of presence as well in the state but that may bevery marginal indeed.2

Table 1. Number and Percentage of Muslims and Christians inIndia,2001 Muslims % Christians%138,188,240 13.4 24,080,0162.3Source : Religion, Census of India 2001( 2011 statistics are stillnot available)

A common framework is quite impossible for analytical purposesyet the following approaches /evidences may be developed to enablesuch a construct, first the necessity of being cautious of thesensitization necessary in community studies, emphasized upon bythe sociologist JPS Uberoi. He warns of overlooking the distinctionbetween ‘of’ and ‘in’. There is a great deal of difference betweenthe usage Muslims and Christians of West Bengal and Muslims andChristians in Bengal. 3 My argument is the two religious groups arenot just residents in West Bengal but claim rightful presence inthe state; they are ‘of ‘West Bengal. This usage highlights theinsider /outsider complexes that surface in the course of community

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studies. The empirical evidence provided later exacerbates thispoint with both the communities vehemently asserting theirinalienable rights to the region.

A second factor enabling the frame is the significance of theRichard Eaton framework rather than Edward Said’s ‘OrientalistDiscourse’ (1995). The former in refutation of the latter refers tothe significance of local characteristics rife in communitybehaviour, this enables him ‘to locate characteristics’ ofendeavour/lack of the same among the communities in the region toattributes inherent to the communities themselves, in other words thecommunities reflect attributes common to the region rather than toimbibed characteristics of the region. .So it is more of what thecommunities project habitually due to prolonged practice of certainattributes that envisions them as being in a particular light,rather than an interpretation of others projection of their habits,as Said had done earlier.4

The study takes into account both the empirical evidence, as wellas policies of the state government. Brief accounts of theevolutions of both communities in the state are made followed bytheir contemporary status. In both instances the moot questionbeing raised is: What has been the nature of interface between theleft front government and the minorities in West Bengal during thetenure of the latter’s rule? This question is again posed againstthe backdrop of two analytical points: how far has social democracybeen facilitated during this phase? Second, was there a specificbrand of secularism visible under the aegis of the left front inWest Bengal? This is examined through a summary assessment of theleft front’s opinions/reactions, its significant policies andprogrammes, along with the responses of the communities to thesame.

I

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The Historical Growth of a Secular environment in Bengal

One has to go backwards in time in order to contextualizecorrectly the interface between the state and its religiouscommunities in West Bengal during the period of the left rule .Itis possible to identify very specific reasons why an involuntarysecular environment developed in Bengal preventing sharp permanentreligious divides. In continuum this situation permeates and formsthe backdrop of secularism that is ingrained in Bengal to beinherited by subsequent governments.

1) Historians have variously analyzed the policies of the stateprevailing towards the existent religious communities during theseventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The picture painted is not ofexclusive communities living disparate lives from one another butsyncretic, common life and living was observed. Mushirul Hasanholds the reason for this was the state did not address the notionof a “unified community” with identifiable interests; religioussolidarity was not the basis of a collective socio-economicexperience, which is the source of communalism today.5 Rather thesmall religious groups scattered throughout Bengal were free topractice their individual perspectives towards life, living and thestate. Hasan’s views are with respect to the Muslim communities,but holds true for the others as well as is seen below.

2) Rafiuddin Ahmad’s edited work6 on the Bengal Muslims is acompilation of research that looks at the specific environment thatemerged in Bengal fostering an identity that was distinctly ‘non-communal.’ Islamization of the people of eastern Bengal began asearly as the sixteenth century; this was through the agrarianpolicy of the Muslim governors. They had employed Muslim and Hinduson rent –free basis to clear up the eastern forests and engage insettled cultivation. These in turn employed local, largelyaboriginal tribal people, as cultivators on the new lands.Gradually, these aboriginal people were Islamized, a process that

5

did not reject previously-held beliefs directly, but accommodatedIslamic elements within pre-existing cosmologies. Hence, conversionto Islam in eastern Bengal, as indeed in many other parts of India,took the form of an extended process of cultural change overseveral generations, rather than a sudden and complete change inidentity, beliefs and allegiances.7 Ralph W. Nicolas arguing in thesame vein finds that many Ulemas found the growing syncretism asign of “incomplete conversion” or ‘unlawful innovation’ (bid’at) yetfor Nichols the language of Islam at this stage was that of thecommon peasant, and because of its easy appropriation by thepeasantry that the religion could grow in the region.8 Peter J.Bertocci shows in his paper how identities emerged as a parallelprocess of interactions with institutions and ideas; this affectsthe social worlds of both Hindus and Muslims.9 Rafiuddin’s book doesnot show that only one form of identity emerged, rather thesyncretism cyclically revolved with another kind of behaviour, the“purgings” by the die-hard believers who emerged periodically,these wanted to relocate Islam in a realm that was closer to theSharia, rather than be encroached upon by other interpretations.

3) The language of the commoner as a marker of identity had anotherclose parallel that enabled a unique confluence of cultural spacesleading on to appropriation of the regional rather than thereligious identities of the Bengali Muslims. Sana Aiyar in a verysignificant researched paper looks at the nature of leadershipprovided by some of the Bengali Muslim leaders in the periodpreceding independence. Her paper is on Fazlul Huq, the Premier ofBengal in the pre-independence period. She looks at some of hisletters written to the officials of the Indian Muslim League aswell as the very important Lahore Resolution of 1940.Therepercussions of the latter were fully felt only as late as 1971,yet it was important in driving home the message of regional overcentralized politics. The specific identity –building process hadstarted since the Government of India act 1935, it was at this time

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provincial politics emerged as a significant challenge tocentralized politics of the all-India parties. The Premierpresented a brand of politics that was neither in conformity withthe completely secular nationalism of the Congress, nor with thatof the religious nationalism of the Muslim League. Between 1940-43Huq’s brand of identity politics appealed not only to religioussentiment but also to regional loyalty that cut across thereligious divide. Significantly, he did so without resorting tosecular claims. By challenging Jinnah's claim to being the solespokesman of Muslims in India and highlighting the differentconcerns of a province with a Muslim majority, Huq reconciled thetwin identities of religion and region within the same politicalparadigm, and foreshadowed the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.BothHuq and Abul Kalam Azad never gave up on their religious identity,neither did they prioritize region over religion, “Instead, theyproduced a peculiar form of identity politics that appealed notonly to religious sentiment in their consolidation of communitysolidarity but also to regional loyalty that cut across thereligious divide. Most significantly, they achieved this withoutresorting to secular claims”.10

4)The Bengali Christian community on the other hand has had a two –stage evolutionary process, and it was only in the second stagethat one can infer the developments of the indigenous perspective,that may be interpreted as the ‘secular’ orientation graduallyvisible in post colonial Bengal. A few words about the first stagewould be in order: The missionaries had considered the question ofproviding shelter and employment to their early converts anessential part of their duty, this fostered a strong paternalisticattitude on the one hand and on the other, the social class of thenew converts, the safety and security of the mission compoundcoupled with the easy access to means of livelihood encourageddependency rather than assertions of independent identity insociety.11The attitude of the missionary at this early stagebordered on authoritarianism :“The missionary was Christianity

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incarnate and was particularly concerned that the Christianity ofhis people should be the true Christianity.”12

5)The second stage exhibited greater symptoms of acculturation thatwere to have wider ramifications relating to situating subsequentIndian Christian attitude vis a vis the state. One sees theemergence of stalwarts of the early Bengali Christian communitysuch as Krishna Mohan Banerjee; Kali Charan Banerjee; Lal BihariDey and Brahmabandhav Upadhyay among others.These thoroughlyquestioned the absolutism of the early period; it was realized thatthe missionary influence was not infallible, and serious effortswere made to couch the religion in a purely Indian context shorn ofthe western trappings. The appearance of these educated rebelswithin Bengali Christian society was not manifested in any overtnationalist stirrings but in their intense desire forindigenization of Christianity. In fact it was their zeal for anational church that inspired Surendranath Banerjee to found theIndian Association of Calcutta in 1876. Typical of the views ofthis band of like-minded Bengali –Christians was the view expressedin the Bengal Christian Herald, started in 1870, by Kali Charan Banerjee:“In having become Christians we have not ceased to be Hindus. Weare Hindu Christians, as thoroughly Hindu as Christians.”13

For propagating their views more cogently the stalwartsestablished the Bengali Christian Conference in 1877, it was usedas a forum to lash out at the missionaries saying that the convertshad been successfully turned into compound Christians. They alsocharged the missionaries for having transferred the theological andecclesiastical differences that had penetrated Christianity as itexisted in the west to India thereby dividing the Indian Christiansinto numerous denominations. The intentions during this period wereto attempt structural and cultural indigenization, “Unless this wasdone Christianity … psychologically …would remain an alienreligion. ” 14

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The analyses so far has attempted to show that in colonialBengal definite strains were visible of the emergence of secularistbehavioural trends from among the main minority groups. They heldon to their belief systems staunchly yet attempted to acclimatizethe same with the region. They did not at any time emerge as majordemand groups as for instance in Kerala .It is this environmentthat enabled the growth of a secular temperament in Bengal thatsubsequently facilitated the left attitude towards the minoritygroups as well.

