Msc Dissertation 2008 Final

8/18/2019 Msc Dissertation 2008 Final

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Is anthropological inquiry better suited to a scientific or a hermeneutic methodological

approach?

Candidate Number: 657880

Master of Science in Social Anthropology 2008

Abstract

Over the last few decades anthropologists have become increasingly divided in their

methodological preferences; those who choose to follow in the footsteps of the natural sciences

aim to formulate causal explanations for cultural phenomena while others opt for hermeneutical

methods entailing the interpretation of meanings which underlie cultural forms. Underpinning

these positions are contentious epistemological issues which have occupied various philosophers

and social scientists over the last three centuries regarding the nature of social phenomena and

the appropriate methods for their analysis. In this paper, I contrast the arguments of two

contemporary philosophers of social science, who have passionately argued in favor of


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humanistic (Winch: 1958) and scientific (Jarvie: 1972) methods respectively. Through an

analysis of their works, I show that scientific explanation plays an indispensable role in social

science, as evidenced by Karl Popper’s method of ‘situational logic’, which Jarvie outlines .

However, building upon Winch’s contentions, I argue that since anthropology largely deals with

phenomena which are either, a) conceptually alien to the analyst or b) metaphysical (e.g.

religion, law, politics), the hermeneutical process of interpreting and ‘understanding’ the

conceptual meanings of social phenomena, which provides the foundation for scientific

explanation, surpasses the latter in significance and ought to be the primary task of

anthropologists.

Introduction

When Eric Wolf (1964:88) suggested that anthropology is perhaps ‘…the most scientific of the

humanities and the most humanistic of the sciences’, he may have captured not only the

discipline’s broad potential but also a susceptibility in its equivocal nature, especially to the

extent that the sciences and humanities are deemed to be theoretically and methodologically

opposed to one another. Over the last few decades, the discipline may have succumbed to what

Lett (1997) terms an ‘identity crisis’ as anthropologists follow divergent paths. A portion of them

have rooted for a more traditional ‘scientific’ methodological approach in line with earlier

anthropological work, entailing the formation and evaluation of logical theories with empirical

data with the aim of forming cross-culturally applicable laws for explaining empirical

phenomena. As a reaction to this treatment of anthropology as if it were analogous to the natural


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sciences, a significant body of anthropologists have emphasized that the unique nature and

objects of anthropological inquiry means that it requires an ‘interpretive’ methodological

approach following the humanistic or heuristic tradition of inquiry. Interpretive anthropologists

criticize attempts to explain social structures and human behavior using analytical theories of

material causality and emphasize descriptive interpretations of the meanings of actions, words

and ideas which lie embedded within cultures.

Underlying these opposed methodological traditions are contentions epistemological and

metaphysical issues, the resolution of which could potentially determine how anthropological

inquiry should be conducted and for what reasons. Thus they have been the subject of heated

debates in academic literature both within anthropology and related disciplines. Since the

interpretive approach has grown exponentially in popularity, there has been a corresponding

trend of scientific minded anthropologists (Keesing 1987; Lett 1991&1997; O’Meara 1989;

Reyna 1994; Carrithers 1990; Kuznar 1997) some of whom have provided lucid evaluations of

both perspectives alongside criticisms of the epistemological assumptions of the interpretive

school which have in turn invited responses from interpretive theorists (Shore 1991; Valeri

1987). Many of the former are concerned with divisions which they feel ‘threaten to tear the

discipline apart’ (Rubel & Rosman 1994: 342) while among the latter, there is a sense in which

the interpretive approach must rightfully displace an outdated ‘positivism’ for there to be

methodological progression. There are however, relatively few studies which impartially

evaluate the methodological rift by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the respective

approaches in order to explore future directions for anthropological analysis or even possibilities

for commensuration. This paper attempts such a broad and dispassionate overview specifically


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by tackling the theoretical issues which lie at the roots of the division and which are crucial for

determining exactly how anthropologists should conduct their inquiries.

The central theoretical question of whether human phenomena can be analyzed and explained

using the scientific methods of the natural sciences has been awarded significant attention in

most of the social sciences as well as in the anthropological debates mentioned above. For many

such as Rabinow (1979:3), the ‘epistemic object of inquiry’ of anthropology as a social science

dealing with human phenomena is wholly distinct from that of the physical sciences and thus

requires a different methodological approach; one adequate to take into account the definition of

humans as ‘suspended in webs of meanings they themselves have spun’ as first argued by Max

Weber (Weber 1968, I, p. 22). This is directly opposed by Roscoe (1995) and O’Meara (1989)

who suggest that human behavior can be explained using generalized scientific laws, though they

emphasize the need for a separation between scientific and metaphysical inquiry. A rigorous

evaluation of the theoretical principles underlying these arguments should make room for a

consideration of the appropriate goals and functions of anthropology and academic inquiry in the

human sciences. It is crucial to understand whether anthropologists can or should aim to produce

a cumulative body of cross-culturally applicable knowledge which offers causal explanations of

the social phenomena of an external knowable world or whether they should direct their energies

to the ‘evocation and interpretation’ of cultures and cultural variability and the ‘understanding’

of the contextual meanings which constitute forms of life or perhaps to focus upon exploring

‘…the character of lived experience’. (Jackson 1989:2) Ultimately, it is the scientific method, its

capacity and its epistemological assumptions, especially with respect to its potential role within

the discipline of anthropology that has been called into question and this paper will attempt to


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address whether it remains of relevance not only in anthropology, but also in contemporary

social science.

While the paper will use anthropological sources to show how theoretical debates have been

incorporated into anthropological discourses to make arguments in favor of either a scientific or

interpretive methodological outlook, the majority of the theoretical points of contention are

considered, as much as is possible, using the work of philosophers of science and social science

for two reasons. Firstly, much of the anthropological literature on this subject is heavily oriented

towards a specific methodological approach, and some of it is strewn with straw men or

totalizing descriptions of the ‘paradigm’ which the authors find disagreeable. Secondly, the

underlying disputes in question are not concerned with anthropological data but rather with a

priori theoretical positions which have been considered in depth in the aforementioned

disciplines. While there is a growing body of anthropologically inclined work of this sort, often

labeled as ‘anthropology of knowledge’, the latter typically hails from interpretive

anthropologists.

The paper is divided into four sections, the first of which charts the origins of both

methodological paradigms in anthropology, evaluating the work of respective theorists and

highlighting the major theoretical differences which set them apart. In order to emphasize

impartiality, anthropological sources from both interpretive and scientific perspectives are used

in every aspect of this overview. The second section deals specifically with the points of

theoretical contention mentioned above, contrasting the perspectives of philosophers of science

Peter Winch (1958) and Ian Jarvie (1972) who have each offered significant contributions to this


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issue, though their respective sympathies lie on opposite ends of the methodological spectrum.

