M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited.gpcb.gov.in/images/pdf/KCIL_RISK_ASSESSMENT.pdfReliance Petrol Pump, High Tension Road, Subhanpura, Vadodara-390 023 Phone: 9825756467/9427838021

Prepared By M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited Page : 1 HSE Department Rev. : 00

M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited.

Survey No 166/1,2,3, 171/1, 172,167,168,

Village : Padana Gandhidham, Dist. Kutch

RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY For Existing and Proposed Plan

PREPARED BY

VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANTS FF-11, Akshat Complex,

Nr. Reliance Petrol Pump, High Tension Road, Subhanpura,

Vadodara-390 023 Phone: 9825756467/9427838021 (M)


CERTIFICATE

We are pleased to certify that this Risk Assessment study of Company has been conducted by us. This is the first Risk Assessment report of this company for new project and it has been carried out during the month of March- 2010. Risk Assessment is a legal requirement u/r 12-c & 68-O of the Gujarat Factories Rules. The recommendations are based on information supplied to us by the company and our plant visits. The Executive Summary is given in the beginning to highlight the important summary of our report and methodology of the risk assessment carried out. We are thankful to the Mr. Shivlal Goyal (Occupier), Mr. D.S. Purohit (Factory Manager), Mr. R. K. Jha ( Dy. Manager HSE) and Officers of the Company for their all co-operation to prepared this report. In particular we acknowledge the continuous support given to us by Mr. R. K. Jha for completion of this report. FOR VAIBHU SAFETY CONSULTANT

Authorized Signatory


SECTION

NO.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

NO. OF PAGES

1 Executive Summary 2 Objectives, Philosophy and methodology of

Risk assessment

3 Introduction of the unit 3.1 Company Introduction 3.2 Details of Unit 3.3 Project setting 3.4 Organisational setup 3.5 List Of product 3.6 List of Raw Material 3.7 Details of storage of Hazardous Materials in

Bulk and control measures provided

3.8 Hazardous Properties Of The Chemicals, Compatibilities And Special Hazard

3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

3.10 Brief Description of process plant 4 Hazard identification 4.1 Introduction 4.2 DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index 4.3 Failure Frequencies 4.4 Identification of Hazardous area 5 Risk Assessment 5.1 Effects of Release of Hazardous Substances 5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas 5.3 Modes of Failure 5.4 Damage Criteria for heat radiation 6 Consequence Analysis 6.1 Consequence Analysis 6.2 Table of Consequences analysis results 6.3 Comments 7 Risk Reduction Measures 7.1 Design 7.2 Safety Devices


7.3 Operation and Maintenance 7.4 Recommendations 8 Disaster Management plan 8.1 On site emergency Plan (OSEP) 8.2 Scope of OSEP 8.3 Elements of OSEP 8.4 Methodology 8.5 Emergencies Identified 8.6 Others 8.7 Emergency Organisation 8.8 Emergency Facilities 8.9 Emergency Escapes 8.10 Assembly points 8.11 Wind sock 8.12 Emergency transportation 8.13 Emergency communication 8.14 Warning Alarm/ Communication of Emergency 8.15 Emergency responsibilities 8.16 Mutual Aids 8.17 Mock Drill


SECTION I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 Executive Summary 1.1 M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd. retained the services of Vaibhu Safety Consultants

for carrying out Risk Assessment Studies for their Gandhidham plant. 1.2 Experts from Vaibhu Safety Consultants visited the site on 23/05/2010 for inspection of

facilities to be erected and commissioned at site as per site plan and the environs and for collection of relevant information about the installation and the operations will be carried out in the plant. They also held detailed discussions on various aspects including Chlorine tonner handling facilities, Solvent storage facilities, Oleum, Sulfur trioxide, Sulfuric Acid, Nitric Acid, Chloro sulphonic Acid storage area, Ethylene Oxide storage facilities, process safety, Finished product storage godown and tank farm area, HSE management system procedures( SOP) and it implementation, Emergency management plan, Emergency handling facilities, Emergency organization and action planet., with the officers of the company.

1.3 In this plant Chlorine, Sulphur, Ethylene Oxide(EO), Caustic soda ( NaOH), Nitric Acid ( HNO3), Benzene, Methanol, toluene, and Paraffin Oil will be majorly used as raw materials and received through road tanker and stored in designated tank farm area.

1.4 Flammable solvents receive through road tanker and stored in underground storage tank farm area as per petroleum Act and Rules. Ethylene Oxide will be received from road tanker and transferred in to tank by Nitrogen pressure and stored under Nitrogen blanketing. EO and Anhydrous ammonia storage facilities generated as per Static and mobile pressure vessel Rule (SMPV), Separate Acid storage area is located at Sulfuric Acid, CSA & Thionyl Chloride (TC) plant.

1.5 Most of products are used as a raw material in one or the more products. Material transfer from one plant to other only by pumping and required quantity for one day is being stored at process plant in Day tank.

1.6 Separate utility plant is provided for chilling cooling in each plant. Oil, Steam, Nitrogen and Air utilities are common for all plants.

1.7 Based on the data furnished and the study of the installation, certain hazards have been identified and their consequences are modeled mathematically using HAMSGAP software.

1.8 The study indicates that possible hazards associated with the plant are confined to (a) Under ground storage tank area, road truck unloading area (b) Chlorine tonner storage area. (c) Ethylene Oxide storage tank area, (d) Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, Nitric Acid, Thionyl Chloride, Sulfur Trioxide and storage tank area. Various hazard scenarios have been identified for Risk Assessment and the consequences modeled. The results of the analysis have been summarized in the table appended.


1.9 It will be observed from the summary that the consequences of hazards associated with any possible spills / leaks except for catastrophic failure of Chlorine tonner, Ethylene Oxide, Anhydrous Ammonia and Oleum release scenarios would be of a relatively small in nature and would be taken care of with the proposed emergency facilities and the manpower deployed at the plant.

1.10 The possibility of occurrence of such hazards and their effects could be further reduced by implementing the suggestions made in this report.

1.11 Catastrophic failure of tonner resulting in major toxic releases is very unlikely events barring gross neglect of time tested safety standards and procedures set up by the industry.

1.12 The possibility of occurrence of major toxic release and mishaps is considered very remote, considering the past operating performance of plant in relation to fire and safety and the field management’s total commitment to implementation of safety systems and procedures.

1.13 However considering the potential for major hazards, however remote they may be, associated with storage area, some suggestions are made in the subsequent chapters for further improvement in the areas of safety, environmental impact, Emergency facilities and emergency preparedness plan.

1.14 Conclusion Based on the 1) Risk Analysis study and information regarding the layout plan and safety systems. 2) Discussions with company officials,


CHAPTER II

OBJECTIVE, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

2.1 Objective :

The main objectives of the Risk Assessment (RA) study is to determine damage due to major hazards having damage potential to life & property and provide a scientific basis to assess safety level of the facility. The principle objective of this study was to identify major risks in the manufacture of chemicals and storage of hazardous chemical at site and to evaluate on-site & off-site consequences of identified hazard scenarios. Pointers are then given for effective mitigation of hazards in terms of suggestions for effective disaster management, suggesting minimum preventive and protective measures & change of practices to ensure safety.

2.2 PHILOSOPHY :

This report is limited to the following: Identification of major risk areas. Hazard identification/Identification of failure cases Consequential analysis of probable risks / failure cases

o Evaluation of heat radiation & pressure wave profiles for identified failure cases

o Risk assessment on the basic of the above evaluation & risk acceptability o Minimum preventive & protective measures to be taken to minimize risks to

maximum possible extent. Giving pointers for effective disaster management Suggesting other measures to further lower the probability of risk

2.3 Methodology

The procedure used for carrying out the Quantitative Risk Assessment Study is outlined bellow: Identify Credible Loss Scenarios for the facility under the study by discussion with KCIL. Simulate loss Scenarios to determine the vulnerable zones for toxic dispersion, pool fire or jet fire, ( Thermal Radiation ), Flash fire, Explosion over pressure ( Vapour cloud Explosion, Ball fire using software packages HAMSGAP. Suggest mitigating measures to reduce the damage, considering all aspects of the facilities. The flowchart of the methodology for the present study is shown in following page.


RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY METHODOLOGY FLOWCHART

START

FACILITY, PROCESS AND METEOROLOGICAL DATA COLLECTION

LISTING OUT OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS & STORAGE DETAILS

DEFINING OF PARAMETERS FOR EACH OF CHEMICALS & EACH OF HAZARDS

IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE SCENARIOS & QUANTIFICATION OF PROBABLE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THEM

DEFINING RELEASE TYPE (CONTINUOUS OR INSTANTANIOUS ) & DETERMINE RELEASE RATES

SIMULATION OF SELECTED CASES FOR CONSEQUENCE MODELING

PREPARATION OF SUMMERY OF CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL RISK TO THE SURROUNDING POPULATION

DISCUSSION & RECOMMENDATION OF MITIGATIVE / REMEDIAL MEASURES

END


SECTION III

INTRODUCTION OF THE UNIT 3.1 COMPANY INTRODUCTION

M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd., is operating a manufacturing unit of various chemicals and dye intermediates at Survey No 166/1,2,3, 171/1, 172,167,168, Village : Padana, Gandhidham, Dist. Kutch Produce unit is classified as Major Accident Hazards unit ( MAH Installation ) based on the storage of the listed hazardous chemicals more than specified threshold quantities.(Schedule 3 under Rule 68-J of the Gujarat Factories Rules-1963 (2004). Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd, with spot light on export market potential was founded in 2004 near the Global all weather ports of Kandla and Mundra. It consists of a well integrated chemical complex consisting of Chlorination, Nitration, Sulphonation and Dyes Intermediates products. In 2006, as a part of its backward integration plan M/s Kutch Chemical Industries Ltd, has set up a 400 TPD of Sulphuric Acid plant at Gandhidham.

3.2 DETAILS OF UNITS

Sr. No. Particulars

1. Full Name & Address of Unit

: Kutch chemical Industries limited Plot no- 165,166/1&3,168,171/1&172 Village:Padana, Nr.Aquagel Chemicals, Gandhidham, Dist – Kutch Gujarat.

2. Telephone No. : 02836-28551-52, Fax-02836-285233 3. Month & Year of

Establishment

: 10TH June 2002

4. Full name & Address of the occupier

: Sh. Shivlal Goyal ( Director) 2, Sri Ram Society, Gotri Road Baroda

5. Full name & Address of the Factory manager

: Sh. D.S.Purohit Plot no – 23, Ward -9B(D) New Bharat Nagar, Gandhidham Pin- 370201

6. Man Power

: 172 including all shift G Shift- 31 A Shift- 47 B Shift- 47 C Shift- 47

7. No. Of shift & Shift timing : Total no of shift :- 04 General shift :- 09AM To 06 PM


First Shift “A”:- 07 AM To 03 PM Second Shift “B”:- 03 PM To 11PM Night Shift “C”:- 11PM To 07AM

8. Environs (Nearest Facilities)

9. Meteorogical Data

Latitude 23º 10’N Longitude 70º 13’ E

Temperature

Maximum 48º C Minimum 7.2 º C

Relative Humadity :

Maximum 100 % Minimum 1 %

Annual Rain Fall :

Minimum 73.6 mm Maximum 1393 mm (1979)

Seasonal wind directions :

Jan- Feb N / NNW / ENE March – Sept SW / WSW Oct to Dec N / NNE

Wind Velocity :

Maximum 100 km/hr NNW (26.10.1975) Minimum 132 km/hr NNW (26.10.1975) Avg. Wind Speed 14 Km/hr

1. Railway Station : Gandhidham, Distance – 20 KM

2. Police Station : Anjar, Distance – 20 KM

3. Fire Station : Anjar , Distance- 20 KM

4. Hospitals : Anjar , Distance- 20KM

10. Total Land at Plant 50 ACRE

11. Total Built-up area at the Factory

30000 M2


12. Power connection Demand : 3000 KVA

13. DG Set KVA: 250 KVA

14. Power plant details : DG Set - 2.5 MW Turbine – 4.2 MW

15. Water Storage and source

Capacity in m3:20000 M3, Source – Gujarat water infrastructure limited (GWIL)

16. Boiler

Type

Model no

Capacity

Licence from Gujarat Govt.

Combi pack

CPB-80 8Ton/Hr GT 4879 IB-1478- 10 Ton/Hr GT 5516

Waste heat Recovery

Maker no-21943 AVU Make

25 Ton/Hr GT-5207

17. Chilled water plant

Particulars

Model No

Capacity

Location

VAM

------

150 TR

DMS Plant

VAM SD30BHX/1 200TR OLD VS

VAM SD30BHX/1 200 TR MCB & PNCB

Ammonia compr 2 nos

KC6-3 150 TR MCB

Ammonia compr 2 nos

KC6-3 150 TR PNCB

Ammonia compr 2 nos

KC6-3 150 TR PDCB

Ammonia compr 5 nos

KC6 300 TR New VS

Ammonia compr 3 nos

KC6 180 TR OLD VS

Total 1480 TR

18. Cooling Tower

Particulars

Flow rate

T R Plants

Process cooling water

4200M3/H 3260 Acid Division


1300M3/H 1000 DMS Plant


1200M3/H 1000 OLD VS


1200M3/H 1000 MCB Plant


1200M3/H 1000 Acetanilide plant


600m3/H 500 PNCB Plant



600M3/H 250 PDCBPlant


500M3/H 300 New VS plant


1350M3/H 1100 TC Plant

Total 9410 19. Effluent treatment

Plant Capacity: 50 M3

20. Fire water source Water reservoir (GWIL) 14 Fire Water Reservoir

capacity : M3 200M3

21. Department wise List of fire extinguishers with mapping if available

Departments Total nos of F/Extinguisher

Benzene storage 04 nos Power plant 12 nos PNCB Plant 16 nos MCB Plant 07 nos PDCB Plant 02nos Ice plant 01 no New VS Plant 09 nos ETP 01 no Acetanilide plant 06 nos EO Storage 05 nos Capacity-25 kg FO Storage 02 nos VS OLD 06 Nos CSA Plant 02nos DMS Plant 18 nos Methanol storage 04 nos SAP Plant 15 nos Boiler house 09 nos ECC Room 10 nos as spare Total 129 nos

22. SCBA sets availability and location mapping

Total Nos of SCBA Sets – 08 Nos Acid division C/R- 01No Chlorine Shed- 02 Nos DMS Plant- 01 Nos TC Plant- 02 Nos Emergency Control centre- 02 nos

23. OHC facilities Occupational Health Centre is declared near main gate and factory medical officer visit schedule is once in a week. Well equipment Ambulance VAN. Stretcher-01 Oxygen cylinder with mask-01 First aid box- 10 nos in all departments

