Multiagency Assessment and Planning: A Concept for Conflict Prevention

MULTIAGENCY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING: A CONCEPT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

Strengthening Australia’s Comprehensive Approach to Peace and Stabilisation Operations

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The Centre would like to acknowledge the work of Noetic Corporation in the development and preparation of this document.

The content is published under a Creative Commons by Attribution 3.0 Australia (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/) licence. All parts of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval systems, and transmitted by any means without the written permission of the publisher.

1MULTIAGENCY ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING: A CONCEPT FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................2

PROJECT OVERVIEW ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................5

Project Methodology .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................6

BEST PRACTICES MODEL .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................8

Intent of the Model .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................8

Defining the Concept of Conflict Prevention..........................................................................................................................................................9

Challenges Facing Conflict Prevention ............................................................................................................................................................................9

Making the Argument for Conflict Prevention ................................................................................................................................................10

Conflict Prevention Assessment and Planning Process [the Model] ................................................................................. 12

THE ROLE OF CULTURE .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................23

Acknowledging the Impact of National Culture ............................................................................................................................................23

Acknowledging the Impact of Organisational Culture ............................................................................................................................24

Australian Culture ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................25

Reflections from the American Perspective ........................................................................................................................................................26

The Role of External Actors .....................................................................................................................................................................................................28

COMPLEMENTARY PROJECT FINDINGS ...................................................................................................................................................................31

Strong Institutional Leadership ...............................................................................................................................................................................................31

Conflict Prevention Funding .......................................................................................................................................................................................................32

Deployable Government Civilian Capacity ...........................................................................................................................................................33

CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................35

ANNEX A: LITERATURE REVIEWED..................................................................................................................................................................................37

ANNEX B: ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED .........................................................................................................................................................40

ANNEX C: WORKSHOP SUMMARIES ...........................................................................................................................................................................42

C.1. Concept Development Workshop, Washington, D.C. ...........................................................................................................42

C.2. Concept Validation Workshop, Washington D.C. ........................................................................................................................45

C.3. Concept Validation Workshop, Canberra ........................................................................................47

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Conflict prevention is difficult to define, measure, and conduct, but nonetheless it is critical in the pursuit of certain strategic goals. Furthermore, given the breadth of expertise needed and the complexity of issues involved, engagement in conflict prevention operations should be undertaken within a multiagency framework. This paper presents the case for two concurrent approaches: promoting recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy imperative, and expanding effective multiagency collaboration initiatives for conflict prevention.

2. These approaches have been synthesised into a proposed model for conflict prevention assessment and planning. The model outlines the critical components of a proactive, multiagency approach to conflict prevention. It does not imply that none of these interactions occur already or that existing mechanisms are dysfunctional. Rather, the model serves as an attempt to clarify understanding of where the necessary interactions occur and their relationships to each other in the context of shared conflict prevention goals. It is intended to inform initiatives to improve or refine conflict assessment and planning.

* The process is not intended to be linear, and is drawn as such for illustrative purposes only. It does not operate in isolation. Host nation government and host nation society involvement are pre-requisites for success.


3. The model is based on the assumption that a full spectrum of international assistance (from a single nation, regional bodies, and the international community writ large) in addition to the activities initiated domestically can work to improve conditions and potentially avert conflict in a host nation. Therefore, promoting recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy imperative, including explicit recognition of conflict prevention objectives, is important to define the policy space and facilitate resource allocation and unity of effort.

4. The model is presented in a linear fashion for clarity, but the process it defines is dynamic rather than linear. The model highlights the importance of aligning conflict prevention planning to a broader strategy. Substantial and frequent multiagency input is important to both the broader strategy, and to the intelligence assessment priorities that inform strategy development. A defined mechanism for identifying fragile or conflict-affected countries to invest in should be created or refined, and a multiagency approach to assessment undertaken that balances numerous factors that would impact planning and the eventual response. These include the ability for the intervening country to influence the situation being targeted, the national interest in investing in that country or region, the priorities and challenges facing the particular agencies that are involved in the assessment, and the critical role and existing activities of the host nation and host society.

5. The model is the product of a research project that synthesised the lessons and best practices of governments and non-government actors engaged with the problems of unstable or conflict environments. The best practices focus on the strategic level but also link to existing operational and tactical tools and guidance. They reflect the reality of operating with existing policy, funding, and structural challenges that can often impede the development of comprehensive, multiagency crisis and conflict prevention and management activities. A summary of these key points can be found in the text boxes below.

6. This research paper does not make prescriptive recommendations, nor advocate one standardised approach to conflict prevention and management. Instead, it offers a notional model based on relevant contemporary defence, development and diplomatic engagement principles. The focus is on a relatively narrow aspect of conflict studies, reflecting primarily on conflict prevention rather than more broadly on the actual implementation of conflict management activities, which are often supported by peace-building and other measures. Nonetheless, this paper informs discussion on the topic of international interventions and the model is a timely addition to the developing practice of conflict prevention.

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7. Summary of key findings:

Conflict prevention: Multiagency collaboration:

• “Conflict prevention” is complex and erroneously implies that conflict can—and should—be prevented in all circumstances.

• Conflict prevention is “an investment, not a purchase.”

• There is no cohesive multiagency approach to conflict prevention despite the broad recognition that international development and diplomacy, including capability building initiatives, education, governance and rule of law programs and stabilisation activities can be considered conflict prevention tools.

• Conflict prevention must be promoted as a foreign policy imperative, including explicit recognition of conflict prevention objectives.

• Conflict can be prevented or mitigated through a multi-pronged, multiagency approach.

• Multiagency conflict prevention begins with a shared diagnosis of the situation.

• A multiagency approach should build on existing organisational structures that have been vetted and are in place, even when a high-profile crisis hits.

• A multiagency group works best when there is strong and deliberate political leadership and interest in a particular end-state.

• The full range of capabilities across government should be evaluated in each context for appropriateness and potential effectiveness in an unstable environment.

• The multiagency approach is already partly utilised in Australia, but needs improvement.

• Multiagency collaboration should be expanded, experimented with and critiqued.


PROJECT OVERVIEW

Introduction

1. The last decade has brought increasing recognition by the Government of Australia, other governments, the United Nations and other international bodies of the importance and benefits of preventing conflict, and of managing or stabilising violence. Conflict is categorised in many ways including through a geographic lens, such as conflict between states or internal conflict within states by groups indigenous to that region, with or without external or diaspora support. Conflict is motivated by many factors, including structural and root causes, competition over increasingly scarce resources, particular triggers such as a coup d’état, ideological or political movements, etc. Conflict is destabilising regardless of its motivation or structure.

2. The Australian Government has robust experience, significant expertise, and a range of ongoing initiatives aimed at preventing and managing conflict overseas. Recent experiences of Australian and allied governments in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted an urgent need for effective whole-of-government approaches to preventing conflict and responding to escalating or continuing crises abroad. However, the nature and range of expertise relevant to comprehensive conflict prevention is scattered across various agencies. Competing agency priorities, national and organisational cultures, and budgetary constraints have curtailed the development of widely accepted concepts and a comprehensive model for multiagency1 conflict prevention. Inadequate coordination of a multiagency response can result in the inefficient use of limited resources. In terms of strategy and planning uncoordinated approaches will be unsuccessful in both determining and reaching appropriate multiagency goals in conflict prevention and management, and could produce detrimental effects on the ground.

3. This working paper is one effort to address the need for greater multiagency coordination, and to understand how interventions may be undertaken earlier in the conflict cycle. Its emphasis on conflict prevention recognises there are significant strategic, resource, and humanitarian imperatives to early action. The paper is the culmination of a project undertaken by Noetic Corporation (Noetic) which was commissioned by the Asia Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence (the Centre).2 The project sought to identify current best practices in assessment and planning for conflict prevention and management in a multiagency context, in order to support strategic decision-making and effective operational outcomes.

1 The term multiagency is descriptive of more than one government agency, department, or office working together. In the American context, interagency is the more common term. However, the term the “multiagency” in the Australian context is not used in the way that “the interagency” is used in the U.S. to describe the broad interactions between various government entities. For simplicity’s sake, the term multiagency is used in this paper to describe both the Australian and American contexts.

2 The project is part of the Australian Government’s broader Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP), which aims to strengthen Australia’s comprehensive approach to peace and stabilisation operations.

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4. This paper synthesises the lessons and best practices of governments and non-government actors engaged with the problems of unstable or conflict environments. The best practices focus at the strategic level but link to existing operational and tactical tools and guidance. They reflect the reality of operating with existing policy, funding, and structural challenges that can often impede the development of comprehensive, multiagency crisis and conflict prevention and management activities. The paper does not make prescriptive recommendations, nor does it advocate one standardised approach to conflict prevention and management given the complexity of the environments and actors in emerging or ongoing crises. Instead, this paper offers a notional model based on contemporary general defence, development and diplomatic engagement principles. The focus is on a relatively narrow aspect of conflict studies, reflecting primarily on conflict prevention rather than more broadly on the actual implementation of conflict mitigation activities, which are often supported by peace-building and other measures.

5. The model has been developed in an ‘organisationally-agnostic manner’, based on a civil-military construct that is broadly applicable to the Australian and other contexts. The model is particularly relevant to internal decision making on how to prioritise and engage in conflict prevention in government. It is but one contribution to the broader discussions within Australia and more widely in the sphere of conflict prevention and management.

Project Methodology

Project Design

6. The information and concepts presented in this paper are the products of desktop research and of interviews and workshops with a number of relevant agencies conducted by Noetic’s Washington, D.C. and Canberra offices between April and June 2011. All discussions were non-attributable. The project team also reviewed a selection of literature from government (Australian, U.S. and others) and international non-governmental sources.3

7. Subsequently more than thirty high-level policymakers and practitioners from Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and other non-governmental organisations were interviewed and asked to share their best practices from first-hand experience in home capitals, host nation capitals, and field locations.4

8. A Concept Development Workshop held in Washington, D.C. on 23 May 2011 brought together subject matter experts to define the scope and explore the critical elements of a multiagency model. The project team facilitated a lively discussion that addressed strategic and operational considerations for engaging and operating in a conflict environment.

3 See Annex A for a full list of documents consulted during this project4 See Annex B for a full list of organisations consulted during this project


9. The project team presented its preliminary findings at a Concept Validation Workshop on 10 June 2011 in Washington, D.C. Australian, British and U.S. Government and non-government stakeholders were invited to critique the candidate model’s effective principles, consider counterintuitive practices, and offer views on what a useful model should comprise. The candid discussions served to validate and further refine the best practices and lessons learned.

