THE REPUTATION OF ISAIAH T. MONTGOMERY: An Exploratory Paper on Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Black Leaders’ Critiques of What Montgomery Did Matthew Holden, Jr. † Presented to Round Table: “Political Strategies Under Extreme Adversity: Joining History and Political Science in the Evaluation of Isaiah T. Montgomery,” National Conference of Black Political Scientists, March 18, 2016 The Reputation of Isaiah T. Montgomery and the General Problem of Reputation In this brief paper, I will mainly deal with Isaiah T. Montgomery (1847-1924), the sole African American delegate in the 1890 Constitutional Convention. Montgomery has been put in the position of epitomizing the 1890 Mississippi Constitution, while the 1890 Constitution is used to besmirch his name. The severe criticism—besmirchment—has grown severe from 1890 until now. Political scientists, in the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, may well be members of any racial group, not merely African American. ‡ But they are likely to have a † Matthew Holden, Jr., President, Isaiah T. Montgomery Studies Project. ([email protected].) This paper is adapted from a presentation made in cooperation with the 47 th Annual Meeting, National Conference of Black Political Scientists, on March 18, 2016 in the House of Representatives Chamber, Old Capitol Museum, Jackson, MS USA. Author’s hard copy mail contact: P. O. Box 14088, LeFleur Station, Jackson, MS USA 39236-4088. ‡
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THE REPUTATION OF ISAIAH T. MONTGOMERY:An Exploratory Paper on Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century
Black Leaders’ Critiques of What Montgomery Did
Matthew Holden, Jr. †
Presented to Round Table: “Political Strategies Under Extreme Adversity: Joining History and Political Science in the
Evaluation of Isaiah T. Montgomery,” National Conference of Black Political Scientists, March 18, 2016
The Reputation of Isaiah T. Montgomery and the General Problem of Reputation
In this brief paper, I will mainly deal with Isaiah T.
Montgomery (1847-1924), the sole African American delegate in the
1890 Constitutional Convention. Montgomery has been put in the
position of epitomizing the 1890 Mississippi Constitution, while
the 1890 Constitution is used to besmirch his name. The severe
criticism—besmirchment—has grown severe from 1890 until now.
Political scientists, in the National Conference of Black
Political Scientists, may well be members of any racial group,
not merely African American.‡ But they are likely to have a
strong interest in “the liberation of Black people.” In any
case, they must cope with how to evaluate Isaiah T. Montgomery
† Matthew Holden, Jr., President, Isaiah T. Montgomery Studies Project. ([email protected].) This paper is adapted from a presentation made in cooperation with the 47th Annual Meeting, National Conference of Black Political Scientists, on March 18, 2016 in the House of Representatives Chamber, Old Capitol Museum, Jackson, MS USA. Author’s hard copy mail contact: P. O. Box 14088, LeFleur Station, Jackson, MS USA 39236-4088.‡. I make this point since, by common sense observation, it seems likely that other people may make contrary assumptions. In addition, it is intellectually possible for scholars to study Black/African American politics without that commitment just as it is possible to study any other group without being identified with that group.
and the 1890 Constitution. If not they will embarrass
themselves. how to study what Montgomery did, and how then to
move on to the generic question of political strategies under
extreme adversity.
My scope is how African Americans of Isaiah T. Montgomery’s
time, and for two generations, his time and for two generations
spoke of him.
Reputation is a political equivalent to currency.
The currency gains credence only if it is circulated by
other people who are believed.
Political scientists sometimes need to study the past more
than they now do. Historians need to study systematic theory
about the data of the past. Historians, political scientists,
and others who wish to understand American politics, will do much
better if they also come to terms with Mississippi’s unique
commitment to first to chattel slavery. Mississippi was always
committed to chattel slavery,§ in contrast to Virginia which
allowed debate in favor of emancipation until the 1830s, ad in
contrast to North Carolina which allows free Black voting until
1835.**
§ . The ordinance of secession, adopted in the very room in which this symposium is conducted says so, the declarations of Jefferson Davis are unequivocal.