24. EMP Prepared as Per ISO-14000


25. EMP plan ( Action Plan) one page

Prepared and displayed in all department

26. List of emergency facilities

A. Dry powder (50% of fire extinguishers ) 50 nos

B. CO2 Cartridges ( 50% of fire extinguishers ) 200 gms (10 kg DCP

50 nos

C. As above 2 Kg ( 75 Kg DCP ) 06 nos

D. Sand scoops 50 nos

E. Safety helmets 500 nos

F. Water curtain nozzles 20 nos

G. Stretchers 01 nos

H. First aid box with anti snake serum 10 nos

I. Rubber hand gloves 200 nos

J. Explosive meter 01 no

K. Fire entry suit w/o breathing apparatus 01 no

L. Resuscitator 05 no

M. Electric siren with 3 km range 01 no

N. Hand operated siren Nil

O. Water gel blandest NA

P. Red/green flags for fire drill Nil

Q. Pressure type self contained breathing apparatus with spare cylinder (30 minutes)

08 nos

R. Safety Shower 14 nos

27. Fire Water Reservoir :- 200 M3

28. Other Source of Water :

Gujarat water infrastructure limited , Anjar

29. Fire Pump Details

Pump Detail Number of Pump

Head Capacity (Flow)

KW/HP

Jockey Pump 01 70 mtr 10.8 m3/h 10 Electrical Pump 01 70 mtr 270m3/h 120

Diesel Pump Nil Nil Nil Nil Total 02 Nil Nil Nil

30. Hydrant System Details

Area / Plant Nos. Of Hydrant with Hose Box

Nos. Of Monitors

PNCB Plant Hydrant – 07 nos Hose box- 01 nos

01 no


MCB Plant Hydrant – 01 nos Hose box- 01 nos

Acid Division Hydrant – 11 nos Hose box- 03 nos

Nil

Old VS plant Hydrant – 06 nos Hose box- 05 nos

01 no

New VS Plant Hydrant – 011nos Hose box- 05 nos

Acetanilide Plant Hydrant – 01no Hose box- 01 no

PDCB Plant Hydrant – 02 nos Hose box- 01 nos

Power Plant Hydrant – 05 nos Hose box- 02 nos

Canteen Hydrant – 01 no Hose box- 01 no

DMS Plant Hydrant – 02nos Hose box- 02 nos

Total Hydrant – 47 nos Hose box- 30 nos

31. License & Approval:

A. Factory Inspectorate

Licence No : 018712 Validity : 31/12/2010

B. GPCB Consent No: 5991/3/5/2005 Validity : 31/1/2010 Note – Application inward ID- 12531/Dated- 18/12/2009 for renewal of consent

C. Solid waste Disposal

Member ship : TSDF, Nandesari Baroda

D. Explosive licence No :

Particulars Licence no Validity Chlorine G/WC/GJ/06/109(G15607) 30/09/2011 Ethylene oxide old VS Plant

S/HO/GJ/03/718(SS5280) 31/03/2013

Ethylene oxide New VS Plant

S/HG/GJ/03/1066(S32386) 31/03/2011

Furnace oil P/WC/GJ/15/2380(PII9928) 31/12/2010 Methanol P/HQ/GJ/15/4682(P120542) 31/12/2010 Benzene& Toluene

P/HQ/GJ/15/4568(P20641) 31/12.2012

3.3 PROJECT SETTING: The company is located at 700 11’ 40.17”East longitude & 230 10’ 14.44” North latitude in Village: Padana, Tal: Gandhidham, Dist. Kutch in Gujarat State. The site location is shown as figure 1.1. and plant layout is provided as figure 1.2.


Figure 1.1


Figure 1.2



3.4 HSE ORGANISATIONAL SET UP

Safety setup organisation chart

3.5 LIST OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED PRODUCTS

Table-3.1

Sr. No. Name of the Product

Existing Capacity,

MT/Month

Additional Capacity,

MT/Month

Total Capacity,

MT/Month

Product Required Environmental Clearance 1. Vinyl Sulphone 500 4000 4500

2. Acetanilide 1000 Nil Nil

3. Sulphonation of PNT,ONT,VS, Tobies & Other

0 1500 1500

4. Benzene Sulphonyl Chloride 0 1500 1500

5. DASDA 0 1000 1000

6. V.S Condense 0 1000 1000

7. Dimethyl Sulfate (DMS) 100 3000 3100

8. Dimethyl Aniline (DMA) 0 1500 1500

9. Diethyl Sulfate (DES) 0 1500 1500

10. Sulfamic Acid 0 1000 1000

11. Power Plant (Coal) 2.5 MW 10 MW 12.5 MW

Product do not required Environmental Clearance

12. Sulphuric Acid (98%) 250 15000 15250

13. Oleum (23% & 65%) 0 3000 3000

Advise Company of safety legislation & updates, safety awareness, carry out safety audits, update safety policy, provide training when required, to provide investigations and reports for any accidents.

Directors

Unit Head

VP Operation GM Operation Dy. Mgr ((Fire & Safety) (General Shift only)

Fire & Safety Supervisor (One in every shift)

Fireman Two in each shift


14. Liquid SO3 ( 70-90%) 0 7500 7500

15. Chloro Sulphonic Acid 1200 5000 6200

16. Thionyl Chloride 0 5000 5000

17. Sodium Bisulphite (SBS) 0 3000 3000

18. Calcium Chloride 0 4000 4000

19. Dicalcium Phosphate (DCP) 0 1500 1500

20. Sulphur Monochloride 0 200 200

21. Sulphuryl Chloride 0 200 200

22. Aluminium Sulphate (Alum) 0 1000 1000

3.6 LIST OF PROPOSED RAW MATERIALS

Sr No.

Raw Materials Physical & chemical composition Rate of Consumption

Chemical Formula State MT/Month

1 Acetanilide C6H5NHCOCH3 Solid 2182

2 Chloro Sulphonic Acid Cl.SO3H Liquid 10182

3 Caustic Lye NaOH Liquid 2182 4 Sodium bysulphite NaHSO3 Solid 3545

5 Sulfuric Acid H2SO4 Liquid 3989 6 Sluphur S Solid 1949 7 Hydrochloric Acid HCl Liquid 6567 8 o-Nitro Toluene C6H4CH3NO2 Liquid 215

9 p-Nitro Toluene C6H4CH3NO2 Liquid 215

10 Oluem H2S2O7 Liquid 19683

11 Sodium Chloride NaCl Solid 117 12 Benzene C6H6 Liquid 663 13 Chlorine Cl2 Gas 2967 14 Soda Ash Na2CO3 Solid 106 15 Iron Fe Solid 29 16 Sodium Hypochloride NaOCl Liquid 406 17 Ammonium Chloride NH4Cl Liquid 88

18 Sodium Carbonate Na2CO3 Solid 1986

19 Methanol CH3OH Liquid 780 20 Aniline C6H5NH2 Liquid 1134

21 Ethanol C2H5OH Liquid 896

22 Ammonia NH3 Liquid 166


3.7 Details of Storage of Hazardous Materials in Bulk

NAME OF

HAZARDOUS

SUBSTANCE

MAX. STORAGE

CAP.[Qty.]

PLACE

OF IT’S

STORAGE

OPERATING

PRESSURE

AND TEMP.

TYPE OF

HAZARD

CONTROL

MEASURE PROVIDED

Vinyl Sulphone Plant Ethylene Oxide

25 KL X 1 bullet 15 KL X 1 bullet

Licenced Premises A/G SS

10 Kg/ cm2 Ambient

Fire /Explosion/ Toxic

Double Safety Valve Nitrogen Blanketing Double Static earthing Dyke wall Scrubber provided Jumper clips on flanges Hydrant system Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking

and prohibited area. Tanker unloading

procedure. Shed provided on bullets. Sprinkler provided on

bullets. SCBA sets available. Safety shower.

Chloro Sulfonic Acid

45 KL X 6 Nos Tank

Tank farm area A/G MS

ATP Ambient

Corrosive Level gauge provided. Scrubber provided Required PPEs provided to

all employees Double drain valve will be

provided to sulfuric Acid storage tank

Full body protection will be provided to operator.

Caution note and emergency first aid will be displayed and train for the same to all employees.

Safety shower and eye wash will be provided in storage tank area and plant area.

Total close process will be adopted for Sulfuric acid handling.

Dyke wall will be provided to storage tank

Chloro Sulfonic Acid (Proposed)

200 MT X 3 Nos. Do ATP Ambient

Corrosive

Caustic Lye 25 KL X 2Nos Tank


ATP Ambient

Corrosive

Caustic Lye 40 KL X6 Nos Tank

Do ATP Ambient

Corrosive

Sulfuric Acid 20 KL X 1Nos Tank

Do ATP Ambient

Corrosive

Hydrochloric Acid

30 KL X 3Nos Tank

Tank farm area A/G HDPE

ATP Ambient

Corrosive

Acetanilide Plant

Acetanilide 600 MT Godown ATP, Ambient

Combustible Flame proof plant, pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Double Static earthing Dyke wall Tanker unloading

procedure. SCBA sets available . Flame proof plant,

pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Aniline 100 KL X 1 No Tank


ATP, Ambient

Flammable

Aniline 200 KL X 1 No Tank

Do ATP, Ambient

Flammable

Acetic Acid 100 KL X 2 No Tank

Do ATP, Ambient

Corrosive/ Flammable

Dil. Acetic Acid

25 KL X 2 No Tank

Do ATP, Ambient

Corrosive


Ethyl Acetate 25 KL X 1 No Tank 15 KL X 1No Tank

Do ATP, Ambient

Flammable Jumper clips on flanges Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking


procedure. Flame arrestor provided on

vent line of the tank MCB, ODCB, PDCB, DCB Plant Chlorine 209 Tonners Storage

Shed 10 Kg/cm2 Ambient

Toxic Chlorine Kit, Caustic Pit, SBA sets, Cl2 Shed, Cl2 Hood, EOT, etc. Provided.

Chlorine 200 Tonners Storage Shed

10 Kg/cm2 Ambient

Toxic

Benzene 40KLX4 Nos Tank Total : 160 KL

U/G Tank MS

ATP Fire Flame proof plant, pumping transfer, close process, etc.




Jumper clips on flanges Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking



vent line of the tank Hydrant system

Monochloro Benzene (MCB)

200KLX2Nos Tank


ATP Fire

PNCB 90KLX 2 Nos Tank

DO ATP Fire

ONCB 200KLX 1 No Tank

DO ATP Fire

Dichloro Benzene (DCB)

200KLX 1 No Tank


ATP Fire

NB, PNT, ONT, Plant

Toluene 40KLX4 Nos Tank Total : 160 KL

U/G Tank MS





Jumper clips on flanges Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking



vent line of the tank Hydrant system

Benzene 40KLX4 Nos Tank Total : 160 KL

U/G Tank MS

ATP Fire

Nitric Acid 20KLX3 Nos Tank

MS A/G Tank

ATP Corrosive Safety Showers provided Caution note provided


Sulphuric Acid

20KLX 1 No Tank

MS A/G Tank

ATP Corrosive Dyke wall provided Level gauge provided. Double drain valve

provided Scrubber provided Required PPEs provided to

all employees PNT (P-NitroToluene)

200KLX1No Tank

MS A/G Tank


Double Static earthing Dyke wall Jumper clips on flanges Hydrant system Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking


procedure. Flame arrestor Provided.

ONT O- Nitro Toluene

200 KLX 1 No Tank

MS A/G(V) Tank

ATP Fire

MNT (Meta Nitro Toluene)

90KL X1 No Tank 200KLX 1 No Tank Total : 290 KL

MS A/G (H) Tank MS A/G(V) Tank

ATP Fire

NB (Nitro Benzene)

150KLX 1 No Tank

ATP Fire

Sulphuric Acid Plant Sulfur powder 5000 MT Storage

yard ATP Fire Separate storage area.

Monitors provided surrounding the storage area.

Automatic conveyer system for charging in melter.

Oleum 65 % 250 MT X2 Nos Tank

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient









Oleum 23% 250 MT X 1No Tank

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Corrosive

Oleum 65 % 100 MT X 2 Nos. MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Corrosive

Liq Sulphur Trioxide

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Corrosive

Sulphuric Acid 98 %

1000 MT X 2 Nos. tank

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Corrosive

CSA Plant Chloro sulphonic Acid

50 KLX 3 Nos Tank 140 KL X 01 Tank

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient




Chloro sulphonic Acid

2000 MT X 2 Nos Tanks

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Corrosive


Dimethyl Sulfate (DMS)

200 MTX 3 Nos.

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire Full body protection will be provided to operator.





Dimethyl Aniline (DMA)

100 MTX 2 Nos.

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire

Diethyl Sulfate (DES)

200 MTX 2 Nos.

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire

Benzene Sulphonyl Chloride

100 MTX 2 Nos.

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire

DASDA

100 MTX 2 Nos. MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire

Methanol 60KLX 4 Nos Tank

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire Flame proof plant, pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Double Static earthing Jumper clips on flanges Hydrant system Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking



Ethanol 200 KL X 1 No. tank

MS A/G Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Fire

Ammonia Anhydrous ( Liquefied )

50 MT X 1 No. Bullet

MS bullet 350 C 4 to 10 kg/cm2

Toxic Flame proof equipment, pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Double Static earthing Dyke wall Scrubber provided Jumper clips on flanges Hydrant system Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking


procedure. SCBA sets available . Safety Showers provided Caution note provided Dyke wall provided Level gauge provided. Double drain valve


all employees Hydrochloric Acid

25 KL X 03 Nos A/G HDPE Tank

Atmospheric Ambient

Corrosive Safety Showers provided Caution note provided Dyke wall provided Level gauge provided. Double drain valve


all employees


TC plant (PROPOSED) Thyonile chloride

150KL X 03 Tank SS A/G Bullet

Atmospheric Ambient









Chlorine 140 Toner Storage Shed

10 Kg/cm2 Ambient

Toxic Chlorine Kit, Caustic Pit, SBA sets, Cl2 Shed, Cl2 Hood, EOT, etc. Provided.

Scrubber provided . Sulpher trioxide

100 MT X 02 Tank

MS Tank Atmospheric Ambient



all employees Chlorinated Paraffin Wax CPW (PROPOSED) HNP 65KLX 04 TANK MS Tank Atmospheric

Ambient Flammable Safety Showers provided

Caution note provided Dyke wall provided Level gauge provided. Double drain valve


all employees HCL 75KLX 6 TANK HDPE

TANK Atmospheric Ambient



all employees


Chlorinated Paraffin oil

20 KLX 03 FRP Atmospheric Ambient



all employees

Furnace Oil/ LDO

27 KLX 2 Nos U/G tanks

MS Tank Atmospheric Ambient

Fire Flame proof plant, pumping transfer, close process, etc.