10. A third and final workshop was held in Canberra on 21 June 2011. This half-day workshop gathered senior leaders from the Australian multiagency environment, including representatives from the Department of Defence, Joint Operations Command, Military Strategic Commitments, Australian Federal Police, AusAID, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Parliament, and the World Bank. The participation of these organisations ensured the model was vetted for its viability in the Australian context.

11. The goal in adopting this approach was to ensure the production of a robust, contemporary, organisationally-agnostic, strategically relevant and practical model for the Australian Government and other actors.

Structure of the Paper

12. There are three parts to this working paper.

• This part introduces the project methodology.

• The next part presents a notional multiagency assessment and planning model for conflict prevention and management, building on an exploration of critical considerations and select best practices learned through the research phase of the project. This section initially defines the concept of conflict prevention, reflects on the challenges facing the discipline, and then explores the importance of making the case for conflict prevention. The notional model is then presented with best practices from the project woven into the explanation of its constituent parts. This is followed by a discussion of underlying organisational cultures and how national culture(s) can motivate, hinder, or simply not encourage investment in conflict prevention. Specific reflections and best practices are drawn from Australian Government dynamics and culture, the U.S. Government and U.S. multiagency dynamics, and from limited engagement with the United Nations and other multinational actors. Finally, three far-reaching challenges that surfaced during the research are explored in more detail, with best practices defined and offered for each. These challenges include ineffective leadership, funding restrictions, including a discussion of the still controversial concept of pooled funding for conflict prevention, and determining effective deployable civilian government capacity for conflict response work.

• The final part of the paper presents the conclusions from the analysis.

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Best Practice Definition

13. A best practice is a method or process that has consistently achieved desired impacts better than other methods or means. The best practices in this paper reflect the lessons that have been identified over combined decades of efforts at conflict prevention and management in the select literature, and by the individuals and agencies consulted in this project. They are necessarily open to refinement, and their suitability and utility will depend on the circumstances to which they would be applied. They are offered here to provide valuable, tested information for those engaged in similar environments.

BEST PRACTICES MODEL

Intent of the Model

14. The purpose of the model is to present, primarily to government audiences, a notional method for initiating assessment and planning for conflict prevention. It could be applied in Australian, American, or other contexts.

15. The model is intended to inform the development and/or improvement of more detailed processes or mechanisms at, and between, each step identified. It also provides a context for understanding the application of identified best practices. Clearly, its graphical representation is but a simplified interpretation of a very complex set of issues.

16. A number of issues are important to acknowledge in developing a multiagency assessment and planning model for conflict prevention and management. These critical considerations are themes that influence why a nation decides, or should decide, to invest in conflict prevention and management, and when.

17. The model:

• Proposes a set of basic, practical organising principles needed to more effectively bring a multiagency approach to the conduct of conflict prevention and management.

• Identifies the necessary elements in a comprehensive multiagency approach;

• Recognises that existing mature bureaucracies such as in the United States and Australian Governments currently possess numerous relevant tools, specific approaches, and frameworks that could be used at different points along the stages of the model5, and should be incorporated where possible.

5 An example is the potential use of the State/CRS Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) at Step 4


Defining the Concept of Conflict Prevention

18. The Centre has defined conflict prevention in its Multiagency Peace and Stabilisation Operations Project (MAPSOP) literature as follows: “[Conflict prevention] involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep low-level or long-festering tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict, but it can also apply to efforts to limit the spread of violence if it does occur, or to avoid the reoccurrence of violence. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General’s “good offices,” early warning systems, confidence-building measures (hotlines, notification of troop movements), preventive deployment, and sanctions. Conflict Prevention is sometimes also referred to as preventive diplomacy. (UN Capstone Document 2008 and USIP Peace Terms Glossary 2011)”

Challenges Facing Conflict Prevention

19. Conflict prevention is a complex discipline. In the Australian and U.S. contexts, there is not an agreed upon theory of change, or change model, for incorporating a “conflict prevention” mindset into the business of government. During the project process, a universal comment noted that there is a critical need to promote the recognition of the importance of conflict prevention across the multiagency context, and Government, and with it the commensurate processes and policies to support it. It is recognised that international development and diplomacy, including capability building initiatives, education, governance and rule of law programs and stabilisation activities can be considered conflict prevention tools, but there is not currently a cohesive multiagency approach to conflict prevention. Clearly, the levers that could cause positive change towards a more robust whole-of-government focus on conflict prevention are unique to each government and organisation, and may differ within the constituent parts of each.

20. Secondly, the term “conflict prevention” makes the assumption that conflict is to be prevented in all circumstances, which is a mischaracterisation. From a geopolitical standpoint, the initiation of conflict may achieve a particular changed end-state that may sometimes coincide with a potential intervening government’s interest and support their strategic goals. For example, the U.S. and most Western partners have presented the spread of democracy as a global goal. Each democracy is unique, and in seeking to become one, it is important to note that the process of democratisation is inherently destabilising and can be a preceding factor to violent conflict. Not attempting to stop a conflict is sometimes a pragmatic option as evidenced in the civil war in Angola that brought the demise of Jonas Savimbi, which led within six weeks to a cessation of violence and UNITA rebels laying down their arms. More recently the civil uprising in Tunisia in early 2011 led to the ousting of long-time President Abidine Ben Ali.

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21. From a broader perspective, the assumption that the actions of one actor have a direct, causal impact on another is inherently precarious. It is difficult to conclude that one actor’s preventative initiatives were the deciding factor in preventing violent conflict from escalating or occurring. The number and effect of different, overlapping or interlinking factors are not predictable or absolute. In other words, it is difficult to prove that an intervention prevented or stopped something that didn’t happen. However, this is perhaps something in which it is worth investing. Certainly it was noted that investments in baseline assessments (followed by periodic reviews) allow for the measuring of trends in at-risk or conflict affected situations. Increasingly sophisticated, system-wide Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks for interventions that include of a range of data sources can also provide meaningful information about actual and perceived levels of stability, security and development in countries and societies.

Making the Argument for Conflict Prevention

22. Participants in the project shared many motivations for supporting conflict prevention assessment and planning. National security concerns were raised as reasons for seeking to stabilise volatile regions overseas that could become “hot beds for terrorists.” In some cases, political leadership and related investment in conflict prevention was seen to hinge on personal interest on the part of senior leaders. A more nebulous “moral” obligation was raised as a factor to make the case for conflict prevention (recognising that conceptions of morality and ethics are unique down to the individual level), noting the “imperative” to provide assistance and to mitigate the loss of life wherever and whenever possible. While international response for relief or humanitarian purposes will inevitably continue, intervention abroad is consistently aligned with the foreign policy objectives of a particular nation. Each interviewee or workshop participant brought a different perspective to the table on why a nation, or organisation, should invest in conflict prevention.

23. The oft-cited “CNN effect” may also be a motivator for a nation to attempt to stabilise another, as public or global outcry demands action to stop violence. Along the opposite track, many commentators note that a lack of media coverage and international interest in an escalating conflict scenario can be the deciding factor for international actors not to intervene and respond, which can result in more intense and prolonged crises.

24. Elected officials (as almost universally referenced by the U.S. based interviewees) are swayed by the demands of their constituencies. Elected representatives will be cognisant of the need to manage the expectations of constituents in terms of what can actually be achieved in a particular place, and in the decision to intervene at all. Should public outcry or extensive constituent pressure grow to a strong degree, political decision makers may be motivated to support or not support conflict prevention and, more often, conflict or crisis action responses.


25. Deterrence is a fundamental objective of any intervention overseas, including conflict prevention. As such, the importance of investing in intelligence gathering, including financial intelligence, and information technology such as an offensive cyber capability, particularly in light of growing links between criminal elements and irregular threats, is increasingly important. Demonstrating national interest, presence and capability (overtly or by suggestion, particularly in those previously listed) in unstable regions or nations can conceivably contribute to deterring activity by destabilising forces as well as those who seek to capitalise on a lack of indigenous capacity. Just as with conflict prevention generally, however, proving causation, or at least correlation, between deterrence and the absence of conflict or instability is problematic.

26. Unfortunately, once a particular approach has been defined, there is a tendency to apply the same formula to every circumstance or environment. Instead, for an effective conflict prevention approach, the full range of capabilities across government should be evaluated in each context for appropriateness and potential effectiveness in an unstable environment that has also been defined as strategically or politically important.

27. Conflict prevention requires both an immediate perspective, in terms of understanding how short-term reactions to current events prompt long-term impact, as well as a long-term strategy over decades. It is, in brief, “an investment, not a purchase.” Long-term state-building focuses on governance and requires reducing pockets of exclusion, ensuring mechanisms for political mediation (national and local level) exist and are used, investing in education and wide-ranging skills-training, while building the legitimacy of and confidence in the custodians of the state. According to many project interviewees, the role of outsiders should be to assist through facilitation and development of local solutions, mentoring and/or training rather than to transplant and impose external (and sometimes alien) solutions.

28. One critical best practice drawn from the research highlighted the importance of linking a clear national interest to any investment in conflict prevention activities. Whether the strategy is to promote regional stability, act in order to invest in a stable world order, or promote economic stability for business development purposes, the investment in conflict prevention assessment and planning will necessarily be motivated by national interest.

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Conflict Prevention Assessment and Planning Process [the Model]

29. The following graphic describes the proposed conflict prevention assessment and planning process. The model explores the particular steps, in an ideal circumstance, of an effective multiagency assessment and planning for conflict prevention and management activities.

Institutional Goals

30. The findings of this project indicate that, in order to facilitate success and to ensure conflict prevention assessment and planning attracts appropriate resources and support two overarching institutional goals should be promoted.

31. These goals are as follows:

Goal #1:

Promote recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy imperative

* The process is not intended to be linear, and is drawn as such for illustrative purposes only. It does not operate in isolation. Host nation government and host nation society involvement are pre-requisites for success.


32. Both government and non-government stakeholders reflected that many development, security, economic and rule of law activities, among others, may prevent conflict even if conflict prevention was not the specific end state identified when they were planned and implemented. The spectrum of international activities from external countries, regional bodies, and the international community writ large, in addition to the activities initiated at the host country level, can work to improve pre-conflict and post-conflict conditions. Promoting recognition of conflict prevention as a foreign policy imperative, including explicit recognition of conflict prevention objectives, is important to define the policy space and facilitate resource allocation and unity of effort.

Goal #2:

Expand effective multiagency collaboration initiatives

33. While there is continued recognition that working in a multiagency environment is, simply put, both the reality and the ideal, there are few examples of multiagency collaboration initiatives to serve as best practice models. In order to develop the necessary organisational trust, and warrant decision-makers to expend political capital in changing bureaucratic structures and incentives to support change, multiagency collaboration should be expanded, experimented with and critiqued, with the lessons diffused widely and applied to future multiagency initiatives.

