Muslim Migration and Identity in Europe

Muslim Migration and Identity 49

Grzegorz J. Kaczyñski PL ISSN 0239-8818HEMISPHERES

No. 24°, 2009

Muslim Migration and Identity in Europe1

Islam is currently the second religion in the European Union, with over 15,5 millionworshippers. This unprecedented religious transformation is a result of the slow butprogressive immigration in the second half of the 20th century. The previous historicalepisodes of the presence of Islam in Europe in the Iberian peninsula (7th�15th cent.)and in Southern Italy and Sicily (9th�11th cent.), and finally the Ottoman presence inthe Balkans (15th�20th cent.), were the results of invasions with short-term proselyteeffects. At those times the identity of Spain, Sicily and the Balkan countries wasIslamic but only at a political level. The majority, or rather the predominant part ofthe autochthonous population remained Christian. In this perspective the history ofPoland offers an example, certainly not the only one, but the most significant, at theidentity level. The presence of Muslims on Polish territory, though marginal, wasnot a result of invasions but of immigrations of the Tartar population since the 14th

century. Later, these immigrants integrated into Polish society and eventually becamecitizens, as they were allowed to confess and practise their Islamic faith. [cf.Szajkowski, 1999; Gród�, 2002; Marechal, 2003. XIX; Dziekan, 2005; Nalborczyk,2005, 2006].

In other words, today, European Islam is no longer like the erstwhile religion ofIslamic invaders (from the verb aslama � to submit, then �muslim�, meaning theone who submits oneself) and has become the religion of European citizens who aremostly of non-European origin. In this way, to use Muslim concepts, Europe isceasing to be dàr al-harb, the house of war, is not yet dàr al-islàm, the house ofIslam, but has become dàr al-shahada, the house of witnesses, that is the house ofthe divulgation of truth and equality, according to the Koran. They are citizens mostlyborn in Europe; they feel European and at the same time Muslims. Their differencein identity reveals itself not only at a religious level but also at a level of habitus andhabitat, in their lifestyle and public life. The mosques, once almost absent in thecultural landscape of European Union countries, countries of immigration, are farmore numerous than they used to be and are starting to indicate a space whereIslamic communities live in urban areas. This is why requests to get a formal

1 This article is a revised fragment of my book: Processo migratorio e dinamiche identitarie,Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2008, p. 231�258.

50 Grzegorz J. Kaczyñski

legitimization of their religious, cultural and social status in the form of an Europeansharìa, that is, the right of the minority inspired by Islamic principles, are beingmade more and more often [cf. Oubrou, 2004]. This phenomenon was referred toby Jacques Chirac when he spoke about �les odeurs d�Islam� in Europe [New YorkTimes, May 13, 1995, p. A3].

I

The Muslim communities present in various European countries have more incommon than just their faith; they also share their origins and development. Firstof all, they are the heirs of labour immigration; originally accepted as low costlabourers, little by little they have become a social burden, particularly since the1970s onwards, a period marked by the energy crisis and by increasingunemployment in Western Europe. Initially, the majority came from the oldcolonies; thus, the Algerians went to France, the Pakistanis and Bengalis to GreatBritain and the Surinams to Holland. Some of them even had passports of theformer colonial country. They knew the language but were not acculturated enoughfor the European social and economic life. Another migratory flow from Muslimcountries was also of a working character but on the basis of internationalagreements, as in the case between Germany and Turkey. A substantial groupcame from Morocco (towards France, Belgium, Holland and, later, Italy). Whatthe majority of immigrants had in common was a low cultural competence. This,together with their weak political and legal position, meant they could hardlyintegrate in the host society, particularly in countries where naturalization followsthe ius sanguinis (blood ties), like in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Theyhad the status of guests until their return to their native countries, which wasmore and more promoted by the governments of the host countries. Despite thefact that they have been living for decades in European countries, many immigrantsdo not have political rights or any hope of getting them. It must be added that thenumber of the Muslim population has increased also as a result of the drift ofrefugees and exiles coming from Palestine, Somalia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Bosniaand other countries whose minorities suffer from persecution, such as the Kurdsin Turkey and Iraq.

We should add to this factor the incidence of underground, illegal immigrationmainly coming from North-African countries, plus a certain influence of religiousconversions due to mixed marriages. Nevertheless, these factors are not assignificant as the high birth rate of the Muslim population, a factor that began to berecorded in the 1970s with the increasing phenomenon of family reunions. As amatter of fact, until those years the immigrant population comprised male individuals,travelling from their native countries to the host societies. When hard times came,especially because of the energy crisis (1973), this type of migration wasabandoned, as the host countries started to tighten their migratory policy. However,by that time, the practice of Muslim immigrants getting their families to join themhad started to spread.


Table 1. Estimates of the Muslim population in the European Union

State

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Great Britain

Greece

Holland

Hungary

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxemburg

Malta

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Total

Muslim population

353.000

400.000

920.000

7.800

2.000

210.000

8.000

29.000

4.000.000

4.026.000

1.647.000

310.000

946.000

24.000

22.000

1.200.000

5.000

3.000

13.000

3.000

19.000

25.000

66.000

5.000

49.000

950.000

450.000

15.692.800

Percentage of population(%)

4,2

4,0

12,2

1,0

nss

3,7

0,5

0,5

6,3

5,0

2,7

3,0

5,7

0,2

0,5

2,0

0,4

nss

3,0

0,7

0,5

0,3

0,3

nss

2,4

2,3

4,8

3,2

Legend: nss = no statistically significantSources: Dassetto et al., 2007; Miller, 2009; recent statistics of EU states.


This demographic phenomenon has proved to be very influential in the shaping ofIslamic communities and their culture. As a matter of fact, the habitual behaviour ofsolitary immigrants, in the sense previously noted, was little marked by their Muslimculture. Actually, they behaved as if they had left it in their country on their departure.The religious rules of halal which concern daily life, such as the prohibition ofdrinking alcohol and the prescription to eat only the food allowed by the religionwere hardly respected. Europe was seen as a place to work and earn money in; itwas also full of infidels and they did not hear the muezzin inviting them to the salat,that is prayers. Perhaps this is why they did not hear the call of dawa which impliesthe duty of proselytism. Their observance of Islam was limited to daily prayers and tothe respect for festivities. It was then a sort of invisible Islam which is also indicatedas �the latent presence of Islam� [cf. Pêdziwiatr, 2007: 28; Bujis, 2002: 23].

With the arrival of relatives the community life has been gradually rebuilt, and asa result there has been the return to Islamic practices and precepts. We could statethat an Islamic revival of this immigration took place then; this was not the effect ofthe informal social control, a typical Islamic feature, but mainly of the intrinsiccommunity character, as a consequence of the rhythm of family life with its symbolic,ritual and normative references.

In order to fully understand this change we must bear in mind some specificfeatures of Islam which are not found in Christendom. First of all, we must rememberthat Islam is a religion of law, where orthopraxis, which is the accomplishment ofcommon rites, matters more than orthodoxy. A Muslim who is not able to complywith this duty or even is doubtful about his faith feels a Muslim nevertheless and heis seen by others as such. As a matter of fact, only an open apostasy is condemnedby law with capital punishment. Any ritual act and accomplishment of a precept fora Muslim is a community act; it is not and cannot be a private act, since it does notbelong to the inner life, but to the community life. So �for him a prayer in �thesilence of his room� is meaningless and could never substitute the ritual prayer. Forhim, what matters are the cult and the law, politics and the religious rules of dailylife. All this is Islam for him, even etiquette and hygiene� [van Ess, 1987: 70]. Infact, the five pillars of Islam (arkan) have a strong community meaning: (1) shahada,i.e. the profession of faith, (2) salat, i.e. the prayer recited five times a day and in themosque on Fridays, (3) siyam, i.e. abstinence from food during the month ofRamadan, (4) zakat, i.e. the ritual alms and (5) hajj, i.e. the pilgrimage to Mecca atleast once in the lifetime. With the first act of faith (�There is no other god exceptAllah and Muhammad is his prophet�) the neophyte declares his own conversion butat the same time the aggregation to umma. Through prayers, which should be donein the community and, if individual, must follow a specific ritual, a Muslim showshis affiliation and identity. This cannot be replaced by meditation. Fast, which laststhe month of Ramadan and consists of abstinence from food and sexual relationsduring the day, has a deep pedagogical, socializing and integrating meaning.Participation in the rhythm dictated by this for the whole month creates moments ofreligious euphoria, similar to that indicated by Durkheim as group effervescence,