II

The policies of the Left Front Government in West Bengal towards the minorities

How did the minorities fare during the period of left rule inWest Bengal? This can best be exemplified by presenting an overviewof the left’s approach towards the two main minority groups in thestate.

1) After gaining power in 1977, Chief Minister Jyoti Basu’s firstspeech from the All India Radio was significant due to itspolitical rhetoric. He congratulated the people for having imposedtheir trust on the left:

You have won back the right to vote in freedom after along and arduous struggle… We are conscious that thepeople of West Bengal have shown great politicalmaturity in voting for a left government and theyexpect a change in the interest of the people and ourstate. We shall strive to the best of our ability to beworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in us…Problems have accumulated over the years in all spheres--- food, clothing, housing, transport, power,education, health and even with regard to drinkingwater facilities. The economy of the state is in amoribund condition and the people’s suffering knows nobounds. Massive unemployment, closed factories,

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retrenchments, absence of investment, power shortage---- all these problems have assumed frightfulproportions. The condition of the countryside beggarsdescription. We shall make serious and sincere effortsto tackle these problems.15

The speech did not refer to any programme of socialdemocratization or to religious minorities per se. Rather itprioritized the political gains and referred to the economic tasksat hand , in this the inclusive tone was paramount, the policieswere for all. Such pronouncements were made periodically by otherparty members as well; no specific reference appeared related toparticular programmes for the upliftment of the backward religiousminorities. It was only at the14th Congress held at Madras in 1992that the Party expressed its policy perspective towards religiousminorities in a tangential manner; this was couched in a generalespousal relating to the right to dissent :

Under socialism, the right to dissent, freedom ofexpression and plurality of opinion will flourish withthe aim of strengthening socialism. The question ofwhether other political parties exist or a multi-partysystem will prevail, depends crucially on the role thatthese parties have played during the process ofrevolution and socialist transformation16

After relinquishing power it was only in 2004 that Jyoti Basuin his pre-election speech made a reference to the negative roleplayed by religionists in the country:

The basis for the threat to India’s secular-democraticedifice comes from the communal ideology which ispropagated insidiously by the BJP and its mentor – theRSS. Setting India on the path of progress andstrengthening national unity requires the rejection ofall communal ideologies and the parties and leaders whorepresent them.17

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The above chronological review indicates the purposiveexclusion of any reference to specific community developmentprogrammes; theirs’ was a secular ideological commitment and it wasadhered to rigorously. However, the disastrous consequences of sucha policy of complete ignorance and subsequent absence of specificattention towards the welfare of particular communities were soonhighlighted by the Sachar Committee Report. The report brought tolight the dreadful performance of the West Bengal Government incommunity welfare and development.

2) In March 2005 the Rajinder Sachar Committee, wascommissioned by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to prepare the latestsocial, economic and educational condition of the Muslim communityof India. The committee was headed by the former Chief Justice ofDelhi High Court Rajinder Sachar, including six other members. Thecommittee prepared a report of 403 pages, and presented it in thelower house (Lok Sabha) of the Indian Parliament on 30 November2006, 20 months after obtaining the terms of reference from thePMO. The Sachar Committee had compared the status of West BengalMuslims with the Scheduled Castes in the country and come to theconclusion that the former were worse off than the ScheduledCastes. This effectively meant that the government had solidevidence that social, economic and political indicators pointedtowards the fact that the Muslims constituted the lowest rung ofthe ladder among the different groups in the country.

The report had its desired effect and one finds the WestBengal Government for the first time making tremendous efforts torectify its hitherto nonchalant stance towards religious minoritiesin the state. A spate of policies was announced by the StateGovernment in 2006 for the Muslim community. The July issue of thegovernment publication West Bengal carried a comprehensive reportciting the landmark strides the government had made specifically indevelopmental measures for the Muslims in the state. In many

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instances these measures, as claimed, predated substantially thescathingly negative report of the Sachar Committee. Some of thefacts and figures cited by the government publication are givenbelow. The report began with a declaration of the long perceivedneed to have a full –fledged department for minority welfare:

The need was increasingly felt by the Government ofWest Bengal to create minorities’ development & welfaredepartment, which would conceptualize, evolve andexecute different development and welfare programmesfor the minorities of the state of West Bengal. Withthe increasing range of its activities the stategovernment has allotted a sum of Rs. 13 crore duringthe financial year 2006-2007 against 6 crore during thefinancial year1997-1998, the year when this departmenthad started functioning as a full-fledged department.18

The West Bengal Minorities’ Development and Finance Corporation(WBMDFC) was established in 1996 mainly to promote self-employmentopportunities in various trades and activities and to developentrepreneurship through infrastructural and financial help fromthe state government as well as from National MinoritiesDevelopment and Finance Corporation. The target groups were mainlythe backward sections of the minorities. Since inception the WBMDFChas disbursed 143.80 crore among 45,325 beneficiaries for self-employment activities. 19 Girls’ education seemed to receive somepriority; this was indicated by the efforts made for theconstruction of about ten hostels to accommodate nine hundredMuslim girls in most of the backward districts having considerableMuslim presence in the state. Apart from the above a scheme todisburse stipends for poor and meritorious students was taken upunder the aegis of the WBMDFC, an amount of 1.05 crore among 7524beneficiaries in the state. Till 2003-2004 these stipends were

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disbursed by the Wakf boards. Subsequently they were made over tothe WBMDFC. The government report mentioned the advances it had madein the area of Wakf property. Wakf (endowment) is a permanentdedication of a person professing Islam in the name of theAlmighty. To manage those properties, a statutory body namely “TheOffice of Wakf Commissioner” was constituted as per provisions inthe Bengal Wakf Act, 1934. In the year 1995, a Central Act namely,“the Wakf Act, 1995” was enacted which came into force in 1996. TheBoard of Wakfs, West Bengal was constituted as per the provisionsof the Act and it was reconstituted in the year 2001. The runningof the Board has been seriously questioned by the community.Questions were raised after the General Budget discussions in 2001in the State assembly regarding the serious malfunctioning of theBoard:

A serious allegation, impugning both the government officialsand in this case certain Muslim elites as well, was made withreference to utilization of Wakf (endowment, plural awakf).Twobasic characteristics of Wakf were and continue to be : perpetuityand permanence. This means that the nature and purpose for whichthe property is originally endowed, in principle, remainsunaltered. Ostensibly these funds were to be used for theeducational progress of backward Muslim boys and girls. However,the Wakf investigation board discovered that millions of rupeesworth of endowment funds had been indiscriminately appropriated. 20

In the light of some of the problems associated with themanagement of Wakf properties, the tenth fiqh Seminar,( among others)made the following observations: Awakf are to be held inperpetuity; Muslims of India along with the government areresponsible for their protection and development; sale or transferof any Awaqf is abhorrent. The Wakf board's proposals on thecorrect method of disbursement of funds were overruled on many

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occasions. Self-employment and free educational schemes among thepoor was also encouraged. The WBMDFC has been disbursing “Interest-Free Education Loan” to the poor and meritorious minority studentsfor undertaking technical and professional education from thefinancial year 2003-2004. An amount of Rs. 137.00 lakh has beendisbursed among 240 such beneficiaries till 2006.

Countrywide there was huge flak against the left frontgovernment with the publication of the Sachar Committee Report. Itscredibility was called into question as never before , at thisjuncture it was not the sitting Chief Minister Shri BuddhadevBhattacharya but the veteran Shri Jyoti Basu the erstwhile ChiefMinister who had to step in to salvage them from the situation .His letter to the Prime Minister Shri Manmohan Singh in October2008, in the wake of the Sachar Committee Report was significant.It expressed the concerns of the State Government specifically overminority affairs and the need for shifting the attention from thecentrality of political issues to social democracy:

The various reports on minority communities and theirplights have been gathering dust. We must fight thecommunal menace through political will andadministrative courage and commitment to secularvalues. There is widespread compromise with communalismfor narrow electoral gains. Majoritarian communalismhas in turn given rise to minority communalism andthings are taking a more and more violent turn.We need to recall that even communalization has itsroots in the economic and social backwardness. Merereservations, necessary as they are, cannot preventsuch a phenomenon from taking place without economicempowerment in particular. Because of what can becalled the class-caste correspondence, those at the

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bottom of the economic structure are also thus at thebottom of the social structure. 21

3) Subsequently we find the left becoming more conscious about itsrole towards the religious minorities and at the nineteenthCongress of the CPM at Coimbatore in 2008, for the first time theparty publicly acknowledged its bounden responsibility towards theMuslim minorities in the state. Two sections of Part II of theresolution were exclusively devoted to the analysis of the statusof the community and their commitments in the future. The followingstatement on the Muslim minority was made :