Double Static earthing Jumper clips on flanges Hydrant system Fire extinguishers Fencing and No Smoking



HSD 21 KL Tank MS Tank Atmospheric Ambient

Fire


3.8 HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES OF THE CHEMICALS, COMPATIBILITIES, SPECIAL HAZARD AND ANTIDOTES Table-3.3

SR. NAME OF

CHEMICAL HAZARD FLASH

POINT 0 C

BP 0 C

LEL %

UEL %

SP.GR. 20 0 C

VD SOLUBILITY WITH WATER at 20 0 C

NFPA H F R

HAZARDOUS COMBUSTION PRODUCT

TLV PPM TWA

IDLH PPM

LC50 mg/m3

CARCINOGENIC CHARACTERISTI

C

ANTIDOT

1. Ethylene oxide CAS # 75-21-8

T/F/E - 17.8 10.6 3.0 100 0.869 1.5 2.0 % SOLUBLE

2 4 3 Irritating vapour

1.0 3.0 5748 ppm for 1 Hr. Rat

Yes Not available

2. Chlorine CAS #7782-50-5

T - -34.1 - - 1.424 - Boils 3 0 0 Toxic and irritating

gases

1 ppm 25 ppm

1017 For human

No milk, milk butter and

milk of magnesia.

3. Benzene CAS # 71-43-2

-11 81.1 1.3 7.9 0.879 2.8 Insoluble 2 3 0 - 0.5 ppm 500 ppm

24 ml/kg for rat for

2H

Yes Not available

4. Methanol F/T 10 54 5.4 44 0.792 1.1 Soluble 1 3 0 Irritating vapour

200 6000 LEL

64000 ppm for 4H rat

No 10 mg diazepam through injection

5. Toluene CAS # 108-88-3

F 4.0 111 1.1 7.1 0.87 3.2 Insoluble 2 3 0 Irritating Vapour

generated

50 2000 400 ppm for 24Hr

Rat

No Diazem – 1 mg/Kg.(Intrav

enous), Epinephina,

Efidrine 6. Ethanol

CAS # 64-17-5 F 17.7 78.2 3.3 19 0.790 1.6 Soluble 0 3 0 - 1000

ppm 3300 ppm

39 gm/m3 for 4H

Rat

No Diazepam 10 mg through

injection 7. Acetanilide

CAS # 103-84-4 T 173.8 303.8 - - 1.219 4.65 Insoluble 1 1 0 NOX Not

listed Not

listed 100 mg/L; 96 Hr Fish

No Milk, Activated

Charcoal or water

8. Ethyl Acetate CAS # 141-78-6

F -4.0 77.0 2.0 11.5 0.902 3.0 1 ml/10ml water

1 3 0 Irritating Vapour

generated

- 400 200 gm/m3

rat

No Not available

9. Acetic Acid CAS # 64-19-7

T / F 44.4 117.9 5.4 16.0 1.015 -- SOLUBLE

2 2 1 Irritating Vapour

generated

10 40 5620 ppm for 1 Hr

Rat

No Sodium Hydro-

Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime


Juice, Milk of Megnesia

10. Chloro Sulphonic Acid CAS # 7790-94-5

T/C - 155 - - 1.375 - Water reactive

3 0 2 Non combustible

0.2 mg/m3

- - No Sodium Hydro-



11. Caustic Lye CAS # 1310-73-2

T - - - - 2.13 - Soluble 3 0 1 Non combustible

- 10 mg/m3

No Apply Water

12. Sulfuric Acid CAS # 7664-93-9

C -- 340 -- -- 1.84 -- Water reactive

3 0 2 Non combustible

1 mg/m3

15 mg/m3

510 mg/m3 for

2H Rat

No Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime Juice,

Milk of Megnesia

13. Sulfur powder CAS # 7704-34-9

T/F 207 115 MP 35 g/m

3

1400

g/m3

- 8.9 None 2 1 0 Irritating fumes

generated

- - 9200 mg m-3 4h

No Not Available

14. Sulfur Trioxide CAS # 7446-11-9

C - 45 - - 1.92 2.76 Water reactive

- SO2 100 ppm

510 mg/m3 for 2H

Rat

Yes Classifie

d : 1

Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime Juice,

Milk of Magnesia

15. Aniline CAS # 62 – 53 - 3

C 75.5 184.1 1.3 11 1.022 - Insoluble 3 2 0 Toxic Vapour 2 ppm 100 ppm

175 ppm for 7H mouse

Yes Mitholene Blu – 1%

Excartric Acid – 5%

16. Hydrochloric Acid HCL

C/T NF 108 NF NF 1.12 -1.19

1.267 Soluble 3 0 1 N A 5 ppm 50 ppm 3124 ppm for 1h rat

No Sodium Hydro-



17. Ammonia (Anhydrous) CAS # 7664-41-7

C - - 33.3 15.50 27 0.682 0.6 Insoluble 3 1 0 N A 25 ppm 300 ppm

7040 mg/m3

for3 0 Mnt Rat-

No Smelling Ethanol or

Ether


18. O- Nitro Toluene CAS # 64-17-5

T/F 106 222 2.0 - 1.16 4.73 Insoluble 2 1 4 Irritating Vapour

generated

2 ppm 200 ppm

790 mg/m3

Rat

No Mitholene Blu – 1%,


19. P- Nitro Toluene CAS # 99-99-0

C 106.1 238.3 - - 1.286 4.72 Insoluble 3 1 0 Toxic Oxides of Nitrogen

2 ppm 200 ppm

975 mg/m3

Rat

No Mitholene Blu – 1%,


20. Oleum CAS # 8014-95-7

T/C - - - - 1.91-1.97 - Insoluble 3 0 2 Toxic and irritating vapors

1 mg/m3 15 mg/m3

510 mg/m

3 for

2 hrs RAT

No Sodium Hydro-


Juice, Milk of Magnesia

21. Nitric Acid CAS # 7697-37-2

C -- 121 -- -- 1.408 2.5 Soluble 3 0 0 - 4 67 ppm

(NO2)/4H.

260 mg/m3/30

M Rat

Yes Sodium Hydro-



22. Chloro Benzene CAS # 108-90-7

T/F 28 132 1.3 9.6 1.11 3.9 Insoluble 2 3 0 Phosgene & Hydrochloric

gases generated

10 ppm 10 ppm

22,000 ppm Rat


enous) Epinephina,

Efidrine 23. Ortho Dichloro

Benzene (ODCB) CAS # 95-50-1

T/F 66 180-183 2.2 9.2 1.3 5.1 Insoluble 2 2 0 CO, CO2, HCL

- 25 ppm

8150 mg/m3 for 4H

Rat


enous) Epinephina,

Efidrine 24. Para Dichloro

Benzene (PDCB) CAS # 106-46-7

T/F 66 180 - - 1.25 5.1 Insoluble 2 2 0 CO, CO2, HCL

10 ppm 10 ppm

> 6.0 mg/ m3 for 4-

hr Rat


enous) Epinephina,

Efidrine 25. Nitro Benzene

( NB) CAS # 98-95-3

T/F 88 211 1.8 40.0 1.2 4.3 0.2 3 2 1 Irritating Vapour

generated

- 1 ppm 556 ppm for 4H

Rat


enous) Epinephina,

Efidrine 26. Thionyl Chloride T - 76 1.64 4.6 - - Water 4 0 2 sulfur dioxide, 1 ppm Not 500 ppm No natural oil and


CAS # 771909-7 reactive sulfur chloride determined

for 1 Hr Rat one table spoon sodium or magnesium sulphate with one glass of

water. one cup strong tea or

coffee. 27. Di methyl sulphate

CAS #77-78-1 T/C 83 188.8 3.6 23.2 1.33 4.35 Soluble 3 2 0 CO , Toxic

vapour 0.1 ppm 10

ppm 45 mg/m3 for 4H Rat

No Cotirco steroid injection.

28. Aluminum Chloride CAS #7446-70-0

C/T - - - - 2.44 4.5 - 3 0 2 Toxic fumes 5 ppm 100 ppm

- No 2 to 5 gm sodium

thiosulphate in 5% sodium bi

carbonate solution in 200

ml 29. Sodium Hydroxide

CAS #1310-73-2 C - very

high - - - - Miscible 3 0 1 Toxic fumes

of sodium oxide.

2 mg/m3 200 mg/m3

2300 mg/m3 for

2H Rat

No Sodium Hydro-Carbonate (4% Conc.), Milk, Lime Juice,

Milk of Magnesia

F = FIRE T = TOXIC E = Explosive R = REACTIVE BP = BOILING POINT LEL = LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT UEL = UPPER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT SP.GR = SPECIFIC GRAVITY VD = VAPOUR DENSITY ER = EVAPORATION RATE H = HEALTH HAZARD CLASS F = FIRE HAZARD CLASS R = REACTIVE HAZARD BR = BURNING RATE TLV = THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUE PPM = PARTS PER MILLION STEL = SHORT TERM EXPOSURE LIMIT NFPA = NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION-usa


3.9 Facilities / System for process safety, transportation, fire fighting system and emergency capabilities to be adopted

Following facilities and system will be installed / implemented. 1. Total enclosed process system. 2. DCS operation plant. 3. Instrument & Plant Air System for control all parameters. 4. High level, low level, High pressure, low pressure, high temp, high

flow, low flow indication and cut off interlocking provided on storage as well as process reactors.

5. Safety valve, rupture disk provided on reactor and pressure storage tanks.

6. Static earthing and electric earthing (Double) will be provided. 7. Jumpers for static earthing on pipeline flanges of flammable chemical

provided. 8. Flame proof light fitting installed where ever it is required. 9. Emergency handling equipments like SCBA sets, Fire extinguishers,

Gas mask, PPEs, Chlorine emergency Kit, chlorine hood, caustic pit , Air l ine respirator, provided.

10. Full fledge ETP plant made and it will take care of liquid effluent of the plant and final discharge parameter will be maintained as per GPCB norms.

11. Scrubbers provided on all process vent and air monitoring carried out and parameters will be maintained as per GPCB norms. Fire Water reservoir for fire hydrant and sprinkler system.

12. Storage tank area are away from the process plant and Separation Distance has been maintained.

13. Dyke wall provided to all above ground storage tanks, collection pit with valve provided.

14. Flame arrestor with breather valve is installed on flammable material storage tank vent.

15. Lightening arrestor on all chimneys and building provided. 16. Fencing and caution notes and hazard identification boards displayed. 17. Only authorized person are permitted in storage tank farm area. 18. Safety permit for hazardous material loading unloading is prepared

and implemented. 19. Static earthing provision is made at all loading unloading points of

flammable chemical storage tank farm area. 20. TREM CARD provided to all transporters and trained for

transportation Emergency of Hazardous chemicals. 21. Fire hydrant system and water sprinkler system installed at tank farm

area. 22. Caution note, safety posters, stickers and emergency preparedness

plan will be displayed.


23. Emergency facilities and medical emergency facilit ies are available at site. Occupational Health centre facility generated at factory premises and paramedical staff is available round the clock.

24. Wind direction indicators are provided. 25. Safety Shower and eye wash are installed at acid/ alkali handling area. 26. Tele Communication system and mobile phone will be used in case of

emergency situations for communication. 27. Emergency siren installed at main gate as well as in all plant. 28. Training programme are being conducted regularly and induction

training are being provided to all employees on chemical safety and process safety.

3.10 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS AND FLOW CHART

3.10.1 Vinyl Sulphone & Vinyl Sulphone Condense:

Chloro Sulphonation: Chloro Sulphonic Acid is charged into the sulphonation reactor. Acetanilide is then slowly added to maintain the temperature below 80° C. The temperature is then maintained between 50-60 °C. The batch thus prepared is transferred to the storage tank. Dumping: Sulphonated mass is charged into the Reactor cooled with brine. Ice water is then added slowly to remove all the HCl formed due to decomposition of excess Chloro Sulphonic Acid. The HCl is scrubbed and absorbed in water to make HCl. Further Ice water is added to dilute the concentrated Sulfuric Acid formed due to the decomposition of Chloro Sulphonic Acid. Here we get of Sulfuric Acid of strength 30-40%. The mass is then filtered out (ASC Cake). Reduction: Sodium Bi Sulphite slurry is added to the reactor. The pH is maintained neutral by adding Caustic Lye. The ASC wet cake is then charged under controlled temperature and pH. After addition is over the temperature is raised up to 50 °C. The mass is then filtered and transferred to condensation vessel. Condensation: The reduction mass in condensation vessel is maintained at 50°C. Ethylene Oxide is slowly added. The pH is maintained to 5-7 by adding dilute sulphuric acid. The material after condensation is transferred to the Nutsch Filter. The Mother liquor is stored in storage tank. The condensed product is then washed and dried.


NHCOCH3

+ 2Cl.SO3H

ACETANILIDE

NHCOCH3

+

SO2Cl

HCl + H2SO4

CHLORO SULPHONIC ACID

NHCOCH3

+

SO2Cl

NaOH + NaHSO3

NHCOCH3

+

SO2Na

Na2SO4 + NaCl

NHCOCH3

+

SO2Na

H2SO4 + H2O

O

H2C CH2

+

NHCOCH3

SO2CH2CH2OH

+ Na2SO4

ETHYLENE OXIDE

NHCOCH3

SO2CH2CH2OH

+ H2SO4

NH2

SO2CH2CH2OSO3H

+ CH3COOH

VINYL SULPHONE

Esterification: The condensed product is charged in esterification reactor. Concentrated Sulphuric Acid is added. The temperature is then raised and maintained at 160°C for 4 hours. Vacumm is applied to take out acetic acid vapors and being condensed. The product is then collected a tank. The dried Vinyl Sulphone is pulverized and packed in PVC bags. Chlorosulphonation:

Reduction:

Ethoxylation:

Esterification:


Process Flow Chart:

Acetanilide 2182CHLOROSULPHONIC ACID 10182

12364

Ice 14545 DUMPING(ICE)

26909

FILTERATION(Nutch) H2SO4 (35-40%)

12364 14545

SOD. BISULPHITE SLURRY(30%) 6545

CAUSTIC LYE 218221091

PRODUCT FROM FILT

ETHYLENE OXIDE 1018H2SO4 2269.00

24378.00

Salt

FILTER 17753SODIUM SULPHITE

SALT (BYPRODUCT)

8299

6625.00

ETP

CONDENSED PRODUCT 9454

6625.00

2262 MOISTURE LOSS

DRYER

4363.00

PRODUCT FROM Dryer

H2SO4 1455 ESTERIFICATION

5818.00ACETIC ACID

1818

VINYL SULPHONE

4000.0

CHLOROSULPHONATION

REDUCTION

ETHOXYLATION

MASS BALANCE/FLOW CHART OF THE VINYL SULPHONE


3.10.2 Sulphuric Acid

The process for the manufacture of sulphuric acid comprise the following steps:

1. Solid Sulphur after weighment is fed to sulphur melter which is provided with steam coils. The ash content of the molten sulphur settles in the melter cum settler and molten sulphur free of impurities is pumped to the sulphur burner where it is burnt with air. Sulphur is converted in to SO2 in the sulphur burner as per the following reaction S + O2 SO2

2. SO2 is further converted to SO3 in presence of Vanadium Pentoxide catalyst in the converter as per the following reaction:

3. SO2 + ½ O2 SO3 The conversion of SO2 to SO3 is carried out in stages in all the five pass of the convertor. The conversion is optimized by intermediate cooling of gases between the different stages and also by interpass absorption of SO3 after 3rd pass of the convertor.