The third section builds upon these arguments using relevant literature and ethnographic or

philosophical examples in order to illustrate and evaluate the epistemological positions presented

in the first part. This is followed by an evaluative and conclusive section which summarizes any

theoretical findings in the context of the methodological divisions in anthropology in order to

determine whether positivistic/scientific and humanistic/interpretive inquiries are

commensurable to any extent and/or whether any particular methodological approach is more

suited for anthropological inquiry.

In this paper, I show that scientific explanation plays an indispensable role in social science, as

evidenced by Karl Popper’s method of ‘situational logic’, which Jarvie outlines (1972: 19-20) .

However, building upon Winch’s contentions, I argue that since anthropology largely deals with

phenomena which are either, a) conceptually alien to the analyst or b) metaphysical (e.g.

religion, law, politics), the hermeneutical process of interpreting and ‘understanding’ the

conceptual meanings of social phenomena which provides the foundations for scientific

explanation surpasses the latter in significance and ought to be the primary task of

anthropologists.

Section 1: Overview of the Anthropological Paradigms

Origins of scientific anthropology

Interpretive theorists such as Holy (1987), trace the roots of the positivistic approach in

anthropology to the use of the comparative method in anthropology, which they suggest provides


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evidence of the first lucid portrayal of the discipline as a natural science. Underpinning the

method were theoretical notions regarding cultures as isolated social systems which, while

eliciting certain clear distinctions had similar social structures which could be compared in order

to form generalized theories explaining similar phenomena in all societies. This method is

thought to have been inherited from Durkheimian ‘comparative sociology’ where descriptions of

social facts would be used in order to formulate and test hypotheses or generalizations, albeit in

anthropology, ethnography would provide the descriptions of exotic cultural systems. Holy notes

that these descriptions of specific societies were sometimes accompanied by larger scale

world-wide statistical comparisons between cultures in order to establish correlations between

phenomena. Examples of these provide further evidence of the methods of the natural sciences

being adopted for anthropological analysis. (1987: 4) During this period, anthropologists

described the process of comparison as the anthropological equivalent of the scientific

experiment while fieldwork allowed the testing of existing generalizations by providing new

observations (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 89-90)

Hobart (1987) agrees that the comparative method epitomized early scientific approaches. Using

the work of Radcliffe-Brown, an early proponent of this approach, he highlights the manner in

which the latter’s work equates comparison with the controlled experimentation of the natural

scientists. The following quote from Radcliffe-Brown serves to elucidate these underlying

methodological assumptions.

“For Social Anthropology the task is to formulate and validate statements about the conditions of

existence of social systems (laws of social statics) and the regularities that are observable in


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social change (laws of social dynamics), This can only be done by the systematic use of the

comparative method…” (Radcliffe-Brown 1958a: 128)

For Radcliffe-Brown then, all social phenomena were subject to natural laws and by the use of

the logical method of induction, as is standard in the natural sciences, it was possible to discover

and prove these general laws (1987: 23-24). Underpinning such a methodology are strict notions

regarding: i) the manner in which the objects of inquiry are conceptualized, ii) theories regarding

the appropriate methods of observation and data analysis iii) the capacity of the scientific method

to formulate and test theories or laws in order to explain societal phenomena iv) the goals of

anthropological inquiry to provide general laws which can explain the ‘conditions of existence of

social systems’ and the ‘regularities that are observable in social change’ (1958a: 128). In Ellen’s

review of ethnographic fieldwork (1984), he takes the second point further by exploring the

manner in which early methods of observation and data analysis were shaped by positivistic

theoretical perspectives. He notes that the tension between observation and experimental results

on the one hand and theory on the other has been resolved in different ways depending upon the

methodological approach one adopts.

In the discipline’s early practice, the technique of participant observation was largely associated

with the structural-functionalist approach which as mentioned above entailed the ‘synchronic

analysis of the interrelations of institutions within the existing socio-cultural whole’ (1984: 17).

Ellen suggests, in line with Holy, that Durkheimian ideology lay behind structural-functionalist

theory and the early use of participant-observation. For Durkheim, the social notions of people

who participate in social life were not important, rather there were certain profound causes or


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underlying social laws which he claimed were ‘unperceived by consciousness’ (Durkheim 1964:

141) These social forces were deemed to be external to the individual and were the determinants

of his/her behavior as well as the rest of social life. Radcliffe-Brown’s work carried this tradition

forward with the aim of forming a natural science of society. In practice however,

Radcliffe-Brown’s method was somewhat unscientific in that he would often use particularistic

descriptions of social life to affirm pre-constructed notions of the regularity of social

relationships. Situational analysts such as Turner were stricter in their interpretations of the

positivistic methodology and concentrated on concrete situations involving social interactions

which would be the main source of analysis and would provide empirical evidence of social

structure. (1984: 20) Importantly, the positivistic paradigm also conceived of anthropology’s

subject matter and data as akin to the data of the natural scientist. Participant observation was the

scientific tool allowing direct observation of social data which was deemed to be information

about the social world acquired through sense experience and as Ellen notes was ‘real, factual

and…had to consist of empirical phenomena which exist somewhere “out there” in the world.’

(1984: 21).

Contemporary Scientific Anthropology

While there are considerable differences in the theoretical approaches that scientific

anthropologists adopt (i.e. from cultural materialism to structuralism to cognitive anthropology),

and while many disagree on a few epistemological issues and especially on whether or not

scientific methods should be scrutinized using philosophical discourse, they all emphasize their

respect for the scientific tradition and the superiority of the scientific method for providing


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information about the empirical world. In addition, they are keen to emphasize that the

foundational characteristics of the method remain the same whether the subject matter is physical

or social. In addition, definitions of scientific anthropology given by anthropologists are usually

abstract and unconcerned with the specifics of anthropological inquiry. Kuznar (1997)

emphasizes three important characteristics of the approach; assumptions of an external knowable

world, an emphasis on the need to evaluate subjective humanly constructed theories with

objective empirical data and the use of the procedural rule which stipulates that a theory’s fit to

all relevant data is the most important factor leading to its acceptance or rejection (1997: 18).