when the sacred is mixed with the profane. Alms have an intrinsic community value,but a value which is relevant in the Islamic community. Eventually, the pilgrimagemust be seen as an act which shows the affiliation to the umma extended overpolitical, social, national and geographical borders. Finally, one can see that Muslimimmigrants in Europe, alone, without their families and far from their own localcommunities were and felt absent, temporarily excluded by umma, mainly as a resultof the impossibility of being able to accomplish the various sacral precepts whichare intrinsically social. Their behaviour, which was in contrast to the prescriptionsand habits of Islam, could not express its true attitudes and feelings. So in our socialand public perception, dominated by Christian belonging � it must be underlined �the conduct of Muslim immigrants was perceived as a swing away from individualsecularism. The progressive rebuilding of the community, as I have already said, hascreated a more and more suitable environment for the reconstruction of Muslim life;actually, it was not a reconversion but just a return to the open Islamic identity.Moreover, the dynamics of family life required a network of relations and sociallinks to health assistance, education, social and public institutions and so on. In thiscontext, either because of the inertia of social life or for conscious and desiredreasons, clashes between Islam and the host society became more and more frequentregarding rules, values, symbols, and uses. Over time, these aspects have becomemore entrenched in the organization of the community life and in identity references.

II

If we accept Scidà’s statement, that �a Muslim immigrant generally tends to behavenot as an individual, but as a collective actor�, then this attitude manifested itself inthat period, becoming the main logic of immigrant behaviour. Solitary Muslimimmigrants regained their social identity. Their conduct as immigrants lost the merelyindividual features to acquire group features. This transformation soon became visibleat a cultural, economic and social level with clear signs also in the urban space.Shops with typical products and halal meat have appeared, as well as Koran schoolsand, above all, mosques. Mosques and prayer halls are symptomatic, since their roleis not only cultural; actually, they are meeting places where people can havediscussions � a central place in the topography of the community life. They are anexpression of organized Islam. �Mainly they accomplish a teaching and integratingaction as regards social life�. If today there are 2.159 mosques in France, over2.200 in Germany and 1.200 in Great Britain, this must be seen as a sign of theincreasingly stronger presence of Islam in public life with more visible political effects.One of the oldest mosques in the European Union is the Mosque of Paris, built in1926, where we can find a library, a restaurant and a hammam (Turkish bath). InGermany the oldest mosque was built in Berlin in 1928, but earlier, in 1915, therewas a mosque in Wündsdorf, built by the government for war prisoners; however,in 1924 it was closed because it was falling down and was destroyed two yearslater. According to Daniela Melfa, �Although these sacred places confirm the bordersof the umma al-islamiyya (the Islamic community) with external reality, which is


profane by opposition, nevertheless they are not absolutely isolated realities, cut offfrom the social context. In fact, first, their foundation takes place in the frameworkof the justice system in force; secondly, they realize themselves through a dialecticrelationship, an interaction with institutions and citizens, which, observed in a restrictedrange of experiences, very often reveals ways of negotiation and adaptation ratherthan incompatible and inflexible positions� [2006: 133]. Elsewhere [Melfa, 1999: 92]she writes. �For immigrants the mosque represents an open door through whichthey are quickly brought into an environment which reproduces the warm, reassuringatmosphere of their own home and country; this helps to soften the feeling ofdisorientation which the contact with a different culture implies�. �There is littlebetween a bar and a mosque�, Stefano Allievi says [2002b: 112]. Though we maydispute this comparison, the meaning of the statement is clear.

As a matter of fact, behind the foundation of mosques there are Muslin associationsand organizations which, apart from the desire of sharing a place where to meetpeople like themselves, require visibility of the Muslim presence. They have beenfounded (1) by the immigrants themselves or (2) with the participation and promotionof local authorities (for example, Conseil de Français du Cult Musulman) or (3) bythe immigrants� countries of origin (for instance, Diyanet in Germany, founded bythe Turkish government) or, finally, created (4) as local sections of large organizationsand international movements, as an expression of Pan-Islamism, for example, themovement Tablighi Jama�at o Al-Jama�at al Islamiyya (Islamic group).

Their orientation swings between the traditionalism and modernism indicated byFelice Dassetto [1996: 180] respectively as isolationism and interventionism. Theformer tends to create a sort of society which is opposed to the Western society,considered immoral and decadent, with the aim of protecting the faithful from moralcontamination; the latter, on the contrary, expresses a trend of modernization ofIslam and encourages Muslims to participate in the political and social life of the hostcountries. At the beginning, an important role in the formation of Islamic associationsand organizations was carried out by the autochthonous neophytes who, after beingconverted to the Islamic faith, gave their contribution to this process with theircultural competence. Today, however, according to Allievi [2002b], their role hasbeen reduced to the figure of the �cultural translator� as a result of the increasingimportance of the position of the second and third generation, born and educated inEurope, who have imposed themselves as the leader élite. In fact, this is the differencebetween the Italian Islam and the French Islam; the former is in an initial organizationphase, and the name is rather misleading, because, in spite of the fractions,orientations, traditions, geo-political divisions and antagonisms, for Muslims Islamis one, since each follower of Allah is part of the umma al-islamiyya, i.e. the Islamiccommunity. Thanks to this affiliation, a common identity is shaped and this identityis not limited to its basic meaning, the religious one, but comprises the social andcultural meaning. If we speak then of European Islam [Dassetto, 1996], of BlackIslam, that is Black Africa Islam [Monteil, 1964] we speak of cultural and geo-political differences, but never theological ones. In fact, the distinction between


Sunnis and Shiahs � the Sunna and the Shi�a � is not the result of theological differencesbut of political ones, which arose at the very beginning of Islam. It has to do with adiscord about the origins of the investiture of the caliph�s role (the first follows therule of the Prophet�s descent, the second the choice of the community).

Today, through migrations � Allievi writes [2002b: 106] � an unexpected thing hasoccurred: the appearance of Islam in the Western world. This is today�s history �chronicle rather than history � and the transformation of such Islam, already largelyautochthonous, changed and European, into a Western Islam, will be mainlytomorrow�s history. It will not be a hybrid, or an a-historical, out of context child ofIslam of the original countries; to a certain extent, a new cultural creature whichperhaps tomorrow will be called Western Islam.

If we call it that, however, we risk being in opposition to its meaning as dictatedby the Islamic tradition; Muslims already have a Western Islam. They have had it forover a thousand years. It is the Maghreb (from the Arabic al-Maghrib, the West),which traditionally encompasses three countries: Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Oncethe Iberian Peninsula was part of it too. It is unlikely that they would wish to use thatname to indicate European Islam; in this case it would become an expression of anew type of fundamentalism with the intent to make Europe another Maghreb, thatis, simply to Islamize it. Perhaps one can find a shadow of this idea, expressed in anallusive, not explicit, way, in one of Bin Laden�s speeches when he expresses hisconcern for al Andalus, that is, the Spanish territories, once Muslim and later lostwith the recapture by Christians. Did he really refer only to the �Jewish occupation�of Palestine as a repetition of the Andalusian catastrophe?

III

As a matter of fact, for the fundamentalist fringe of Islam the interpretation ofhistory, especially the part concerning the relations between Islam and Europe, isoften quite different, because it follows a different logic of the understanding offacts. Certain events and historical texts, rescued from oblivion with great effort,in order to get a better knowledge of the past, are read in the fundamentalistretrospective as moments of the greatness of Islam and are ideologicallymanipulated. Certain texts on the presence of Muslims in Andalusia and their drasticexpulsion in 1492, defined as the �Andalusian catastrophe�, are read in this way. Itcould be stated that in all fundamentalist programs there is an echo of the severeand concise declaration of the imam Hassan al-Banna, ideologue and founder ofthe Muslim Brothers, in 1928. �Islam is dogma and cult, home and nationality,religion and state, spiritualism and activism, Book and sword. The noble Koransays all this [�]. Islam does not recognize geographical borders nor does it considerrace and blood divisions. All Muslims are intended as a unique nation (umma) andalso the Islamic nation is united however far its countries may be and contendedits frontiers.� [from: Caruso, 2001: 63�64].