4. The gas from the 3rd & 5th pass of the convertor containing SO3 is cooled & then fed to the interpass & final absorption tower where SO3 is removed by circulating Sulphuric Acid in the absorption towers. The concentration of sulphuric acid is controlled by addition of water in the pump tank.

5. Air for sulphur burner is routed through Air Filter to drying tower and further to suction

side of Centrifugal Air Blower. 98.5% acid is circulated through drying tower at 70°C, thus heating to 125°C before entering sulfur burner. This system helps to increase generation of steam and hence power generation.

6. SO2 emission during start up of the plant is controlled by a Venturi Scrubber using alkali as scrubbing medium. The plant therefore does not cause any pollution either during start up or during normal operation. The process as described above has been divided into five main sections described as follows: • Sulphur Circuit

The weighed quantity of sulphur of about 99.5% purity is fed to the first compartment of sulphur melter. The heat for melting sulphur is provided through steam coils. The optimum pressure to be maintained for melting sulphur in the first compartment is upto 7 kg/cm2 G. The molten sulphur flows from compartment no. 1 to pumping compartment through underflows/overflows. The sulphur pumps for feeding sulphur are fitted in pumping compartment. The total time of retention in the compartments corresponds to more than 72 hrs at normal rated production capacity of the plant. In order to achieve


optimum results, it is necessary that the feeding of sulphur to the melter should be maintained at specified temperature of 135 °C. All compartments are fitted with steam coil to provide the necessary heat for maintaining the temperature of molten sulphur at the desired level. Molten sulphur from the pumping compartment is pumped to the sulphur burner through one of the submersible type sulphur pumps through specially designed sulphur feeding gun. The rate of feed of sulphur to the sulphur burner is controlled by operation of sulphur feed control valve. Drain lines have been provided in the molten sulphur discharge line at two different points. The optimum steam pressure for coils located in 2nd, 3rd , 4th through pumping compartments of the sulphur melter is around 4 kg/cm2 G. This regulated steam pressure is achieved through pressure reducing valve. Molten sulphur line starting from the discharge flange of the sulphur pump to the inlet of the sulphur burner is suitably steam jacketed to maintain correct temperature of molten sulphur fed to the sulphur burner.

• SO2 Scrubber It is very important that SO2 emission during plant startup is controlled within persmissible limits. This is achieved by use of a alkali scrubber located after the final absorption tower where gas is scrubbed with circulating alkali solution.

• DM and Water Softening Plants For generation of steam of high quality DM water is required for this purpose RO plant and DM plant will be installed.

• The plant is provided with data logging system through DCS control circuits for control of parameters like Acid concentration control, pump tank level control, Boiler feed water level control, boiler feed water from deaerator temperature control. All the output signals are fed to a computer and output data is collected based on reports to be prepared including log sheets.

Chemical Reaction:

S + O2 SO2

SO2 + 1/2O2 SO3

SO3 + H2O H2SO4

Overall S 3/2O2 + H2O H2SO4

M.W 32 48 18 98


3.10.3 Oleum & SO3

Oleum (23%) Oleum 23% is manufactured by absorbing SO3 gas with Sulphuric Acid. H2SO4 + SO3 H2S2O7 Oleum 23% means free SO3 in the product is 23%, which is equivivalent to 105.17% Sulphuric Acid. This way 23% Oleum is equivalent to 1.07 of 98% Sulphuric Acid. The sulphur required for 1 ton of 23% oleum is 0.326 x 1.07 = 0.349 ton. Oleum (65%) Oleum 65% means, the free SO3 in this product is 65% which is equivalent to 114.626% sulphuric acid. This way the oleum 65% is equivalent to 1.17 times of 98% sulphuric acid. The sulphur required for 1 ton of 65% Oleum 0.326 x 1.17 = 0.381 ton Liquid SO3 Liquid SO3 is = 1.25 times of 98% Sulphuric Acid. The Sulfur required for 1 ton of liquid SO3 = 0.326 x 1.25 = 0.41 ton.


Sulphur Metler (135°C)

163.25 MT

904341 M3 Air Drying Tower Furnace (1100°)

(Oxygen: 245 MT)

Water

WHB Steam Steam Turbine to Generate

4 MW Power

Convertor (upto 3rd pass)

100 MTDM Water

H2SO4 (98.5%)

Acid Pump Tank PIPAB(Inter Pass

Absorption Tower

99% H2SO4

Convertor (4th pass)

Oleum Storage

(23% or 65%)

99% H2SO4

H2SO4 (98.5%) Storage

Final Absorption Tower

Alkali Scrubbe

r

Vent to Atmosphere

Wastewater 500 MT/Day 0.8 KLD

Oleum Tower

Oleum Pump Tank (Oleum 23%

or 65%)

PROCESS FLOW CHART OF H2SO4(98.7%), Oleum (23% & 65%)


SO3 + HCl ClSO3H(l) (g) (l)80 36.5 116.5

1567 HCl Chilling

1567Chilled HCl

H2SO4 Gas Cleaning Bleed

1567Dry HCl 99.90%

3433 Liq SO3 Reactor

100.00% Gas to StackCaustic

Scrubber0.8 Castic Solution Wastewate To ETP

10% 0.8 KL/Month

5000Chlorosulphonic Acid

MASS BALANCE OF CHLOROSULPHONIC ACID

Condenser SO3 Liquid

7500

Oluem Pump Tank (23%)

8070

Oleum Tower (23%)

SO3 Convertor (132 °C)

PROCESS FLOW CHART OF SO3 LIQUID 3.10.4 Chloro Sulphonic Acid

The HCl gas is refrigerated and cleaned in gas cleaning tower. The dry HCl is reacted with liq SO3 to get Chloro Sulphonic Acid. The unconverted gas is scrubbed in caustic scrubber.

Chemical Reaction:

Mass Balance:


3.10.5 Sulfonation (of ONT/PNT, Tobias, VS)

Take ONT/PNT in as sulfonator and charge 98% Sulphuric Acid and 65% Oluem in it slowly. After completion of reaction blow sulfomass in another vessel containing water, charge common salt, mix it, cool it and filter in neutsch. Material is then centrifuge. Collect filterate as Spent Sulphuric Acid for sale. Sulphonated ONT/PNT from centrifuge is then packed in HDPE bags and sent for sale. For Tobias, Take Oleum (65%) in sulfonator, charge Tobias Acid slowly and after completion of charging raise temperature and maintain it. Now cool the sulphonated mass and blow it in Brine water. Allow for mixing, filter and give wash of brine water. Centrifuge the mass and collect the wet cake as product and packed in HDPE bags. Chemical Reaction (o-NT/p-NT):

98

178

o-Nitro Toluene Sulphonated Sulfuric Acido-NT

137 217 98

CH3NO2 H2SO4

H2S2O7

CH3NO2

SO3H

+ H2SO4

Chemical Reaction: (Tobias)

+ H2S2O7 + H2SO4

Tobias Acid (TA) STA (Sulfo Tobias Acid)223 178 303 98

NH2

SO3H SO3HNH2

SO3H

MASS BALANCE:

ONT 137H2SO4 98H2S2O7 178

413

Water 18Common Salt 117(NaCl) 548

Spent Acid (25%)Filteration (Water+Salt+Sulfuric Acid)

217 331

Centrifuge 2(Recycle to Drawning Vessel)

Wet Cake215

Sulfonator

Drawning Vessel

MASS BALANCE OF SULPHONATION ONT/PNT


3.10.6 BENZENE SULPHONYL CHLORIDE

Benzene is reacted with Chloro Sulphonic Acid in a agitated vessel at low temperature at about 20 -25 °C. Chloro Sulphonic Acid is used in excess for the reaction. The reacted mass is then kept under agitation for some time. It is then transferred to another vessel containing chilled water. During the addition, the vessel is cooled up to desire temperature till the addition complete. The contents are kept under agitation for some time. The mass is then separated. The acid layer is transferred to the storage tank for sale. The organic layer is washed, dried & distilled under vacuum to get the product. The HCl gas evolved during the reaction & isolation is send to CAS plant for making Chloro Sulphonic Acid.

Chemical Reaction:

C6H6 + HOSO2Cl C6H5SO2Cl + HCl

Benzene CSA BSC Hydrochloric Acid Gas(l) (l) (l) (g)

M.W 78 116.5 176.5 36.5 Mass Balance/Flow Chart:

663 Benzene HCl gas

1980 CSA 310

2333

Isolation Dilute H2SO4

1500 833

DistillationCrude

Dimethyl Sulphone

1485 15

Benzyl Sulphonyl Chloride

MASS BALANCE OF BENZYL SULPHONYL CHLORIDE

Reactor

3.10.7 Thionyl Chloride

Sulphur is charged in sulfur monochloride reactor along with chlorine in measured quantity and reacted over a period of 12 hours to Sulphur Monochloride (SMC), which is stored for further reaction. Thionyl Chloride reacted is fed with SMC, SO3 and Chlorine. Reactor is fitted with fractionating column. TC gas thus produced is passed through 3 condenser, out of which first condenser used cooling water and other two condenser use chilled water. Crude TC is then sent to Distillation column as reflux. A part of crude TC is reacted with sulfur to get pure Thionyl Chloride.


818 Sulphur890 Chlorine

17082044 SO3 To Sulfuric Acid & SBS plant (Recycle)890 Chlorine 1627

3015

2400Product

600Product

15Total Product 3000

MASS BALANCE OF THIONYL CHLORIDE

SMC Reactor

TC Reactor

Condenser

Distillation Column

Alkali Scrubber is provided to absorb SO2 when required; similarly chlorine scrubber removes traces of chlorine. Byproduct is recycled back to sulfuric acid plant, where it is converted to Sulphur Trioxide for reuse in TC Plant.

Chemical Reaction:

2S + Cl2 S2Cl2

Sulphur Chlorine Sulphur Monochloride (SMC)

64 70 134

S2Cl2 + 2SO3 + Cl2 2SOCl2 + 2SO2

134 160 70 236 128

SMC Sulphur Trioxide Chlorine TC

Overall Chemical Reaction:

2S + 2Cl2 + 2SO3 2SOCl2 + 2SO2

64 140 160 236 128

Mass Balance:

3.10.8 DASDA

Sulfuric Acid & Oluem (65%) are taken in Sulfonator, Para Nitro Toluene (PNT) is then charged. The mass in then dumped in to the water, cooled and filtered in Neutsch filter. The acid is then separated, The mass (PNTOSA) is then oxidized with sodium hypochloride. After completion of the reaction common salt is charged at the room temperature the mass is then filtered in Neutsch Filter . Then reduction of PNTOSA is carried out with Fe, HCl and NH4Cl. Filter the reduction mass & isolate the filterate using dilute H2SO4 & filter it in Neutsch filter. Material thus prepared is DASDA. Which is then centrifuged and packed in the HDPE bags.


PNT 63H2SO4 45Oleum 82

190Water 20Salt 15

225

Neutsch Filter 58 To ETP

167

Centrifuge 30 ML(Recycle)137 Drawning

Common Salt 15Soda Ash 18NaOCl 69Water 25

264

Neutsch Filter 58 To ETP206

Centrifuge 5 ML(Recycle)201 Drawning

Fe 5HCl 8NH4Cl 15

229

Filter Press 27 To ETP202

Isolation Vessel

202

Neutsch Filter 26 To ETP176

Centrifuge 6 ML(Recycle)170 Isolation Vessel

Product

DASDA

MASS BALANCE OF DASDA

Sulfonator

Drawning Vessel

Oxidation

Reduction Vessel

PNT(137) 98 178 PNTSA (217)

+ 2HCl + 3H2O2NaOCl +H2O

217 149 18 474 73 54

Fe/HCl

NH4Cl

(DNSDA) Di-Sodium Salt (Nitro form) Di-Sodium Salt (Amino form)414

+ H2SO4

414 370DASDA

CH3

+

NO2

H2SO 4 + H2S2O7 2H2SO4

CH3

NO2

+SO3H

O2N

SO3Na

- C = C

H H

SO3N

NO2 H2N

SO3Na

- C = C

H H

SO3N

NH2

H2N

SO3Na

- C = C

H H

SO3N

NH2 H2N

SO3H

- C = C

H H

SO3H

NH

CH3

NO2

+SO3H

2 O2N

SO3Na

- C = C

H H

SO3N

NO2

Chemical Reaction:

Mass Balance:


3.10.9 Power Generation of 10 MW (Coal)

For power generation steam will be generated from the boiler, which is then sent to steam turbine to generated the power. At the outlet of the turbine steam goes to condenser to recover the water utilized and further sent back to the boiler. The fuel utilized for the boiler will be Coal. To generated 10 MW, a steam of 40 MTD required, which is generated from the coal based boiler. The coal consumption for the required steam would be approximately 10 MTD. For Power plant, separate coal yard will be made in which coal will be stored, from coal yard the coal will be sent to crusher. The crushed coal is then sent to silo for ultimate feed in to the combustion chamber. Process Flow Chart:

High Pressure Steam45 kg/cm2

410°C

Exhaust0.1 kg/cm2

100 °CCondenser Condensate back to

Boiler feed water

Turbine GeneratorSet

3.10.10 Sodium Bi Sulphite

Sodium Carbonate and Water is charged in the reactor. Sulphur Dioxide is then passed slowly to the reactor. The mass is then allowed for continuous mixing. The material thus prepared is Sodium Bi Sulphite.

Chemical Reaction:

Na2CO3 + 2SO2 + H2O 2NaHCO3 + CO2106 64 18 208 28

Sodium SBSCarbonate

Mass Balance:

CO2Sodium Carbonate 106 28SO2 64Water 18

160

Reactor

MASS BALANCE OF SODIUM BI SULPHITE


1979 Liq SO3DME Gas

1138

1524 Methanol Day Tank Heat Exchanger

Reactor Containing

Al2O3 Catalyst(260°C)

Reactor

386 Water To ETP Condensation Tank

Pure Dimethyl Sulphate 3000 Distillation

11798% Spent Sulfuric Acid

MASS BALANCE OF DIMETHYL SULPHATE

3.10.11 Dimethyl Sulphate Methanol from day tank in the plant is taken through metering pump passed through heat exchanger and condenser in gas cycle. The methanol gas is passed through the aluminum catalyst, further it is reacted with liquid SO3. The ration of consumption of methanol + SO3 for DMS produced is as follows:

SO3 = 0.70 MT Methanol = 0.55 MT.

The moisture shall be collected out of Methanol and sent to ETP. After reaction of SO3 + Methanol gas in a closed reaction , Which will have chilled water circulation in jacket. The crude DMS formed is having a high acidity. The distilled and acid thus produced is 98% Sulphuric Acid. This is a by product and will be sold.