Many have provided concise definitions of what scientific anthropology should entail. O’Meara

(1989) notes as key, the systematic descriptions and classification of objects, events and

processes and the explanation of the latter with theories which ‘employ lawful regularities’ and

which must be testable using publicly observable data (1989: 354). Watson (1976, 1992),

mentions that these theories must, in the social sciences, lead to explanations and predictions of

human cultural behavior (Kuznar 1997: 18). Finally, due to the recent emphasis on reflexive

critiques in anthropology, many scientific anthropologists are keen to highlight the self-critical

nature of scientific inquiry especially evident in the history of anthropology. Thus, Kuznar notes

that theories, data and methods must be continually reevaluated especially in cases where new

theories may better explain the data or when further data from other sources falsifies a theoretical

approach. In fact, the comparative method mentioned above has often been used in anthropology

to reevaluate and criticize once trusted and respected theoretical concepts which were not

cross-culturally applicable. For example, Radcliffe-Brown spent much time refuting

nineteenth-century concepts of unilineal evolution while in turn, many of his successors


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suggested that they could not find cross-cultural evidence of societies organized in accordance

with his structural-functionalist principles (1997: 24).

Assumptions

Underlying the methods and theories of contemporary scientific anthropology are certain

epistemological and ontological assumptions which largely resemble those of the earliest

scientifically-minded anthropologists such as Radcliffe-Brown. While conceptions of the objects

of inquiry are important for consideration of appropriate methods and goals of analysis, even

more elementary are conceptions of the world and of reality and whether or not it can be

apprehended and understood by an observer. Empirical analysis for scientific anthropologists

rests on assumptions of an orderly predictable world which exists externally to the observer who

can observe the world directly or through the use of scientific instruments. Specifically for

anthropologists, this external world consists of social structures and the behavioral patterns of

humans and these natural phenomena can be observed and explained ‘without recourse to

mysterious forces beyond investigation.’ (Bernard 1994b: 168). Scientific anthropologists and

positivistic philosophers of science often debate whether ideas concerning the world are

ontological assumptions (i.e. those concerned with the actual existence of reality and worldly

phenomena) or epistemological (i.e. those concerned with how we come to know and understand

what we observe). Kuznar notes that such considerations of whether or not there may be a true

‘reality’ beneath what we experience are insignificant, especially since science is only concerned

with phenomena which are empirically testable (1997: 29) Thus, while everything we perceive

may be partially constructed by our minds as the philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested, since


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that is the only reality we can experience and the only reality which is empirically testable, it

becomes the appropriate subject of scientific analysis.

More importantly, scientific anthropologists often make allusions to an underlying pure reality

which for an everyday observer is adulterated by cultural and theoretical biases, the state of

empirical knowledge and one’s powers of observation. The aim of science is to escape from

these limitations as much as is possible and draw nearer to an ideal notion of truth. Thus in

anthropology, there is the need to review all the current ethnographic data and theoretical

conceptions regarding an issue in order to determine which ideas and explanations are the most

complementary and therefore provide the most accurate available version of the truth while at the

same time attempting to bypass the perceptions, interpretations, motivations, feelings etc of the

observer which threaten to skew the reality hiding underneath (1997: 30). On the other hand,

science qualifies its discoveries by emphasizing that it is only able to provide the best temporary

explanation of the facts rather than absolute truths and thus remains open to systematic, scientific

revisions. Kuznar notes that in anthropology for example, there has been an effort to establish

whether the ‘!Kung’ are the indigenous people of the Kalahari region where they presently reside

and if so, how long they have lived there. Different anthropologists have provided different

interpretations of the ‘Kung!’ and the reality of their existence which vary tremendously

depending upon many of the factors mentioned above (1997: 28). Underlying all these aims and

goals are certain notions of scientific objectivity which is deemed to be at risk of being veiled by

subjective political, religious and ideological positions to which it is directly opposed. The latter

are about maintaining a normative position regarding the world and science is concerned only

with knowing about the world from a neutral albeit elevated stance. In line with this, since


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metaphysical phenomena are not empirically testable, they are considered to be beyond the

purview of scientific inquiry, although a small group of anthropologists (e.g. Murdock 1980;

Schneider 1965) support the use of empirical evidence to falsify metaphysical statements such as

those regarding the existence of a soul or God (Lett 1997: 52).

Origins of interpretive/humanistic anthropology

While there have been several early anthropological studies which have adopted a humanistic

approach, for example Ruth Benedict’s (1934) ‘Patterns of culture’, the majority of scientific and

interpretive anthropologists would agree that the contemporary surge of anthropological interest

in the interpretive methodological approach truly began with the publication of Clifford Geertz’s

early work and specifically the oft-cited introduction to his ‘The Interpretation of cultures’

published in 1973 in which he claims that the analysis of culture should not be ‘an experimental

science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz 1973: 5). While

there are other trends which have accompanied the early development of the interpretive

paradigm and which take anthropology beyond its scientific limits, for example Hyme’s (1972)

call for a literally humanistic anthropology which would be politically and ethically sensitive to

the domination of weaker populations by the world’s hegemonic powers or Asad’s (1973)

descriptions of the implicit association between early anthropology and western colonialism,

since these are not strictly and explicitly dealing with conceptual issues associated with the

interpretive paradigm which might clearly distinguish it from a scientific methodological

approach, they are not of primary concern. Geertz on the other hand, deems his ‘humanistic’

approach as being directly and fundamentally opposed to the underlying tenets of the materialist


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tradition in scientific anthropology and goes on to explain the benefits of the hermeneutical

method as an alternative option for anthropological inquiry.

Geertz emphasizes that in order to interpret the webs of meaning which constitute a culture the

anthropologists must describe and understand the actions and words of individuals through the

use of ‘thick descriptions’. The specific aim of such description is to untangle the contextual

meanings and intentions underlying behavior which may not be apparent through superficial

description. For example, whether an individual is twitching or winking may not be immediately

obvious through simple observation of physical behavior, though a deeper consideration of the

situation may clarify. Furthermore, it is important to have the more general goal of focusing

upon actors and how they shape and are shaped by their culture. In order to achieve these

hermeneutical goals, the anthropological observer must enmesh themselves in a culture,

eventually becoming an ‘insider’ in order to transform his/her perspective and help decode the

complex meanings deeply embedded within the core of the life form. (1973: 3-10)

Geertz conceptualizes his subject matter, i.e. culture as analogous to a text in that both are

constructed and require similar methods for interpretation while the ethnographic writings of the

anthropologist are deemed to be ‘fictions’ (1973: 15) Thus the work of the ethnographer

becomes akin to that of the literary critic though Geertz makes sure to highlight that despite their

constructed nature, ethnographic texts are strongly tied up with real ways of life, i.e. what

‘…people say, what they do, what is done to them…’ (1973: 18). Regarding this latter aspect,

Geertz implies that despite the novel methodology of the interpretive approach, its underlying

goals remain scientific in that it aims to evaluate theories according to ‘systematic modes of


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assessment’ (1973: 24) Ultimately, the ambitions remain empirical in that particular

ethnographic experiences are used to understand the function of meaning in human culture. On

the other hand, rigid scientific methods which aim to ‘codify abstract regularities’ or generalize

across cases are inadequate for such an inquiry which deals with the unpredictability and

complexity of cultural life (1973: 26).