We can see a significant difference which distinguishes the followers of thefundamentalist orientation from those of the moderate one in the Islamic terminologyitself. For the former, only the Koran (from qur�an, recitation) together with sunna,which contains the Prophet�s tradition (his intentions, acts and silences called hadith)are the reference values and normative sources of the conduct of life of today�sMuslims: hence the full acceptation of sharia, the Islamic law (literally: the straightand narrow path). Moreover, the umma al-islamiyya is indicated as the Islamic nation,not only as a community. The dar al-islàm and the dar al-harb are not intended as,respectively, the house of Islam and the house of war, but as the reign of Islam andthe reign of war, then also the meaning of jihad is accepted and approved in theoriginal sense, that is, as concrete war, physical struggle against the infidels, as animperative and not as spiritual war, a sort of peaceful proselytism which is appliedby moderate Islam. So the jihad has grown in importance among the duties of aMuslim. As a consequence, a Muslim can obey only the Muslim power and only theobservers of the Koranic law; it follows then that a Muslim cannot trust in dhimmi,i.e. the followers of the religions of the Book � Jews and Christians.

This interpretation of the jihad has its legitimization in the teaching of the variouslegal and theological schools [Lo Jacono, 2002: 23], according to which it is thesixth pillar of Islam, but with two meanings: minor and major fight. The major jihadis �the only one acceptable and the only one compulsory for each believer�; theminor jihad instead is a sort of sacred commitment with the use of weapons onlywhen the house of Islam is assaulted by enemies, then in a defensive war, or in caseof offensive war, that is war for the conquest and conversion of the infidels in daral-harb. The latter is not a religious obligation of the Muslim; however, the fact thatthe holy war had a central role in the expansion of Islam in the first period of itshistory is a factor which has a great influence on the different configurations ofpresent Islam. �Success has accompanied Islam since the beginning,� Josef van Essstated [1987: 69]. Basically, Islam�s history, in spite of the loss of Sicily and Spain �territories which were regained by the previous owners, i.e. Christians � and somedefeats in decisive battles (Poitiers � 732, Lepanto � 1571, Vienna � 1683), has beena series of conquests and dominations. Only during the 19th century, beginning withcolonialism, did it suffer European � and therefore Christian � supremacy. As aresult of the traumatic impact with the Western world [cf. Gellner, 1993: 35] notonly has the push to reformism, always present in Islam, gained strength and intensitybut also new topics and motivations have arisen; these have raised the question as towhy the West has overcome it and represents a threat.

Again the answer came in the return to the origins of Islam, for simple reasons:�In the original Islam the ideal models for all times were established and still todayMuslims look at those times of religion with admiration and respect. The historicalnarration of Mahomet�s life and of the times of the first four caliphs, the so-called�guided by justice�, is a political and moral program still today� [van Ess, 1987: 70].The return to the origins is a cycle which has always characterized Islam; a sort of�cyclic and infinite reform�, already revealed by Ibn Khaldun and David Hume [Gellner,


1993: 24]. Its logic is based on the idea according to which human destiny dependson the accomplishment of God�s commandments, transmitted by the prophet; thequestion asked is not addressed then to the inner spiritual life but to the externalreality, compared to the golden age of the original community. �The ideal is notintrospective, but retrospective�, states van Ess [1987: 70].

In this way, Islamic reformism appears as reformism in its original etymologicalmeaning; in truth, the term reform comes from the Latin reformare (to restore) andmeans to return to the original form. As a matter of fact, such motivation wasbehind all the actions of Christian reformers � to return to the authentic Christianorigins. In any case, each reformative expression came from the community,considering that Islam does not recognize the ecclesiastical structure, that is, thestructure of the officials of cult. It provides only for the figures of the ulama �jurists, the imam � the people in charge of the religious functions, who are consideredthe true successors of the Prophet and others according to tradition. Its structurestands on the political structure of the community which was originally expressedby the figure of the caliph. Islam enjoyed a precocious and rapid political successand perhaps this was one of the reasons why at its interior the dualism state-churchnever appeared; the original charismatic community did not need to define itself as acounterpart of the state, because the community was the state since the very beginning[cf. Gellner, 1993: 23]. For this reason also the diversity of Islamic movementscould not break the integration of the political community. In other words, the affiliationto Islam expressed through the political structures was an identity basis and it still istoday, expressed in a sort of Islamic nationalism; mainly in periods of crisis orconflicts with others, identified as enemies. In this sense, the fight against colonialismwas the cradle of Islamic nationalism. A Muslim nation is basically a set of Muslims,sharing the same faith, living in the territory of a state. Therefore, Islam appears asa secular and egalitarian theocracy where there is no space for individualism. Accordingto van Ess [1987: 85]:

A Muslim is alone before God with no mediator; however, he does not act as anindividual, but as a member of his community and indeed the community � sitvenia verbo � �saves� him. However great a sinner he may be, he will suffer only atemporary punishment and after that he will enter paradise. He is justified by themere belonging to the community of Muslims. His very witness is abandon toGod�s will: it is Islam.

Islam is umma � community � hence all Islamic movements, regardless of theirfundamentalist or modernist orientation, are seen with suspicion even by the Islamiccommunity, as an expression of an inner autonomy which threatens the integrity ofIslam. An eloquent example of such phenomenon can be seen by the Senegaleseconfraternities among which the Muridiyya is the most widespread and important.Actually, it is a question with a sort of perverse logic, since the call to Islamicreunification, which is a kind of utopia for many Islamic movements, in itself hinders


the realization of such a goal and for this reason they are not reputed to be �prophetsin their own houses�. As a matter of fact, the majority of Islamic reformers,charismatic figures and leaders are considered by Islamic regimes as religiousdissidents; since they do not find approval in their countries, instead of moving toother Islamic countries, they seek refuge in Europe. So do their followers, whomostly come from the new generations, open to religious fundamentalism. Such anIslamic orientation plays, as shown by the statistics on the majority of Islamic countries,quite a significant role in the formation of their identity. In fact, in order to understandthe reasons for this phenomenon, I have devoted ample space to this matter.

IV

In a not too distant past, in 1994, Roberto Cipriani [1994: 48] wrote that EuropeanIslam tended �to distance itself from the fundamentalism of the original countries aswell as from revival solutions, trying to assume a more modern physiognomy whichis closer to western religions and societies�. But already then certain signs of thewidespread trends of the young generations towards radicalized and combative Islamwere visible in France, mainly in the riots and urban violence which took place in thesummer of 1990. Later those signs would appear with a more and more worryingfrequency. September 11 is a tragedy which has obliged us to rewrite the recenthistory of Islam, since the majority of the terrorists involved in the attack to theWorld Trade Center of New York came from the West [cf. Parzymies, 2003, passim].

According to the FBI, one of the coordinators or maybe the leader of the nineteenhijackers was Mohammed Atta as-Sayyid, leader of the Islamic terrorist cell ofHamburg [cf. Thompson, 2004]. When he came to Germany from Egypt in 1993 hewas thoroughly agnostic; two years later he revealed his conversion performing thehajj to Mecca, according to the Islamic ritual. He was a good student and got adegree in architecture at Cairo University in 1990. In Germany he entered theTechnical University of Hamburg and worked as a car salesman. He had a lot ofGerman friends and colleagues who considered him intelligent, devout and deeplyinterested in the politics of the Middle East, with a strong anti-Semitic and anti-American attitude. During his studies he joined an Islamic prayer group offundamentalist orientation. He also attended the Al-Qod mosque in Hamburg. In1998, he went to Egypt on holiday. His old friends found him very devout andobservant. When he came back to Germany, he founded the so-called Hamburg cell,got a degree in civil engineering in 1999 with a thesis on the development of theurban network of Aleppo (Syria), showing the contrast between the elements ofArabic origin and the modern ones. Mohammed Atta often arranged meetings in hisflat, inviting many of the future terrorists, including the author of the attack to theTwin Towers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In November 1999, he and his friends leftGermany to fight against the Russians in Chechnya. In the meantime they got intouch with al-Qa�ida. Atta joined the organization and was trained in its camps invarious Islamic countries. In Afghanistan he met Osama Bin Laden. He travelled alot abroad. In June 2000, with other members of the cell of Hamburg he went to the


USA for the first time; they opened some bank accounts and later moved to Floridawhere they enrolled at a flight school. In December, Atta got his pilot�s licence. Inthe preparatory phase of the attack he made some trips and it was clear that Spainbecame his favourite place for training. Three weeks before the attack he was on thelist of the 19 supposed terrorists involved in planning an attack, presented by Mossadto the CIA. The list was ignored. It was Atta who took the helm of one of the twoaeroplanes and crashed it into the northern Tower of the World Trade Center (at10.28 a.m.). The crash caused 92 victims (11 members of the crew and 5 membersof the death squad included), but the collapse of the Towers caused the death of1366 people. In Atta�s luggage they found a leaflet in Arabic, where, among variouspieces of advice, it was written: �Swear you will die and renew your intentions�, �Beabsolutely quiet, because the time when you will join paradise is near�, �Check yourweapons before you go and also much earlier. You must sharpen your knife well andnot make the animal (the Western man � GJK) feel at ease while you slit his throat�[Frontline, 2002]. Shortly after the attacks of July 7, 2005 in London in an interviewon CNN Atta�s father expressed respect and approval for his son�s martyrdom,declaring that the two events represented the beginning of a religious war whichwould last fifty years and would see many fighters like his son [Connelly, 2002].