Process

34. The conflict assessment and planning model is not bound as a linear process. It is represented as such in the graphic for illustrative purposes only. For example, a multiagency plan or a standing coordination mechanism for supporting that plan may already exist for a particular scenario (process step 7a.) If so, efforts may commence at this stage, with single agencies developing their plans (process step 7b.) and then moving into continual evaluation and review (process step 8) and the process can circle back to clarifying and articulating the government strategy (process step 1) and ensuring alignment with the plan. In addition, depending on organisation and country or area of proposed intervention, the “entry point” into the process will not necessarily be the proposed process step 1. A refrain from the project participants noted that there is no one, single multiagency or intra-agency assessment tool that is perfectly appropriate for every situation. Therefore, relevant assessment and coordination mechanisms should be utilised and brought together as needed.

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PROCESS STEP 1: CLARIFY AND ARTICULATE GOVERNMENT STRATEGY

35. In order to determine whether or not a case can be made for initiating conflict prevention assessment and planning, it is important for planners and others involved in the process to understand the overall government strategy. For example, if the predominant government focus is on a major, domestic crisis, or leadership has clearly stated during election campaigning or in recent policy documents that there are limited resources or interest in new foreign affairs endeavours, it is important to be aware of this broad contextual reality.

36. The rationale for investing in conflict prevention and management is derived from security concerns, strategic ambition, inherent moral interests and the many different factors within each which exert influence at the strategic, operational, or political levels of government. Practical considerations of decision makers include having the opportunity, the political will, the resources to act, while being mindful to “do no harm”. According to many project participants, governments should exert discipline in standing back from interventions overseas that are not aligned with defined strategic political objectives.

37. In Australia, there are clearly defined national strategic objectives to contribute to stability and security in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood6. Even so, in the model, the initial “clarify and articulate government strategy” step is one that is not often well understood in both the Australian and US contexts. A process of clarifying and articulating government strategy involves marrying stated, enduring strategic interests with the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the day to contextualise specific issues and problems in an appropriate political framework. The model provides for a clear articulation of government strategy to form the necessary foundation for effective engagement across the multiagency community and with the government in the assessment and planning of conflict prevention activities.

PROCESS STEP 2: PROMOTE MULTIAGENCY INPUT TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT PRIORITIES

38. Determining appropriate areas of focus for conflict prevention (and management) activities will be influenced by the credibility of the information available about a particular region or country. In order to attempt to promote a particular area for attention, it would be important to be aware of, and ideally influence, the data sets that are analysed by the official intelligence community. Given that different internal organisational cultures, priorities and mandates exist within governments, multiagency input into these priorities would help to ensure that all drivers and dynamics of violent conflict are reviewed. This is expanded on further below in process steps 6 and 7.

6 Australian Government, Department of Defence, “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030”, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, 2009, p. 54 (para 7.10)


39. One senior level official during the U.S. interview process noted with concern that in the present American system, there is a fundamental lack of synchronisation between intelligence support (based on a Cold War system as the predominant lens and entrenched structure to understand the threats facing the American state) and crisis action planning. As such, the weighting of open source, near-impossible to verify social media streams may be overlooked as a result of the focus on the reporting from existing classified mechanisms. Similar concerns were raised in the Australian context, particularly highlighting a need for greater multiagency input into national intelligence priorities. Some participants also recognised the limitations on sharing information given that open source data is often classified once incorporated into intelligence analysis. Communication with the broader international community and the analyses presented by the UN, World Bank, non-governmental organisations, among other diverse groups, would be useful in order to gather balanced information about a fragile conflict-affected area.

PROCESS STEP 3: DEFINE MECHANISM TO IDENTIFY COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER FOR MULTIAGENCY CONFLICT PREVENTION

40. Each area of government will have unique ways of identifying the factors and prerequisites for increasing focus on a particular region, country, or trend. However, in order to ensure that there is in fact multiagency (as opposed to individual agency) assessment and planning, a mechanism should be defined for coordinating information and allocating appropriate roles and responsibilities. The mechanism may differ depending on the geopolitical strategic focus on the country (or region) in question, and/or its relative weight to other political priorities. As noted above in defining a key, underlying institutional goal, to “expand effective multiagency collaboration initiatives,” defining the identification mechanism would benefit from existing multiagency collaboration initiatives and exercises. The National Security Staff could be expected to play a robust role in defining and endorsing these mechanisms in the U.S. context. In Australia, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet could also play an essential convening role.

41. An important finding from the project indicated the importance of committing to retain existing organisational structures that have been vetted and are in place, even when a high-profile crisis hits. Wasting time and resources to create entirely new organisations and coordination mechanisms when some already exist is not logical or recommended. The key question then is not whether existing organisations, capabilities and mechanisms should be dramatically changed or replaced, but how they can operate with greater coherence and complementarity for conflict prevention and management. One interviewee noted that current U.S. program and funding mechanisms are unable to sufficiently support the complex, multidimensional requirements of pre- and post-conflict environments. A collaborative model for organising multiagency assessment, planning and implementation was offered where individual agencies plug into a “conflict centre” with a discrete funding line and staffed not by development or rule-of-law specialists, but rather by conflict specialists who know when and how to draw on development, rule-of-law, security and diplomacy expertise when planning and responding to instability and conflict.

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42. In order to effectively assess the pre-conflict environment, the project findings note three areas that are recommended in developing a functional model. These are described as process steps 4, 5, and 6 in the model.

43. It is worth stating that the term “assessment” differs in traditional meaning between the military and civilian arenas. Often, a civilian understanding of assessment, typically relating to programmatic assessment, is to evaluate measures of effectiveness and performance, though this is not to suggest that civilian programs lack contextual analysis as a basis for program planning. A prominent interpretation of assessment in the military is in the context of intelligence, as the information and contextual understanding of a situation, event, group and/or other entity.

PROCESS STEP 4: CONDUCT ASSESSMENTS DRAWING ON MULTIAGENCY EXPERIENCE

44. Best practice multiagency or multinational assessment starts with a shared diagnosis of the situation by the agencies or nations involved. A collective appraisal of relevant issues facilitates the development of synchronised and complementary assessments and plans, while the process of analysing the problems together enables a shared vision and vocabulary to be developed.

45. The particular bias of any one office or personality can impact the findings of an assessment. Therefore, it is critical to draw on multiagency experience to mitigate the threat of any one opinion or perspective gaining undue dominance. For example, a stereotypical criticism has been that any expert in rule of law will determine the most critical conflict prevention approach to be a rule of law, security sector assistance response, or that a public health officer will determine that the most stabilising factor in an unstable environment would be to bolster the health service in a particular area. Bringing together multiagency perspectives would ideally mitigate these types of concerns by ensuring competing views and perspectives are addressed and mitigated early on in the process. In addition, the use of conflict specialists who have a comprehensive, interdisciplinary and inherently multidimensional understanding of conflict and its precursors can assist in the development of balanced, comprehensive assessments. A range of tools already exist in the assessment space and should be utilised as appropriate to the context and the actors involved, though few represent holistic, multidimensional assessments combining multiple levels of assessment.

46. An essential part of assessment involves the incorporation of relevant early warning systems pulled from both inside government, and from external multinational actors. Many organisations within the international community evaluate the drivers of conflict in existing early warning type systems.7 Key drivers include factors such as political polarisation, economic elitism, widespread or uncontested corruption, recruitment of militia, and a noticeable change in criminal statistics.

7 Some examples include Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), TCAF, ICAF, etc.


47. Unfortunately, some of the current literature still refers to the possibility of there being one or multiple pre-defined “triggers” that can be predicted to “spark” widespread violent conflict. There is rarely a predictable, singular “trip point” that initiates an increase in violent conflict. The underlying assumption reflects a linear interpretation of events that would be better described as wicked problems.8

48. The interviewees in the U.S. context were chosen due to their extensive understanding of and work in conflict prevention or related activities. The majority of them emphasised the importance of nuanced analysis of the drivers of conflict and expressed concern with the oversimplification of complex problems by bureaucrats and especially elected officials in the United States.

49. Early warning is undertaken in different ways by different parts of government. For example, in the defence context, early warning systems could be understood as the standard intelligence tools that analysts draw on in order to assess security and political conditions on the ground in a particular area. Diplomatic and government international development personnel would also use intelligence tools and analysis to better understand the changing dynamics of a fluid situation on the ground. Open source materials have played an increasingly important role over the past ten years. Non-governmental and international organisations including the World Bank and the United Nations evaluate different indicators on the ground to assess the timing and level of direct assistance. Commercial entities including multinational, regional and national corporations are also cognisant of changing conditions in the areas where they invest, and adapt their actions and reactions accordingly.

50. Therefore, it is important for decision makers and individual agencies or offices to refrain from making simplistic causal linkages between pre-conflict factors and the escalation of violent conflict. Mainstream media can feed into this dynamic of limited assessment and analysis in favour of overblown news stories. A critical element of effective assessment is to incorporate different types and sources of information into any early warning and assessment process.

8 The phrase “Wicked problem” was first used in social planning to describe a problem that is extremely challenging or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and changing requirements that impact the problem space. These requirements and the related impact from them are often difficult to recognise. It is possible that the effort to solve one aspect of a wicked problem may highlight or create other problems. (Paraphrased from Ritchey, Tom; “Wicked Problems: Structuring Social Messes with Morphological Analysis,” Swedish Morphological Society, last revised 7 November 2007.) An additional resource on wicked problems can be found at http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications07/wickedproblems.pdf

http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications07/wickedproblems.pdf

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PROCESS STEP 5: ASSESS AGAINST KEY FACTORS

51. There are multiple factors that a department, agency, or office should assess against when determining how best to develop, and contribute to, a multiagency assessment and planning process. Determining that there is, in fact, an ability to influence a particular sector, society, country or region is a critical element. This includes understanding the financial, human, and political resources available. The assessment should weigh the current and expected national interest in planning for, and then responding to, an area or country in pre-conflict conditions. The internal policies or circumstances of each department, agency or office may impact the ability of that entity to respond due to factors such as the legislated authorities vested in that office, or in the funding streams appropriated to it. It is highly beneficial for any actor in a pre- or post-conflict environment to honestly assess the unique capability that it brings to bear and any restrictions on their capacity to act. Further, the willingness of actors to discuss, frankly, those capabilities and restrictions with other actors in a multiagency forum facilitates both a clear understanding of what capabilities and capacity exists, and complementary planning for the most effective and efficient use of limited resources.