Contemporary Interpretive Anthropology and its assumptions

While contemporary interpretive anthropologists share a good amount of methodological

principles, they also disagree on several fundamental issues, sometimes as significant as whether

interpretive anthropology can aim to form empirical and verifiable laws or explanations of

cultural meanings (in Geertz’ (1973: 27) words ‘to uncover the conceptual structures which

inform our subjects’ acts’) or whether it must devote itself to a reflexive analysis and critique of

ethnographies and thus function as a vehicle for ‘self-reflection and self-growth’ (Marcus and

Fischer 1986: 1) It may be fair to suggest that in many respects what unites the interpretive

tradition are the criticisms which many of its’ members have made against positivistic

methodology and its’ assumptions but especially what is deemed to be the latter’s misguided

quest for naturalistic cross-culturally applicable laws which may explain and predict human

behavior.

Thus Hobart (1987) dealing with the use of the comparative method, criticizes scientific

cross-cultural comparisons of operationally defined variables which whether they are

institutions, beliefs or institutionalized relationships, are deemed to have ‘essences discernable

independent of observers and frames of reference’ despite the fact that the objects of comparison


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are social discourses rather than objective ontological forms (1987: 4). Furthermore, he argues,

there is a general disregard of the extent to which comparison and translation are affected by the

interpretive acts of the analyst where there always exist rival interpretations. Rabinow (1977)

notes that anthropologists are ‘not neutral scientists collecting unambiguous data’ and that the

individuals’ lives that they study are not unconsciously determined by alien social forces. For

Rabinow, the facts of the anthropologist are fictitious and cross-cultural in the sense that they

become objective through the mutual interactions (i.e. questionings, observations and

experiences) of the anthropologist and the people he/she studies (1977: 152).

Holy (1987) adds that since observation is no longer taken for granted as providing objective

information, interpretive theorists have emphasized how the observer ‘has come to know what he

claims to know about a particular society or culture’ and thus the need for adequate descriptions

has replaced the need for sociological generalizations (1987: 7). An interpretive methodological

approach therefore emphasizes the extent to which the anthropologist’s own experiences and

conceptual tools affect the constitution of an ethnographic account. Cross-cultural comparisons

on the other hand are no longer deemed capable of providing the scientific function of theory

testing, rather interpretive approaches are characterized by analytical descriptions of culturally

specific processes of meaning construction. This does not necessarily lead Holy away from

having empirical ambitions. He suggests that interpretive methods of cultural-comparison must

aim to compare similar ‘forms, objects or constructs in two or more cultures with the objective of

elucidating the defining processes through which their meanings are constructed’ in order to

discover underlying ‘cultural logics’. Furthermore, through intra-cultural comparison, one may

compare dissimilar constructs within a society with the aim of discovering similar processes of


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meaning creation which underlie them (1987: 7-10).

Ellen (1984) takes the issue of ethnographic analysis further by exploring what distinguishes it

from natural scientific analysis. He notes that interpretive participant observation is conceived of

differently from the simple positivistic notion of a scientist observing his subject, in that

emphasis is placed on the enmeshing of the observer with his object of study, so much so that

he/she is primarily a participant and only secondarily an observer. In Ellen’s words, this

‘eliminates the distinction between the observer and the observed phenomena’ and thus, through

his/ her ‘socialization into the culture being studied’ the observer can learn the embedded

meanings of social life (1984: 29-30). Many of these reconsiderations are the result of the recent

move in interpretive anthropology away from the field (i.e. a posteriori analysis) and back into

the armchair (i.e. a priori analysis). Phillips (1973: 78) writes that the current crisis in social

science is due to the fact that knowledge of appropriate methodology for anthropological

analysis is dependent upon better knowledge of the anthropological object of analysis (i.e. social

phenomenon). Since the latter can only be achieved by acquiring better methods, interpretive

anthropologists argue that existing data must be reanalyzed and that the theoretical assumptions

of positivistic methodology must be interrogated and adapted to suit inquiry in the social

sciences (Ellen, 1984: 27).

Regarding the anthropologists’ object of study, Barnes (1982) argues that the assumption that

human phenomena are subject to natural laws which one must discover, ignores the

immeasurably complex nature of experience even above language which is complex and rich

enough. For Barnes, there is little in common between physical objects and social events (1982:


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28) Rabinow adds that anthropologists are not dealing with logical epistemic subjects whose

activities may be ‘generalized and understood as context-free operations’ (1979: 4). In the

Critique of Pure reason, Kant notes that the human subject is unique in that through reflection

upon actions, it comes to know itself as a subject in a world which is not only passively

experienced but also actively constituted through one’s intended thoughts and acts. Rabinow

notes that in line with this understanding of human experience, interpretive theorists must

criticize any system of knowledge which reduces human phenomena to ‘a system of categories

defined only in terms of their relations to one another’ (1979: 4). He further notes that

interpretive theorists understand that ‘the web of meaning constitutes human existence to such an

extent that it cannot ever be meaningfully reduced to constitutively prior speech acts, dyadic

relations, or any predefined elements’ (Rabinow 1979: 6)

Another concern of interpretive theorists is the culturally mediated and therefore relative position

of western science. Rabinow is skeptical of absolute perspectives or privileged positions

especially since in his perspective, all intellectual paradigms are historically constituted. He

suggests that the western constitution of reality is ‘exotic’ and that scientific claims to truth are

‘linked to social practices’ (Lett 1997:15) Tyler concurs, suggesting that all historically

constituted rules and criteria for logical and rational analysis are self-affirming and not

necessarily objective ‘guides to action, knowledge, and belief’ and denies that the discourse of

one cultural tradition could ever encompass that of another. (Tyler 1991:80) In addition, Tyler

follows postmodern philosophers of science such as Feyerabend and Quine by further suggesting

that the scientific method is only capable of achieving consensus and affirmation for its

discoveries within the sub-culture of science, which is far removed from its goals of objective


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cross-cultural knowledge (1997: 15). In general however, interpretive theorists do not explicitly

criticize natural science and its’ results. They feel however, that scientific methods and goals are

circumspect when they are thoughtlessly imported for use in the social sciences and regarded as

suitable for acquiring cumulative knowledge of human phenomena without consideration of the

important distinctions which make anthropological analysis radically different to the work of the

scientist in the lab, especially considering the subjective interactions involved in the use of

participant observation.