Atta�s life story is an extreme expression of the bond between Islamicfundamentalism and terrorism. Only after the tragic events of September 11 was theGerman public made aware that already in 2000, in a report presented to the Officefor the Protection of the Constitution 31, 450 members of about twenty fundamentalistorganizations of the country were registered [Stern, 20�9�2000, n. 39]. I will citetwo of them: Islam Cemaat ve Cemiyetler Birligi (League of Islamic Circles andcommunities) and Milli Gorus (Vision of the National World). The first organizationof that period numbered about a thousand followers �with laws, taxes, courts, eveninterior secret services, all in the name of the Koran� [Del Re, 2001: 153] whereMeti Kaplan, �Caliph of Cologne� was one of the leaders. In the weekly magazineÜmet-i-Muhammad (Mahomet�s community), a sort of organ of that organization,of February 17, 2000 we could read: �Let the infidels live in Hell! Down with alldemocracies and democrats!� The Milli Gorus was even more powerful; at thebeginning of the century it numbered about 27 thousand supporters and ran about500 mosques. Through Mehmt Sabri Erbakan, one of its leaders and nephew of theTurkish ex-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, it had the political support of Turkey.In the Milli Gazete (National Journal), an organ of the organization, an appealaddressed to Islamic women said: �You must bring up your children so that in anymoment they are ready for the jihad and to fight like lions. You must be ready toleave your husband�s house where you came in a white bridal gown only with thewhite dress of death� [del Re, 2001: 154].

We assume that the power of Germany, which lies in its democratic system, hasproved to be weak as regards the management of the rights granted to Islamic foreignresidents, sometimes recognized as political refugees � mostly following the lawaccording to which all the organizations of religious kinds could obtain an official


recognition. This law is known as religious privilege. In fact, one of first moves ofthe German government was the removal of this law (November 2001) and theintroduction of a packet of legal measures in order to fight terrorism and to controlIslamic fundamentalism. A similar policy had been introduced years earlier in GreatBritain and France. However, we do not mean to say that Cipriani�s statement, citedabove, was not valid for the majority of Muslim immigrants, we simply want tounderline the existence of an Islamic fundamentalism which was not marginal andembraced also the idea of minor jihad, especially for the generations who did notknow the house of Islam, because they were born and bred in Europe. Therefore, iftheir strong Islamic identity appears so surprising, the affiliation of many of them tofundamentalist organizations and some to terrorist cells is worrying. It is worryingbecause the identity regaining of the second and third generation, which in a certainway would verify Hansen�s law, turns out to be anti-Western, although it does notby any means indicate terrorist tendencies. It is worrying because, as Thomas andZnaniecki have shown in the case of Polish immigrants in America, the commonfaith represents an extremely strong factor in social reintegration. This means thatfacing a new reality together softens the implicit conflict aspects and in the case ofMuslim immigrants, it may be a disintegrative factor because it magnifies the culturaldifferences between them and the host society, thus creating situations ofestrangement and conflict. However, in order to understand the reasons why youngMuslims tend towards extreme positions, towards secularization or fundamentalism,which create an ideological space where various concrete identities lay, we mustalso analyze the social, political and cultural context which appears different in thevarious European countries [cf. Pace, 2004].

V

It is no accident that we have mentioned three countries, Germany, Great Britainand France; each of them represents a certain model of migratory and naturalizationpolicy. Germany is a country with one of the largest numbers of immigrants: 8 million(9% of the population), almost half of whom come from Muslim countries. In spiteof these numbers, the state follows a policy which is summed up in the followingstatement: Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland (Germany is not an immigrationcountry). The large masses of immigrants who arrived in Germany from the secondhalf of the 1950s until the beginning of the 1970s were considered Gastarbeiters(guest workers) with no legal possibility of integration. Until the 1990s the ius sanguiniswas in force with a clause which offered a possibility to obtain citizenship but onlyafter a long authorized stay (15 years for adults, 8 for young people between 17 and23). Their assimilation was not provided for; on the contrary, their return to theirnative country, sooner or later, was expected. In this sense, the government gavethem the possibility of expressing their culture, not in order to form cultural nichesand thus to create multiculturalism, but in order to keep their traditions alive whichwould facilitate their return home. Later, guest workers got the status of ausländischeMitburger, foreign citizens; a status which confirmed the continuation of a policy


which could not be defined as segregationist or even integrationist. It was a form oftemporary integration (Integration auf Zeit). Marco Martiniello [2000: 54] observes:�In Germany it matters little if a child was born on national soil; if his parents areTurkish, he will be Turkish as well�. This opinion, however, dates back to a periodwhen Germany was a set of various manifestations of xenophobia and ethnic hatredon the one side and social protests on the other, which made German authoritiesrethink the migration and integration policy. In 1993, five Turkish immigrants werekilled by German neo-Nazi extremists. The President of Germany, Richard vonWeizsacker, pronounced the famous speech: �The extremists who march in thestreets shout: �Germany to Germans� (Deutschland den Deutschen); what do theywant? to change the Constitution? The first article declares the dignity of men and,if it were otherwise, we would query the dignity of Germans. As regards the Turkswho live here, shouldn�t it be better and more human to call them Germans ofTurkish origin?� [cited after: Melotti, 2005: 88�89]. Recently some laws have beenintroduced, for instance, the ius soli in 2000, which facilitates the naturalization offoreigners and to a certain extent expresses a concession, however weak, towardsmulticulturalism which in Germany is called multikulti.

Islamophobia can be defined as an irrational fear or prejudice towards Islam andMuslims, as the fear of the submission of the culture to Islam. In other words, it isan expression of the fear of losing freedom, cultural and social identity, economicposition and even life because of Islamic rules and laws founded on the sacred texts.Simply, it is �making Muslims enemy� [Gottschalk, Greenberg, 2008]. Islamophobiaas a problem gained currency in part thanks to the known books of Francis Fukuyama[1992] and Samuel Huntington [1996].

Strong and sometimes tragic symptoms of the weakness of multiculturalism inGermany from time to time shake the public opinion of the country; one of them iswithout doubt the murder of Marwa al Sherbini on July 1, 2009. We will report thedynamics of the event in order to understand at least partially the logic of a phenomenoncalled Islamophobia and not only in Germany, as we will see.

Sherbini, a 31-year-old pharmacist from Egypt lived temporarily with her familyin Dresden. She was pregnant. Her murderer was Alexander Wiens, a 28-year-oldGerman, who had immigrated from Siberia in 2003. Everything began with a banalquarrel on a children�s playground. Wiens sat on a swing and Sherbini asked himto leave the swing to make room for her son, but Wiens only yelled at her that shewas an �Islamist� and a �terrorist.� So Sherbini pressed charges against Wiens,who was convicted and fined by a local court for insulting the woman on racialand religious grounds. During the trial on July 1, 2009 Wiens smuggled a 7-inchkitchen knife into the courtroom to attack Sherbini and he stabbed her at least 16times. Three months pregnant with her second child, Sherbini bled to death in thepresence of her husband and their 3-year-old son, who had accompanied Sherbinito the hearing. Her husband was also injured when trying to help his wife � notonly by Wiens� knife, but also by a security guard, who believed that the husbandwas the attacker. He shot him in the leg.