The Muslims who constitute 13.4 per cent of thepopulation are overwhelmingly poor and socially andeconomically deprived. Lack of access to education andemployment is a major source of frustration for theMuslim youth. The destruction of traditional crafts andindustries has hit their livelihood further. Muslimwomen are the most exploited and as working women theyhave no protection whatsoever. Apart from socio–economic deprivation, the minorities face insecuritydue to the constant targeting by the Hindu communalforces. The report of the Justice Rajinder SacharCommittee to study the socio–economic and educationalstatus of Muslims has presented the actual picture ofthe social and economic status of Muslims, though ithas not taken into consideration the effect of landreforms in West Bengal which has benefited the largerural Muslim population. The report has presentedsufficient evidence to show the backward socio–economicstatus of Muslims. The Committee has made a strong casefor boosting the community’s share in jobs andeducational institutions. The CPI(M) had demanded thatthere should be a sub–plan for the Muslim minority onthe lines of the sub–plan for the scheduled tribes so

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that dedicated funds for the development of areas withsubstantial Muslim population can be allocated. TheCPI(M) has also, based on the Sachar report, proposedvarious measures to improve the access to education andjobs for the Muslim community. The UPA government hasonly taken some partial and cosmetic measures toimplement the Sachar report recommendations. The CPI(M) will champion the rights of theminorities and defend them from attacks by majoritycommunalism. The Sachar report is not the panacea forall the basic problems facing the Muslim community. TheParty should specially address the needs of the poorestsections amongst the Muslims, poor peasants, artisans,unorganized sector workers and the working women. TheParty’s work among the minorities should be stepped upand all efforts made to draw them into common movementsand the democratic platform. The Party, whilecontinuing to resolutely combat attacks on theminorities by majority communalism, will also counterthe fundamentalist and extremist elements in theminority community some of whom are being aided byexternal forces.22

The gravity of the situation had inevitably penetrated theparty officials so at least two sections were devoted to theirrenewed perception towards the community.

4) The ordeals of the Left Front government were however far fromover, it faced a serious task in 2009, when the Ranganath MishraCommittee Report was tabled in Parliament, also referred to as theReport of the National Commission for Religious and LinguisticMinorities, May 2007 (tabled in Parliament in December 2009). Itpresented an important challenge, since it had to respond factually

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regarding its policy and implementation on the minority front.After the Sachar committee Report of November 2006, this was agrave reminder of the long pending tasks of the government thatconstantly referred to its pro-poor image. However, this time thegovernment was prepared; it had preempted the questioning inParliament and was prompt in its response:

a) Going beyond the Ranganath Mishra Commission recommendationthe WB government provided 10% reservation in government jobs forOBC Muslims and 7% for non Muslim OBC’s . They took certain quickpolicy measures and came up with the statement: “As a result of theexpansion of State OBC list, currently, among 2.02 crore Muslims inBengal, 1.72 crores are OBCs amounting to over 85% of total Muslimsin the state”.23 The 10% reservation facilitated fifty threebackward Muslim communities in the state.

b) In response to the recommendation that Select institutions inthe country like the Aligarh Muslim University and the Jamia MilliaIslamia should be legally given a special responsibility to promoteeducation at all levels to Muslim students, the WB government citedthe instance of setting up a new campus of the Aligarh MuslimUniversity at Murshidabad with 300 acres. This was apart from theAliah University , started since 2007 ,the erstwhile CalcuttaMadrasah, which now offered a five year integrated course ofsecular subjects as well. Instances were also cited of the WB StateUniversity in Barasat and Gour Banga University in Malda that haveover 20% enrolment of Muslim students. The above mentioned measureswere all in the wake of the Sachar Committee Report, and pre-emptedthe Ranganath Mishra Commission .So the period of implementation ofthe policies was very brief between 2007 and the pre-electionperiod of 2009.

Table 2. Achievements of the Left Front Government inthe field of Madrasah Education

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Issues Years

Allotment for Madrasah education

1977-78 2010

560000 610 crores

No of Madrasahs 238 605

West Bengal MadrasahEducation Service

-- 4000 new teachers

Total Madrasah teachers

2580 19,992

Source: People’s Democracy, Posted by Ajoy Dasgupta 3rd April 2011.

The above figures posted in the CPM mouthpiece, People’s Democracy showed that the government was to a certain extent determined to salvage its image since the publication of the Sachar committee report to rectify the previous gross negligence of the community’s educational development.

c)Some other facts and figures were given which sought to comprehensively respond to both the Ranganath Mishra Commission report and the Sachar Committee report.

Table 3. Achievements of the Left Front Government

Issues 2010 explanation1.

Multi SectoralDevelopment Project (MSDP)

264.24 cr

This is 36% of total MSDP till 30/12/11, highest in thecountry

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2.

Houses under Indira Awas Yojana

21317

3 Anganwadis 4109 --4.

Additional classrooms

2043

5.

Landownership by Muslims

25.6% Of total cultivated land ,being held by 30.9 % ofrural households, this is thetotal of rural Muslim households

6.

Total Pattas distributed to Muslims (1977-2010)

18% Of the total

7.

Primary Schoolenrolment

30.03% Percentage of total enrolmentin state.National enrolment average 13.04% in 2009-2010.

source: As Table 1 above.

5) These efforts to salvage its image continued almostdesperately even after it received a serious drubbing at theState Assembly polls in 2011. The twentieth Party Congress of theCPI (M) held in Kolkata in January 2012, was significant , eventhough the party was no longer in power, it affected possiblythe most important turning point visible in the policies andprogrammes of the CPM. The shift as has been mentioned aboveappeared in the document produced after the Coimbatoreconference, yet the Kolkata conference seemed to be strategicallymore important since the ‘concern for the minorities’ was seen asa continuing one even though it was no longer in power. 24It wasan absolute volte face visible in the policy of the majorcoalition party, in including a substantially large sectionspecifically subtitled “Problems of Muslim Minority” in thepolicy document, four large paragraphs from 2.86 to 2.90 were

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devoted to the thorough analysis of the same. They started withan allegation that the UPA had turned down their proposal ofhaving a sub-plan for the Muslim minority in line with theexisting sub-plan for the Scheduled Tribes, so that dedicatedfunds for the development of Muslim majority areas could beallocated. They refuted the Central Government’s proposal toprovide 4.5 % reservation for the Muslims within the existing27%, rather as stated earlier their demand was for 10%. For thefirst time the word ‘Christians’ was included in their proposals:“ the benefits of reservation enjoyed by the Scheduled Castesshould be extended to their counterparts among the Muslims andthe Christians”.25 They also expressed their strong indignationat the treatment meted out to Muslim youth in the wake of anyterrorist or communal attack “this biased and discriminatorytreatment by the police and investigating security agencies is agross injustice and it only feeds into the communal stereotypingof the Muslim community. The CPI (M) demands an end to suchdiscrimination and violation of human rights.” 26

It was not the governmental postings alone on its website,or publications in its official media , but various writings by arange of party supporters also periodically emerged from 2009onwards, strongly upholding the achievements of the Left front inthe realm of minority welfare, in certain instances it wasclaimed to be the best in the country. For instance, Suhasini Aliand Maidul Islam scathingly attacked Abusaleh Shariff, the ChiefEconomist of the National Council of Applied Economic Research,who was the Member-Secretary of the Sachar Committee, for hisdata on West Bengal Muslims. They claimed it was outdated, and itwas quite fallacious to compare the situation in West Bengal withthat of Gujarat. West Bengal had not faced horrendous riotscomparable with Gujarat since 2002. They decried the datapresented point by point and alternatively presented in somedetail the significant achievements made by the state.27Such

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propaganda was engaged in over the internet as well: forinstance, writings such as by Prasenjit Bose 28who sought tocompare the achievements of the Uttar Pradesh Minority FinancialDevelopment Corporation’s functioning from 1994(two years beforethe inception of the West Bengal Minority Development andFinancial Corporation) and came to the conclusion that the WBMDFCemerged best in the country!

This phase of attempted changes in policy formulationsregarding the Muslims was however interspersed with theunfortunate Singur and Nandigram events in association with thegovernments’ well-intended yet ill-conceived industrializationplans. The government paid heavily for its policies on forcibleland acquisition and eventually had to give way for the emergenceof the Trinamul government in May 2011.These areas comprisedconsiderable numbers of the Muslim community so attitudesemanating from these areas not only influenced Muslimselsewhere in West Bengal, it created a fear psychosis among manythat their lands would also be forcibly taken away ( videinterviews conducted in Uttar Dinajpur , Dakhin Dinajpur, Malda,Murshidabad, North and South 24 Parganas over time )29.Thegovernment had perceived the emerging perceptions of the Muslimsand so apart from distributive measures , an attempt was made atdialogue to placate the community. Thus along with SiddiqullahChowdhury of the Jamate Ulema Hind , other Muslim leaders wereinvited by the Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya for talks ,immediately after the Nandigram fiasco.30

The analysis presented above reveals the post Sachar periodwas indeed one of concerted attempts to rectify the previouslacuna in community –oriented development. The governmentpolicies were mired in the perspective of ‘trickle –down ‘effectsof development, that development in one area eventuallyinfluenced the growth of all . That this was a total misreading

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of the situation, resulting from gross alienation from the grassroots where the majority of the Muslims were lodged was soon tobe revealed.