Those who would understand Mississippi, and its role in the
American polity, have also to come to terms with the counter-
attack or the campaign of counter-emancipation that went on into
the 20th century, to pretend acceptance of the Civil War
Amendments, but all the same to exclude people of African
ancestry, as an exchange for a broad national acceptance of a
regime of white supremacy.†† White supremacy does not mean
simply racial hostility, which is probably impossible to avoid to
some degree. It means a norm that in all walks of life – public
and private -- there was the possibility for an absolute veto of
equality based upon racial identification, especially African
ancestry.
The Constitution of 1890 was a white supremacy constitution.
This point should be emphasized, especially for political
scientists, since our discipline includes the study of
constitutions, including sometimes state constitutions. A
constitution is, I offer for exploration, a political agreement
amongst those capable of exerting power about the terms on which
they will deal with each other, whom else they will admit and on
what terms, and whom they will treat mere resources, but
†† . Matthew Holden, Jr., “Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Role of Institutions,” R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rckman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, New York:Oxford Univesity Press, 2006, 163-189. The analysis in this paper is based upon the hypothesis that counter-attack is to be expected in domestic politics as much as military engagement.
otherwise admissible all.‡‡
In 1869, with Radical Republicans still strategically
powerful in Congress and Grant’s becoming President, Mississippi
had to accept the Constitution that provided for equality of
white and black. How long did this last? It lasted just five
years.
From 1869, when the constitution mandating full Black
membership and inclusive rules that included Black voting and
officeholding, the state went through by six years. For the next
fifteen years, there was a series of counter-attacks, in 1874 in
Warren County, the county in which Jefferson Davis had lived most
of his political life, though he at the time was not living
there. The fight left to a white vs. black confrontation in arms.
The white people won. Hands down. §§ In thinking of
extreme adversity, learn to think of killing rates. In county
after county, disputes led to killings. On a deaths per thousand
of population basis, the killing rates often exceeded the killing
rates in New York on September 11, 2011.***
‡‡ . Within this definition, there are five intersecting sets of rules: (a) Membership or who is inside, who is marginal (and possibly admissible), and who is present only as a (whether respected as in the case of Green Card holders); reservoir rules (or who is potentially eligble for offices of authority); recruitment rules (or procedures for the actual choice of officeholders); substantive output rules (or what substantive decisions may or must be decided and what not, e. g. privateownership of property in the United States or marriage rules); decision process rules; and constituent rules (or rules for changing rules).§§ . Nicholas oLemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006. *** . Matthew Holden, Jr., Tougaloo Lecture
When the Convention assembled on August 12, 1890, it had 133
white delegates and one black delegate, Isaiah T. Montgomery.†††
Except for extreme adversity, there is way for a 61% voting
majority to 1 delegate of out of 134. When this 1890 Convention
was elected Mississippi was a Black voting majority state. The
black men theoretically entitled to vote were 189,884 or 61
percent of the total of 308, 684.
The Montgomery Presence.
On September 15 1890, Montgomery stood alone in the
Constitutional Convention.‡‡‡ Montgomery’s situation makes clear
the question in the subtitle of this paper: political strategies
under extreme adversity, not just “minority” status, but extreme
adversity.
“The white people determined that the best interests of the
State and their own protection demanded that they should rule.”
Montgomery continues. “This rule being generally fixed and
arbitrary, virtually amounts to a domination, with a fixed
purpose to repress the Negro vote. The methods adopted to
produce this result have introduced into the body politic every
††† . Matthew Holden, Jr., Isaiah T. Montgomery and Emancipation: ITM Discussion Paper 2013-3, Isaiah T. Montgomery Studies Project, P. O. Box 14088, LeFleur Station, Jackson, MS 39236
‡‡‡ . “What Answer?”: Speech in Support of Franchise Committee Report, Mississippi Constitutional Convention, 1890, by Isaiah T. Montgomery, edited by Matthew Holden, Jr.
form of demoralization - bloodshed, bribery, ballot-box stuffing.
Corruption and perjury stalk unblushingly through the land.”
The corruption and bribery that stalked unblushingly through
the land was not that of the black men, but of white men.
Proposition One: I believe we have gotten the Montgomery
reputation and performance wrong by failure to note that the
verbal African Americans, all of whom operated from outside
Mississippi, had different degrees of disagreement or agreement
Montgomery’s course of action, but all treated it with respect.