Wiens was sentenced to life prison in the very same courthouse where the murderhappened. �He was convinced that all foreigners were taking work away from him,�the presiding judge was quoted as saying by the London Times. �Above all, he hatedMuslims. In his eyes they were all Islamists. The fact that he himself was of foreignorigin is something that he repressed�. Guido Westerwelle, German Foreign Minister,commenting on the verdict said: �This shows that violence, racial hatred andintolerance have no place in Germany� [UPI.com, Nov. 12, 2009].

VI

The British model is considered to be a pluralistic approach [Martiniello, 2000:51�52] but, basically it is an uneven pluralism [Melotti, 2005: 81]. It recognizes theethnic and racial diversities which consider important elements in the accomplishmentof migration and integration processes. In fact, in the census of the population theregistration of the ethnic and racial belonging is compulsory. This should foster apolicy of intermediary involvement of the minorities in order to avoid any form ofdiscrimination; a form of collaboration with the government. Actually, at least untilrecent years, in this policy a system of indirect rule, the British colonial system,echoed; it was the rule applied first by Lord Lugard in Nigeria and later extended toall colonies, which expressed an old Roman rule: divide et impera. Formally, itrespected and involved the traditional autochthonous structures of power, but actuallyit was a political façade of the policy of submission and dependence which eventuallyhas shown itself to be efficient enough to maintain peaceful and collaborative relationsbetween Great Britain and its ex-colonies. Moreover, the majority of them are part ofthe Commonwealth. However, as earlier in the colonial empire and in its metropolises,the question of immigration and naturalization was imbued with a strongethnocentrism which still survives. It was a policy which respected diversity but atthe same time admitted that nothing could be done about it. The Anglo-Saxon modelas a reference model underlies the political correctness inspired basically by thebelief that �even immigrants from countries that are traditionally close as regardshistory and culture could never become �good British�� [Melotti, ibidem]. The systemproved to be efficient until recently because it mostly considered immigrants fromthe ex-colonies extremely different as regards culture, religion, race and ethnic group,but content with the social and political status of being recognized as British. Moreover,many of them got a British passport, the right to vote, etc., which, however, couldnot secure full integration, since the British idea of citizenship has a socio-culturalmeaning that is different from the Continental one. The ethnic and racial filter, thatis, the belonging to a minority, determined, and still determines in a latent way, thepolitical, social and cultural status of foreigners, of non-British. It did have, however,an evident merit � it gave them the comfort of maintaining their own identity, offeeling accepted with their cultural diversity. Nevertheless, it could not and cannotbe enough for the second and third generation who do not want to be closed in theethnic scheme; they do not want to be perceived through the cultural, ethnic, racialdiversities intended as a form of marginalization. In other words, these generations


of immigrants want to be recognized as British in every sense of the word, especiallyas individuals, not as members of a group. It is then a question of identity which, inspite of the new legal and administrative rules of the British government, is stillcurrent and often irresolvable since multiculturalism does not seem to secure totalequality of identity.

Analyzing the survey carried out by the British Internet portal �Muslim News�since 2005 up to 2006 [Muslim News, 2005�2006] we can distinguish two groupsamong Muslims who live in the United Kingdom. The first one is formed by thosewho reject British identity and consequently can be labelled as Muslims; the secondone comprises those who describe themselves as British Muslims.

Generally speaking � Szo³ajski observes [2006: 160] � the former group representsfundamentalist attitudes, while the latter is close, in ideological terms, to Muslimmodernism. The M (Muslims � GJK) group members build their identity exclusivelyon religion and are hostile towards Western culture and British state institutions,while representatives of the BM (British Muslims � GJK) group have a compoundidentity including elements of Muslims faith, (British) citizenship, (British or nativecountry) cultural and/or national allegiance. They also appreciate the values andachievements of Western culture.

VII

The French model seems at least formally opposite to the English one; it isethnocentric and assimilative. This is a consequence of the Jacobin idea of state,according to which France is a republic where all citizens are equal without anydistinction of race, ethnic group and religion. �Men are born and remain free andequal in rights�, according to Article 1 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man andCitizen of August 26, 1789. France is a modern État-Nation, the country of theFrench, all with the same rights and with the same cultural tradition expressed bythe formula: Nos ancêtres les Gaulois. Any form of non-institutional relationshipbetween the state and the citizen is accepted. The belonging to the French nation isindivisible. This policy was first adopted by France in their colonies (direct rule) andthen towards immigrants, the foreigners. In other words, those who want to belongto the French society have no other choice but assimilation. There is no conceptualor legal space for French of foreign origin. The cultural or religious belonging ofevery citizen is not recognized by the law, since feelings of belonging of this kind areconsidered to be individual options. France is the European country where the broadestassimilation policy has been pursued: 13 million citizens descend from immigrants.At present we can find over 5 million foreigners (about 8% of the population), amongwhom the majority is represented by Muslim immigrants. Along with French citizensof Arabic or Turkish origin, or coming from another Islamic country, they form aMuslim minority, the most numerous in France, which numbers almost 4 millionpeople, that is, almost 6% of the population. The ever increasing presence ofimmigrants and citizens of foreign origin has resulted in more evident social, cultural


and political problems, which as early as the 1960s forced the French government tomodify its immigrant and assimilation policy that actually did not differ greatly fromthe previous line. On the contrary, since the 1980s the big immigration fluxes havecaused a sort of invasion syndrome in certain socio-political circles, not onlyconservative but also moderate ones, which has manifested itself in various actionsof a xenophobic character, even at a legislative level [cf. Melotti, 2005: 79�80] Stillin the 1990s, in a text on the matter of ethnicity we could read: �The Jacobin ideologyof our Republic, in the name of the dogma of the union State-Nation all the timedenies the ethnic diversity of French population� [Lapierre, 1995: 13].

However, even if still today the basic idea of the policy on that matter has notchanged, the solutions applied by the public administration �have breached the wall ofthe assimilation model� [Martiniello, 2000: 56]. Therefore, at present the migration andintegration policy in France is quite contradictory; it is an assimilation system by lawwhich actually carries on, in different ways and under different names, with the helpof various socio-political euphemisms, the features of a pluralistic and multiculturalsystem. It is also called positive discrimination as it consists of a corrective action ofunjust realities [Jacq, 2008: 142]. In this context we also have proposals of a theorizationof French multiculturalism, including those by Michel Wiewiorka [1996] and AlainTouraine [1997]. According to Touraine [1997: 323]: �Ethnicity is actually an affirmationof reconsidered culture by individuals who live in modern society; at the same timethey recognize the importance of the economic and administrative organization of thesociety in which they live�. They never speak of the Muslim minority, but of Beurs(Arabs in colloquial language), a term which indicates Muslim citizens born in France,the majority of whom comprises the second and third generation of Muslim immigrantsfrom the Maghreb. They prefer to speak of beurgeoisie [Leveau, Withol de Wenden,2001], since they belong to the middle class for their professional status. Among themwe find doctors, a frequent job among Muslims, university teachers, professionals,businessmen and many civil servants. They see themselves as French, but they feelMuslim, often in the cultural sense. However, only a minority of the Beurs is well off;the majority comprises the inhabitants of the urban suburbs (banlieues), unemployed,marginal people, socially excluded but also exceedingly critical towards the Frenchauthorities and openly tied to the Muslim identity. The constitutional secularity of Francefollowed in public life with a particular rigour is perceived by them as an expression ofanti-Islamism and social segregation. The accidents caused by the manifestation ofsymbols, uses and habits of the beurgeoisie in public life, schools, offices, and, forinstance, the use of chador by women and girls (hijab) which from time to timebecomes a subject of lively public discussion, reveal only the tip of the iceberg. Thepublic had the opportunity to realize the seriousness of the situation some years ago,when in 2005�6 France was shaken by violent riots in the suburbs of cities. In twomonths, over ten thousand cars, four thousand shops, bars, bus stops, phone boxeswere sacked or burnt. It was a real revolt whose participants were young, male andMuslim. They did not have organizations or ideological provokers � no one who couldbe charged and taken to court.