The aim of the next section is to consider the underlying epistemological arguments

underpinning the most destructive accusation which various interpretive theorists have leveled

against scientific anthropologists in order to assess its’ value. It can be summarized as follows:

Scientific methods are inappropriate for dealing with the subject matter of anthropology

At the root of all social phenomena are reflecting humans who are caught up in webs of meaning

which they themselves have spun. Data from this subject matter is ‘collected’ in a unique manner

which is not analogous to the work of the natural scientist. It involves the grasping of social

meaning through subjective interaction rather than observation of objective facts in the form of

human behavior or social structures.

Section 2: Winch and Jarvie

While many philosophers of science and social science have attempted to explain and elucidate

the unique aspects of social scientific inquiry which distinguish it from natural scientific

explanation (e.g. Taylor 1979; Palmer 1969), the most influential and lucid attempt must be


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Winch’s (1958) ‘The Idea of a Social Science’. In this work, Winch promotes the understanding

of principles which underlie the conduct of human behavior, highlighting its importance above

and beyond the formation of generalizations from behavioral regularities. Throughout the book,

Winch rails against scientific approaches which attempt to search for social ‘logics’ which may

help to explain social phenomena and predict developments. Winch focuses upon J.S. Mill and

his attempts to form a science of any subject matter which displays a sense of regularity, even

when the facts upon which the phenomena depend are difficult to observe. For Mill, sciences

such as Tidology and Meteorology are such examples where the complexity and variability of

the phenomenon in question have made scientific analysis difficult and prediction imprecise.

These phenomenon share aspects such as irregularity, especially across space and time, with

social phenomenon, and the best one could hope for according to Mill are statistical

generalizations concerning the probable outcome of situations which, in the case of human

behavior, would be possible to a greater degree of accuracy when dealing with the ‘collective

conduct of masses’ (18: Book VI). While these probable outcomes do vary somewhat

spatiotemporally, regularities are evidence of an underlying logic which Mill locates in the mind,

exhibited as psychological states which he suggests may or may not correspond to specific

physiological states (1958: 62-65).

Despite Mill’s psychological reductionism which Karl Popper has criticized, Winch has greater

concerns with his conflation of the appropriate logic of explanation required for social and

natural phenomenon which, according to Winch, risks masking the unique nature and aspects of

human behavior which underlie superficial statistical regularities. While Mill feels rightly that

complexity sets human or social phenomena apart from natural ones, he misapprehends what this


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complexity entails. Winch is pointing out that the qualitatively judged regularities of human

behavior belong to a separate and distinct conceptual framework from the one used to judge

physical regularities in natural phenomena. With regards to social phenomena, in order to decide

when two situations are the same, one must understand ‘the kind of activity in the context of

which the question arises’ since the concepts derive from this activity and belong to a particular

form of life. They cannot be imposed by external observers such as social scientists (Winch

1956: 23). The participants understand the rules and requirements for correct performance of this

activity and it is the concepts belonging to this activity which subjectively determine what

constitutes regularity of behavior. To an outside observer, similar bodily movements during a

religious ritual may constitute regularity when in fact an understanding of the ritual may reveal

them to have distinct meanings. On the other hand, when dealing with natural phenomena such

as tides or physical objects, it is the scientific community which forms concepts in the form of

methods and procedures of investigation which it uses to judge what constitutes regularity.

Winch uses the example of a physics experiment dealing with gravity. The experiment will have

certain variables such as the inclination of a plane or the material of the plane, and understanding

the procedure entails understanding these variables and what it would mean for them to ‘varied’

or ‘kept the same’ in distinct experiments (1956: 26-29) These inanimate objects do not in

themselves function in accordance with a conceptual framework but rather a framework is

externally applied. In order to fully appreciate how this applies in the case of analysis in social

science, it is necessary to consider what explanation of human regularities implicitly assumes.

For Winch, complex concepts explaining human behavior may not be intelligible directly to

participants. However, what is important is that the concepts are rooted in understandings of


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contextual ways of life from which they derive. To explain the high rate of divorce in a certain

village using complex alien concepts, one must first understand fully what divorce entails in that

particular cultural form of life before one can go further to offer appropriate explanations. Winch

uses the example of an economic concept of liquidity preference which, although it is not

generally used in everyday business conduct explains how the business man’s behavior brings

about changes in the value of money. Crucially, the concept is logically tied to concepts which

are understood by business men such as ‘money’, ‘markets’ and ‘value’ (1956: 19).

In order to fully evaluate Winch’s arguments, it is necessary to explore two further issues which

his analysis raises. Firstly, there is the question of what lies at the root of human behavior and

regularities or rather what meaningful behavior actually consist of and secondly, the kinds of

explanations and generalizations it would be feasible to offer once this is taken into account. The

first issue is crucial for Winch, since it sums up the most significant aspect of sociological

inquiry, namely to understand the nature of social phenomena by understanding the

understandings of others which allow them or rather give them the capacity to act appropriately

or inappropriately in social life. Thus the philosophical task of epistemology becomes for Winch,

the primary goal of the social sciences. But how do we get from the understandings of others to

their behaviors? The central premise of Winch’s work is that ‘all behavior which is meaningful

(therefore all specifically human behavior) is ipso facto rule-governed’ (1958: 48). This behavior

is far from blind habit in the sense that it is purposeful and goal directed. For Winch, a human

society consists of a whole constituting different kinds of rule-governed behavior. Rule-governed

behavior is contrasted by Winch with animal behavior such as the performance of a trick by a

dog. A dog may learn to do a trick and repeat it regularly in response to a certain stimulus. This


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kind of action is unreflective and does not involve an intentional act or an attempt at performing

the trick correctly. On the occasion that the dog doesn’t manage to perform the trick, there may

perhaps be a conflicting stimulus but it would be senseless to speak of a failed attempt unless we

refer to the dog in an anthropomorphic fashion. On the other hand, for a human to get to work on

time regularly, he must understand what the latter entails and despite varying situations attempt

to follow rules in accordance with his understandings of such concepts as ‘time’, ‘work’ and

‘early’ while also understanding what it means to behave consistently as opposed to

inconsistently. The central point is that once someone has learnt a rule and knows for example

what it means to arrive early to work on a regular basis, he must be able to use these rules and

apply them in varying conditions and situations and this is what makes behavior reflective rather

than blind regurgitation (1958: 56-60).