260°C2 CH3OH CH3-O-CH3 + H2O

Catalyst(Al2O3)Methanol Dimethyl Ether

2 x 32 46 18

CH3-O-CH3 + SO3 (CH3)2SO4

Dimethyl Sulphate46 126

SO3 + H2O H2SO4

80 18 98

Chemical Reaction:

Mass Balance :


260°C2 CH3OH CH3-O-CH3 + H2O

Catalyst(Al2O3)Methanol Dimethyl Ether2 x 32 46 18

CH3-O-CH3 + C6H5NH2 (CH3)2C6H5NH2

Dimethly Aniline46 93 123

DME GasAniline1134

560

780 Methanol Day Tank Heat Exchanger

Reactor Containing Aluminium Catalyst

Reactor

220 Water To ETPCondensation

Tank

1694

1500 Pure Dimethyl Aniline Distillation

194Wastewate to ETP

MASS BALANCE OF DIMETHYL ANILINE

3.10.12 Dimethyl Aniline Methanol from day tank in the plant is taken through metering pump passed through heat exchanger and condenser in gas cycle. The methanol gas is passed through the aluminum catalyst, further it is reacted with Aniline. The product is then distilled to get Dimethyl Aniline The moisture shall be collected out of Methanol and sent to ETP.

Chemical Reaction:

Mass Balance:

3.10.13 Diethyl Sulfate

Ethyl Alcohol and SO3 reacts in presence of catalyst Sodium Sulphate and Urea and formed Ethyl Hydrogen Sulfate (EHS). This EHS mass is ammoniated by ammonia and EHS gets converted into Diethyl Sulfate. Ammonia is passed in Ethyl Hydrogen Sulfate mass. The product thus formed is crude Diethyl Sulphate. Moisture content present in the Ethyl Alcohol reacts with SO3 and forms Sulphuric Acid. Distillation of crude EHS takes place under vacuum. The pure DES is produced and transported to the storage tanks.

Chemical Reaction:


2C2H5OH + 2SO3 2C2H5OSO3HCatalyst

Ethyl Alcohol Ethyl Hydrogen Sulfate92 160 228

2C2H5OSO3H + NH3 (C2H5)2SO4 + NH4SO4

EHS Ammonia Diethyl Sulfate Ammonium Sulfate228 17 154 114

896 Ethyl Alcohol

1558 SO3

3542100

NH3166

2266

Spent ST Tank766

1500Pure Diethyl Sulfate

MASS BALANCE OF DIETHYL SULFATE

Reactor (Catalyst: Urea+Sod. Sulfate)

Cooler

Ammoniation Reactor

Distillation

Mass Balance:

3.10.14 Calcium Chloride

Calcium Carbonate is reacted with Hydrochloric Acid to get Calcium Chloride.

Chemical Reaction:

2CaCO3 +4 HCl 2CaCl2 + 2 HCO3


0.2Water

5 Lime Stone Ventury Scrubber (Alkali)ETP

4 HCl 0.29

Sludge to ETP1

8 CaCl2 Clear Liquid

Mosture Loss

5Dry CaCl2

Product

Reactor

Filter Press

MASS BALANCE OF CALCIUM CHLROIDE

Evaporator

Mass Balance:

3.10.15 Di Calcium Phosphate

Rock Phosphate is reacted with Hydrochloric Acid to generated Phosphoric Acid, which is further reacted with Lime stone to get DCP which separated and crystallized.

Ca F2 3 ( Ca3(PO4)2) + 14 HCl 7 CaCl2 + 3Ca H(PO4)2 + 2HF Chemical Reaction:

3Ca (OH)2 6CaHPO4 DCP

Rock Phosphate 1800

HCl (30%) 36005400

Lime 200

5600

Hydrated Lime 200

Sodium Silicate 105810

Filteration Process Sludge5310 500

Recycle to Reactor to recover DCP 1500 Centriguge

3810

Dryer Mositure Loss3000 810

Finished Product

Reactor

Neutralisation

Separation

MASS BALANCE OF DI CALCIUM PHOSPHATE

Mass Balance:


3.10.16 Sulphur Mono Chloride Sulphur Monochloride is generated by reacting sulphur & Hydrochloric Acid in a reactor.

Chemical Reaction:

2S + Cl2 S2Cl2

Sulphur Chlorine Sulphur Monochloride (SMC)

64 70 134

95.5 Sulphur104.5 Chlorine

200

MASS BALANCE OF SULPHUR MONOCHLORIDE

SMC Reactor

Mass Balance:

3.10.17 Sulphuryl Chloride

Sulphur, Chlorine & Sulphur Trioxide is reacted to gether to get Sulphuryl Chloride. Chemical Reaction

:

S + 3Cl2 + 2SO3

3SO2Cl2

32 210 160 402

Sulphuryl Chloride

Mass Balance:

16 Sulphur17.5 Chlorine

33.580 SO3

89.5 Chlorine203

190Product

13

Residue Product 103

Reactor

Reactor

Condenser

Distillation Column

MASS BALANCE OF SULPHURYL CHLORIDE


Water

860 Alumina Hydrate/Bauxite

456 Sulphuric Acid1316

1316

456 Sulphuric Acid

Mouldingin to Slab

Reactor

Settling Tank

Reactor

MASS BALANCE OF ALUM

3.10.18 Aluminium Sulphate (Alum) Aluminium Sulphate is manufactured by the reaction of Aluminia Hydrate and Bauxite with Sulphuric Acid. Bauxite is ground in the pulveriser to 90% passing through 200 mesh and elevated to batch hopper through bucket elevator. Measure quantity of water is added in the lead bonded reactor and slowly sulphuric acid is to be added in the reactor.. After getting the required temperature in the reactor, slowly ground bauxite i.e added. After the addition of measure quantity of bauxite/alumina hydrate, the agitator is kept on for about 45 minutes, solution is then dumped in to the settling tank. The decanted solution of Aluminium Sulphate is then taken to the reactor and the required quantity of sulphuric acid is added after getting the required temperature Hydrated Alumina is added slowly. After addition, Aluminum Sulphate is moulded in the trays with the help of tray filling arrangements. The slabs after cooling are to be taken out from the trays and stacked in the store.

2Al(OH)3 + 3H2SO4 Al2(SO4)3 + 6H2O 156 294 342 108

Chemical Reaction:

Mass Balance:


350 Urea Reactor3300 SO3/Oleum

(23-25%) 3650R/C Mother Liquor

Mixing

5150

Separation Spent Acid2400 2750

100 Water Make -Up

2500

Cyrstallisation1500

1000

Packing/Bagging

Figure are in Ton/Month

MASS BALANCE OF SULFAMIC ACID

3.10.19 Sulfamic Acid

Urea & 23-25% Oleum are fed at controlled rates to reactor, which is cooled by chilled water/brine and cooling water. The reaction products are diluted by mixing with recycled mother liquor (available after separation of crystals of sulfamic acid). Temperature is controlled during mixing by chilled water/brine. Dilute acid streams (70% sulfuric acid) is separated after the mixing operation and is sold to SSP/Alum manufacturer.

NH2CONH2 + SO3 NH2CONHSO3H + CO2

Chemical Reaction:

NH2CONHSO3H + H2SO4 2NH2SO3H + CO2

Overall Reaction

NH2CONH2 + SO3 + H2SO4 2NH2SO3H + CO2

60 80 98 2 x 97 44

Mass Balance:


SECTION IV

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Risk assessment process rests on identification of specific hazards, hazardous areas and areas vulnerable to effects of hazardous situations in facilities involved in processing and storage of chemicals. In fact the very starting point of any such assessment is a detailed study of materials handled & their physical / chemical / thermodynamic properties within the complex at various stages of manufacturing activity. Such a detailed account of hazardous materials provides valuable database for identifying most hazardous materials, their behaviour under process conditions, their inventory in process as well as storage and hence helps in identifying vulnerable areas within the complex. Hazardous posed by particular installation or a particular activity can be broadly classified as fire and explosive hazards and toxicity hazards. Whether a particular activity is fire and explosive hazardous or toxicity hazardous primarily depends on the materials handled and their properties. It will be from the above discussion that study of various materials handled is a prerequisite from any hazard identification process to be accurate. Based on this study the hazard indices are calculated for subsequent categorization of units depending upon the degree of hazard they pose. In a Dyes Intermediates manufacturing plant main hazard handling of hazardous chemicals like Chlorine, Ethylene Oxie, Flammable solvents, corrosive and toxic chemicals, Natural Gas and HSD as a fuel in CPP, the primary concern has always been toxic release, fire and explosion prevention and control as these are the main hazard posed by such unit. This concern has grown through the lose of life, property and materials experienced after experienced after major disasters, which have occurred over the years. Identification of hazards is the most important step to improve the safety of any plant. The hazard study is designed to identify the hazards in terms of chemicals, inventories and vulnerable practices /operations.

The hazard evaluation procedures use as a first step by chemical process industries and petroleum refineries are checklists and safety reviews. Dow and Mond fire and explosion indices, which make use of past experience to develop relative ranking of hazards, is also extensively used. For predictive hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP), Fault tree analysis, Event tree analysis, Maximum credible accident and consequence analysis etc are employed.


4.2 Dow’s fire and Explosion Index (F & EI) 4.2.1 Steps in fire and explosion index calculation are given below : 4.2.2 Results of fire explosion and toxicity indices.

TABLE- 4.1

Sr.No

Material Stored

Storage Qty.

Nh Nf Nr MF

GPH SPH FEI Degree of hazard

Radius of expo.

(ft.)

Th Ts TI Degree of Hazard

1. Chlorine 900 Kg. X 209 Nos.

4 0 0 1 2.05 2.82 5.8 Light 4.9 325 125 26.41 Severe

2. Ethylene Oxide 15 MT Bullet

2 4 3 29 3.0 3.2 278 Severe

200 125 125 18.0 Severe

3. Sulfur Trioxide/ Sulfuric

100MTl x2 Tanks

3 0 2 1 2.9 3.3 9.57 Low hazard for fire

8 250 125 27.00 Severe

4. Benzene 40 KLx6 U/G Tanks

2 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Intermediate 106 125 125 16.38 Heavy

5. Toluene 40 KL X2 U/G Tanks

2 3 0 16 2.55 3 122.4 Intermediate 106 125 125 16.38 Heavy

6. Methanol 60 KLX4 Tanks

1 3 0 16 2.55 2.35 95.88 Moderate 78 50 50 5.3 Light

7. Oleum 150 MTx 2 Tanks

3 0 2 24 2.85 1.5 102.6 Intermediate 87 250 125 20.06 Severe

8. Sulfuric acid 1000MTX2 Tanks

3 0 2 1 2.9 3.3 9.57 Low hazard for fire

8 250 125 27.00 Severe

9. Nitric Acid 20 KLX 3 Tanks

2 1 0 4 2.90 3.0 34.8 Intermediate 28 125 75 7.9 Moderate

10. Thionyl Chloride 11. Ammonia 50 MT 3 1 0 4 3.75 2.91 10.9 Light 8 250 75 24.89 Heavy 12. FO 60 MT 0 0 0 10 2.2 2.4 52.8 Light 44 0 50 2.7 Light 13. HSD 20 0 2 0 10 2.55 1.93 49.21 Light 41 0 50 2.4 Light

Select Pertinent Process

Determine Material Factor

Calculate GHP(F1), General Process Hazards

Calculate SPH(F2), special process Hazards

Determine Hazard Factor F1 X F2 =F3

F3XMaterial Factor =F & E Index

Determine Exposure area


FEI= MF x GPH x SPH TI = Th + Ts x ( 1+ GPH tot + SPH tot ) ------------- 100

Nh = NFPA Health rating GPH = General Process Hazard Nf = NFPA Fire rating SPH = Special Process Hazard Nr = NFPA Reactive rating FEI = Fire Explosion Index MF = Material Factor Th = Penalty Factor Ts = Penalty for Toxicity TI = Toxicity Index

4.3 Failure Frequencies 4.3.1 Hazardous material release scenarios can be broadly divided into 2 categories

I) catastrophic failures which are of low frequency and II) ruptures and leaks which are of relatively high frequency. Releases from failure of gaskets, seal, rupture in pipelines and vessels fall in the second category whereas catastrophic failure of vessels and full bore rupture of pipelines etc fall into the first category.

4.3.2 Typical failure frequencies are given below:-

TABLE-4.2

Item Mode of failure Failure frequencies

Atmospheric storage

Catastrophic failure Significant leak

10-9 /yr 10-5 /yr

Process Pipelines < = 50 mm dia Full bore rupture

Significant leak 8.8 x 10-7 /m.yr 8.8 x 10-6 /m.yr

> 50 mm <=150mm dia Full bore rupture Significant leak

2.6 x 10-7 /m.yr 5.3 x 10-6 /m.yr

< 150 mm dia Full bore rupture Significant leak

8.8 x 10-8 /m.yr 2.6 x 10-6 /m.yr

Hoses Rupture 3.5 x 10-2 /m.yr


TABLE-4.3

TABLE-4.4


4.4 Identification of Hazardous Areas:

A study of process for manufacturing as given in chapter 2 of the report indicates the following: Various raw materials used in the manufacturing processes are listed in Table-3.2 in Section-3 along with mode / type of storage & storage conditions. It can be readily seen that raw materials even though hazardous in nature, are used in continuous process & inventory are low at process plant. However some chemicals such as Methanol, Chlorine are used / common in more than one process & therefore their inventory requirement is higher. Most of hazardous chemicals are stored in dedicated Explosive licence premises. List of chemicals stored in larger quantities is provided in Table-4.5 Following areas considered as a Hazardous area of the plant. (a) CCOE approved Chlorine tonner Shed (b) Class A petroleum storage tank farm (c) Ethylene Oxide Storage bullet tank farm ( CCOE approved licenced premises). (d) Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, SO3, CSA, TC & DMS storage area. (e) Anhydrous Ammonia storage tank (CCOE approved licenced premises)

4.4.1 Evaluation Of Hazards : 4.4.1.1 Major inventory of Hazardous chemicals within the factory premises are-

The materials were studied with respect to their flammability, reactivity and toxicity based on the criteria given by the NFPA (NFPA ratings). Material factor values were determined using these ratings. General process hazards and Special process hazards for all the materials stored were determined as per the guidelines given by DOW Chemicals Company in DOW Index. FEI values for all these materials were calculated form the above data. Value of material factor, General Process Hazard & Special Process Hazard as also FEI / TI values & degree of hazard are given in Table 4.1 It can be seen storage in tank farms is mostly in the Severe category due to pressure storage and highly flammable and toxic nature of chemicals. The radius of exposure for various tanks considering FEI Values is also calculated and presented in the Table.

4.4.1.2 Evaluation of Process Areas :

Existing and proposed Sulfuric Acid and Thyonil Chloride, VS, CSA & DMS plant are a state of the art Technology process fully automatic DCS operation and continuous process plant. Thus the inventory of hazardous chemicals is in the plant is very small.