Finally in line with the above mode of reasoning it isinteresting to see that despite the tremendous buoyancy exhibitedby the government in disbursing minority welfare, post SacharCommittee Report, yet the CPIM felt fully confident only underthe shadow of erstwhile Chief Minister Jyoti Basu whileattempting to regain lost ground. Media sources quoting the partysaid: A battered CPM is all set to use Jyoti Basu’s memories torevive its lost base in rural Bengal. The party has taken up theinitiative to compile Basu’s speeches into audio and audio-visualforms that will be used as part of the mass campaign in variousdistricts.31A last effort was made to strengthen its grip over thecommunity, by increasing the number of candidates for the 2011assembly elections; they put up 57 candidates as against the 44candidates put up in the previous assembly elections.

III

The Muslim and Christian response in West Bengal under the Left Front Government

The third section explores the attitudes, opinions andoverall behavioural responses of the two communities discussedabove to the Left front Government in Bengal. These wereobviously as a rejoinder to or the presence /absence of policiesof the government projected towards them.

1. The Muslim response

Since the Muslims are not a homogeneous community to attempta record of their comprehensive response to the Left Frontgovernment is fallacious. Moreover responses are not staticphenomena; they change overtime in keeping with the current

22

socio-political interface between the responding partners at anygiven point of time. Nevertheless a perusal of the writings ofthe Muslims both Bengali-speaking and Urdu –speakers in theregion, mainly literary expositions in the written media bringsout an overall impression of the changing attitudes, opinions andbehavioural responses of the Muslim communities in Bengal towardsthe Left Front government. However, this constitutes a huge rangeof written material which will be difficult to summarize heremoreover it does not come under the scope of this paper. Yet, avery quick perusal of the vast welter of Bengali and Urduliterary writings indicates a community seeped in their religionstill, identifying the region as the inalienable space for bothsuccor and sustenance. The almost complete indigenization of theBengali Muslim in the colonial period has already been alludedto. The tenor of the same never shifted. Yet there wereincreasing allusions to poverty and allied distress perpetuallyafflicting the community, such writing gradually replaced theoverall religious overtones that had primarily been visibleearlier, moreover the Urdu litterateurs tended to be morereligious and didactic in their tone.

Apart from literary works are the newspapers run by thecommunity which constitute an important vehicle of their identityand exemplify their hopes, aspirations, and reactions topolitical agendas. Mention may be made of the Bengali weeklynewspapers Kalam; Natun Gati and Meezan, and the Urdu newspapersAzad e Hind and Akbare Masrikh, they are the more popular newspapersamong the two linguistic groups. These have reflected thechanging dimensions in the political arenas more clearly. Yet,though recent events in the wake of the Singur and Nandigramcrisis saw them vociferously attempting to safeguard their hearthand home, a cautionary note is always observable in theeditorials. The newspapers had suffered inordinately in the post-Babri Masjid period. There was an expected wave of protest from

23

their community all over India, in the wake of which a generalcrack down on all newspapers emanating from their communityensued; most of these papers were likewise affected in WestBengal as well. They are thus cautious of their minority statusand value the operative freedom. Writings did appear during theperiod of Singur and Nandigram agitations that reflected theirextreme anguish over the land policies of the government.

The Muslim volte face in the 2011 assembly elections in WestBengal was expected. They had already expressed disapprovaltowards the left in the preceding Lok Sabha and municipalelections. The massive distancing from a previously almostquiescent community however came as a big blow to the left. Anexplanatory viewpoint becomes significant here. The left had allalong provided ‘security’ to the minorities 32over a period oftime this became an ‘instrumentalist and a pragmatic’ issue aswell, of mutual convenience.33 The provision of basic securityinterpreted as ‘noninterference’ in community affairs along withthe Left’s commitment to a non-communal environment in WestBengal and significant efforts to stem communal violence wasreciprocated with a steady support base from the Muslims. Butthis question of ‘security’ was violently cast against deeperquestions of livelihood, employment and the daily experience ofexcruciating poverty. After the Sachar Committee published thedisparaging report of the left government’s disastrous recordtowards the Muslims the efforts at industrialization by thegovernment had to be violently aborted. Traditionally, till theassembly polls of 2006, the Left Front could depend on securingabout 18 out of the 25 per cent Muslim vote in the state. Post-Nandigram and post-Singur, the situation changed radically, witha big chunk of Muslims - who dominate Nandigram and Singur -moving to the Trinamul Congress and the Congress, making the LeftFront vulnerable.

24

The 2011 election results of the two constituencies ofNandigram and Singur, traditionally left bastions were asfollows:

Table 4 Results of 2011 Assembly election,Nandigram and SingurConstituency

District Winning candidate

Numberof votes

% ofvotes won

Winningparty

Nandigram East Midnapur

Firoza Bibi

103,300

60% TMC

Singur Hooghly Rabindranath Bhattacharya

100,869

57.61%

TMC

Source: Eciresults.ap.nic.in 14May 2011, accessed 25/10/12

3) A third area of investigation is important to establish thetype of interface that was eventually visible among the Muslimsand the government. For this I refer to my own survey dataobtained through intensive survey conducted from 2006-2008 alongsome of the border districts and towns of West Bengal, namely,Uttar Dinajpur, Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda, North 24 Parganas andSouth 24 Parganas. A number of questions had impelled theresearch, the most significant being their perceptions/affiliations towards the government in the context of changes inlife and living over time.

Table 5 Comparative Percentages of Muslims and Hindus in WestBengal In the Districts surveyed ,since 1981

H M H M H M

25

Source: Final Population totals Census of India,2001, West Bengal, Distribution of Population by Religion. Director ofCensus Operations West Bengal. Uttar and Dakshin Dinajpur were separated in 1981.

The inordinate rise ofthe Muslim population in thelast decade was the subjectof controversy among theright wing political groupsin the country. The fresh

division of the district into Uttar and Dakshin Dinajpur couldexplain the sudden increase in the Hindu population in the newlyformed Dakhin Dinajpur (Uttar Dinajpur has a traditionally largerpercentage of Muslims) and the corresponding increase in theMuslim population in Uttar Dinajpur during the eighties and thenineties, but the spiraling growth in the Muslim population evenin the last decade in Uttar Dinajpur and the decline of theHindus in the neighbouring district was attributed to illegalmigrants of one community in the northern region and thecontinuing flight of the Hindus from the southern . This offsetthe traditional majority/minority complexion of the region. Therehas been cross border migrations and this is corroborated by thedata obtained from Census reports. Located between the unsavouryKishengunje District of Bihar on its left, which also has a largeconcentration of members of the minority community and sharingits borders with Bangladesh on its right, this “chicken neck”district is a habitual attraction for migrants from both sides;Hindus from Bangladesh in search of security and Muslims fromBihar in search of protection from the law in their own state.Small tea shop owners along National Highway 34 along the roadfrom Malda to Uttar Dinajpur, very frankly observed there wasabsolute break down of law and order in their own District of

WW.B.

11981

11981

11991

11991

22001

22001

UUD.*

663.26

335.79 54.20

445.35

551.72

447.36

DD.D

663.26

335.79

775.32

223.51

774.01

224.02

MMalda

554.49

445.27

552.25

447.49

449.28

449.72

MMursh.

441.15

558.67

335.39

661.40

335.92

663.67

N.24 P

77.16

22.50

75.46

24.17

75.23

24.22

26

Kishengunje in Bihar, this had prompted them overtime to migratealong with their families to the eastern “comparatively safehaven” of Uttar Dinajpur. The safety for them terms was therelative noninterference in their lifestyles. “If they respectedthe law, the mandate of the local party, then their community wasleft alone.”34

It can be assumed that the entry of outsiders into areasthat enjoyed agriculture as the prime mode of occupation didcreate certain amount of upheavals. In this connection I wishedto explore how many had experienced change in economic status orprofession .The query was impelled by the plaintive note heardfrom many of the villagers in course of conversations with themthat agriculture was no longer a paying occupation. Deep tubewells could not be used due to absence of electricity for longhours at a stretch; the price of fertilizers had increased; themarkets were not situated in prime locations, they were meant tobe at the cross roads of villages but their locations in remoteareas were the manifestations of the intensity of local cloutexercised by people in a certain locality. Some villagers in theTehatta region of Nadia District, who claimed their residencefrom the time of the Battle of Plassey, rued that “all had lostout in the land reforms, both the Hindus and the Muslims.” Thisfact in a way built up unspoken bonds among the old families.Everyone was engaged in the daily struggle for existence; howeverthe commonness among them did not mature into organizedexpressions of protest against the lack of amenities.