It would be desirable if I had statistically competent data
on what African Americans, and other people at the time thought
about Isaiah T. Montgomery and the course that he followed. There
were recorded opinions from President Grover Cleveland, the
editors of Harper’s Weekly, and others. But, for the time being,
all I have are some opinions from some members of the African
American elite. I use those here to show the direction of my
argument, subject to the professionally required view that if
others conduct new work in a better way, with better results that
will be highly desirable. The closer people were to the
realities of the time, the more they were willing to give
Montgomery credit, and sometimes to agree with him.
Timothy Thomas Fortune and the New York Age§§§
§§§ . “Fortune, Timothy Thomas,” by Emma Lou Thornbrough, in Rayford W. Logan and Michael E. Winston (Eds.), Dictionary of American Negro Biography, eds., New York: W. w. Norton, 1982, 236-238.
I choose Timothy T. Fortune’s paper, The New York Age, went
at the subject on at least three occasions. We begin with the
African American elite outside the South. We then switch to some
comments from African Americans from within Mississippi.
These commentators in 1890 showed a clear appreciation of the
extremity of the Mississippi situation, even while some of them
expressed disagreement with Montgomery’s action. On September
27, Fortune published an editorial, “Disfranchised” that begins:
“There was perhaps nothing left for Isaiah T. Montgomery of
Bolivar, the only member of the Mississippi Constitutional
Convention, so called, to do but make a speech on the
franchise. . .” Fortune quotes at length a crucial portion. He
continues, then, to say:
Perhaps no man was ever called upon by
the nature of his surroundings to adopt a
more radical or iniquitous measure than was
Mr. Montgomery. Perhaps he adopted the
wisest and safest course available to him.”
Fortune had some reason to know “the nature of the surroundings.”
His own father was then one of the remaining African American state
politicians in Florida. He had some sense of reality, as he also
discussed the extremity of the sacrifice, 123,000 black voters. He
concludes “Did he do right, was it wise for him sanction a measure he
did approve, binding, in a measure, not only himself, but all the race
in his State to accept in good faith and abide by a measure intended
forever to disfranchise them, to exclude them from all participation
whatsoever in the administration of the government of which they are
part? “ It may be that he did, (but) we think not.”
Some further calculation is called for. The numbers used, and
that Fortune does not challenge, say that 2/3 of the Black voters were
being removed. If 2/3 are removed, then 1/3 remain. That is not the
same as excluding African Americans from all participation whatsoever
in the administration of the government, although that was the
ultimate result.
Frederick Douglass (1817-1995) is represented under the caption,
“Mr. Montgomery’s Speech.” In that column, Frederick Douglass,
apparently preparing for his mission to Haiti, was quoted at length
Two weeks later (October 11, 1890). The Douglass commentary contains
the quotation that exists as ad nauseam cliche in contemporary
writing. “No thoughtless, flippant fool could have inflicted such a
wound upon our cause as Mr. Montgomery has done in this address.”
Douglass pays open tribute to Montgomery’s intelligence, statesmanlike
calmness, and responsibility. “Such a man is not to be dismissed by calling him
a traitor nor a self-seeking hypocrite, for he is neither the one nor the
other.” He then offers a military analogy. “Like a general on the field of
battle, he has retreated when he could no longer fight and has surrendered a
post which he thought he could no longer successfully defend.”
3. On Montgomery’s choice, then, Douglass moves in the
analytical kill. Frederick Douglass limited himself, though to
attacking the action, not the actor He said he had “no denunciation
of the man Montgomery [who] is not a conscious traitor though his act
is treason . . . to the cause of the colored people, not only of his
own State, but of the United States.” (Hill, 2005.) Montgomery’s
intention, Douglass says, is beneficent, but his action is disastrous.
It is “assassination.”
Montgomery, he said, has a position that is “deplorable, and will
eventually fill his soul with bitter reflections.” There is some
evidence that this forecast may have been right, in the end.