Despite an emphasis on understanding rule-following behavior, in much of his earlier work,

Winch still assumes that the ultimate task of social science must be the detection and formulation

of human behavioral regularities, albeit with greater regard for the peculiar nature of human

regularities in relation to physical regularities. For Winch, this novel aspect requires a renewed

procedural approach and an abandonment of older explanatory models which apparently do not

take rule-following behavior into account. Perhaps if these models are considered, it may be

possible to understand their weaknesses and how an emphasis on ‘understanding’ may help to

improve their capacity to ‘detect and formulate behavioral regularities’ (1958: 48). Winch’s first

concern is a model which attempts to understand a social institution by ‘observing regularities in

the behavior of its participants’ without understanding the contextual nature of ‘regularity’

(1958: 81). As mentioned earlier, the analyst must understand what regularity ‘means’ in the


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particular context of this institution and in order to do so he must familiarize himself with the

relevant social activities and their meanings. As Winch emphasizes, the analyst of religion ‘must

have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying’ just

as the ‘historian of art must have some aesthetic sense’ (1958: 83). Thus externally related

judgments of regularity from for example common behavioral or physiological states would be

inadequate and that is precisely what Winch censures. It is quite peculiar that Winch uses

examples of certain institutions such as religion and art and in other places refers to ‘love’ rather

than using examples of non-metaphysical rule-following behavior such as driving or

scuba-diving, especially since it is the latter which are usually prone to analyses involving

statistical generalizations. This aspect will be focused in greater depth below.

The second aspect of social scientific explanatory models which Winch criticizes is their

tendency to form predictions from generalizations. For Winch, social predictions are unlike

scientific ones; while it may be possible to predict decisions in certain situations, at the root of all

social phenomena are the intentional decisions of individuals as attempts to apply learnt rules to

novel situations, and an extraordinary situation may lead to a completely unpredictable outcome.

This can be contrasted with the example of a dog’s performance of a trick which relies on a

single stimulus. One can predict that as long as there is no countering stimulus, such as food

nearby, the dog will perform the trick. To offer another example, a mechanic may easily

determine how a slight modification will affect the performance of his machine but a chancellor

will struggle to offer an equally valid prediction of the outcome of a particular economic policy

due to the complex actions and interactions of rule-following individuals. It must be mentioned

however that it would be unusual to find social scientific analyses which attempt to predict the


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outcomes of financial policies or criminal trials with the accuracy that one may use to predict

‘physical’ or ‘natural’ changes. Rather, the concept of ‘liquidity preference’ which Winch lauds

is the kind of prediction which is customary in the social sciences and as described above, it

involves a general explanation of how the value of money may likely be affected by the activities

of business men. (1956: 30-33)

Ian Jarvie is a philosopher of social science who has written much to counter many of Winch’s

arguments while accepting the validity of some of his concerns. His arguments revolve around

the notion that while humans may be complex rule-following individuals, the goal of social

science is not to explain this behavior i.e. conscious action, but rather to explain the unintended

outcomes of human actions; entities such as ‘groups, marriage, morals and knowledge’ which for

Jarvie are products of their actions ‘but not necessarily of their intentions’ (Jarvie 1972: 3) While

novel methods such as hermeneutics may be required for a social science to deal with

understandings at the level of rule following and getting to grips with a person’s psychology in

order to understand an individuals reasons for say declaring war or divorcing his spouse,

explaining why war broke out in a particular situation etc is a different kind of inquiry, one

which can make use of scientific methods. In his major work ‘Concepts and Society’, Jarvie goes

on to outline Karl Popper’s method of situational logic which he feels is an appropriate

explanatory model for such an inquiry. The main function of this model is to weigh up the aims

and goals of individuals alongside their situational context which would include any natural,

social, psychological and ethical circumstances which constitute both means by which

individuals achieve their aims and constraints on those aims. The model assumes that given a

certain context, humans attempt to find the most effective means of achieving their aims or a


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‘logic’ which suits. Jarvie notes that the actor’s ideas, inclinations and proclivities are ‘part of his

situation in a complicated way’ (1972: 4).

A major assumption is that an objective appraisal of the situation by social scientists will reveal

certain favorable means of achieving aims as more effective and thereby rational than others.

This is termed as the ‘logic of the situation’ which Jarvie describes as an empirical description of

the procedure of explanation which goes on in the social sciences’ and is described as ‘a special

case of the deductive analysis of causal explanation in general’ thereby illustrating what is key in

this argument, namely ‘the unity of method in the sciences’ (1972: 4-5). Jarvie goes on to offer a

few examples. In one of these, he uses the method of situational logic in order to explain why in

a particular situation; a driver who is generally cautious causes a major accident by. He notes

that a proper analysis of the situation may reveal that for example the driver was using the

motorway on this occasion when he is more accustomed to city driving. Thus, in order to explain

the collision, one must understand the experience of the driver and the conditions under which

he/she was driving but also the kinds of norms which are respectively involved in city and

motorway driving. This latter aspect is what Winch is so keen to emphasize, specifically the

understanding of what the social and physical act of ‘driving’ entails. In order to fully appreciate

driving conditions, one must perhaps have driven oneself or at least one must fully understand

the social regulations and variable conditions which a driver can potentially meet at any time. In

other words, one must appreciate what the rule-following behavior of driving entails, namely, the

rules an individual must understand and act in accordance with in order to drive successfully. In

fact Jarvie himself suggests that ‘learning about traffic is a model for learning about society’ in

that the latter includes certain customs, institutions and expectations which in accordance with


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Winch, an individual can choose to follow in order to drive successfully or ignore perhaps in

order to willingly crash. (1972: 7)

Section 3: Analysis

There is no need to go any further into Jarvie’s account in order to explore the assumptions of

situational logic regarding how human behavior should be defined or whether all behavior can be

explained by the logic of the situation. There are surely numerous cases when such a method can

be used to explain the unintended outcomes of human actions but there appears to be a set of

assumptions which underlie such explanations involving the understanding

of the relevant social

activities. In sociological analysis dealing with mundane activities such as driving, this latter

process of ‘understanding’ is not immediately obvious and does not even appear as a separate

step in the inquiry. For example, English sociologists analyzing a vehicle collision on a British

road will be most likely have a good understanding of British traffic norms and what the activity

of driving involves. But English anthropologists wishing to explain a similar incident in an

exotic location where the rules of driving are entirely different will first need to spend a good

deal of time in order to become accustomed to this new style of driving. Furthermore, the inquiry

of understanding this new form of driving as a variant of a widespread human activity constitutes

a much more profound scientific activity than explaining a collision. Rather than being the first

step towards explanation of specific events, the understanding of a social phenomenon becomes

in itself a significant task and a distinct kind of analysis, one which is better suited to a

hermeneutical methodology coupled with participant observation where the latter is an efficient

manner of understanding a new ‘rule’ since it involves the actual practice of rule-following.