Existing and proposed plants are generally controlled by Distributed Control System (DCS) to provide an integrated plant control built in safety devices provided. Process parameters control and interlocking are provided and foolproof safety interlocking and logics applied at design level and maintained.

Existing Captive Power Plant and proposed CPP plant gas base engine and NG will be used through pipe line.

From heat recovery of sulfuric acid plant, steam will be utilized in steam turbine for power generation.


Thus Produce units will do not warrant any detailed calculations as consequences due to any worst case scenario due to very quantity of material & damage is such a case is expected to be limited to within the factory premises.

Considering this, the risk analysis and consequences studies are concentrated on storage in bulk as per Table -3.2.


SECTION V

RISK ASSESSMENT 5.1 Effects Of Releases Of Hazardous Substances

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures / catastrophes, causing possible damage to the surrounding area. In the following discussion, an account is taken of various effects of release of hazardous substances and the parameters to be determined for quantification of such damages.

In case of release of hazardous substances the damages will depend largely on source strength. The strength of the source means the volume of the substance released. The release may be instantaneous or semi-continuous. In the case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in kg and in semi-continuous release the strength of the source depends on the outflow time (kg/s.). In order to fire the source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel. The physical properties, viz. Pressure and temperature of the substance determine the phase of release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid, liquid in equilibrium with its vapour or solids. Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the storage conditions the following situations may occur. The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system. In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool.

Pool Fire

In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be calculated on the basis of this pool. The heat load on object outside a burning pool of liquid can be calculated with the heat radiation model. This model uses average radiation intensity, which is dependent on the liquid. Account is also taken of the diameter-to-height ratio of the fire, which depends on the burning liquid. In addition, the heat load is also influenced by the following factors :

Distance from the fire The relative humidity of the air (water vapour has a relatively high

heat-absorbing capacity) the orientation i .e. horizontal/vertical of the objective irradiated with

respect to the fire.


Jet Fire The escaping jet of Hydrogen gas from a pipe line or a pipeline if ignited causes a jet flame. The direction and tilt of this jet flame will depend on the prevailing wind direction and velocity. The damage in case of such type of jet fire is restricted within the plant boundary limit. However, the ignited jet may impinge on other nearby vessel / equipment / pipeline causing a domino effect.

Fire Ball This happens during the burning of Methanol vapour cloud, the bulk of which is initially over rich (i.e. above the upper flammable limit.). The whole cloud appears to be on fire as combustion is taking place at eddy boundaries where air is entrained (i.e. a propagating diffusion flame). The buoyancy of the hot combustion products may lift the cloud form the ground, subsequently forming a mushroom shaped cloud. Combustion rates are high and the hazard is primarily thermal.

“UVCE” UVCE stands for unconfined vapor cloud explosion. The clouds of Hydrogen Gas mix with air (within flammability limit 3.0 % to 74 %) may cause propagating flames when ignited. In certain cases flame may take place within seconds. The thermal radiation intensity is severe depending on the total mass of Gas in cloud and may cause secondary fire. When the flame travels very fast, it explodes causing high over pressure or blast effect, resulting in heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such explosion is called UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion) and is most common cause of such industrial accident. BLEVE( Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Cloud Explosion ) Is a physical explosion, which occurs when the vapour side of a storage tank is heated by fire e.g. a torch. As a result of the heat the vapour pressure will rise and the tank wall will weaken. At a given moment the weakened tank wall will no longer be able to withstand the increased internal pressure and will burst open. As a result of the expansion and flash-off, a pressure wave occurs. With flammable gases, a fireball will occur. DISPERSION CASES : PLUMES : Plumes are continuous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Smoke from a chimney is an example. Plumes can cause FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS as secondary scenarios. PUFFS : Puffs are instantaneous release of hazardous gases and vapours. Puffs can give rise to FIRE BALLS and vapour cloud explosions(VCE). A special case of vapour cloud explosion is the Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapour Explosion (BLEVE).


SPILLS POOL: Spills are l iquid pools created by leaking liquid chemicals. Spills cause evaporation and dispersal of toxic gases and if the spilled liquid is flammable, then it can catch fire creating a pool fire also the vapours can cause explosion.

5.2 Identification of High Risk Areas :

Following areas considered as a High Risk area of the plant. (a) Chlorine tonner Shed ( CCOE licenced premises ) (b) Class A petroleum storage area ( CCOE licenced premises ) (c) Ethylene Oxide Storage bullet tank farm ( CCOE approved licenced premises). (d) Oleum, Sulfuric Acid, SO3, CSA, TC storage area. (e) Anhydrous Ammonia storage tank (CCOE approved licenced premises)

5.3 Modes of Failure:

5.3.1 Following failure are considered for detailed analysis and safe distances computed:

Liquid release due to catastrophic failure of storage vessel or road tanker. Liquid release through a hole/crack developed at welded joints/flanges / nozzles /

valves etc. Vapour release due to exposure of liquid to atmosphere in the above scenarios. Gas release due to catastrophic failure of gas/ liquid outlet valve failure.

Based on the above the following accident scenarios were conceived as most probable failure cases:

TABLE-5.1 Event Causes Tank on Fire/ - Catastrophic failure of tank + Ignition availability Pool fire - Failure of liquid outlet line + Ignition availability Fire Ball/ - Catastrophic failure of road tanker/ storage tank Flash Fire Vapour generation due to substrate and wind UVCE Vapour cloud generation and about 15 % of

total vapour mass Above the UEL-LEL % Ignition availability Toxic gas dispersion - Toxic Gas release due to catastrophic failure of tonner/bullet/ Tanks and ignition not available within LEL- UEL range. Considering the quantity of storages & nature of Toxic nature and Flammable storage, following scenarios were taken up for detailed analysis & safe distances computed : Catastrophic failure of road tanker of Methanol, Toluene, Benzene and presence of

ignition source poses heat radiation hazards to nearby areas. Dispersion of vapour up to LC-50 ( Fatal ), Immediate Danger to Life and Health

(IDLH ) and TLV ( Threshold Limit Value ) concentration Dispersion of vapour to toxic end points


Failure cases considered for consequence analysis are representative of worst-case scenarios. Probability of occurrence of such cases is negligible (less than 1 x 10-6 per year) because of strict adherence to preventive maintenance procedures within the complex. General probabilities for various failure is provided in Table-4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, but consequences of such cases can be grave & far reaching in case such systems fail during life history of the company. Hence such scenarios are considered for detailed analysis. It is to be noted however that such situations are not foreseeable or credible as long as sufficient measures are taken. Also, consequence analysis studies help us evaluate emergency planning measures of the Company.

Table-5.2

Scenario No.

Failure Type Failure Mode Consequence

1,2,3,4 Methanol, Benzene, Toluene, Ethanol road tanker catastrophic failure

Un loading arm 100 %

failure. Random failure

Un confined Pool fire Ball Fire, Flash Fire, UVCE

5,6,7,8,9, 10

Ethylene Oxide storage bullet catastrophic failure

Catastrophic failure

Pool fire, Ball Fire/ BLEVE, Flash Fire, UVCE, Puff

dispersion, Spill pool Evaporation up to LC 50,

IDLH and TLV level. 11 Puff Isopleth Simulation

For Chlorine Tonner Catastrophic Failure


Puff dispersion up to LC 50 Human, IDLH and TLV level.

12 Point source plume release for Chlorine liquid/ gas phase valve failure.

Random failure


14 Oleum storage Tank catastrophic failure


Spill pool Evaporation up to LC 50, IDLH and TLV level.

15 SO3 storage Tank catastrophic failure



16 CSA storage Tank catastrophic failure



17 TC storage Tank catastrophic failure



18 HCL storage Tank catastrophic failure



19 Sulfuric Acid storage tank catastrophic failure



20 Sulpher powder storage area fire

Due to source of ignition and

heat

Fire in storage area, Toxic release due to SO3 gas generated during fire

21 Anhydrous Ammonia storage bullet catastrophic failure




5.4 Damage Criteria For Heat Radiation:

Damage effects vary with different scenarios. Calculations for various scenarios are made for the above failure cases to quantify the resulting damages. The results are translated in term of injuries and damages to exposed personnel, equipment, building etc. Tank on fire /Pool fire due to direct ignition source on tank or road tanker or catastrophic failure or leakage or damage from pipeline of storage facilities or road tanker unloading arm, can result in heat radiation causing burns to people depending on thermal load and period of exposure.

All such damages have to be specified criteria for each such resultant effect, to relate the quantifier damages in this manner, damage criteria are used for Heat Radiation.

TABLE 5.3 DAMAGE CRITERIA – HEAT RADIATION

Heat Radiation Incident Flux KW/m2 Damage 38 100% lethality, heavy damage to tanks 37.5 100% lethality, heavy damage to equipment. 25 50% lethality, nonpiloted ignition 14 Damage to normal buildings 12.5 1% lethality, piloted ignition 12 Damage to vegetation 6 Burns (escape routes) 4.5 Not lethal, 1st degree burns 3 1st degree burns possible (personnel only in emergency allowed) 2 Feeling of discomfort 1.5 No discomfort even after long exposure


CHAPTER VI

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 6.1 Consequence analysis.

In the risk analysis study, probable damages due to worst case scenarios were quantified and consequences were analyzed with object of emergency planning. Various measures taken by the company and findings of the study were considered for deciding acceptability of risks.

6.1.1 Weather Data :

Average wind speed : 5 m / sec. Average Ambient Temperature : 35 deg. c. Average Humidity : 70 % Atmospheric Stability : A

6.1.2 Assumption :

6.1.2.1 For Class A Petroleum Road tanker catastrophic failure( Unloading arm 100 %

failure

Catastrophic failure is considered for 20 MT Methanol, Toluene, & Benzene road tanker while unloading and due to vapour cloud of evaporated solvent vapour mass comes in the contact with ignition source pool fire, UVCE, Ball Fire and Flash Fire scenarios were considered for various situation.

6.1.2.2 For Ethylene Oxide as follows.

♦ Pool Fire in 15 MT, 18.8 MT and 11.3MT E.O. storage Bullet ♦ Catastrophic failure is considered for E.O. Storage tanks and road

tanker while unloading and due to vapour cloud of E.O. If release vapour mass come in the contact with ignition source it may give various scenarios like UVCE, Ball Fire, Flash fire and BLEVE were considered for various situation.

♦ We have calculated following hazardous distance for the above mentioned scenarios.

♦ Fatality ( LC-50 ) ♦ Immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) concentration area ♦ TWA/TLV concentration distance( Meters)


6.1.2.3 For Chlorine supply system as follows.

♦ Chlorine tonner catastrophic failure i .e. 900 kg gas puff dispersion ♦ For Chlorine liquid/ gas phase valve failure release scenario, we have

considered release rate 1000 grms/sec. Maximum contents of the tonners will be release within 900 seconds or 15 minutes.


♦ Fatality ( LC-50 ) ♦ Reverse Injury Concentration (RIC-50 )for human ♦ Immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) concentration area ♦ TWA/TLV concentration distance( Meters)

6.1.2.4 For Oleum/ CSA/ DMS/ Sulfuric Acid / Thyonil Chloride storage tanks/ road

tanker as follows.

♦ Oleum Storage tank catastrophic failure i.e. So2 gas puff dispersion ♦ For Oleum outlet line valve failure release scenario, we have

considered release rate 1000 grms/sec. 900 kgs oleum release within 15 minutes.


♦ Fatality ( LC-50 ) ♦ Immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) concentration area ♦ TWA/TLV concentration distance( Meters)

6.1.2.5 For Ammonia release scenarios

♦ Ammonia tank catastrophic failure i .e. 50 MT gas puff dispersion ♦ Due to pool evaporation maximum evaporation rate will be 1442

g/sec. ♦ We have calculated following hazardous distance for the above

mentioned scenarios. ♦ Fatality ( LC-50 ) ♦ Immediate danger to life and health (IDLH) concentration area ♦ TWA/TLV concentration distance( Meters)


Scenario –1 Unconfined Pool Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE –1 Unconfined Pool Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : UNCONFINED POOL FIRE

Input Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 20 KL Max. IHR at flame centre height 180 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 25(m) Flame centre height 9.6 meter Pool liquid depth 0.1 (m) Maximum Flame width 9.59 meter Wind speed 6 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 1.34 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 791 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 58.82 Mims.

Incident Intensity of

Heat Radiation (IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance

( Meters )

Effect if IHR at Height of Simulation

37.5 13.5 Damage to process equipment. 100 % Fatal in 1 Min. 1 % fatal in 10 sec.

25.0 15.6 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). 100 % fatal in 1 Min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

12.5 22.1 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 % fatal in 1 min. 1 st deg. burn in 10 sec.

4.0 39.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 61.6 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results ♦ In the 13.5 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. ♦ In the 22.1 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 39 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 61.6 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –2 Fire Ball simulation for Solvent road tanker unloading catastrophic failure

TABLE –2 Fire Ball simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : FIRE BALL In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 20 KL Fire Ball radius 14.66 meter Mass of vapour Between LEL-UEL%

184 Kgs. Fire ball Intensity of Heat radiation

243 Kw /m 2

Heat of combustion 28500 Kj/Kg Fire Ball rate of energy release

658492 Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 6 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release

3.9e +006 Kj

Liquid Density 791 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 5.98 sec.

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation (IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2

IHR- Isopleth Distance ( Meters )

Damage effects

37.5 30 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact)

25.0 38 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant injury.

12.5 54 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn .

4.0 94 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 180 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results ♦ In the 30 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. ♦ In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 94 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 180 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –3 Flash Fire simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE –AB Flash Fire simulation Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : FLASH FIRE

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 20 KL Visible Flash Fire Height 34.38 meter Mass of Gas 184 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 17.19meter Heat of combustion 42267 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 5.99 sec. Fuel-Air volume ratio in Flash fire cloud

0.600 Radius of fuel-air cloud mixture 14.67 meter

Stochiometric Fuel-Air Mixture

0.133 Total energy release 2622000 Kj

Wind speed 6.0 m/s Max. Heat Radiation from 1 m from Flash Fire

162 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 1.29 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.5


level KW /m 2


Damage effects


25.0 38 Significant injury. Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ).



Results ♦ In the 30 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min. and first degree burn in 10

sec. ♦ In the 54 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 93 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 148 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –4 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Solvent road tanker

TABLE – 4 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Solvent road tanker

Scenario : UVCE

In put Data Stored quantity 20 KL Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL % 405 lbm. TNT equivalent 7.8 Explosion efficiency 0.04 Wind speed 6.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in feet

Over pressure

( psi )

% Fatality lung Rupture

% Eardrum rupture

%Structural damage

% Glass rupture

20 47.7 100 100 100 100 25 28.0 98.8 100 100 100 40 9.1 0.0 78.7 100 100 105 2.3 0.0 2.6 10.9 100 2005 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3

Results

♦ In case of UVCE up to 20 feet distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum

rupture radius. ♦ Up to 40 feet distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 105 feet distance

for 100 % glass damage area.