It was a movement of the ethnicity whose ideals are embodied by the footballplayer Zinedine Zidane, the raï singer Klaled or Faudel, by the actor SmainFairousze, all millionaires and all Beurs. They do not have anything in commonwith the revolt of the Beurs, but have become their flag. The ethnicity of the Beursis more and more visible, proud of their Mediterranean phenotypical traits, withtheir chansons rap or raï, where they invoke the destruction of the �whorishMarianne�. These songs tell the truth about society. In the virtual world, in videoclips we can see a new look of young and beautiful Muslim girls; this gives us theimpression that such beauties fill the modern seraj. If, however, such a Muslimwoman actually appeared in a provincial French road, she would provoke disgust,condemn and anathema, and even an assault by traditional Muslims. Actually,every day these young women, especially the married ones, are totally covered tothe strangers� eyes; even the most emancipated wear the chador. Moreover, thevideo clips strengthen the fatalism according to which a Beur cannot expectanything good from the West, a Beur is part of the umma, whatever it may be inthis world, whose destiny has been debased by the West [¯elazny, 2008: 67�68].

At an identity level, the Beurs appear as a social formation in the European context;it is an ethnic hybrid which, on the one hand identifies itself with the conquests of themodern and open society, hence with freedom, justice, equality and technology; on theother hand, it does not reject certain values and components of the original culture,that is, the message of the Koran, the status of women prescribed by the tradition,certain religious precepts and the practices of everyday life. It is a new type of ethnicgroup which, next to the old ethnic problems (Basques, Bretons, Corsicans) that arethemselves hard to resolve with the strict assimilation formula, creates a new problemrequiring new and adequate measures in order to be solved. This is the reason why inthis matter the French policy is starting to evolve towards a multicultural approach, atleast at a social and pragmatic level which, as we have already noted, is beginning to befollowed by scholars of social sciences and takes into account the French peculiarity.

VIII

In any case, this trend, toutes proportions gardées, can be seen in the majority ofEuropean countries [Parzymies, 2005] and generally expresses itself as one of thepositions on the continuum between the assimilation model and the pluralistic model.

What�s the use � says Martiniello [2000: 59] � bending ourselves over backwardsto extol the virtues of the assimilation or pluralist �model�? In actual fact, we canregister a certain convergence � not uniformity � between the political and socialdynamics in force in all European countries. France is closer to multiculturalismthan it recognizes and Great Britain is closer to the assimilation model than itclaims.

Another example is given by the migration and identity dynamics which in acertain way distinguish Holland [cf. Matusz Protasiewicz, 2008; Pêdziwiatr, 2007:


97�110; Zdanowski, 2005a], a country which traditionally is considered to be oneof the most tolerant in this respect. The Dutch model has been multicultural andhas provided for the integration of immigrants with the safeguarding of their identitysince the beginning of immigration in the 1960s. The Muslim culture was evencalled one of the five pillars of the verzuiling (from zuil � pillar), that is, of the so-called vertical Dutch pluralism. Latest research, however, has shown thatnaturalization does not foster integration and has no influence on the bond with theethnic group. Such characteristics deeply mark the Muslim minority (the immigrantsand the second and third generation of immigrants, mainly from Morocco, Turkeyand Suriname) which numbers almost a million people, i.e. 5,7% of the wholepopulation. Muslims represent 30% of all immigrants in the Netherlands. The Islamicorganizations are concentrated on the conservation of Muslim culture, of theirvalues and social position (including the rejection of women�s emancipation), onunderlining their cultural diversity and ignoring certain aspects of Dutch society,so that it can be kept at a distance. Moreover, it has been discovered that a lot ofpeople employed in Islamic schools were tied to various Islamic fundamentalistorganizations like the Muslim Brothers and even terrorist groups like the PalestineMovement of Hamas. In other words, the Islamic organizations and associationshave not made a positive contribution to the process of integration; this fact hasbeen verified by social research. Instead of the hoped-for integration in their diversity,local Muslim communities, characterized by poverty, self-referential culture andhigh unemployment, have been created; in a word, true Muslim ghettos. All thishappened in spite of the considerable financing received for years by thegovernment.

Nor is it surprising then that after September 11 and the tragic murders of PimFortuijn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004, Dutch policy became more selective asregards migration and integration, particularly towards the Muslim community. Whatis surprising, however, is the sudden and radical turnabout of Dutch public opinionwhich for years had supported a tolerance policy. Fortujin, leader of the right politicalwing which obtained a large election consensus, was openly anti-tolerant towardsthe immigrants; he said that �the boat is full�, that the frontiers had to be closed and�Islam is a dated religion�. The film director Van Gogh made the film Submissionwhich deals with the submission and maltreatment of women in the Islamic culture,following the screenplay by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a woman of Somali origin, future memberof the European Parliament; her life story can be traced in this screenplay. The film,which contains unusual erotic fragments, such as a scene with quotes from theKoran with naked women in the background, was interpreted by Muslims as anoutrage to their religion. After a series of threats, van Gogh was cruelly murdered bya young Moroccan in the centre of Amsterdam; first he was shot, then his throatwas slit and finally with a knife the murderer attached to the victim�s body a leaflet,in which it was written that the jihad would defeat Europe and America. The factwas followed by numerous acts of violence by the Dutch against the Muslims andgenerally by signs of an increasing Islamophobia.


Although Islamophobia has been consistently manifested in the Dutch context, itmust be noted that it is not a local or recent phenomenon, but to a certain extentcharacterizes many European countries and has deep historical roots linked to theancient struggle for the borders between Christendom and Islam [cf. Delumeau,1987]. To mention but some examples, Dante Alighieri placed Muhammad and hiscousin Ali in hell; Voltaire in his Le Fanatisme, ou Mahomet le prophète (1737)accused the Muslims of fanaticism and violence. If we consider the problem only inour perspective, the migratory one, it must be underlined that the expression�Islamophobia� rarely appeared in the mass media before September 11; later, asIslamic terrorism developed, it has spread to indicate not only acts of intolerance,hostility, and aggressive behaviour towards the Muslims, but also of prejudices andnegative stereotypes [cf. Geisser, 2003]. The fear of outsiders, aliens, as an expressionof the defence of our purity, that is a self defence from the contamination of our vitaluniverse, highlighted in an evocative way by Mary Douglas [1966], can also help tounderstand Islamophobia. According to a survey carried out in Germany in 2005,about 80% of the population associates the word Islam with terrorism and ill-treatmentof women [Pêdziwiatr, 2007: 228]. Fred Halliday [1999] is right when he observesthat basically we are dealing with Muslimophobia rather than Islamophobia. InBelgium, the right-wing party of Vlaams Belang, which expresses the secessionisttrends of the Flemish, has recently increased in popularity since it has proved to beparticularly hostile towards the Muslim population; Muslims are contemptuouslycalled allah-tons (from allochtonen, in Flemish foreigner, from the Greek allos �different and chtoon � world) [Ceuppens, 2003]. As early as 1995 Dassetto [1995:62] observed that �today Islamic symbols made visible by the presence of a mosqueare perceived by the Western population as an aggression and threat to socialintegration�. However, it is also true that at present all the preventative measuresapplied to public life against Islamic terrorism which make even daily life tensecannot be justified by such a perspective. Yet it is a reality which affects the conditionof Muslim immigrants and citizens in Europe and their identity choices; especiallythe extreme, fundamentalist choices where actually it would not be difficult to finddeep traces in the opposite analogy of Islamophobia: Christianophobia.

We said that Islamophobia can be defined as an irrational fear or prejudice towardsIslam and Muslims. It is an idea which is easy to apply to mass phenomena, tocrowds, in a word, to the common man, but it does not appear adequate to explainthe attitudes and behaviours of clear anti-Islamic character of people who have aremarkable social status due to their professional, cultural or political position. Inthis case the concept of Islamophobia seems too reductive since such anti-Islamismis the result of fear or rather a reaction to a naive pro-Islamism and to a violentIslam. This reasoning is more convincing in the Dutch context, considered untilrecently the most tolerant in Europe. Yet the Dutch tolerance was not the result of anopening towards the foreigners, the immigrants, but the effect of a sort of socialimperative, rooted in the Dutch Calvinist tradition which had rejected any form ofirrationalism, of rhetorical references to the detriment of an extreme utilitarianism, a


rationality of the civil cohabitation, a sort of disenchanted society, to use Weber�sconception. As a result, foreigners were seen and treated in the same way.

This model collapsed when a mass of Muslim immigrants, especially after the dramaticevents reported earlier, proved to conceive collective life in a way far from the Calvinistsocialization. The reason why �Dutch society feels hopeless, does not know how tocome to an understanding with �strangers� and its unique reaction is a violence similar tothat shown by them� [Staniszkis, 2008: 96] perhaps is to be found in this social andcultural mechanism. Dutch violence is yet expressed in a rational way.