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This point is elaborated somewhat by philosopher of science Palmer and anthropologists Watson

and Watson-Franke (1975), who emphasize that explanatory models typically tend to ask

questions such as “What is the time?” and “Why did war break out?” in order to get some

information and a segment of a context while hermeneutical understandings of social

phenomenon as understandings of a whole ask more basic and fundamental questions such as

“What is time?” and “What is war?” (1975: 251). The latter model attempts to reflexively

question preunderstandings and remains open to new concepts derived from the phenomena

under analysis while the former model is more conservative in that it sets rigid boundaries of its

own and wants superficial information which suits its own conceptual framework. While Winch

tends to suggest that a consideration of the complexities of rule-following makes social

predictions and causal explanations of human behavior much harder and redundant to a certain

extent, what becomes clear is that while such explanatory models are indeed partially capable of

prediction and explanation, they are thoroughly confined by their own aims.

Of even greater significance is the fact that hermeneutics becomes indispensable when the

subject matter is metaphysical as is often the case in typical anthropological analyses of exotic

cultures although Winch does not fully appreciate this important distinction. Throughout his

work he seems to suggest that whatever the social activity, unless one can grasp an individuals

reasons for behaving in a certain manner, one can never explain his actions and in the same way,

the development of say social institutions must be analyzed by focusing upon individuals and

their intentions, expectations and relations. But as Jarvie (1972) notes, an explanatory model

based upon situational logic is suited to explaining the unintended outcomes of human actions

such as a car accident whilst generally taking into account the kinds of customary, purposeful


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and reflexive (rule-following) behavior which driving entails (1972: 2-7) In a similar manner,

such a model could even attempt to explain what allows a hunter gather tribe to develop into a

complex industrial society through an evaluation of social developments as the unintended

products of human behavior in particular situational contexts. Furthermore, as mentioned above,

Winch appears to support the economic concept of liquidity preference which could be used in

such an explanatory model in order to explain a change in the financial value of a business

institution by associating this causally with the unintended consequences of the behavior of

businessmen. Thus, scientific methods can potentially be used to explain the developments of

non-metaphysical social phenomena through legitimate ethno-scientific analysis, although it is

true that explanations and predictions of social phenomena will never be as accurate as those

dealing with natural or physical phenomena for all the reasons Winch outlines. However,

assuming this is the only appropriate kind of social scientific analysis eschews another kind of

inquiry, namely the understandings of other people’s understanding which becomes especially

significant when the subject matter is metaphysical . While Winch elaborates his descriptions of

rule-following behavior in order to excoriate the status of social science, what he is actually

outlining is a completely distinct methodology; one which legitimately stands alongside

explanatory models such as ‘situational logic’. And in anthropology, this kind of analysis, in the

form of hermeneutics, surpasses ethno-scientific explanation in importance since its’

‘understandings’ determine what kinds of explanatory models will be appropriate for

‘explaining’ not only alien ways of life, but also metaphysical matters such as art, morality,

politics and religion which are central to the appreciation of any culture and which can only be

explained by determining what constitutes ‘rational’ or ‘logical’ behavior within them.


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Nielsen is a philosopher who draws upon Winch’s ideas to elucidate the manner in which

‘verstehen’ analysis allows an analyst to grasp the meanings which metaphysical social

phenomena hold in particular ways of life. He suggests that ethno-scientific explanatory models

often preliminarily judge exotic belief systems to be irrational and therefore dismiss the task of

‘understanding’ in favor of ‘explaining away’ by searching for causal explanations which may

uncover the origins of these phenomena or the ‘psychological needs they satisfy’ (Nielsen 1982:

469). He suggests that a favorable understanding of these phenomena would involve getting to

grips with the contextual rationale for the belief, action or rule-following behavior as Winch is

keen to highlight. This process involves an appreciation of the local ‘rationality’ which underlies

the mode of social life whether it is religion, morality, law, natural science or Azande magical

conceptions. To understand what this appreciation entails we arrive at the central theme of

Winch’s work which Nielsen recalls; namely the understanding of concepts which are possessed

by ‘those engaged in these activities’ (1982: 469).

An example should help to clarify the perils of utilizing a scientific model in order to explain

metaphysical beliefs, something which has plagued anthropological inquiry ever since

Malinowski. In his essay named ‘social science’ Winch counters a proposition of Italian

sociologist and philosopher Vilfredo Pareto. Pareto claims that all human societies contain

culturally specific discourses akin to ideologies which offer pseudo-explanations of social life

but which disguise the reality of the social phenomena by making groundless rationalizations for

pointless activities. Pareto suggests that these activities, ‘ Derivations, ’ are actually the results of

certain universal human sentiments and that the social scientist must attempt to use scientific

techniques in order to uncover the reality which underlies these ideologies i.e. the ‘ residues’ or


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the real nature and causes of the ‘behavior’ which is under analysis (Winch: 1958: 97-100). Thus

while a certain religious group may explain their beliefs by referring to theological texts etc,

these for Pareto would constitute ‘derivations’ while other ‘real’ scientific explanations would

clarify the actual reasons for belief. But unlike Jarvie’s explanatory model, (which takes into

account the concepts or rule-following behavior required for ‘driving on a public road’ in order

to scientifically explain unintended events), this kind of analysis doesn’t attempt to achieve an

understanding of the meanings underlying this exotic social activity by grasping local concepts;

rather it attempts to impose scientific standards of rationality upon an exotic metaphysical social

activity. And if Winch has taught us one thing it is that the concept of societal behavior ‘cannot

be grasped except in terms of the concept of rule following and rule-governed behavior…’

(Winch 1956: 25) Though Pareto probably appreciates that the rule-following behavior

constituting religious belief (as a metaphysical activity) is perhaps not as easy to learn as is the

behavior involved in Jarvie’s driving example. Indeed, Winch reminds us that the analyst of

religion ‘must have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is

studying’ just as the ‘historian of art must have some aesthetic sense’ (1958: 83). As mentioned

above there is something special about art and religion; is this not a call for a ‘metaphysical’

hermeneutics?

Section 4: Conclusion

Verstehen vs. Eklären?