While these complaints seemed to be the general woes ofruralites, the villagers near the border had more deep-seatedproblems. The barbed wire boundary running along the borders withBangladesh was erected a few years ago. The wide fencing in agreat many of the cases created a peculiar phenomenon called zeropoint land, which fell inside the wide fencing but could still be

27

cultivated. The villagers were allowed into their respectivecultivable plots three times during the day: at 7am; 12pm. and4pm. for 10minutes at a time. The Border Security Forcecontrolled the opening and closing of the gates across the barbedwires apparently with extreme strictness but much depended upontheir whims and fancies as well. Even if a farmer wished to go tohis village for certain exigent circumstances, he could not;political influence, economic clout all counted towards gainingfavours from the B.S.F.A third reason that was cited and whichled to serious questions relating to the continuing significanceof agriculture as an occupation was the growth in the incidenceof tea gardens in the districts of Uttar Dinajpur, and DakshinDinajpur. The entire infrastructure in the areas such as KrishnaSujali, Ramgunge I and II Blocks; or Matikunda I and II, (UttarDinajpur) bore the brunt of slow but steady encroachment of teagardens over and against cultivation. The farmers simply did notfind it lucrative to continue with farming operations any more.They were coerced in various instances to part with their farmland in lieu of some amount of money. Usually Rs 12000 was paidper acre. However, these plaintive notes were counterbalanced bycertain other voices that claimed tea gardens had brought inemployment to at least 20% of the unemployed. I could see acommunal divide in these observations, the Muslims seemed tocomplain, but the Hindus seemed to be more resigned. Rather, somepeople such as the Head Master of Choto Nandoi Primary School(Islampur Block, Uttar Dinajpur) felt many of them had torelocate their residences further inwards due to the fencing.These facts were obtained in conversation with the BDO, IslampurBlock and other villagers in Uttar Dinajpur.

The economic conditions of the people surveyed, was anythingbut satisfactory, I wished to investigate a little more to knowwhether the economic conditions were always so or there had beenchanges over time. The data gave a very clear and to some extent

28

also a morbid picture regarding this. There was a veryperceptible shift from relatively ‘safe’ agriculture to otheroccupations; the vast majority had been engaged in agriculture,but within the span of ten years in some instances much less,large-scale shifts into ‘other’ ‘relatively insecure’ occupationshad increased. The common refrain heard was it was no longerprofitable to engage with agricultural operations any more. Lossof land therefore signaled large-scale poverty and the evidenceof impoverishment of the villagers was very much visible. Theshift was either to an innocuous shop- keeping but more often toa third category referred to as ‘other’ occupations. Most ofthese were unskilled construction site workers, unregisteredlabourers in the tea gardens or even those who helped in the homeembroidery work done otherwise by their women (all of themremained unregistered, to avoid legal complications of tax,ownership of land and so on). In all, ‘other’ occupationsreferred to the insecure informal labour force that lived atsubsistence level.

A few more positions expressed by the respondents should bedescribed: I wanted to see if there was any correlation betweenpolitical support and material benefits or loss of the same. Only13.01 % stated that they had obtained specific benefits, whereas74% said they had faced problems; 11% felt they had not faced anyproblems on account of their political preferences. 2% did notrespond to this query. Perception of discrimination was profoundin the areas surveyed; discrimination in the job sphere (a firstclass Post graduate, Net qualified in Mathematics had her namewiped out mysteriously from the College Service Commission panel;a qualified person despite being selected was ultimately deniedthe job of an Assistant under the Panchayat in a village underTehatta, Plassey para, as his appointment would tilt the balancein favour of one community) was the most serious allegationvoiced at the individual level. Innumerable allegations of not

29

being found suitable for School Service Commission jobs were alsomade. (Vide interviews conducted by me in Tehatta, Nadia, andvarious villages in Uttar Dinajpur, also in North 24 Parganas).35

At the community level however discrimination of a differentkind was alleged. These grievances related to discrimination inobtaining the benefits of development earmarked for particularvillages dominated by the Muslims being diverted to anothervillage dominated by the Hindus; roads and tube wells indilapidated conditions; schools without any modicum ofinfrastructure; all this appeared in stark contrast to therelatively better conditions prevailing in either the nextlocality, the next village or area where members of the Hinducommunity lived. These facts to a great extent corroborated thefindings of the Sachar Committee Report that indeed much has tobe done in areas dominated largely by the members of the minoritycommunity in the region.36

The above statements point to a slow but perceptible shiftin political support bases towards viable alternative politicalpower, the move was not a sudden volte face but gathering stormover the years. Yet what was remarkable was the intensealignment with the region and the desire to hold on to theirhearth and home despite abject marginalization in distributivebenefits.64% of my sample expressed eagerness to move out insearch of better employment; 24% wished to stay on and identifywith whatever the future held for them but a large 83% expresseda fierce support for retention of hearth and home in Bengal , astrong alignment with the region; better monetary prospects couldon no account alienate them from their roots. A very surprisingfactor was the same allegations of gross neglect of developmentin areas dominated by Muslims brought against both Congress andCPM dominated panchayats. It was not projected as communalattributes of the governing authorities, merely “ora beshi paye’

30

oder besi unnayan hoi”. (they get more; they receive the largershare of development).

Did these attitudes reflect apathy on the part of thedwellers towards the administration, disgust, and desire forchange or even the possibilities of rebelliousness?

What emerges from the above narration is not a case forcommunal conflict, neither is it a case of possible revolt. Foranalytical purposes I see an instrumentalism here applicable bothfor the self and community and the state. The conception of the‘rights bearing’ self simply does not exist. The notion of statepower is inextricably linked to continuity of hearth and home, orour notions of security. The state on the other hand does notnecessarily have to be burdened by the baggage of obscurantismand archaic systems; the community is left alone. The state’sdiscourse is with the outer rim of the community; there is noneed to penetrate within. However, this essentialist pragmatismis in lieu of political commitments, which may vary acrossdifferent districts and need not be steadfastly promised towardsany particular political party per se. I did not find any partyeven bothering to affect any form of penetration. ParthaChatterjee refers to the adjudication performed under the aegisof the panchayats. That is true; yet, such shalishi is doneperfunctorily to retain power in the panchayat, without anyattempt to go beyond the bounds of community practices of theeveryday. This is the essential connection of the democraticstate and the continuity of self.

Here a reference to Chantal Mouffe’s theorization is inkeeping, “whether one participates in governance, or gets thebenefits of governance remains unclear –security is translated as“continuity”’; in course of time that continuity may becomefurther defined as “ager theke bhalo achi” (tr. English “I am ina better condition than earlier”). The need to ask for more does

31

not really arise; as the self is lost in the hierarchies ofstagnant power, the welter of community identity, and thehabitual slovenliness characteristic of the eastern regions. Thisattitude is also very useful so far as the construction ofsecularism, growth and democratic imagery for the macro politicalspace is concerned. It serves an instrumental purpose.

Concluding our observations on the Muslims of Bengal ,another instance of pragmatism of the everyday should berecounted. When sabhas, samities (meetings) or even lectures areheld for monocommunity audiences, the tensions built up in thecourse of the speeches, and the significant drawing of boundariesbetween own community and the ‘other’ is palpable. Yet, membersof the same audience when questioned individually or even whenaddressing the common public space tend to use a differentlanguage. This substantiates the position adopted in thisarticle, that regardless of acts of terrorism being conductedsporadically in different parts of the country, either fuelled byexternal forces or internal recalcitrant’s, the life of thecommoner dotting the vast expanse of the geographical space inrural West Bengal is lived out in the perceptions of securityexperienced as a daily necessity, this is what is referred to aseveryday pragmatism.

2) The Christian Response

The Christians in Bengal have been conscious of the factthat the government has always meant the Muslims in the state bythe use of the epithet “minorities”. Thus policies, plans ordisbursements have been made exclusively for that communityrather than all the minority communities in the state. Repeatedapplications made in this respect to acquaint the government ofsimilarities in status of both the Muslims and the Christians inthe state on many counts have been to no avail. The allegationwas both the Central as well as the state government placed more

32

importance on the Muslim community rendering them to a “aminority among minorities”. 37So, right at the outset the grossdiscrimination even in the status of a minority is glaringlyobvious.