A clear and resounding example of this is the case of Geert Wilders, a Dutchpolitician and parliamentarian, leader of the Party for Freedom which won the lastparliamentary elections (2009). Wilders attributes his politics to his support for theso-called Judeo-Christian values and from this position he criticizes Islam verystrongly. Anyway, he underlines: �I don�t hate Muslims, I hate Islam.� [Raynor,2008]. He does not believe in the existence of the so-called moderate Islam and he isconvinced that the Koran in many fragments incites Muslims to terrorism, that is, toa war against the unbelievers. This is a reason, according to him, that there is nodistinction between Good Islam and Bad Islam. On August 8, 2007, Wilders sent anopen letter to the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant where he affirms that the Koran,called by him a �fascist book�, should be outlawed in the Netherlands, like AdolfHitler�s Mein Kampf [Wilders, 2007a]. He has stated that �The book incites hatredand killing and therefore has no place in our legal order.� [den Boer, 2007]. He hasalso referred to Mohammed as the �devil� [Liphshiz, 2008]. A short film Fitna madeby him in 2008 illustrates his anti-Islamic ideas. This film explores the Koran as aholy book which inspires motivations for terrorism, Islamic universalism, and Islamin the Netherlands. (Fitna is an Arabic word and means: �test�, �suffering�, but also�dissent, quarrel� and even �civil war�). According to Kepel [2004], fitna does notinvolve only the Islamic world inside but at present indicates and incites to a violentcrash with the Western world; this crash gets a political and theological meaning andthen a total one.

Wilders is convinced that after the Islamization of Europe, it would be up toAmerica to preserve the heritage of Rome, Athens and Jerusalem. Immediately afterthe projection of the film in the Internet, Wilder was condemned with a fatwa by theterrorist network Al-Qaida; it means they have given orders to any Muslim to murderhim. �In the name of Allah, we ask you to bring us the neck of this unbeliever whoinsults Islam and the Muslims and ridicules the prophet Mohammed� [Jihad, 2008].

In a speech before the Dutch Parliament in 2007�09�06, he stated that: �Islam isthe Trojan Horse in Europe. If we do not stop Islamization now, Eurabia and Netherabiawill just be a matter of time. One century ago, there were approximately 50 Muslimsin the Netherlands. Today, there are about 1 million Muslims in this country. Wherewill it end? We are heading for the end of European and Dutch civilisation as weknow it. [�] Very many Dutch citizens, Madam Speaker, experience the presenceof Islam around them. And I can report that they have had enough of burkas,headscarves, the ritual slaughter of animals, so-called honour revenge, blaring


minarets, female circumcision, hymen restoration operations, abuse of homosexuals,Turkish and Arabic on the buses and trains as well as on town hall leaflets, halalmeat at grocery shops and department stores, Sharia exams, the Finance Minister�sSharia mortgages, and the enormous overrepresentation of Muslims in the area ofcrime, including Moroccan street terrorists� [Wilders, 2007b].

After such sharp criticism and much dissent from some representatives of theDutch, and not only Dutch, political world a three-judge criminal division in thedistrict of Amsterdam ordered on January 21, 2009 to try Wilders on Wednesday,January 20, 2010. The charge speaks about group insult of Muslims, incitement tohatred and discrimination against Muslims because of their religion and incitement tohatred and discrimination against non-Western immigrants and/or Moroccans becauseof their race. �The court also considers appropriate criminal prosecution for insultingMuslim worshippers because of comparisons between Islam and Nazism made byWilders� [Wilders, 2009a]. Geert Wilders commented it: �On the 20th of January2010, a political trial will start. I am being prosecuted for my political convictions.The freedom of speech is on the verge of collapsing. If a politician is not allowed tocriticise an ideology anymore, this means that we are lost, and it will lead to the endof our freedom. However I remain combative: I am convinced that I will be acquitted�[Wilders, 2009b].

IX

In this perspective it is possible to state that �fundamentalism [�] is connected tothe perception of a humiliated identity� [Perrotta, 2002: 135]. The situation offrustration linked with social exclusion in a country with a different religious cultureproves to be a favourable context for the definition of the ethnic identity in religiousterms because it is in opposition to the common enemy, that is, the European, Christian,Western man. In this way a suppressed identity, the one linked to a common faithwhich earlier did not exist or rather was not perceived as such, is awakened. Wemust underline, however, that basically, because of its totalizing nature whichcomprises all the basic spheres of the vital universe, Islam is the prerequisite for thebuilding of the fundamentalist personality which expresses itself according to thepsychological configurations that vary individually but can have many convergencesboth at a psychic and at a social level. The migratory context of Muslims in Europeseems to foster, as a matter of fact, the building of such identity. Yet what remainsobscure is the process by which this identity is associated with violence, then formsthe personality of an Islamic terrorist. Perhaps the Weberian discussion on the worldlyand the unworldly and on asceticism and mysticism of religions could be usefulepistemologically in this task. In fact, if we start from the assumption that Islam is,almost par excellence, an ascetic and worldly religion, that is, it privileges actionover meditation and promises a reward only after death for the task carried out inthis world, the matter of the religious identity in this context appears much clearer.For this reason proselytism is one of the endemic features of Islam; it has at itsdisposal all the means indicated by the Koran and by the sunna, among which there


is the idea of the jihad with its two interpretations: major and minor, as mentionedearlier. Islamic terrorism is a choice dictated by despair, frustration, humility orcultural stress but in any case it is a totally new choice because it is theologicallyconceptualized and applied to the modern world. As such, it is always an expressionof modern but radical Islam in contrast with the conciliatory kind followed by themajority of Muslims living in Europe.

The active protest, the fight religiously legitimized, is a problem which is notconfined to the Islamic circle [cf. Kaczyñski, 2005]. As Ernst Troeltsch [1949: 1,466] teaches us, the religious answers to the world, under the social form of sects,cults, movements, communities and so on, swing between resignation and hostility.The former tendency becomes the basis of resigned behaviour, the latter of rebelliousbehaviour both at a social and at an individual level. They also form themselvesaccording to the cultural features of a given social group which, as Ruth Benedict[1934] says, can be distinguished by mystic tendencies or by a fighting spirit.

X

Abdel Rahman al-Rashed, Saudi intellectual and director of the television Al Arabiya,once said: �Not all Muslims are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslim�. However, itmust be emphasized that the fundamentalist Muslims only in their marginal part jointerrorism and represent one of the two extreme poles of Islamic identities present inEurope. The other pole is represented by a small minority of citizens from Muslimcountries and by their descendants who belong to a medium-high social status. Theyare immigrants of the second and third generation, educated and sometimes withprestigious jobs. They form a social equivalent of the French bourgeoisie. They areMuslims on the surface or because they have been labelled as such. Basically, theirbelonging to Islam is intimate, private, latent, and almost secularized. In the EuropeanMuslim environment they are seen as ours but strangers. Probably they are thesociological Muslims of Renzo Guolo [1999: 73�77]. Between those two extremepoles there is a sort of continuum of Muslim identities which find their own socialexpressions. In this sense we can speak of a plural Islam in Europe [cf. Saint-Blancat, 1999; Pace, Perocco, 2000; Pêdziwiatr, 2007].

Chantal Saint Blancat [1999: 124�1259], referring to the Veneto, describes foursocial categories of Muslims according to their religious identity: secularized,observant, cultural and not practising. The secularized identify themselves with thegeneral human values almost without any reference to Islam; the observant are allthose who identify themselves with Islamic values even if in a selective way, focusingtheir attention on Islamic spirituality or on the observance of rituals; the culturalmovements express that type of identity which is linked to the inherited faith thatbecomes a general value reference; finally, those who do not practise distinguishthemselves for an identity of suspended faith.

It must be observed, however, that in Italy the Muslim migration is still dominatedby the symptoms of the first generation. In a certain way, signs of settling arebeginning to show; it seems more visible [Allievi, 2002b: 113] at least from the


quantitative point of view (the presence of about 1.200.000 people, i.e. 2,0% of theentire population). Yet altogether it appears as an external social and religiouscomponent, so it cannot be defined as Italian Islam. Its increasing visibility waslegitimized in a certain way by the Italian authorities on September 10, 2005 with thefounding of a Council for Islam as an initiative of the Minister of the Interior, GiuseppePisanu; it was an initiative similar to those carried out by various Europeangovernments before and mostly after September 11, in order to foster the creationof associations at a national level in their countries.