52. In addition, the host society and host nation should not be assumed to be a homogenous entity. The host opinions are central to a comprehensive assessment of conditions on the ground and host views are vital to the success of any conflict prevention plan. It is important to be aware of, and incorporate, local contextual knowledge and understanding into any assessment and planning efforts in conflict prevention and management. Power dynamics in the host government and society, as well as between the intervening and host actors are important to understand when incorporating local information and views. Engagement across host governments, other political actors, civil society and the general population is required for a comprehensive picture of a host perspective, and critically important in understanding both the factors and dynamics that destabilise the environment as well as those that have the capacity to produce or support stability. An accurate assessment of what is often described as the “human terrain” in a potential target area, country or region will impact the level and focus of investment in longer-term, sometimes hard-to-define conflict prevention and management objectives.


53. In general terms, assessments should include local, country, and regional levels of analysis in order to account for actors and activities taking place further afield than affect the environment in focus. Assessment should be both contextual and thematic in focus areas, such as incorporating the impact of transnational crime, terrorism, and trafficking. The traditional conception of the nation-state and the structural design and culture of governments to operate within those confines constrain effective engagement on issues that cross borders and involve significant non-government actors. This is particularly concerning in light of the prevalence of terrorists and criminals operating across national borders, as well as the rising influence of non-state actors within nations. National borders of fragile and unstable states tend to be sparsely populated, unmonitored by law enforcement, far from the bases of foreign intelligence actors, and provide opportune access to multiple markets, thus making them favoured by those with insalubrious intent.9

54. According to a number of experienced practitioners, assessments should be led by those with a strong multidisciplinary background, and supported by experts (or subject matter experts, to include so-called conflict specialists). Those with the multi-disciplinary background are sometimes referred to as “generalists” who have a broad understanding of the context or area being evaluated, but are not specific experts in any one field. Civilian participants should be experienced in working in unstable environments in the field, and with marginally or non-functioning bureaucracies. Each office, agency, or department has its own interests, experts, and funding pools, and in order for an assessment report to be actionable, it requires the full support of its host office. If feasible, each office may decide to gather the information in the manner it sees fit in the field, and then participate in the “cross-walk” of assessment findings at headquarters. An alternative might be a multiagency assessment team conducting in-country assessment and engagement, supported by conflict specialists.

9 The U.S. Government’s Regional Strategic Initiative was an attempt at overcoming the structural constraints to effective management of cross-border problems. It was under-pinned by principles that more agencies are not necessarily better. A shared diagnosis of the problem is highlighted as the most useful starting point for multiagency activities. It argues that “host” nations fare better when dealing with actors unified in their analysis of the issues. In this initiative, the U.S. Embassy hosts representatives of relevant government agencies from the countries affected by the cross border activity. The first set of meetings consists of agency briefings leading to the development of a shared diagnosis of the problem, the identification of programs and needs, and negotiations to decide who will be responsible for what action. Subsequent to the meeting one report (in cable form) agreed to by all the agencies party to the meeting is sent back to Washington with joint action recommendations. If Phase One is successful, the group meet again, typically a few months later, to again diagnose the problem and identify priorities. Representatives of the countries affected by the cross-border activity are invited to the table in order to join the process of dividing responsibilities. A third phase prescribed by the initiative has seldom been undertaken but brings together the governments of affected nations at a high level to work through a similar process.

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PROCESS STEP 6: ADVISE GOVERNMENT AND REQUEST GUIDANCE

55. While it may seem self-evident that there would need to be a particular decision point in an assessment and planning process, given the concern noted by many during the project that there are insufficient or nebulous decision points in when and how to plan in the multiagency context, it is important to highlight where one is most usefully situated. A number of participants noted that while there is an overall perspective that conflict prevention (and stability more inherently) is important as a part of an overall foreign policy goal, there are few mechanisms or structures through which senior level leadership can or do specifically demand increased investment in this area. This decision point is necessary so that the diverse multiagency actors are vested in the outcomes of planning, and are also held accountable to the overall success of the eventual plan. Recommendations from one area of government to senior decision makers, be they on the policy side such as the National Security Council or from external lobbyists to the Congress in the U.S. context, may prompt further study and analysis before planning is made a multiagency priority. This is conveyed by the link back to the “Promote Multiagency Input to National Intelligence Assessment Priorities” step of the process.

56. Assessment and planning should not be construed as sequential processes. Instead, it is an iterative process, with information feeding back and forth between processes. A holistic concept for planning begins with assessment, ideally with the relevant, action-oriented stakeholders involved throughout the process, and it extends through to review and evaluation. There are three areas in the process model that focus predominantly on planning: developing the multiagency plan and establishing a standing coordination mechanism; facilitating single agency plans to support the multiagency one; and instituting a perpetual monitoring, evaluation and review process. The following three sections discuss this in more detail.

PROCESS STEP 7A: DEVELOP MULTIAGENCY PLAN AND ESTABLISH COORDINATION

57. A standing coordination mechanism for evaluating conflict related activities occurs at multiple levels within the U.S. Government. Often, when an expected crisis environment begins to deteriorate, increasingly senior levels of the government bureaucracy are brought in, culminating with a Deputies Committee (Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense, for example) meeting regularly at the National Security Council level. It is important to establish parameters such as the appropriate roles and responsibilities of participants and the venue and frequency of meetings to effectively coordinate the many different actors in the chaos of an escalating conflict situation. One useful coordination mechanism example is a joint leadership effort, such as an empowered Special/High Representative focused on political issues, a Pro Consul with responsibility for overall coordination of all civilian and military activities in a particular country or area of responsibility, with a senior in-country military commander reporting to the Pro Consul. These processes and mechanisms may vary, or require modification, from case to case.


58. The relatively small size of the multiagency community in Australia means personnel are reasonably likely to interact repeatedly with other agencies (and, in many cases, the same people) over the years, building relationships and mutual understanding of roles, working cultures, and capabilities. The close physical proximity of some agencies enables much informal communication and chance meetings that further enhance cooperation. On the other hand the small size of Australian bureaucracies is an oft-cited reason for being unable to provide or spare personnel for participation in and contributions to multiagency collaborative forums, particularly those with a more deliberate, conflict prevention rather than conflict response focus. Certainly the strength of the Australian arrangement is derived from the network of personal relationships and hence is vulnerable to the loss of any one of those critical relationships.

59. Additionally, there are relatively few individuals who work in the multiagency sphere on a regular basis. Therefore when agencies are engaged in multiagency interventions in a conflict situation a great number of staff members tasked with working on a response effort are often much less familiar with other agencies roles, responsibilities, programming and funding mechanisms, etc. At a higher level, these interactions in formal mechanisms such as Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Forces (IDETFs) primarily serve as opportunities for sharing information and, to a lesser extent, coordinating activities of separate agencies. They are not tasked with or used for development of an overarching multiagency plan or planning guidance. Furthermore, such mechanisms are currently activated in response to a crisis, not to consider conflict prevention.

PROCESS STEP 7B: SINGLE AGENCIES DEVELOP PLANNING TO PLUG INTO/SUPPORT THE MULTIAGENCY PLAN

60. At the same time that the overarching multiagency plan is developed and socialised, each of the relevant departments, agencies, and offices will also need to develop detailed plans to enact their contributions to the multiagency effort. These would be directly in support of the broader planning process, but may also include particular elements that are unique to that agency. There may be funding ramifications across different funding lines that require modifications at a variety of levels and impact multiple agencies. In the U.S. context, these would then involve the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In Australia the Treasury and Department of Finance and Administration play a vital role in costing and funding for contingencies and could conceivably contribute to a stronger basis for costing and funding multiagency endeavours. This starting point for any plan in determining the institutional baseline of each contributing actor is critical.

61. Defining the essential core functions of each agency and office is crucial so that all actors are aware of what others are bringing to the negotiation and response table. While there may be a lot of representatives at the planning table, it should be acknowledged that not every agency can or should make the same level of contribution. A well-documented best practice in planning indicates that any conflict prevention or mitigation plan should be informed by, and where appropriate link to, existing planning processes such as U.S. Department of Defense,

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Combatant Command-led theatre campaign planning, Department of State Mission Strategic Resource Plans etc. In an Australian context multiagency conflict prevention plans should be informed by AusAID Country Strategies & Plans, DFAT engagement priorities, Defence International Engagement Programs and operational engagements and other Australian Government agency programs that have an international engagement element. It should be noted that the relationship between a multiagency and individual agency plan is a two-way interaction, with multiagency efforts likely resulting in efficiency and effectiveness dividends at the agency level, while individual agency specialisation and focus can provide the necessary nuance and detail to overarching multiagency approaches.

PROCESS STEP 8: EVALUATE AND REVIEW

62. Planning is a constantly evolving process across all levels of a response. The commitment to, and mechanism for, continual monitoring, evaluation and review should be built into the process. More importantly, the learning from the evaluation should be deliberately indoctrinated and internalised where relevant in order to improve the process for future iterations. Depending on the circumstance, it may be more effective to develop plans that propose scalable interventions, and be broadly defined to allow for minor and, when needed, major revision in reaction to frequently changing on-the-ground dynamics. What is valid on day one of an assessment in a pre-conflict, post-conflict or transitional environment will not be valid on day sixty.

63. Comprehensive planning to simultaneously support foreign policy and foreign aid objectives, military-to-military security sector assistance (SSA), justice, rule of law and policing assistance and other security and governance engagement , is a distinctly complex and difficult task. Best practice indicates that it is important to understand these broader strategies and their specific objectives in order to design a conflict prevention and management plan that stands in complement rather than competition to these other plans.


THE ROLE OF CULTURE

64. The role of “culture” arose as a critical, central point to any discussion regarding conflict prevention. The activities that encompass conflict prevention as a discipline, as well as its methods, motivations, and effectiveness measures, are not strongly defined and are therefore susceptible to ongoing change and interpretation. In addition to lacking a substantial, theoretical and policy grounding, conflict prevention sits in an institutional grey area, with no widely understood structural home (foreign affairs versus development versus civil-military stability operations). As a result, the impact of individual and organisational cultures greatly (and possibly, disproportionately) influences the interpretation of appropriate conflict assessment and planning, as well as the metrics to build accountability into these processes.

Acknowledging the Impact of National Culture

65. “Cultural baggage” gives context to common differences such as diagnosis of a problem and approaches to problem solving but is often disregarded or underestimated in the assessments and planning for external engagement. The Australian and U.S. Governments, among others, tend to assume and automatically default to creating foreign institutions broadly in their own image, assuming that Australian and U.S. normative concepts of public good, social contract, and the purpose of government are, or should be, the same in all cultures. The research affirmed that there is also no one, uniform Australian or American culture or one, homogenous Australian or U.S. Government. These terms are used for simplification purposes here in order to articulate a fundamental point.