The response of the Christian community can best berecorded by following the activities of the most comprehensiveorganizational representative of all Christians in the state,referred to as the Bangiya Christiya Pariseba (BCP). Thisorganization proclaims ‘united mass movement towards unity,justice, peace and service’. It is the only state level, alldenominational, non-political, registered Christian Forum in WestBengal, authorized by all the major denominations in the state:the Roman Catholic, Church of North India ( Protestants),Methodists and Heads of other denominations to “ stand and speakon behalf of the Christian community of West Bengal.”38 Themovement was initiated on the 25th of May 1994, to strengthen thehands of the Church and other religious bodies with three majorissues:

1) Rights to establish and administer educationalinstitutions of our choice as per Article 30 of the Indian constitution. 2) Rights to enjoy various governmental privilegesincluding reservation in jobs and education for Christians of Schedule Casteorigin and Christians holding Portuguese names.39

3) Encountering of anti-church fundamentalist’agenda and activities.40

The above mentioned objectives encompass more or less thecomprehensive objectives of the Christian community; the non-political stance mentioned in the preface is significant. Oneobserves the community maintaining this attitude throughout theperiod being analyzed. Though the community at large has

33

maintained a non-political front, yet a political party calledThe Christian Democratic Party joined the "Save Bengal Frontformed by Mamata Banerjee on the eve of the 1998 elections.Several small parties that were opposed to the Left Front, suchas the Muslim League, the Awami Muslim League, the Indian UnionMuslim League and the All India Christian Democratic Party,joined the Front.41 This party did have a marginal presence inWest Bengal , it was at one time renamed as the All IndiaChristian Democratic and Backward People’s Party. However itexisted as a registered, unrecognized political party, meaningthereby it had failed to gain recognition either as a state ornational political party, though it remained registered with theElection Commission. Arun Anthony Biswas, the single nameassociated with the party is a retired school teacher; he wishesto protect the interest of the Christians and other backwardpeople. His stand point remains:"Christians are often attacked.We need to be united. This is why I am trying to increase oursupport base by tying up with minority groups."42

One important source to assess the Bengali Christianresponse to emergent politics is the monthly journal Nabayan ,themagazine for the Bengali speaking Christians all over India,Bangladesh and overseas. It is published by the BangiyaChristiya Sahitya Kendra, located at 65A Mahatma Gandhi Road,Kolkata It is a major publication centre of the BengaliChristians and has been in publication since 1967.The editorialas well as the letters to the editor, reflect the tone and themood, the orientation of the community towards the politicalstructure,specific events and issues in the state. A perusal ofthe journal over time shows none of the writings expressedaffiliation with any specific party or ideology; rather thediscussions were to a large extent informative and pragmative innature. For instance, the editorial published immediately afterthe left front came to power in 1977 critiqued the autocraticregime instituted by the Congress party. It hailed in unstintedwords the return to democratic governance in Bengal by theelection of the left, and this, the editorial claimed was aclear stamp of erudition displayed by the people of Bengal.AChristian interpretation of the emergence of the left was given:

34

The minority Christian community in the state, considerin the light of their faith, that the one who isresponsible for all successes and downfalls in thisworld ,it is by the same divine powers ruling and planthat the left has gained political authority in thestate. God has given them this opportunity toreinstitute justice and truth for those who have beendeprived of the same. They should not misutilize thisopportunity for personal or party-based gain.43

(Translation is mine).

Similarly in 1980, when Mrs. Indira Gandhi regained power atthe centre, the editorial expressed inordinate hope on the new PrimeMinister, saying the reemergence of the Congress was through anordeal by fire. Supplications were made that her leadership wassuccessful44

Despite the apparent apolitical stance, their interface with thegovernment over the issues indicated above with which the BangiyaChristiya Pariseba (BCP) has identified itself, has been persistentand forceful. Their methods to present their rightful demands haveranged from dialogue with the authorities to forming pressure groupsto actively project their demands. In 2008 an organization, The WestBengal Association of Minorities Educational Institutions was formedas a first of its kind organization “to fight the discriminatorypolicies of the government”, the General secretary of the BCP andmember of the new association, Herod Mullick , reported to thepress.45 More than 2500 schools run by Christians, Sikhs, Muslims,Buddhists and other communities joined the association. Theintention was to meet the education minister of the state andpresent their charter of demands; if favourable response was notobtained they wished to intensify their movement. However this wasnot the only association formed periodically with growingfrustration, at non- fulfillment of demands such steps had beentaken earlier. The West Bengal Minorities Coordination Committee was

35

formed on the 23rd of August 2006, to discuss various problems facedby the minorities and seek viable solutions for them . These were:Furfura Sharif from Amanat Foundation, West Bengal Madrasa Students Union, WestBengal Minority Youth Federation, Ahle Sunet al Jamet and Natun Gati representedthe Muslims; The Sikhs were represented by Rashbehari Gurdwara JagatSudhar, Sikh Nari Manch, and SikhYouth Forum. The BCP represented theChristians. 46What constituted their charter of demands?

The educational sector constituted their main area of demands.The BCP alleged that despite their contributions being maximal inthe education sector yet, discrimination prevailed: “This Marxistgovernment says it’s secular, but in practice it is not.” HerodMullick the Secretary of the BCP alleged a whole list of grievancesthat glaringly pointed towards the extreme marginal treatment of thecommunity even in the matter of school education by the government.So they planned to go to Delhi to start an agitation there.47 Theirallegations included:1) Recognition to schools run by Christian institutions did notoccur despite fulfilling the criteria for regular schools. Theschools resented interference by the government, since under Article30 of the Constitution, minority schools can administer andestablish their educational institutions independently, but thestate government’s 100 point roster was preventing them from doingso.48

2) As per their specific rights guaranteed under the Constitution,they followed a 50% reservation for students in schools run by them;however, through a Supreme Court order instituted since 2005,suddenly this privilege was denied to the training colleges, in factChristian students were totally missing from the first listspublished.49

3) A much more debatable issue was the School Service Commission(Amendment) Bill 2006.The Bill categorically stated that “thegovernment would either stop governmental grants to a minorityschool, or cancel its affiliation, unless the school appointed its

36

teachers according to procedures enlisted by the School ServiceCommission.” This was an extremely serious infringement on therights of the minority communities. A long drawn protest by almostall the minority communities was planned, with a day’s protestclosure of all their institutions. This was to be followed by arelay hunger strike on the first day of the Assembly session.50

Other types of interference were also noted; reduction in thenumber of seats in B.Ed colleges run by Christian institutions bythe government on the plea that it violated existing teacher-studentratio set by the National Council for Teacher Education. This wasdone without consideration of the fact that recruitment of teacherswould also be hampered. Another allegation was regarding the NoObjection certificates required to set up new educationalinstitutions; there was inordinate delay in this, beyond thestipulated 90 days. There was abject partiality and red tapismagainst minority institutions in procuring the NOC. No informationwas given to them regarding the time or the number of documents tobe submitted. 51The obtainment of minority status itself was atremendous hurdle. The state minority affairs and Madrasah educationdepartments were responsible for granting minority status toinstitution, not only was there inordinate delay in this, sometimesrecognized institutions could be derecognized by relevantuniversities ( such as for instance Cluny Women’s College locatedin Kalimpong, which was derecognized by the North Bengal stateUniversity on flimsy grounds).52 The management of primary schoolsalso reflected undue advantage taken by the government. More than200 primary schools were located on church lands, the churchprovided the infrastructure, but their management was in the handsof the government. These were gross infringements on minorityrights. 53

4) The BCP demanded the setting up of a state level body of theNational Commission for Minorities in West Bengal; this they feltwould help the speedy redressal of the problems being faced by them.

37

The setting up of a National Commission for Minority EducationalInstitutions was not sufficient, since the problems had to be solvedlocally. Moreover, it was imperative that the minority institutionswere exempted from the purview of the state’s reservation policy.5) One of the long-standing demands was to be exempted from thegovernments’ reservation policy for both teaching posts andenrolment of students. This demand was granted to the Christianinstitutions, after the state government decided to lift the statusof reserved seats for SC/ST teachers in government-aided Urdu mediumschools.6) Apart from education related matters the land-grab allegationagainst the government was a serious issue. It was not only Singurand Nandigram that were affected ; the Christians claimed similarvictimization. To cite one instance: the Seventh day AdventistChurch that ran a school for poor children on 375 acres inFalakata , in Jalpaiguri was told by the government that it couldkeep only 24 acres.The allegation was that the church had floutedland ceiling rules , an organization could not hold over 7.5 acresin urban areas and 24.20 acres in other areas. However in specialcases where approval had been obtained from the central governmentand the objective was to set up an industry or for a developmentproject of the state retention of excess land was possible. Citingthe land rules, the state government had started acquiring 60 acresfrom the Methodist church in Asansol; 21 acres from the BaptistUnion Church in Midnapore;21 acres from the Evangelical Lutheranchurch in Purulia and 14acres from the church of North India inJiagunge , Murshidabad. The crisis this generated was very severe,since a lot of philanthropic work was carried on in most of theselands, which were actually donated. Such activities had to be curbeddue to the decision by the government. The BCP had contended incourt that the government could not include church lands under landceiling laws.54