Of the Islamic communities in Italy, the one living in Mazara del Vallo (Sicily)is quite amazing and has its own story. It is one of the most important foreigncommunities in the whole Sicilian and, for some reasons, also Italian context.The large Muslim community � mainly fishermen of Tunisian origin � enteredthe city life about forty years ago. The existence of such a significant community,already consisting of several generations, is a test of a peaceful cohabitation of aforeign community with the autochthonous Sicilian inhabitants. In a documentof the European Union we can read that in this town: �the peaceful cohabitationof a large number of Tunisian workers in the fishing industry with localinhabitants provides a positive example of successful integration� [cited after:Crociata, 2006: 41]. However, also this community have experienced momentsof contextual difficulties [cf. Gamuzza, 2008] especially after September 11,which in social terms have resulted in the exclusion or self-exclusion from someareas of daily and public life.

According to Konrad Pêdziwiatr [2007: 42�45], who has grasped the Muslimminority�s diversity, this phenomenon in a European perspective distinguishes threecategories of Muslim identity: religious Muslims, cultural Muslims and ethnic Muslims.The first category is formed by people who are strongly linked to the Islamiccommunity (umma) and observe the religious precepts in daily life. However, it is astrongly diversified category from the point of view of understanding the role ofbeliefs in social and political life; it ranges from an attitude of total disinterest in thismatter to an attitude of total involvement and therefore terrorism. To use an example,it must be observed that in France in 2001 only 33% of people who recognizedthemselves as Muslims prayed daily, but 65% observed the precept of Ramadan(Maréchal et al., 2003: 17). The cultural Muslims are characterized by theinternalization of the values of the so-called Islamic culture. In other words, thesymbolic Muslim universe has a central role in the value and identity references. Themajority of French Muslims of Algerian origin belongs to this category (Tribalat,1995). Finally, the ethnic Muslims are people who identify themselves with Islam asa feature of their own ethnic belonging.

In order to read properly the identity structure of Muslims in Europe, it must beunderlined that it varies according to the origin of immigrants. In Great Britain,Asian Islam, influenced by Sufism, is dominant; in France, there is almost exclusivelythe presence of North African Islam, still mindful of the colonial struggles; inGermany, the most widespread Islam is from the Middle East, mainly Turkish with


strong secular trends; also in the Netherlands Turkish Islam predominates (50% ofimmigrants) but there is also a consistent part of Muslims of Moroccan origin. Thereare also internal divisions among Muslims from the same country, as in the case ofSenegalese. For example, the existence of four brotherhoods of Senegalese Islam(Tijaniya, Murridiyya, Quadriyya and Layennes) is maintained with a strict distinctionwhich has resulted in a sort of social inclusion/exclusion [Scidà. 2002: 201�234;Melfa, 2006: 123�140; Kaczynski, 2006: 102�103].

It is difficult to evaluate how this factor, together with the diversified social andpolitical contexts affects the process of integration; the point is that, according tovarious surveys and studies, the identification of Muslims with the host societyvaries and it is difficult to understand it [cf. Heckmann et al. 2001]. Almost half ofthe Muslims living in Great Britain declare they feel emotionally linked with thiscountry; in France, only a quarter identify themselves with the French nation; inGermany, the identification with the host society is very low � 8%. However, thisdoes not preclude a type of integration, especially social integration. It appears thatthe Muslim minority in Great Britain is characterized by a strong trend towardshomogenization with a high rate of homogamy. In France, Holland and even inGermany in young Muslims we notice a trend which is clearly opposite.

XI

In conclusion, the first significant identity distinction which we noted in EuropeanIslam is the intergenerational one, which I have already indicated. It is the differencewhich distinguishes the first generation of Muslim immigrants from their childrenand grandchildren � the second and third generation. We could properly speak ofimmigrants� Islam and citizens� Islam, since these are mainly citizens with full rights.[Pêdziwiatr, 2007: 204�210]. The Islam of immigrants is, as we have already noted,latent, socially invisible; it is also popular and � more significantly � understood at alevel of ethnic identity. For all the immigrants from Muslim countries, ethnic belongingis identified as Islamic belonging. In other words, being Moroccan, Pakistani, Algerian,or Tunisian means being a Muslim in a different way. So for them, cultural differencescoincide with ethnic and cultural differences. As a rule, they do not claim a publicspace for their religion; freedom or religious tolerance guaranteed by Europeandemocracies are sufficient.

In the case of citizens� Islam the identity matter is quite different; Islam assumesa central role in the identity of people born and bred in Europe and is removed fromits ethnic meaning. In other words, they do not feel Moroccan, Algerian or Pakistani,or at least not so much; rather, they feel citizens of the new country but with theidentity distinction of being Muslims. Surprising as it may seem, the second andthird generation feel the need to express their Islamic identity. It is a new Islamizationof the immigrant population called Muslim in a generic way. This phenomenon is allthe more surprising as it happens in the heart of the most secularized continent,Europe. Is it perhaps one of the expressions of the revenge of God?, asks GillesKepel [1994]. The true meaning of Kepel�s question has however clear historical


references and others which are contingent to the phenomenon which is found in atriangle: the social and cultural context, identity and religion.

It seems that in this perspective, one of the reasons must be sought in the universalityof the religious identity when faced with the identity that is ethnically built, becauseit provides for a belonging to a community that not only goes beyond their ethnicgroup but also the host society [cf. Jacobson, 1997]. In other words, we can statethat Islam as an identity reference could not be perceived as such in an ethnicallyhomogeneous environment � that of the immigrants � as there was no such need;instead, in a new, heterogeneous, environment it has acquired or perhaps regainedits identity value because it has turned out to be a distinctive feature of the newcitizens as compared with the autochthonous population. It has been learnt in theprocess of socialization but it could not be preserved intact in the new way of lifecharacterized by the new belonging as a citizen where the very identity diversitybuilt on religious choice is not only permitted by the civil society but also is morecoherent with the new one in nuce, that is national. In this way, it appears morerewarding, as Barth [1969] would say, than the ethnic one, since it enlarges theborders of one�s social identity and it is not in contrast with the citizen identity.

This is why their Islam is different; it is not �lower or more popular� than theIslam of their fathers and grandfathers, but �higher�, using the terms proposed byGellner [993: 23]. It is a more reflexive, transparent and socially visible Islam astheir followers are more educated and, moreover, their affiliation is the result ofchoosing to be a Muslim in a context which is not part of the predominant culture asin Islamic countries.

However, the need for distinction has also resulted in the marking of the border ofone�s own collective identity, as Barth noted [1969], between us and others, and thiscauses the tendency towards isolation, also spatial, as in the tradition of social lifedictated by Islam. Islam is urban in its origins: Mahomet�s city, Mecca, is called inthe Koran (VI, 92) �the Mother of cities�, while Medina, where he took shelter, isthe city par excellence and it is reproduced by Islamic communities everywhere. �InAccra � Pino Schirripa notes � inhabited mainly by immigrants belonging to a preciseethnic group, there are no ethnic districts, so the city appears linguistically andethnically rather heterogeneous. Yet in this context there is a district, Nima, inhabitedmainly by �people of Muslim faith�� [Schirripa, 1992: 44]. There is an endemic trendof Islam towards ghettoization, caused in a certain way by the precepts of ritualsand collective life. In fact, in the European urban landscape the modern citadels, ifwe do not want to use the word �ghetto�, are founded mainly by Muslims.

It happens that the public space of the Muslim community also acquiresarchitectural characteristics pertinent to its religious cult, such as minarets whichindicate the presence of the Muslim community in the urban topography in anunmistakeable way. In this case, it causes a transformation of a traditional habitatthat may not obtain common consensus, as shown by the negative result of thedemocratic people�s referendum regarding the presence of minarets in Switzerland(November 2009). This � understandably � provoked a heated debate on intolerance


and Islamophobia but also a reflection on the legitimacy of the tools of the democraticsystem including the people�s referendum. There is no doubt, however, that theintrinsic diversity of Muslims, reinforced and accented in the public space, removesthem from a context that would encourage integration.

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Muslim Migration and Identity in Europe

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