Scenario –5 Unconfined Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE – 5 Unconfined Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure


In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 14 MT Max. IHR at flame centre

height 108.40 Kw/m2

Pool diameter 45 (m) Flame centre height 39.13 meter Pool liquid depth 0.3 (m) Maximum Flame width 38.83 meter Wind speed 6 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 6.96 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 37.97 Mims.


level KW /m 2







Results ♦ In the 34.8 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. ♦ In the 60.2 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 106.3 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 168.1 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –6 Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE – 6 Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide Road Tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : FIRE BALL

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 14 MT Fire Ball radius 26.58 meter Mass of vapour Between LEL-UEL%


314.43 Kw /m 2


2.79317e+006 Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 5 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release 3.03159e+007 Kj Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 10.85 sec.

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 78 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact) 25.0 96 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant

injury. 12.5 136 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn . 4.0 238 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 368 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results ♦ In the 78 meter radius area is considered as 1% fatality in 1 min. ♦ In the 136 meter radius area is considered as first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 238 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 368 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –7 Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE – 7 Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure


In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 14 MT Visible Flash Fire Height 64.07 meter Mass of Gas 1135 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 32.04 meter Heat of combustion 42267.5 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 10.85 Sec. Fuel-Air volume ratio in Flash fire cloud



0.128 Total energy release 1396584.22 Kj


157.22 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 869 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.5


level KW /m 2


Damage effects





Results ♦ In the 58 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min ♦ In the 96 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 164 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 264 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –8 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE – 8 Unconfined Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide road tanker

catastrophic failure

Scenario : UVCE In put Data

Stored quantity 14 MT Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL % 2504 lbm. TNT equivalent 0.16 Explosion efficiency 0.1 Wind speed 6.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in meter

Over pressure

( psi )


% Eardrum rupture

%Structural damage

% Glass rupture

50 38.00 100 100 100 100 51 32.6 98.8 100 100 100 53 11.2 0.0 78.7 100 100 73 1.9 0.0 2.6 10.9 100

Results

♦ In case of UVCE up to 50 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum

rupture radius. ♦ Up to 53 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 73meter feet

distance for 100 % glass damage area.



Scenario –9 Puff release simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE – 9 Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : PUFF RELEASE

Input Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 14 MT End point

(meter) Release Rate 1.4e + 007 gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 4443 ppm 397.34 IDLH value 800 ppm 663.95 TLV value 1 ppm 4186.56

Results • LC50 Human (4443 ppm) area up to 397.34 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and

health-800 ppm) concentration area up to 663.95 meter and TLV (1 PPM ) area up to 4186.56

meter. Therefore 663.95 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation zone.


Scenario – 10 Spill Pool simulation for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

TABLE – 10 Spill Pool simulation module for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

Scenario : SPILL POOL

Input Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 14 MT End point

(meter) Release Rate 8041 Gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 4443 ppm 79.78 IDLH value 800 ppm 201.16 TLV value 1 ppm 2841.01

Results • LC50 HUMAN (4443 ppm) area up to 79.78 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and

health-800 ppm) concentration area up to 201.16 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 2841.01

meter. Therefore 201.16 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area.



Scenario –11 Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE – 11 Pool Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure


In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 15 MT Max. IHR at flame centre height 46.55 Kw/m2 Pool diameter 10 (m) Flame centre height 14.43 meter Pool liquid depth 1 (m) Maximum Flame width 13.43 meter Wind speed 6 m/s Mass burning rate liquid 6.86 kg/ m2/min. Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Flame burnout time 2.10 Mims.


level KW /m 2







Results ♦ In the 8.6 meter radius area is considered as 100% fatality in 1 min. ♦ In the 14.9 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 26.4 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 41.7 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –12 Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE – 12 Ball Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure

Scenario : FIRE BALL

Input Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 15 MT Fire Ball radius 16.06 meter Mass of vapour Between LEL-UEL%


305.35 Kw /m 2


989915 Kj/ sec.

Wind speed 6 m/s Fire- Ball total energy release 6.49053e+006 Kj Liquid Density 869 kg/m3 Fire ball duration 6.55 sec.

Incident Intensity of Heat Radiation ( IHR) at ground

level KW /m 2


Damage effects

37.5 49.0 100 % Fatal . Min. to ignite wood (without flame contact) 25.0 54.0 Min. to ignite wood ( without flame contact ). Significant

injury. 12.5 84.0 Min. to ignite wood (with flame contact). 1 st deg. burn . 4.0 144.0 Pain after 20 secs. Blistering unlikely. 1.6 217.0 No discomfort even on long exposure.

Results ♦ In the 49 meter radius area is considered as 1% fatality in 1 min. ♦ In the 54 meter radius area is considered as first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 144 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 217 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –13 Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE – 13 Flash Fire simulation for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure


In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 15 MT Visible Flash Fire Height 40.53 meter Mass of Gas 243 Kgs. Visible Flash Fire Width 20.26 meter Heat of combustion 42267.5 Kj/kg Duration of Flash-Fire in Sec. 6.56 Sec. Fuel-Air volume ratio in Flash fire cloud



0.128 Total energy release 3245265 Kj


152.68 Kw/ m2

Gas Density 869 kg/m3 Combustion efficiency 0.5


level KW /m 2


Damage effects





Results ♦ In the 32 meter radius area is considered as 100 % fatality in 1 min ♦ In the 40 meter radius first degree burn in 10 sec. ♦ In the 100 meter radius area will give pain after 20 seconds. Blistering unlikely. ♦ In the 157 meter radius area is considered as safe area and no discomfort even on long

exposure.



Scenario –14 Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE – 14 Vapour cloud Explosion ( UVCE ) for Ethylene Oxide 15MT Bullet catastrophic failure

Scenario : UVCE

In put Data Stored quantity 15 MT Mass of vapour between LEL – UEL % 535 lbm. TNT equivalent 0.16 Explosion efficiency 0.1 Wind speed 6.0 m/s

Radial

Distance in Meter

Over pressure

( psi )


% Eardrum rupture

%Structural damage

% Glass rupture

13 49.9 100 100 100 100 14 37.7 98.8 100 100 100 27 8.2 0.0 78.7 100 100 32 1.8 0.0 2.6 10.9 100

Results

♦ In case of UVCE up to 13 meter distance is considered as 100 % fatality and 100 % ear drum

rupture radius. ♦ Up to 27 meter distance is considered as 100 % structural Damage and up to 32 meter distance

for 100 % glass damage area.



Scenario – 15 Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE –15 Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure


In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 15 MT End point

(meter) Release Rate 1.5e + 007 Gms/ Sec.

LC50 Human 4443 ppm 405.79 IDLH value 800 ppm 677.54 TLV value 1 ppm 4262.31


health) concentration area up to 677.54 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 4262.31 meter.

Therefore 677.54 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area.



Scenario – 16 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE – 16 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure

Scenario : SPILL POOL In put Data Results of Computations

Stored quantity 15 MT End point (meter) Release Rate 1800 Gms/ Sec.

LC50 Human 4443 ppm 41.24 IDLH value 800 ppm 89.79 TLV value 1 ppm 1681.42






Scenario – 17 Spill Pool evaporation module for Oleum 250 MT Tank catastrophic failure

TABLE – 17 Spill Pool evaporation module for Oleum 250 MT Tank catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 2405 Gms/ Sec.( As SO3) LC50 Human 460 ppm ( 1460 mg.m3) 96.26 IDLH value 3.0 ppm ( 15 mg/m3) 872.05 TLV value 0.30 ppm (1 mg/m3) 1967.21

Results • LC50 HUMAN (460 ppm) area up to 96.26 meter, Immediate danger to life and health (3 ppm

) concentration area up to 872.05 meter and TWA (0.30 PPM ) area up to 1967.21 meter.




Scenario – 18 Spill Pool evaporation module for Chloro Sulphonic Acid Tank catastrophic failure

TABLE – 18 Spill Pool evaporation module for Chloro Sulphonic Acid Tank catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 1000 Gms/ Sec. ( As HCL gas)

LC50 Human for 30 mints

3940 ppm 29.73

IDLH value 50 ppm 292.07 TLV value 1 ppm 1238.93






Scenario – 19 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulphuric Acid Storage Tank catastrophic failure

TABLE – 19 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulphuric Acid Storage Tank catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 1000 Gms/ Sec. ( As SO3) LC50 Human 460 ppm (1460 mg/m3) 59.85 IDLH value 3.0ppm (15mg/m3) 587.63 TLV value 0.2 ppm (1mg/m3) 1349.6

Results • LC50 HUMAN (460 ppm) area up to 59 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health)

concentration area up to 587.63 meter and TWA (0.2 PPM ) area up to 1349.6 meter.




Scenario – 20 Puff release simulation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure

TABLE –20 Puff release simulation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 1e + 008 Gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 460 ppm (1460 mg/m3) 1192.32 IDLH value 3.0 ppm (15mg/m3) 4121.82 TLV value 0.2 ppm (1mg/m3) 7486.05


health) concentration area up to 4121 meter and TWA (0.30 PPM ) area up to 7486.05 meter.

Therefore 7486 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area.



Scenario – 21 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure

TABLE – 21 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 999 Gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 460 ppm (1460 mg/m3) 66.22 IDLH value 3.0 ppm (15mg/m3) 970.84 TLV value 0.2 ppm (1mg/m3) 3958.42

Results • LC50 HUMAN (460 ppm) area up to 66.22 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health)

concentration area up to 970 meter and TWA (0.20 PPM ) area up to 3958 meter. Therefore

970 meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area.



Scenario – 22 Puff release simulation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE –22 Puff release simulation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 5e + 007 Gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 6164 ppm 649.68 IDLH value 300 ppm 1509.17 TLV value 25 ppm 2951.09






Scenario – 23 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure

TABLE – 23 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure



(meter) Release Rate 1442 Gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 4443ppm 102.31 IDLH value 300 ppm 553.38 TLV value 25 ppm 2709.05






Scenario – 24 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia Road Tanker Unloading Arm failure

TABLE – 24 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia Road Tanker Unloading Arm failure



(meter) Release Rate 856 Gms/ Sec. LC50 Human 4443ppm 38.39 IDLH value 300 ppm 58.27 TLV value 25 ppm 399.82






Scenario-25 Puff Isopleth Simulation For Chlorine Tonner Catastrophic Failure

TABLE –O FOR CHLORINE Scenario : PUFF DISPERSION

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 1 MT Tonner Max. ground level conc. 456393 ppm Instantaneous Puff Release quantity

900 kgs Dist. of maxi. ground level conc.

17 meter

Molecular weight 70.9 Wind speed 3.0 m/s Density ( Air) 2.49kg/m3

Hazard Level Concentration

(PPM) End point (Meter)

LC50 1017 210.30 IDLH 10 856.39

TWA/ TLV 1 1619.16 • LC50 HUMAN (1017 ppm) area up to 210 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health)

concentration area up to 856 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 1619 meter. Therefore 856

meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area.



Scenario-26 Point source plume release for Chlorine tonner liquid/ gas phase valve failure

TABLE –P FOR CHLORINE Scenario : POINT SOURCE PLUME RELEASE

In put Data Results of Computations Stored quantity 1 MT Max. ground level conc. 501046ppm Rate of release 1000 g/s Dist. of maxi. ground level

conc. 5 meter

Molecular weight 70.9 Wind speed 6.0 m/s Density ( Air) 2.49kg/m3

Hazard Level Concentration

(PPM) End point (Meter)

LC50 HUMAN 1017 51.91 IDLH 10 445.25

TWA/ TLV 1 1035.91 • LC50 HUMAN (1017 ppm) area up to 51 meter, IDLH (Immediate danger to life and health)

concentration area up to 445 meter and TWA (1 PPM ) area up to 1038 meter. Therefore 445

meter area in wind direction is considered as evacuation area.



6.2 Assessment Of Consequence Modeling Results : Results of consequence analysis for the release of various flammable and toxic materials at the KCIL are depicted in Table 6.3.


TABLE - 6.3 Details regarding Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment table :-

Scenario Type of failure

considered Spill quantity consideration Max. Credible loss scenario in KL.

Evaporation vapor cloud mass Btn. LEL-UEL % for 15 mints release from the source.

Tank fire / pool fire damage radius at various KW/ M2 in meter

Fire Ball damage radius at various KW/ M2 in meter

Flash fire simulation radius at various KW/ M2 in meter

Vapor cloud Explosion ( Unconfined vapor cloud explosion) UVCE peak over pressure in feet.

Heat Intensity KW/ M2 37.5 12.5 1.6 37.5 12.5 1.6 37.5 12.5 1.6 100%

Fatality 100%

Eardrum rupture

100% Structur

al Damage

100% Glass brk.

1,2,3,4 Unconfined Pool Fire, Fire Ball, Flash fire & Unconfined Vapour Fire for Solvent road tanker catastrophic failure

20 184 13.5 22.1 61.6 30 54 148 30 54 148 20 25 40 105

5,6,7,8 Unconfined Pool Fire, Fire Ball, Flash fire & Unconfined Vapour Fire for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

14 1135 34.8 60.2 168.1 78 136 368 58 96 264 15 16 25 85

11,12,13,14

Unconfined Pool Fire, Fire Ball, Flash fire & Unconfined Vapour Fire for Ethylene Oxide 15 MT Bullet catastrophic failure

15 243 8.6 14.9 41.7 49 84 217 32 56 157 8 9 17 55


TABLE - 6.4

Type of failure considered Spill quantity consideration Max. Credible loss scenario in MT.

Evaporation Rate Grm/ Sec.

LC50 Distance in meter

IDLH Distance in meter

TLV Distance in meter

Scenario –9 Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

14 - 397.34 663.95 4186.56

Scenario – 10 Spill Pool simulation module for Ethylene Oxide road tanker catastrophic failure

14 8041 79.78 201.16 2841.01

Scenario – 15 Puff release simulation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure

15 - 405.79 677.54 4262.31

Scenario – 16 Spill Pool simulation module for Ethylene Oxide Bullet catastrophic failure

15 1800 41.24 89.79 1681.42

Scenario – 17 Spill Pool evaporation module for Oleum 250 MT Tank catastrophic failure

250 2405 79.18 267.76 1489.53

Scenario – 18 Spill Pool evaporation module for Chloro Sulphonic Acid Tank catastrophic failure

2000 1000 29.73 292.07 1238.93

Scenario – 19 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulphuric Acid Storage Tank catastrophic failure

1000 1000 71.03 230.91 1349.46

Scenario – 20 Puff release simulation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure

100 - 1192.32 2234.82 7486.05

Scenario – 21 Spill Pool evaporation module for Sulfur Trioxide 100 MT Tank catastrophic failure

100 999 178.26 748.04 15709.48

Scenario – 22 Puff release simulation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure

50 - 649.68 1509.17 2951.09

Scenario – 23 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia 50 MT Bullet catastrophic failure

50 1442 102.31 553.38 2709.05

Scenario – 24 Spill Pool evaporation module for Ammonia Road Tanker Unloading Arm failure

50 856 38.39 58.27 399.82

Scenario-25 Puff Isopleth Simulation For Chlorine Tonner Catastrophic Failure

1 - 210 856 1619

Scenario-26 Point source plume release for Chlorine tonner liquid/ gas phase valve failure

1 1000 51 445 1035


6.3 Comments

The appended table 6.3 and 6.4 summarizes the consequences of the various hazards analyzed under this study. As can be seen from the results of the summary of the Risk Analysis study, the Fatality zone due to burn up to 78 meters in worst case scenario. First degree burn zone up to 136 meter. Due to explosion fatal distance is maximum 20 feet, structural damage zone is up to 40 feet for fire and explosion scenarios. In case of toxic gas release Fatal distance upto 1192 meters and evacuation zone maximum up to 2234 meter and company has to plan for evacuation accordingly. Company has to increase awareness programme in the surrounding vicinity and educate people for safe evacuation at the time of toxic release. On site emergency preparedness plan On site emergency preparedness plan is prepared but risk assessment study data needs to be studied and further prepared as per risk assessment findings. Emergency control facilities and resources to be plan and rehearsal / Mock- Drill needs to be conducted regularly to combat emergency in minimum time. Emergency handling facilities and training: All employees should be well aware about possible emergencies and its consequences, emergency control equipments and practices to control such hazardous condition within premises.