4. The last part of Douglass’s critique skips over all the
practical issues of the time and moves to a broad rhetorical and
philosophical level. There is no “race problem.” Nor is there an
immigrant problem. Nor is there a Catholic problem. The “solution of
the real problem is, so far as the Government of the United States is
concerned, to see that each and all the descriptions of persons and
sects under the broad wings of the American eagle should be protected
in every right, privilege, and immunity guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States.”
In all this critique, Douglass has nothing at all to say about
what Montgomery should have done between August 12, 1890 (when the
Convention met) and November 1, 1890, when it adjourned sine die.
T. McCants Stewart (1854-1923) was then a person of some
prominence amongst the literate African American professionals.
(Contee (1982) in Logan and Wilson (1982, 571-573.) Stewart is no
longer a well-known figure. He had an interesting and complex
history, in New York, Hawaii, the West Indies, Africa, and England.
He seems to have tended toward the Democrats during the Grover
Cleveland era.
Stewart said he was reluctant to criticize Montgomery.
Montgomery was on the spot, and able to judge better than someone from
afar. He said he agreed with the educational qualification, which is
what he thought would reduce the African American franchise. But he
thought “Mr. Montgomery should have protested strongly and
emphatically against the omission of the property qualification” and
against what became “the understanding clause.” Stewart also used
his essay to criticize white Mississippians.
Frederick Douglass, Jr. ( )
Frederick Douglass, Jr. had a New York Age commentary on
October 18, 1890. Unlike his famous father, the younger
Douglass shows remarkable empathy with Montgomery, with whose
policy he said he did not agree. He speaks with the cold
comprehension of realpolitik.
Look at Douglass’s description of things Montgomery has
seen:
(1) the Negro as slave, freedman, soldier, and so-called
citizen;
(2) Government . . . turn him over to the tender mercies of
his former oppressors . . .
(3) friends counsel patience in the face of murder and
persecution;
(4) those who fought the Government given power to nullify
rights;
(5) “the whole North aroused in denunciation whenever force
was used to maintain the Negro’s rights at the ballot box”;
(6) state legislatures given into the hands of those
dedicated to a white man’s party;
(7) colored citizens driven from their homes while the
general government is helpless.
Douglass, Jr. says “He (Montgomery)
naturally turns to those who have it in their
power to better or make worse his condition
and tries to bring about a concession which
he hopes will be lasting, to better the
condition of his people.”
Of the policy itself, he adopts language very like that of his
father. Douglass the elder had spoken of the general retreating
when he could no longer fight and has surrendering what he could
no longer successfully defend. Douglass the younger extends that
language.
In speaking of Montgomery’s position, he said:
“It seems to me a full and complete surrender, admitting of no rally
hereafter. Any policy which puts us deeper into the pit on a one-sided good
faith, from which there can be no escape after a violation of confidence, is a
bad policy.
Ida B. Wells-Barnett (1862-1931)
Ida B. Wells-Barnett was as close in time as was Montgomery
himself. Her particular worth here is that she was always
unrelenting in her criticism of those with whom she disagreed.
At that time, she was a young woman in her twenties, publishing a
weekly newspaper in Memphis. Wells, in 1931 when Montgomery had
been dead seven years, said that she had criticized him severely
in her paper in 1890. He made the trip to Memphis to see her,
and explain his position. She said she had never agreed with
what he had done. Nonetheless, “we became the best of friends,
and he helped to increase the circulation of the paper
wonderfully by sending me all through the Delta.” [. . .]
The instructive fact is that no one of the same generation of action, no
matter how much in disagreement, could fail to recognize the harsh realities
and no one could come to the point of denunciation.
Buck Colbert Franklin ( )
Buck Colbert Franklin was a younger man, having been born in
1879. An Oklahoma attorney, Franklin was a boy in 1890 and makes
no claim of having studied what Montgomery did in 1890. But he
knew Montgomery later, and was married April 1, 1903 (Buck
Colbert Franklin, 126) in Montgomery’s living room, wrote years
after of “the great Isaiah Montgomery.” That is the language of
respect.
Proposition Two: The Five Mississippians Who Were Almost Silent
Political scientists and historians have gotten the
reputation of Isaiah T. Montgomery wrong by failure to think out
the silence of other Mississippi African American leaders as
of 1890.