66. A frequent American sentiment indicates support for the “quick fix” in foreign engagements, rather than long-term, institutional or structural investment. Nations (and institutions) need to be aware of what cultural baggage they bring to understand how that influences decisions, approaches, and interactions internally and with external partners. In order to do so, and to mitigate “quick fix” solutions obfuscating longer-term strategies, continuous review and evaluation of assessment, planning, and response should be built into multiagency initiatives and structures.

67. A predominantly Western or Northern perspective raised during the interview phase indicated that informal systems are perceived to be less legitimate, sophisticated, or adequate than formal structures. This attitude can lead to a disinclination to try ideas suggested by host nationals. Nevertheless, clearly the West does not have the monopoly on knowing what will work best for others, and indigenous programs may have equal possibility of having a positive impact. If the goal is ultimately for local populations to manage their internal conflict in a way that is acceptable to the donors, their ideas and methods for doing so should be heard, evaluated, and incorporated

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into plans. Even marginally effective indigenous-inspired programs can add value for both the host nation and the wider community. In addition, it can be expected that the host culture will impact to varying degrees how compatible, and likely to succeed, the systems and approaches of external actors are.

Acknowledging the Impact of Organisational Culture

68. Within governments there are unique subcultures among the military, police, diplomatic, and development areas—and each of these does not represent a homogenous group. In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature and commentary on the role of individual cultures within the multiagency government structure. Overcoming the assumptions and preconceptions of where one sits, and the impact that these have on action or inaction requires honest reflection and bureaucratic structures to support behaviour change. Even when these implicit differences are acknowledged (such as between military infantry and civil affairs officers, relief and long-term development workers, field-based and headquarters staff) incentives and disincentives need to be in place that support coordination and cooperation.

69. A culture of risk aversion permeates many bureaucracies, which limits creativity and can inhibit effectiveness in program design. The project research validated this sentiment in both the U.S. and Australian Government contexts. In order to achieve broad consensus, or at least tacit acceptance of the role of conflict prevention, it is important to incentivise working in a multiagency environment. Bureaucrats are promoted within the bureaucracy for protecting their turf and being effective advocates of their agency perspective or position, not for playing nicely in the ‘multiagency sandbox’.

70. Investments in conflict prevention will always be confined by national interests, and periodically in politically sensitive cases, motivated by the humanitarian imperative. A comprehensive focus on conflict prevention encourages a view of national interest across a longer timeframe, and thus would require significant political courage to challenge a risk-averse system that currently incentivises a much shorter-term planning time horizon.

71. The organisational culture of the host nation and host society is equally important to the potential for effective conflict prevention strategies. Ideally, the host nation’s government (and potentially non-government actors) inputs into the priorities, and the international community generally supports them. There will be circumstances, however, wherein a supposedly legitimate central government is not widely supported and there are active popular dissident factions, or where supporting the government is not in an external actor’s best interests. Though this complicates matters it does not preclude effective conflict prevention. In fact it further reinforces the notion that governments’ methods and approaches for conflict prevention need to broaden beyond government to government interaction and do more to understand how to leverage and engage local actors and capacities in civil society and the non-government sector.


72. Working with and through local capacities for peace is critical. This demands a detailed understanding of local dynamics to be able to seek the opportunities that may be present with local structures and systems, and not contribute to further instability. People will bring to bear different ethics, values, and leadership needs. Engaging with host nations and host societies requires the development of relationships across the spectrum of a multiagency and multi-actor environment. Not only is investment in the host nation and society needed in the assessment and planning of any kind of operation, but attaining local ownership is also a pre-condition for reducing or withdrawing external assistance.

Australian Culture

73. The above points regarding the impact of organisational culture are generally applicable, but there are also some differences between the Australian and U.S. organisational cultures and dynamics that need to be noted. The principle of ministerial responsibility inherent within the Australian system of government shapes the environment within which multiagency collaboration occurs. This means that individual ministers are accountable for all actions undertaken by their department and, hence there is a limitation on how much agencies can be bound by decisions taken below ministerial level.

74. Yet Australia is no stranger to the multiagency approach. There are already many areas, such as in the response to natural disasters and conceptualising contributions to peace and stabilisation operations that are conducted on a multiagency basis. This is partly due to the relatively small size of Australia’s bureaucracy, which is conducive to productive interpersonal relationships and the broad awareness among agencies of what direction other agencies are heading. However, as previously noted the lack of depth within most Australian Government bureaucracies tends to focus personnel on “core business” and limits the capacity for agencies to collaborate as a multiagency community outside of crises.

75. The Australian military has demonstrated a greater willingness than their U.S. counterparts to work under civilian direction in the operational environment. A unique example of this approach, frequently cited during the Australian-based interviews for this report, has been the Regional Security Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the case of RAMSI, direction comes not only from a civilian, but one who is also formally a representative of a multinational regional forum. This was determined as the approach in response to a unique set of demands and circumstances, which may or may not be repeated in the future when the next Special Coordinator is announced.

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Reflections from the American Perspective

U.S. Government Culture

76. Expanding further on the culture of risk aversion permeating most U.S. Government agencies, entrenched structural disincentives have led to a prevailing perspective among civilian U.S. Government personnel that they have “everything to lose and nothing to gain” from taking risks. Ambassadors are not incentivised to take bureaucratic risks often in fear of the ramifications of a negative review from the Accountability Review Board. As a system obsessed with checks and balances, mid to senior level U.S. Government personnel actions are routinely scrutinised internally by multiple oversight bodies such as the Government Accountability Office, Accountability Review Board, Special Inspectors General, and externally by savvy media. Absolute success is expected with little acceptance of nuanced “results.” A cultural shift is required within government to accept a measure of risk taking, and recognition that in complex pre-conflict and conflict environments, initial failures are not only likely, but sometimes the necessary precursors for success.

77. Creative or counterintuitive methods for designing programs are limited given budget appropriation and allocation constraints, rendering mechanisms such as multi-year contingency funding improbable in the near term. Operational risk has been routinely devolved downwards. Often, decisive responsibility for taking chances rests on individuals on the front line, who are ironically often those who have the most to lose professionally and personally from taking chances. The effect of this institutional reluctance to take risks is a continuation of the status quo, even if that means that mediocre, possibly wasteful and occasionally counter-productive programs endure.

78. During candid reflection at the DC Concept Validation Workshop, U.S. Government civilians noted that, unlike DOD, civilians typically do not see themselves bound, or constrained, by defined plans. Civilian agencies make plans but do not always feel obligated to follow them. Furthermore, they often note that it is important to constantly question plans that have been made when situations change. Historical reflection notes that once a crisis occurs, often plans are discarded and new ones devised by whoever is leading the effort in situ. However, once changes to plans are put in place, DOD is often better equipped than civilian agencies to adapt to those changes.

79. For the U.S. Government, investment in long-term conflict prevention and management would require a fundamental paradigm shift in how it typically perceives its role oversees. There remains in government the view that the U.S. should be ready and willing to intervene and assist overseas in nearly every circumstance with diplomacy, money, and troops, and particularly those that flash across international global media. However, the long timeframes and large number of exogenous factors at play mean that it is difficult to identify tangible outcomes from conflict prevention activities. This is a major factor preventing greater funding for conflict prevention.


80. The project research indicated that a “forward” or field-based assessment, planning, and coordination process when working in either a multiagency and/or a civil-military context proved more effective in reaching the strategic and operational goals outlined in the project implementation plans than a headquarters-driven process. In addition, the earlier civilians are involved in military planning improves the odds of having effective non-military engagement and commitment later on.

U.S. Multiagency Dynamics

81. The diverse and sometimes conflicting cultures of U.S. Government agencies mean efforts for personnel within those agencies to work together are inherently challenging, but not necessarily incompatible. As evidenced in everything from resource allocation to defining national security objectives, each actor does not have an equal voice in the multiagency environment.

82. The military is effective at planning for a military engagement, when it has near full control of almost all aspects of a situation. In contrast, the military has not proven successful in planning for, and implementing, effective conflict prevention engagement such as in state-building. In Stability Operations which are akin to conflict prevention activities, there is some doctrine and operational experience but their evaluation is limited. The recent institution of Theater Campaign Plans at U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands seeks to increase the emphasis on the achievement of long-term stability, including through increased interaction with other agencies. The effectiveness of implementation of these structures, however, has been mixed.

83. The U.S. Department of Defense is a cohesive and highly structured organisation that, by necessity, has a rigid chain of command. As has been expanded upon extensively in other literature, this rigidity can make it difficult for the U.S. military to work with and in different cultural environments.

84. In the U.S. the lack of coherent whole-of-government planning reflects a tendency in the Government to constantly be in “crisis response mode” and incrementally develop policy rather than proactively addressing issues. In addition, the absence of critical reviews of policies means there is little opportunity to identify gaps and understand how divergent policies might impact one another—or how innovations in one area could diffuse elsewhere.

85. The National Security Council is considered by many to be the ideal coordination point for U.S. multiagency efforts because of its unrivalled authority and effectiveness in getting things done politically and strategically. However in reality the NSC is persistently focusing on the latest issue and lacks the capacity to do complex strategic or operational planning, a challenge intensified by the tendency for NSC staff to be lacking in experience and often motivated by political agendas.

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86. The “whole of government” approach currently only happens in the immediate and medium term. However, agencies such as State Department, often USAID, and certainly DOD, have long-standing relationships and ongoing programs in nations where a conflict prevention effort is needed. The real imperative for these actors to come together to act is generally driven by conflict or crisis however, and is generally characterised as an entirely different form and structure of intervention. After an initial investment in conflict resolution and management, USAID for long-term economic development, the State Department, for ongoing diplomatic engagement, and DOD for military capacity building and engagement will resume separate and largely unsynchronised programs and plans. Any attempts at developing a consensus, or mutually beneficial focus on conflict prevention and management should be pragmatic and take into consideration the history and the resiliency of surviving structures.

87. For example, the U.S. Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) model of being “interagency in a box” was, not surprisingly, rejected by incumbent regional bureaus who perceived that S/CRS was duplicating existing skills already present without the Department of State and USAID structures. Building anything new runs the risk of being bureaucratically threatening or disempowering to existing structures. In another, equally detrimental tactic, if a designated agency on conflict prevention is created, other agencies could react by deferring responsibility to that agency entirely rather than analysing the skills they each bring to bear in conflict prevention, or aligning conflict prevention with overall agency or organisation strategies.

88. In the civilian domain, the functional lines of government will default to reporting up their respective chains of command, even if individuals are seconded or assigned to an interagency assessment, planning, or response team. This is in contrast to the military where being seconded to augment a joint mission frequently occurs and is accepted. In order for robust multiagency assessment and planning to occur, these unique approaches should be acknowledged and managed—either pragmatically in that all actors support a joint goal or in that individual lines of government define goals that can be reinforced among all lines.