SECTION VII

RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

Some of the safeties and risk reduction measures adopted and recommended for the safety of the plant are as follows:- 7.1 Design 7.1.1 During the design stage itself adequate care has been taken for design, selection,

fabrication, erection and commissioning of Flammable and toxic liquid / gas handling facilities and other equipment, piping, pipe fittings, electrical equipment etc. relevant and prevalent international and Indian standards has been followed for design, fabrication, inspection of the storage tanks and other equipment.

7.1.2 Civil foundations is suitably designed to take care of earthquakes, cyclones, landslides, flooding, collapse of structures etc.

7.1.3 Plant operator and staffs are selected well experience and qualified for chemical plant operation.

7.1.4 All key personals are trained for emergency handling procedures and regular Mock- Drills has been conducted on various scenarios.

7.2 Safety Devices

Following safety devices are provided to protect from any malfunctioning of plant equipments:

7.2.1 Storage tanks.

a) Nitrogen blanketing for flammable liquid/ gas storage tanks. b) Pressure ( Maximum and Minimum ) cutoff and gauge provided. c) DCS operational process plan with 100 % foolproof safety logics are provided for

process as well as storage safety. d) Level gauges on storage tanks. e) Static bonding of pipeline flanges. f) Dyke wall provided surround above ground storage tanks. g) Safety valve and other venting system provided on pressure storage vessels. h) All pumps flameproof type and double mechanical seal type. i) All pipeline and tanks painted as per IS colour code. j) Jumpers and static earthing provision made on all flanges and tanks. k) Caution note and Material identification, capacity displayed on all storage tanks. l) Water sprinklers surrounding Ammonia storage tank and EO storage tank. m) Matur curtain sprinkler will be provided for Acid storage tanks leakage spillage. n) Mosture absorbent (Silica gel provision will be made on sulfuric, Oleum , SO3 storage

tanks. 7.2.2 Pumps

a) Required out let valve and NRV provided on pump outlet. b) Modular fire extinguishers provided near of most of the pumps.


c) FLP type and mechanical seal type pump installed for flammable chemicals. 7.2.3 Pipelines

a) Jumper connections on flanges to prevent build up of static electricity charge. b) Proper supports and clamping are provided c) Double earthing provided to all electrical motors. d) Colour code as Per IS maintained.

7.3 Operation and Maintenance

Operations and maintenance of the plant is being in accordance with the well-established safe practices. Some of the guidelines are as follows:-

a) Periodic testing of hoses for leakages and continuity. b) Earthing of all plant equipment and earthing of vehicles under unloading operations. c) Annual testing of all safety relief valves. d) Planned preventive maintenance of different equipment for their safety and reliable

operations. e) Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness

measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc. f) Comprehensive color code scheme to identify different medium pipes. g) Strict compliance of safety work permit system. h) Proper maintenance of earth pits. i) Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identify badges for outsides, gate

pass system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries etc. j) Strict enforcement of no smoking regime. k) Periodic training and refresher courses to train the staff in safety, fire fighting and first

aid. 7.4 Recommendations 7.4.1 From the Risk Analysis studies conducted, it would be observed that by and large, the risks

are confined within the factory boundary walls in case of fire & explosion, except in the event of a catastrophic failure of storage tanks of gas it will create OFF site emergency situations and required more attention and emergency preparedness for combat such situations.. To minimize the consequential effects of the risk scenarios, following steps are recommended.

Plant should meet provisions of the Manufacture, storage & Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1986 & the factories Act, 1948. Sprinkler system to be installed in Ammonia storage area and EO storage area to be

made more effective and pressure needs to be maintained. Sprinkler opening valve location needs to be relocate away from the EO storage tanks. Air line respirator provision to be made in Chlorine, EO, Oleum, Sulfur trioxide, DMS

and CSA, Thionyl chloride storage tank farm area. Chlorine hood with blower and neutralizing pit arrangement needs to be made at

Chlorine tonners storage area. React with water and generate toxic fumes while contact with water caution note to be

displayed in Acid tank farm area.


Fire hydrant system for proposed plant to be installed as per TAC/NFPA Norms in each plant and buildings.

Dyke wall and collection pit with drain valve needs to be provided in acid storage area Tanker unloading procedure needs to be displayed at tanker unloading area. Periodic On Site Emergency Mock Drills and occasional Off Site Emergency Mock

Drills to be conducted, so those staffs are trained and are in a state of preparedness to tackle any emergency.

Emergency handling facilities to be maintained in tip top condition at all time. Safe operating procedure to be prepared for hazardous process and material handling

process. Safety devices and control instruments to be calibrated once in a year. Proper colour work as per IS 2379 to plant pipeline and tank, equipments to be done

once in a six month to protect from corrosion. Permit to work system to be implemented 100 % for hazardous work in the plant. Safety manual as per Rule-68 K & P and Public awareness manual as per 41 B & C be

prepared and distributed to all employees and nearby public. As per puff release Scenario for Catastrophic Failure of storage tanks, it has been

observed that IDLH distance cover surrounding 2234 meters distance. Hence, population evacuation plan up to 3.0 kms. needs to be prepared for near by factories in wind direction in case of extreme accident scenario.

The details of emergency equipments are given in on site emergency Plan along with its quantity. As per our site visit, these was found in order & working condition and sufficient for existing production Activates.

Manual call points for fire location identification to be installed in plant premises. Fog type Pressure sprinkler to be installed at EO storage tank farm. For proposed plant Fire & Safety organization setup to be replanted for batter plant

process safety. On line gas detection system needs to be provided in Chlorine shed area and EO

storage tank farm area. All Acid vents to be connected with scrubber system. A HAZOP study to be carried out for all product plant and storage facilities. Induction safety course to be prepared and trained all new employees before starting

duties in plant.


SECTION VIII

DESASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

An onsite emergency in the industries involving hazardous processes or in hazardous installations is one situation that has potential to cause serious injury or loss of life. It may cause extensive damage to property and serious disruption in the work area and usually, the effects are confined to factory or in several departments of factory, premise. An emergency begins when operator at the plant or in charge of storage cannot cope up with a potentially hazardous incident, which may tum into an emergency. 8.1 ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN 8.1.1 OBJECTIVES OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

A quick and effective response at during an emergency can have tremendous significance on whether the situation is controlled with little loss or it turns into a major emergency. Therefore, purpose an emergency plan is to provide basic guidance to the personnel for effectively combating such situations to minimize loss of life, damage to property and loss of property. An objective of Emergency Planning is to maximize the resource utilisation and combined efforts towards emergency operations are as follows. :

8.1.2 DURING AN EMERGENCY.

To increase thinking accuracy and to reduce thinking time. To localize the emergency and if possible eliminates it. To minimize the effects of accident on people and property. To take correct remedial measures in the quickest time possible to contain the incident

and control it with minimum damage. To prevent spreading of the damage in the other sections. To mobilize the internal resources and utilize them in the most effective way To arrange rescue and treatment of causalities.

8.1.3 DURING NORMAL TIME.

• To keep the required emergency equipment in stock at right places and ensure the

working condition. • To keep the concerned personnel fully trained in the use of emergency equipment. • To give immediate warning tooth surrounding localities in case of an emergency

situation arising. • To mobilize transport and medical treatment of the injured. • To get help from the local community and government officials to supplement

manpower and resources. • To provide information to media & Government agencies, Preserving records, evidence

of situation for subsequent emergency etc.


8.2 SCOPE OF OSEP

This OSEP is prepared for industrial emergencies like fires, explosions, toxic releases, and asphyxia and does not cover natural calamities and societal disturbances related emergencies (like strikes, bomb threats, civil commission’s etc.)

8.3 ELEMENTS OF ONSITE EMERGENCY PLAN

The important elements to be considered in plan are

Emergency organization Emergency Facilities. Roles and Responsibilities of Key Personnel and Essential Employee. Communications during Emergency Emergency Shutdown of Plant & Control of situation. Rescue Transport & Rehabilitation. Developing Important Information.

8.4 METHODOLOGY.

The consideration in preparing Emergency Plan will be included the following steps:

• Identification and assessment of hazards and risks. • Identifying, appointment of personnel & Assignment of Responsibilities. • Identification and equipping Emergency Control Centre. • Identifying Assembly, Rescue points Medical Facilities. • Formulation of plan and of emergency sources. • Training, Rehearsal & Evaluation. • Action on Site.

Earlier, a detailed Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment was carried out on hazards and their likely locations and consequences are estimated following the standard procedure. However the causing factors for above discussed end results may be different and causing factors are not discussed in this plan.

8.5 EMERGENCIES IDENTIFIED

Emergencies that may be likely at bulk fuel storage area, process plant, cylinder storage area, and drum storage shed, and autoclave reactor area. There are chances of fire and explosive only.

8.6 OTHERS

Other risks are earthquake, lightning, sabotage, bombing etc., which are usually, not in the purview of management control.


8.7 EMERGENCY ORGANISATION.

Plant organization is enclosed. Based on the plant organization, which includes shift organization, an Emergency Organization is constituted towards achieving objectives of this emergency plan. Plant Manager is designated as Overall in Charge and is the Site Controller. The following are designated as Incident Controllers for respective areas under their control. Shift in charge Engineer (Plant Operations) is designated at Incident Controller for all areas of plant.

8.8 EMERGENCY FACILITIES 8.8.1 EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE (ECC)

It is a location, where all key personnel like Site Controller, Incident Controller etc. can assemble in the event of onset of emergency and carry on various duties assigned to them. Plant Manager’s Office is designated as Emergency Control Centre. It has P&T telephone as well as internal telephones, ECC is accessible from plant located considerably away from process plant, Storage’s and on evaluation of other locations, Plant Manager’s Room find merit from the distance point of view, communication etc.

8.8.2 FACILITIES PROPOSED TO BE MAINTAINED AT EMERGENCY CONTROL

CENTRE (ECC)

The following facilities and information would be made available at the ECC

• Latest copy of Onsite Emergency Plan and off sites Emergency Plan (as provided by District Emergency Authority).

• Intercom Telephone. • P&T Telephone. • Telephone directories (Internal, P&T) • Factory Layout, Site Plan • Plans indicating locations of hazardous inventories, sources of safety equipment,

hydrant layout, location of pump house, road plan, assembly points, vulnerable zones, escape routes.

• Hazard chart. • Emergency shut-down procedures. • Nominal roll of employees. • List and address of key personnel • List and address of Emergency coordinators. • List and address of first aides, • List and address of first aid fire fighting employees, • List and address of qualified Trained persons.


8.8.3 FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES.

• Internal hydrant system • Portable extinguishers

8.8.4 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

These systems are proposed to protect the plant by means of different fire protection facilities and consist of • Hydrant system for exterior as well as internal protection of various buildings/areas of

the plant. • Portable extinguishers and hand appliances for extinguishing small fires in different

areas of the plant. • Water cum foam monitor to be provided in bulk fuel storage area. • Fire water pumps. • Two (2) independent motor driven pumps each of sufficient capacity and head are

proposed for the hydrant systems which is capable to extinguish Fire or cooling purpose.

8.8.5 HYDRANT SYSTEM.

Adequate number of fire hydrants and monitors will be provided at various locations in and around the buildings and other plant areas. The hydrants will be provided on a network of hydrant mains drawing water from the hydrant pump, which starts automatically due to drop of pressure in the event of operating the hydrant valves. We are suggesting you to go for TAC approved hydrant system for foolproof safety and benefit from fire policy premium.

8.9 EMERGENCY ESCAPES

The objective of the emergency escape is to escape from the hazardous locations, to the nearest assembly point or the other safe zone, for rescue and evacuation.

8.10 ASSEMBLY POINT.

Assembly point is location, where, persons unconnected with emergency operations would proceed and await for rescue operation.

8.11 WIND SOCK.

Wind socks for knowing wind direction indication would be provided at a suitable location to visible from many locations. It is proposed to install windsocks at E.O storage area and Administration Building so as to be visible from different locations in the plant.

8.12 EMERGENCY TRANSPORT.

Emergency Ambulance would be stationed at the Administration Office and round the clock-driver would be made available for emergency transportation of injured etc.


However, the other vehicles of the company also would be available for emergency services.

8.13 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION.

There are two kinds of communication system provided.

(a) Regular P&T phones with intercom facility. (b) Mobile phone

8.14 WARNING/ALARM/COMMUNICATION OF EMERGENCY

The emergency would be communicated by operating electrical siren for continuously for five minutes with high and low pitch mode.

8.15 EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES:

Priority of Emergency Protection.

• Life safety • Preservation of property

Restoration of the normalcy 8.16 MUTUAL AID

While necessary facilities are available and are updated from time to time, sometimes, it may be necessary to seek external assistance; it may be from the neighboring factories or from the State Government as the case may be.

8.17 MOCK DRILL

Inspite of detailed training, it may be necessary to try out whether, the OSEP works out and will there be any difficulties in execution of such plan. In order to evaluate the plan and see whether the plan meets the objectives of the OSEP, occasional mock drills are contemplated. Before undertaking the drill, it would be very much necessary to give adequate training to all staff members and also information about possible mock drill. After few pre-informed mock drills, few UN-informed mock drills would be taken. All this is to familiarize the employees with the concept and procedures and to see their response. These scheduled and unscheduled mock drills would be conducted during shift change, public holidays, in night shift etc. To improve preparedness once in 6 months and performance is evaluated and Site Controller maintains the record. Incident Controller (IC) coordinates this activity.

M/s. Kutch Chemical Industries Limited.gpcb.gov.in/images/pdf/KCIL_RISK_ASSESSMENT.pdfReliance Petrol Pump, High Tension Road, Subhanpura, Vadodara-390 023 Phone: 9825756467/9427838021

Documents