38

7) In August 2008, the state planned a new Education Bill underwhich all private institutions were to come under one comprehensivelaw. The draft of the bill contained: a 17 point agenda thatincluded –a fee structure as per the guidelines of the government;setting up of schools as designated by the government; and electedguardian representatives. Strong protests were launched against thismove as well 55

8) At one point of time the media reported that “Exhausted with thepersistent victimization, around 700 Christian schools across thestate expressed their desire to break away from the School EducationDepartment and join the Education Department. These were affiliatedto the state Boards for Madhyamik and Higher Secondaryexamination”.56 What this effectively meant but which the mediafailed to correctly interpret was, the schools privately managed byChristian managing committees had to apply to the School EducationDepartment in the State for recognition if they wished to beaffiliated with Delhi Boards of Examination, but this was a veryfrustrating and lengthy process. The Heads of the respective schoolsexpressed humiliating experiences how they were refused time andagain by the department. However, even if they wished they could notapproach the Education Department at the centre for affiliation tothe various boards the process had to be via the State EducationDepartment. In the case of schools affiliated to Madhyamik or HigherSecondary Examination systems the experience was lessexcruciating.57

Despite some ameliorating efforts being made by the governmentto stem the growing anti-left attitudes there was a visible turningaway from the left front government and for the first time the BCPinstructed the Christians to vote for the non-left combines in theLok Sabha and the assembly elections. The Chairman of the NationalCommission for Minority Educational Institutions had assured theChristians that they need not unduly worry about non-obtainment ofno-objection certificates for their schools , because if theirdemand was not met within the stipulated 90 days of the

39

application , the matter no longer rested with the state government.They could function on the basis of their minority certificates.58

Herod Mullick, the All Bengal State Secretary of theBengal Christiya Parisheba had a few more observations to make .(Vide interview in the office of the BCP located on 16 Elgin Road,Kolkata, on 18th of October 2012) He pointed out the basic problemlay in the left government’s refusal to categorize the Christians inthe same category as the Muslims; thus there was not a singleChristian in any of the minority related offices. OBC certificateswere not easily available to backward class Christians since therules were not compatible with the practices that governed Christianconversions. For instance a person converted in the early 1990s,could never produce a caste identity certificate, because thatsimply did not exist; hence the benefits of OBC, available to theMuslim was not available to the equally impoverished Christian!Moreover the clause that the surname is decisive in the case ofcastes also does not hold for Christians since their names changeafter conversion. Mullick felt the extremely weak position of theChristians in the state was primarily due to their own innerfragmentation; moreover the excessive spirituality exhibited by thechurch even in serious political issues prevented a forceful unitedfront from being formed. So their demands were shelved and treatedwith marginal concern! The church asked the Christians to prayrather than exert their demands forcibly. However, the formation ofthe Bangiya Christiya Parisheba had rectified matters to a certainextent. It was a coalition of all the major denominations, RomanCatholics and Protestants in the state. Smaller denominations alsojoined in, but were asked to register, in order to verify theirlegitimacy. A hard wrought unity among the Christian community wasvisible; their influence had penetrated to the grass roots aswell .Mullick believed that some demands had been met by the leftfront, but not all. 59

Concluding Observations: The observations made above relating to the Christiansand the Muslims during the period of Left rule in West Bengal on noaccount point to internally homogeneous communities; they signifynot two communities but a multiplicity of communities having

40

different historical origins, also having differential responses toboth temporal and spiritual power. Both communities have multiplesectoral divisions. However these divisions relate more to theirspiritual being, their tenets of belief and the religiousinstitutions they are affiliated to. The divisions visible arewithin the boundary line that separates the Christian from the non-Christian or the Muslim from the non- Muslim. But political behavioror political attitudes visible in the outer realm, in the openpolitical space are more or less cohesive with minor deviations.The broad generalization presented here of community response hasbeen substantiated by intense empirical observations overtime. I wish to conclude by referring to the notion of shiftingboundaries- Where are the communities lodged today and in whatcondition? In other words if shifts have taken place then what doesit portend? Has any movement upward taken place? I refer to this asthe shifting boundaries syndrome. What does the evidence support?Greater secularization or greater radicalization of views?Withdrawal into their previous bounded spaces or penetration intothe wider spaces of urban living? The World Bank, CountryStrategy Progress Report (2005-2008) has characterized West Bengalas a ‘mediocre’ one, with lack of spectacular growth, yet,manifesting unusual political stability. These comments arouseinterest as to “who were the people that cast their votes in favourof the left combine in the state of West Bengal?” The analystsdeveloped a correlation between the left coalition and economicbackwardness in the region: “the left could continue in power due tocontinuity of economic backwardness.” A “clientalism developedbetween the poor and the left, the former sell their rights to votein return for the continuity of their subsistence level existence inthe state.”A series of articles published in the Economic andPolitical Weekly analyzed the unusual stability of political powerin rural West Bengal. The basic question sought answers in the samemode: “What are the reasons internal to the institutions ofgovernment and politics in rural West Bengal that might endanger thestability of Left Front rule?” the findings of the authors veeredaround two factors similar to that expressed in the World BankReport : institutional effectiveness and clientalism; the findings

41

stated , successful institutionalization of these in the state, hastranslated into continued stability in the region:

“Every account speaks of the ubiquitous presence ofthe “party”...It is indeed the elementary institutionof rural life in the state-not family, not kinship,not caste, not religion, not market, but party. It isthe institution that mediates every single sphere ofsocial activity, with few exceptions, if any.” 60

The allusion is invariably to the left party combine in powerin the state for the last thirty-three years. While theomnipresence of the party cannot be refuted, I have tried toquestion the assumption that the party at the cost of any otherinstitution has achieved successful penetration of the vast fabricof rural life. Rather the argument advanced here is, a particularvariant of the democratic principle, pragmatism of the everyday, wasfound to be in operation for a greater part of the 33 years, thiswas mutually satisfying both to the small minority communitiesdotting the landscape as well as the coalition of parties. From thestandpoint of the latter, a dialogue with only the outer rim of thecommunity has been necessary; in this way immediate countenancing ofthe baggage of alternate ideologies, belief systems and powerstructures emanating from the same could be permanently shelved; onthe other hand, from the standpoint of the community the innerprecincts retain their dense sacrosanct impenetrability, at the sametime the largesse of security which may not come with such ease inother states of the country is also ensured. The political strengthof this tacit agreement was however never fully explored by theparty in power, leaving the links very loose and tenuous, which hasbeen detrimental to it in recent times.

The pragmatic philosophy has seen many bends in its curvedjourney yet, what shines through the works of its proponents, is itspenchant for democracy and social experimentation, even though inthe process it may undermine liberalism (including the rule of lawand democracy) by questioning the possibility of basing the ideologyon anything firmer than expediency. The rules influencing governanceaccording to this principle would then be largely shaped by thenotion of “what works” rather than their correspondence to truth,natural law, or some other abstract validating principle.

42

…………………………………………………References :Primary Sources: West Bengal Legislative Assembly, General Discussion on Budget, Feb 2001 Jyoti Basu(2004) Election Speech on Door Darshan, People’s Democracy, Vol XXVIII,No18,2 May 2004Jyoti Basu(1977) Thirty Years Ago ,in a message broadcast from the Calcutta Station of All India Radio, on June 22, 1977 http://jyotibasu.net/?q=node/17 accessed on 22/10/2012. Jyoti Basu’s Letter to Prime Minister, in response to his letter of 7th October 2008, http://jyotibasu.net/?q=node/251, accessed 22/10/2012 Communist Party of India(Marxist) On Certain Ideological Issues,Resolution Adopted at the 14th Congress of the CPI(M), Madras, January 3-9, 1992.Communist Party of India (Marxist) On Left-Led Governments: The Experience and their Role in the Present Situation From Political-Organizational Report (Part II),Adopted at the XIX Congress of the CPI (M),March 29 to April 3, 2008, Coimbatore. Communist Party of India (Marxist) Draft Political Resolution For the 20th Congress (Adopted by the Central Committee in its meeting held from January 17 to 20, 2012 at Kolkata) WBMDFC: Major initiatives for the minorities in West Bengal, July 2006

Collections

A Brief Report of the Movements of Bengal Christiya Pariseba, till date toward retrieving and sustaining Educational Rights of the Christian Minority Educational Institutions in West Bengal As per Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, as covered by the Media.

Mass Movement of Bangiya Christiya Pariseba Towards Unity, Justice, and Peace: Retrievingof legitimate Rights and Against Religious Fundamentalist Forces ( As covered by the media various years).

43

Secondary Sources Asghar Ali Engineer(2010) “Indian Muslims: Problems and Voting Pattern, http://www Csss-isla.com, 24th June , accessed on 25/10/12Bonita Aleaz(2012) “Pragmatic Components of Indian Democracy: Notesfrom the field” in Partha Pratim Basu et al ed. Democracy and Democratization in South Asia, New Delhi: Har Anand Publishers .