89. While the “big thinkers” in a particular field, such as conflict studies, are important, it is also important to find the “good enough” solutions that work across and within extant structures and the target host nation, and within the broader international community.

The Role of External Actors

Multinational Actors

90. Given the scope of the project, exploration into the role of other multinational actors was relatively limited. However, project interviewees, particularly those that have spent substantial time in the field, noted the importance of not making the assumption that an external actor


is the only, or primary, effective actor when planning for conflict prevention and planning. The role of international, regional multinational and international and indigenous non-governmental organisations, community based organisations, and other civil society, grass-roots entities can be critical in the sustainability of all planned activities, be they externally or internally initiated.

91. There are different configurations of entities that are present within the society facing conflict and from the outside that play a role in conflict prevention. These include governments and non-state actors including international organisations such as the United Nations, the World Bank Group, and the International Monetary Fund. Non-governmental organisations in humanitarian response and advocacy, universities, independent foundations, and individuals can also be involved in conflict prevention. Each entity brings a particular set of benefits and disadvantages to preventing conflict, depending on the context and other factors working together or in opposition.

92. Regional economic and political organisations also play a role in conflict prevention. These include the African Union, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Asia Development Bank, among others. Any government multiagency conflict prevention plan would benefit from discovering and acknowledging the aims and impact of these organisations where they are relevant to the context being analysed.

United Nations Culture

93. The United Nations plays a unique role in conflict prevention and management overseas as compared to the initiatives of individual governments. Often the UN Country Team on the ground is well versed in the local and regional dynamics that contribute to the escalation of violence. The Resident Representative /Humanitarian Coordinator should be aware of the overall dynamics at play, and play a coordinating role among the many UN agencies and offices in country, while maintaining close contact with other international, non-governmental, civil society, and governmental actors. The UN may in some scenarios be the best equipped to lead in the analysis of a conflict environment, and conflict prevention measures—but may not in others.

94. According to a number of interviewees, the structure and nature of the UN system unfortunately constrains the Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s ability to effectively plan for conflict prevention and management. Effective, integrated, and strategic planning requires longer timelines than are usual in the establishment of peacekeeping operations. The stove-piped nature of the United Nations system presents similar challenges to collaboration and cooperation that governments face.

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95. Political sensitivities of member countries may limit the UN’s ability to plan effectively, particularly should national actors object to certain contingencies for which the UN wants to plan. However, the United Nations is a representative of the international community, and possesses tools such as leveraging sanctions and asserting Security Council resolutions to support international action. As an entity, it is a critical player in conflict prevention and management and can often provide nearly universally accepted legitimacy to the actions of individual states.

96. The peace-keeping and peace-building communities play a unique role in conflict prevention and in state-building, wherein a variety of tools and structures support these aims. UN Special Envoys, should be used carefully, but also can play a pivotal role in supporting conflict prevention initiatives, working either in a lead or a supporting role to country-led activities.

97. The rigidity of the World Bank’s timelines and limited interaction between peacekeeping personnel, World Bank, and Country Teams compound the challenges of developing and implementing a comprehensive approach.

WORLD BANK

98. The World Bank plays a dynamic role in conflict prevention through support to fragile and conflict-affected countries. These activities include coordinating donor contributions and managing multi-donor trust funds (such as in Afghanistan and Sudan), and supporting community development, social services, public administration, education and other initiatives. The World Bank has called for a paradigm shift in how the broader, international development community works in fragile and conflict-affected environments given the Bank’s conclusion that violence and related conflict cannot be solved by “short-term or partial solutions in the absence of institutions that provide people with security, justice, and jobs.”10

99. The World Bank has researched the fundamental differences between violent, fragile environments as compared to those that are stable and developing, and has recommended different approaches to supporting institutional transformation and promoting good governance in each. One of the tenets articulated by the World Development Report 2011 supports one of the main findings in this small study; that “in fragile transitions or situations of rising risk, successful reforms have […] taken time [and] [t]he task of transforming institutions and governance is slow. Historically, no country has transformed its institutions in less than a generation, with reforms taking from 15 to 30 years.” In brief, the World Bank links the crucial importance of short-term confidence building activities to this long-term change through bottom-up state-society relations in insecure areas, security and justice reform programs that link policing with civilian justice, basic job creation, the pivotal involvement of women, and anti-corruption efforts. These are along a track of refocusing assistance on confidence building through a prevention lends. In addition, reforming of international agency involvement, regional response, and renewing cooperation among lower, middle, and higher income countries are central recommendations.

10 World Development Report 2011


COMPLEMENTARY PROJECT FINDINGS

100. During the project, three subject areas arose that have played a role in the development of the model described herein, and warrant further discussion in order to capture the best practices gathered during the discussion of these three themes.

Strong Institutional Leadership

101. A best practice throughout the project research that had a positive impact on assessment and planning, not only for conflict prevention but from the perspective of any initiative, was the central importance of strong institutional leadership. In the U.S. context, this was presented in examples from both Washington and field contexts wherein the commitment and focus of key individuals directly affected the multiagency “buy-in” to a particular process or response. A multiagency group works well together when there is strong and deliberate political leadership and interest in a particular end-state, such as reportedly in the U.S. Government community in response to the Haiti Earthquake in January 2010, or in response to violence in Kyrgyzstan.

102. Within the U.S. Government there are different leadership training models. The particular commitment and training of U.S. Military personnel has been very effective in building a cadre of strong leaders whose strong willed resolution in crisis situations is exceptional. Civilian counterparts rarely have exposure to professional development of leadership skills. One recommendation from project participants focused around the need to develop the leadership skills in both the civilian and military spheres to respond to the modern challenges facing all actors in the foreign affairs arena, including diplomacy, international development, and foreign military deployments in support of a variety of missions but in particular, stabilisation and reconstruction activities and humanitarian assistance. The opportunities for cross-training are few and far between. The confidence to work well together comes with practice.

103. One entirely new structural solution proposed by U.S. stakeholders during the project was presented by the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR): the creation of a U.S. Office for Contingency Operations (USOCO). A SIGIR lessons learned report from February 2010 (Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations) recommended the establishment of this new entity, which would be responsible for the management of all aspects of U.S. stabilisation and reconstruction operations. The planning, staffing, funding, execution and accountability measures would be housed in this office. The idea for USOCO was presented at the U.S. validation workshop,

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sparking lively discussion among participants weighing both the benefits and disadvantages of a new, stand-alone structure. The mere suggestion for a radical new coordination office highlights the fragmented nature of how the multiagency environment in the U.S. context in these activities is currently managed.

Conflict Prevention Funding

104. Throughout the project, participants in the workshops and in interviews lamented the challenge of insufficient funding in government for conflict prevention related activities. However, the refrain of “insufficient resources” is one heard frequently throughout government circles. While the topic of a pooled fund for contingency planning and conflict prevention was frequently raised and differing opinions presented, arguments for and against the creation of a pooled fund in the U.S. context were mixed, and no consensus opinion emerged. In contrast, the June validation workshop in Canberra resulted in a clear finding that a specific pooled fund is not feasible or recommended in the current Australian government context. The United Kingdom has put in place a Conflict Prevention Pool allocating former annual funding to longer-term commitments in recognition of the longer-term nature of conflict prevention and other confidence-building work, with mixed results.

105. A frequent chorus during the project discussions noted that longer-term (3-5year) mandates and funding perspectives would enable more appropriate planning for conflict prevention and more effective execution of planned activities. At present, funding cycles are predominantly one year. A longer time frame for project planning supported by secure funding could result in a more nuanced understanding of the ever-changing dynamics in a host society, and plans could adapt over time as necessary. Many project participants cited the need for a medium to long term perspective in order to gather a “return” on the investment. Personnel with a predominant field focus seemed better able to grasp the challenge of trying to reach any kind of preventative “success” in a short time frame, and raised concerns with “the politicians” focus on only short term, quick impact type project funding. Funding of more than one year, with flexibility to manage funds within a specified limit to change course or alter project objectives during that timeframe due to on-the-ground realities, would be a best practice recommendation of nearly all of the project participants.

106. Programs that are funded for time frames of several years provide stability that is crucial for effective conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. The ten year funding the U.S. Congress guaranteed for Plan Colombia is an example of this. Specific activities within the plan can change over time to meet changing circumstances without the pressure of them having to deliver immediate results in order to secure future programs. Funds that are fungible are an important resource for agencies operating in unstable or conflict-affected environments, necessarily contexts where needs, priorities, and resources can change far more often and quickly


than funding bodies can respond. In an environment where multiple sources of funding are coming in for numerous projects, while challenging, ideally a capable local official such as a District Governor or Minister should act as a single coordinator of all foreign aid in order to de-conflict project plans and ensure as much as possible local involvement.

107. Confidence building is a long-term goal at the state-to-state, the state-to-community and the community-to-community levels. Effective investment in confidence building measures at the host country level are long term initiatives that would require a shift in the mindset of the U.S. multiagency to support over multiple planning/budget cycles, according to U.S. based government personnel.

Deployable Government Civilian Capacity

108. The project commenced on the heels of the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) process, initiated by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The implementation phase of the QDDR has been ongoing during the project timeframe. As such, the particular questions surrounding the evolving role for conflict prevention by U.S. Government organisations such as the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (State/CRS) and USAID’s Office of Conflict Mitigation and Management and Office of Transition Initiatives have been at the fore. Equally relevant, in the Australian context, the newly conceived Australian Civilian Corps has only recently been developed and utilised.

109. The appropriate scope, training, and missions for a deployable government civilian capacity were some of the most heated discussions during the project workshops. One frequent best practice highlighted by experienced civilian diplomats was to avoid creating civilian capacities in the model of the military. There are differences that need to be taken into account when creating these capabilities, not least of which is the disparity in level of resources allocated to non-military departments and agencies. Even with extensive training on the civilian side, such as the State/ CRS level 1 planners and other extensive training programs for the Civilian Response Corps at State and the Office of Civilian Response at USAID, it cannot compare to the institutionalised training culture that is in the military community.

110. In addition, one recommendation from U.S. Government interviewees to other nations or organisations planning to build this capacity would be to be explicit about the objectives and missions for the civilian response corps before building it. The U.S. civilian response corps example has shown that it is inappropriate to expect to have the cadre of all specialised knowledge maintained for contingency operations. Attempting to find, train, and maintain the requisite numbers of specialists in this regard is cost-heavy and unsustainable. Instead, a reserve corps-type of structure was widely recommended, using the foreign, civil, and contracted staff within your current government structures that engage overseas for deployment. It would be

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more appropriate to augment the numbers of these staff to improve conflict management overseas, rather than creating a stand-alone deployable group. Former and retired government personnel could be one avenue to hire from.