The black leadership in Mississippi appears on the
record isolated from Montgomery. The question is what
support was offered at the time by any other Mississippi African American at the time? Jackson
in 1890 was not an integrated town in the 20th century sense. And it was a small town. He had
to have to go somewhere to eat and sleep. He had to have to gone somewhere to eat and sleep.
Someone had to have seen him walking down the street, or getting a haircut.
The normal thing would have been for other black leaders to attempt to talk to him. If
he had refused to talk to them, it would have been normal to report a refusal to their fellows.
What is more likely, since there is no such evidence yet, is that they had all given up. John
E. Lynch is the one exception. The criticisms from John R. Lynch
have been crucial to the reputation of Isaiah T.
Montgomery, though Lynch was careful in what he said.****
Under the caption, “The Mississippi Plan,” Lynch said he had
known Montgomery “favorably and well for a number of years,” and
believed him to be “a man of good sense, a sound Republican and
loyal to his race.”
Lynch would have been a natural leader in such a
matter if he had chosen to make a controversy within
the state. But by the time of the 1890 Convention, he
appeared already to have been shifting his life outside
the state. The “state’s Republican African American
leadership, principally former Mississippi house
speaker and U. S. representative John Roy Lynch and
former senator Blanche Bruce, traveled in Republican
circles, splitting their time between Washington and
Mississippi.”†††† Lynch had farm interests in Adams
**** . New York Age, October 18, 1890.†††† . Richard Vallely, The Two Reconstructions, Chicago?: University of Chicago Prress, 247, n. 53.
14
County, but he already had a job at the Treasury
Department in Washington. Lynch said he had written
Montgomery, and gotten a letter in response. “‘You will
notice,’” Lynch said Montgomery had written him, “‘that, in the
speech, I have gone as far as possible on the lines indicated,
and supported the committee report as a choice of evils.’”
Lynch states his own view. “ I am satisfied that that the
proposition, the adoption of which Mr. Montgomery advocated, was
not what he wanted, but he seems to have been laboring under the
impression that if it were rejected, a worse proposition would be
adopted.” He continued that “It is on this point that Mr.
Montgomery, in my opinion, has made a grave, if not a fatal,
mistake.”
Lynch, unlike Douglass, did have an idea what Montgomery
should have done. Montgomery should have made an alliance with a
Judge Chrisman, who advocated an unconditional educational and
property qualification.
Lynch said he had written Montgomery, and gotten a letter in
response. “‘You will notice,’” Lynch said Montgomery had written
him, “‘that, in the speech, I have gone as far as possible on the
lines indicated, and supported the committee report as a choice
of evils.’” Lynch states his own view. “ I am satisfied that
that the proposition, the adoption of which Mr. Montgomery
advocated, was not what he wanted, but he seems to have been
15
laboring under the impression that if it were rejected, a worse
proposition would be adopted.” He continued that “It is on this
point that Mr. Montgomery, in my opinion, has made a grave, if
not a fatal, mistake.”
Lynch, unlike Douglass, did have an idea what Montgomery
should have done. Montgomery should have made an alliance with a
Judge Chrisman, who advocated an unconditional educational and
property qualification.
Hiram Revels (1822-1901)
Hiram Revels, the first black United States Senator
ever, was still alive. He had been elected to fill
Jefferson Davis’s seat. Once out of the Senate, Revels
was back in Mississippi, residing in Holly Springs. His
time in Mississippi overlapped with that of Jefferson
Davis, sometimes also back in Mississippi as he sought
to establish a new life himself.
Blanche K. Bruce (1841-1898)
Blanche K. Bruce, who once had a house in Rosedale, who had been sheriff before becoming
US Senator, and had owned land eight miles southwest of Mound Bayou, was still alive. Bruce as
a Senator had initiated an investigation of the 1875 coup. (Bruce, in McFarlin, 1976, 13-32.)
But the same factors that made Republicans unwilling to have a fight over the Hayes-Tilden
election of the next year were at work. No corrective result was forthcoming.
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The now-controlling Democrats in the Mississippi Legislature replaced Bruce with James
Z. George. Bruce might have gone back to Mississippi, but by this time he was already
effectively a Washington resident, though he still had his farm property interests in Bolivar
County.‡‡‡‡ What, if anything, was Bruce to do to influence the situation?