In order to evaluate what kind of methodological approach is appropriate for anthropology


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inquiry, it is first necessary to appreciate one underlying notion which runs throughout the

philosophical discussion in the previous section. Scientific explanation and hermeneutical

interpretation or understanding are not as diametrically opposed to one another as it would seem

to one glancing across the contemporary anthropological literature. In fact, these methodologies

need not even meet each other face to face, since their respective territories are clearly distinct.

However, it is perhaps closer to the boundaries dividing these territories where

misunderstandings have often arisen. This paper has explored theoretical debates regarding the

suitability of these distinct methodologies for the analysis of a variety of social phenomenon,

whilst specifically focusing upon how these methods weigh up in the kinds of analysis which

sets anthropology apart from other social sciences.

In the foregoing discussion, it was made clear that methodologies such as Jarvie’s (1972)

‘situational logic’ are appropriate for explaining social phenomena as the unintended

consequences of human actions through the analysis of the dispositions of a given situational

context but it was also noted that such analyses are confined in their aims in three primary ways.

Firstly, as Watson and Watson-Franke (1975) highlight, by their vary nature, they are only

capable of considering a segment of a social context rather than dealing with a social whole; i.e.

they may attempt to explain a particular incident (such as reasons for war breaking out) but not

the social phenomenon of war as a meaningful social activity. The most profound explanation

would be one dealing with the diachronic development of social phenomenon; perhaps

considering the social evolution of societal institutions. Secondly, as Winch (1958) reiterates,

their considerations and explanations of this segment of a particular social phenomenon must

depend upon understandings of the concepts which belong to this activity. Indeed, Jarvie who is


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usually quite antagonistic towards Winch’s arguments concedes this point by highlighting the

necessity of understanding the entailments of ‘driving a car’ such as customs, institutions and

expectations in order to explain a driving incident (1972: 4). This kind of understanding is

straightforward in an analysis of one’s own society, but typically in anthropological cases, this

would require a separate analysis involving the familiarization of oneself with the

‘rule-following behavior’ of the ‘exotic’ social activity in question.

We can infer from this that in all cases where such an analysis falls short, it is the method of

‘verstehen ’ or understanding which is the missing factor. Needless to say, there are a plethora of

cases when an understanding of relevant concepts can be taken for granted and scientific

methods can offer useful explanations. Winch himself highlights the benefits of a scientific

concept such as liquidity preference commonly used in economics. However, in anthropology,

the emphasis on understanding an alien social activity or culture ‘in it’s own terms’ has proved to

be a profound inquiry’; one large enough to fill up the whole of an anthropologists’ to-do-list.

This is before one considers the third issue constraining the use of scientific methods in

anthropology. Namely that the social phenomenon which usually occupy anthropologists, such

as religion, politics, art, law and morality are metaphysical and any scientific explanation of

them would require one to first appreciate the rationale underlying such activities. It appears that

the majority of anthropologists have taken these considerations into account; as mentioned in the

introduction, the general disciplinary trend has been towards the greater use of hermeneutical

methods and this has been coupled with a critical stance towards the inappropriate use of

scientific methods.


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Anthropological science?

More generally, the goal of this paper was to explore the suitability of employing scientific

methods for the analysis of social phenomenon especially within the context of anthropology, in

order to consider the merits of two opposed methodological positions which divide

anthropologists. It is not of concern here to evaluate the arguments of those most radically

opposed to the use of empirical science in an anthropological context. What is more important is

to use the findings of this paper in order to pinpoint the limits of scientific analysis in

anthropology, in order to thereby consider the value of the hermeneutical arguments advanced in

opposition. As outlined in the first section, the definition of anthropological science proffered by

O’Meara, one of its most ardent followers is as follows: scientific anthropology should aim for

the ‘systematic description and classification of objects, events and processes, and the

explanation of those events and processes by theories that employ lawful regularities’ (1989:

354). In the previous section, it was made clear that the ‘explanation’ of social and therefore

human phenomena is not analogous to the description of physical or natural phenomena,

although as outlined above, this does not render scientific explanation wholly redundant. An

anthropological example may help to illustrate this. As long as an analyst is familiar with the

Kula exchange systems of the Trobriand Islanders, is fully aware of the kinds of rules, customs

etc required to participate successfully in such a system and perhaps has a specific understanding

of how such a system customarily affects the social status of participating members, he/she is

qualified to attempt a scientific explanation of two main kinds. Firstly, one may explore a

specific incident within the context of the social activity; for example one may ask why an

islander has managed to retain all of his Kula valuables while at the same time increasing his/her


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prestige. Secondly, one may attempt a causal explanation of the origins of the exchange system

with an emphasis on the political/religious/economic roles it plays generally in Trobriand

society.

However, each of these inquiries is thoroughly dependent upon an understanding of the exotic

exchange system in question and a grasping of the concepts which belong to it. This is exactly

what anthropologists have historically managed to do by providing meaningful ‘translations’ of

the workings of alien social activities which we can all agree with. In general, this involves an

interpretation of the meanings and logical structures that have been ascribed to social

phenomenon in particular contexts and is the central goal of hermeneutical inquiry. By

describing scientific anthropology as the ‘description…of objects’ and their ‘explanation’,

O’Meara has purposefully neglected the complexities inherent in the process of ‘describing’

human phenomena and it signals that he deems the ‘descriptions’ to be less significant than the

‘explanations’ or at best equal to them. The fact that the definition O’Meara advances could be

directly imported for use in the natural sciences without even a slight alteration is quite telling of

his implicit assumptions.

The conflation between natural and social phenomenon is a common occurrence in scientific

anthropological literature and a good example can be found in a paper by Roscoe (1995) in

which he argues that since our knowledge of natural and physical phenomenon are based upon

the social interpretations of a scientific community, our knowledge of human affairs should

similarly be derived from ‘interpretations’ of the same order through the use of analogous

‘interpretive’ conceptual frameworks (1995: 496). However, a key insight of this paper, as


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elucidated by Winch (1958) has been to contrast the nature of human phenomenon, which

function in accordance with their own conceptual frameworks, with physical phenomenon which

we understand through the external application of our own scientific concepts. In his work,

O’Meara pleas for anthropologists to focus upon the ‘causes’ of human affairs and not delve into

interpretations of their ‘meanings’ and quotes Einstein who had suggested that the aim of science

is not ‘to give a taste of the soup’ (quoted in O’Meara 1989:366). However, this paper has shown

that it is precisely through a ‘taste’ of the social activity in question that anthropologists can even

attempt causal explanations and that ultimately, ‘tasting’ is often such a significant and time

consuming activity, that anthropologists ought to have time for little else afterwards.

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