111. One criticism from existing response corps deployments raised by experienced government field personnel focused on the lack of appropriate knowledge about their agencies, missions, or tasks that they found in rapidly deployed, predominantly short-term contracted staff. It is important not only to verify the skill sets of those you deploy, and ensure an appropriate level of experience, but to also require that response staff have incorporated an understanding of the culture and institution of their deploying agency and government as well as technical expertise needed in theatre.

112. A number of participants highlighted the importance of thinking through whether the civilian government deployment capacity will be necessary in, as an example, 10 or 20 years’ time. And if the recommendation is made to create or expand this cadre, a deliberate analysis should be done to determine how it would be maintained. Participants cautioned that creating a temporary organisation is setting it up for failure, given that it risks a lack of strong and continuous leadership and will become a target for budget cuts. Representatives from USAID, the Department of State, and the UN noted their struggles with this issue.

113. There have been a number of different models and structures suggested at length in other literature on the topic of civilian deployments. The experimentation of different approaches continues and should be encouraged, given the different contexts and demands where conflict assessment and planning activities would be expected to occur.

114. As noted above regarding the weight that every actor brings to the multiagency table, regardless of mission, if there are American troops deployed, the military will be in control of their troops even if DOD is in a supporting role to a higher mission. Finding and working through appropriate multiagency coordination mechanisms holds greater importance, and is increasingly challenging, when the number of multiagency and international representatives multiplies.

115. A major constraint to the effectiveness of deployed civilians is the institutional reluctance towards risk-tasking that often curtails their movement to the compounds and otherwise “secure” location in a foreign conflict or pre-conflict environment. This security posture, while understandable, compromises their ability to appropriately engage in their projects and with host communities, and can further complicate civil-military relations.


CONCLUSIONS

116. Creating a comprehensive, multi-agency process for assessment and planning in conflict prevention and management is a challenge for any bureaucratic system focused on improving its response to external violence. The model presented herein is one attempt to advance the dialogue necessary in order to raise the profile of the importance of conflict prevention. It serves as a rudimentary road map for assessment and planning, primarily focused on the internal processes of established governments.

117. The project research highlighted the fact that a compelling and comprehensive argument had yet to be effectively articulated for long-term investment in conflict prevention, or at least one that effectively addressed the real and difficult political, cultural and structural challenges to implementing a conflict prevention approach.

118. The project team, in analysing current literature and through more than 30 interviews and in 3 workshops, determined that the role of culture at the national and organisational levels has a substantial impact on why, when and how an organisation will decide to focus on preventing (or responding to) violence. Therefore, it is critical for stakeholders to acknowledge and deconstruct the assumptions that they bring into efforts to prevent conflict overseas.

119. The host society, which encompasses more than only the host nation government, plays a primary role in assessing and planning for conflict prevention activities. Local and regional initiatives in conflict prevention should be sought and then inform any assessment or planning undertaken by external actors. Engagement in the host society is also critical to understanding the dynamics underpinning conflict.

120. The process for planning for conflict prevention matters as much as the plan itself. Building stakeholder confidence and coming to a common diagnosis of the problems being faced and ensuring that multiple actors are given the opportunity to inform both the process and the plan are important factors. The rapidly changing environment present in fragile states and areas affected by violence demands a constant motivation for, and process to, review and evaluate both the plans and activities. Without a commitment to this iterative process, a multiagency plan will rapidly become obsolete.

121. The model presented herein presents one effort in practical thinking around the broad and complex subject area that is multiagency conflict prevention assessment and planning. Research and testing of practical models, dependent on the particular context and conditions facing conflict-prone locations, is an ongoing effort that would benefit from clear strategic direction, cultural awareness, and patience.

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122. The process of developing this model identified some critical characteristics of conflict prevention and multiagency collaboration. First and foremost, “Conflict prevention” is complex and erroneously implies that conflict can—and should—be prevented in all circumstances. Secondly, conflict prevention is “an investment, not a purchase.” There is no cohesive multiagency approach to conflict prevention despite the broad recognition that international development and diplomacy, including capability building initiatives, education, governance and rule of law programs and stabilisation activities can be considered conflict prevention tools. Conflict prevention must be promoted as a foreign policy imperative, including explicit recognition of conflict prevention objectives.

123. It is clear that conflict can best be prevented or mitigated through a multi-pronged, multiagency approach. Multiagency conflict prevention begins with a shared diagnosis of the situation. Moreover, a multiagency approach should build on existing organisational structures that have been vetted and are in place, even when a high-profile crisis hits. The full range of capabilities across government should be evaluated in each context for appropriateness and potential effectiveness in an unstable environment. The multiagency approach works best when there is strong and deliberate political leadership and interest in a particular end-state.

124. The multiagency approach is already partly utilised in Australia, but needs improvement. Multiagency collaboration should be expanded, experimented with and critiqued.


ANNEX A: LITERATURE REVIEWED

Organisation Date of Publication Title

World Bank April 2011 World Development Report 2011

U.S. Department of State

December 2010

Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power

NATO December 2010

Built on Shaky Ground: The Comprehensive Approach in Practice

U.K. Stabilisation Unit November 2010

Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (Joint Doctrine Publication JDP3-40)

U.K. Stabilisation Unit November 2010

Responding to Stabilisation Challenges in Hostile and Insecure Environments: Lessons Identified by UKSU

APCMCOE November 2010

Strengthening Australia’s Conflict and Disaster Management Overseas

RAND September 2010

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers—Counterinsurgency Case Studies

RAND September 2010

Victory Has a Thousand Fathers—Sources of Success

U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP)

July 2010 Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments: Metrics Framework

U.S. Government, GAO

June 2010 Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration

U.K. Department for International Development (DFID)

March 2010 Analysing Conflict and Fragility (Building Peaceful States and Societies DFID Guides A-I)

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U.K. Stabilisation Unit December 2009

Planning for Stablisation—Structures and Processes

USIP/ U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stabilization Institute (PKSOI)

November 2009

Guiding Principles for Stabilisation and Reconstruction

Government of Australia

December 2008

Australia’s National Security Statement

UK Stabilisation Unit November 2008

Approach to Stabilisation

U.S. Department of Army

October 2008

Stability Operations (FM3-07)

Strategic Studies Institute, Dr. W.J. Olson

2008 Interagency Coordination: the Normal Accident or the Essence of Indecision?

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), U.S. Department of State

2008 Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)

United Nations 2008 Mission Start-Up Field Guide for Senior Mission Managers of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

2007 Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations

U.S. Department of Army

2006 Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24)



International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

2006 Effective Conflict Analysis Exercises

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)

2006 Manual for Conflict Analysis

Fund For Peace 2006 Conflict Assessment Manual

S/CRS 2005 Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix

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ANNEX B: ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED

Australian Government

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)

Australian Army Headquarters, Department of Defence

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Headquarters Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, Australian Army

Headquarters Joint Operations Command, Australian Department of Defence

Humanitarian and Peace Building Branch, AusAID

International Deployable Group, Australian Federal Police

Military Strategic Commitments Branch, Australian Department of Defence

Military Strategy & Future Warfighting, Military Strategy Branch, Australian Department of Defence

Parliament of Australia

Strategic Issues and Intelligence Branch, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

United States Government

Army Policy Plans and Strategy, HQ Department of the Army, U.S. Department of Defense

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development

Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning, U.S. Agency for International Development

Center for Complex Operations, National Defense University


Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace

Office of Civilian Response, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development

Office of Program, Policy and Management, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development

Office of the Administrator, and Office of Afghanistan & Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)

U.S. Institute of Peace

United Nations

Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations

Non-Governmental Organisations

Caerus Associates

Center for the Study of Threat Convergence, Fund for Peace

Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries, World Bank

Future of Peace Operations Program, The Stimson Center

IDS International

Institute for State Effectiveness

World Bank

Other

Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Centre (JCDEC), Swedish Armed Forces

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ANNEX C: WORKSHOP SUMMARIES

C.1. Concept Development Workshop, Washington, D.C.

Introduction

On 23rd May 2011, Noetic convened the first of three workshops as part of a project to develop a model for multiagency assessment and planning for Conflict Prevention and Management for the Australian Government. Sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, the project seeks to identify best practices of governments and other actors engaged in unstable and conflict environments worldwide in order to improve Australia’s effectiveness in attempting to prevent violent conflict overseas.

This summary note captures the key strategic and operational findings from the workshop.

Project Design

The initial phase of the project reviewed select contemporary doctrine, frameworks and guidance from a variety of international governments and non-governmental sources. The desktop research has been enriched by more than a dozen interviews with senior policymakers and practitioners in the U.S. and Australia.

The Concept Development workshop brought together eight experts to define the scope and explore the critical elements of a multiagency model. A facilitated discussion approach under Chatham House Rule was used to address strategic and operational considerations for engaging and operating in a conflict environment. Agencies represented include the Center for Complex Operations, the U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (Conflict Prevention and Planning portfolios attended), the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Civilian Response, The Stimson Center, the Swedish Armed Forces Concept Development and Experimentation Centre and the World Bank Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Unit.

To ensure widespread Stakeholder agreement and acceptance, the proposed main principles of the model will be presented for consideration, at high-level Concept Validation workshops on 10th June at the Embassy of Australia in Washington, D.C., and in Canberra on 21st June.


Findings—Strategic

In the U.S. context, the strategic rationale for conflict prevention and conflict management derive from innate moral interests and national security concerns. Four factors affecting decision-making are having an opportunity, the political will, and the resources to act, while being mindful to “do no harm11”. Not stopping a conflict is sometimes a pragmatic best option as evidenced in 1997 Angola and 2011 Tunisia.

The prevailing orthodoxy as suggested by current planning, assessment methods and politicians, that Conflict Prevention is a linear process characterised by short-term quick-impact interventions was emphatically challenged. Conflict prevention requires a long-term commitment over 30–40 years—it is “an investment, not a purchase”—that demands patience and consistency in order to assist in transforming the capacity of a weak or predatory state to manage its own benign social contract with its population. Such long-term state-building focuses on governance and requires: reducing pockets of exclusion; ensuring mechanisms for mediation exist and are used; investing in tertiary education and wide-ranging skills-training; while building the legitimacy of and confidence in the custodians of the state. The role of outsiders is to assist by mentoring or training rather than to impose. This approach requires significant political courage to challenge a risk-averse system that incentivises 3–5 year planning time horizons, but it is “without question” most efficient in terms of resources and realising national strategic goals.

In the U.S. the lack of whole-of-government planning reflects a tendency in the Government to constantly be in crisis response mode and incrementally developing policy rather than proactively addressing issues. The absence of critical reviews of policies means there is little opportunity to identify gaps and understand how divergent policies might impact one another.