James Hill had been the Secretary of State when Adelbert Ames was Governor.§§§§ Hill
was still in business and politics in Vicksburg. But he had somehow had to make his peace with
the 1875 results in Warren County. But what, if anything, was James Hill to do as of 1890, with
regard to the Constitution? What action could Hill have taken to
any useful result? Lynch said he had written Montgomery, and
gotten a letter in response. “‘You will notice,’” Lynch said
Montgomery had written him, “‘that, in the speech, I have gone as
far as possible on the lines indicated, and supported the
committee report as a choice of evils.’” Lynch states his own
view. “ I am satisfied that that the proposition, the adoption
of which Mr. Montgomery advocated, was not what he wanted, but he
seems to have been laboring under the impression that if it were
rejected, a worse proposition would be adopted.” He continued
that “It is on this point that Mr. Montgomery, in my opinion, has
‡‡‡‡ . Lawrence Otis Graham, The Senator and the Socialite: The True Story of America’s First Black Dynasty, New York: HarperCollins, 2006, Chapters 10-11, at 122-168. §§§§ . In passing, Hill was the last Republican secretary of state until the incumbent. Hill is an obscure figure in the present, though there is a statue above his grave site within one hundred yards from the Masonic temple where Medgar Evers’ office was located, on a street named for John R. Lynch within a quarter mile of a street named for Montgomery.
17
made a grave, if not a fatal, mistake.”
Lynch, unlike Douglass, did have an idea what Montgomery
should have done. Montgomery should have made an alliance with a
Judge Chrisman, who advocated an unconditional educational and
property qualification.
Hill, as I have noted, remained politics and in the state
all the while. He continued as the Republican patronage manager in Mississippi, and did
so into the early 1900s. He and Montgomery had done business with each other in getting the
deal with the railroad for the land on which Mound Bayou was settled.
Willis E. Mollison ( )
Willis E. Mollison was a Fisk graduate, who held local office in Issaqueena County.
Issaqueena, on the north side of the Yazoo from
Vicksburg, is the same county represented by the
delegate (William Farish), who led a floor challenge to
seating Montgomery in the 1890 Convention. Mollison was
to have been Republican candidate for state-wide office in 1889, the year before the
Constitutional Convention. The Republicans, out of armed harassment by the
Democrats, virtually abandoned their campaign.
As of 1890, Willis E. Mollison was still in
Mississippi, although he later left the state and moved
to Chicago. What, if anything, was Mollison say to
18
Montgomery in 1890?
Lynch, Revels, Bruce, Hill and Mollison all were
men of substance, yet they came to the point of virtual
silence in the Mississippi of 1890. These men embodied
the small, town-based, landholding African American
middle class. The problem of the Montgomery reputation
should be seen at least partly in light of that silence
by these hitherto active men.
In time, most of them left the state, but not all
and not right away. Hill remained in the state the
rest of his life, though he engaged in fights with
Bruce and others in Washington as to who would be
regarded as the leader of the Mississippi Republicans.
He continued as the Republican patronage manager in Mississippi, and did so into the
early 1900s.***** He and Montgomery had done business with each other in getting the deal with
the railroad for the land on which Mound Bayou was settled.
Mollison later decided to move to Chicago. Even
after he moved, so the historian Nan Woodruff reports,
he was a favorite for Delta planters to get to come
South during World War I and make morale-building
***** . Karl Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley.
19
speeches to urging tenant farmers to buy war bonds, and
to stay on the plantations to work rather than go to
the cities. †††††
Mollison had a son Irvin C. Mollison, ultimately to become a
Federal judge. ‡‡‡‡‡ When a young person, Irvin C. Mollison
authored an article, the source notes of which refer to his
father. In that article there is detailed discussion of a
lawyer named Samuel Beadle. Beadle was associated with
the “black and tan” faction in Republican politics, and
was one of the people squeezed out when Theodore
Roosevelt decided that his Progressive party would have
room only for the “lily whites.§§§§§ Beadle was a
formidable lawyer, who did both business work and
personal work for Jackson’s most prominent cotton
merchant, until Governor Vardaman influenced the firm
††††† . Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, American Congo: The African American in the Freedom Struggle in the Delta, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. 52.