Bonita Aleaz( 2002 ) “Christians in India Today : in Lipi Ghosh et al ed . Minorities in South Asia, V.II , New Delhi : Manak Publications.

Bonita Ghosh(1979)The Bengali Christians in Calcutta today: In their Socio-Cultural and Political Melieu (unpublished Dissertation) submitted to the University of Calcutta, for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.

Clifford Manshardt (1933)Christianity in a Changing India, Calcutta : YMCA, Publishing House.

Kaj Baago(1964) Pioneers of Indigenous Christianity Madras: Christian Literature Society Partha Chatterjee (2009) “ The Coming Crisis in West Bengal” in Economic and Political Weekly(EPW) 28 February, Vol XLIV No 9pp42-45.;some of the other articles also address the query, such as Pranab Bardhan, et al “ Local Democracy and Clientalism: Implications for Political Stability in Rural West Bengal” in ibid, pp46-58; and Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya “ Of Control and Factions: TheChanging ‘Party-Society’ in Rural West Bengal” in ibid. pp59-69.

Richard M. Eaton(2000) “Re)imag(in)ing Otherness: A Postmortemfor the Postmodern in India” in Journal of World History 11.1,pp57-78.

Mushirul Hasan (1991 )“Competing Symbols” in Sarvepalli S. Gopal ed. Anatomy of a Confrontation:The Babri Masjid Ramjanmabhoomi Issue ,NewDelhi: Viking. Prasenjit Bose(2009 “What the communists have done to WestBengal”, http://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/2009-April/019293.html accessed on 15th September 2011.

Rafiuddin Ahmad Ed.(2001) Understanding the Bengal Muslims ;Interpretative Essays, New Delhi:OUP Rowena Robinson (2003) Christians of India, New Delhi etc: Sage Publications

44

Sana Aiyar, “Fazlul Huq, Region and Religion in Bengal: The Forgotten Alternative of 1940–43” in Modern Asian Studies , Volume 42 / Issue 06 / November 2008 , pp 1213-1249 S.Samuel David(1977) “The Development of the concept of Indigenization among Protestant Christians in India from the time of Henry Venn” in Indian Church History Review Vol IX, No 2,Aug . Suhasini Ali and Maidul Islam(2011) “Status of Muslims in Bengal”,The Hindu13th April.

NOTES

1 Rowena Robinson(2003) Christians of India, New Delhi etc: Sage Publications,p.92 http//ncm.nic.in/minority_population.pdf, accessed on 15th September2011.

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/CPM-rekindles-Basu-magic-to-regain-lost-ground/571415/posting Date : 27-JAN-10 accessed 24/10/12

http://www .Eciresults.ap.nic.in 14May 2011, accessed 25/10/123 Robinson,p.94 Richard Eaton(2000) “Re)imag(in)ing Otherness: A Postmortem for thePostmodern in India” in Journal of World History 11.1,pp57-78.5 Mushirul Hasan((1991 )“Competing Symbols” in Sarvepalli S. Gopal ed. Anatomy of a Confrontation:The Babri Masjid Ramjanmabhoomi Issue ,New Delhi: Viking.p.1036 Rafiuddin Ahmad Ed.(2001) Understanding the Bengal Muslims ;Interpretative Essays, New Delhi:OUP7 Richard Eaton, “Who are the Bengal Muslims? Conversion and Islamization in Bengal”pp26-49,in Rafiuddin Ahmad, Ibid.8 Ralph W.Nicholas,” Islam and Vaishnavism in the Environment of Rural Bengal,” pp52-70, in Rafiuddin Ahmed Ibid.9 Peter J. Bertocci, “Islam and the Social Construction of the Bangladesh countryside,”in Ibid pp71-85.10 Sana Aiyar(2008) “Fazlul Huq, Region and Religion in Bengal: The Forgotten Alternative of 1940–43” in Modern Asian Studies , Volume 42 / Issue 06 / November , p1214.11 Bonita Ghosh(1979)The Bengali Christians in Calcutta today: In their Socio-Cultural and Political Melieu (unpublished Dissertation) submitted to the University of Calcutta, for the degree of Master of Arts in PoliticalScience.p.812 Clifford Manshardt(1933)Christianity in a Changing India, Calcutta : YMCA, Publishing House.p.1713 Kaj Baago(1964) quotes the Christian Military Intelligencer , in Pioneers of Indigenous Christianity Madras: Christian Literature Society,p3.14 S.Samuel David(1977) “The Development of the concept of Indigenization among Protestant Christians in India from the time of Henry Venn” in Indian Church History Review Vol IX, No 2,Aug,p106.15 Jyoti Basu, Chief Minister, in a message broadcast from the Calcutta Station of All India Radio, on June 22, 1977

16 On Certain Ideological Issues, Resolution Adopted at the 14th Congress of the CPI(M),Madras, January 3-9, 199217Jyoti Basu’s Election Speech on Door Darshan, People’s Democracy, Vol XXVIII,No18,2 May 2004.18 West Bengal(2006)p,119 Ibid.20 West Bengal Legislative Assembly, General Discussion on Budget, Feb 200121 Jyoti Basu’s Letter to Prime Minister, in response to his letter of 7th October2008,http://jyotibasu.net/?q=node/251, accessed 22/10/201222Political Resolution, Adopted at the XIX Congress of the CPI(M) March 29 to April 3, 2008, Coimbatore accessed on 26th August 2014.23 Ranganath Mishra Commission Report (2009)p.124 The Kolkata conference of 2012 does not strictly fall within the purview of this paper, yet it is mentioned here , to facilitate the radical shift that was brought about in course of time by the party in its policies towards the minorities.25 ”. Communist Party of India (Marxist) Draft Political Resolution For the 20th Congress (Adopted by the Central Committee in its meeting held from January 17 to 20, 2012 at Kolkatap.4126 Ibid p.4327 Suhasini Ali and Maidul Islam(2011) “Status of Muslims in Bengal”,The Hindu13th April.28 Prasenjit Bose(2009 “What the communists have done to West Bengal”, http://mail.sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list/2009-April/019293.html accessed on 15th September 2011.29 I undertook extensive surveys over a period of time from 20076 to 2008 in Malda, Murshidabad, Uttar and Dakhin DInajpur, and North 24 Parganas . The attitudes against the CPIM’s land acquisition policy were already being formed in these areas.30 Indian Express 12/10/200731 . http://www.indianexpress.com/news/CPM-rekindles-Basu-magic-to-regain-lost-ground/571415/ Posting Date: 27-JAN-10,accessed 24/10/12.32 Asghar Ali Engineer(2010) “Indian Muslims: Problems and Voting Pattern, http://www Csss-isla.com, 24th June , accessed on 25/10/1233 Bonita Aleaz(2012) ) “Pragmatic Components of Indian Democracy: Notes from the field” in Partha Pratim Basu et al ed. Democracy and Democratization in South Asia, New Delhi: Har Anand Publishers . This view could be interpreted from that which was projected by a large number

of those surveyed. Both the residents along the National Highway, which in itself is a vulnerable area and those in the inner localities far away from motorways, felt that the political brokers did not unduly touch the community.34 Ibid35 Ibid36 Ibid.37 The Statesman , 15 January 2009.38 Bangiya Christiya Parisheba, A Brief Profile,p.1 The Christianpopulation in West Bengal is more than 10 lakhs: which is about alittle more than 1 % of the population; More than 60% are of SCorigin; Tribal Christians are about 39%; the number of Dioceses are :Catholics 8; Church of North India :4; Baptist, Methodist and TheAssembly of God Church are the other prominent denominations; apartfrom these the other smaller denominations are 17.39 Ibid40 Bangiya Christiya Parisheba, A Brief Report of the Movements of BCP, till date toward retrieving and sustaining Educational Rights of the Christian Minority Educational Institutions in West Bengal As Per Article 30 of the Indian Constitution , as covered by the Media ,p.1.41 Frontline Vol. 15, No. 10 , May 09 - 22, 199842 Times of India, 23 April 2009.43 Nabayan, July,19 Issue no.7,p.21244 . Nabayan, January 1980,p.3.45 TheTelegraph,12 December 200846 The Indian Express, 24 August 200647 The Sunday Express, 24th April 200548 Sunday Hindustan Times 24th April 200549 Ananda Bazar Patrika, 22 May 200550 The Telegraph, 5th April 2006.51 The Statesman, 12th December 200852 The Telegraph, 26th August 2008.53 Hindustan Times , 7 March 2006; The Telegraph 24th March 2007;The Indian Express, 10th March 2007; The Statesman,24th March 200754 The Telegraph,17th August 200855 The Indian Express, 23rd August 200856 Indian Express, 14th February 200957 Interview , Herod Mullick on 28th August 2014.

58 . The Statesman 24th March 2007

59 . Interview with Herod Mullick , the State Secretary of the Bangiya Christiya Parisheba, at his office , 18th October 2012.60 Partha Chatterjee et al in the Economic and Political Weekly,February 28-March 6, 2009