The National Security Council is considered the ideal coordination point for U.S. multiagency efforts because of its unrivalled authority and effectiveness in getting things done politically and strategically. However in reality the NSC is persistently focusing on the latest issue and lacks the capacity to do any strategic or operational planning, a challenge intensified by the tendency for NSC staff to be lacking in experience and often with political agendas.

The inconsistent efficacy of early warning systems (acknowledging that no one “system” exists), continues to present a challenge, as evidenced by the widespread surprise at the recent “Arab Spring” unrests. The problem is compounded by the lack of or limited response to warnings due to structural, leadership, and political challenges. Open source technological innovations, particularly social media, increasingly provide early warning indicators of potential “tipping points” to violent conflict, although this has not yet been systematically analysed. Incorporating such tools into analyses of a simmering conflict’s actors, dynamics, and potential triggers for violence provides real-time enhanced situational awareness that can signal subtle changes in conditions.

Findings—Operational11 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War, (Lynne Rienner: April 1999)

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Multiagency planning and operational effectiveness are impeded by incomplete and inappropriate skill sets, and a lack of institutional incentives to work together. A failure to honestly identify the needs of an operation has meant that initiatives that have been developed do not meet the needs in reality. Value initiatives would include more civilians with planning skills, more basic negotiation and facilitation skills, and adaptive capacity across agencies; as well as non-conflict-specialists having a better understanding of the dynamics peculiar to a conflict-affected environment in order to promote more flexible, less ethnocentric “one size fits all” approaches to their work with and in host nations. A further obstacle to multiagency effectiveness is the tendency for the quality of personnel joining an operation to degrade over time as the spotlight turns to other priorities. This is compounded by a lack of systems or processes enabling true interagency interaction, and a perceived lack of institutional incentive to perform for personnel from agencies whose core function is not conflict related, since their performance has no impact on their home agency nor their own career prospects.

Discussion of a “Host Nation” was notably thin, and lacked consideration of its existing capabilities, culture, or needs, as well as failing to address how to truly engage with its institutions and people.

The cultures of nations, governments, and agencies have significant but underestimated roles in operational effectiveness. Recognising the “cultural baggage” that each country and each agency brings to an engagement provides context to such common differences as understandings of problems and approaches to problem solving. The American culture of efficiency underlies the inclination of U.S. agencies to quickly find a “fix” for problems, with little tolerance for slow-working, long-term efforts. Institutions should be aware of what cultural baggage it brings and how that influences its decisions, its approaches, and its interactions within itself and with external partners.

Next Steps

Issues raised in the workshop that merit further exploration include clarification of understandings of conflict prevention; specific triggers for multiagency conflict prevention; how to weave long-term goals through short-term perspective; and improved engaging with host nations. Given Australia’s relative size and resources in comparison to the U.S., analysis of Canada, the U.K., Sweden, and the Netherlands’ work in this area could be of value. These issues and the key findings identified will be explored in the Working Paper being developed and at the upcoming Concept Validation workshops.


C.2. Concept Validation Workshop, Washington D.C.

Introduction

On 10th June 2011, Noetic convened the second of three workshops as part of a project for the Australian Government to develop a model of multiagency assessment and planning for preventing and managing conflict. Sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, the project seeks to identify best practices of governments and other actors engaged in conflict environments worldwide in order to improve Australia’s effectiveness in preventing and mitigating the effects of violent conflict overseas.

The workshop gathered senior leaders from the U.S. Department of Defense (Deputy Assistant Secretary level), Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of the Army, British Embassy, The Center for Complex Operations, and The Stimson Center. All discussions were non-attributable.

Findings of Event

The findings of the project were validated and expanded on throughout the workshop.

INTERAGENCY

A whole of government approach to assessment and planning is often necessary given the complexity of today’s interventions. For the U.S. Government it can be done most effectively in field environments and not at headquarters. Efforts are complicated by the size of the U.S. Government, out-dated structures and tools, and different organisational cultures. However shared experiences, mutual understanding of partner agencies, and an effective relationship among agencies’ senior leaderships can mitigate those difficulties.

CULTURE

Aspects of national and organisational culture permeated every discussion of the workshop, demonstrating the extensive but rarely acknowledged influences that “cultural baggage” has on decisions about where and how to get involved in an emerging or post-conflict environment. Each agency is shaped by its own subcultures which preclude one homogenous government culture. One characteristic common to many U.S. Government agencies is an aversion to risk because of bureaucratic restrictions and disincentives.

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LEADERSHIP

Leadership and personality are considered key determinants of success. While the bureaucratic system inherently discourages risk-taking and initiative, participants agreed that a quality leader can operate effectively regardless of such constraints, provided the leader is empowered and accepted. U.S. Government leaders encounter a variety of situations in their efforts to prevent and manage conflict, therefore the leadership cadre requires a variety of individuals with different combinations of experiences, skills, traits, and leadership styles. Participants pointed to a lack of specific, operational-level guidance or defined outcomes given by politicians and a lack of experience among the National Security Staff as challenges to planning for conflict prevention and management.

HOST NATION ENGAGEMENT

Effective engagement with the host nation is considered most likely when civil society and other constituent actors are recognised, not solely the government. Other constructive efforts include involving host nation actors in assessments and plans from an early stage, recognising and accounting for the impact of domestic cultures in plans, and including representatives of the host nation (not solely diaspora nationals) on teams.

DEPLOYABLE CIVILIAN CAPACITY

Discussion about deployable civilian capacity identified a lack of clarity in what such a capacity should provide, as well as insufficient recognition of the structural adjustments necessary to accommodate it. The use of deployable civilians over recent years has advanced understanding of their utility and scope of potential roles. The concept of an auxiliary civilian capacity would benefit from further critical study.

FUNDING

Participants were unanimous that longer-term (three to five or more years) mandates and funding streams enable more appropriate planning and effective execution. They showed reserved interest in pooled funding as a possible means to improve interagency cooperation and coordination for conflict prevention.

ASSESSMENTS

Assessments are most valuable when they are conducted in the field, looking at both country and regional levels with inputs from local perspectives, informal networks such as open source social media, and the host nation private sector. Analysis of assessments can be done either in the field or at headquarters. Assessments should not provide recommendations themselves, rather they should provide situational analysis to inform the design of plans by planners and by those who will execute the plans.


PLANNING

Planning for contingencies before they become immediate problems is extremely valuable. The process of gathering a team and thinking through potential situations together is as beneficial as an eventual plan itself. Friction between civilian agencies and the military is stoked by a lack of understanding of their respective different requirements for planning and approaches to it. One participant voiced concern about the apparent lack of an agreed theory of change within the U.S. Government for conflict prevention or management to guide plans.

MEASURES AND EVALUATION

Independent evaluators, mixed-method evaluations, refutable objectives that are correlated to strategy, and analysts using technical tools were suggested as critical elements of accurate and useful evaluations. A mechanism that enables evaluations to inform plans so they can be adjusted if necessary is essential. Funds should be dedicated to such a feedback loop from the outset.

Next steps

The key findings from the workshop will be considered for their validity to the Australian multiagency environment by senior Australian Government officials and non-government stakeholders at a Concept Validation workshop in Canberra on 21st June, 2011. The challenges and best practices identified during the project will undergo final analysis by the joint U.S.- Australia project team before being submitted as a working paper to the APCMCOE.

C.3. Concept Validation Workshop, Canberra

Introduction

On 21st June 2011, Noetic convened the third and final workshop as part of a project for the Australian Government to develop a model of multiagency assessment and planning for preventing and managing conflict. Sponsored by the Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, the project seeks to identify best practices of governments and other actors engaged in conflict environments worldwide in order to improve Australia’s effectiveness in preventing and mitigating the effects of violent conflict overseas.

This half-day workshop gathered senior leaders from the Australian multiagency environment, including representatives from the Department of Defence, Australian Federal Police, AusAID, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Parliament, and the World Bank.

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Findings

ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL/CONFLICT DYNAMICS

It was agreed in principle that a shared diagnosis of arising conflict is of value across the Australian multiagency. However, this is neither easy nor practicable on all occasions. In a sense, a shared diagnosis is less applicable than a shared understanding of Australia’s strategic interests in intervening, and a checklist or trigger for action. Furthermore, shared planning is more important than a shared diagnosis of the problem. There was acknowledgement that on the whole Australia conducts assessments well during a crisis and during the course of a commitment, but that the focus needs to shift to pre-conflict scenarios.

The participants discussed at length the need for contextual/thematic analysis in addition to a country-specific and regional understanding of a developing conflict situation. There also needs to be an explicit recognition within any shared understanding of a conflict prevention intervention that the boundaries between the area of operations and the area of interest are likely to shift over time.

DEVELOPING A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC PLAN

There was broad agreement that Australia lacks mid-term planning for conflict-prevention, but this must happen in the scope of long-term strategic objectives. Moreover, Australia must always remain realistic about what its goals are, and what is feasible considering its capacity and capabilities. Many of the workshop participants had been involved in Australian operations that could be described as being based on short-term planning without strategic direction. This discussion highlighted strategic direction as a gap in current multiagency planning.

Furthermore, it was agreed that the Australian government and the multiagency environment need to broaden their understanding and acceptance of risk. Interventions are always problematic, and mistakes will always be made—especially in the initial phases of the intervention. There should be thorough assessment of possible risks, and a mature attitude toward risk. This will set the foundation for post-intervention evaluation that assesses risks taken and outcomes reached, which will allow for better preparation for future conflict prevention engagements.

WORKING EFFECTIVELY AS A MULTIAGENCY TEAM

A productive relationship with the host-nation is essential for an effective conflict-prevention operation. However, the nature of this relationship must be in line with Australia’s strategic interests, and it must be acknowledged that at different points throughout the relationship, the interests of Australia and the host nation will diverge to some degree. Furthermore, there will never be one single, homogenous ‘host nation’ representation.


It was agreed that Australia’s selection of leadership for conflict-prevention operations is a very important consideration, and that this leadership must be context-specific. It was acknowledged that the multiagency environment does not institutionally produce well-rounded individuals with the requisite broad subject-matter understanding, leadership experience, and credibility across agencies that is requisite for the role of leading a multiagency intervention.

CONFLICT PREVENTION AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Pooled multiagency funding for conflict prevention was not validated by the participants as a possibility for Australia. This is because Australia’s financial bureaucracy already allows for unexpected costs to be recovered at the end of the financial year, and agencies are reluctant to relinquish control of their own funds.

However, there was some agreement that pooled resource for conflict prevention assessment and intervention might be a more cost-effective and overall efficient use of assets.

w w w . c i v m i l c o e . g o v . a u

Multiagency Assessment and Planning: A Concept for Conflict Prevention

Technology

concept of conflict

conflict prevention

prevention funding

role of culture

australian culture

impact of national culture

practices model

planning process