‡‡‡‡‡ . Irvin C. Mollison, practiced law in an office with William L. Dawson, who after the 1942 election became the second Black Democrat in Congress. Irvin C. Mollison was appointed to the U.S. Court of Claims by President Harry S. Truman. Truman K. Gibson, ., 2005, 36-38).
§§§§§ . Geoffrey Cowan, LET THE PEOPLE RULE: Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of the Republican Presidential Primary, New York: 2016.
20
to fire him.****** He then chose to leave the state for a
literary life in Chicago.
Sidney D. Redmond ( )
The mood of understanding Montgomery and respecting him,
even in disagreement, shifts absolutely with the testimony of
Sidney D. Redmond.†††††† Redmond minced no words. He called
Montgomery “Judas.”‡‡‡‡‡‡ He is quoted as saying “Montgomery
betrayed his people by voting for Section 240 of the infamous
Constitution of 1890 which wiped out the political liberties of
the Negro people and the vast masses of white people.”
The Redmond view, mixed in with the Lynch recital, has since
become the standard historical interpretation of Montgomery in
1890, accepted also in the civil rights movement and amongst
African American legislators.
Conclusion: The central theme of “political strategies under extreme adversity”
It is, one may note, a mere matter of convenience that that the brief
discussion above concentrates on African American elites, both outside
Mississippi and inside Mississippi. But one could as well attempt to
****** . Irvin C. Mollison, “Negro Lawyers in Mississippi,” Journal of Negro History (1930),
†††††† . Redmond was a very successful lawyer-physician, a skillful entrepreneur, in Mississippi in the 1940s. V. O. Key,
Southern Politics in State and Nation, New York: Alfred A. Knopf?, 195?, . cites his estate as having probated at $808,000
(?) which is equivalent to $xxxxxxx in 2-4 values.?‡‡‡‡‡‡. Bunche, 9, n. 12)
21
ascertain what white people thought at the time. Redmond did tell the
interviewer that “Montgomery was lionized and acclaimed by the
Bourbons for this betrayal.”
The atmosphere of mystification comes in, from the academic side, in the
writing of the Vernon Wharton, a University of North Carolina-
trained historian, who taught at Millsaps College. Wharton
states in apparent wonderment, “It is possible that he believed
the best move for his people was that of absolute surrender.”
There is a considerable amount of commentary by more recent
historians of Reconstruction, though with one or two exceptions,
notably John Willis and Stephen Cresswell, with strong views of
the pro-left quality present in recent historiography. None of
it has the intense commitment to realpolitik that I believe is
required in studies of power-in-constitution-making.
The aim here has not been to justify or decry
Montgomery, but to put the analytical question sharply
to historians and political scientists?
For the present conclusion, let me refresh the
question of political strategies under extreme
adversity.
1. At the simplest, ask the Frederick Douglass
question. Was Isaiah T. Montgomery “a traitor?” Or was
this a self-serving declaration of a symbolic leader
22
with no pragmatic solution to the hard problem at hand?
2. In any case, if you set up a simulation, what
would you expect the student playing Montgomery to do?
3. What questions would political science theory
would guide us to ask some and thereby create some
data that we do not presently have?§§§§§§
4. Could the theories and methods now required in
graduate school enhance the question of political
strategies under extreme adversity?
5. If you took the role of the African Americans of
the time, what would imagine the strategy to be, under
what conditions.
6. If you and I were teaching the 1890 situation as
a case study, how would we expect students to frame the
Montgomery problem?
7. If you or I set up a simulation, what would we
expect the student playing Montgomery to do?
8. What political science theory or political
science method would adequately reproduce what we
§§§§§§ . Matthew Holden, Jr., “The Competence of Political Science: ‘Progress in Political Research’ Revisited,” American Political Sciennce Review 90:1 (2000). 1-10.
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already know?
9. If you took the role of the African Americans of
the time, what would you imagine the strategy to be,
under what conditions?
10. If we set a prize competition for the best
essay by a first-class student today, what new thinking
would we get?
11. If the American Political Science Review, the
Journal of Politics, the National Political Science
Review – or any other serious journal-- were to issue a